1. BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES, GR No.

127685, 1998-07-23

Facts:
Petitioner Ople prays filed a petition to invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important
constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to... legislate, and
two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the
petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against
further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996 and was published
in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On
January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the
Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On
April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
Petitioner contends that 1) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O.
NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Issue:
1. Whether or not A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and
hence, beyond the power of the President to issue.

2. Whether or not A.O. 308 is unconstitutional.

Held:

1. Yes. A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond
the power of the President to issue. The President executes the laws and is granted
administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to
discharge his duties effectively.

A.O. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative

order. An administrative order is: "Sec. 3. Administrative Orders.-- Acts of the President
which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties
as ad`ministrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.” It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and
carrying out the legislative policy.

2. Yes. A.O. 308 is unconstitutional. A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification
that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and
foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy. The right to
privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society.

In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by
issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving
information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic
services.
 Thus, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for
being unconstitutional.

2. REPUBLIC v. DRUGMAKER’S LABORATORIES, GR No. 190837, 2014-03-05

Facts:
The FDA was created pursuant to RA 3720 otherwise known as the "Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act," primarily in order "to establish safety or efficacy standards and quality measures for
foods, drugs and devices, and cosmetic product[s]."... the DOH issued AO 67, s. 1989, entitled
"Revised Rules and Regulations on Registration of Pharmaceutical Products" In which a
satisfactory bioavailability/bioequivalence (BA/BE) test is needed for a manufacturer to secure
a CPR for these products.
Respondents manufacture and trade a "multisource pharmaceutical product" with the generic
name of rifampicin branded as “Refam” applied for and were issued a CPR for such drug, valid
for five (5) years. At the time of the CPR's issuance, Refam did not undergo BA/BE testing since
there was still no facility capable of conducting BA/BE testing.
The issuance of Circular No. 1, s. 1997 resumed the FDA's implementation of the BA/BE testing
requirement with the establishment of BA/BE testing facilities in the country and thereafter,
issued Circular No. 8 for its additional implementation details.
Refam were found out to be "not bioequivalent with the reference drug." Thus, respondents
were ordered to submit satisfactory BA/BE test results for Refam. Instead of submitting the
requirement, respondents filed a petition for prohibition and annulment of Circular Nos. 1 and
8, s. 1997 before the RTC, alleging that it is the DOH, and not the FDA, which was granted the
authority to issue and implement rules concerning RA 3720.

Issues:
Whether or not the FDA may validly issue and implement Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s.
1997.

Held:
Yes. FDA may validly issue and implement Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997.
Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making powers only if
there exists a law which delegates these powers to them. Their authority is to fix the
details in the execution or enforcement of the policy set out in the law itself.
In the case at bar, FDA has been deputized by the RA 3720 to accept applications for
registration of pharmaceuticals and, after due course, grant or reject such applications.
The said law expressly authorized the Secretary of Health, upon the recommendation of
the FDA Director, to issue rules and regulations that pertain to the registration of
pharmaceutical products.
 In accordance with his rule-making power under RA 3720, the Secretary of Health
issued AO 67, which required, among others, that certain pharmaceutical products
undergo BA/BE testing prior to the issuance of CPR. The only purpose of the Circular
Nos. 1 and 8, is for the FDA to administer and supervise the implementation of the
provisions of AO 67, s. 1989.
Thus, FDA has sufficient authority to issue the said circulars and are therefore valid.
The petition is GRANTED.

3. MIRASOL VS. DPWH

Facts: 
Petitioners filed for TRO for DPWH Administrative Order 1, S. 1968 (prohibiting bicycle,
tricycle, pedicab, motorcycle or any vehicle (not motorized) to drive in limited access facilities)
and DPWH Department Order 74, Series of 1993 (Declaration of the North Luzon Expressway
from Balintawak to Tabang and the South Luzon Expressway from Nichols to Alabang as
Limited Access Facilities). Whilst this is pending, DPWH acting thru TRB issued Department
Order 123 allowing motorcycles with engine displacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside
limited access facilities. Petitioners assail the DPWH’s failure to provide “scientific” and
“objective” data on the danger of having motorcycles plying our highways. They attack this
exercise of police power as baseless and unwarranted. Trial court dismissed the petition but
declared DO 123 invalid.

Issue:
Whether or not AO1 and DO 123 are unconstitutional on the ground of violating
equal protection law.

Held:

DO 74 / 215 / 123 declared void and AO 1 valid. 

The sole standard in measuring its exercise is reasonableness. What is “reasonable” is not
subject to exact definition or scientific formulation. No all-embracing test of reasonableness
exists for its determination rests upon human judgment applied to the facts and circumstances
of each particular case. We find that AO 1 does not impose unreasonable restrictions. It merely
outlines several precautionary measures, to which toll way users must adhere. These rules
were designed to ensure public safety and the uninhibited flow of traffic within limited access
facilities.
DPWH has no authority to regulate limited access highways since EO 546 has devolved this
function to the DOTC.

Thus, DO 123 is void for want of authority of the DPWH to promulgate it.

4. CIR VS. CA

Facts:

Fortune Tobacco Corp. is engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes. On

various dates, the Philippine Patent Office issued to the corporation separate certificates of
trademark registration over "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes. 'Champion,' 'Hope,'
and 'More' were classified as foreign brands since they were listed in the World Tobacco
Directory as belonging to foreign companies. However, Fortune Tobacco changed the names of
'Hope' to Hope Luxury' and 'More' to 'Premium More,' thereby removing the said brands from
the foreign brand category. Proof was also submitted to the Bureau (of Internal Revenue
['BIR']) that 'Champion' was an original Fortune Tobacco Corporation register and therefore a
local brand." Ad Valorem taxes were imposed on these brands
A bill, which later became R.A. No. 7654, was enacted for imposing tax to cigarettes. Two days
before its effectivity, Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 ("RMC 37-93"), was issued by
the BIR in which 'HOPE,' 'MORE' and 'CHAMPION' cigarettes which are locally manufactured
are appropriately considered as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject
to the 55% Ad Valorem tax.
Fortune Tobacco requested for a review, reconsideration and recall of RMC 37-93 but was
denied. Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the CTA. CTA held that `HOPE,' `MORE'
and `CHAMPION' were not CURRENTLY CLASSIFIED AND TAXED at 55% pursuant to Section
1142(c)(1) of the Tax Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7654 and were therefore still classified as
other locally manufactured cigarettes and taxed at 45% or 20% such that when R.A. No. 7654
took effect, brands in question were still not classified.
The CIR forthwith filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. CIR disputes the
decision of CA affirming the resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals.

Issue:
Whether or not RMC 37-93 is merely an interpretative ruling of the BIR which can thus
become effective without any prior need for notice and hearing, nor publication, and that
its issuance is not discriminatory.

Held:
No. RMC 37-93 is not merely an interpretative ruling of the BIR but rather a legislative
rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation. Thus, should not be effective without any
prior notice and hearing, nor publication.
A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary
legislation by providing the details thereof. In the same way that laws must have the benefit of
public hearing, it is generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there must be
hearing.  Such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to
provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.
Prior to the issuance of the questioned circular, "Hope Luxury," "Premium More," and
"Champion" cigarettes were in the category of locally manufactured cigarettes not bearing
foreign brand subject to 45% Ad Valorem tax. Hence, without RMC 37-93, the enactment of RA
7654, would have had no new tax rate consequence on private respondent's products.
In this case, the BIR not simply interpreted the law; verily, it legislated under its quasi-
legislative authority. The due observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of
publication should not have been then ignored. Additionally, the Constitution mandates
taxation to be uniform and equitable. Thus, all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same
class must be taxed at the same rate.
Thus, the decision of the Court of Appeals, sustaining that of the Court of Tax Appeals,
is AFFIRMED. 
 5. Tañada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29,
1986)

Facts:

Petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or
cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders,
invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official GazetteThe
Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending
that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
Issue:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable.
Held:
Yes. Publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes
valid and enforceable.

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is
to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publicat
ion, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat.
It would be the height of injustiCe to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression
of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a

requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that
presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and
effect.
 6. ASTEC vs. ERC, G.R. No. 192117 : September 18, 2012

FACTS:

On 8 December 1994, R.A. No. 7832 or the Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission
Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994 was enacted which imposed a cap on the
recoverable rate of system loss that may be charged by rural electric cooperatives to
their consumers. The IRR of R.A. No. 7832 required every rural electric cooperative to
file with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), on or before 30 September 1995, an
application for approval of an amended Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) Clause
incorporating the cap on the recoverable rate of system loss to be included in its
schedule of rates.

On 8 June 2001, R.A. No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001
(EPIRA) was also enacted. Section 38 of the EPIRA abolished the ERB, and created the
Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC). The ERC issued an Order which provides that
rural electric cooperatives should only recover from their members and patrons the
actual cost of power purchased from power suppliers. The ERC also ordered Petitioners
Batangas I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BATELEC I), et al. to refund their respective over-
recoveries to end-users. In addition, the ERC also adopted the new "grossed-up factor
mechanism" in the computation of the over-recoveries of the electric cooperatives to
be remitted to their consumers.

Thus, BATELEC I, et al. moved to reconsider the said orders but the ERC denied the
same. On appeal, the CA upheld the validity of the ERC Orders.

Hence, this petition. BATELEC I, et al. aver that these ERC Orders are invalid for
lack of publication, non-submission to the U.P. Law Center, and for their retroactive
application.

 ISSUE:
Whether or not the assailed orders are invalid for non-publication, non-
submission to the U.P.
HELD:
Partly Yes. The assailed orders are invalid for non-publication, non-submission
to the U.P. only insofar as the order of refund but the new "grossed-up factor
mechanism" in the computation of the over-recoveries of the electric
cooperatives to be remitted to their consumers, should be published for it is not
interpretative regulation of the ERC.
Procedural due process demands that administrative rules and regulations be published
in order to be effective. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation."
However, several exceptions to the requirement of publication. First, an interpretative
regulation does not require publication in order to be effective. The applicability of an
interpretative regulation "needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no
real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed." It "adds
nothing to the law" and "does not affect the substantial rights of any person." Second, a
regulation that is merely internal in nature does not require publication for its effectivity.
It seeks to regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
general public. Third, a letter of instruction issued by an administrative agency
concerning rules or guidelines to be followed by subordinates in the performance of
their duties does not require publication in order to be effective.

The policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power
suppliers are interpretative regulations. Publication is not necessary for the effectivity of
the policy guidelines. As interpretative regulations, the policy guidelines of the ERC on
the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are also not required to be
filed with the U.P. Law Center in order to be effective.

The policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power
suppliers are not retrospective. The policy guidelines did not take away or impair any
vested rights of the rural electric cooperatives. Furthermore, the policy guidelines of
the ERC did not create a new obligation and impose a new duty, nor did it attach a new
disability.

However, the grossed-up factor mechanism amends the IRR of R.A. No. 7832 as it
serves as an additional numerical standard that must be observed and applied by rural
electric cooperatives in the implementation of the PPA. In light of these, the grossed-up
factor mechanism does not merely interpret R.A. No. 7832 or its IRR. It is also not
merely internal in nature. The grossed-up factor mechanism amends the IRR
by providing an additional numerical standard that must be observed and applied in
the implementation of the PPA. The grossed-up factor mechanism is therefore an
administrative rule that should be published and submitted to the U.P. Law Center in
order to be effective.

As previously stated, it does not appear from the records that the grossed-up factor
mechanism was published and submitted to the U.P. Law Center. Thus, it is ineffective
and may not serve as a basis for the computation of over-recoveries. The portions of the
over-recoveries arising from the application of the mechanism are therefore invalid.
Furthermore, the application of the grossed-up factor mechanism to periods of PPA
implementation prior to its publication and disclosure renders the said mechanism
invalid for having been applied retroactively.

Thus, the petition is partly granted.

 7. SANTIAGO VS. BAUTISTA
judicial power and judicial function

Facts:
Teodoro Santiago was a Grade 6 pupil at Sero Elem. School. He was adjudged 3rd Honors. 3 days
before graduation, Teodoro and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of honor
students. They filed a CERTIORARI case against the principal and teachers who composed the
committee on rating honors.
They contend that the committee acted with grave abuse of official discretion because they
claim that  the 1st and 2nd placers had never been a close rival of Santiago before, except in
Grade 5 only.  That Santiago was a consistent honor student from Grade 1 to 5. That the
1st placer was coached and tutored by grade 6 teachers during the summer (gaining unfair
advantage). The committee was composed only of Grade 6 teachers. That some teachers
gave Santos a 75% with an intention to pull him to a much lower rank. That in the Honors
Certificate in Grade 1,  the word “first place” was erased and replaced with “second place”. That
the Principal and district supervisors merely passed the buck to each other to delay his
grievances.
The respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was improper, and that even assuming it
was proper, the question has become academic (because the graduation already proceeded). 
Respondents the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial
functions. (under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial functions)

ISSUE: 
Whether or not judicial function be exercised in this case.
HELD:
No. Judicial function cannot be exercised in this case.
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial
function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In order for an action
for certiorari to exist, (TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A TRIBUNAL OR BOARD EXERCISES
JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS) 1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons
brought before a tribunal for hearing and determination; 2) that the tribunal must have the
power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision and ; 3) the tribunal must
pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at least the not the
legislative nor the executive)
It maybe said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the
legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy. The phrase judicial power is
defined as authority to determine the rights of persons or property. An authority vested in
some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or property or
the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication. The power exercised by
courts in hearing and determining cases before them. The construction of laws and the
adjudication of legal rights.
The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial
bodies in the performance of its assigned task. The judiciary has no power to reverse the award
of the board of judges.
Thus, it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests, and similar competitions.
8. ANG TIBAY V. CHR

FACTS:

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the
Philippine Army. Due to an alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of
his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said
lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of
the rival labor union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a
company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right to a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence. The Court granted a new trial. Thus, the Solicitor General, arguing
for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Labor Union (respondent) is entitled to a new trial.

HELD:
Yes. The National Labor Union (respondent) is entitled to a new trial.

The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which
they attached to their petition with the Supreme Court, were evidence so inaccessible to them
at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to
have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect
that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang
Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing.
The Supreme Court also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly
bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply with the requirements of
due process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with such as; The right to
a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof; Not only must the party be given an opportunity to
present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented; Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion; The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; The
administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision; The administrative body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

Therefore, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire
record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that
it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove.

9. CASIMIRO VS. TANDOG

Facts:

Petitioner Casimiro as assessment clerk in the Office of the Treasurer of San Jose, Romblon was
appointed as Municipal Assessor. Based on an investigation conducted, it found out that
Casimero conducted irregularities having an anomalous cancellation of one Tax Declaration in
the name of T. Matillano and the issuance of a new one in the name of petitioner's brother
Ulysses Cawaling and 2 Tax Declaration in the name of Noraida and the issuance of new ones in
favor of petitioner's brother-in-law M. Molina.
After the investigation report, respondent Mayor Tandog issued Memorandum Order placing
the petitioner under preventive suspension for thirty (30) days. On its letter, petitioner denied
the allegation. Respondent Mayor directed petitioner to answer in writing the affidavit-
complaint of Noraida and T. Matillano alleged that the 2 Tax Declarations covering parcels of
land owned by her parents were transferred in the name of a certain M. Molina, petitioner's
brother-in-law, without the necessary documents. Noraida further claimed that M. Molina had
not yet paid the full purchase price of the said land. T. Matillano claimed that he never executed
a deed of absolute sale over the parcel of land in favor of Ulysses Cawaling, petitioner's brother.
On its answer, petitioner denied the allegation.
Not satisfied, respondent Mayor created a fact-finding committee to investigate the matter.
After a series of hearings, the committee submitted its report recommending petitioner's
separation from service finding petitioner guilty of Dishonesty and Malperformance of duty as
Municipal Assessor of San Jose, Romblon.
Petitioner appealed to the CSC, which affirmed respondent Mayor's order of dismissal. He filed
motion for reconsideration and later elevated the case to CA. CA affirmed CSC Resolution
affirming the Decision of Municipal Mayor Filipino Tandog of San Jose, Romblon, finding
petitioner Haydee Casimiro guilty of dishonesty and ordering her dismissal 3from the service.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was afforded procedural and substantive due process when
she was terminated from her employment as Municipal Assessor of San Jose, Romblon.
Held:
No. The petitioner was afforded procedural and substantive due process when she was
terminated from her employment as Municipal Assessor of San Jose, Romblon.

The essence of due process in the administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one
side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. "To be
heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also thru pleadings.
The due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy or given opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.
In the case at bar, petitioner was accorded every opportunity to present her side. She filed her
answer to the formal charge against her.
As to the substantive due process, it is obvious to us that what petitioner means is that the
assailed decision was not supported by competent and credible evidence.
The law requires that the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative
cases is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where the
employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct
and his participation therein renders him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded by his
position.
In the case at bar, there is substantial evidence to prove petitioner's dismissal. Two alleged
irregularities provided the dismissal from service of herein petitioner. The cancellation of
complainant’s tax declaration and the issuance of a new one in favor of another. Dishonesty is
considered as a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense.
Thus, petitioner is guilty of acts of dishonesty and should be dismissed from service. Her acts of
cancelling the tax declarations of the complainants in favor of her close relatives without
complying with the requirements set under the law constitute grave acts of dishonesty. The
petition is DENIED.

10.BRILLANTES VS. CASTRO

Facts:
The plaintiff Brillantes filed a complaint  against the   defendant Castro before  the  Wage 
Administration Service  for  the  recovery of  alleged unpaid salary  and overtime pay. The
parties entered into an arbitration agreement whereby  they  agreed  "1. That  they  submit 
their case to the WAS for investigation"; and "2. That they bind themselves to abide by
whatever decision this Office may render on the case and that they recognize said decision to
be final and conclusive"; that in accordance with the said agreement, the parties, assisted by
their respective counsel, adduced evidence before the WAS.
WAS rendered a decision in which the claim for overtime and underpayment is hereby
dismissed but the respondent is adjudged to pay to the claimant P50.88 corresponding to his
salary for services rendered in the month of November.
No appeal was taken from the said decision, and that on November 10, 1954, the plaintiff filed a
complaint against the defendant to the court over the same subject-matter and cause of action
litigated between them before, and decided by, the WAS.
The trial dismissed the complaint on the ground that the action is barred by prior judgment.

Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff can still file a case to court over the same subject-matter and
cause of action litigated between them before, and decided by, the WAS.

HELD:

No. The plaintiff cannot file a case to court over the same subject-matter and cause of
action litigated between them before, and decided by, the WAS.
The Hearing Officer of the Wage Administration Service was  pursuant to" the authority granted
to the Secretary of Labor to "delegate any or all  of his powers in the  administration  or
enforcement of the Minimum Wage Law to  the Chief of the WAS, who may act personally  or
through  duly authorized  representative"  Republic Act No.  602.
The jurisdiction  of the  Wage Administration Service to render  the aforesaid decision, as well 
as the remedy  of the aggrieved party against such a decision,  is impliedly recognized by the
Supreme  Court. In view of the failure of the  herein plaintiff to avail himself of the remedy
marked out by said Section 7 of  Republic  Act No.  602 within the  time  therein specified, the
aforesaid decision  of the Wage1 Administration Service became final  and  conclusive, not only
by clear  implication but also by express agreement  of the  parties "That they bind themselves
to  abide  by whatever decision  this Office (WAS)  may render  on the  case, and that they
recognize  said decision to be  final and conclusive".
The rule is often stated in general terms that a judgment  is conclusive  not only upon the 
questions  actually  contested  and determined, but  upon all  matters  which might have been
litgated and  decided  in  that suit;  and  this  is  undoubtedly true of  all matters properly
belonging  to  the subject of the controversy and within the scope of the  issues. Res
adjucata refer to decisions rendered by the courts but they are also applicable to decisions of a
quasi-judicial body like the Wage Administration Service (WAS).
Thus, the decision of the court in dismissing the complaint was affirmed for being barred by
prescription and barred from prior judgment.
 11. SEC. QUIRICO P. EVANGELISTA v. HILARION U. JARENCIO, GR No. L-29274, 1975-11-
27
Facts:
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code,
[1] the President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and
Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7,... 1966.[2]
Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following functions and responsibilities:[3]
To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions,
smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are
prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to submit... proper
recommendations to the President of the Philippines.
"e. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and
3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of
unlawfully amassed wealth . . .
"h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints
against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and to file and prosecute
the proper charges with the appropriate agency.
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers
of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code,
including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum,... administer
oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.[4]... petitioner Agency draws its
subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4 para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood,
empowered it to "summon witnesses, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the
investigation"
Issues:
whether the Agency, acting thru its officials enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its
conduct of fact-finding investigations.
Ruling:
There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon
sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in
anomalous transactions[23] fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and... that the
information sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando Manalastas, of which he is claimed
to be in possession,[24] is reasonably relevant to the investigations.
Principles:
administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether
or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown[16] and even
before the issuance of a complaint.[17] It... is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a
specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant
to one.  It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose
When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it,
too may... take steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of law.[21] In
sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is
(1) within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite;... and (3) the
information is reasonably relevant.[22]
 12. NESTLE PHILIPPINES v. UNIWIDE SALES, GR No. 174674, 2010-10-20

Facts:
respondents filed in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a petition for declaration of
suspension of payment, formation and appointment of rehabilitation receiver, and approval of
rehabilitation plan.
approved the petition
Interim Receivership Committee filed a rehabilitation plan in the SEC.
Interim Receivership Committee filed in the SEC an Amended Rehabilitation Plan (ARP). The
ARP took into account the planned entry of Casino Guichard Perrachon
SEC approved... the Interim Receivership Committee filed in the SEC a Second Amendment to
the Rehabilitation Plan (SARP) in view of Casino Guichard Perrachon's withdrawal.
approved
Petitioners, as unsecured creditors of respondents, appealed to the SEC... praying that the 23
December 2002 Order approving the SARP be set aside and a new one be issued directing the
Interim Receivership Committee, in consultation with all the unsecured creditors, to... improve
the terms and conditions of the SARP.
the SEC denied petitioners' appeal for lack of merit.
Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit
In reviewing administrative decisions, the findings of fact made therein must be respected as
long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or
preponderant;... that the administrative decision in matters within the executive jurisdiction
can only be set aside on proof of grave... abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.
a Revised Third Amendment to the Rehabilitation Plan (revised
TARP).
A majority of the secured creditors strongly opposed
Hearing Panel directed respondents to show cause why the rehabilitation case should not be
terminated considering that the rehabilitation plan had undergone several revisions.
denied
Respondents then filed in the SEC a petition for certiorari... the Hearing Panel disapproved the
revised TARP and terminated the rehabilitation case as a consequence.
respondents filed another petition appealing the Hearing Panel's 13 January 2010 Resolution.
Considering the pendency of SEC En Banc Case No. 12-09-183 and SEC En Banc Case No. 01-10-
193, recently filed in the SEC, involving the very same rehabilitation case subject of this
petition, the present petition has been rendered premature.
Issues:
whether the SARP should be revoked and the rehabilitation proceedings terminated.
whether the SARP should be revoked and the rehabilitation... proceedings terminated, would be
premature.
Ruling:
The Court thus defers to the competence and expertise of the SEC to determine whether, given
the supervening events in this case, the SARP  is no longer capable of... implementation and
whether the rehabilitation case should be terminated as a consequence.
Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine a
controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative
tribunal to... determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
In other words, if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized
training, and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before resort to the court is had even if the matter may well be
within... the latter's proper jurisdiction.
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining
whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency
has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding...
before the court.[
It is not for this Court to intrude, at this stage of the rehabilitation proceedings, into the primary
administrative jurisdiction of the SEC on a matter requiring its technical  expertise.
we are constrained to dismiss this petition for prematurity.
Principles:
Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine a
controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative
tribunal to... determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

13.
14. SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE v. ANANIAS D. SELUDO, GR No. 173840, 2012-04-
25
Facts:
As members of the Board of Directors (BOD) of the petitioner Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc.
(SAMELCO II), an electric cooperative providing electric service to all members-consumers in
all municipalities within the Second Congressional District of the Province... of Samar,
individual petitioners passed Resolution No. 5 [Series] of 2005 on January 22, 2005.
The said resolution disallowed the private respondent to attend succeeding meetings of the
BOD effective February 2005 until the end of his term as director. The same resolution also
disqualified him for one (1) term to run as a candidate for director in the upcoming district...
elections.
Convinced that his rights as a director of petitioner SAMELCO II had been curtailed by the
subject board resolution, private respondent filed an Urgent Petition for Prohibition against
petitioner SAMELCO II, impleading individual petitioners as directors thereof, in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Calbiga, Samar. The case was docketed as Special Civil Case No. C-2005-
1085 and was raffled to Branch 33 of the said court x x x.
In his petition, private respondent prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 5, [Series] of
2005, contending that it was issued without any legal and factual bases.
In their answer to the petition for prohibition, individual petitioners raised the affirmative
defense of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the case. Individual
petitioners assert that, since the matter involved an electric cooperative, SAMELCO II,... primary
jurisdiction is vested on the National Electrification Administration (NEA).
Issues:
IN ITS INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED LEGAL ERRORS IN LIMITING THE
DOCTRINE TO "CERTAIN MATTERS IN CONTROVERSIES INVOLVING SPECIALIZED DISPUTES"
AND IN UPHOLDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT
OVER THE URGENT PETITION FOR PROHIBITION FILED BY RESPONDENT SELUDO ON THE
GROUND THAT THE ISSUES RAISED THEREIN "DO NOT REQUIRE THE TECHNICAL EXPERTISE
OF THE NEA"
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN SUSTAINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL
COURT, COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW BY HOLDING THAT "A PERUSAL OF THE LAW
CREATING THE NEA DISCLOSES THAT THE NEA WAS NOT GRANTED THE POWER TO HEAR
AND DECIDE CASES INVOLVING THE VALIDITY OF BOARD
RESOLUTIONS UNSEATING ANY MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS" AND THAT
"NEITHER WAS IT GRANTED JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION
OR MANDAMUS."... who between the RTC and the NEA has primary jurisdiction over the
question of the validity of the Board Resolution issued by
SAMELCO II.
Ruling:
Section 10, Chapter II of P.D. No. 269, as amended by Section 5 of P.D. No. 1645, provides:
Section 5. Section 10, Chapter II of Presidential Decree No. 269 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 10. Enforcement Powers and Remedies. - In the exercise of its power of supervision and
control over electric cooperatives and other borrower, supervised or controlled entities, the
NEA is empowered to issue orders, rules and regulations and motu... proprio or upon petition of
third parties, to conduct investigations, referenda and other similar actions in all matters
affecting said electric cooperatives and other borrower, or supervised or controlled entities.
In addition, Subsection (a), Section 24, Chapter III of P.D. No. 269, as amended by Section 7 of
P.D. No. 1645, states:
Section 7. Subsection (a), Section 24, Chapter III of Presidential Decree No. 269 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Section 24. Board of Directors. - (a) The Management of a Cooperative shall be vested in its
Board, subject to the supervision and control of NEA which shall have the right to be
represented and to participate in all Board meetings and deliberations and to approve all...
policies and resolutions.
A comparison of the original provisions of Sections 10 and 24 of P.D. No. 269 and the
amendatory provisions under Sections 5 and 7 of P.D. No. 1645 would readily show that the
intention of the framers of the amendatory law is to broaden the powers of the NEA.
A clear proof of such expanded powers is that, unlike P.D. No. 269, P.D. No. 1645 expressly
provides for the authority of the NEA to exercise supervision and control over electric
cooperatives. In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of
an... officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.[5]  If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties.[6] Control, on the... other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
A careful reading of the above-quoted provisions of P.D. No. 1645 clearly show that, pursuant to
its power of supervision and control, the NEA is granted  the authority to conduct investigations
and other similar actions as well as to issue orders, rules and... regulations  with respect to all
matters affecting electric cooperatives. Certainly, the matter as to the validity of the resolution
issued by the Board of Directors of SAMELCO II, which practically removed respondent from his
position as a member of the Board of Directors... and further disqualified him to run as such in
the ensuing election, is a matter which affects the said electric cooperative and, thus, comes
within the ambit of the powers of the NEA as expressed in Sections 5 and 7 of P.D. No. 1645.
It may not be amiss to reiterate the prevailing rule that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,...
has been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency.[9]  In such a case,
the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its... view or, if the parties would not be
unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.
Corollary to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.  The Court, in a long line of cases,[11] has held that before a party is allowed to seek
the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition... that he avail himself of all administrative
processes afforded him.  Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy... must be exhausted first before the court's
power of judicial review can be sought.[12] The premature resort to the court is fatal to one's
cause of action.[13] Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may... be
dismissed for lack of cause of action.
True, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are
subject to certain exceptions, to wit: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party
invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal,...
amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that
will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so
small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved... is
purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial
intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue...
of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l)
in quo warranto proceedings.

15.

16. UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. v. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, GR No.

191427, 2011-05-30
Facts:
Petitioner Universal Robina Corp. is engaged in, among other things, the manufacture of animal
feeds at its plant in Bagong Ilog, Pasig City. Respondent Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA) after conducting a laboratory analysis of petitioner's corn oil refinery plant's wastewater,
found that it failed to comply with government standards provided under DENR Administrative
Orders (DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990.
LLDA later issued an Ex-Parte Order requiring petitioner to explain why no order should be
issued for the cessation of its operations due to its discharge of pollutive effluents into the Pasig
River and why it was operating without a clearance/permit from the LLDA. Petitioner's
wastewater continued to have failure to conform to its effluent standard in terms of Total
Suspended Solids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD), Color and Oil/Grease.
Despite subsequent compliance monitoring and inspections conducted by the LLDA, petitioner's
wastewater failed to conform to the parameters set by the aforementioned DAOs.
Petitioner soon requested for a reduction of penalties. After conducting hearings, the LLDA
issued its Order in which respondent is hereby ordered to pay accumulated daily penalties
amounting (PHP 1,247,000.00).
Petitioner moved to reconsider, praying that it be ordered to pay only (P560,000).Petitioner
challenged by certiorari the twin orders before the Court of Appeals, attributing to LLDA grave
abuse of discretion in disregarding its documentary evidence, and maintaining that the lack of
any plain, speedy or adequate remedy from the enforcement of LLDA's order justified such
recourse as an exception to the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to
judicial action.
The appellate court affirmed both LLDA orders, which it found to be amply supported by
substantial evidence, the computation of the accumulated daily penalties being in accord with
prevailing DENR guidelines.
Issues:
Whether or not petitioner was deprived of due process and lack of any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy as grounds which exempted it from complying with the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Held:
No. Petitioner was not deprived of due process and lack of any plain, speedy or adequate
remedy as grounds which exempted it from complying with the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
EO 192 also created the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary
which took over the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with
respect to the adjudication of pollution cases, including the latter's role as arbitrator for
determining reparation, or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution.
Petitioner had thus available administrative remedy of appeal to the DENR Secretary. It is noted
that during the hearing, the LLDA gave petitioner the opportunity "to submit within fifteen (15)
days any valid documents to show proof of its non-operating dates that would be necessary for
the possible reduction of the accumulated daily... penalties," but petitioner failed to comply
therewith.
Thus, the computation of LLDA of the accumulated daily penalties is in accord with prevailing
DENR guidelines.
Petition is denied.