Lecture Draft for LL.

B Students on Immovable Property

Prepared by: Kaaka Dello-Ziem,JP;
[PhD-Std, LL.M,MPhil in Law & Dev’t, [Link], LL.B, BBA, BA, HND, Teachers’ Cert. “A”]

CHAPTER ONE
1. Nature, scope & terminologies

a. The concept of land

b. Characteristics of land
c. The doctrine of no ownerless lands in Ghana
d. Terminologies
- Possession
- Title
- Ownership

e. Circumstances under which superior title may be lost

INTRODUCTION
Land is regarded as one of the important assets and a medium of investment. It
is also an indispensable factor of production. Apart from the economic
significance of land, some people, particularly Africans, attach emotional and
spiritual significance to land. This non- economic value of land is said to be one
of the reasons certain people contest vehemently for land which may have
minimal economic value. In Africa it is believed that the land is a goddess or has
a goddess. In Ghana the land or its goddess is called Asase Yaa and it is believed
to possess spiritual powers. It is therefore often invoked to provide protection
or success. In some places there are priests or priestesses who perform rites in
honour of the earth goddess such the case of Tendana among Dagaabas who
believed that the priest is the overlord of the land of the God of the Earth and
Ancsetors. In annual harvest and first crop rituals of the fields, special rituals are
performed and celebrations to thank the Earth God or Goddess like the Odwira
among Ashantis, Homowo among Ga, Kobine or Kakube among Dagaabas in
Lawra and Nandom, Tedudu among the Ewes etc. At the national level, land is
needed for agricultural production as a natural resource base and as a tax base.

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Lecture Draft for LL. B Students on Immovable Property
Prepared by: Kaaka Dello-Ziem,JP;
[PhD-Std, LL.M,MPhil in Law & Dev’t, [Link], LL.B, BBA, BA, HND, Teachers’ Cert. “A”]

In view of the significance of land to the development of any country,

appropriate policies are pot in place by states to ensure sustainable management
of this important resource. One of such key measures is the use of law as a tool
to achieve this objective. The branch of law that deals with land and interests in
land is called Law of Immovable Property.
In our lectures Some of the topics covered are nature of Law of Immovable
Property, the definition of land, the concept of land ownership, Characteristics
of land, Doctrine of no ownerless land, constraints to land ownership, interests
in land, conveyancing, land registration and instruments affecting land etc.

12.1 NATURE OF LAW OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

Simply speaking, the law of immovable property concerns the identification of
the various interests in land, how they are transferred from one person to another
and how they are registered. The difficulty there are movable properties when
they are attached to the land are regarded as part of the land known as fixtures,
a principle that gave birth to the maxim: “Quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit”
(meaning whatever is attached or affixed to the soil (Land) goes with it or passes
with it)
12.2 SOURCES OF LAW OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
The following are the sources of Law of Immovable Property in Ghana:
i. The Constitution, 1992 (particularly Articles 18, 20, 257, 258, 266
and 267);
ii. Enactments including the State Lands Act, 19621, Administration of
Lands Act, 1962,2 Rent Act, 1963,3 Conveyancing Act, 1973,4 and
Land Title Registration Act;5

1
Act 125
2
Act 123
3
Act 122
4
NRCD 175
5
PNDCL 152

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Lecture Draft for LL. B Students on Immovable Property
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iii. The rules of Common Law, doctrines of Equity, Ghana's Customary

Law; and
iv. Relevant judicial decisions

THE CONCEPT OF LAND

In treating the subject land law, it is proper to deal with other subject matter like
houses, Farmlands, Rivers, Lakes or structures on land in our quest to give varied
definition of land. Regarding land Blackstone, the legendary English legal
historian commented as follows: “Land is a word of a very extensive
signification”.
The Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law 277 (2014) defined “land as an area
of the earth usually inclusive of improvements, bodies of water, and natural
or man-made objects and extending indefinitely upward or downward”.
In English law “land” means the soil as well as anything attached or fixed to the
soil. This was the origin of Latin rendition as “quicquid plantatur solo, solo
cedit.”
This definition of land was endorsed by section 32 of the repealed Interpretation
Act, 1960 (C.A. 4) which provides: “Land” includes land covered by water, any
house, building or structure.
Both the Interpretation Act, 2009 (Act 792), and section 45 (1) of the
Coveyancing Act, 1973 (NRCD 175) defined Land to includes “land covered by
water, any house, building or structure whatsoever, and any estate, interest or
Commented [U1]: The plaintiff, as successor to K. A.,
right in, to or over land or water. It is not clear whether the above definition claimed that in or about 1942, K. A. had pledged his cocoa
disposes of the customary conception of land. DADZIE v KOKOFU. farm
to the defendant in return for a loan of £G7. The defendant
The definition of land in Ghana's Conveyancing Act6 is the meaning ascribed to contended that the transaction was a sale
and relied on a document, exhibit B, which was executed by
Land in so far as conveyancing is concerned. K. A. Both the defendant and K.A. were
illiterate, and the defendant made no attempt to prove the
The Black’s Law Dictionary defines Land as “An immovable and indestructible document. HELD: In this case, the Supreme Court held that
ownership of cocoa farms was to be strictly distinguished
three-dimensional area consisting of a portion of the earth’s surface, the space from ownership of the land had no automatic claim to such
farms, where these had been made by another person under a
license granted by the decease
6
Conveyancing Act, 1973 (NRCD 175)

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Lecture Draft for LL. B Students on Immovable Property
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above and below the surface, and everything on or permanently affixed to it”
It may be seen from the above definitions that land, in law, goes beyond just a
particular surface of land. It encompasses water that may be found on or beneath
the land, any mineral that may be found on or beneath it as well as the bundle of
rights that may be vested in one person or more persons.
The general rule is that ownership of the surface of land carries with it rights to
what is below the surface and to control of the airspace above. This is expressed
in Latin as: ― cuius est solum, eius est usque ad caelom et ad inferos (meaning
whoever owns the soil owns everything up to the heavens and down to the depths
of the earth). This rule has seen light in a number of cases.
Commented [SDQ2]: The plaintiff brought an action to
stop the defendant from mining on a parcel of land. The
The principle is that “a person who owns the surface area of land is also entitled
plaintiff bought the said piece of land from a railway
to the air space above which is needed for his ordinary use”.7 In Kelsen v company which compulsorily acquired the land under the
Imperial Tobacco Co. (Supra), The plaintiff, Mr. Joel Kelsen, was the lessee of powers given by the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act.
However, the defendants had been mining on the land
a one-storey tobacconist's shop. He brought an action against Imperial Tobacco before it was sold to the plaintiff.
Company (of Great Britain and Ireland) seeking an injunction requiring the HELD: On the above facts the court held that the defendant
defendant to remove from the wall above his one-storey shop, a large advertising cannot be stopped from mining on the land since the
plaintiff bought the land subject to the activities of the
sign which projected into the air space above the plaintiff's shop by a distance of defendant. Hence the ownership of the surface of the land
some eight inches. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant, by fixing that sign was distinguished from the ownership of the soil below the
in that position, had trespassed on his air space and that they threaten to continue surface.

to trespass unless restrained by the court. HELD: The court held that the air
space above the shop was part of the premises demised to the plaintiff, since on Commented [SDQ3]: The plaintiff brought an action
against the defendant for trespass. The basis of the
the true construction of the lease of December, 1948, there was nothing to plaintiff‘s action was that the defendant took a single aerial
displace the prima facie conclusion that the demise of the premises included the photograph of the plaintiff's premises from a height of
several hundred feet. The plaintiff objected to the
air space above the shop. It was further held that the invasion of the plaintiff's photograph being taken also without his permission. He
air space by the sign amounted to a trespass on the part of the defendant. Hence, further contended that the defendant was not entitled to
he was entitled to a mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to remove the rely on the statutory defense under section 40(1) of the Civil
Aviation Act 1949, since that section was limited to a bare
sign right of passage over land and did not permit the use of air
space for the purpose of photography.
POUNTNEY v CLAYTON (In this case, the rule was not strictly applied) HELD: Giving judgment in favor of the defendant, the court
held that the rights of an owner of land in the air space
above the land extended only to such height above the land
as was necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of the
LORD BERNSTEIN OF LEIGH v SKYVIEWS & GENERAL LTD land and the structures on it, and above that height the
owner had no greater rights in the air space than any other
member of the public. Hence, the defendant did not
trespass since his aircraft was at a distance far away such
7
Kelsen v Imperial Tabacco Co [1957] 2 QB 334 that it did not trespass on the property of the plaintiff.

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Lecture Draft for LL. B Students on Immovable Property
Prepared by: Kaaka Dello-Ziem,JP;
[PhD-Std, LL.M,MPhil in Law & Dev’t, [Link], LL.B, BBA, BA, HND, Teachers’ Cert. “A”]

In the case of STAR ENERGY WEALD BASIN LIMITED v BOCARDO

SA, The defendant drilled three wells under the land owned by Bocardo SA in
order to extract the oil that lies beneath it. Bocardo SA then instituted an action
for trespass against them. The plaintiff‘s argument was that, since it owns the
land, it therefore mean it owned everything attached to the land. The defense on
her part was of the opinion that because the minimum depth of the well is about
800 feet, it cannot be reasonable to say that they are trespassing on the plaintiff‘s
property, and that their activity cannot negatively affect the plaintiff‘s use and
enjoyment of their property.
HELD: Since the defendants' aircraft had flown several hundred feet above the
ground and had not caused any interference with any use to which the plaintiff
put or might wish to put his land, the defendants had not infringed such rights as
the plaintiff had in the air space and had not therefore committed a trespass.
REASON: The rights of an owner of land in the air space above the land
extended only to such height above the land as was necessary for the
ordinary use and enjoyment of the land and the structures on it, and above
that height the owner had no greater rights in the air space than any other member
of the public.
Under section 1 of the Mineral and Mining Act, 2006, (Act, 703), in the case of
interference with the ground beneath the land, requires evidence that the
defendant has mining rights and therefore protected under the Act, 703 else he
becomes liable for trespass to the subsoil.

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Lecture Draft for LL. B Students on Immovable Property
Prepared by: Kaaka Dello-Ziem,JP;
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Article 4 (1) of the 1992 constitution of Ghana provides that: The sovereign State
of Ghana is a unitary republic consisting of those territories comprised in the
regions which, immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution,
existed in Ghana, including the territorial sea and the air space. See section 2 of
the Maritime Zones (Delimitation) Act, 1986 (PNDCL 159). And according
section 3 of PNDCL 159, the internal waters of Ghana include the waters on the
landward side of the baseline. Note that the definition of land in Ghana's
Conveyancing Act excludes its airspace, territorial sea and its bed and subsoil.
Ordinarily land is seen in terms of physical ground. According to Ollennu:
“The term land as understood in customary law has a wider application. It
includes the land itself, i.e. the surface soil, things on the soil, which are enjoyed
with it as being part of it by nature, i.e. rivers, streams, lakes, lagoon, creeks,
growing trees like palm and dawadawa trees or things artificially tied to it like
buildings and any structure whatsoever. It also includes any estate, interest or
right in, to or over the land or over any of the other things which land denotes,
i.e. right to collect herbs or snails or to hunt on the land”.
The above definitions of land are not recognised by customary law. In
customary law, land does not include fixtures or things attached to the soil.
Accordingly, houses and other things attached to the land are not regarded as
land. Thus, house built by a person on another’s land belongs to the builder and
not the owner of the land. In Asseh v. Antoh8, it was held that the maxim
“quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit” did not apply in customary law. However,
Customary Law to the meaning of Land, coincides with the principle that land
include not only the surface of the earth but also the airspace above the soil as
well as the depth under the soil to the centre of the earth. This is rendered in
Latin as, “cejus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos.

8
(1961)1 GLR 103

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Lecture Draft for LL. B Students on Immovable Property
Prepared by: Kaaka Dello-Ziem,JP;
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CHARACTERISTICS OF LAND (29/01/21)

From the various definitions it very obvious that Land has the following
characteristics, thus:
1. land is virtually indestructible
2. uniquely immovable
3. immutable
4. land is fixed (Fixity of land)
5. Permanence
6. Land is indispensable
7. Land is inseparable from flora and fauna without which no living thing
will survive
8. Land is also immeasurable to both living and non-living
9. Peculiarities of land
10. Minerals
11. Accession
12. Imperishability
13. Safety
14. Limited supply and competition
15. Income and capital value
16. Necessity
17. Investment
18. Title
19. Relativity and security of titles
20. Ownership
21. Estates
22. Tenure
23. Legal estates and equitable interests
24. Entry upon land and possession
25. The shield of effective possession
26. Abandonment
27. Waste
28. Improvements

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Lecture Draft for LL. B Students on Immovable Property
Prepared by: Kaaka Dello-Ziem,JP;
[PhD-Std, LL.M,MPhil in Law & Dev’t, [Link], LL.B, BBA, BA, HND, Teachers’ Cert. “A”]

THE DOCTRINE OF NO OWNERLESS LAND

There is a theory that there is no land without an owner in Ghana. By the fact
that land was mainly acquired by settlement and practically all lands in Ghana
has now been settled upon, there can be no land that has not an owner.
Ollennu stated that “the first basic principle of our customary law is that there is
no land in Ghana without an owner. Every inch of land in Ghana is vested in
somebody.”9 The above statement was repeated by Bentsi-Enchill.’10 Similarly,
Woodman stated in the article “The Allodial Title to Land”11 that there “is a firm
principle in customary law that there is no unowned land in Ghana.” An
important discordant note was sounded by Kludze who maintains that this view
was based on obiter dictum in Wiapa v. Solomon, (1905) Ren. 405 and other
cases.
The assertion that there are no ownerless lands in Ghana appears to mimic the
English 'nulles terre sans seigneur’: no land without a lord; namely, no land in
England is allodial or owned by a subject and not held of a lord. The concept of
ownerless lands in Ghana, whatever its validity, serves the practical purpose of
preventing lawlessness in the acquisition of land and ensures an orderly and
systematic approach to customary land law.
The concept has a long pedigree. In 1897 Sarbah noted:
“According to native ideas there is no land without owners. What is now forest
or unused land will, as years go by, come under cultivation by the subjects of the
stool, or members of the village community, or other members of the family.”
Again, Sarbah observed that “the making of grants to strangers, particularly to
Europeans, of waste lands, that is, lands abandoned or never under cultivation
by any one, and of minerals, and of concessions of forest land for a term of years,
though said to be modem comparatively speaking, is not necessarily illegal,
according to customary law.” 12

4. N. A. Ollennu Principles of Customary land Law in Ghana, London 1962, p. 4.

5. Bentsi-Enchill 1964, p. 22.
6. University of Ghana Law Journal (1968) Vol. 5, p. 79. J.M.
7. J.M Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws, 1897 Pp 66-67

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Sarbah was not alone. The principle was first enunciated by Francis Smith
(Report on native land tenure on the Gold Coast, 1891): According to native
ideas there is no land without an owner. What is now a forest or unused land
will, as years go on, come under cultivation by the subject of the stool, or
members of the village community, or other members of the family.13 “Land in
the colony is distinguished under the following heads: Stool land, family land
and private land; and under these designations all the land in the colony, save
what the government have from time taken for public purposes, has, according
to native law, an owner.”14
Equally, Bruce Hindle stated that: “It is considered by the natives that all lands,
whether reclaimed or not, are attached to the stools of the different kings and
chiefs, with the exception of the comparatively small portions detached in the
manner aforesaid. There is no land which is not or has not been so attached.”15
The foregoing were closely considered in Kludze’s article, “The Ownerless
Lands of Ghana”. Kludze’s detailed criticisms started with the observation:
“A doctrine which appears so far to have been unquestioned, is that in Ghana
there is no land without an owner. Its implication seems to be that for every piece
of land in the country it is possible to identify an owner. While this doctrine may
serve some purposes and convenience and may also usefully be called in aid in
the resolution of otherwise intractable land disputes, it is the present writer’s
view respectful view that its general application in the country is not justified. It
is also submitted that there is insufficient authority for the proposition.” 16
Kludze attacked the very basis of the doctrine:
“In the first place they (propositions of ownerless lands) are not judicial
pronouncements and do not carry the weight of such authority. Secondly, they
are not based on adequate research, let alone field research. They are opinions
of colonial judges who did not understand our system of land tenure and who,
on their own admission, relied solely on the conflicting evidence and the

13 Id. 66. He cited for his authority Smith and Hindle.

14
ibid
15
Ibid 271
16
UGLJ, (1974) Vol. II pp123-140

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conflicting opinions of the so-called native experts who appeared before them.”
17

A further ground for Kludze’s criticisms is the view that the statement that there
are no ownerless lands in Ghana is founded on the false assumption that all
lands are stool lands.’
Kludze’s contentions appear to be borne out by the cases. The proposition was
stated in Wiapa v. Solomon (1905) Ren 405 but merely as obiter dictum. In that
case plaintiff claimed title to certain lands on the basis of long occupation,
asserting that his predecessor had found the land ownerless. The trial court found
that he had not been in effective occupation. The court further observed, inter
alia (at pp 410-411): “Mr. Sarbah, for the applicants, argued that if this land was
no one’s land and was within Akwapim country, it must have been attached to
the Akwapim stool, and he enunciated the general principle that all unoccupied
land within territory under a paramount stool belongs to such stool. This is
practically the principle upon which the Courts of this colony have proceeded
from their inception, and this doctrine has served as a safeguard to the natives
against possible Government claims.”
It was stated further in Wiapa v. Solomon that:
"Though the principle obtains that all the unowned land under the authority of a
paramount stool belongs to such stool, in practice this is much modified... Each
subordinate stool has attached to it large portion of land, apparently carved out
of the territory originally belonging to the paramount stool; similarly, families
have large tracts of land carved out of the subordinate stool lands, and finally,
we get down to indi¬viduals with private ownership of particular parts of the
family and; or private individuals may have part of stool land not being family
land. Any unoccupied land within the recognised boundaries of subordinate stool
land or family land would, of course, belong to the subordinate stool, or the
family as the case might be; but any unoccupied land not being a part of the land
of a subordinate stool or family or a private person, would be attached to the
paramount stool.”

17
Ibid 123

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Lecture Draft for LL. B Students on Immovable Property
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Similar observations were made by the court in Ababio v. Kanga (1932) W.

A.C. A. 253 at 255: “Now in the Gold Coast there is no land without an owner,
all vacant lands being attached to the nearest stool in which they may he said to
vest for the community represented by that particular stool.” In Ofori Atta v.
Atta Fua D. & F. Ct. ‘11-’16, 66 the court said: “These lands being
uninhabited lands situated between two paramount stools would according to
native law and custom accrete to the paramount stools and the question of
boundary between the two paramount stools would be one in respect of adjoining
land.”
Tic principle was mentioned tangentially in Ohimen v. Adjei (1957) 1
W.A.L.R. 275 where Ollennu J. described the modes of acquisition of title to
land as comprising of the following: (a) conquest and subsequent settlement and
the discovery and settlement on unowned land. Two other methods were gift
and purchase.
Kludze contends that there are ownerless lands in Ghana and points to areas
where lands are owned by families, notably among the Dangmes and Ewes such
as Abudome land of Hohoe (Gbi), and distinguishes between jurisdictional
authority and proprietary interest over land which has not accreted to any family,
arguing that within a jurisdictional area there may be parcels where no
proprietory interest is claimed. Kludze concedes that “it is probably true that
there is no land over which no chief exercises jurisdiction. This, however, may
not be extended to ownership of proprietary interests. Finally, he actually points
to certain lands in the Volta region as ownerless.
Prof. Nukunya came to the same conclusion with Prof. A.K.P Kludze, that
among the Ewe the stool as a rule does not have the proprietary interest in the
lands over which it exercises jurisdiction. Thus, he concludes from his specific
study of the Anlo Ewe that the Awoamefia or Paramount Chief of Anlo is not
the owner of all Anlo lands but the respective families. He, therefore, came
across the case of the Keta Lagoon which, because it does not belong to any
family or individual, is ownerless. The Lagoon is not stool land or stool
property. Thus, among the Anlo Ewe also we have the example of the Keta
Lagoon which is ownerless land

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Lecture Draft for LL. B Students on Immovable Property
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Instructively, section 19(2) of the Land Title Registration Law, 1986 (PNDCL
152) requires the Registrar to register (a) the state as proprietor of all lands vested
in the state by any enactment, (b) the state as trustee of all lands held by the state
in trust under any enactment and (c) the state as proprietor of all lands not held
by any other proprietor.

TERMINOLOGIES
- Possession
A person who owns land must have something to support that claim. The
claimant can demonstrate this by establishing that he has been in long and
undisturbed possession of the land. Such possession gives the occupier a right
which supersedes all other claims except that of the true owner. This means that,
Possession by itself is good title against the whole world except someone having
a better legal right of possession.
Possession may take two forms:
The first is direct possession (Actual Possession, and the second is where the
claimant is not in physical occupation of the land (Adverse Possession), but has
placed something on the land indicating that he has immediate right to
occupation. Possession may be proved by calling owners of adjoining parcels of
land and other witnesses to testify to that fact.
At customary law, possession is preceded by entry upon land, followed by the
exercise of physical acts of ownership, such as cultivating ground or occupying
a house. Entry consists in intentionally and peaceably going upon a parcel of
land, formerly held by another, with the purpose of taking possession, such as
occurs when a purchaser assumes ownership and control of what formerly
belonged to the vendor. The act of possession depends on the nature of the thing
possessed. The courts had occasion to comment on the nature of possession in
Shai Hills Acquisition, unreported judgement of the Land Court, 3 June 1957,18

Reported in N.A. Ollennu. Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana, London 1962,
p. 177.

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noting that the act of possession of land may be conditioned by peculiarities of

the land or of economic activities thereon, e.g. the consequences of slash and
bum and shifting cultivation; If the land is comprised of premises capable of
rental, possession may consist merely in the receipt of rent. Thus, possession
may be defined as the condition under which an owner exercises proprietary
power over an object to the exclusion of all others. In the Shai Hills Case, it was
stated that “land, particularly land on the plains where farming is chiefly by
shifting cultivation, is not necessarily abandoned by reason only of the fact that
it was not being used at any particular point in time either for farming or
residence. Abandonment consists not so much in allowing land to lie waste, but
rather in the non-exercise of right to immediate control.”
In taking possession the purchaser/grantee should be vigilant. The presence of
economic tress like mango and cashew on land overgrown with weeds is prima
facie evidence that the area where they are found is a farmstead: Norquaye-
Tetteh v. Malm. (1959) G.L.R. 368. In Brown v. Quarshigah (2003-2004)
SCGLR, 930 Date-Bah JSC stated (at p. 966) that “purchasers of land who
ignore signs of possession by a party other than their vendor on the land, do so
at their own risk and are likely to come to grief.”
In Amodu Tijani v. The Secretary, Southern Nigeria (1921) A. C. 399 at p. 402
the court recognised a distinction between ‘possession’ as known to English law
and possession within the context of West Africa thus:
“Their Lordships make the preliminary observation that in interpreting the native
title to land, not only in Southern Nigeria, but other parts of the British Empire,
much caution is essential. There is a tendency, operating at times unconsciously,
to render that title conceptually in terms which are appropriate only to systems
which have grown up under English law. But this tendency has to be held in
check closely. As a rule, in the various systems of native jurisprudence
throughout the Empire, there is no such full division between property and
possession as English lawyers are familiar with.”
Possession may be further distinguished from mere custody. Even here,
difficulties in grasping the difference between the legal and non-legal meanings
of the term persist. The custodian may have physical control of property, but he
actually controls it on behalf of someone else. Our land law is replete with

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instances of caretakers maintaining control of land for real owners. In such cases
the real owners continue to possess the land through the caretakers.
The development of possessory rights arose from the inadequacy of early
proprietary remedies. According to Salmond, “the procedure by which an owner
recovered his property was cumbrous, dilatory and inefficient. The path of the
claimant was strewn with pitfalls, and he was lucky if he reached his destination
without disaster. The part of plaintiff in such an action was one of grave
disadvantage, and possession was nine points of the law.”19

19 J. L. Parker, Salmond on Jurisprudence, London 1936, p. 409.

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[PhD-Std, LL.M,MPhil in Law & Dev’t, [Link], LL.B, BBA, BA, HND, Teachers’ Cert. “A”]

The shield of effective possession

In the old English law the term seisin’ was employed synonymously with 'possession’, but the
former term was often accompanied by an estate of freehold. It denoted an intention on the part
of the possessor to claim the freehold interest in the land. The word ‘possession’ was commonly
used in reference to a term of years and other interests of short duration. Seisin’ was therefore
opposed to mere possession which in the strictly technical sense, applies only to leaseholds and
personal property. Once the grantee assumes effective possession of land, he is shielded by a
number of remedies. Legal remedies intended for the protection of possession, even against the
owner, are called possessory rights; those available for the protection of the owner are described
as proprietary rights. The court observed in Brown v. Quarshigah (2003-2004) SCGLR, 930,
per Kludze, JSC (at p. 951):
“Possession is a matter of law but is established by physical acts. Possession is generally
regarded as implying physical control; but physical control cannot mature into possession in law
unless accompanied by other facts... The physical control is usually actual control and includes
the right to exclude others from the property... Secondly, there must be the animus possidendi
or intention to possess which must be concurrent with the requisite physical control.” Section 48
of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (N. R. C. D.323) provides as follows:
“48(1) The things which a person possesses are presumed to be owned by him. (2) A person who
exercises acts of ownership over property is presumed to be the owner of it.”
The Ghanaian cases on possession bear the imprint of English law. At common law possession
is evidence of ownership. Possession is a good title against claimants who cannot show a better
title. The transfer of possession is the chief method of transferring title; and the first possession
of a thing without an owner is a good title. The possessor is presumed to own a thing; all other
claimants are put to strict proof of their title. In addition, under rules of prescription, long
possession by a person without title may ripen into ownership. Possession in fact not necessarily
constitute possession in law. For instance, a lessor not necessarily lose possession of his property
by reason merely: presence of a lessee. As with many other areas of the law, intent or animus
possidendi is necessary to create possession. To constitute possession in law, the act of
possession should be evidenced by a lawful intention by the party to appropriate the thing
concerned to his exclusive use.
Beyond the above, possession must be embodied in a corpus. The claim of possession must be
realised in the fact of actual and continuous possession of the thing concerned. As far as land is
concerned, the most perfect form of possession requires the personal presence and physical

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[PhD-Std, LL.M,MPhil in Law & Dev’t, [Link], LL.B, BBA, BA, HND, Teachers’ Cert. “A”]

power of the possessor to exclude all alien interferences in the exclusive enjoyment of the
property.
As we have seen, possessory remedies are rooted in difficulties of proof of ownership,
particularly in pre-literate societies. It is easy to prove actual physical possession, but difficult to
proof title, especially by documentary means. It may be feared that this would lead to violent
self-help through acquisition of possession against rightful owners. In English law, equity gave
the rightful owners the remedy of injunction while the issue of ownership is resolved.
Also see the case of Seraphim v Amuah-Sakyi, [1962] 1 GLR 328@331 and page 8 of Justice
Ayisi’s Handout for reference
- Title
Possession of document to prove title is essential but it is not sufficient. Title is the means by
which someone establishes his right to land. It indicates the means by which the person
establishes his right to the land. It can be established by various means. These include
documentary proof. A document here does not necessarily mean an indenture (Conveyance). It
could be a receipt. Refer to section 48 of the Evidence Decree, (NRCD 323).
Title can also be established through long undisturbed possession (12 years in the Ghanaian
situation).
Title may also be established through oral tradition or oral grant. Under this a person may lead
oral evidence to demonstrate that the land belongs to him.
Section 54(10) of the Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459) provides, inter alia, that in “disputes relating
to titles to land, due regard shall be had to any overriding provisions of the law of the place in
which the land is situated.”
Relativity and security of titles:
The received property law does not recognise the notion of an absolutely secure title. Title is
dependent on the relative strengths of contending parties. This is a concept from the common
law which recognized no ‘absolute’ title. It is often said that the best way to acquire absolute
title is to create out of nothing. Men did not own land in the beginning of time and do not create
land, save in exceptional cases. English law therefore emphasised the right to recover title, rather
than the abstract notion of ‘absolute’ ownership. The Land Title Registration Law, 1986 (P.N.D.
C.L: Law 152) purports to confer an ‘absolute’ and indefeasible title on the purchaser, but as
anybody familiar with the Torrens system of title registration knows, even this is subject to a

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[PhD-Std, LL.M,MPhil in Law & Dev’t, [Link], LL.B, BBA, BA, HND, Teachers’ Cert. “A”]

number of exceptions. On account of the relative nature of title, the concept of ‘possessory’
ownership becomes relevant in the light of various possibilities of recovery of title, including the
recovery of a lost will or claims based on the reversion upon the expiration of an extensive term
of years.

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[PhD-Std, LL.M,MPhil in Law & Dev’t, [Link], LL.B, BBA, BA, HND, Teachers’ Cert. “A”]

The theoretical possibility of someone else proving a better title than the owner is never discounted.
Party A may dispossess Party B of land lawfully belonging to Party B. If Party B takes no action,
Party A remains in possession but his title is incompatible with Party B’s. However, Party A can
maintain an action in regard to the land against the whole world except Party B and those claiming
through him. Meantime, Party A gains a set of advantages described as 'possessory rights’; and
may exercise rights of ownership, suing trespassers and alienating parcels of the land to strangers;
all these are subject to Party B’s right to recover possession until that right is extinguished by
limitation.
During litigation over title, the court is primarily concerned with the relative strengths of the titles
asserted by the rival claimants. A plaintiff with a weaker title cannot defeat a defendant in
possession by relying on the better title of a third party (jus tertii). If X proves than he has a better
title than Y, he succeeds in spite of the fact that a third party may have a better title than X. This
raises the possibility of several adverse titles in regard to the same parcel of land. As between
competitive owners of a defective title, the longer in possession may succeed in proving a better
title by reason of prior possession. But if, for any reason, his title is barred by the operation of law,
the other asserts a better title.
The standard of proof in essential. Since the ruling of the West African Court of Appeal in
Kodilinye v. Odu (1935) 2 W. A. C. A. 336 the courts have accepted that a party in an action for
declaration of title to land must rely on the strength of his own case rather the weakness of the case
of the opponent. In that case Webber CJ. stated:
“The ‘onus lies on the plaintiff to satisfy the Court that he is entitled on the ‘evidence brought by
him to a declaration of title. The plaintiff in this case must rely on the strength of his own case and
not on the weakness of the defendant’s case. If this onus is not discharged, the weakness of the
defendant’s case will not help him and the proper judgment is for the defendant.”
Kodilinye v. Odu was been followed in a long list of cases. But the principle laid down by Webber
C. J. appears to side-step the standard requirement in civil litigation where proof is based on the
balance of probabilities. The general position in civil proceedings was stated by the Supreme Court
in Serwah v. Kesse (1960) 6. L. R. 227 to the effect that in title cases, as in civil cases, the
preponderance of probability in favour of a party may constitute sufficient ground for a judgment
in favour of that party. This was followed in Ricketts v. Addo (1975) 2 G L.R. 158
In Odametey v. Clocuh (1989-90) 1 G. L. R. 14 Taylor JSC attacked the foundation of the principle
(at. pp. 15-16):
“The mechanical application of this so-called principle in actions for declaration of title — The
genesis of which is traceable to [the dictum] of Webber C. J. in Kodilinye v. Odu that “the plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his own case and not rely on the weakness of the defendant’s case —
should be deprecated ... then the dictum is now no more true of the legal position in modem Ghana,
at least since the coming into force of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (N. R. C. D. 323) ... if there was
even a doubt about the principle ... then NRCD 323, has now definitely cleared all possible
doubts.”

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[PhD-Std, LL.M,MPhil in Law & Dev’t, [Link], LL.B, BBA, BA, HND, Teachers’ Cert. “A”]

Hayfron-Benjamin JSC stated (at p. 592) in Odonkor v. Amartei (1992) 1 G.L.R. that “it is well
that Taylor JSC has blunted the sharpness of the principle and consigned it between the covers of
NRCD 323 where judges may be able to consider the relative merits of a civil case based on the
preponderance of probabilities rather than on an archaic principle which may not accord with
reason or common sense.”
Section 12(1) of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (N. R. C. D. 323) provides that “except as otherwise
provided by law, the burden of persuasion requires proof by a preponderance of probabilities.”

- Ownership
The concept of ownership of land embraces possession of and title to land. An owner of land is a
person who can show that he and those through whom he claims title have possessed the land for
so long that there can be no reasonable probability of the existence of a superior adverse claim. In
showing this, he may rely on documents of title or on his own possession. The important thing is
that there is no adverse claim. If an adverse claim is raised against the owner, the court has to
consider the conflicting titles, whether they are documentary or based on mere possession or an
oral grant. If the conflicting titles are documentary, the court has to decide which document confers
a better title. If the title is based on oral grant, then the court must confirm which grant complies
with the requisites of a grant at customary law. Except in cases where there is an incontestable
documentary title, the person in possession has an advantage. If it is the defendant who is in
possession, then the plaintiff who claims ownership must prove a better title. If he cannot do this,
he must fail. The defendant can simply rely on his possession. If the plaintiff who sues for
declaration of title is in possession and he cannot be dislodged unless the defendant shows a better
title, that is, a better right to possession than the plaintiff. Indeed, a plaintiff in possession carries
no greater burden of proof than a defendant in possession.20 If it is the plaintiff who is in
possession, he simply remains in possession.21 If it is the defendant who is in possession who is in
possession, the plaintiff must fail. Under certain circumstances, the plaintiff will fail even if he
proves better title to the land. For example, in Ntim v Boateng,22 the supreme court held that:
“if a landowner, who is a farmer and as such well aware of local farming conditions, including the
position that cocoa, when planted takes between four and five years to commence bearing, can
allow his land to be occupied and developed unchallenged, such owner cannot be allowed to
recover possession and damages for the occupation and improvement of such land. The conduct
of the land owner in such a case would amount to acquiescence. He would be estopped from
claiming possession.”
Also in Madjoub Rafat v Ellis23, Windsor – Aubrey J said:

20
See Asare v Appau II [1984-86]1 GLR 599
21
See Peniana v Afraim [1966]GLR 220; Kodilinye v Adu (1935)WACA 336;Abakam Afiana Family[1959] GLR
362;
22
[1963]2 GLR 97@98
23
(1954) 14 WACA 430@431

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[PhD-Std, LL.M,MPhil in Law & Dev’t, [Link], LL.B, BBA, BA, HND, Teachers’ Cert. “A”]

“I am satisfied that they [the respondent and his family] must, by their conduct, be held to have
acquiesced, and knowingly permitted the defendant to incur expenditure on renovating and adding
to the building. They have thereby waived and abandoned any rights which they possessed, and
cannot now enforce them”

OWNERSHIP OF LAND UNDER CUSTOMARY LAW

In Amodu Tijani v. Secretary of Southern Nigeria24,, the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council said, “The next fact which it is important to bear in mind in order to understand the native
law is that the notion of individual ownership in foreign to native ideas. Land belongs to the
community, the village or the family, never to the individual.” This observation was accepted to
a great extent as correct under Ghana law, in that by the nature of the acquisition of land in ancient
times, it was unlikely for an individual to acquire land. The title acquired by the groups described
above is called Absolute or Allodial title. Also see AGBLO v SAPPOR [1947] 12 WACA 187 Commented [U4]:
Where the head of the family does not participate in the
transaction such alienation is void ab initio. The rule was
stated as follows:
E. CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH SUPERIOR TITLE MAY BE LOST (27/01/21) “The principal members of a family cannot give any title in a
conveyance of family land without the participation of the
(LOSS OF THE ALLODIAL TITLE) head of family. The head of family may be considered to be
in a position analogous to a trustee from which it follows
that it is quite impossible for land to be legally transferred
and legal title given without his consent. The alleged deed
The customary freehold may potentially subsist forever. There are, nevertheless, circumstances in transferred was therefore ab initio and the respondents
derive no right of absolute ownership thereof.”
which it may be terminated. These are: by abandonment; by forfeiture; by failure of successors;
by compulsory acquisition by the State; and by sale or gift.
➢ Under Compulsory acquisition. Examine the following provisions:
❖ 1992 Constitution, Article 20, clauses 1,2,3,5 & 6.
❖ Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123).
❖ State Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125) as amended.
Distinguish between the procedure as well as the effects of compulsory acquisition and vesting.
Particularly emphasise the effects on the allodial title.
In compulsory acquisition the allodial title is extinguished. However, vesting does not extinguish
the allodial title. For effects of vesting refer to the case of Nana Hyeaman II v. Osei (1982-83)
GLR [Link] Twumasi J, the meaning of the words “vested in the President in trust for the stools
concerned” should be construed univocally in both the Concessions Act, 1962 (Act 124) and the
Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123). The provisions were in pari materia and ought to
bear the same construction. An incisive study of the provisions of the two Acts, however, disclosed
nothing, open or esoteric, in the two statutes which suggested, even faintly, that the legislature by

24
(1921)2 AC 399 at 404

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[PhD-Std, LL.M,MPhil in Law & Dev’t, [Link], LL.B, BBA, BA, HND, Teachers’ Cert. “A”]

enacting that stool lands including those subject to existing or future concessions should be vested
in the President for the stools concerned, intended that the stools should be denuded of their
inherent rights to ownership of stool lands. The statutory powers of the President ought to be
construed as running side by side with the powers of the stools as the allodial owners of stool
lands. Dictum of Lord Mansfield in R. v. Loxdale (1758) I Burr. 445 applied. Ofori Atta II v.
Mensah (1957) 3 W. A. L. R. 32; B.P. (West Africa) Ltd. V. Boateng [1963] G.L.R. 232 and
Frimpong v. Nana Asare Obeng II [1974] I G.L.R.16 cited. Per curium It becomes obvious, if
we adopt the purpose-oriented policy of statutory interpretation that the legislature had never had
the intention of depriving the stools of this country of their inherent right to ownership of stool
lands, notwithstanding statutory provisions entrusting stool lands to the president for the stools.
This is made manifest by the fact that in one statute, Act 123, there is provision in section 8 to the
effect that stools can make grant of stool lands even though the same lands may be entrusted to the
president.
(2) Under Act 124, stool lands could lawfully be taken away to a concessionaire; but before
such a process was brought into fruition, the right of the stool to deal with the land in a manner not
inconsistent with the provisions of Act 123 still persisted. Consequently, the occupant of the stool
could, without any inhabitation, challenge the validity of a purported concession affecting his land.
The objection to the capacity of the plaintiff was therefore untenable.
Section 7(1) provides that of the Administration of Lands Act,1962 (Act, 123) provides:
“Where it appears to the President that it is in the public interest so to do may, by executive
instrument, declare any stool land to be vested in him in trust and accordingly it shall be lawful for
the President, on the publication of the instrument, to execute any deed or do any act as trustee in
respect of the land specified in the instrument”.
Section 10(1) of Act, 123 provides that: “The President may authorise the occupation and use
of any land to which this Act applies for any purpose which in his opinion, is conducive to the
public welfare or the interests of the state”. Section 10 makes provision for the payment of
appropriate compensation from funds voted by parliament. Examples of Vested Land are
Koforidua and Nkawkaw Lands (E.I. 195 of November 1, 1961); Efutu and Gomoa Ejumako
Lands (E.I. 206 of November 21, 1961) and Stool Lands within one mile radius of the Winneba
Roundabout (E.I. 83 of June 6, 1963).

a. By abandonment: Abandonment in the customary law involves actual loss of possession

and the establishment of possession by another party. Both the allodial and customary law
freehold titles may be lost by abandonment which he or they have possessed a determinable
title for more than ten years or abandons the land with the intention not to use it any longer,
it reverts to the allodial owner from whom the customary freeholder interests was derived.
Abandonment is a question of law ascertained from the purposes for which land was
granted; it is inferred from the specific facts of the case. What may constitute abandonment
of building land may not hold for farmland: Shai Hills Acquisition Case (supra).

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[PhD-Std, LL.M,MPhil in Law & Dev’t, [Link], LL.B, BBA, BA, HND, Teachers’ Cert. “A”]

i) Customary Abandonment
Some writers consider abandonment for a specific period of time. For instance, to Sarbah,
to fail to cultivate a land for ten years constitutes abandonment. Another school of thought Commented [U5]: Where an individual or family in
rather looks at it from a conceptual point of view. In the KOKOMLEMLE possession abandons any portion of the land in their
possession for upwards of ten years, the stool can grant that
CONSOLIDATED CASES, the judge was of the view that, failure to cultivate a land after particular portion to any other subject or to a stranger and
a reasonable fallow period constitutes abandonment. such grantee will be bound to perform such services and
pay such sums as may be declared to be performed or paid
The modern thinking adds the intent. The question on intent is whether the person will annually in accordance with native custom. see Lokko v.
Konklofi ; Golightly and Another v. Ashrifi and Others; and
return or does not intend to return? As to whether he will return or not, depends on the facts
see also Sarba, Fanti Customary Law, 2nd ed., pp. 66-67.
of each case. Time is important in determining the intention of the return to the land. The
following cases illustrate the above:
1. OHEMIN v ADJEI (1957) 2 WALR 275, Commented [U6]: The learned judge said: “The stool
2. ATTA v LAGOS [1960] GLR 42 holds the absolute title in the land as trustee to and on
behalf of its subjects, and subjects are entitled to the
3. KOKOMLEMLE CONSOLIDATED STOOL LANDS beneficial interest or usufruct thereof and have to serve the
4. KOW II v ANSAH II [1975] 2 GLR 176 stool. Each individual or family is regarded in the broad
5. MALM v LUTHOROTH [1963] 1 GLR 1 sense as the owner of so much of the land as it is able by its
industry or by the industry of its ancestors to reduce into
6. MANU v ASAMOAH [1975] 1 GLR 225 the lawful possessions and control. The area of the land so
ii) Statutory Abandonment reduces into lawful possession of individual or family, and
over which he or they exercise a usufructuary right, usually
In the case of farming land, the general rule is that where a person stops using the land or called his property. It cannot, save with the express consent
of the family or individual, be disposed of by the stool. The
exercising any right in it for a considerable time, says more than ten years, he is considered individual or family may assign or disposed of his interest in
to abandon it. There must be evidence of a clear intention not to use the land anymore. the land to another subject of the stool and the land may be
Statute now imposes a more automatic test most parts of Ghana apart from the northern sold in execution of a decree against the individual, or the
family, as the case may be, without the consent of the stool.
region, Upper West Region and Upper East Region. Section 1 of the Farm Lands But he may not dispose of the stool’s absolute ownership in
(Protection) Act, 1962 (Act 107), provides that if a person acquires land after the it to strangers without the consent and concurrence of the
commencement of the Act for farming, his title to any part on which he fails to farm within stool.”

eight years is to be extinguished. The object of this section of Act 107 seems to be to
prevent speculation whereby people invest in land with no intention of developing it, but
of selling it after an increase in the market value caused by the scarcity of land.
In the case of building land, when the subject fails for a considerable period to build on the
land granted to him the family or the stool cannot grant the land to another subject or
member of the family until the subject owner has been warned several times. The point
was discussed in Komey v. Korkor25. The court therefore observed: “I find upon the
evidence that by native custom a stool is entitled to forfeit land which it grants to a subject
or to anyone else for purposes of building, if the grantee fails, after a considerable period
to build on the land. What is a considerable period will depend on the circumstances of
each particular case. I also find that by native custom such forfeiture of building land cannot
be lawfully made unless the grantee has been given every opportunity and been warned

25
(1958)3 WALR 331

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[PhD-Std, LL.M,MPhil in Law & Dev’t, [Link], LL.B, BBA, BA, HND, Teachers’ Cert. “A”]

twice at least and has, in spite of those warnings, made no genuine effort to building on the
land.”
In short, a temporary disuse of a building is insufficient to constitute abandonment. – Total
Oil Products Ltd v. Obeng & Manu – the Court said abandonment has a special meaning
in customary law. Mere neglect or non-user of land for a period however, long, does not
itself constitute abandonment. Some act or conduct must be exhibited by the owner which
shows the intention not to use the land any longer. Temporal illness of the tenant which
caused delay in rebuilding on the land does not amount to abandonment – Malm v.
Lutterodt. A customary freehold might automatically terminate if the building ceased to
stand – De – Vine v. Mould. Where a customary freehold is expressly acquired for
building, the test of abandonment is not quite the same. In such a case, the customary
freeholder may be considered to have abandoned the land if he fails to build or a
considerable period after he has acquired it - see Propaganda Fide v. Mensah.
Also see AGBLO v SAPPOR [1947] 12 WACA 187 Commented [U7]:
Where the head of the family does not participate in the
b. By forfeiture: the holder of a customary freehold title or interest forfeits his title or interest transaction such alienation is void ab initio. The rule was
when he denies the title of the allodial owner. For example, by acknowledging that the land stated as follows:
“The principal members of a family cannot give any title in a
he occupies is owned by another community or by refusing to perform customary services conveyance of family land without the participation of the
when demanded by the allodial title owning community. The right of the forfeiture could head of family. The head of family may be considered to be
in a position analogous to a trustee from which it follows
not be validly exercised until the customary freeholder has been warned at least twice and
that it is quite impossible for land to be legally transferred
afforded the opportunity of building if he wishes. In the absence of such warning, any and legal title given without his consent. The alleged deed
purported forfeiture and a grant subsequent to such forfeiture is of no effect – Total Oil transferred was therefore ab initio and the respondents
derive no right of absolute ownership thereof.”
Products Ltd v. Obeng & Manu; and Komey v. Korkor.
c. By compulsory acquisition: The State has statutory power to acquire land compulsorily
from any proprietor of land whether a community, an individual or a corporate body and
whether the title is allodial, a freehold or whatever. The effect of compulsory acquisition
by the State pursuant to the State Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125) is to vest the allodial title
and all other subordinate titles and interests and that includes the customary freehold in the
State free from all encumbrances whatsoever. The State can also compulsorily acquire land
pursuant to section 7 of the Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123). Compulsory
acquisition under this Act, however, does not extinguish the customary freehold and other
subordinate titles and interests derived out of the allodial land. It is only the community’s
allodial title which is affected by compulsory acquisition under section 7 of Act 123 – see
Saaka v. Dahali [1982-83] GLR 774.
d. By failure of successors: The customary freehold title subsists potentially forever so long
as the original proprietor has successors in title and provided nothing is done by any
proprietor for time being which may be treated as abandonment or may incur forfeiture by
the allodial owner – Mansu v. Abboye [1982-83] GLR 1313. The customary freehold will
however terminate when the unlikely event of failure of successors occurs.

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[PhD-Std, LL.M,MPhil in Law & Dev’t, [Link], LL.B, BBA, BA, HND, Teachers’ Cert. “A”]

e. By sale or gift: The customary freehold land may be sold by auction in execution of a
judgment debt against the customary freeholder – see Mensah v. Ackwonu. The purchaser
of the land at such an auction sale will not acquire the customary freehold title but a
common law freehold title. This because the purchaser’s acquisition of the land sis not by
exercise of any inherent customary law right vested in him but by purchase for valuable
consideration. Similarly where the customary freeholder makes a gift or sale of his
customary freehold land to any other person, the done or purchaser will acquire a common
law freehold title or interest because the land is no longer a vacant virgin allodial land in
which the done or purchaser, if a member of the community owning the allodial title has
exercised any inherent customary law right. The assertion here may appear contrary to the
general proposition of law that a purchaser acquires the right, title and interested of his
vendor unless there is a contrary intention expressed in the conveyance – see section 13(2)
of the Conveyancing Decree 1973 (NRCD 175). It is submitted that in spite of these
seemingly obvious contradiction, the statement of the customary law here is correct taking
into consideration the mode of creation of the customary freehold discussed earlier.

THE MODERN POSITION OF THE CUSTOMARY FREEHOLD

The customary freehold is an interest which a member of the community holding the allodial title
may acquire as of right. The rapid growth of the population and the high level of urban
development which have taken place in the last fifty years means that land is not so easily or readily
available. Firstly, there is scarcely any land left anywhere in Ghana which can be described as
unoccupied virgin and. Furthermore, even if there were any land which could be described as
vacant, a member of the owning community cannot under modern conditions appropriate to
himself an unlimited tract of the community land. As villages grow into towns and town expand
into cities, it becomes a matter of practical necessity and social justice that the customary right of
the member to appropriate as much land as he pleases should be curtailed.
The modern development is therefore towards imposing on the member the requirement that he
should obtain the consent of the community which is the allodial owner before carving out any
land to himself – see Onano v. Mensah; and Oblee v. Armah. The modern position was stated in
the case of Frimpong v. Poku by the Supreme Court – see above. Thus, it is quite clear that the
customary freehold would have eventually died out even without the intervention of the
constitution – see article 267(5). The present position regarding the customary freehold is that as
from 7th January, 1993 i.e. date for the commencement of the 1992 Constitution, no customary
freehold or indeed any kind of freehold interest can be created out of stool land. Article 267(5) in
clear terms prohibits the creation of any freehold interest out of stool land in Ghana. The member
of the community owning the allodial title there has no longer any inherent right to occupy and
develop any part of a vacant and virgin community allodial land and claim to have acquired a
customary freehold interest.

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Lecture Draft for LL. B Students on Immovable Property
Prepared by: Kaaka Dello-Ziem,JP;
[PhD-Std, LL.M,MPhil in Law & Dev’t, [Link], LL.B, BBA, BA, HND, Teachers’ Cert. “A”]

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