CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

CASE COMPILATION
Based on Atty. Justin Ryan Morilla’s Syllabus
Digested and Compiled by 4th Year - 4 Year Program Law Students
Jose Maria College - College of Law

RULE 115

CASE TITLE PERSON ASSIGNED DIGESTED

SUBJECT MATTER: Section 1

People vs Sequerra, October 12, 1987 Paniza ✔

People vs Benemerito, 264 SCRA 677 Roxas ✔

People vs Calayca, 301 SCRA 192 Salcedo ✔

People v. Bermas, April 21, 1999 Soriano ✔

People vs Continente, 339 SCRA 1, 2000 Tado ✔

People v. Ayson, July 7, 1989 Tan ✔

People v. Sabayoc, G.R. No. 147201, January Usman ✔

15, 2004

People vs Gallarde, February 17, 2000 Villarin ✔

Beltran vs Samson, 53 Phil 750 Abellana ✔

People v. Crispin, 327 SCRA 167 Alaba ✔

People v. Boholst, 152 SCRA 263 (1987) Arevalo ✔

Canson v. Garchitorena, July 28, 1999 Banuelos ✔

Binay vs Sandiganbayan, October 1, 1999 Boligor ✔

SUBJECT MATTER: Section 1

People vs Sequerra
October 12, 1987
Lyndzelle Jane D. Paniza

Facts: In barangay Calaba in Bangued, Abra, Renato Bonete was shot in the back while driving
his tricycle. Rushed to the hospital, he died shortly upon arrival. In the afternoon of the same
day, Danilo Sequerra was picked up at his residence and thereafter investigated for the killing.

During the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses, all of them positively identified
Sequerra as the killer. One of the witnesses, Rowena Bonete, was actually riding in the tricycle
driven by the victim when he was shot only a few meters after they had passed Sequerra, who
was standing by the road. The other witness, Carolina Bonete, who heard the shot and looked
on the scene of the crime was only 30 meters away and had a clear view of what was happening.
There were no other persons in the vicinity except the killer and his victim. Significantly, both
these witnesses knew Sequerra well and categorically identified him as the killer. There could not
have been, in the circumstances, any possibility of mistaken identity. As for witness Concepcion
Barsuela, she was also positive in pointing to Sequerra as the person whom the victim identified
as the person who had shot him. She said the victim mentioned Sequerra’s name thrice.

On the other hand, Sequerra merely claimed that he was not in Calaba, Abra when the killing
occurred, but in Tarlac.

The trial court gives credence to the witnesses for the prosecution and finds the accused guilty
of murder beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue: Whether the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until contrary is proved
beyond reasonable doubt was violated.

Ruling: No. The presumption of innocence is not an automatic or blanket exoneration. It is at

best only an initial protection. If the prosecution succeeds in refuting the presumption, it then
becomes the outlook of the accused to adduce evidence that will at least raise that inkling of
doubt that he is guilty. Once the armor of the presumption is pierced, so to speak, it is for the
accused to take the offense and ward off the attack.

The attack has not been repelled in this case. It has disarmed and vanquished Sequerra and his
guilt has been laid bare. In the face of the weighty evidence against him, his invocation of the
constitutional presumption of innocence, having failed, must be rejected.

Against his positive identification, all Sequerra offered was the feeble defense of alibi, which he
and his witnesses failed to substantiate. He is condemned, of course, not because he failed to
prove that he was in Tarlac but because the prosecution succeeded in proving that he was in
Calaba, Abra.

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Alibi is an inherently weak defense and is not accepted in the absence of a clear showing that
the accused was not, nor could feasibly have been at the scene of the crime when it was
committed. In this case, the defense is based mainly on Sequerra’s own self-serving testimony
and with rather feeble corroboration at that. This corroboration is also testimonial only. There is
not a single shred of documentary evidence to prove that Sequerra was many kilometers away
from Calaba, Abra when the victim was shot.

People vs Benemerito

RULE 115 | 2
 264 SCRA 677
Editha L. Roxas

Facts: Benjamin Quitoriano and five others charged accused-appellant Alexander "Alex"
Benemerito and his sister, Precy Benemerito, with the crime of Large Scale Illegal Recruitment
wherein the said accused required them to submit documentary requirements and exacting
from them the total the total amount of P583,000.00, Philippine Currency as recruitment fees
without the required necessary license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment.

Alex Benemerito denied having participated in the transaction of his sister, Precy, and that the
complainants admitted before the NBI agents who arrested him that he had nothing to do with
their transaction with Precy Benemerito, who left for Brunei in August, 1993, and that it was only
before the Inquest Fiscal that the complainants pointed to him as the one who received the
money, which he denied.

The trial court ruled that the testimonies of the complainants were "positive and credible," and
found that "accused Alex Benemerito, together with his sister Precy Benemerito, was positively
identified as having promised them employment abroad for a fee and that as shown by a
Certification of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, both Alex and Precy
Benemerito are neither licensed nor authorized by said office to recruit workers for overseas
employment.

On appeal, the accused-appellant asserts that he should be acquitted under the "equipoise rule"
in view of the doubts as to his guilt (his conviction was based mainly on his association with
Precy, that even assuming he helped his sister entertain the complainants, he did so only
because he was also an applicant eager to work abroad, and his sister promised to pay for his
placement fee, that the complainants knew that he was not a part of any conspiracy), and that
the evidence points in fact to his sister Precy as the recruiter who received the money from the
complainants.

Issue: Whether or not the accused should be acquitted under the "equipoise rule".

Ruling: No. The evidence overwhelmingly established the fact that both the accused-appellant
and his sister Precy Benemerito were engaged in the business of illegal recruitment. The
testimonies of the complainants were positive, categorical and firm, that the accused-appellant
actively participated in the recruitment process. The latter was present when each complainant
was offered a job in Japan, and the accused-appellant even made representations as to the
existence of such jobs and accompanied the complainants for their medical examinations. The
accused-appellant likewise received installment payments from the complainants. These acts
demonstrated beyond doubt that the accused-appellant was not merely an applicant for a job
or an unwitting victim of his sister; on the contrary, he was a knowing and willing participant in
the recruitment activities, which were obviously conducted for profit.

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The accused-appellant's plea for the application of the "equipoise rule" must likewise fail. This
rule provides that where the evidence of the parties in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the
constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is,
therefore, no equipoise if the evidence is not "evenly balanced." Not even a semblance of parity
is present in this case. Against the direct, positive and convincing evidence for the prosecution,
the accused-appellant could only offer a mere denial and the incredible claim that he was an
unwitting victim of his sister Precy Benemerito. He miserably failed to overcome the
prosecution's evidence, hence the rule is unavailable to him.

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 People vs Calayca
301 SCRA 192, January 20, 1999
Zusmitha D. Salcedo

Facts: A rape charge was initiated by Neddy Calayca, a 16 year old, against his father Artemio
Calayca. Neddy narrated she was raped by his father inside their house at Barangay Solo,
Balingasag, Misamis Oriental. Her statement was corroborated by her sister, Betty Lani Calayca
and Dr. Angelita A. Enopia, a physician at the Balingasag Medicare Hospital, Misamis Oriental.
A judgment then was rendered by the trial court in a Decision dated June 13, 1995 convicting
Artemio Calayca of the crime charged and imposing upon him the penalty of death.

The trial court imposed the death penalty on Artemio because of the presence of the
circumstance of minority Neddy (she was only 15 years old at the time she was raped on January
29, 1994) as well as their relationship (father and daughter), pursuant to Section 11 of Republic
Act No. 7659 which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue: Whether the imposition of the penalty of death is proper for the crime of rape that was
charged against Artemio Calayca.

Ruling: No. the information filed against Artemio charged only the felony of simple rape and no
attendant qualifying circumstance, specifically that of his being supposedly a guardian of the
victim, was alleged. On this additional consideration, he cannot, therefore, be punished with the
penalty of death even assuming arguendo that he is such a guardian. Neither can that fact be
considered to aggravate his liability as the penalty for simple rape is the single indivisible
penalty of reclusion perpetua (Article 63, Revised Penal Code).

There being no allegation of the minority of Neddy in the Information under which Artemio was
arraigned, he cannot be convicted of qualified rape as he was not properly informed that he is
being accused of qualified rape. Artemio’s conviction of qualified rape violates his constitutional
right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. In a criminal
prosecution, it is the fundamental rule that every element of the crime charged must be alleged
in the Information. The main purpose of this constitutional requirement is to enable the accused
to properly prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts
that constitute the offense.

The failure to allege the fact of minority of Neddy in the Information for rape is fatal and
consequently bars the imposition of the death penalty. Having been informed only of the
elements of simple rape, Artemio can be convicted only of such crime and be punished
accordingly with reclusion perpetua.

RULE 115 | 5
RULE 115 | 6
 People v. Bermas
April 21, 1999
Emilio Soriano

Facts: Manuela P. Bermas stated, in sum, that she had been raped by accused Rufino Mirandilla
Bermas, her own father.

On the day scheduled for his arraignment, the accused was brought before the trial court
without counsel. The court thereupon assigned Atty. Rosa Elmira C. Villamin of the Public
Attorney’s Office to be the counsel de officio. Accused forthwith pleaded not guilty.

The prosecution placed complainant Manuela Bermas at the witness stand. She testified on
direct examination with hardly any participation by defense counsel who, inexplicably, later
waived the cross-examination and then asked the court to be relieved of her duty as counsel de
officio.

Counsel’s request was granted, and Atty. Roberto Gomez was appointed the new counsel de
officio. While Atty. Gomez was ultimately allowed to cross-examine the complainant, it should
be quite evident, however, that he barely had time to prepare therefor.

In view of the fact that the counsel de officio has repeatedly failed to appear in this Court to
defend his client-accused, the Court is hereby constrained to appoint another counsel de officio
to handle the defense of the accused. For this purpose, Atty. Nicanor Lonzame is hereby
appointed as the counsel de officio for accused Rufino Mirandilla Bermas. Atty. Lonzame himself
asked to be relieved as counsel de officio but later, albeit reluctantly, retracted.

The defense counsel in the instant appeal took over from Atty. Lonzame who himself, for one
reason or another, had ceased to appear for and on behalf of Accused-Appellant.

Issue: Was the accused properly given the right to counsel? NO

Ruling: This Court finds and must hold, most regrettably, that accused-appellant has not
properly and effectively been accorded the right to counsel.

The constitutional mandate is reflected in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedures which declares
in Section 1, Rule 115, thereof, that it is a right of the accused at the trial to be present in person
and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings from the arraignment to the promulgation of
the judgment.

The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the
mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the
accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the
cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the
lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of

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the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the
fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to
counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his
client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple
perfunctory representation.

The Court sees no other choice than to direct the remand of the case to the court a quo for new
trial.

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 People vs Continente
339 SCRA 1, 2000
Diann Kathelline A. Tado

Facts: Donato Continente and several other John Does were initially charged with the crimes of
murder and frustrated murder in connection with the shooting incident on April 21, 1989 at the
corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City which caused the death of
U.S. Col. James N. Rowe while seriously wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. After the arrest of
another suspect, Juanito Itaas, on August 27, 1989 in Davao City, the prosecution, with prior
leave of court, filed two (2) separate amended Informations for murder and frustrated murder to
include Juanito T. Itaas, among the other accused.

During the interrogation which was conducted by CIS Investigator Virgilio Pablico in the
presence of Atty. Bonifacio Manansala in Camp Crame on June 17, 1989, appellant Continente
admitted to his participation in the ambush of Col. James Rowe and his driver as a member of
the surveillance unit under the Political Assassination Team of the CPP-NPA. Pablico investigated
and took down the statements of appellant Itaas who disclosed during the investigation that he
was an active member of the Sparrow Unit of the NPA based in Davao City and confessed, in the
presence of Atty. Filemon Corpuz who apprised and explained to him his constitutional rights,
that he was one of those who fired at the gray Mitsubishi Galant car of Col. James Rowe. The
testimony of prosecution eyewitness Meriam R. Zulueta positively identified the appellants.

For the defense, appellant Juanito Itaas testified and denied the truth of the contents of his
sworn statements which are respectively dated August 29, 1989 and August 30, 1989, insofar as
the same establish his participation in the ambush of Col. James Rowe and his driver on April 21,
1989. Appellant Itaas testified that he was allegedly tortured by his captors on August 27 and 28,
1989 in Davao City; that he was blindfolded and a masking tape was placed on his mouth; and
that subsequently, he was hit and mauled while a cellophane was placed on his head thus,
causing him to loss consciousness.

Appellant Itaas further testified that he affixed his signatures on his sworn statements dated
August 29 and 30, 1989 in the presence of the CIS officers and that Atty. Filemon Corpus was
not present during those two occasions. The said appellant admitted having sworn to the truth
of the contents of his said sworn statements before the administering fiscal, but he disclosed
that the CIS officers previously threatened him to admit the contents of the two sworn
statements.

Appellant Continente affirmed the truth of his personal circumstances only which appear on his
sworn statement dated June 17, 1989 but denied having made the rest of the statements
embodied therein. The said appellant claimed that he initially denied any knowledge in the
killing of Col. James Rowe but CIS Investigator Pablico maintained that he (Continente) knew
something about it; that appellant Continente was alone with Investigator Pablico during the
investigation; that he signed his sworn statement in the presence of Pablico and swore to the
truth thereof before the administering fiscal for fear that something might happen to him while

RULE 115 | 9
he was alone; that he signed the last page of his sworn statement first before signing the waiver
of his constitutional rights upon arrival of Atty. Bonifacio Manansala whose legal services was
engaged by the CIS Investigators; and that he had no opportunity to talk with Atty. Manansala
who left after he (Atty. Manansala) signed, merely as witness, the first page of his sworn
statement, which is the waiver of his constitutional rights.

Issue: Whether or not the waivers of the constitutional rights during custodial investigation by
the appellants were valid; and

Ruling: Yes. The rights of the accused during custodial investigation are enshrined in Article III,
Section 12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:

"Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel."

The rights to remain silent and to counsel may be waived by the accused provided that the
constitutional requirements are complied with. It must appear clear that the accused was initially
accorded his right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. In addition, the waiver must be in writing and
in the presence of counsel. If the waiver complies with the constitutional requirements, then the
extrajudicial confession will be tested for voluntariness, i. e., if it was given freely-without
coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and credibility, i.e., if it was consistent with
the normal experience of mankind.

In assailing the validity of their written statements, appellants Donato Continente and Juanito
Itaas contend that they were not properly informed of their custodial rights under the
constitution as to enable them to make a valid waiver.

We have consistently declared in a string of cases that the advice or "Paliwanag" found at the
beginning of extrajudicial confessions that merely enumerate to the accused his custodial rights
do not meet the standard provided by law. They are terse and perfunctory statements that do
not evince a clear and sufficient effort to inform and explain to the appellant his constitutional
rights. We emphasized that when the constitution requires a person under investigation "to be
informed" of his rights to remain silent and to have an independent and competent counsel
preferably of his own choice, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle. In other words, the right of a person under investigation "to be
informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and
contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding of what is conveyed.
Short of this, there is a denial of the right.

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It must be noted however, that far from being a mere enumeration of the custodial rights of an
accused, the aforequoted portions ("Paliwanag") of the written statements contain an
explanation as to the nature of the investigation. They also include an advice that the appellants
may choose not to give any statement to the investigator and a warning that any statement
obtained from the appellants may be used in favor or against them in court. In addition, they
contain an advice that the appellants may engage the services of a lawyer of their own choice. If
they cannot afford the services of a lawyer, they will be provided with one by the government
for free. Thereafter, both appellants manifested to CIS Investigator Virgilio Pablico their
intentions to give their statements even in the absence of counsel.

We agree with the trial court's observation that the retention by appellant Continente of Atty.
Bonifacio Manansala as his counsel until the early stages of his case in the lower court and his
subsequent decision to engage the legal services of Atty. Manansala's relative, Atty. Ceferino
Manansala, who represented the said appellant throughout the proceedings in the absence of
the former bespeaks of the trust he had for the said lawyer. On the other hand, while it is
admitted that Atty. Felimon Corpuz served in the military as prosecutor in the Efficiency and
Separation Board of the armed forces, such fact is not sufficient to adjudge the said lawyer as
biased against the appellant (Itaas) in the absence of any concrete evidence to that effect. The
defense also failed to adduce substantial evidence to support a finding that Atty. Corpuz was
short of being a vigilant and effective counsel for the said appellant.

RULE 115 | 11
 People v. Ayson
July 7, 1989
Cesnee Joyce V. Tan

Facts: Ramos was a Philippine Airlines ticket freight clerk assigned in Baguio. He was allegedly
involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets. PAL management notified him that an
investigation will be conducted on the matter. The day before the investigation, Ramos gave his
superiors handwritten notes stating his willingness to settle the irregularities. At the
investigation, Ramos was informed of the finding of the Audit Team. His answers in response to
questions asked by PAL branch manager Cruz were taken in writing. Two months later, an
Information was filed against Ramos charging him with the crime of estafa. Ramos entered a
plea of not guilty and trial ensued. The private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence
which included that statement of accused (the handwritten notes) as well as his handwritten
admission (the written responses to the questions). Respondent Judge did not admit those
stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have
counsel

Issues:
a) Whether the right against self-incrimination is available in an administrative case
b) Whether the Exhibits should be excluded in evidence on the ground that Miranda rights were
not accorded to the accused.

Ruling:
a) YES. The right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives evidence,
whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative
proceeding. The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself"

The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be
claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It
follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the
appropriate time.

b) NO. The exhibits should not be excluded in evidence.

Judge Ayson has misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate rights set forth in
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken them as applying to the same
juridical situation, equating one with the other.

The right to self-incrimination and custodial investigation are accorded only when the accused is
subjected to custodial inquest which involves the questioning initiated by police authorities after
a person is taken in custody or deprived of his freedom in any way. Because the statements were

RULE 115 | 12
obtained beyond the purview of custodial investigation the evidence should be admitted in
court.

It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under
custodial interrogation, prior to and during the administrative inquiry which he appeared to
have had a hand. It is also clear that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on
the first day of the administrative investigation and agreed that the proceedings should be
recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action
subsequently filed against him was a free and even spontaneous act on his part.

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 People v. Sabayoc
G.R. No. 147201, January 15, 2004
Hanna-Tunisia Fatima Usman

Facts: An information was filed charging Benjamin Sayaboc, Patricio Escorpiso, Marlon
Buenviaje, and Miguel Buenviaje with murder. On 8 March 1995, Pilar and Jaramillo identified
Benjamin Sayaboc at the PNP Provincial Headquarters in Bayombong as the gunman who shot
Joseph Galam to death. On the afternoon of that day, SPO4 Cagungao was called to the
Provincial Command Headquarters in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, to take the statement of
Sayaboc. When he arrived at the headquarters he saw Sayaboc being interviewed by reporters
inside the investigation room. He then brought Sayaboc to the inner part of the room. Before
taking the statement of Sayaboc, he advised the latter of his constitutional rights. Then Sayaboc
told him that he wanted to have a counsel of his own choice. But since Sayaboc could not name
one, Cagungao asked the police officers to get a lawyer. Half an hour later, the police officers
brought Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo of the PAO, who then conferred with Sayaboc for a while. After
Cagungao heard Sayaboc say, "okay," he continued the investigation, during which Atty. Cornejo
remained silent the entire time. However, Cagungao would stop questioning Sayaboc whenever
Atty. Cornejo would leave to go to the comfort room. That night Sayaboc executed an
extrajudicial confession in Ilocano dialect. He therein confessed to killing Joseph Galam at the
behest of Marlon Buenviaje for the sum of P100,000. He likewise implicated Miguel Buenviaje
and Patricio Escorpiso. The confession was also signed by Atty. Cornejo and attested to by one
Fiscal Melvin Tiongson.

Issue #1: Whether Sayaboc’s extrajudicial admission was admissible to the court. (NO)
Issue #2: Whether Sayaboc was afforded his constitutional right to a competent counsel. (NO)

Ruling: Apart from the absence of an express waiver of his rights, the confession contains the
passing of information of the kind held to be in violation of the right to be informed under
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. In People v. Jara, the Court explained:

The stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later
repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Police investigators either
automatically type it together with the curt "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or
even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style does not
create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The
showing of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.

The right to be informed requires "the transmission of meaningful information rather than just
the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." It should allow
the suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of these

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rights. More so when the suspect is one like Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of
Grade IV, was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of the police
officers for two days previous to the investigation, albeit for another offense.

Sayaboc was not afforded his constitutional right to a competent counsel. While we are unable
to rule on the unsubstantiated claim that Atty. Cornejo was partial to the police, still, the facts
show through the testimonies of Sayaboc and prosecution witness SPO4 Cagungao that Atty.
Cornejo remained silent throughout the duration of the custodial investigation.

The right to a competent and independent counsel means that the counsel should satisfy
himself, during the conduct of the investigation, that the suspect understands the import and
consequences of answering the questions propounded. In People v. Deniega, we said:

The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered

meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful
advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so
cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired.

This is not to say that a counsel should try to prevent an accused from making a confession.
Indeed, as an officer of the court, it is an attorney’s duty to, first and foremost, seek the truth.
However, counsel should be able, throughout the investigation, to explain the nature of the
questions by conferring with his client and halting the investigation should the need arise. The
duty of a lawyer includes ensuring that the suspect under custodial investigation is aware that
the right of an accused to remain silent may be invoked at any time.

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 People vs Gallarde
February 17, 2000
Paulo Jose S. Villarin

Facts: In the evening of May 26, 1997, at the house of spouses, their neighbors converged.
Among them were appellant and others. Idling by was Editha, 10 year old daughter of spouses
Talan. A fluorescent lamp illuminated them as they partook beer. Thereafter, Editha entered the
kitchen and took hold of a kerosene lamp. Jaime followed her and asked where she was going.
Editha answered that she would look for appellant. Soon Editha left enroute to where appellant.
Moments later, Roger arrived and informed them that Editha was missing. Roger asked the
group to help look for her. The searchers found appellant squatting with his short pants. His
hands and knees were covered with soil. Asked where Editha was, appellant replied: “I do not
know, I did not do anything to her.” The searchers, thereafter, noticed disheveled grasses. Along
the way, they saw a wide hole among the disheveled grass. They found the dead body of the
victim. Mindful of appellant’s safety, Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to bring appellant to the
municipal building. On their way though, they met policemen on board a vehicle. He flagged
them down and turned over the person of appellant, saying that he is the suspect in the
disappearance of the little girl. The policemen together with appellant proceeded to where the
people found Editha. One of the policemen shoved more soil aside. The lifeless Editha was
completely naked when she was recovered. The cause of Editha’s death as revealed in the post-
mortem examination showed “suffocation of the lungs as a result from powerful covering of the
nose and mouth, associated with laceration of the vagina and raptured hymen. The trial court
found the appelant guilty of homicide. Hence the appeal.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting him of murder in an information
charging him of rape with homicide.
2. Whether The taking of pictures of an accused violates of his constitutional right
against self-incrimination.

Ruling:
1. No. The Supreme court sustains Gallarde’s contention that the trial court erred in convicting
him of murder in an information charging him of rape with homicide. A reading of the
accusatory portion of the information shows that there was no allegation of any qualifying
circumstance.
Although it is true that the term “homicide” as used in special complex crime of rape with
homicide is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical
injuries committed by reason or on the occasion of rape, it is settled in this jurisdiction that

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where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the
component offense, the accused can be convicted of the other.

In rape with homicide, in order to be convicted of murder in case the evidence fails to support
the charge of rape, the qualifying circumstance must be sufficiently alleged and proved.
Otherwise, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the
offense with which he is charged. It is fundamental that every element of the offense must be
alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of
a crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.
He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

In the absence then in the information of an allegation of any qualifying circumstance, Gallarde
cannot be convicted of murder. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that
with which he is charged in the complaint or information under which he is tried. It matters not
how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be
convicted of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information for which he is
tried, or is necessarily included in that which is charged. He has a right to be informed of the
nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial. To convict an accused of
a higher offense than that charged in the complaint or information under which he is tried
would be an unauthorized denial of that right.

2. No. The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a
purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.

The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body
in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition
as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of
counsel is not required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial
compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it
has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical
examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to submit to
physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as
to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel
morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with
bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or
replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.

RULE 115 | 17
RULE 115 | 18
 Beltran v. Samson
53 Phil. 750
Jean Marie L. Abellana

Facts: Francisco Beltran complains that the respondent judge ordered him to appear before the
provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. The order was given
upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing Beltran’s handwriting and determining
whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.
Beltran, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the constitutional
provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58.

Issue: Whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by Beltran for the purpose of comparing
his handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified,
constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional
provision under examination.

Ruling: Yes. As a general rule, whenever the defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his
own behalf, denies that a certain writing or signature is in his own hand, he may on cross-
examination be compelled to write in open court in order that the jury maybe able to compare
his handwriting with the one in question.

This is true when the defendant, in offering himself as witness in his own behalf, waived his
personal privileges or where the judge asked the defendant to write his name during the
hearing, and the latter did so voluntarily.

But in this case, it does not appear that any information was filed against Beltran for the
supposed falsification; this is only an investigation prior to the information and with a view to
filing it.

In a case wherein the handwriting or the form of writing of the defendant was obtained before
the criminal action was instituted against him, the same is only possible if the defendant
voluntarily offered to write, to furnish a specimen of his handwriting. In the case at bar, Beltran
here did not voluntary give specimens of his handwriting. In fact, he refuses to do so and has
even instituted these prohibition proceedings that he may not be compelled to do so.

Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a
purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in
the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine
whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states.

For purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled
to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for
in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. But, the present case is
more serious than that of compelling the production of documents or chattels, because here the

RULE 115 | 19
witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does
not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier.

It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the
petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the
circumstance that Beltran is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal
to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain
specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for
trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution.

What is required of Beltran here is to compel him to perform a positive, testimonial act, to write
and give a specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of comparison. It was not about seeking
to exhibit something already in existence, but a question that deals with something not yet in
existence, and it is precisely sought to compel Beltran to make, prepare, or produce by this
means, evidence not yet in existence; in short, to create this evidence which may seriously
incriminate him.

RULE 115 | 20
 People v. Crispin
327 SCRA 167 (March 2, 2000)
Michelle M. Alaba

Facts: Edgar Crispin was accused to have murdered Miguel Badenas with the help of a number
of others. He was the only one to have been arrested, arraigned, and put to trial. He was
consequently found guilty.

His conviction was based primarily on the testimony of Honorio Cabailo asserting that he
recognized Crispin despite the darkness of the night. Reference was also made to the affidavit of
Cesar Delima who claimed to have witnessed Crispin and four others attack and kill Badenas
with the aid of a flashlight. Cesar Delima was named a principal witness in the Information, but
he failed to testify despite being subpoenaed twice.

In considering the affidavit as evidence, the RTC reasoned that the sworn statement formed part
of the record of the case on preliminary investigation.

Issue: Whether Crispin was denied the right to confront, to cross-examine, or to meet the
witnesses face-to-face

Ruling: YES. We cannot uphold the ruling of the RTC. Affidavits cannot be allowed because they
cannot be cross-examined.

An affidavit is hearsay and has weak probative value, unless the affiant is placed on the witness
stand to testify on it. Being hearsay evidence, it is inadmissible because the party against whom
it is presented is deprived of his right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the
statement or writing is attributed. The right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him is a fundamental right of every accused which may not be summarily done away with.
Another reason why the right to confrontation is so essential is because the trial judge’s duty to
observe and test the credibility of the affiant can only be met by his being brought to the
witness stand. That the affidavit formed part of the record of the preliminary investigation does
not justify its being treated as evidence because the record of the preliminary investigation does
not form part of the record of the case in the RTC. Such record must be introduced as evidence
during trial, and the trial court is not compelled to take judicial notice of the same. The
prosecution having failed to present Cesar Delima as a witness, his sworn statement was
patently inadmissible and deserves no consideration at all.

*Crispin was acquitted of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.

RULE 115 | 21
 People v. Boholst
152 SCRA 263 (1987)
Honeelee E. Arevalo

Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8, finding
accused-appellant Rodolfo Boholst y Amadore guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
violating Sec. 4, Art. 11 in relation to Sec. 21(b), Art. IV, R.A. 6425.

The second assignment of error centers on the court's admission of documents (They are
receipts for property seized (Exh. C), the marked P20.00 bill with conforme of the accused (Exh.
E); and a signature on the Booking and Arrest Sheet (Exh. F) which, according to the defense,
were obtained in violation of the appellant's constitutional right. The same were allegedly
obtained through force, coercion, and intimidation, and that the accused was without counsel
when he signed the statements.

Issue: Whether or not the documents signed by the appellant were obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights.

Ruling: NO. Appellant's claim of maltreatment is untenable. The records show that he never
requested for a medical examination or treatment of his alleged injuries. There is no confession
or extrajudicial statement involved in this case. The accused-appellant did not give any
statement against his own interests.

The appellant's contention that the prosecution's evidence is inadmissible due to the
absence of a counsel is immaterial since the documents referred to are not confessions or
extrajudicial statements. They are receipts for property seized (Exh. C) with the specimen
signature of the accused, the marked P20.00 bill with conforme of the accused (Exh. E); and a
signature on the Booking and Arrest Sheet (Exh. F)…even if the accused refused to sign the
receipt, the marked bill, or the booking and arrest sheet, the court can still evaluate the
testimony of the apprehending officers to arrive at the facts of the case. The conviction is not
based on the appellant's signatures.

RULE 115 | 22
 Canson v. Garchitorena
July 28, 1999
Kelvinn L. Banuelos

Facts: On November 21, 1995, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan eleven (11)
informations for murder against the therein named members of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) which the Ombudsman amended on March 1, 1996 downgrading the charges against
accused Panfilo M. Lacson from principal to accessory after the fact.

On March 6, 1997, herein complainant received from the Sandiganbayan a copy of the
Resolution dated September 4, 1996 (ANNEX L) resolving the motions for reconsideration.
Although dated six (6) months earlier, the said resolution was promulgated on March 5, 1997. It
was signed by its ponente, Associate Justice Lagman on September 4, 1996, concurred in by
Associate Justice Demetriou on October 30, 1997 and by respondent Justice de Leon on
February 28, 1997. A separate dissent thereto was filed by Associate Justice Balajadia on October
28, 1996 while respondent Presiding Justice entered his dissent on February 26, 1997.

Complainant argued that despite the readiness of Associate Justices Lagman, Demetriou and
Balajadia to dispose of the incident as of October 1996, respondent Justices clearly delayed
action on the motions for reconsideration. Their action was knowingly and intentionally delayed
in anticipation of the amendatory law that would eliminate the jurisdictional objections for the
Sandiganbayan to try and decide the subject criminal cases.

Complainant invokes this Courts disciplinary authority over the respondent Sandiganbayan
Presiding Justice praying that he be held accountable for having tarried overlong in resolving
the motions for reconsideration and for stonewalling Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 in
violation of: 1.] Section 7, P.D. No. 1606; 2.] Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan;
3.] Rules 1.02, 2.01, 3.01 and 3.05 of the Canons of Judicial Conduct. Complainant also faults the
respondents with gross misconduct for knowingly and deliberately delaying the transfer of the
said criminal cases to the RTC of Quezon City.

Issue: Is SB Judge Garchitorena guilty in delaying the administration of justice?

Held: YES. Once again we reiterate that tired old legal maxim, justice delayed is justice denied. It
need not be overemphasized that this oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of
disputes much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the
right to a speedy trial, which, as defined is one [c]onducted according to the law of criminal
procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.

The primordial purpose of this constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of the accused
by delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of time. It, likewise, is intended to
prevent delays in the administration of justice by requiring judicial tribunals to proceed with
reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal prosecutions.

RULE 115 | 23
Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people’s faith in the judiciary. Hence,
magistrates are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross
inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions on them.

RULE 115 | 24
 Binay vs Sandiganbayan
October 1, 1999
Terry Louise P. Boligor

Facts: On September 7, 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan
three separate informations against Jejomar Binay, one for violation of Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code, and two for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The informations, which were
subsequently amended on September 15, 1994, all alleged that the acts constituting these
crimes were committed in 1987 during Binay’s incumbency as Mayor of Makati.

Binay moved to quash the informations. He contended that the six-year delay from the time the
charges were filed in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 27, 1988 to the time the
informations were filed in the Sandiganbayan on September 7, 1994 constituted a violation of
his right to due process. Arraignment of the accused was held in abeyance pending the
resolution of this motion.

Issue: Whether or not Binay’s right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated by the
inordinate delay in the resolution of the subject cases by the Ombudsman. -NO

Ruling: There was no violation on his Constitutional right to speedy trial.

Article III of the Constitution provides that:

Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in
all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any
party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice.

However, the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays;
or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without
cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having
his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant
has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in
which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as
the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by
the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of speedy disposition is a
relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.

RULE 115 | 25
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the
application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular
regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
In petitioner Binays case, the Court finds that there was no undue delay in the disposition of the
subject cases. The proceedings conducted before the Office of the Tanodbayan, and later with
the Office of the Ombudsman, adequately explains the length of the delay. Ten charges are
involved in these cases and the prosecution, unable to rely on the raw findings of the
Commission on Audit in 15 reports caused the investigation and examination of thousands of
vouchers, payrolls, and supporting documents considering that no less than the Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, assisted by a team supervisor and 10 team members had to take part in
the conduct of a final audit consisting of evaluation and analysis of the initial findings in the 15
raw reports, the cases must have involved complicated legal and factual issues which do warrant
or justify a longer period of time for preliminary investigation.

RULE 115 | 26