[G.R. Nos. 122250 & 122258. July 21, 1997.

EDGARDO C. NOLASCO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, and EDUARDO
A. ALARILLA, Respondents.

FLORENTINO P. BLANCO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and

EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, Respondents.

Pete Quirino-Cuadra for petitioner in G.R. No. 122250.

Benitez, Parlade, Africa, Herrera, Parlade & Panga Law Offices for petitioner
G.R. No. 122258.

Romulo B. Macalintal, and George S. Briones for Private Respondent.

SYNOPSIS

In the 1995 election for Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Florentino Blanco won over
Eduardo Alarilla while Edgardo Nolasco was elected vice-mayor. Alarilla however, filed
with the COMELEC a petition to disqualify Blanco. The COMELEC (First Division), on the
ground of vote-buying, disqualified Blanco who moved for reconsideration in the
COMELEC en banc. Nolasco, as vice-mayor, intervened in the proceedings, moved for
reconsideration, urging that as vice-mayor he should be declared Mayor in the event
Blanco was finally disqualified, citing Section 44 of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of
1991) and the Courts’ decision in Labo v. COMELEC. The COMELEC en banc denied both
motions for reconsideration. Hence, this two petitions for certiorari by Blanco and
Nolasco. The Court affirmed the resolution of the COMELEC en banc but with
modification that Nolasco is adjudged Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan in view of the
disqualification of Blanco.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; PETITION FOR

DISQUALIFICATION; COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION OVER PROCLAMATION AND
DISQUALIFICATION CASES. — It cannot be denied that the COMELEC has jurisdiction
over proclamation and disqualification cases. Article IX-C, Section 2 of the Constitution
endows the COMELEC the all encompassing power to "enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election . . ." We have long ruled that this
broad power includes the power to cancel proclamations. Section 68 of B.P. Blg. 881
(Omnibus Election Code) and Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.

2. ID.; PETITIONS FOR DISQUALIFICATION ARE SUBJECT TO SUMMARY HEARINGS. —

Petitions for disqualification are subject to summary hearings. Blanco also urges that
COMELEC erred in using summary proceedings to resolve his disqualification case.
Again, the COMELEC action is safely anchored on Section 4 of its Rules of Procedure
which expressly provides that petitions for disqualification "shall be heard summarily
after due notice." Vote-buying has its criminal and electoral aspects. Its criminal aspect
to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be the subject of summary
 hearing. However, its electoral aspect to ascertain whether the offender should be
disqualified from office can be determined in an administrative proceeding that is
summary in character.

3. ID.; RESOLUTION NO. 2050; COMELEC CANNOT ALWAYS BE STRAITJACKETED BY

THE PROCEDURAL RULE UNDER RESOLUTION NO. 2050. — We hold that COMELEC
cannot always be straitjacketed by this procedural rule. The COMELEC has explained
that the resolution was passed to take care of the proliferation of disqualification cases
at that time. It deemed it wise to delegate its authority to its Law Department as partial
solution to the problem. The May 8, 1995 elections, however, did not result in a surfeit
of disqualification cases which the COMELEC cannot handle. Hence, its decision to
resolve the disqualification of Blanco directly and without referring it to its Law
Department is within its authority, a sound exercise of its discretion. The action of the
COMELEC is in accord with Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646.

4. ID.; THE CASE LAW IS THAT IN A MAYORALTY ELECTION, THE CANDIDATE WHO
OBTAINED THE SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES CANNOT BE PROCLAIMED
WINNER IN THE CASE THE WINNING CANDIDATE IS DISQUALIFIED. — Our case law is
now settled that in a mayoralty election, the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes, in this case Alarilla, cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning
candidate is disqualified. Thus, we reiterated the rule in the fairly recent case of Reyes
v. COMELEC viz: . . . "We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC in denying claimed mayor petitioner Julius O. Garcia’s petition to be
proclaimed mayor in view of the disqualification of Renato U. Reyes." That the
candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified is not settled. The doctrinal
instability caused by see-sawing rulings has since been removed. In the latest ruling on
the question, this Court said: To simplistically assume that the second placer would
have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the
voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was
repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the
first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified
candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to
extrapolate the results under the circumstances. "Garcia’s plea that the votes cast for
Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The votes cast for Reyes are presumed to have
been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reason can not be treated
as stray, void, or meaningless. The subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot
retroact to the date of the elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him."
Consequently, respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it
failed to follow the above doctrine, a descendant of our ruling in Labo v. COMELEC.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

First, we rewind the facts. The election for mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan was held on
May 8, 1995. The principal protagonists were petitioner Florentino P. Blanco and private
respondent Eduardo A. Alarilla. Blanco received 29,753 votes, while Alarilla got 23,038
votes. 1 Edgardo Nolasco was elected Vice-Mayor with 37,240 votes.

On May 9, 1995, Alarilla filed with the COMELEC a petition to disqualify Blanco. He
alleged: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"x       x       x

"4. Based on intelligence reports that respondent was maintaining his own ‘private
army’ at his aforesaid resident, P/Insp. Ronaldo O. Lee of the Philippine National Police
assigned with the Intelligence Command at Camp Crame, applied for and was granted
search warrant no. 95-147 by Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila on 5 May
1995. A copy of the said search warrant is attached as Annex "A" hereof.

5. In compliance with said search warrant no. 95-147, an elite composite team of the
PNP Intelligence Command, Criminal Investigation Service (CIS), and Bulacan Provincial
Command, backed up by the Philippine National Police Special Action Force,
accompanied by mediamen who witnessed and recorded the search by video and still
cameras, raided the house of respondent Florentino Blanco at his stated address at
Bancal, Meycauayan, Bulacan.

6. Enclosed as Annex. "A-1" is a video tape taken of the proceedings during the raid.

7. The composite team was able to enter the said premises of respondent Florentino
Blanco where they conducted a search of the subject firearms and ammunition.

8. The search resulted in the arrest of six (6) men who were found carrying various
high powered firearms without any license or authority to use or possess such long
arms. These persons composing respondent’s ‘private army,’ and the unlicensed
firearms are as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A. Virgilio Luna y Valderama —

1. PYTHOM (sic) Cal. 347 SN 26946 with six (6) Rounds of Ammo.

2. INGRAM M10 Cal. 45 MP with Suppressor SN: 45457 with two (2) Mags and 54
Rounds of Ammo.

B. Raymundo Bahala y Pon —

1. HKMP5 Sn. C334644 with two (2) Mags and 47 Rounds of Ammo.

C. Roberto Santos y Sacris —

1. Smith and Wesson 357 Magnum Sn: 522218 with six (6) Rounds of Ammo.

D. Melchor Cabanero y Oreil —

1. Armscor 12 Gauge with three (3) Rounds of Ammo.

E. Edgardo Orteza y Asuncion —

1. Paltik Cal. 38 Rev with six (6) Rounds of Ammo.

F. Francisco Libari y Calimag —

1. Paltik Cal. 38 SN: 36869

Copies of the inventory receipts are hereto attached as Annexes "B" to "B-5" hereof.

9. During the search, members of the composite team saw through a large clear glass
window, respondent’s Galil assault rifle on a sofa inside a closed room of the subject
premises.

10. Not allowed entry thereto by respondent and his wife, the members of the
composite police-military team applied for the issuance of a second search warrant
(Annex "B-6") so that they could enter the said room to seize the said firearm.

11. While waiting for the issuance of the second search warrant, respondent’s wife and
respondent’s brother, Mariano Blanco, claiming to be the campaign manager of
respondent in the Nationalist People’s Coalition Party, asked permission to enter the
locked room so they could withdraw money in a vault inside the locked room to pay
their watchers, and the teachers of Meycauayan in the 8 May 1995 elections.

12. For reasons not known to petitioner, Mrs. Florentino Blanco and Mariano Blanco,
were allowed to withdraw ten (10) large plastic bags from the vault.

13. When the said PNP composite team examined the ten (10) black plastic bags, they
found out that each bag contained ten (10) shoe boxes. Each shoe box when examined
contained 200 pay envelopes, and each pay envelope when opened contained the
amount of P1,000.00. When questioned, respondent’s brother Mariano Blanco and
respondent’s wife, admitted to the raiding team that the total amount of money in the
ten (10) plastic bags is P10,000,000.00.

14. The labels found in the envelope shows that the money were intended as
respondent’s bribe money to the teachers of Meycauayan. Attached as Annex "C" is the
cover of one of the shoe boxes containing the inscription that it is intended to the
teachers of Brgy. Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan.

15. On election day 8 May 1995, respondent perpetrated the most massive vote-buying
activity ever in the history of Meycauayan politics. Attached as Annex "D" is the
envelope where this P10,000,000.00 was place in 100 peso denominations totalling one
thousand pesos per envelope with the inscription ‘VOTE !!! TINOY.’chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

This massive vote-buying activity was engineered by the respondent through his
organization. called ‘MTB’ or ‘MOVEMENT FOR TINOY BLANCO VOLUNTEERS.’ The
chairman of this movement is respondent’s brother, Mariano P. Blanco, who admitted to
the police during the raid that these money were for the teachers and watchers of
Meycauayan. Bulacan.
Attached as Annex "E" hereof is an MTB ID issued to one Armando Bulan of Precinct 77-
A, Brgy. Jasmin, Bancal, Meycauayan, Bulacan. You will note that the ID is perforated in
the middle. The purpose is for the voter to tear the office copy and return it to
respondent’s headquarters to receive the balance of the P500.00 of the bribe money
after voting for respondent during the elections. The voter will initially be given a down-
payment of P500.00.

16. This massive vote-buying was also perpetrated by respondent thru the familiar use
of flying voters. Attached as Annex "F" hereof is a copy of the Police Blotter dated 8
May 1995 showing that six (6) flying voters were caught in different precincts of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, who admitted after being caught and arrested that they were
paid P200.00 to P300.00 by respondent and his followers, to vote for other voters in
the voter’s list.

17. Not satisfied, and with his overflowing supply of money, respondent used another
scheme as follows. Respondent’s paid voter will identify his target from the list of voter
and will impersonate said voter in the list and falsify his signature.

Attached as Annex "G" hereof is the Minutes of Voting and Counting of Votes in Precinct
No. 26, Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. Annex "G-1" is the statement of one Ma.
Luisa de los Reyes Cruz stating that when she went to her precinct to vote, her name
was already voted upon by another person. This entry was noted by Leticia T. Villanco,
Poll Chairman; Estelita Artajo, — Poll Clerk; and Nelson John Nito — Poll Member.

18. Earlier before the election, respondent used his tremendous money to get in the
good graces or the local Comelec Registrar, who was replaced by this Office upon the
petition of the people of Meycauayan. Attached as Annex "H" hereof is an article in the
3 May 1995 issue of Abante entitled ‘1 M Suhol sa Comelec Registrar.’

19. The second search warrant on respondent’s residence yielded to more firearms and
thousands of rounds of ammunition. These guns were used by respondent to terrorize
the population and make the people afraid to complain against respondent’s massive
vote buying and cheating in today’s elections. Respondent’s bribery of the teachers
ensured the implementation of his vote-buying ballot box switching, impersonations,
and other cheating schemes.

Attached as Annexes ‘I-1’ to I-2’ are the pertinent Receipts of the guns and
ammunitions seized from Respondent. Attached as Annex "J" is a Certification to the
same effect.

20. The above acts committed by respondent are clear grounds for disqualification
under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code for giving money to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters or public officials performing election functions; for committing acts
of terrorism to enhance his candidacy, and for spending in his election campaign an
amount in excess of that allowed by the Election Code. There are only 97,000
registered voters in Meycauayan versus respondent’s expenses of at least
P10,000,000.00 as admitted above. (Emphasis supplied).

On May 15, 1995, Alarilla filed a Very Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Suspend Proclamation.
The COMELEC (First Division) granted the motion after finding that there was a
"probable commission of election offenses which are grounds for disqualification
pursuant to the provisions of section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), and
the evidence in support of disqualification is strong." It directed the Municipal Board of
Canvassers "to complete the canvassing of election returns of the municipality of
Meycauayan, but to suspend proclamation of respondent Florentino P. Blanco should he
obtain the winning number of votes for the position of Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan
until such time when the petitions for disqualification, against him shall have been
resolved." cralaw virtua1aw library

On May 25, 1995, Blanco filed a Motion to Lift or Set Aside the Order suspending his
proclamation. On May 29, 1995, he filed his Answer to the petition to disqualify him.

On May 30, 1995, the COMELEC (First Division) heard the petition to disqualify Blanco.
The parties thereafter submitted their positions papers. 2 Blanco even replied to the
position paper of Alarilla on June 9, 1995.

On August 15, 1995, the COMELEC (First Division) disqualified Blanco on the ground of
vote-buying, viz.: 3

"x       x       x

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVES to

DISQUALIFY Respondent Florentino P. Blanco as a candidate for the Office of Mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan in the May 8, 1995 elections for having violated Section 261 (a)
of the Omnibus Election Code. The Order suspending the proclamation of herein
Respondent is now made PERMANENT. The Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Meycauayan, Bulacan shall immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed
canvass of the election returns, determine the winner out of the remaining qualified
candidates who shall be immediately proclaimed.

SO ORDERED." cralaw virtua1aw library

Blanco moved for reconsideration on August 19, 1995 in the COMELEC en banc.
Nolasco, as vice mayor, intervened in the proceedings. 4 He moved for reconsideration
of that part of the resolution directing the Municipal Board of Canvassers to
"immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass of the election
returns, determine the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates who shall be
immediately proclaimed." He urged that as vice-mayor he should be declared mayor in
the event Blanco was finally disqualified. The motions were heard on September 7,
1995. The parties were allowed to file their memoranda with right of reply. On October
23, 1995, the COMELEC en banc denied the motions for reconsideration.

In this petition for certiorari, 5 Blanco contends: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"x       x       x

18. Respondent COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse or discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction and acted arbitrarily in affirming en toto and adopting as
its own the majority decision of the First Division in that: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
18.1 It upheld the validity of the May 17, 1995 order suspending proclamation of
Petitioner Blanco herein as the winning candidate for Mayor of Meycauayan without the
benefit of any notice or hearing in gross and palpable violation of Blanco’s constitutional
right to due process of law.

18.2 It violated the provisions of COMELEC Res. No. 2050 as amended, prescribing the
procedure for disposing of disqualification cases arising out of the prohibited acts
mentioned in Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, which Resolution this Honorable
Tribunal explicitly sanctioned in the case of Lozano v. Yorac. Moreover, it (COMELEC)
violated Blanco’s right to equal protection of the laws by setting him apart from other
respondents facing similar disqualification suits whose case were referred by COMELEC
to the Law Department pursuant to Com. Res. No. 2050 and ordering their
proclamation — an, act which evidently discriminated against Petitioner Blanco herein.

18.3 It decided Petitioner Blanco’s disqualification case in a SUMMARY PROCEEDING in

violation of law and the precedents which consistently hold that questions of VOTE-
BUYING, terrorism similar such acts should be resolve in a formal election protest
where the issue of vote buying is subjected to a full-dress hearing instead of disposing
of the issue in a summary proceeding;

18.4 It declared Petitioner Blanco as having been involved in a conspiracy to engage in

VOTE-BUYING without that minimum quantum of proof required to establish a
disputable presumption of vote-buying in gross and palpable violation of the provisions
of Section 28, Rep. Act. 6646;

18.5 It ordered the proclamation of a SECOND PLACER as the duly elected Mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, in gross violation and utter disregard of the doctrine laid down
by this Honorable Supreme Court in the case of LABO v. COMELEC which was reiterated
only recently in the case of Aquino v. Syjuco.

On the other hand. Nolasco contends in his petition for certiorari 6 that he should be
declared as Mayor in view of the disqualification of Blanco. He cites section 44 of R.A.
No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 and our decision in
Labo v. COMELEC. 7

We shall first resolve the Blanco petition.

Blanco was not denied due process when the COMELEC (First Division) suspended his
proclamation as Mayor pending determination of the petition for disqualification against
him. Section 6 of R.A. 6646 and sections 4 and 5 of the Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure merely require that evidence of guilt should be strong to justify the COMELEC
in suspending a winning candidate’s proclamation. It ought to be emphasized that the
suspension order is provisional in nature and can be lifted when the evidence so
warrants. It is akin to a temporary restraining order which a court can issue ex-parte
under exigent circumstances.

In any event, Blanco was given all the opportunity to prove that the evidence on his
disqualification was not strong. On May 25, 1995, he filed a Motion to Lift or Set Aside
the Order suspending his proclamation. On May 29, 1995, he filed his Answer to the
petition to disqualify him. The COMELEC heard the petition. Blanco thereafter submitted
his position paper and reply to Alarilla’s position paper. The COMELEC considered the
evidence of the parties and their arguments and thereafter affirmed his disqualification.
The hoary rule is that due process does not mean prior hearing but only an opportunity
to be heard. The COMELEC gave Blanco all the opportunity to be heard. Petitions for
disqualification are subject to summary hearings. 8

Blanco also faults the COMELEC for departing from the procedure laid down in COMELEC
Resolution 2050 as amended, in disqualification cases. The resolution pertinently
provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"x       x       x

Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the
respondent candidate the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a
disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary
investigation to the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department
makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed
with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of
the proclamation the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is
pending and the said court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the
evidence of guilt is strong." cralaw virtua1aw library

It is alleged that the violation is fatal as it deprived Blanco of equal protection of our
laws.

We do not agree. It cannot be denied that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over
proclamation and disqualification cases. Article IX-C, section 2 of the Constitution
endows the COMELEC the all encompassing power to "enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election . . ." We have long ruled that this
broad power includes the power to cancel proclamations. 9 Our laws are no less explicit
on the matter. Section 68 of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 68. Disqualification. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a

party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or
made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-
paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been
elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for an elective office under
this Code, unless said person has waive his status as permanent resident or immigrant
of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
elections laws." cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 likewise provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong." cralaw virtua1aw library

Despite these laws and existing jurisprudence, Blanco contends that COMELEC must
follow the procedure in Resolution No. 2050 as amended. We hold that COMELEC
cannot always be straitjacketed by this procedural rule. The COMELEC has explained
that the resolution was passed to take care of the proliferation of disqualification cases
at that time. It deemed it wise to delegate its authority to its Law Department as partial
solution to the problem. The May 8, 1995 elections, however, did not result in a surfeit
of disqualification cases which the COMELEC cannot handle. Hence, its decision to
resolve the disqualification case of Blanco directly and without referring it to its Law
Department is within its authority, a sound exercise of its discretion. The action of the
COMELEC is in accord with Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646, viz: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"x       x       x

SEC. 28. Prosecution of Vote-Buying and Vote-Selling. — The presentation of a

complaint for violations of paragraph (a) or (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881 supported by affidavits of complaining witness attesting to the offer or promise by
or of the voter’s acceptance of money or other consideration from the relatives, leaders
or sympathizers of a candidate, shall be sufficient basis for an investigation to be
immediately conducted by the Commission, directly or though its duly authorized legal
officers under Section 68 or Section 265 of said Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. (Emphasis
supplied)

"x       x       x"

Indeed, even Commissioner Maambong who dissented from the majority ruling, clings
to the view that "Resolution No. 2050 cannot divest the Commission of its duty to
resolve disqualification cases under the clear provision of section 6 of R.A. 6646." 10
Clearly too, Blanco’s contention that he was denied equal protection of the law is off-
line. He was not the object of any invidious discrimination. COMELEC assumed direct
jurisdiction over his disqualification case not to favor anybody but to discharge its
constitutional duty of disposing the case in a fair and as fast a manner as possible.

Blanco also urges that COMELEC erred in using summary proceedings to resolve his
disqualification case. Again, the COMELEC action is safely anchored on section 4 of its
Rules of Procedure which expressly provides that petitions for disqualification "shall be
heard summarily after due notice." Vote-buying has its criminal and electoral aspects.
Its criminal aspect to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be the
subject of summary hearing. However, its electoral aspect to ascertain whether the
offender should be disqualified from office can be determined in an administrative
proceeding that is summary in character.

The next issue is whether there is substantial evidence to prove the vote buying
activities of Blanco. The factual findings of the COMELEC (First Division) are as follows:
11

"x       x       x

"Respondent argues that the claim of vote-buying has no factual basis because the
affidavits and sworn statements admitted as evidence against him are products of
hearsay; inadmissible because of the illegal searches; they violate the Rule of Res Inter
Alios Acta and the Offense of vote-buying requires consummation.

We are not impressed.

A studied reading of the affidavits [Respondent’s affidavit is unsigned] attached to the

Reply of the Respondent to the Position Paper of the Petitioner [Annexes 1, 2 and 3]
would reveal that they are in the nature of general denials emanating from individuals
closely associated or related to respondent Blanco.

The same holds true with the affidavits attached to Respondent’s Position Paper
[Annexes 1, 2, 3 and 4]. Said affidavits were executed by Blanco’s political leaders and
private secretary.

On the other hand, the affidavit of Romeo Burgos [Exhibit "E-1" ] is rich in detail as to
how the alleged vote-buying was conducted.

Moreover, the same is corroborated by object evidence in the nature of MTB [Movement
for Tinoy Blanco] cards which were in the possession of the affiants and allegedly used
as a means to facilitate the vote-buying scheme.

There are also admissions of certain individuals who received money to vote for
Respondent [Annexes "E-2", "E-3", "E-4", "E-5", "E-6", "E-7", "E-8", "E-9" and "E-10].

On the day of the elections, two individuals were apprehended for attempting to vote
for Respondent when they allegedly are not registered voters of Meycauayan. A criminal
complaint for violation of section 261 [2] of BP 881 was filed by P/Sr. Inspector Alfred
S. Corpus on May 9, 1995 with the Municipal Trial Court of Bulacan. The same was
docketed as Criminal Case 95-16996 [Exhibit F-2].

Again similar pay envelopes with money inside them were found in the possession of
the suspected flying voters.

The incident was corroborated by Adriano Llorente in his affidavit narrating the same
[Exhibit "F-1" ]. Llorente, a poll watcher of Petitioner, was the one who accosted the
two suspected flying voters when the latter attempted to vote despite failing to locate
their names in the voter’s list.

From rich backdrop of detail, We are disappointed by the general denial offered by
Respondent. In People of the Philippines v. Navarro, G.R. No. 96251, May 11, 1993,
222 SCRA 684, the Supreme Court noted that "Denial is the weakest defense’ [page
692].
In People of the Philippines v. Rolando Precioso, Et Al., G.R. No. 95890, May 12, 1993,
221 SCRA 1993, the Supreme Court observed that,

‘We have consistently ruled that denials if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence are negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and
cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses.
Ergo, as between the positive declarations of the prosecution witness and the negative
statements of the accused, the former deserve more credence." [page 754].’

However, Respondent conveniently resorts to section 33, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
of Court which states that a declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilty of the
offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included herein, may be given in
evidence against him [affiants who executed Exhibits E-1 to E-10] but not against
Respondent.

There is no merit in this contention.

The affiants are not the accused. Their participation in the herein case is in the nature
of witnesses who have assumed the risk of being subsequently charged with violating
Section 261 [1] of BP 881. In fact, their affidavits were sought by the Petitioner and not
by any law enforcement agency. Even Respondent admits this finding when he filed his
Reply to Petitioner’s Position Paper and Motion to Refer for Preliminary Investigation
and Filing of Information in Court against the Persons Who Executed Exhibits E-1 to E-
10 for Having Admitted Commission of Election Offense. If they were the accused, why
file the motion? Would not this be redundant if not irrelevant?

x          x           x

Another telling blow is the unexplained money destined for the teachers. Why such a
huge amount? Why should the Respondent, a mayoralty candidate, and according to his
own admission, be giving money to teachers a day before the elections? What were the
peso bills doing in pay envelopes with the inscription "VOTE !!! TINOY", and kept in
shoe boxes with the word "Teachers" write on the covers thereof?

There is also something wrong with the issuance of the aforementioned MTB cards
when one considers the testimony of Burgos that more or less 50,000 of these cards,
which is equivalent to more or less 52% of the 97,000 registered voters of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, were printed by respondent; that there are only 443 precincts in
Meycauayan; that under the law, a candidate is allowed only one watcher per polling
place and canvassing area; and, finally, that there is no explanation at all by the
respondents as to what these "watchers" did in order to get paid P300.00 each.

x          x           x

Respondent also avers that for an allegation of vote-buying to prosper, the act of giving
must be consummated.

Section 281 [a] of BP 881 states "any person who gives, offers, or promises
money . . ." Section 28 of RA 6646 also states that "the giver, offeror, the promisor as
well as the solicitor, recipient and conspirator referred to in paragraphs [a] and [b] of
section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be liable as principals: . . .

While the giving must be consummated, the mere act of offering or promising
something in consideration for someone’s vote constitutes the offense of vote-buying.

In the case at bar, the acts of offering and promising in consideration for the votes of
said affiants is sufficient for a finding of the commission of the offense of vote-buying."
virtua1aw library
cralaw

These factual findings were affirmed by the COMELEC en banc against the lone dissent
of Commissioner Maambong.

There is an attempt to discredit these findings. Immediately obvious in the effort is the
resort to our technical rules of evidence. Again, our ingrained jurisprudence is that
technical rules of evidence should not be rigorously applied in administrative
proceedings especially where the law calls for the proceeding to be summary in
character. More importantly, we cannot depart from the settled norm of reviewing
decisions of the COMELEC, i.e., that "this Court cannot review the factual findings of the
COMELEC absent a grave abuse of discretion and a showing of arbitrariness in its
decision, order or resolution." 12

We now come to the petition of Nolasco that he should be declared as mayor in the
event Blanco is finally disqualified. 13 We sustain the plea. Section 44, Chapter 2 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) is unequivocal, thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"x       x       x

"SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor,
and Vice Mayor. — (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or
mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall become the governor or
mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor,
mayor, or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his
permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the
governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent
vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian
members according to their ranking as defined herein.

(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest
ranking sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second
highest ranking sanggunian member shall, become the punong barangay.

(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sangguniang members shall be
resolved by the drawing of lots.

(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their
predecessors.

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official
fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed
from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge
the functions of his office. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall
be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning
candidate to the total number of registered voters in each distribution the immediately
preceding election." cralaw virtua1aw library

In the same vein, Article 83 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing, the Local
Government Code of 1991 provides"

"x       x       x

"ART. 83. Vacancies and Succession of Elective Local Officials. — (a) What constitutes
permanent vacancy — A permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a
higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from
office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the
functions of his office.

(b) Permanently vacancies in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor and vice
mayor —

(1) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice
governor or vice mayor concerned shall ipso facto become the governor or mayor. If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the
highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second
highest ranking sanggunian member, shall ipso facto become the governor, vice
governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said
office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their
ranking as defined in this Article." cralaw virtua1aw library

Our case law is now settled that in a mayoralty election, the candidate who obtained
the second highest number of votes, in this case Alarilla, cannot be proclaimed winner
in case the winning candidate is disqualified. Thus, we reiterated the rule in the fairly
recent case of Reyes v. COMELEC, 14 viz: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"x       x       x

"We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in denying
petitioner Julius O. Garcia’s petition to be proclaimed mayor in view of the
disqualification of Renato U. Reyes.

"That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be
proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled. The
doctrinal instability by see-sawing rulings has since been removed. In the latest ruling
on the question, this Court said: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes
would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just
that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or
plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates
because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the
circumstances.

"Garcia’s plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The votes
cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified
and for that reason can not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. The subsequent
finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to
invalidate the votes cast for him."cralaw virtua1aw library

Consequently, respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it

failed to follow the above doctrine, a descendant of our ruling in Labo v. COMELEC. 15

A final word. The dispute at bar involves more than the mayoralty of the municipality of
Meycauayan, Bulacan. It concerns the right of suffrage which is the bedrock of
republicanism. Suffrage is the means by which our people express their sovereign
judgment. Its free exercise must be protected especially against the purchasing power
of the peso. As we succinctly held in People v. San Juan, 16 "each time the
enfranchised citizen goes to the polls to assert this sovereign will, that abiding credo of
republicanism is translated into living reality. If that will must remain undefiled at the
starting level of its expression and application, every assumption must be indulged in
and every guarantee adopted to assure the unmolested exercise of the citizen’s free
choice. For to impede, without authority valid in law, the free and orderly exercise o the
right of suffrage, is to inflict the ultimate indignity on the democratic process."
cralaw virtua1aw library

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the resolution of the respondent COMELEC en banc dated October
23, 1995 is affirmed with the modification that petitioner Edgardo C. Nolasco is
adjudged as Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan in view of the disqualification of Florentino
P. Blanco. No costs.