19.Philippine Scout Veterans v.

Secretary, 224 SCRA 682

FACTS: On April 6, 1989, private respondent labor union, PGA Brotherhood Association – Union
of Filipino Workers (UFW), hereinafter referred to as “the Union ” filed a petition for Direct
Certification/Certification Election among the rank and file employees of Philippine Scout
Veterans Security and Investigation Agency (PSVSIA), GVM Security and Investigations Agency,
Inc. (GVM). and Abaquin Security and Detective Agency, Inc. (ASDA). These three agencies were
collectively referred to by private respondent Union as the “PGA Security Agency,” which is
actually the first letters of the corporate names of the agencies.

On April 11, 1989, summons was issued to the management of PSVSIA, GVM, ASDA (PGA
Security Agency) at 82 E. Rodriquez Avenue, Quezon City.

On April 11, 26, 1986, petitioners filed a single comment alleging therein that the said three
security agencies have separate and distinct corporate personalities while PGA Security Agency
is not a business or corporate entity and does not possess any personality whatsoever; the
petition was unclear as to whether the rank-and-file employees mentioned therein refer to
those of the three security agencies collectively and if so, the labor union cannot seek a
certification election in three separate bargaining units in one petition.

ISSUE: WON petitioners can interfere with the certification election proceeding. NO.

RULING:
Petitioners’ arguments deserve scant consideration. The facts and circumstances extant in the
record indicate that the Med-Arbiter and Secretaries Drilon and Torres were not mistaken in
holding that the three security companies are in reality a single business entity operating as a
single company called the “PGA Security Group” or “PGA Security Services Group.” Factual
findings of labor officials are conclusive and binding on the Court when supported by
substantial evidence.

Under the amendments, there is no need for the labor union to prove that at least 20% of the
security guards in the three agencies supported the petition. When a duly organized union files
a petition for certification election, the Med-Arbiter has the duty to automatically conduct an
election. He has no discretion on the matter. This is clearly the mandate of Article 257 of the
Labor Code, as amended by Section 24 of R.A. 6715.

Finally, except where the employer has to file a petition for certification election pursuant to
Article 258 of the Labor Code because of a request to bargain collectively, it has nothing to do
with a certification election which is the sole concern of the workers. Its role in a certification
election has aptly been described in Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS)
v. Trajano, as that of a mere by-stander. It has no legal standing in a certification election as it
cannot oppose the petition or appeal the Med-Arbiter’s orders related thereto. An employer
that involves itself in a certification election lends suspicion to the fact that it wants to create a
company union.
Indeed, the three security agencies should not even be adverse parties in the certification
election itself. We note with disapproval the title given to the petition for certification election
of the Union by the Med-Arbiter and the Secretary of Labor naming the three security agencies
as respondents. Such is clearly an error. While employers may rightfully be notified or informed
of petitions of such nature, they should not, however, be considered parties thereto with
concomitant right to oppose it. Sound policy dictates that they should maintain a strictly hands
-off policy.

20.International School Alliance v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 123619, June 8, 2000

FACTS: International School Alliance of Educators (the School) hires both foreign and local
teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-
hires.

In which, the School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires including
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, home leave travel allowance and a salary rate
25% more than local hires based on “significant economic disadvantages”

The labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the
School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires.

The Union claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory
to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial
discrimination.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the Union can invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim
of parity. YES.
(2) Whether or not foreign-hires belong to the same bargaining unit as the local hires. NO

RULING: (1) The Constitution directs the State to promote “equality of employment
opportunities for all.” Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall “ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed.” It would be an affront to both the spirit and
letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure
equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and
conditions of employment. Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by
the Labor Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and penalizes the payment of lesser
compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work of equal value.
Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to
wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.

The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare,”
“to afford labor full protection.” The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the
relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so
impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included,
must yield to the common good. Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to
public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.

In this case, the court find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to
justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid
classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires
and local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires
contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.

(2) The Court agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as
the local-hires.

A bargaining unit is “a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all
of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best
suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law.” The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are
(1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees’ interest,
such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working
conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)
similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability is
whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights.

It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with
local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School
also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited
tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions
under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain
benefits not granted to local-hires. These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably related to their status as foreign-
hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a
bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective
collective bargaining rights.

21.De La Salle v. De La Salle University Employees' Association, 330 SCRA 363

FACTS: The De La Salle University (UNIVERSITY) and the De La Salle University Employees
Association (UNION) entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a period of three (3)
years. During the freedom period, of sixty (60) days before the expiration of the said CBA, the
UNION initiated negotiations with the UNIVERSITY to have a new CBA which, however, turned
out to be unsuccessful. Thereafter, a partial CBA was executed by the parties in which there
were still several issues that remain unresolved and one of those issues was the scope of
bargaining unit wherein it is being disputed whether Computer Operators and discipline officers
of the UNIVERSITY can be a member of the bargaining unit since the former’s function merely
include clerical and routinary work and was not engaged in the setting of management policies
for the UNIVERSITY, and the latter belong to the rank-and-file employees by reason of the
nature of their job, respectively.
The UNIVERSITY argued that computer operators and discipline officers are confidential
employees, and that the UNION has already recognized the confidential nature of their
functions when the latter agreed in the parties’ CBA to exclude the said employees for the
bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees. They further contended that the nature of the work
of computer operators is a sufficient justification to exclude them from the CBA since they are
engaged in the keeping of confidential records and information of the university, including
those relating to labor relations, and that discipline officers are alter egos of management as
they perform tasks which are inherent in the management of the university.

ISSUE: Whether or not prior agreements in the collective bargaining agreement of excluding
computer operators and discipline officers from bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees bar
any amendments or modifications thereto.

RULING: No, prior agreements in the collective bargaining agreement of excluding such
employees from bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees does not bar any amendments or
modifications in the said CBA.
The Court explained that, “the express exclusion of the computer operators and discipline
officers from the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees in the 1986 collective bargaining
agreement does not bar any re-negotiation for the future inclusion of the said employees in the
bargaining unit. During the freedom period, the parties may not only renew the existing
collective bargaining agreement but may also propose and discuss modifications or
amendments thereto.”

22.Republic Savings Bank v. CIR, 21 SCRA 226

FACTS: The Bank employs Resuello et. al. In 1958, it then discharged the private respondents
for having written a patently libelous letter tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt not only of officers and employees of this bank, but also of the bank itself.

The letter was actually a letter-charge, which Private Respondents had written to the bank
president, demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the
appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination to bank employees.
At the instance of respondents, Prosecutor A. Tirona filed a complaint in the CIR alleging that
the Bank violated the Industrial Peace Act, which makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to discriminate against an employee for having filed charges.
In 1960, however, the Supreme Court overruled the decision of the CIR in the Royal Interocean
case and held that "the charge, the filing of which is the cause of the dismissal of the employee,
must be related to his right to self-organization in order to give rise to unfair labor practice on
the part of the employer," because "under subsection 5 of section 4(a), the employee's (1)
having filed charges or (2) having given testimony or (3) being about to give testimony, are
modified by 'under this Act' appearing after the last item."

Relying upon Royal Interocean Lines v. CIR, and Lakas ng Pagkakaisa sa Peter Paul v. CIR, the
Bank argues that the court should have dismissed the complaint because the discharge of the
respondents had nothing to do with their union activities as the latter in fact admitted at the
hearing that the writing of the letter-charge was not a "union action" but merely their
"individual" act.

ISSUE: whether the dismissal of the eight (8) respondent employees by the petitioner Republic
Bank (hereinafter referred to as the Bank) constituted an unfair labor practice. YES.

RULING: Assuming that they acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter, they
were nonetheless protected, for they were engaged in a concerted activity, in their right of self-
organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, interference with
which constitutes unfair labor practice under Section 4(a)(l) of Republic Act No. 875. The joining
in protests or demands by even a small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests
as such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that
union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated.

In the case at bar, respondents wrote and published a letter to the bank president, demanding
his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism, favoritism and discrimination in the
appointment and promotion of bank employees.

When respondents complained against nepotism, favoritism, and other management practices,
they were acting within an area marked out by the Industrial Peace Act as a proper sphere of
collective bargaining. Even the reference to immorality was not irrelevant, as it was made to
support the respondents' other charge that the bank president had failed to provide
wholesome working conditions, let alone a good moral example for the employees, by
practicing discrimination and favoritism in the appointment and promotion of certain
employees on the basis of illicit relations or blood relationship with them.

What the bank should have done was to refer the letter-charge to the grievance committee.
This was its duty, failing which it committed an unfair labor practice under Section 4(a)(6) of the
Industrial Peace Act. Instead of stifling criticism, the bank should have allowed respondents to
air their grievance. Good faith bargaining required of the bank an open mind and a sincere
desire to negotiate over grievances. Collective bargaining does not end with the execution of an
agreement. It is a continuous process. The duty to bargain imposes on the parties during the
term of their agreement the mutual obligation “to meet and confer promptly and expeditiously
and in good faith x x x for the purpose of adjusting any grievances or question arising under
such agreement” (Sec. 13, Rep. Act No. 875) and a violation of this obligation is, by Section 4(a)
(6) and (b)(3), an unfair labor practice.

23.Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. San Miguel Corporation, 198 SCRA 586

FACTS: The Union known as Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) said to represent 4,500
employees of San Miguel Corporation, presented to the company a demand for correction of
the significant distortion in wages.

In that demand, the Union explicitly invoked Section 4 of RA 6727, “The Wage Rationalization
Act”, which reads as follows:
Where the application of the increases in the wages rates under this section results in
distortions as defined under existing laws in the wage structure within an establishment and
gives rise to dispute therein, such dispute shall first be settled voluntarily between the parties
and in the event of a deadlock, the same shall be finally resolved through compulsory
arbitration by the regional branches of the National Labor Relations Commission having
jurisdiction over the workplace.

It shall be mandatory for the NLRC to conduct continuous hearings and decide any dispute
arising under this section within twenty (20) calendar days from the time said dispute is
formally submitted to it for arbitration. The pendency of a dispute arising from a wage
distortion shall not in any way delay the applicability of the increase in the wage rates
prescribed under this section.
The Union claims that the demand was ignored. When the Company rejected the reduced
proposal of the Union the members thereof, on their own accord, refused to render overtime
services, most especially at the Beer Bottling Plants at Polo, starting October 16, 1989. In this
connection, the workers involved issues a joint notice reading as follows:

Sama-samang pahayag: Kaming arawang manggagawa ng Polo Brewery pawang kasapi ng Ilaw
at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) ay nagkakaisang nagpasya na ipatupad muna ang eight hours
work shift pansamantala habang hindi ipinapatupad ng SMC Management ang tamang Wage
Distortion.

ISSUE: Whether or not wage distortion shall be a ground for strike/lockout. NO.

RULING: It is SMC's submittal that the coordinated reduction by the Union's members of the
work time theretofore willingly and consistently observed by them, thereby causing financial
losses to the employer in order to compel it to yield to the demand for correction of "wage
distortions," is an illegal and "unprotected" activity. It is, SMC argues, contrary to the law and to
the collective bargaining agreement between it and the Union. The argument is correct and will
be sustained.
Among the rights guaranteed to employees by the Labor Code is that of engaging in concerted
activities in order to attain their legitimate objectives. Article 263 of the Labor Code, as
amended, declares that in line with "the policy of the State to encourage free trade unionism
and free collective bargaining. Workers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for
purposes of collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection." A similar right to
engage in concerted activities for mutual benefit and protection is tacitly and traditionally
recognized in respect of employers.

The more common of these concerted activities as far as employees are concerned are: strikes;
picketing; and boycotts. On the other hand, the counterpart activity that management may
licitly undertake is the lockout. In this connection, the same Article 263 provides that the "right
of legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employer to lockout, consistent
with the national interest, shall continue to be recognized and respected." The legality of these
activities is usually dependent on the legality of the purposes sought to be attained and the
means employed therefor.

It goes without saying that these joint or coordinated activities may be forbidden or restricted
by law or contract.

In the particular instance of "distortions of the wage structure within an establishment"

resulting from "the application of any prescribed wage increase by virtue of a law or wage
order," Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6727 prescribes a specific, detailed and comprehensive
procedure for the correction thereof, thereby implicitly excluding strikes or lockouts or other
concerted activities as modes of settlement of the issue.

The legislative intent that solution of the problem of wage distortions shall be sought by
voluntary negotiation or abitration, and not by strikes, lockouts, or other concerted activities of
the employees or management, is made clear in the rules implementing RA 6727 issued by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment pursuant to the authority granted by Section 13 of the Act.
Section 16, Chapter I of these implementing rules, after reiterating the policy that wage
distortions be first settled voluntarily by the parties and eventually by compulsory arbitration,
declares that, "Any issue involving wage distortion shall not be a ground for a strike/lockout."

24.Interphil Laboratories Employees Union-FFW v. Interphil, 372 SCRA 658

FACTS: Petitioner is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of
Respondent. They had a CBA.

Prior to the expiration of the CBA, respondent company was approached by the petitioner,
through its officers. The Union inquired about the stand of the company regarding the duration
of the CBA which was set to expire in a few months. Salazar told the union officers that the
matter could be best discussed during the formal negotiations which would start soon.
All the rank-and-file employees of the company refused to follow their regular two-shift work
schedule. The employees stopped working and left their workplace without sealing the
containers and securing the raw materials they were working on.

To minimize the damage the overtime boycott was causing the company, Salazar immediately
asked for a meeting with the union officers. In the meeting, Enrico Gonzales, a union director,
told Salazar that the employees would only return to their normal work schedule if the
company would agree to their demands as to the effectivity and duration of the new CBA.
Salazar again told the union officers that the matter could be better discussed during the formal
renegotiations of the CBA. Since the union was apparently unsatisfied with the answer of the
company, the
overtime boycott continued. In addition, the employees started to engage in a work slowdown
campaign during the time they were working, thus substantially delaying the production of the
company.

Respondent company filed with the National NLRC a petition to declare illegal petitioner union’s
“overtime boycott” and “work slowdown” which, according to respondent company, amounted
to illegal strike. It also filed with Office Secretary of Labor a petition for assumption
of jurisdiction. Secretary of Labor Nieves Confesor issued an assumption order over the labor
dispute.

Labor Arbiter Caday submitted his recommendation to the then Secretary of Labor Leonardo A.
Quisumbing. Then Secretary Quisumbing approved and adopted the report in his Order, finding
illegal strike on the part of petitioner Union.

ISSUE: WON the Labor Secretary has jurisdiction to rule over an illegal strike. YES.

RULING: On the matter of the authority and jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment to rule on the illegal strike committed by petitioner union, it cannot be denied that
the issues of “overtime boycott” and “work slowdown” amounting to illegal strike before Labor
Arbiter Caday are intertwined with the labor dispute before the Labor Secretary.

The appellate court also correctly held that the question of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment’s jurisdiction over labor-related disputes was already settled in International
Pharmaceutical, Inc. vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor and Associated Labor Union (ALU) where the
Court declared:

In the present case, the Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code the
authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or
lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly.
Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must include and
extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the
labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.
Moreover, Article 217 of the Labor Code is not without, but contemplates, exceptions thereto.
This is evident from the opening proviso therein reading ‘(e)xcept as otherwise provided under
this Code x x x.’ Plainly, Article 263(g) of the Labor Code was meant to make both the Secretary
(or the various regional directors) and the labor arbiters share jurisdiction, subject to certain
conditions. Otherwise, the Secretary would not be able to effectively and efficiently dispose of
the primary dispute. To hold the contrary may even lead to the absurd and undesirable result
wherein the Secretary and the labor arbiter concerned may have diametrically
opposed rulings. As we have said, ‘it is fundamental that a statute is to be read in a manner that
would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it.

In fine, the issuance of the assailed orders is within the province of the Secretary as authorized
by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code and Article 217(a) and (5) of the same Code, taken
conjointly and rationally construed to subserve the objective of the jurisdiction vested in the
Secretary.

Petition denied.

25.NFSW v. Ovejera, 114 SCRA 354

FACTS: Petitioner, the bargaining representative of Central Azucarera de la Carlota (CAC)

employees entered into collective bargaining agreement with CAC wherein the parties agreed
to maintain the present practice on the grant of Christmas bonus, milling bonus and
amelioration bonus equivalent to 1 1/2 month's salary.

On November 30, 1981, petitioner and respondent CAC entered into a compromise agreement
two days after the petition struck to compel payment of the 13th month pay agreeing to abide
by the final decision of the Supreme Court in any case involving the 13th month pay if it clearly
held that the employer is liable to pay the same separate and distinct from the bonuses already
given.

Meanwhile, G.R. No. 51254, Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Marcopper Mining
Corporation which sought to annul the decision of the Labor Deputy Minister granting the 13th
month pay to its employees in addition to mid-year and Christmas bonuses under a CBA was
dismissed on June 11, 1981 on the vote of seven (7) Justices and the motion for its
reconsideration was denied by a vote of five Justices. Thereafter, petitioner struck after six days
notice with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE). One day after the commencement
of the strike, petitioner filed a strike vote report with MOLE . The strike was declared illegal by
respondent Ovejera for violation of the 15 day cooling-off period and the 7 day strike ban
required by B.P. 130. Without appealing to the NLRC, the present petition was filed questioning
the declaration of illegality of the strike and the denial of the 13th month pay.

ISSUE: WON the strike staged by NFSW was illegal? YES.

RULING: he foregoing provisions hardly leave any room for doubt that the cooling-off period in
Art. 264(c) and the 7-day strike ban after the strike-vote report prescribed in Art. 264(f) were
meant to be, and should be deemed, mandatory.

When the law says "the labor union may strike" should the dispute "remain unsettled until the
lapse of the requisite number of days (cooling-off period) from the filing of the notice," the
unmistakable implication is that the union may not strike before the lapse of the cooling-off
period. Similarly, the mandatory character of the 7-day strike ban after the report on the strike-
vote is manifest in the provision that "in every case," the union shall furnish the MOLE with the
results of the voting "at least seven (7) days before the intended strike, subject to the
(prescribed) cooling-off period." It must be stressed that the requirements of cooling-off period
and 7-day strike ban must both be complied with, although the labor union may take a strike
vote and report the same within the statutory cooling-off period.

If only the filing of the strike notice and the strike-vote report would be deemed mandatory,
but not the waiting periods so specifically and emphatically prescribed by law, the purposes
(hereafter discussed) for which the filing of the strike notice and strike-vote report is required
would not be achieved, as when a strike is declared immediately after a strike notice is served,
or when — as in the instant case — the strike-vote report is filed with MOLE after the strike had
actually commenced Such interpretation of the law ought not and cannot be countenanced. It
would indeed be self-defeating for the law to imperatively require the filing on a strike notice
and strike-vote report without at the same time making the prescribed waiting periods
mandatory.

On review, The Supreme Court, in affirming the decision of the deputy of labor minister, ruled
that a) the failure of the NFSW to abide with the mandatory cooling-off period and the 7 day
strike ban made the strike illegal.

26.Lapanday Workers Union v. NLRC, 248 SCRA 96

FACTS: Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (LADECO) and Cadeco Argo
Development Phils Inc. are sister companies engaged in the production of bananas. Their
agricultural establishments are located in Davao City. They agreed to a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) covering the period from December 5, 1985 to November 30, 1988 with
Lapanday Workers’ Union (Union). Said union is the duly certified bargaining agent of the rank
and file employees and is affiliated with the KMU-ANGLO.

Before the expiration of the CBA, the management policies were initiated by the sister
companies which changed the relationship of the parties:

Sister companies contracted with Philippine Eagle Protectors and Security Agency, Inc., to
provide security services. But there was an allegation that guards intimidated and harassed the
union members.
Seminars on Human Development and Industrial Relations (HDIR) for their managerial and
supervisory employees and the rank-and-file were conducted which the Union claimed that the
ANGLO (Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization) was considered belonging to
other outlawed labor organizations such as the National Democratic Front or other leftist
groups.
A labor-management meeting was held on August 2, 1988 where the labor group represented
by its President Arquilao Bacolod, and its legal counsel raised unfair labor practices such as
coercion of employees, intimidation of the union members and union busting. They agreed to
allow its members to attend the seminar for the rank-and-file employees. But, the Union
directed its members not to attend the seminars and picketed the premises of the Philippine
Eagle Protectors to show their displeasure on the hiring of the guards.

The Union filed on August 25, 1988, a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) accusing the company of the same issues raised during the August 2,
1988 labor-management meeting. A conciliation conference was called for where it was agreed
that union officers would attend the HDIR seminar deleting the discussion on KMU-ANGLO and
guidelines governing the guards would be established.

On September 8, 1988, Danilo Martinez, a member of the Board of Directors of the Sister
companies charged the Union with economic sabotage through slowdown to which they filed
charges against the Union and its members for illegal strike, unfair labor practice and damages,
with prayer for injunction.

City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte intervened but the dialogues proved fruitless as sister companies
refused to withdraw the cases earlier filed with the Union. Thereafter, a strike vote was
conducted among the members of the Union and those in favor of the strike won
overwhelming support from the workers. The result of the strike vote was then submitted to
the NCMB on October 10, 1988. Two days later, or on October 12, 1988, the Union struck.

The gunman was later identified as Eledio Samson, an alleged member of the new security
forces of sister companies. This incident resulted to:

most of the members of the Union refused to report for work

they did not comply with the “quota system” adopted by the management to bolster
production output
there were allegations that the Union instructed the workers to reduce their production to
thirty per cent (30%).
Tomas Basco and 25 other workers, filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal
suspension against LADECO.

Another complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal was filed by the Union,
together with Arquilao Bacolod and 58 other complainants. These cases were heard by Labor
Arbiter Newton Sancho.
With the case filed by the sister companies, Labor Arbiter Antonio Villanueva ruled that the
Union staged an illegal strike and declared the employees listed as respondents in the
complaint to have lost their employment status with Lapanday Agricultural and Development
Corporation and Cadeco Agro Development Philippines, Inc.; and ordered respondents
(petitioners in this case) to desist from further committing an illegal strike.

Petitioners appealed the Villanueva decision to public respondent NLRC.

Before the NLRC could resolve the appeal on the Villanueva decision, Labor Arbiter Sancho
rendered a decision in the two (2) cases filed by the Union against private respondents LADECO
and CADECO declaring LADECO and CADECO guilty of unfair labor practices and illegal dismissal
and ordered the reinstatement of the dismissed employees of private respondents, with
backwages and other benefits. It considered the refusal of the workers to report for work on
September 9, 1988, justified by the circumstance then prevailing which is the killing of Danilo
Martinez on September 8,1988.

NLRC upheld the decision of Labor Arbiter Villanueva. The Union filed its MR but to no avail.
Hence, this petition claiming that NLRC gravely abused its discretion in: a) declaring that their
activities, from September 9, 1988 to October 12, 1988, were strike activities; and b) declaring
that the strike staged on October 12, 1988 was illegal.

ISSUE: Whether strike staged on October 12, 1988 illegal

RULING: Yes, as it was held within the seven (7) day waiting period provided for by paragraph
(f), Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended. The haste in holding the strike prevented the
Department of Labor and Employment from verifying whether it carried the approval of the
majority of the union members. Hence, there was no grave abuse of discretion committed.

RATIO: The applicable laws are Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. No.
111, dated December 24, 1986.

Paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. 111, provides:

(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file
anotice of strike or the employer may file, notice of lockout with the Ministry at least 30 days
before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the notice shall be 15 days
and in the absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may
be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members. However, in case of
dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union
constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting where the existence of the union
is threatened, the 15-daycooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action
immediately.

xxx xxx xxx

(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership
in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for
that purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of
directors of the corporation or association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by
secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of
the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout
vote was taken. The Ministry may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected
party, supervise the conduct of secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall
furnish the Ministry the results of the votingat least seven (7) days before the intended strike or
lockout subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.

Article 264 of the same Code reads:

Art. 264. Prohibited activities. — (a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or
lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or
without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary
strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union
officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be
declared to have lost his employment status: Provided that mere participation of a worker in a
lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a
replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. (emphasis ours).

DISPOSITIVE: The petition is dismissed for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the public respondent. Costs against the petitioners.