Right Against Self-Incrimination

Case No. 1: Galman vs. Pamaran.

GR No. 71208-09, 30 August 1985

Doctrines:
1. Presidential Decree No. 1886 denied them the right to remain silent. They were compelled to
testify or be witnesses against themselves. Section 5 of P.D. 1886 leave them no choice. They
have to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed
or refused to do so. The jeopardy of being placed behind prison bars even before conviction
dangled before their very eyes.

2. It has been categorically declared that a person detained for the commission of an offense
undergoing investigation has a right to be informed of his right to remain silent, to counsel, and to
an admonition that any and all statements to be given by him may be used against him.

3. There can be waiver of right against self-incrimination but only if there is an option to do so. In
this case, there was no option as it was taken away by P.D. 1886.

4. Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two : one, which grants "use immunity";
and the other, which grants what is known as "transactional immunity." The distinction between
the two is as follows: "Use immunity" prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits
in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. On the other hand,
"transactional immunity" grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to
which his compelled testimony relates.

5. Right against self-incrimination can be invoked not only in criminal proceedings but also in civil,
administrative, and all other government proceedings.

6. Such infringement of the constitutional right renders inoperative the testimonial compulsion,
meaning, the witness cannot be compelled to answer UNLESS a co-extensive protection in the
form of IMMUNITY is offered.

FACTS

On August 21, 1983, former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was gunned down to death at the Manila
International Airport. To determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a
free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the tragedy, P.D. 1886 was promulgated
creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board which later became more popularly known as the Agrava Board.

Pursuant to the powers vested in it by P.D. 1886, the Board conducted public hearings wherein various
witnesses appeared and testified and/or produced documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a
subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the Board. Among the witnesses who appeared,
testified and produced evidence before the Board were the herein private respondents General Fabian C.
Ver, Major General Prospero Olivas, Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo
Mojica, Sgt. Pepito Torio, Sgt. Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido. All the private respondents,
except Generals Ver and Olivas, are members of the military contingent that escorted Sen. Aquino while
disembarking from the plane that brought him home to Manila on that fateful day. Being at the scene of
the crime as such, they were among the first line of suspects in the subject assassination.

Upon termination of the investigation, two (2) reports were submitted to President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
The reports were thereafter referred and turned over to the TANODBAYAN for appropriate action. After
conducting the necessary preliminary investigation, the TANODBAYAN filed with the
SANDIGANBAYAN two (2) Informations for MURDER, one for the killing of Sen. Benigno S. Aquino
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10010 and another, criminal Case No. 10011, for the killing of
Rolando Galman, who was found dead on the airport tarmac not far from the prostrate body of Sen.
Aquino on that same fateful day. In both criminal cases, private respondents were charged as accessories,
along with several principals, and one accomplice.
Upon arraignment, all the accused, including the herein private Respondents pleaded NOT GUILTY.

In the course of the joint trial of the two (2) cases, the Prosecution represented by the Office of the
petition TANODBAYAN, marked and thereafter offered as part of its evidence, the individual
testimonies of private respondents before the Agrava Board. Private respondents, through their respective
counsel objected to the admission of said exhibits. Private respondent Gen. Ver filed a formal "Motion to
Exclude Testimonies of Gen. Fabian C. Ver before the Fact Finding Board as Evidence against him in the
above-entitled cases" contending that its admission will be in derogation of his constitutional right
against self-incrimination and violative of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. He prayed that his
aforesaid testimony be rejected as evidence for the prosecution. Major Gen. Olivas and the rest of the
other private respondents likewise filed separate motions to exclude their respective individual
testimonies invoking the same ground. Petitioner TANODBAYAN opposed said motions contending that
the immunity relied upon by the private respondents in support of their motions to exclude their
respective testimonies, was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their right against self-
incrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board.

Basis under P.D. 1886:

SEC. 5. No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records,
correspondence, documents, or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the Board on the
ground that his testimony or the evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to
penalty or forfeiture; but his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in
connection with any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having invoked
his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except that such individual so
testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying, nor
shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office.

On May 30, 1985, petitioner having no further witnesses to present and having been required to make its
offer of evidence in writing, respondent SANDIGANBAYAN, without the pending motions for exclusion
being resolved, issued a Resolution directing that by agreement of the parties, the pending motions for
exclusion and the opposition thereto, together with the memorandum in support thereof, as well as the
legal issues and arguments, raised therein are to be considered jointly in the Court's Resolution on the
prosecution's formal offer of exhibits and other documentary evidences. On June 3, 1985, the prosecution
made a written "Formal Offer of Evidence" which includes, among others, the testimonies of private
respondents and other evidences produced by them before the Board, all of which have been previously
marked in the course of the trial. All the private respondents objected to the prosecution's formal offer of
evidence on the same ground relied upon by them in their respective motion for exclusion.

On June 13, 1985, respondent SANDIGANBAYAN issued a Resolution, now assailed in these two (2)
petitions, admitting all the evidences offered by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or other
evidence produced by the private respondents in view of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886.

ISSUE & RULING

The crux of the instant controversy is the admissibility in evidence of the testimonies given by the eight
(8) private respondents who did not invoke their rights against self-incrimination before the Agrava
Board.

Petitioner’s contention: It is the submission of the prosecution, now represented by the

petitioner TANODBAYAN, that said testimonies are admissible against the private respondents,
respectively, because of the latter's failure to invoke before the Agrava Board the immunity
granted by P.D. 1886. Since private respondents did not invoke said privilege, the immunity did
not attach. Petitioners went further by contending that such failure to claim said constitutional
privilege amounts to a waiver thereof.

Respondents’ contention: Notwithstanding failure to set up the privilege against self-

incrimination before the Agrava Board, said evidences cannot be used against them as mandated
by Section 5 of the said P.D. 1886. They contend that without the immunity provided for by the
second clause of Section 5, P.D. 1886, the legal compulsion imposed by the first clause of the
same Section would suffer from constitutional infirmity for being violative of the witness' right
against self- incrimination.
Supreme Court Resolution:
Considering the foregoing environmental settings, it cannot be denied that in the course of receiving
evidence, persons summoned to testify will include not merely plain witnesses but also those suspected as
authors and co-participants in the tragic killing. And when suspects are summoned and called to testify
and/or produce evidence, the situation is one where the person testifying or producing evidence is
undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense and not merely in order to shed light on the
facts and surrounding circumstances of the assassination, but more importantly, to determine the character
and extent of his participation therein.

Among this class of witnesses were the herein private respondents, suspects in the said assassination, all
of whom except Generals Ver and Olivas, were detained (under technical arrest) at the time they were
summoned and gave their testimonies before the Agrava Board. This notwithstanding, Presidential
Decree No. 1886 denied them the right to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or be witnesses
against themselves. Section 5 of P.D. 1886 leave them no choice. They have to take the witness stand,
testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or refused to do so. The jeopardy of
being placed behind prison bars even before conviction dangled before their very eyes. Similarly, they
cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves, both of which are sacrosantly enshrined
and protected by our fundamental law. Both these constitutional rights (to remain silent and not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself) were right away totally foreclosed by P.D. 1886. And yet
when they so testified and produced evidence as ordered, they were not immune from prosecution by
reason of the testimony given by them.

Of course, it may be argued is not the right to remain silent available only to a person undergoing
custodial interrogation? We find no categorical statement in the constitutional provision on the matter
which reads:
... Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. ...
Since the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, we now have a mass of jurisprudence on this specific
portion of the subject provision. In all these cases, it has been categorically declared that a person
detained for the commission of an offense undergoing investigation has a right to be informed of his right
to remain silent, to counsel, and to an admonition that any and all statements to be given by him may be
used against him.

But the petitioners claim that this is only applicable when there is an investigation and only to confessions
not admissions. So the SC said: Neither are we impressed by petitioners' contention that the use of the
word "confession" in the last sentence of said Section 20, Article 4 connotes the Idea that it applies only
to police investigation, for although the word "confession" is used, the protection covers not only
"confessions" but also "admissions" made in violation of this section. They are inadmissible against the
source of the confession or admission and against third person.

It is true a person in custody undergoing investigation labors under a more formidable ordeal and graver
trying conditions than one who is at liberty while being investigated. But the common denominator in
both which is sought to be avoided is the evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing
interrogation for the commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter
convict him. This is the lamentable situation we have at hand.

Also, since the respondents are suspects, it is too taxing upon one's credulity to believe that private
respondents' being called to the witness stand was merely to elicit from them facts and circumstances
surrounding the tragedy, which was already so abundantly supplied by other ordinary witnesses who had
testified earlier. In fact, the records show that Generals Ver and Olivas were among the last witnesses
called by the Agrava Board. The subject matter dealt with and the line of questioning as shown by the
transcript of their testimonies before the Agrava Board, indubitably evinced purposes other than merely
eliciting and determining the so-called surrounding facts and circumstances of the assassination. In the
light of the examination reflected by the record, it is not far-fetched to conclude that they were called to
the stand to determine their probable involvement in the crime being investigated. Yet they have not been
informed or at the very least even warned while so testifying, even at that particular stage of their
testimonies, of their right to remain silent and that any statement given by them may be used against
them.
Did they lose their aforesaid constitutional rights simply because the investigation was by the Agrava
Board and not by any police investigator, officer or agency? True, they continued testifying. May that be
construed as a waiver of their rights to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against
themselves? The answer is yes, if they have the option to do so. But in the light of the first portion of
Section 5 of P.D. 1886 and the awesome contempt power of the Board to punish any refusal to testify or
produce evidence, We are not persuaded that when they testified, they voluntarily waived their
constitutional rights not to be compelled to be a witness against themselves much less their right to
remain silent.

Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the
product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from
making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be
sufficient. So is moral coercion 'tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant.

Petitioners also claim that the right against self-incrimination is not applicable in this case because when
testimonies were given before the Agrava Board, it was not yet denominated as a criminal case. SC said:
The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other import except to make said provision
also applicable to cases other than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify
against himself" applies to the herein private respondents notwithstanding that the proceedings before the
Agrava Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case.

Two kinds of immunity, as asked in the module:

Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which grants "use immunity"; and the other,
which grants what is known as "transactional immunity." The distinction between the two is as follows:
"Use immunity" prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection
with the criminal prosecution of the witness. On the other hand, "transactional immunity" grants
immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates."
It is beyond dispute that said law belongs to the first type of immunity statutes. It grants merely immunity
from use of any statement given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the
basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence do not render the witness immuned from
prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self- incrimination. He is merely saved
from the use against him of such statement and nothing more. Stated otherwise ... he still runs the risk of
being prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self- incrimination.

Conclusion: Our review of the pleadings and their annexes, together with the oral arguments,
manifestations and admissions of both counsel, failed to reveal adherence to and compliance with due
process. The manner in which the testimonies were taken from private respondents fall short of the
constitutional standards both under the DUE PROCESS CLAUSE and under the EXCLUSIONARY
RULE in Section 20, Article IV. In the face of such grave constitutional infirmities, the individual
testimonies of private respondents cannot be admitted against them in ally criminal proceeding. This is
true regardless of absence of claim of constitutional privilege or of the presence of a grant of immunity by
law. Nevertheless, We shall rule on the effect of such absence of claim to the availability to private
respondents of the immunity provided for in Section 5, P.D. 1886 which issue was squarely raised and
extensively discussed in the pleadings and oral arguments of the parties.

The dictates of fair play, which is the hallmark of due process, demands that private respondents should
have been informed of their rights to remain silent and warned that any and all statements to be given by
them may be used against them. This, they were denied, under the pretense that they are not entitled to it
and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them.

It is for this reason that we cannot subscribe to the view adopted and urged upon Us by the petitioners that
the right against self-incrimination must be invoked before the Board in order to prevent use of any given
statement against the testifying witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution.

Since the constitution provides for right against self-incrimination, from a layman's point of view, he has
the option to refuse to answer questions and therefore, to make such claim. P.D. 1886, however,
forecloses such option of refusal by imposing sanctions upon its exercise, thus:
SEC. 4. The Board may hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and impose appropriate penalties
therefor. A person guilty of .... including ... refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness or to subscribe to
an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt
by the Board. ...

Such threat of punishment for making a claim of the privilege leaves the witness no choice but to answer
and thereby forfeit the immunity purportedly granted by Sec. 5. The absurdity of such application is
apparent Sec. 5 requires a claim which it, however, forecloses under threat of contempt proceedings
against anyone who makes such claim.

As a rule, such infringement of the constitutional right renders inoperative the testimonial compulsion,
meaning, the witness cannot be compelled to answer UNLESS a co-extensive protection in the form of
IMMUNITY is offered. Hence, under the oppressive compulsion of P.D. 1886, immunity must in fact be
offered to the witness before he can be required to answer, so as to safeguard his sacred constitutional
right. But in this case, the compulsion has already produced its desired results the private respondents had
all testified without offer of immunity. Their constitutional rights are therefore, in jeopardy. The only way
to cure the law of its unconstitutional effects is to construe it in the manner as if IMMUNITY had in fact
been offered. We hold, therefore, that in view of the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or
to answer questions under Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized
under Section 5 of the same law. The applicability of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886 cannot be made
to depend on a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination which the same law practically strips
away from the witness.

Case No. 2: Mapa vs. Sandiganbayan,

G.R. No. 100295, April 26, 1994

The failure of petitioners to testify in the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York cannot nullify
their immunity. They have satisfied the requirements both of the law and the parties' implementing
agreements.

Under section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended, their duty was to give information to the prosecution, they
did. Under their Memorandum of Agreement, they promised to make themselves available as witnesses in
the said RICO cases, they did. Their failure to testify is not in their own making.

FACTS

Placido Mapa and Lorenzo Vergara et al. was charged with violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices.

Ferdinand E. Marcos and Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos were charged in New York with violations of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) by transporting to the United States and
concealing the investment of money through cronies and offshore organizations. To insure the conviction
of the Marcoses, the prosecution solicited the testimonies of witnesses who were petitioners Placido
Mapa, Vergara et al., they were interviewed and requested to testify in the said RICO cases against the
Marcoses. They were promised immunity from further criminal prosecution (in their Anti-Graft and
Corrupt case). They agreed.

Petitioners travelled to New York to testify. Their travel fare and hotel accommodations were even
furnished by the PCGG. However, the US prosecutors decided not to call them to the witness stand. The
result was a debacle for the US prosecutors and the PCGG. Mrs. Imelda Marcos was acquitted by the
jury. Former President Marcos was delisted as an accused as he died in the course of the proceedings.

Since the petitioners were not able to testify, the Respondent Sandiganbayan contended that the immunity
from suit of the petitioners took without force and effect. However, the record shows that the petitioners
provided information to the PCGG relating to the prosecution of the RICO cases against the Marcoses in
New York.

ISSUE & RULING

Whether the immunity given by the PCGG to Mapa is still in effect and force.
Yes. The Immunity is still in effect and force.

Under Sec. 5, EO 14, the PCGG has the separate power to grant immunity to any person from being
prosecuted provided they will meet the conditions provided by the PCGG.

Here, the petitioners was granted immunity from the prosecution or criminal case where they are being
tried, and the PCGG even shouldered all the expenses when they flew to New York to testify implying
that the petitioners was able to meet the conditions and the PCGG accepted the information given by them
to testify against the Marcoses during the RICO trial. Failure of the petitioner to testify on the RICO case
cannot nullify the immunity given to him by the PCGG since the petitioners was able to satisfy the
requirements both of the law and the parties’ implementing agreements. Though the petitioners were not
able to testify against the Marcoses in RICO, it can be said that it not their own fault.

The petitioner must be acquitted on the basis of the immunity granted by the PCGG, which under the law
has the power to grant immunity.

The State’s immunity statutes are of American origin. In the United States, there are two types of
statutory immunity granted to a witness. They are the transactional immunity and the use-and-derivative-
use immunity

Two kinds of immunity that can be granted:

1. Transactional Immunity – is broader in the scope of its protection. By its grant the witness can
no longer be prosecuted for any offence whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction.
2. Used-and-derivative-use – a witnessed is only assured that his or her particular testimony and
evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.

Nachura: (Galman v. Pamaran)

Transactional Immunity – It is granted by the Commission on Human Rights to any person whose
testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine
the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, which makes the witness immune
from criminal prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates.
Use and fruit immunity – which prohibits the use of the witness’ compelled testimony and its fruits in
any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness.

Nachura: These immunity statutes are not a bonanza from government. Those given this privilege paid a
high price for it; the surrender of their right to remain silent. These laws should, therefore, be given a
liberal interpretation.

Right of Persons under Custodial Investigation

Case No. 1: People vs. Morial

G.R. No. 129295, August 15, 2001

Doctrine:

A person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights, which attach upon the commencement
thereof. These are the rights (1) to remain silent, (2) to competent and independent counsel, preferably of
his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights. The prosecution must prove with clear and
convincing evidence that the accused was accorded said rights before he extra-judicially admitted his
guilt to the authorities.

Under Section 12 (3), Article III of the Constitution, these rights cannot be waived unless the same is
made in writing and in the presence of counsel.

An accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very
start thereof. The competent or independent counsel so engaged should be present from the beginning to
end, i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the
investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he
may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.

FACTS
The crime allegedly took place at 6:00 in the evening, Gabriel Guilao, had just finished pasturing his
horses and was on his way home. He was passing through the road near the house of Benjamin Morial
when he heard the voice of Paula Bandibas pleading, "Please don't kill me. I am going to give you
money." Finding what he heard "weird," Gabriel paused and remained at a distance of about eight (8)
meters from the yard of the house. From where he stood, Gabriel saw accused Nonelito Abiñon slap Paula
Bandibas' neck. Paula fell and was stabbed by accused Edwin Morial with a small, sharp, pointed
weapon. Accused Leonardo Morial stood outside the house.

Gabriel also saw Paula Bandibas' grandson, Albert Bandibas, run towards his grandmother's garden.
Gabriel then heard the crushing sound of a stone against flesh. The three accused stayed in the house for
about ten minutes after the killing the victims. Thereafter, they departed and headed towards the nearby
houses.

The police found Edwin and Leonardo Morial in the house of Nonelito Abiñon and invited the two to the
police station, where they were turned over to SPO4 Andres Fernandez. The accused, all first degree
cousins, interposed denial and alibi as their defense. They denied being together at the time of the
incident. During interrogation, Edwin was advised to tell the truth so he would not be killed.
Nevertheless, he refused to admit his alleged participation in the killings. Someone then struck his left
hand with a pistol. Like Edwin, Leonardo refused to own up to the incident so a policeman called two
other policemen and directed them to gag Leonardo. When a policeman attempted to box him again,
Leonardo finally admitted that Nonelito Abiñon and Edwin Morial were responsible for the death of
Paula Bandibas. Leonardo's interrogation lasted one and a half to two hours.

Leonardo's statements were then reduced into writing. Leonardo was told that his counsel would be a
certain Atty. Aguilar whose office was very near the police station. Leonardo consented. After being
introduced to Leonardo Morial, Atty. Aguilar had a short conference with him. Atty. Aguilar warned him
that the statements that he may give might be used in evidence against him. Leonardo said he was willing
to answer the questions voluntarily.

Midway into the investigation, Aguilar asked the investigator that he be given leave as he had a very
important engagement. The investigator agreed to the lawyer's request. Before leaving, Atty. Aguilar
asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer the questions in his absence. He also instructed the police
that, after the written confession had been prepared, the accused and the document containing the
confession should be brought to his office for "further examination."

At about 1:30 or 2:00 in the afternoon, Leonardo and his policeman-escort arrived at Atty. Aguilar's
office. Atty. Aguilar asked the accused whether he was maltreated while he was away and examined the
suspect's body for contusions or abrasions. Leonardo told him that he was not harmed by the police
officer. The lawyer then studied the document to determine whether its contents conformed to the
answers given by the accused in his (counsel's) presence. Leonardo then signed the extra-judicial
confession, after which Atty. Aguilar affixed his. The signing over, Leonardo was brought back to the
police station. Later in court, Leonardo claimed that he merely made up all the statements in the
document because he was afraid.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision convicting all the three accused.

ISSUE & RULING:

Whether Leonardo Morial was deprived of his right to counsel during the custodial investigation, thus,
making his extra judicial confession invalid.

Yes. The Court finds Leonardo Morial's extra-judicial confession invalid since he was effectively
deprived of his right to counsel during the custodial investigation.

A custodial investigation is understood to mean as "any questioning initiated by law enforcement

authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant manner." It begins when there is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but
starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating
or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.

The Court has stressed that an accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel
assisting him from the very start thereof.

If it were true that Atty. Tobias had to attend to matters so pressing that he had to abandon a client
undergoing custodial investigation, he could have terminated the same to be continued only until as soon
as his schedule permitted, advising the suspect in the meantime to remain silent. This he failed to do.
Appallingly, he even asked his client whether he was willing to answer questions during the lawyer's
absence. The records also disclose that Atty. Tobias never informed appellant of his right to remain silent,
not even before the custodial investigation started. Atty. Tobias, by his failure to inform appellant of the
latter's right to remain silent, by his “coming and going" during the custodial investigation, and by his
abrupt departure before the termination of the proceedings, can hardly be the counsel that the framers of
the 1987 Constitution contemplated when it added the modifier "competent" to the word "counsel."
Neither can he be described as the "vigilant and effective" counsel that jurisprudence requires. Precisely,
it is Atty. Tobias' nonchalant behavior during the custodial investigation that the Constitution abhors and
which this Court condemns. His casual attitude subverted the very purpose for this vital right. That the
extra-judicial confession was subsequently signed in the presence of counsel did not cure its
constitutional defects. As Leonardo Morial was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during
custodial investigation, his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against him.

The confession is also inadmissible against appellant Leonardo Morial's co-accused, Nonelito Abiñon and
Edwin Morial. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by
an act, declaration, or omission of another.

Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession executed by Leonardo Morial, the
conviction of appellants is fully supported by the other pieces of evidence adduced by the prosecution. It
is well settled that where there is independent evidence, apart from the accused's alleged uncounselled
confession, that the accused is truly guilty, the latter nevertheless faces a conviction. Here, the testimony
of eyewitness Gabriel Guilao certainly deserves credence.

The defense has tried to discredit Guilao by harping on the latter's relationship with private complainant,
Benjamin Morial, who is the brother of Gabriel's wife, conveniently forgetting that Gabriel is also related
to all of the accused who are all his nephews. On this score, the Court has held that the weight of
testimony of a witness is not impaired or in any way affected by his relationship to the victim when there
is no showing of improper motive on the part of the witness. A person who was close to the victim would
not callously violate his conscience by blaming it on someone he believed innocent thereof, especially if
the accused were his blood relatives.

Case No. 2: People vs. Fortuna

G.R. No. 187745, September 07, 2010

Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime, but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect.
A confession is not valid and not admissible in evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of the
rights of persons under custodial investigation.

Even if the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence if there are other evidence sufficient to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, still, the accused may be convicted.

FACTS

The consolidated cases arose in connection with the killing of former Chief of the Metropolitan
Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine Constabulary, now the Philippine National
Police (PNP), Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla (Abadilla), who was ambushed in broad daylight while
driving his car.

From the testimony and medico-legal, it was disclosed that the victim died of hemorrhage as a result of
multiple gunshot wounds, mostly in the head and chest, and also sustained abrasions, contusions,
lacerated skin, hematoma and incised wounds or cuts in the skin caused by glass splinters. Records
indicate that immediately after the incident, elements of the CPDC, PNP-NCR at Camp Karingal were
already coordinating with investigators of Station 8-CPDC who had turned over to said office the
evidence gathered and referred the witnesses present at the crime scene. As a result of follow-up
operations, Joel de Jesus, alias Tabong, was apprehended on June 19, 1996 at his house at Dahlia St.,
Fairview, Quezon City. He executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated June 20, 1996 and Karagdagang
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated June 21, 1996.

Joel de Jesus narrated that on June 13, 1996 at 6:30 in the morning after parking his tricycle, he was
fetched by Lorenzo Larry delos Santos who was his neighbor at Ruby St. Larry was accompanied by his
nephew Ogie, and a certain Tisoy who drove the owner-type jeep. Larry told him they were going to kill a
big-time personality (may titirahin na malaking tao), whose name was Abadilla, and that they were going
to ambush the latter at Katipunan Avenue. The ambush would be carried out by Joel, Larry, Tisoy, Ram
(de Jesus), Cesar who was a policeman, and four (4) others. According to Joel, he only acted as lookout;
Lorenzo, Ram and Cesar were the ones who fired shots, while Tisoy focused on a security guard at a
store.
Joel further stated that the ambush-slay of Abadilla was planned by the group three (3) days before, when
they met at the house of Ram de Jesus also in Fairview near his house. Although he did not know the
identity of the person who masterminded the ambush-slay of Abadilla, he described the mastermind as the
one (1) who opened Abadillas car and pulled Abadilla from the inside of the car, and he was also the one
(1) who drove the L-300 van. Lorenzo told him he should not worry because Lorenzo would take care
that he would be compensated for his participation.

In his second statement, Joel pointed to his cohorts in a police line-up inside the CID-CPDC, PNP-NCR,
Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he positively identified Rameses de Jesus (Ram), Cesar Fortuna,
Lenido Lumanog and PO2 Romeo Costibolo as among those who participated in the ambush-slaying of
Abadilla on June 13, 1996.

With respect to Lorenzo delos Santos, he also executed a statement dated June 21, 1996 admitting his
participation in the ambush-slay of Abadilla on June 13, 1996, and pointing to Rameses de Jesus as the
mastermind and also named the following suspects: POGS whose real name was Lenido Lumanog, Joel
de Jesus alias Tabong, Cesar Fortuna and four (4) others whom he did not know. He said that he was just
brought along by Rameses de Jesus and was further threatened that if he would not go with them, they
would kill his family. He claimed that he merely acted as a lookout. A gold-plated Omega wristwatch and
a wallet containing an undetermined amount of cash plus calling cards and other important papers, all of
which were supposedly stolen by them after killing Abadilla.

When arraigned, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the murder charge.

The witness declared that the constitutional mandate and requirements under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7438 had been complied with because he secured the services of a counsel during the interrogation of
then suspect Joel de Jesus when his sworn statement was taken on June 20, 1996. He had informed the
said suspect of his right to counsel in the presence of CID personnel and when he brought him to the
office of Atty. Confesor R. Sansano of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) located at the second
floor of the Hall of Justice, Quezon City Hall. Asked why it occurred to him to bring the suspect to the
IBP, the witness replied that he believed IBP was a private, not a government, institution. He also asked
Joel -- who was allowed to make a telephone call, although he was not aware if Joel made any such call --
whether he had his own lawyer. He recalled asking Joel if he was willing to go with them to the City Hall,
because he had asked to secure the services of counsel. There had been instances when the IBP lawyers
assisted some suspects brought by the CPDC. Joel executed his statement, with SPO2 Jose L. Garcia, Jr.
propounding the questions. They started taking his statement at 1:10 p.m. of June 20, 1996 at Room 235,
IBP Office, Quezon City Hall of Justice in the presence of Atty. Sansano and a number of people inside
said office. He was apprised for the first time about a suspect (Joel) who was just apprehended when he
called their office upon arriving home on the night of June 19, 1996. The information was given to him by
the desk sergeant and thereupon he gave instruction to contact the witness and include that suspect in a
line-up.

While still inside the office of P/Insp. Castillo, SPO2 Garcia, Jr. asked Joel if his statement was voluntary
and what kind of statement he was going to give. Joel answered that his statement was voluntary and he
wanted to be included as state witness in the Abadilla case. After completing the taking down of the
statement, he gave it to Joel and asked the latter to read it. Joel read the typewritten statement and when
he finished reading, he gave the same to Atty. Sansano. Atty. Sansano read all the contents of the
document and asked Joel if he understood it, to which he answered Yes, sir. Atty. Sansano then asked
Joel if he was willing to sign the statement, to which the latter again replied in the affirmative. Joel signed
the statement in his presence and also that of Atty. Sansano, who likewise signed it in his presence.

On cross-examination, SPO2 Garcia, Jr. affirmed that before the taking down of the statement, he had
explained to Joel the consequences of his being a state witness, in accordance with the instruction of
P/Insp. Castillo. He specifically explained to Joel: Itong statement na ito ay puwedeng gamitin laban o
panig sa yo sa alinmang hukuman dito sa Pilipinas. Ikaw ba ay nakahandang tumestigo sa mga sasabihin
ng tao dito sa statement mo na ito na magiging laban sa kanila. Joel told him, yes, sir. P/Insp. Castillo
had told him that Joel was to turn state witness before the latter was brought to the IBP Office.

The trial court also found that the statements of Joel, in which he admitted his participation in the crime
assisted by Atty. Sansano and in the presence of the IBP personnel and police investigators, were not
flawed by intimidation or violence when obtained and sworn to before the fiscal.

ISSUE & RULING

Whether the extra-judicial confession of accused Joel de Jesus taken during the custodial investigation
valid.
NO. Police officers claimed that upon arresting Joel, they informed him of his constitutional rights to
remain silent, that any information he would give could be used against him, and that he had the right to a
competent and independent counsel, preferably, of his own choice, and if he cannot afford the services of
counsel he will be provided with one (1). However, since these rights can only be waived in writing and
with the assistance of counsel, there could not have been such a valid waiver by Joel, who was presented
to Atty. Sansano at the IBP Office, Quezon City Hall only the following day and stayed overnight at the
police station before he was brought to said counsel.

Even assuming that custodial investigation started only during Joel’s execution of his statement before
Atty. Sansano on June 20, 1996, still the said confession must be invalidated. To be acceptable,
extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. A confession is not valid and not
admissible in evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of the rights of persons under custodial
investigation.

Atty. Sansano, who supposedly interviewed Joel and assisted the latter while responding to questions
propounded by SPO2 Garcia, Jr., did not testify on whether he had properly discharged his duties to said
client. While SPO2 Garcia, Jr. testified that Atty. Sansano had asked Joel if he understood his answers to
the questions of the investigating officer and sometimes stopped Joel from answering certain questions,
SPO2 Garcia, Jr. did not say if Atty. Sansano, in the first place, verified from them the date and time of
Joel’s arrest and the circumstances thereof, or any previous information elicited from him by the
investigators at the station, and if said counsel inspected Joel’s body for any sign or mark of physical
torture.

With respect to the other appellants, they were likewise entitled to the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution when they were brought to the police station as suspects and were, therefore under custodial
investigation. However, they cannot simply rely on those violations of constitutional rights during
custodial investigation, which are relevant only when the conviction of the accused by the trial court is
based on the evidence obtained during such investigation. As for the matters stated in the extrajudicial
confession of appellant Joel, these were not the basis for appellants conviction. It has to be stressed
further that no confession or statement by appellants Fortuna, Lumanog, Augusto and Rameses was used
as evidence by the prosecution at the trial.

After a thorough and careful review, we hold that there exists sufficient evidence on record to sustain
appellants conviction even without the extrajudicial confession of appellant Joel de Jesus.

NOTE: Rights of Accused During Custodial Investigation

The rights of persons under custodial investigation are enshrined in Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof (right against self-
incrimination) shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this section as well as compensation
for the rehabilitation of victims of tortures or similar practices, and their families.

Criminal Due Process

Case No. 1: Galman vs. Sandiganbayan

GR N0. 72670, September 12, 1986

An impartial court or tribunal is clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it.
Due process requires an impartial tribunal and an unbiased prosecution.

FACTS

Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had just
landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the
back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the
man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later
as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in
turn.

President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people who
joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.

The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that
"the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers
in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a
military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority
report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the
military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them.

Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.

Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two
criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed
for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments
and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the
prosecution.

But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition
and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The
same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent
Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them).
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal
ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are
entitled to due process.

However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged,
declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with
the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter,
same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that
respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice
and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the
Philippines to due process of law.

ISSUE & RULING

Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

Yes. Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases
which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due
process.

The court held that people were denied due process which requires an impartial tribunal and an unbiased
prosecution.

The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his
authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder
cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer
who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business
coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice."

Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling and
treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacañang conference (and revealed only after
fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided
ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere
tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar
where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at
stake.

The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand
unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would
have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity
to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and
committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the
prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of politics and
prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and
the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused before the military tribunal, Ninoy
had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil
courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the
"treacherous and vicious assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties
plead once more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial the non-trial of the century-and
that the pre-determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.

Case No. 2: Alonte vs. Savellano

GR No. 131652

FACTS
A case of rape was filed against Bayani Athur Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of Biñan, Laguna, and
Buenaventura Concepcion, who brought complainant child, Juvielyn Punongbayan, to the rest house of
accused Alonte at Sto. Tomas, Biñan, Laguna and after receiving the amount of P1,000.00 left her alone
with Bayani Alonte who subsequently raped her.

The case was brought before the RTC of Biňan. The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change
of venue to RTC of Manila due to alleged intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie
executed an affidavit of desistance.

The prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of venue was granted notwithstanding the
opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr.
Judge Savellano found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion.

They pleaded “not guilty” to the charge. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and she attested to
the voluntariness of her desistance because of media pressure and that they would rather establish new
life elsewhere.

The case was then submitted for decision and Judge Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion
perpetua. Judge Savellano commented that: accused were each represented during the hearing on 07
November 1997 with their respective counsel of choice. None of their counsel interposed an intention to
cross-examine rape victim Juvielyn Punongbayan, even after she attested, in answer to respondent judge's
clarificatory questions, the voluntariness and truth of her two affidavits — one detailing the rape and the
other detailing the attempts to buy her desistance; the opportunity was missed/not used, hence waived.
The rule of case law is that the right to confront and cross-examine a witness "is a personal one and may
be waived."

ISSUE & RULING

Whether Alonte was denied criminal due process.

Yes.

Sec 14, pars (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the fundamentals.

(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in
his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require
(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it;
(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused ;
(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and
(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.

The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our
own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance
and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met
without a "law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only
after trial."

It should be pointed out, however, that the existence of the waiver must be positively demonstrated. The
standard of waiver requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and
done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Mere silence of
the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver. The SolGen has aptly discerned a few of the deviations from
what otherwise should have been the regular course of trial:
(1) Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to prove their defenses nor have dates
therefor been scheduled for the purpose;
(2) the parties have not been given the opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor have dates
been set by respondent Judge for the purpose; and
(3) petitioners have not admitted the act charged in the Information so as to justify any
modification in the order of trial.

There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his
full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of
Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.

For FAILURE OF DUE PROCESS, the assailed judgment, convicting petitioners is declared NULL AND
VOID and thereby SET ASIDE; accordingly, the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.

Right to Bail

Case No. 1: Government of Hongkong vs. [Link]

GR No. 153675, April 19, 2007

Doctrine: “Bail has been allowed to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative
proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to
uphold human rights.”

FACTS

Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an
advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of
Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the
common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term
of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.

The DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of
Muñoz. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn,
filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of Muñoz.
The RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against Muñoz. That same day, the NBI agents
arrested and detained him.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the
extradition of Muñoz. For his part, Muñoz filed a petition for bail in the same case.

After hearing, the judge issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no
Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that Muñoz is a high "flight risk."
Muñoz filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This was granted
by Judge Olalia in an Order allowing private respondent to post bail in the amount of Php750,000.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it
was denied. It then filed a petition for certiorari, alleging that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting Muñoz to bail; that there is nothing in
the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being
limited solely to criminal proceedings.

ISSUE & RULING

Whether an extraditee has the right to bail

YES. The family of nations upholds the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity
of every person. The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of
every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order
their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right
to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.

First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not
necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as
deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained.

Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential
history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal
proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the
pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under
international conventions to uphold human rights.

Case No. 2: Government of US vs. Judge Puruganan

GR No. 148571, September 24, 2002; December 17, 2002

DOCTRINES

“We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision
on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person
has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." 60 It follows that the constitutional provision on bail
will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional
right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion." 61 Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional
provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned
offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature.”

FACTS

The Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed a Petition for
Extradition. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. In order to prevent the
flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to
Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," which prayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set for
hearing. During the hearing, respondent, in his Memorandum, sought an alternative prayer: that in case a
warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The court below issued its
questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his
temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the
required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001

ISSUE & RULING

Whether the allowance of bail of proper

NO

Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."

We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision
on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person
has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Also, the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an
argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and
distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts
trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.

Presumption of Innocence

Case No. 1: Corpus vs. People

GR No. 74259, February 14, 1991

Doctrine:
The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of the parties is evenly
balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the
accused.

FACTS

Generoso Corpuz y Padre, was charged with malversation on the ground that he failed to produce the
missing amount (total deficiency of P50,596.07) incurred during his designation as an Acting Supervising
Cashier  in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Vizcaya. SB convicted him of the crime
charged.

He insisted, however, that he is not guilty of the charge because the shortage imputed to him was
malversed by other persons.

ISSUE & RULING

Whether petitioner’s claim of presumption of innocence is sufficiently proved?

No. His conviction must be affirmed.

The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of the parties is evenly
balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the
accused. There is no such equipoise here.

Moreover, the evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the
petitioner with his nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the
accused must yield to the positive finding that he malversed the sum of P50, 310.87 to the prejudice of the
public whose confidence he has breached.

Case No. 2: Dumlao vs. COMELEC

GR No. L-52245, January 22, 1980

Doctrine
An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged provision
contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for
public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military
tribunal.

FACTS

Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar and petitioner, Alfredo
Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo assails the
validity of Bp 52 sec 4:

Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate
for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity
therein: provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be
conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes
before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie
evidence of such fact
.
ISSUE & RULING

Whether it violates the presumption of innocence

Yes. Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is
not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of
innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges
have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In
ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts
of dislotalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be
ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges
have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a
crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to
hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be
rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time
constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome
the prima facie evidence against him.

Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather
than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings
between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided.
Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted
for a judicial determination.

Right to be heard by Himself and Counsel

Case No. 1: Amion vs. Chiongson

AM NO. RTJ-97-1371, January 22, 1999

An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that
the preference in the choice of counsel pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under
investigation rather than one who is the accused in criminal prosecution.
Even if we were to extend the application of the concept of preference in the choice of counsel to an
accused in a criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion cannot partake of a discretion so absolute
and arbitrary as would make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused.
As held by this Court in the case of People vs. Barasina:
Withal, the word preferably under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not
convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive
as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his
defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation, will be
solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the
interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or another, is not available to
protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by the framers
of the charter

Applying this principle enunciated by the Court, we may likewise say that the accuseds discretion in a
criminal prosecution with respect to his choice of counsel is not so much as to grant him a plenary
prerogative which would preclude other equally competent and independent counsels from representing
him. Otherwise, the pace of a criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused to the
detriment of the eventual resolution of the case.

FACTS

This is an administrative matter filed before the court charging the respondent judge for ignorance of the
law and oppression for vehemently insisting of appointing the accused-appellant counsel de officio
despite the appellant’s opposition because he has his own counsel of choice in the person of Atty.
Depasucat. However, many instances that Atty. Depasucat did not appear in court which prompted
respondent judge to assign Atty. Lao Ong from the PAO to represent the accused stating on record that
his representation is without prejudice to the appearance of the accused own counsel. This was done in
order to avoid delay of the trial since the complainant already expressed frustration on the so many
postponement of the hearing.

ISSUE & RULING

Whether or not there is merit of invoking the right to counsel of his own choice as asserted by the
accused in the case at bar.

The court finds the administrative complaint against respondent judge devoid of merit. An examination of
related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that the "preference in the
choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation  rather than one
who is the accused in a criminal prosecution. Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of his
substantive and constitutional right to due process as he was duly accorded all the opportunities to be
heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense but he forfeited this right, for not appearing in
court together with his counsel at the scheduled hearings. It was the strategic machination of delaying the
proceeding by the accused that gave rise to the need of appointing him counsel de officio by the court as
delaying further the hearing is prejudicial to speedy disposition of a case and causes delay in the
administration of justice

Case No. 2: People vs. Agbayani

GR No. 122770, January 16, 1998

The trial court is presumed to have complied with its four-fold duties under Section 6 of Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court, namely,
(1) to inform the accused that he has the right to have his own counsel before being arraigned;
(2)after giving such information, to ask accused whether he desires the aid of counsel;
(3) if he so desires to procure the services of counsel, the court must grant him reasonable time to
do so; and
(4) if he so desiresto have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court must assign counsel de
oficio to defend him. No. Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court reads: Time to prepare for
trial.

FACTS

Eduardo Agbayani was sentenced to death by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 106 of Quezon City for
raping her 14-year old daughter, Eden. The conviction was based on the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses, Dr. Florante Baltazar, the victim and SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje.
The defense, on the other hand, interpose the defense of denial and alibi, and one of the evidence
presented was the affidavit of desistance of the victim. However, it was retracted by the victim during the
presentation of the rebuttal evidence claiming that she was only pressured by her mother and sister to sign
it.

Hence, in this appeal the appellant questioned the credibility of the testimony of the victim in view of her
execution of the affidavit of desistance.

ISSUE & RULING

Whether the lower court failed to apprise the accused of his right to have counsel of his own choice.

No. It is true that the transcript of the stenographic notes of the proceedings of 22 December1994 and the
order issued by the trial court after the conclusion of said proceedings only state that the court appointed
de oficio counsel with the consent of the said accused. They do not categorically disclose that the trial
informed appellant of his right to counsel of his own choice. However, this does not mean that the trial
court failed to inform appellant of such right. Since appellant has miserably failed to show that he was not
informed of his right to counsel, the presumptions that the law has been obeyed and official duty has been
regularly performed by the trial court stand. In other words, the trial court is presumed to have complied
with its four-fold duties under Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, namely,

(1) to inform the accused that he has the right to have his own counsel before being arraigned;
(2) after giving such information, to ask accused whether he desires the aid of counsel;
(3) if he so desires to procure the services of counsel, the court must grant him reasonable time to
do so; and
(4) if he so desiresto have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court must assign counsel de
oficio to defend him. No. Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court reads: Time to prepare for
trial.

After a plea of not guilty, the accused is entitled to two (2) days to prepare for trial unless the court for
good cause grants him further time. It must be pointed out that the right must be expressly demanded.
Only when so demanded does denial thereof constitute reversible error and a ground for new trial.
Further, such right may be waived, expressly or impliedly. In the instant case, appellant did not ask for
time to prepare for such trial hence, he effectively waived such right.

Case No. 3: People vs. Holgado

GR No. L-2809, March 22, 1950

DOCTRINE:
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given
the opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include
the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not
because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen
more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by
counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that
under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an
attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the
court should assign one de oficio  if he so desires and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to procure an
attorney of his own.

When a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four important duties to comply with:
1. It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned;
2. After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney
3. If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend
him; and
4. If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable
time therefor.

FACTS
Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal
detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without
justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight
hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty." Upon the arraignment, the accused
pleaded guilty to the information. The offense committed by the accused is kidnapping and serious illegal
detention as defined by article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by section 2 of Republic Act
No. 18.

However, it appears that the caption in the judgment is named SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION while
in the body of the judgment if is said that the accused "stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention." In the formation filed by the provincial fiscal it is said that he "accuses Frisco
Holgado of the crime of slight illegal detention." The facts alleged in said information are not clear as to
whether the offense is named therein or capital offense of "kidnapping and serious illegal detention" as
found by the trial judge in his judgment. Since the accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence
appears to have been presented by either party, the trial judge must have deduced the capital offense from
the facts pleaded in the information.

Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given by the accused who was unaided by
counsel, it was not prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to render such a serious judgment finding
the accused guilty of a capital offense, and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and one
day of prision mayor to twenty years, without absolute any evidence to determine and clarify the true
facts of the case.

ISSUE & RULING

Whether the appellant Holgado validly waived his right to counsel during trial

No, it is not validly waived.

The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. It is expressly provided in our rules of
Court, Rule 112, section 3, that:
If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to
have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must
assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring
attorney.

Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four important duties to
comply with:
1. It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned;
2. After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney
3. If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend
him; and
4. If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable
time therefor.

Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record discloses that said court did
not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one. The
trial court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him reasonable
time to procure or assign an attorney de oficio. The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do
you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?" Not only did such a question fail to inform the
accused that it was his right to have an attorney before arraignment, but, what is worse, the question was
so framed that it could have been construed by the accused as a suggestion from the court that he plead
guilt if he had no attorney. And this is a denial of fair hearing in violation of the due process clause
contained in our Constitution.

One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given
the opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include
the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not
because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen
more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by
counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that
under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an
attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the
court should assign one de oficio if he so desires and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to procure an
attorney of his own.
It must be added, in the instant case, that the accused who was unaided by counsel pleaded guilty but with
the following qualification: "but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo." The trial court failed to inquire as
to the true import of this qualification. the record does not show whether the supposed instructions was
real and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No
investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no
way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of
the confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had
investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the
court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a
qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted
by counsel specially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found
to be capital by the court.

The judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court below for a new
arraignment and a new trial after the accused is apprised of his right to have and to be assisted by counsel.
So ordered.

Right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation.

Case No. 1: People vs. Quitlong

GR No. 121562, July 10, 1998

Doctrine:
In order that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him may not be violated, the information must state the name of the accused, the
designation given to the offense by statute, a statement of the acts or omission so complained of as
constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate time and date of the commission
of the offense and the place where the offense had been committed. The information must set forth the
facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused, so that the
accused can prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against
two or more persons is conspiracy. Where no such allegation is made in the information, the court’s
finding of conspiracy violates the constitutional requirement.

FACTS

Jonathan Capito (19 yr. old student of [Link] in Baguio) and others while on their way home buy fish
balls. When Calpito counted the change for his 100-peso bill, he saw that he had only been handed back
thirty five pesos. Confronted by Calpito, the fishball vendor did not admit that he had short-changed.

Commotions between group of Capito and group of Fish ball vendors happened. Capito was stabbed and
died. Police officers caught the accused on the act of stabbing Capito. Emelio Senoto, Salvador Quitlong,
and Ronnie Quitlong was charge for murder. But in the original charge it was not alleged that there was
conspiracy.

ISSUE & RULING

Whether the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the accusation has been violated.

Yes. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of conspiracy, so averred and proved as heretofore
explained, an accused can only be made liable for the acts committed by him alone and this criminal
responsibility is individual and not collective and so it is that must be so held in this case.

Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial court, evidence of conspiracy is not
enough for an accused to bear and to respond to all its grave legal consequences; it is equally
essential that such accused has been apprised when the charge is made conformably with prevailing
substantive and procedural requirements. Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in particular,
mandates that no person shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without due process of law and
that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. The right to be informed of any such indictment is likewise explicit in procedural
rules. The practice and object of informing an accused in writing of the charges against him has been
explained as early as the 1904 decision of the Court in U.S. vs. Karelsen;
 First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him
to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection
against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts
alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one
should be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S., 542). In order that this requirement may be
satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and
intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names
(plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific
allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.

An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of his accusation is not violated, must state the name of the accused; the
designation given to the offense by the statute; a statement of the acts or omissions so complained
of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time and date of
the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense has been committed.20 In
embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts
and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the
accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a
complaint against two or more accused persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of
an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to during trial, may be
corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that
would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in
order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation, equally
guilty with the other or others in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can
rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary
importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others. Verily, an accused must know from
the information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the
acts of his co-accused as well.

A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the
details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the
common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy.
Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing
a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of the facts relied upon to be
constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the
case will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended,
and with such precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment
based on the same facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment may be held sufficient "if it follows the
words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of the character of the offense he is charged with
conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt
act to effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the
language of the respective statutes defining them.

Case No. 2: Pecho vs. People GR No. 111399, September 27, 1996

Doctrine:
An accused may be convicted of a crime which, although not the one charged, is necessarily included in
the crime charged.

FACTS

The charge against Pecho was violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. After the case reached the SC for the
first time, he was found guilty of the complex crime of attempted Estafa through falsification of official
and commercial documents—which the SC held to be necessarily included in the crime charged.

Pecho contends that he cannot be convicted of the complex crime of attempted Estafa through
falsification of official and commercial documents because this will violate his right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.

ISSUE & RULING

Whether the complex crime will violate the right of Pecho to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.

No. The accused may be convicted of a crime which, although not the one charged, is necessarily
included in the latter.

Objectives of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him:
(1) To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to
make his defense;
(2) to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further ‘prosecution for
the same cause; and
(3) to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law
to support a conviction, if one should be had.

In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated; not conclusions of law.

Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent: these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff or defendant), and circumstances.

In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to
constitute the crime charged.

What determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts
stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor
the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. An
incorrect caption is not a fatal mistake.

It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which, although not the one charged, is
necessarily included in the latter.

Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides:

“SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When there is variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged
is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved.”

(Note: However, Pecho was ultimately acquitted of the complex crime of attempted Estafa through
falsification of official and commercial documents, because of the lack of sufficient circumstantial
evidence to prove conspiracy between him and his co-accused.)

Right to speedy, public, impartial trials

Case No. 1: Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases against
Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan,
AM No. 10-11-5-SC, June 14, 2011; October 23, 2012

Doctrine:

Prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the "totality of
circumstances" test. That the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that
pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial , and that there must be
allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of
possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a
fair trial.

FACTS

On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were killed while on
their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. Touted as the worst election-related violence and the most
brutal killing of journalists in recent history, the tragic incident which came to be known as the
"Maguindanao Massacre" spawned charges for 57 counts of murder and an additional charge of
rebellion against 197 accused, commonly entitled People v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr.,et al. Following
the transfer of venue and the re-raffling of the cases, the cases are being tried by Presiding Judge Jocelyn
Solis-Reyes of Branch 221 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon Cityinside Camp Bagong Diwa
in Taguig City.
Almost a year later or on November 19, 2010, petitioners, the National Union of Journalists of the
Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims,
individual journalists from various media entities, and members of the academe filed a petition before
this Court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be
allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist
the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the
use of devices. The Court docketed the petition as A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC.

Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage of court proceedings.
They principally urge the Court to revisit the 1991 ruling in Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the
Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquino's Libel Case and the 2001 ruling in Re: Request Radio-TV
Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President Joseph E.
Estrada which rulings, they contend, violate the doctrine that proposed restrictions on constitutional rights
are to be narrowly construed and outright prohibition cannot stand when regulation is a viable alternative.

Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has attracted intense media coverage
due to the gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of the accused, and the number of media personnel
killed. They inform that reporters are being frisked and searched for cameras, recorders, and cellular
devices upon entry, and that under strict orders of the trial court against live broadcast coverage, the
number of media practitioners allowed inside the courtroom has been limited to one reporter for each
media institution.

The record shows that NUJP Vice-Chairperson Jose Jaime Espina, by January 12, 2010 letter to Judge
Solis-Reyes, requested a dialogue to discuss concerns over media coverage of the proceedings of the
Maguindanao Massacre cases. Judge Solis-Reyes replied, however, that "matters concerning media
coverage should be brought to the Courts attention through appropriate motion." Hence, the present
petitions which assert the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information, right to a fair and
public trial, right to assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances, right of free access
to courts, and freedom of association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court.

ISSUE & RULING

Whether the trial should be broadcasted

The Court partially grants pro hac vice petitioners prayer for a live broadcast of the trial court
proceedings, subject to the guidelines which shall be enumerated shortly.

Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners
correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the
"totality of circumstances" test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that the
right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se
prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the
impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not
tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.

Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies. He may challenge the validity of an adverse
judgment arising from a proceeding that transgressed a constitutional right. As pointed out by petitioners,
an aggrieved party may early on move for a change of venue, for continuance until the prejudice from
publicity is abated, for disqualification of the judge, and for closure of portions of the trial when
necessary. The trial court may likewise exercise its power of contempt and issue gag orders.

One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from the earlier cases is the
impossibility of accommodating even the parties to the cases the private complainants/families of the
victims and other witnesses inside the courtroom.

An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where
his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with
and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of
long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must
be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and
observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a
reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness
negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then
be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.

Even before considering what is a "reasonable number of the public" who may observe the proceedings,
the peculiarity of the subject criminal cases is that the proceedings already necessarily entail the presence
of hundreds of families. It cannot be gainsaid that the families of the 57 victims and of the 197 accused
have as much interest, beyond mere curiosity, to attend or monitor the proceedings as those of the
impleaded parties or trial participants. It bears noting at this juncture that the prosecution and the defense
have listed more than 200 witnesses each.

The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all the
interested parties, whether private complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if the right
itself commands that a reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it
takes place inside the courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent
limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial.

*** Aquino Case

The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm ─ "a trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious
importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment, and to so treat it
deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest for
truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated." The observation that "massive intrusion of
representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter and destroy the constitutionally
necessary atmosphere and decorum" stands.

Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly
administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the people
to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio
and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for
news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties
and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or
photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.

Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the
participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved
to PROHlBIT live radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video footage of court hearings
for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated.

Case No. 2: People vs. Tee

GR No. 140546-47 January 20, 2003

One must take into account that a trial is always subject to postponements and other causes of delay. But
in the absence of a showing that delays were unreasonable and capricious, the State should not be
deprived of a reasonable opportunity of prosecuting an accused.

A trial court is not in error, if it opts to reopen the proceedings of a case, even after both sides had rested
and the case submitted for decision, by the calling of additional witnesses or recalling of witnesses so as
to satisfy the judge’s mind with reference to particular facts involved in the case.

FACTS

Appellant was charged with illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8, Art II of RA 6425.

A certain Abratique helped him in transporting the illegal drugs from one place to another. Appellant
insisted that the prosecution’s unjustified and willful delay in presenting witness Abratique unduly
delayed the resolution of his case. He points out that a total of eight 8 scheduled hearings had to be reset
due to the failure or willful refusal of Abratique to testify against him. Appellant insists that said lapse on
the prosecution’s part violated Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98 [an act to ensure a speedy trial of all
criminal cases]. Further, he alleged that the prosecution deliberately resorted to delaying the case to cause
him untold miseries. Hence, the failure of Abratique to appear and testify in 20 hearing dates allegedly
violated Appellant’s constitutional and statutory right to speedy trial.

Appellant next contends that the trial court gravely abused its discretion, and exhibited partiality, when it
allowed the reopening of the case after the prosecution had failed to present Abratique on several
occasions and had been directed to rest its case. Appellant stresses that the lower court’s order to reopen
the case to receive Abratique’s further testimony is an indication that the trial court favored the
prosecution and unduly prejudiced appellant.

ISSUES & RULINGS

(1) Whether the right to speedy trial was violated

No. The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, provides that the trial period for criminal cases in general shall be
one hundred eighty (180) days. However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts
should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled
hearings of the case.

 The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when:

(1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
(2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or
(3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried.

In the present case, although the absences of prosecution witness Abratique totaled twenty (20) hearing
days, there is no showing whatsoever that prosecution capriciously caused Abratique’s absences so as to
vex or oppress appellant and deny him his rights. On record, after Abratique repeatedly failed to show up
for the taking of his testimony, the prosecution went to the extent of praying that the trial court order the
arrest of Abratique to compel his attendance at trial. The prosecution likewise tried to get the NBI to
produce Abratique as the latter was in the Bureau’s custody, but to no avail. Eventually, the trial court
ordered the prosecution to waive its right to present Abratique and rest its case on the evidence already
offered.

Moreover, nothing on record shows that appellant Appellant objected to the inability of the prosecution to
produce its witness. Under the Rules, appellant could have moved the trial court to require that witness
Abratique post bail to ensure that the latter would testify when required. Appellant could have moved to
have Abratique found in contempt and duly sanctioned. Appellant did neither. It is a bit too late in the day
for appellant to invoke now his right to speedy trial.

(2) Whether the re-opening of the case is an indication that the trial court favored the prosecution and
unduly prejudiced appellant.

No, a motion to reopen may properly be presented only after either or both parties have formally offered
and closed their evidence, but before judgment. On May 7, 1999, the prosecution so moved, stressing
that it had not yet formally offered its evidence and that the substantial rights of the accused would not be
prejudiced inasmuch as the latter had yet to present his evidence. Appellant filed no opposition to the
motion. The trial court granted the motion six days later. Plainly, there was nothing to reopen, as the
prosecution had not formally rested its case. Moreover, the taking of Abratique’s testimony was not for
the purpose of presenting additional evidence, but more properly for the completion of his unfinished
testimony. 

In U.S. vs. Base, the Court held that a trial court is not in error, if it opts to reopen the proceedings of
a case, even after both sides had rested and the case submitted for decision, by the calling of
additional witnesses or recalling of witnesses so as to satisfy the judge’s mind with reference to
particular facts involved in the case.

A judge cannot be faulted should he require a material witness to complete his testimony, which is what
happened in this case. It is but proper that the judge’s mind be satisfied on any and all questions presented
during the trial, in order to serve the cause of justice.

Right of Confrontation

Case No. 1: US vs. Javier

GR No. L-12990, January 21, 1918

Doctrine:
There are two principal reasons for the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which says: "That in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face." The first
reason is the right of cross-examination, and the second is that the tribunal may have before it the
department and appearance of the witness while testifying.
 FACTS

Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon of October 22, 1915, fastened his carabao valued at P150 in his corral
situated in the barrio of Trapiche, municipality of Tananuan, Province of Batangas. On the following
morning when he went to look after the animal, he found the gate to the corral open and that the carabao
had disappeared. He reported the matter to the Constabulary, and a patrol of the Constabulary under the
leadership of sergeant Presa, on the 20th of November following, encountered the accused Lazaro Javier,
Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido de Chavez leading a carabao. When the ladrones saw the Constabulary,
they scattered in all directions. On the following day, the Constabulary found this carabao tied in front of
the house of one Pedro Monterola in the barrio of Santa Clara, municipality of San Pablo. The carabao
was identified by Doroteo Natividad as the one which had been taken from his corral on the night of
October 22, 1915, and by the Constabulary as the one seen in the possession of the accused.

The defendants appealed the case saying that Presa’s statement, Exhibit B, should not have been admitted
in evidence. Because Presa is already dead. Appellant’s argument is predicated on the provision of the
Philippine Bill of Rights which says, "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . .
. to meet the witnesses face to face," and the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 (5),
which say that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled: . . . to be confronted at the trial
by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him."

RULING

Such provision: …intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by
witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who give their
testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended to
prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve
the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right of cross-
examination. In other words, confrontation is essential because cross-examination is essential. A second
reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the deportment and appearance of the
witness while testifying.

The sworn statement of Presa was not made by question and answer under circumstances which gave the
defense an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The proviso of the Code of Criminal Procedure as to
confrontation is therefore inapplicable. Presa’s statement again is not the testimony of a witness deceased,
given in a former action between the same relating to the same matter. Nor is the statement of Presca a
dying declaration or a deposition in a former trial or shown to be a part of the preliminary examination.

The Supreme Court said that if they predicated their decision in the case of R. v. Paine, wherein it was
objected that B, being dead, the defendant had lost all opportunity of cross-examining him, and the
defendant was favored, there will be an undue delay to the owner of the carabao and the involved
soldiers. This is because they did not rebut the evidence of the petitioner and so it is deemed sufficient to
prove the guilt of the defendants beyond reasonable doubt.

Case No. 2: Talino vs. Sandiganbayan

GR No. L-75511-14, March 16, 1987

Doctrine:
The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the person
facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a
chance to cross-examine them on their charges. No accusation is permitted to be made against his back or
in his absence nor is any derogatory information accepted if it is made anonymously, as in poison pen
letters sent by persons who cannot stand by their libels and must shroud their spite in secrecy.

FACTS

The petitioner Talino et al., were charged in four separate informations with estafa through falsification of
public documents for having allegedly conspired to defraud the government in the total amount of
P26,523.00, representing the cost of repairs claimed to have been undertaken, but actually not needed and
never made, on four government vehicles, through falsification of the supporting papers to authorize the
illegal payments.

In the four separate cases, they were tried jointly for all the accused until after the prosecution had rested,
when Genaro Basilio, Alejandro Macadangdang and petitioner Talino asked for separate trials, which
were allowed.

They then presented their evidence at such trials, while the other accused continued defending themselves
in the original proceedings, at which one of them, Pio Ulat gave damaging testimony against the
petitioner, relating in detail his participation in the questioned transactions.

The Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in all the four cases finding Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang Ulat
and Renato Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt. This decision is now challenged by the petitioner on
the ground that it violates his right of confrontation as guaranteed by the Constitution.

ISSUE & RULING

Whether the decision violates the petitioner’s right of confrontation

NO. The decision did not violate Talino’s right of confrontation.

The rule is that the trial court should exercise the utmost circumspection in granting a motion for separate
trial, allowing the same only after a thorough study of the claimed justification therefor, if only to avoid
the serious difficulties that may arise, such as the one encountered and regretted by the respondent court,
in according the accused the right of confrontation.

The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the person
facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a
chance to cross-examine them on their charges. No accusation is permitted to be made against his back or
in his absence nor is any derogatory information accepted if it is made anonymously, as in poison pen
letters sent by persons who cannot stand by their libels and must shroud their spite in secrecy.

The respondent court did not consider the testimony given by Ulat in convicting the petitioner. The part
of that decision finding Talino guilty made no mention of Ulat at all but confined itself to the petitioner's
own acts in approving the questioned vouchers as proof of his complicity in the plot to swindle the
government.

The factual findings of the respondent court being supported by substantial evidence other than Ulat's
testimony, there is no reason to disturb them. It is futile for the petitioner to invoke his constitutional
presumption of innocence because his guilt has in the view of the trial court been established beyond
reasonable doubt.

Double Jeopardy

Case No. 1: People vs. Hon. Velasco,

G.R. No. 127444, September 13, 2000

DOCTRINE:

When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the
accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information

It bears repeating that where acquittal is concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it occurs at the
level of the trial court or on appeal from a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the finality-of-
acquittal rule in our jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our Constitution, statutes and cognate
jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens
at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals.

In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme
Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial. The doctrine that "double jeopardy
may not be invoked after trial" may apply only when the Court finds that the "criminal trial was a sham"
because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due process.

FACTS

In San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a small town north of Manila, was shattered by gunshots fired in rapid
succession. The shooting claimed the life of young Alex Vinculado and seriously maimed his twin
brother Levi who permanently lost his left vision. Their uncle, Miguel Vinculado, Jr. was also shot.

As a consequence, three (3) criminal Informations - one (1) for homicide and two (2) for frustrated
homicide - were originally filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, against Honorato
Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, a municipal employee and alleged bodyguard of
the mayor. However, the charges were withdrawn and a new set filed against the same accused upgrading
the crimes to murder and frustrated murder. Mayor Galvez was charged, in addition, with violation of PD
1866 for unauthorized carrying of firearm outside his residence; hence, a fourth Information had to be
filed.

In the course of the proceedings, the judge inhibited himself and the cases were re-raffled to respondent
Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco of Branch 89. The trial court found the accused Godofredo Diego guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and double frustrated murder. However, it acquitted Mayor
Honorato Galvez of the same charges due to insufficiency of evidence. It also absolved him from the
charge of illegal carrying of firearm upon its finding that the act was not a violation of law.

The acquittal of accused Honorato Galvez is now vigorously challenged by the Government before this
Court in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and Sec. 1, Art. VIII, of the
Constitution. It is the submission of petitioner that the exculpation of the accused Galvez from all
criminal responsibility by respondent Judge Tirso Velasco constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Allegedly, in holding in favor of Galvez, the judge deliberately and
wrongfully disregarded certain facts and evidence on record which, if judiciously considered, would have
led to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner proposes that this patently
gross judicial indiscretion and arbitrariness should be rectified by a re-examination of the evidence by the
Court upon a determination that a review of the case will not transgress the constitutional guarantee
against double jeopardy. It is urged that this is necessary because the judgment of acquittal should be
nullified and substituted with a verdict of guilt.

The main hypothesis of the Government is that elevating the issue of criminal culpability of private
respondent Galvez before this Tribunal despite acquittal by the trial court should not be considered
violative of the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy, for it is now settled
constitutional doctrine in the United States that the Double Jeopardy Clause permits a review of acquittals
decreed by US trial magistrates where, as in this case, no retrial is required should judgment be
overturned. Since Philippine concepts on double jeopardy have been sourced from American
constitutional principles, statutes and jurisprudence, particularly the case of Kepner v. United States, and
because similarly in this jurisdiction a retrial does not follow in the event an acquittal on appeal is
reversed, double jeopardy should also be allowed to take the same directional course.

ISSUE & RULING

Whether a review by the Supreme Court of a judgment of acquittal in light of the constitutional
interdict against double jeopardy is permissible

NO. It must be explained that under existing American law and jurisprudence, appeals may be had not
only from criminal convictions but also, in some limited instances, from dismissals of criminal charges,
sometimes loosely termed "acquittals." But this is so as long as the judgments of dismissals do not
involve determination of evidence. It must involve questions of law or matters unrelated to a factual
resolution of the case which consequently, on appeal, will not involve a review of evidence.

This contextual situation in which appeals from dismissals of criminal cases are allowed under American
rules of procedure does not obtain in the Philippines. To be sure, United States v. Scott positively spelled
out that if an acquittal was based on an appreciation of the evidence adduced, no appeal would lie. In the
case at bar, the records show that respondent trial judge based his findings of acquittal, no matter how
erroneous it might seem to the petitioner, upon the evidence presented by both parties. The judgment here
was no less than a factual resolution of the case.
The doctrine that an appeal of a judgment after the defendant had been acquitted by the court in a bench
trial is a new trial, is applicable in this case.

The requisites for invoking double jeopardy: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) before a competent
court before which the same is filed; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the defendant
was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent. It bears repeating that where acquittal is concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it occurs
at the level of the trial court or on appeal from a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the
finality-of-acquittal rule in our jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our Constitution, statutes and
cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it
happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals.

In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme
Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial. Thus, the doctrine that "double
jeopardy may not be invoked after trial" may apply only when the Court finds that the "criminal trial was
a sham" because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due
process. The Court in People v. Bocar rationalized that the "remand of the criminal case for further
hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and
does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy."

There is some indication that courts view the writ of certiorari as an appeal in itself where the applicant
shows that there is no other adequate remedy available, and it is not uncommon to find language in cases
to the effect that the state should not be permitted to accomplish by certiorari what it cannot do by appeal.

Philippine jurisprudence has been consistent in its application of the Double Jeopardy Clause such that it
has viewed with suspicion, and not without good reason, applications for the extraordinary writ
questioning decisions acquitting an accused on ground of grave abuse of discretion.

The petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent judge acquitting the accused
Honorato Galvez goes deeply into the trial court's appreciation and evaluation in esse of the evidence
adduced by the parties. A reading of the questioned decision shows that respondent judge considered the
evidence received at trial. These consisted among others of the testimonies relative to the positions of the
victims vis-à-vis the accused and the trajectory, location and nature of the gunshot wounds, and the
opinion of the expert witness for the prosecution. While the appreciation thereof may have resulted in
possible lapses in evidence evaluation, it nevertheless does not detract from the fact that the evidence was
considered and passed upon. This consequently exempts the act from the writ’s limiting requirement of
excess or lack of jurisdiction. As such, it becomes an improper object of and therefore non-reviewable by
certiorari. To reiterate, errors of judgment are not to be confused with errors in the exercise of
jurisdiction.

Case No. 2: Ivler vs. Hon. Modesto-SanPedro

G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010

DOCTRINE:
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy
Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a
subsequent prosecution for “serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence”
because of the accused’s prior acquittal of “slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence,” with both
charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained: Reason and precedent both coincide in that once
convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again
for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done,
would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and
cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions.

FACTS

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L.
Ponce; and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of
respondent Ponce's husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce's vehicle. Petitioner
posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 (Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries) and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction,
petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court, in
a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension
of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A.
No. 2803 as a prejudicial question.

Without acting on petitioner's motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of
petitioner's absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the MeTC issued a
resolution denying petitioner's motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after
his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained
unresolved.

Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of
S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.

The RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing
to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance
at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803,
the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.

ISSUE & RULING

Whether petitioner's constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 82366 (Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property)

YES. Petitioner’s conviction in the case of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries bars
his prosecution in criminal reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. The two
charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses .

The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the
prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.

Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless
imprudence. The MTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses,
whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the
framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely
a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s
unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365.
These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of
their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent
effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more
than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light
offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded,
Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so
that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts,
whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of
quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes
occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

Ex Post Facto Law and Bill of Attainder

Case No. 1: Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos. 50581-50617, January 30,1982

"An ex post facto law has been defined as one - (a) Which makes an action done before the passing of the
law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) Which aggravates a
crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) Which changes the punishment and inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) Which alters the
legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. "

FACTS

Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the validity of the Presidential Decree
creating the Sandiganbayan, He was accused before such respondent Court of estafa through falsification
of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public
officials, in several cases.

Upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds. A week
later, respondent Court denied such motion. There was a motion for reconsideration filed the next day; it
met the same fate. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition it is the claim of petitioner that
Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the respondent Court is violative of the due process,
equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution.

ISSUE & RULING

Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1486 is violative of the due process, equal protection and ex
post facto clauses of the Constitution, thus declaring it unconstitutional?

No. The petition then cannot be granted. The unconstitutionality of such Decree cannot be adjudged.
Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they
can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common
weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in
reason For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under
circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in term of burden or charges,
those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in
the group equally binding on the rest.

An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and
which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than
it was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidences, and authorizes conviction
upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission to regulate civil
rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when
done was lawful, and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty.”

Even the most careful scrutiny of the above definition fails to sustain the claim of petitioner. The "lawful
protection" to which an accused "has become entitled" is qualified, not given a broad scope. It hardly can
be argued that the mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right to appeal is therein embraced.
This is hardly a controversial matter. This Court has spoken in no uncertain terms.

The first authoritative exposition of what is prohibited by the ex post facto clause is found in Mekin v.
Wolfe, Thus: "An ex post facto law has been defined as one - (a) Which makes an action done before the
passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) Which
aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) Which changes the punishment
and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) Which
alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time
of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. " 35 There is relevance to the next
paragraph of the opinion of Justice Cooper: "The case clearly does not come within this definition, nor
can it be seen in what way the act in question alters the situation of petitioner to his disadvantage. It gives
him, as well as the Government, the benefit of the appeal, and is intended First Instance may commit error
in his favor and wrongfully discharge him appears to be the only foundation for the claim. A person can
have no vested right in such a possibility.

This court has had frequent occasion to consider the requirements of due process of law as applied to
criminal procedure, and, generally speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard in a court of
competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after
inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded
within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law.”

This Court holds that petitioner has been unable to make a case calling for a declaration of
unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1606. The
decision does not go as far as passing on any question not affecting the right of petitioner to a trial with all
the safeguards of the Constitution. It is true that other Sections of the Decree could have been worded to
avoid any constitutional objection. As of now, however, no ruling is called for. The view is given
expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the
Decree from the dire fate of invalidity, they must be construed in such a way as preclude any possible
erosion on the powers vested in this Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be
contested. It commends itself for approval. Nor should there be any doubt either that a review by
certiorari of a decision of conviction by the Sandiganbayan calls for strict observance of the constitutional
presumption of innocence.

Case No. 2: People vs. Hon. Ferrer

G.R. No. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972

FACTS

On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of Sec 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed
against the Feliciano Co in the CFI of Tarlac because he became an officer and/or ranking leader of the
Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the
Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means
for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government under
the control and domination of an alien power, by being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the
training school of recruits of the New People's Army, the military arm of the said Communist Party of the
Philippines.

Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.

Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, sharing the
respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion because they organized, joined and/or remained as
offices and/or ranking leaders, of the Kabataang Makabayan, a subversive organization as defined in RA
1700.
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute and one of the grounds is
that it is a bill of attainder.

ISSUE & RULING

Whether RA 1700 otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.

Ruling: No

Article III, Sec 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex port facto law shall be
enacted."

A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial . Its essence is the
substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt . The constitutional ban against bills of
attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-
making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. History in perspective,
bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, and it is against
this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition
of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder.

1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist
Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment.

What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in Sec 4, against membership in the outlawed
organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" issued solely for definitional purposes. In
fact, the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other
organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on
conduct.

Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge
Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the
undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at
the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the
Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to
overthrow the existing Government by force deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under
the control and domination of a foreign power.

2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough
to render it a bill of attainder. It is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial
does it become a bill of attainder.

3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within the ambit of
the prohibition against bills of attainder.

It is also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This requirement follows
from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt. As Justice Frankfurter observed,
"frequently a bill of attainder was ... doubly objectionable because of its ex post facto features. This is the
historic explanation for uniting the two mischiefs in one clause — 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto
law shall be passed.' ... Therefore, if [a statute] is a bill of attainder it is also an ex post facto law. But if it
is not an ex post facto law, the reasons that establish that it is not are persuasive that it cannot be a bill of
attainder."

Sec 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act expressly states that the prohibition therein applies only to acts
committed "After the approval of this Act." Only those who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts
affiliate themselves with, become or remain members of the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or
its successors or of any subversive association "after June 20, 1957, are punished. Those who were
members of the Party or of any other subversive association at the time of the enactment of the law, were
given the opportunity of purging themselves of liability by renouncing in writing and under oath their
membership in the Party. The law expressly provides that such renunciation shall operate to exempt such
persons from penal liability. The penalties prescribed by the Act are therefore not inescapable.

Right against Involuntary Servitude

Case No. 1: Philippine Refining Company Worker’s Union vs. PRC

GR No. L-1668, March 29, 1948
 “The voluntariness of the employee's entering into such a contract of employment with an implied
condition that when any dispute between the employer or landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer
has been submitted to the Court of Industrial relations for settlement or arbitration, and pending award
or decision by it, the employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so
enjoined by the court after hearing and when public interest so requires, and if he has already done so,
that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which shall be issued only after hearing when
public interest so requires or when the dispute cannot, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled,
negatives the possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing..”

FACTS

Philippine Refining Company, Inc. vs. Philippine Refining Company Worker's Union (CLO), was
scheduled for hearing before the Court of Industrial Relations. A series of conferences with both parties
was held by the court. Thereafter, considering the circumstances and facts of the case at that stage of the
proceedings, the Court of Industrial Relations came to the conclusion that for the welfare of everybody
concerned, for the interest of the public, and because the court might not be able to decide the case
promptly, the striking laborers should be directed to return and resume their work in the Philippine
Refining Company on September 27, 1946, at 7:00 o'clock in the morning, and the management of the
respondent company should accept them beginning that date; and it was so ordered by the court.
The order contained the following injunction:
“The striking laborers, pending the final determination of this case, are enjoined not to stage any
strike or walk out from their employment without authority from and without first
submitting the grievances to the Court. The Petitioning Company is likewise enjoined not to
lay-off, dismiss, discharge, or admit any new employees or laborers in its employment during
the pendency of this case, without beforehand notifying and obtaining the authority of the Court.
The controversial points involved in the petition will be heard by this Court at the opportune
time.”

The Philippine Refining Company Workers' Union assailed the order on the ground that it is null, void
and invalid for it is an infringement of the constitutional rights and liberties of the workers and is
moreover repugnant to the constitutional inhibition prohibiting involuntary servitude in any form.
(The question thus raised are substantially the same as those raised in G.R. No. L-1573, Kaisahan ng mga
Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas vs. Gotamco Saw Mill.)

ISSUE & RULING

Whether or not the return-to-work order is repugnant to the constitutional inhibition prohibiting
involuntary servitude

No. It does not offend against the constitutional inhibition proscribing involuntary servitude. An
employee entering into a contract of employment after said law went into effect, voluntarily accepts,
among other conditions, the implied condition that when any dispute between the employer or landlord
and the employee, tenant or laborer has been submitted to the Court of Industrial relations for settlement
or arbitration, and pending award or decision by it, the employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or
walk out of his employment when so enjoined by the court after hearing and when public interest so
requires, and if he has already done so, that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which
shall be issued only after hearing when public interest so requires or when the dispute cannot, in its
opinion, be promptly decided or settled.

The voluntariness of the employee's entering into such a contract of employment — he has a free choice
between entering into it or not — with such an implied condition, negatives the possibility of
involuntary servitude ensuing.

Case No. 2: In the matter of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus of Segifredo Aclaracion vs.
Hon. Gatmaitan
G. R. No. L-39115, May 26, 1975

Doctrine/s:
“Appellate Court may compel a former court stenographer to transcribe his stenographic notes. That
prerogative is ancillary or incidental to its appellate jurisdiction and is a part of its inherent powers which
are necessary to the ordinary and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction and essential to the due
administration of justice”

“Involuntary servitude denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another or the
condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against his will, to labor for
another, whether he is paid or not”

FACTS

Segifredo L. Aclaracion functioned as a temporary stenographer in the Gapan branch of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija from October 1, 1969 to November 21, 1971. His appointment expired on
November 21, 1972 while he was working as a temporary stenographer in the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Thereafter, he was employed as a stenographer in the Public Assistance and Claims Adjudication
Division of the Insurance Commission, where he is now working. After Aclaracion had ceased to be a
court stenographer, the Court of Appeals required him to transcribe his stenographic notes in two cases
decided by the Gapan court which had been appealed: Muncal vs. Eugenio, CA-G. R. No. 49711-R and
Paderes vs. Domingo, CA-G. R. No. 52367-R. He failed to comply with the resolutions of the Court of
Appeals. He was declared in contempt of court. In lieu of the contempt, he was imprisoned but eventually
was released however, the Court required him to transcribed his notes in Paderes case and Muncal.
Petitioner however, refused and contended that "no involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as
a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted" (Sec. 14, Art. IV, Bill of
Rights, 1972 Constitution). He was averse to being subjected "to involuntary servitude sans
compensation". He desired to be released from the obligation of transcribing his notes. (He filed his
petition in forma pauperis)

ISSUE & RULING

Whether to mandate the petitioner to transcribe the said cases constitutes involuntary servitude

NO, the SC hold that an Appellate Court may compel a former court stenographer to transcribe his
stenographic notes. That prerogative is ancillary or incidental to its appellate jurisdiction and is a part of
its inherent powers which are necessary to the ordinary and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction and
essential to the due administration of justice (See State vs. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 5 Pac. 2d
192, 39 Ariz. 242, Note 74, 21 C. J. S. 41; 20 Am. Jur. 2d 440; Fuller vs. State, 57 So. 806, 100 Miss.
811).

Aclaracion's contention that to compel him to transcribe his stenographic notes would constitute
involuntary servitude is not tenable. Involuntary servitude denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory
service of one to another (Hodges vs. U.S., 203 U.S. 1; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil.
660, 708) or the condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against his
will, to labor for another, whether he is paid or not (Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 961). That
situation does not obtain in this case.