LUIS MARCOS P.

LAUREL
vs.
HON. ZEUS C. ABROGAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Makati City, Branch 150, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES &
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY,
G.R. No. 155076
January 13, 2009

FACTS:
Laurel together with others from Baynet Co., Ltd. was accused with theft under
Article 308 of the RPC for allegedly taking, stealing and using the international
long distance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple Resale
(ISR) which is a method of routing and completing international long distance
calls using lines, cables, antenae, and/or air wave frequency which connect
directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is
destined, effectively stealing this business from PLDT while using its facilities.
Laurel claims that a telephone call is a conversation on the phone or a
communication carried out using the telephone and is not synonymous to electric
current or impulses. Hence, it may not be considered as personal property
susceptible of appropriation. He claims that PLDT does not produce or generate
telephone calls. It only provides the facilities or services for the transmission and
switching of the calls. He also insists that business is not personal property. It is
not the business that is protected but the right to carry on a business. This right is
what is considered as property. Since the services of PLDT cannot be considered
as property, the same may not be subject of theft.
ISSUE:
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 1
1. Whether or not the business of PLDT is personal property
2. Whether or not the acts of the petitioners constitute theft
RULING:
1. Yes. Interest in business was declared to be personal property since it is
capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real
properties. Article 414 of the Civil Code provides that all things which are
or may be the object of appropriation are considered either real property
or personal property. Business is likewise not enumerated as personal
property under the Civil Code. Just like interest in business, however, it
may be appropriated.
In Strochecker v. Ramirez, the Court stated:
 
With regard to the nature of the property thus mortgaged
which is one-half interest in the business above described,
such interest is a personal property capable of appropriation
and not included in the enumeration of real properties in
article 335 of the Civil Code, and may be the subject of
mortgage.

Following the ruling in Strochecker v. Ramirez, business should also be

classified as personal property. Since it is not included in the exclusive
enumeration of real properties under Article 415, it is therefore personal
property.
 2. Yes. Petitioners’ acts constitute theft of respondent PLDTs business and
service, committed by means of the unlawful use of the latter’s facilities. In
this regard, the Amended Information inaccurately describes the offense
by making it appear that what petitioner took were the international long
distance telephone calls, rather than respondent PLDTs business.
The international long distance calls, taking the form of electrical energy,
cannot be said to be personal properties belonging to PLDT since the latter
could not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes,
augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex
communications infrastructure and facilities. PLDT not being the owner of
said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that such telephone
calls were taken without its consent. It is the use of these communications
facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft,
which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and business.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 2

 ANTONIA BICERRA, DOMINGO BICERRA, BERNARDO BICERRA,
CAYETANO BICERRA, LINDA BICERRA, PIO BICERRA and
EUFRICINA BICERRA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
TOMASA TENEZA and BENJAMIN BARBOSA, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-16218
November 29, 1962

FACTS:
Bicerras claimed to be the owners of the house, worth P200.00, built on and
owned by them and situated in the said municipality Lagangilang; that sometime
in January 1957 appealed forcibly demolished the house, claiming to be the
owners thereof; that the materials of the house, after it was dismantled, were
placed in the custody of the barrio lieutenant of the place; and that as a result of
appellate's refusal to restore the house or to deliver the material appellants the
latter have suffered damages.
The Court of First Instance of Abra dismissed the complaint filed by the Bicerras,
upon motion of defendants-appellate on the ground that the action was within
the exclude (original) jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court of
Lagangilang, of the same province. Hence, the case was brought on appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action involves real property
RULING:
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 3
A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherence to the soil
on which it is built (Art. 415, par. 1, Civil Code). This classification holds true
regardless of the fact that the house may be situated on land belonging to a
different owner. But once the house is demolished, as in this case, it ceases to
exist as such and hence its character as an immovable likewise ceases.
The case is therefore within the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court,
since there is no real property litigated, the house having ceased to exist, and the
amount of the demand does exceed P2,000.00
 ANTONIO PUNSALAN, JR.,
vs.
REMEDIOS VDA. DE LACSAMANA and THE HONORABLE JUDGE
RODOLFO A. ORTIZ
G.R. No. L-55729
March 28, 1983

FACTS:
Punsalan was the owner of a parcel of land which he mortgaged to PNB for
10,000 pesos. For his failure to pay said amount, the property was foreclosed.
PNB was the highest bidder in the foreclosure proceedings.
In 1974, while the property was still in the alleged possession of petitioner and
with the alleged acquiescence of respondent PNB, petitioner constructed a
warehouse on said property.
A Deed of Sale was executed between PNB and Lacsamana over the property.
This contract was amended to include the building and improvement thereon. By
virtue of said instruments, Lacsamana secured title over the property in her name
as well as separate tax declarations for the land and building.
Punsalan commenced suit praying that the Deed of Sale of the building executed
between PNB and Lacsamana be declared null and void asserting that the
building is not owned by the bank. Lacsamana, in her answer, averred the
affirmative defense of lack of cause of action in that she was a purchaser for value
and invoked the principle in Civil Law that the "accessory follows the principal".
PNB filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that venue was improperly laid
PROPERTY LAW
considering that CASE DIGESTS was real property under article 415 (1) of the New
the building 4
Civil Code and therefore section 2(a) of Rule 4 should apply. Respondent Court
granted respondent PNB's Motion to Dismiss.

Punsalan filed a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating the argument that the
action to annul does not involve ownership or title to property. The respondent
Court denied said motion for lack of merit. Petitioner then filed a Motion to Set
Case for Pre-trial which the respondent Court denied. Hence, this Petition for
Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the warehouse is an immovable property
RULING:
The warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner is an immovable or real
property as provided in article 415(l) of the Civil Code. Buildings are always
immovable under the Code. A building treated separately from the land on which
it stood is immovable property and the mere fact that the parties to a contract
seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in
no wise changed its character as immovable property.
 Tsai vs. CA
G.R. No. 120098
October 2, 2001

FACTS:

Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX) loaned P3,000,000.00 from petitioner

Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) which was secured with a deed of
Real and Chattel Mortgage over a lot, where its factory stands, and the chattels
located therein as enumerated in a schedule attached to the mortgage contract. A
second loan was granted to EVERTEX and was secured by a Chattel Mortgage
over personal properties which were similar to those listed in the first mortgage
deed. After the date of the execution of the second mortgage mentioned above,
EVERTEX purchased various machines and equipment.

Upon EVERTEX's failure to meet its obligation to PBCom, the latter commenced
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against EVERTEX under Act 3135 and Act
1506 or "The Chattel Mortgage Law". PBCom was the highest bidder for the both
auctions. PBCom consolidated its ownership over the lot and all the properties in
it.

It leased the entire factory premises to petitioner Ruby L. Tsai. Later, PBCom
sold the factory, lock, stock and barrel to Tsai, including the contested
machineries.

EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and damages

against PBCom, alleging inter alia that the extrajudicial foreclosure of subject
mortgage was in violation of the Insolvency Law. EVERTEX averred that PBCom,
without anyLAW
PROPERTY legalCASE
or factual
DIGESTSbasis, appropriated the contested properties, which 5
were not included in the Real and Chattel Mortgage of the first mortgage nor in
the Chattel Mortgage of the second, and neither were those properties included in
the Notice of Sheriff's Sale and Certificate of Sale.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contested properties are personal or movable properties

RULING:

The nature of the disputed machineries, i.e., that they were heavy, bolted or
cemented on the real property mortgaged by EVERTEX to PBCom, make
them ipso facto immovable under Article 415 (3) and (5) of the New Civil Code.
This assertion, however, does not settle the issue. Mere nuts and bolts do not
foreclose the controversy. The parties' intent must be known.

While it is true that the controverted properties appear to be immobile, a perusal

of the contract of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties herein gives
us a contrary indication. In the case at bar, both the trial and the appellate courts
reached the same finding that the true intention of PBCOM and the owner,
EVERTEX, is to treat machinery and equipment as chattels.

Assuming arguendo that the properties in question are immovable by nature,

nothing detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation
under the principle of estoppel. As far back as Navarro v. Pineda, 9 SCRA 631
(1963), an immovable may be considered a personal property if there is a
stipulation as when it is used as security in the payment of an obligation where a
chattel mortgage is executed over it, as in the case at bar.
 CALTEX (PHILIPPINES) INC.,
vs.
CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS and CITY ASSESSOR
OF PASAY
G.R. No. L-50466
May 31, 1982

FACTS:

Caltex loaned machines and equipment to gas station operators under an

appropriate lease agreement or receipt. It is stipulated in the lease contract that
the operators, upon demand, shall return to Caltex the machines and equipment
in good condition as when received, ordinary wear and tear excepted. The lessor
of the land, where the gas station is located, does not become the owner of the
machines and equipment installed therein. Caltex retains the ownership thereof
during the term of the lease.

The city assessor of Pasay City characterized the said items of gas station
equipment and machinery as taxable realty. The city board of tax appeals ruled
that they are personalty. The assessor appealed to the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals.

The Board held that the said machines and equipment are real property within
the meaning of sections 3(k) & (m) and 38 of the Real Property Tax Code,
Presidential Decree No. 464, and that the definitions of real property and
personal property in articles 415 and 416 of the Civil Code are not applicable to
this case.
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 6
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the pieces of gas station equipment and machinery are
subject to realty tax
2. Whether or not the gas station equipment and machinery permanently
affixed by Caltex to its gas station and pavement should be subject to the
realty tax
RULING:
1. Yes. The said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances to the gas
station building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty
tax) and which fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station,
for without them the gas station would be useless, and which have been
attached or affixed permanently to the gas station site or embedded
therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within the meaning of
the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.

2. Improvements on land are commonly taxed as realty even though for some
purposes they might be considered personalty (84 C.J.S. 181-2, Notes 40
and 41). "It is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real property
for purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered
personal property" (Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo, 44 Phil.
630, 633).

This case is also easily distinguishable from Board of Assessment Appeals

vs. Manila Electric Co., 119 Phil. 328, where Meralco's steel towers were
considered poles within the meaning of paragraph 9 of its franchise which
exempts its poles from taxation. The steel towers were considered
 personalty because they were attached to square metal frames by means of
bolts and could be moved from place to place when unscrewed and
dismantled.

Nor are Caltex's gas station equipment and machinery the same as tools
and equipment in the repair shop of a bus company which were held to be
personal property not subject to realty tax (Mindanao Bus Co. vs. City
Assessor, 116 Phil. 501).

The Central Board of Assessment Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion in upholding the city assessor's is imposition of the realty tax on
Caltex's gas station and equipment.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 7

 MERALCO
vs.
CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, BOARD OF
ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF LAGUNA and PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR
OF LAGUNA
G.R. No. L-46245
May 31, 1982

FACTS:

Meralco Securities installed from Batangas to Manila a pipeline system consisting

of cylindrical steel pipes joined together and buried not less than one meter
below the surface along the shoulder of the public highway.

The pipes are embedded in the soil and are firmly and solidly welded together so
as to preclude breakage or damage thereto and prevent leakage or seepage of the
oil. The valves are welded to the pipes so as to make the pipeline system one
single piece of property from end to end. Hence, the pipes are permanently
attached to the land.

However, Meralco Securities notes that segments of the pipeline can be moved
from one place to another as shown in the permit issued by the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications which permit provides that the government
reserves the right to require the removal or transfer of the pipes by and at the
concessionaire's expense should they be affected by any road repair or
improvement.

Pursuant
PROPERTYtoLAW
the CASE
Assessment
DIGESTS Law, Commonwealth Act No. 470, the provincial 8
assessor of Laguna treated the pipeline as real property. Meralco Securities
appealed the assessments to the Board of Assessment Appeals of Laguna which
upheld the assessments. Meralco Securities brought the case to the Central Board
of Assessment Appeals which ruled that the pipeline is subject to realty tax.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Meralco Securities' oil pipeline is subject to realty tax

RULING:

Yes. A pipeline for conveying petroleum has been regarded as real property for
tax purposes.

Article 415[l] and [3] provides that real property may consist of constructions of
all kinds adhered to the soil and everything attached to an immovable in a fixed
manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the
material or deterioration of the object.

The pipeline system in question is indubitably a construction adhering to the soil.

It is attached to the land in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom
without dismantling the steel pipes which were welded to form the pipeline.

Insofar as the pipeline uses valves, pumps and control devices to maintain the
flow of oil, it is in a sense machinery within the meaning of the Real Property Tax
Code. It should be borne in mind that what are being characterized as real
property are not the steel pipes but the pipeline system as a whole.
 METROPOLITAN BANK, & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
Hon. FLORO T. ALEJO, in His Capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
172 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela; and SY TAN SE,
represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, SIAN SUAT NGO, respondents.
G.R. No. 141970
September 10, 2001

FACTS:
Spouses Acampado obtained loans from MBTC. As security for the loans, the
Acampados executed in favor of petitioner a Real Estate Mortgage and an
Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land registered in their
name, covered by TCT No. V-41319.
Respondent Sy Tan sought for the nullity of TCT No. V-41319 against Spouses
Acampado. In the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Branch 172, it was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4930-V-96. Despite being the registered mortgagee of
the real property covered by the title sought to be annulled, petitioner was not
made a party, nor was she notified of its existence.
Because the spouses defaulted in the payment of their loan, extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged property were initiated. Petitioner
was the highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor. Petitioner
executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership to enable the Registry of
Deeds of Valenzuela to issue a new TCT in its name. Upon presentation to the
Register of Deeds of the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, petitioner was
informed
PROPERTYofLAW
theCASE
existence of the RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 4930-V-96,
DIGESTS 9
annulling TCT No. V-41319.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of the RTC
Decision but was outrightly dismissed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mortgagee MBTC is an indispensable party in a suit to nullify
an existing Torrens Certificate of Title (TCT) in which a real estate mortgage is
annotated
RULING:
Yes. MBTC is encompassed within the definition of an indispensable party; thus,
it should have been impleaded as a defendant in Civil Case No. 4930-V-96.
Although a mortgage affects the land itself and not merely the TCT covering it,
the cancellation of the TCT and the mortgage annotation exposed petitioner to
real prejudice, because its rights over the mortgaged property would no longer be
known and respected by third parties. Necessarily, therefore, the nullification of
TCT No. V-41319 adversely affected its property rights, considering that a real
mortgage is a real right and a real property by itself.
 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ 
vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 133250
July 9, 2002

FACTS:

On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public

Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation
of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of
Manila Bay. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of
fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.

On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential

Decree No. 1084 creating PEA which is tasked to "to reclaim land, including
foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease
and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same date, then President Marcos
issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in
the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road and Reclamation Project.

On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing

PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that "All future works in MCCRRP x x x
shall be funded and owned by PEA."

On April 25,LAW
PROPERTY 1995,PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a
CASE DIGESTS 10
private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the
reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these
islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the
Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA
through negotiation without public bidding.

On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez as a taxpayer, filed the

instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends
the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the
reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms
of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7,
Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the
public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to
private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of
billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion.

On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement. On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President under the
administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA.

Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner
now prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated
contract be declared null and void."
ISSUE:

Whether or not stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of
lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.

RULING:

Yes. The Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose "object or
purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the commerce of men,"
are "inexistent and void from the beginning." The Court must perform its duty to
defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA
null and void ab initio.

The mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas

does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the
National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the
lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial
lands of PEA.

Absent two official acts – a classification that these lands are alienable or
disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not
needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the
public domain. Only such an official classification and formal declaration can
convert reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
open to disposition under the Constitution, Title I and Title III of CA No. 141 and
other applicable
PROPERTY LAW laws.
CASE DIGESTS 11
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 
vs.
MICHAEL C. SANTOS, VANNESSA C. SANTOS, MICHELLE C.
SANTOS and DELFIN SANTOS, all represented by DELFIN C.
SANTOS, Attorney-in-Fact, Respondents.
G.R. No. 180027
July 18, 2012

FACTS:

In October 1997, the respondents purchased from Generosa, et al.,three parcels

of unregistered land situated in Barangay Carasuchi, Indang, Cavite. Later, the 3
parcels were consolidated into a single lot—"Lot 3"—with a determined total area
of nine thousand five hundred seventy-seven (9,577) square meters.

On 12 March 2002, the respondents filed with the RTC an Application for

Original Registration of Lot 3. Later, the respondents submitted a
Certification from the DENR-Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) attesting that, indeed, Lot 3 was classified as an "Alienable or
Disposable Land" as of 15 March 1982.

On May 13, 2003, after fulfillment of the jurisdictional requirements, the

government, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed the lone
opposition to the respondents’ application.

The respondents allege that their predecessors-in-interest i.e., the previous

owners of the parcels of land making up Lot 3, have been in "continuous,
uninterrupted,
PROPERTY LAWopen, public and adverse" possession of the said parcels "since
CASE DIGESTS 12
time immemorial." It is by virtue of such lengthy possession, tacked with their
own, that respondents now hinge their claim of title over Lot 3.

On the other hand, the government insists that Lot 3 still forms part of the public
domain and, hence, not subject to private acquisition and registration. The
government, however, presented no further evidence to controvert the claim of
the respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents shall be granted original registration of Lot
RULING:

No. The respondents were not able to present any "express declaration" from the
State, attesting to the patrimonial character of Lot 3. To put it bluntly, the
respondents were not able to prove that acquisitive prescription has begun to run
against the State, much less that they have acquired title to Lot 3 by virtue
thereof. As jurisprudence tells us, a mere certification or report classifying the
subject land as alienable and disposable is not sufficient. The SC held that the
respondents are not entitled to the registration under Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529.

There being no compliance with either the first or second paragraph of Section 14
of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Regalian presumption stands and must be
enforced in this case. The SC accordingly overturn the decisions of the RTC and
the Court of Appeals which granted the respondents’ Application for Original
Registration of a parcel of land under Presidential Decree No. 1529, for not being
supported by the evidence at hand.
 TEOFILO C. VILLARICO, petitioner, 
vs.
VIVENCIO SARMIENTO, SPOUSES BESSIE SARMIENTO-DEL
MUNDO & BETH DEL MUNDO, ANDOK’S LITSON CORPORATION
and MARITES’ CARINDERIA, respondents.
G.R. No. 136438
November 11, 2004

FACTS:

Teofilo C. Villarico is the owner of a lot in La Huerta, Parañaque City, Metro

Manila with an area of sixty-six (66) square meters and covered by TCT No.
95453 issued by the Registry of Deeds, same city. His lot is separated from the
Ninoy Aquino Avenue (highway) by a strip of land belonging to the government.
As this highway was elevated by four (4) meters and therefore higher than the
adjoining areas, The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
constructed stairways at several portions of this strip of public land to enable the
people to have access to the highway.

In 1991, Vivencio Sarmiento, his daughter Bessie Sarmiento and her husband
Beth Del Mundo, respondents herein, had a building constructed on a portion of
said government land. A part thereof was occupied by Andok’s Litson
Corporation and Marites’ Carinderia, also impleaded as respondents.

In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, petitioner acquired a

74.30 square meter portion of the same area owned by the government. The
property was registered in his name as T.C.T. No. 74430 in the Registry of Deeds
ofPROPERTY
Parañaque City.
LAW CASE DIGESTS 13
In 1995, petitioner filed with the RTC a complaint for accion publiciana against
respondents. He alleged inter alia that respondents’ structures on the
government land closed his "right of way" to the Ninoy Aquino Avenue; and
encroached on a portion of his lot covered by T.C.T. No. 74430.

Respondents, in their answer, specifically denied petitioner’s allegations,

claiming that they have been issued licenses and permits by Parañaque City to
construct their buildings on the area; and that petitioner has no right over the
subject property as it belongs to the government.

The trial court found that petitioner has never been in possession of any portion
of the public land in question. On the contrary, the defendants are the ones who
have been in actual possession of the area. According to the trial court, petitioner
was not deprived of his "right of way" as he could use the Kapitan Tinoy Street as
passageway to the highway. On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals issued
its Decision affirming the trial court’s Decision in toto

ISSUE:
Whether or not constructing respondents’ buildings on the lot in question, has
deprived the petitioner of his "right of way" and his right of possession over a
considerable portion of the same lot
RULING:

No. Public use is "use that is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to
the indefinite public." Records show that the lot on which the stairways were built
is for the use of the people as passageway to the highway.
Consequently, it is a property of public dominion. Considering that the lot on
which the stairways were constructed is a property of public dominion, it cannot
be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in favor of herein petitioner.
In fact, its use by the public is by mere tolerance of the government through the
DPWH. Petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself. Verily, he cannot claim any
right of possession over it. This is clear from Article 530 of the Civil Code which
provides:

"ART. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being
appropriated may be the object of possession."

Accordingly, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
respondents have better right of possession over the subject lot. However, the
trial court and the Court of Appeals found that defendants’ buildings were
constructed on the portion of the same lot now covered by T.C.T. No. 74430 in
petitioner’s name. Being its owner, he is entitled to its possession. Neither
petitioner nor respondents have a right of possession over the disputed lot where
the stairways were built as it is a property of public dominion.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 14

JOSE MENCHAVEZ, JUAN MENCHAVEZ JR., SIMEON MENCHAVEZ,
RODOLFO MENCHAVEZ, CESAR MENCHAVEZ, REYNALDO,
MENCHAVEZ, ALMA MENCHAVEZ, ELMA MENCHAVEZ, CHARITO
M. MAGA, FE M. POTOT, THELMA M. REROMA, MYRNA M.
YBAÑEZ, and SARAH M. VILLABER, petitioners, vs.
FLORENTINO TEVES JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 153201
January 26, 2005

FACTS:

A "Contract of Lease" was executed by Menchavez, et al. as lessors; and

Florentino Teves Jr. as lessee. The contract was for that area covered by
FISHPOND APPLICATION No. VI-1076 of Juan Menchavez, Sr. The term of the
lease was five years.

On June 2, 1988, Cebu RTC Sheriffs Gimenez and Cabigon demolished the
fishpond dikes constructed by respondent and delivered possession of the subject
property to other parties. As a result, he filed a Complaint for damages with
application for preliminary attachment against petitioners. In his Complaint, he
alleged that the lessors had violated their Contract of Lease, specifically the
peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the property for the entire duration of the
Contract.

Respondent further asserted that the lessors had withheld from him the findings
of the trial court in Civil Case No. 510-T, entitled "Eufracia Colongan and Paulino
Pamplona v. Juan Menchavez Sr. and Sevillana S. Menchavez." which involved
the same property,
PROPERTY LAW CASEwhere the Menchavez spouses were ordered to remove the
DIGESTS 15
dikes illegally constructed and to pay damages and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Contract of Lease was void
RULING:

Yes. The parties do not dispute the finding of the trial and the appellate courts
that the Contract of Lease was void. Indeed, the RTC correctly held that it was the
State, not petitioners that owned the fishpond. The 1987 Constitution specifically
declares that all lands of the public domain, waters, fisheries and other natural
resources belong to the State. Included here are fishponds, which may not be
alienated but only leased. Possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot ripen
into ownership.

Being merely applicants for the lease of the fishponds, petitioners had no
transferable right over them. And even if the State were to grant their application,
the law expressly disallowed sublease of the fishponds to respondent. Void are all
contracts in which the cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, public order or
public policy.
 FRANCISCO U. DACANAY, petitioner,
vs.
MAYOR MACARIO ASISTIO, JR., CITY ENGR. LUCIANO SARNE, JR.
of Kalookan City, Metro Manila, MILA PASTRANA AND/OR
RODOLFO TEOFE, STALLHOLDERS AND REPRESENTING CO-
STALLHOLDERS, respondents.
G.R. No. 93654
May 6, 1992

FACTS:

Pursuant to MMC Ordinance No. 79-02 enacted by the Metropolitan Manila

Commission, designating certain city and municipal streets, roads and open
spaces as sites for flea markets, the Caloocan City mayor opened up seven (7) flea
markets in that city. One of those streets was the "Heroes del '96" where
petitioner Dacanay lives. Upon application of vendors, the respondents city
mayor and city engineer, issued them licenses to conduct vending activities on
said street.

In 1987, Antonio Martinez, as OIC city mayor of Caloocan City, caused the
demolition of the market stalls on Heroes del '96, V. Gozon and Gonzales streets.
Stall owners filed an action for prohibition against the City of Caloocan, the OIC
City Mayor and the City Engineer and/or their deputies in the RTC praying the
court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction ordering these city officials to
discontinue the demolition of their stalls during the pendency of the action.

The court issued the writ prayed for. However, on December 20, 1987, it
dismissed
PROPERTYthe LAWpetition and lifted the writ of preliminary injunction which it had
CASE DIGESTS 16
earlier issued. The trial court found that Heroes del '96, Gozon and Gonzales
streets are of public dominion, hence, outside the commerce of man. However,
shortly after the decision came out, City Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr., as successor
of Mayor Martinez, did not pursue the latter's policy of clearing and cleaning up
the city streets.

Francisco U. Dacanay, a resident on Heroes del '96 Street, filed a complaint

against Mayor Asistio and Engineer Sarne in the Office of the OMBUDSMAN. In
their letter-comment, said city officials explained that in view of the huge number
of stallholders involved, not to mention their dependents, it would be harsh and
inhuman to eject them from the area in question, for their relocation would not
be an easy task. In reply, Dacanay maintained that respondents have been
derelict in the performance of their duties and through manifest partiality
constituting a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, have caused undue injury to
the Government and given unwarranted benefits to the stallholders.

After conducting a preliminary investigation, the OMBUDSMAN found that the

respondents' inaction is purely motivated by their perceived moral and social
responsibility toward their constituents, but "the fact remains that there is an
omission of an act which ought to be performed, in clear violation of Sections
3(e) and (f) of Republic Act 3019." The OMBUDSMAN recommended the filing of
the corresponding information in court.

Dacanay filed the present petition for mandamus on June 19, 1990, praying that
the public respondents be ordered to enforce the final decision in Civil Case No.
C-12921 which upheld the city mayor's authority to order the demolition of
market stalls on V. Gozon, Gonzales and Heroes del '96 Streets and to enforce
P.D. No. 772 and other pertinent laws.
ISSUE:
Whether or not public streets may be leased or licensed to market stallholders by
virtue of a city ordinance or resolution of Metropolitan Manila Commission

RULING:

No. There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private
respondents' market stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets, as found by
the trial court in Civil Case No. C-12921. A public street is property for public use
hence outside the commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code). Being outside
the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract
(Villanueva et al. vs. Castañeda and Macalino, 15 SCRA 142, citing the
Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, 30 SCRA 602; Espiritu vs. Municipal Council of
Pozorrubio, 102 Phil. 869; and Muyot vs. De la Fuente, 48 O.G. 4860).

As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy
portions of the public street, the City Government, contrary to law, has been
leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases or licenses are null and void
for being contrary to law. The right of the public to use the city streets may not be
bargained away through contract. The interests of a few should not prevail over
the good of the greater number in the community whose health, peace, safety,
good order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are under legal
obligation to protect.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 17

MANILA LODGE NO. 761, BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE ORDER
OF THE ELKS, INC., petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF MANILA, and
TARLAC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
G. R. No. L-41001
September 30, 1976

FACTS:
On June 26, 1905 the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1360 which
authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed
area was to form part of the Luneta extension. The Act provided that the
reclaimed area "Shall be the property of the City of Manila" and that "the City of
Manila is hereby authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land formed by
the Luneta extension x x x at the north end not to exceed five hundred feet by six
hundred feet in size, for a hotel site, and to lease the same, with the approval of
the Governor General, to a responsible person or corporation for a term not
exceed ninety-nine years."

For the remainder of the Luneta Extension, a portion sold to the Manila Lodge
No. 761, PBOE, a new Certificate of Title No. 2196 was issued to the City of
Manila.

Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, subsequently sold the said 5,543.07 square meters
to the Elks Club, Inc., to which was issued TCT No. 67488. 4 The registered
owner, "The Elks Club, Inc.," was later changed by court order to "Manila Lodge
No. 761, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, Inc."
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 18
In January 1963, the BPOE petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch IV, for the cancellation of the right of the City of Manila to repurchase the
property. This petition was granted on February 15, 1963.

On November 19, 1963 the BPOE sold the land together with all the
improvements thereon to the Tarlac Development Corporation. (TDC)

In June 1964 the City of Manila filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a
petition for the reannotation of its right to repurchase; the court, after haering,
issued an order, dated November 19, 1964, directing the Register of Deeds of the
City of Manila to reannotate in toto the entry regarind the right of the City of
Manila to repurchase the property after fifty years. From this order TDC and
BPOE appealed to this Court which on July 31, 1968 affirmed in G.R. Nos. L-
24557 and L-24469 the trial court's order of reannotation, but reserved to TDC
the right to bring another action for the clarification of its rights.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the property subject of the action, pursuant to the provisions of
Act No. 1360, as amended by Act No. 1657, was patrimonial property of the City
of Manila and not a park or plaza
RULING:
No. The SC held that the property is of public dominion, intended for public use.

Article 344 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that to property of public use, in
provinces and in towns, comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares
streets fountains, and public waters the promenades, and public works of general
service paid for by such towns or provinces." A park or plaza, such as the
extension to the Luneta, is undoubtedly comprised in said article.

The petitioners, however, argue that, according to said Article 344, in order that
the character of property for public use may be so attached to a plaza, the latter
must be actually constructed or at least laid out as such, and since the subject
property was not yet constructed as a plaza or at least laid out as a plaza when it
was sold by the City, it could not be property for public use. It should be noted,
however, that properties of provinces and towns for public use are governed by
the same principles as properties of the same character belonging to the public
domain.

It is not necessary, therefore, that a plaza be already constructed of- laid out as a
plaza in order that it be considered property for public use. It is sufficient that it
be intended to be such In the case at bar, it has been shown that the intention of
the lawmaking body in giving to the City of Manila the extension to the Luneta
was not a grant to it of patrimonial property but a grant for public use as a plaza.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 19

 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BENJAMIN TANCINCO, AZUCENA
TANCINCO REYES, MARINA TANCINCO IMPERIAL and MARIO C.
TANCINCO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-61647
October 12, 1984

FACTS:
Tancincos are registered owners of a parcel of land situated at Barrio Ubihan,
Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The
private respondents filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent
to their fishpond property.

Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, in representation of the Bureau of

Lands filed a written opposition to the application for registration.

The private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the application for

registration with respect to Lot 3 in line with the recommendation of the
Commissioner appointed by the Court. Therefore, trial proceeded only with
respect to Lots 1 and 2.

On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on
the finding that the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents'
fishponds covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709. Petitioner Republic
appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision affirming in
toto the decision of the lower court. 
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 20
The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of
the New Civil Code because what actually happened is that the private
respondents simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the
Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is any accretion to speak of, it is man-made
and artificial and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation
by the waters of the river.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was accretion to the property of the Tancincos
RULING:

No. Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides “To the owners of lands adjoining
the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters.”

The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of three requisites before an

accretion covered by this particular provision is said to have taken place. They are
(1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the
effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.

The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the
river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all
deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of
nature. In the instant case, there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the
addition to the said property was made gradually through the effects of the
current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. We agree with the observation of
the Solicitor General that it is preposterous to believe that almost four (4)
hectares of land came into being because of the effects of the Meycauayan and
Bocaue rivers.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 21

 MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF PARAÑAQUE, CITY MAYOR OF
PARAÑAQUE, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD NG PARAÑAQUE,
CITY ASSESSOR OF PARAÑAQUE, and CITY TREASURER OF
PARAÑAQUE, respondents.
G.R. No. 155650
July 20, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) administers the land,
improvements and equipment within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter
transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land, including the runways
and buildings then under the Bureau of Air Transportation. The MIAA Charter
further provides that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be
disposed of through sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by the
President of the Philippines.
On 21 March 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC)
issued Opinion No. 061. The OGCC opined that the Local Government Code of
1991 withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section
21 of the MIAA Charter. Thus, MIAA negotiated with respondent City of
Parañaque to pay the real estate tax imposed by the City. MIAA then paid some of
the real estate tax already due.
On 17 July 2001, the City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices
of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the
City of Parañaque
PROPERTY LAW CASE threatened
DIGESTS to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and 22
Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency. MIAA thus
sought a clarification of OGCC Opinion No. 061.
On 7 February 2003, this Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO)
effective immediately. The Court ordered respondents to cease and desist from
selling at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings. Respondents received
the TRO on the same day that the Court issued it. However, respondents received
the TRO only at 1:25 p.m. or three hours after the conclusion of the public
auction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real
estate tax under existing laws
RULING:
Yes. The SC held that MIAA's Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real
estate tax imposed by local governments. First, MIAA is not a government-owned
or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government and
thus exempt from local taxation. Second, the real properties of MIAA are owned
by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax.

The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and
therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Civil Code
provides:

ARTICLE 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private

ownership.
ARTICLE 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
 (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth. (Emphasis supplied)
ARTICLE 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character
stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.
ARTICLE 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for
public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property
of the State.

No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420
of the Civil Code, like "roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State," are owned by the State. The term "ports" includes
seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a "port"
constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport
Lands and Buildings are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the
State or the Republic of the Philippines.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 23

 VERGO D. TUFEXIS, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
FRANCISCO OLAGUERA and THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF
GUINOBATAN, represented by its president, Agapito
Paulate, defendants-appellees.

G.R. No. L-9865

December 24, 1915

FACTS:
Vergo D. Tufexis, in his complaint, alleged that on September 30, 1911, plaintiff
acquired at a public sale held in execution of a judgment rendered against
Ricardo Pardo y Pujol, a piece of property situated in the municipality of
Guinobatan, consisting of a frame building of strong materials with a galvanized-
iron roof, erected on a parcel of land belonging to that municipality and intended
for a public market; that plaintiff also acquired at the sale all the right, interest,
title, and participation in the said property that appertained or might appertain
to Pardo y Pujol; that the said building was constructed by virtue of a concession
granted by the former Spanish government to Ricardo Pardo y Cabañas, father of
the judgment debtor, who, by a public instrument of July 31, 1912, renounced his
right to redeem the said property and conveyed it to plaintiff, together with all his
rights therein, the instrument of grant, being attached to the complaint as a part
thereof; that on January 2, 1912, the said building was totally destroyed by an
accidental fire; that subsequent to the date just mentioned and for several
months thereafter the municipal council of Guinobatan carried on negotiations
with plaintiff for the purchase of his rights in the said concession; that these
negotiations
PROPERTY LAW could notDIGESTS
CASE be brought to a conclusion because the municipal council 24
had acted therein deceitfully, fraudulently, and in bad faith and for the sole
purpose of beguiling, deceiving, and prejudicing plaintiff in order to prevent him
from exercising his right to reconstruct the burned market building and utilize it
in accordance with the terms of the said concession; that the defendant municipal
council, without plaintiff's consent and in connivance with the other defendant,
Francisco Olaguera, had authorized the latter unlawfully to take possession of all
the land from March 1, 1912, in violation of plaintiff's rights; that the said
Olaguera occupied the same with booths or stores for the sale of groceries and
other merchandise, for billiard tables, and other analogous uses and derived
unlawful gain from the revenues and rents produced by the said buildings; that
plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the said land in accordance with the
concession, which was in full force and effect and belonged to plaintiff; that
plaintiff proposed to construct another public market building on the same land,
but that the defendants had prevented him from using the land and
reconstructing thereon the said public market building, and refused to recognize
plaintiff's right and to vacate the land that had been occupied by the burned
edifice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a building intended for a public market, by virtue of a concession,
under the conditions therein imposed upon the grantee, could be attached and
sold at public auction
RULING:
No. The building constructed on land of the municipality of Guinobatan for a
public market could not be attached and sold as the result of a debt contracted by
Ricardo Pardo y Pujol in favor of a third person,
The land on which the building was erected and contained in the franchise
granted by the Government of the former sovereignty, belongs to the
municipality of Guinobatan. Although the building was constructed at the
expense and with the money of the grantee, Ricardo Pardo y Cabañas, it is,
nevertheless, the property of the state or of the said municipality, and was
temporarily transferred to the grantee, Pardo y Cabañas, in order that he might
enjoy the usufruct of its floor space for forty years, but on the termination of this
period the said right of usufruct was to cease and the building was to belong
finally and absolutely to the state or the municipality in representation thereof.

For these reasons, then, there is no question that the building and the land on
which it was erected, since they did not belong to the grantee, Pardo y Cabañas,
nor do they belong to his son and heir, Ricardo Pardo y Pujol, could not be
attached or sold for the payment of a debt contracted by the latter.

The concession granted by the former Spanish Government is personal and

transferable only by inheritance, and in no manner could it be conveyed as a
special personal privilege to another and a third person unless were an hereditary
successor of the grantee, Pardo y Cabañas, without knowledge and consent of the
administrative authorities under whose control the special right of usufruct in the
floor space of the said market building was enjoyed and exercised.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 25

 ROMAN R. SANTOS, petitioner-appellee, 
vs.
HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, as Secretary of Public Works and
Communications and JULIAN C. CARGULLO, respondents-appellants
G.R. No. L-15829
December 4, 1967
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
FACTS:
The Zobel family of Spain formerly owned vast track of marshland in the
municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga province. Called Hacienda San Esteban, it
was administered and managed by the Ayala y Cia. From the year 1860 to about
the year 1924 Ayala y Cia., devoted the hacienda to the planting and cultivation of
nipa palms from which it gathered nipa sap or "tuba." It operated a distillery
plant in barrio San Esteban to turn nipa tuba into potable alcohol, which was in
turn manufactured into liquor.
Accessibility through the nipa palms deep into the hacienda posed as a problem.
Ayala y Cia., therefore dug canals leading towards the hacienda's interior where
most of them interlinked with each other. The canals facilitated the gathering of
tuba and the guarding and patrolling of the hacienda by security guards called
"arundines." By the gradual process of erosion these canals acquired the
characteristics and dimensions of rivers.
In 1924 Ayala y Cia shifted from the business of alcohol production to bangus
culture. It converted Hacienda San Esteban from a forest of nipa groves to a web
of fishponds. To do so, it cut down the nipa palm, constructed dikes and closed
the canals criss-crossing the hacienda.
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 26

Sometime in 1925 or 1926 Ayala y Cia., sold a portion of Hacienda San Esteban to
Roman Santos who also transformed the swamp land into a fishpond. In so
doing, he closed and built dikes across Sapang Malauling Maragul, Qui 帽 orang
Silab, Pepangebunan, Bulacus, Nigui and Nasi.

The closing of the man-made canals in Hacienda San Esteban drew complaints
from residents of the surrounding communities. Claiming that the closing of the
canals caused floods during the rainy season, and that it deprived them of their
means of transportation and fishing grounds, said residents demanded re-
opening of those canals.
Subsequently, Mayor Lazaro Yambao of Macabebe, accompanied by policemen
and some residents went to Hacienda San Esteban and opened the closure dikes
at Sapang Malauling Maragul Nigui and Qui 帽 orang Silab.
Whereupon, Roman Santos filed Civil Case No. 4488 in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga which preliminarily enjoined Mayor Yambao and others
from demolishing the dikes across the canals. The municipal officials of
Macabebe countered by filing a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 4527) in
the same court. The Pampanga Court of First Instance rendered judgment in both
cases against Roman Santos who immediately elevated the case to the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE:
Do the streams involved in this case belong to the public domain or to the owner
of Hacienda San Esteban according to law and the evidence submitted to the
Department of Public Works and Communications?
RULING:
A private person may take possession of a watercourse if he constructed the same
within his property.
One and all, the evidence, oral and documentary, presented by Roman Santos in
the administrative proceedings supports the conclusion of the lower court that
the streams involved in this case were originally man-made canals constructed by
the former owners of Hacienda San Esteban and that said streams were not held
open for public use. This same conclusion was reached 27 years earlier by an
investigator of the Bureau of Public Works whose report and recommendations
were approved by the Director of Public Works and submitted to the Secretary of
Commerce and Communications.
The streams in question were artificially made, hence of private ownership.
Pursuant to Article 71 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, and Article
408(5) of the Spanish Civil Code, channels of creeks and brooks belong to the
owners of estates over which they flow. The channels, therefore, of the streams in
question, which may be classified creeks, belong to the owners of Hacienda San
Esteban.

With the exception of Sapang Cansusu, being a natural stream and a continuation
of the Cansusu River, admittedly a public stream, belongs to the public domain.
Its closure therefore
PROPERTY LAW CASEbyDIGESTS
the predecessors of Roman Santos was illegal. 27
All the other streams, being artificial and devoted exclusively for the use of the
hacienda owner and his personnel, are declared of private ownership. Hence, the
dams across them should not he ordered demolished as public nuisances.
 MANUEL ALMAGRO, ELIZABETH ALMAGRO, Petitioners,
vs.
 SALVACION C. KWAN, WILLIAM C. KWAN, VICTORIA C. KWAN,,
JOSE A. ARBAS, and CECILIA C. KWAN,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 175806/175810
Oct. 20, 2010
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondents are the successors- in- interest of the Lot No. 6278-M, a 17,181
square meter parcel of land located at Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental. On 18
September 1996, they filed with the MTC an action for recovery of possession and
damages against the occupants, on of which are the Petitioners. MTC dismissed
the complaint on the ground that the remaining dry portion of Lot No. 6278-M
has become foreshore land and should be returned to the public domain.
Respondents appealed to the RTC. The RTC conducted ocular inspections of
subject lot on two separate dates: on 5 October 2001 during low tide and on 15
October 2001 when the high tide registered 1.5 meters. RTC concluded that the
small portion of respondent’s property which remains as dry land is not within
the scope of the well-settled definition of foreshore and foreshore land; the small
dry portion is not adjacent to the sea; thus Respondent have the right to recover
possession of the remaining small dry portion of the subject property in question.
CA affirmed said decision.
ISSUE:
PROPERTY
Whether orLAW
not CASE DIGESTS portion of Lot is no longer private land but has
the disputed 28
become foreshore land and is now part of the public domain
RULING:
The disputed land is not foreshore land. To qualify as foreshore land, it must be
shown that the land lies between the high and low water marks and is alternately
wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.[The land's proximity to the waters
alone does not automatically make it a foreshore land.
Thus, in Republic of the Philippines v. Lensico, the Court held that although the
two corners of the subject lot adjoins the sea, the lot cannot be considered as
foreshore land since it has not been proven that the lot was covered by water
during high tide
Similarly in this case, it was clearly proven that the disputed land remained dry
even during high tide. Indeed, all the evidence supports the conclusion that the
disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M is not foreshore land but remains private
land owned by respondents.
 BINALAY vs. MANALO
195 SCRA 374

A sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is not the alluvial process
contemplated in Art. 457. The accumulation of the soil deposits must be slow
and hardly imperceptible in order for the riparian owner to acquire ownership
thereof. Also, the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of
the rivers (or the sea coast).

FACTS:

Manalo acquired 2 lots which were originally owned by Judge Taccad from 2
different people (the latter’s daughter and from an earlier purchaser). These lots
were later consolidated into Lot 307, a total of 10.45 hectares. The lot was beside
the Cagayan River, which, due to flooding, would place a portion of the land
underwater during the rainy season (September to December). On sunny days,
however, the land would be dried up for the entire dry season (January to
August). When a survey of the land was conducted on a rainy month, a portion of
the land that Manalo bought was then underwater and was thus left unsurveyed
and excluded from Lot 307.

The big picture is this: Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a
certain point to form two braches (western and eastern) and then unites at the
other end, further north, to form a narrower strip of land. The eastern branch of
the river cuts through Lot 307, and is flooded during the rainy season. The
unsurveyed portion, on the other hand, is the bed of the eastern branch. Note
that the fork exists only during the rainy season while the “island”/elongated
strip of land formed in the middle of the forks becomes dry and perfect for
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 29
cultivation when the Cagayan river is at its ordinary depth. The strip of land in
the middle of the fork totaled 22.7 hectares and was labeled Lot 821-822. Lot 821
is directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated by the eastern branch of the river’s
fork.

Manalo claims that Lot 821 belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged
portion of the land to which it is adjacent. Petitioners (Binalay, et al) who possess
the Lot 821, on the other hand, insist that they own it. They occupy the other
edges of the lot along the river bank (i.e. the fertile portions on which they plant
tobacco and other agricultural products) and also cultivate the western strip
during the summer.

Manalo filed 2 cases for forcible entry which were both dismissed. Later on, he
filed a complaint for quieting of title, possession, and damages against petitioner.
The trial court and the CA ruled in favor of Manalo, saying that Lot 821 and Lot
307 cannot be considered separate and distinct from each other. They reasoned
that when the land dries up for the most part of the year, the two are connected.
[Note: The CA applied the ruling in Gov’t of the Phil Islands vs. Colegio de San
Jose, which was actually inappropriate because the subject matter in this case
was a lake so that the definition of a “bed” was different.]

ISSUE:

Whether or not Manalo owns Lot 821 by way of accretion

RULING:
No. The disputed property is not an accretion. It is the action of the heavy rains
that cause the highest ordinary level of waters of the Cagayan River during the
rainy season. The depressed portion is a river bed and is thus considered
property of public domain.

The SC observed the following:

a) The pictures identified by Manalo during his direct examination depict the
depressed portion as a  river bed. The dried up portion had dike-like slopes
(around 8m) on both sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are vertical
and very prominent.
b) The eastern bed already existed even before Manalo bought the land. It was
called “Rio Muerte de Cagayan.”
c) Manalo could not have acquire ownership of the land because article 420 of the
civil code states that rivers are property of public dominion. The word “river”
includes the running waters, the bed, and the banks. [The seller never actually
owned that part of the land since it was public property]
d) The submerged area (22.72 ha) is twice the area of the land he actually bought.
It is difficult to suppose that such a sizable area could have been brought about by
accretion.
More importantly, the requisites of accretion in article 457 were not satisfied.
These are: 1) that the deposition of the soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; 2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or
sea); and 3) the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of
the rivers (or the sea coast). The accretion should’ve been attached to Lot 307 for
Manalo to acquire its ownership. BUT, the claimed accretion lies on the bank of
the river; not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite it – across the river. Aside
from that, the dike-like slopes which were very steep may only be formed by a
sudden and forceful action like flooding. The steep slopes could not have been
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 30
formed by the river in a slow and gradual manner.
 HILARIO vs. CITY OF MANILA
G.R. No. L-19570
April 27, 1967

FACTS:
Dr. Jose Hilario was the registered owner of a large tract of land around 49
hectares in area (Barrio Guinayang, San Mateo, Rizal). Upon his death this
property was inherited by his son, Jose Hilario, Jr., to whom a new certificate of
title was issued. During the lifetime of plaintiff’s father, the Hilario estate was
bounded on the western side by the San Mateo River.3 To prevent its entry into
the land, a bamboo and lumber post dike or ditch was constructed on the
northwestern side. This was further fortified by a stonewall built on the northern
side. For years, these safeguards served their purpose. However, in 1937, a great
and extraordinary flood occurred which inundated the entire place including the
neighboring barrios and municipalities. The River destroyed the dike on the
northwest, left its original bed and meandered into the Hilario estate, segregating
from the rest thereof a lenticular piece of land. The disputed area is on the
eastern side of this lenticular strip which now stands between the old riverbed
site and the new course. In 1945, the US Army opened a sand and gravel plant
within the premises, and started scraping, excavating and extracting soil, gravel
and sand from the nearby areas along the River. The operations eventually
extended northward into the strip of land. Consequently, a claim for damages was
filed with the US War Department by Luis Hidalgo, the then administrator of Dr.
Hilario’s estate. The US Army paid. In 1947, the plant was turned over to herein
defendants-appellants and appellee who took over its operations.
On 22 October
PROPERTY LAW22, 1949,
CASE plaintiff filed his complaint for injunction and damages
DIGESTS 31
against the defendants City Engineer of Manila, District Engineer of Rizal, the
Director of Public Works, and Engr. Busuego, the Engineer-in-charge of the
plant. Subsequently, the Bureau of Mines and Atty. Maximo Calalang were
respectively allowed to join the litigation as intervenors; as per issue of fees and
penalties for materials (sand and gravel) extracted. On 14 March 1954,
defendants filed a petition for injunction against plaintiff and intervenor Calalang
in the same case, alleging that the latter have fenced off the disputed area in
contravention of an agreement had between the latter and the Director of Public
Works wherein the defendants were allowed to continue their operations but
subject to the final outcome of the pending suit. On 13 May 1954, plaintiff
amended his complaint and impleaded as additional defendants the City of
Manila, the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal, and Engr. Eulogio Sese, the new
Engineer-in-charge of the plant. Plaintiff also converted his claim to one purely
for damages directed against the City of Manila and the Director of Public Works,
solidarily, in the amount of P1,000,000.00, as the cost of materials taken since
1949, as well as those to be extracted therefrom until defendants stop their
operations. On 21 December 1956, the lower court rendered its decision, ordering
the City of Manila and Director of Public Works to pay Hilario in solidum the
sum of P376,989.60 as cost of gravel and sand extracted from the plaintiff’s land,
plus costs; and ordering the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal to reimburse intervenor
Calalang of P36.80 representing gravel fees illegally collected. None of the parties
litigants seemed satisfied with this decision and they all sought a reconsideration
of the same. On August 30, 1957, the lower court resolved the motions to
reconsider with an order, holding that the 2/5 portion of the area in controversy
to Hilario, and dismissing the case against the Bureau of Public Works insofar as
money claims are concerned without prejudice to Hilario taking action against
proper party in such claim. Hilario and Calalang filed a second motion for
reconsideration, which the lower court denied. Hence, the appeal.
HELD:
The Supreme Court set aside the decision and orders appealed from, and entered
another judgment to the effect that the City of Manila and the Director of Public
Works, and his agent and employees, are absolved of liability from extracting
materials from subject property (of public domain); and the portion within the
strip of land question declared not part of public domain and confirmed as part of
Hilario’s private property. No Costs.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 32

 MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF PARAÑAQUE, CITY MAYOR OF
PARAÑAQUE, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD NG PARAÑAQUE,
CITY ASSESSOR OF PARAÑAQUE, and CITY TREASURER OF
PARAÑAQUE, respondents.
G.R. No. 155650
July 20, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) administers the land,
improvements and equipment within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter
transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land, including the runways
and buildings then under the Bureau of Air Transportation. The MIAA Charter
further provides that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be
disposed of through sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by the
President of the Philippines.
On 21 March 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC)
issued Opinion No. 061. The OGCC opined that the Local Government Code of
1991 withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section
21 of the MIAA Charter. Thus, MIAA negotiated with respondent City of
Parañaque to pay the real estate tax imposed by the City. MIAA then paid some of
the real estate tax already due.
On 17 July 2001, the City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices
of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the
City of Parañaque
PROPERTY LAW CASE threatened
DIGESTS to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and 33
Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency. MIAA thus
sought a clarification of OGCC Opinion No. 061.
On 7 February 2003, this Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO)
effective immediately. The Court ordered respondents to cease and desist from
selling at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings. Respondents received
the TRO on the same day that the Court issued it. However, respondents received
the TRO only at 1:25 p.m. or three hours after the conclusion of the public
auction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion
and thus cannot be the subject of levy and auction sale.
RULING:
Under the civil code, property may either be under public dominion or private
ownership. Those under public dominion are owned by the State and are utilized
for public use, public service and for the development of national wealth. The
ports included in the public dominion pertain either to seaports or airports.
When properties under public dominion cease to be for public use and service,
they form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
The court held that the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public
dominion. Since the airport is devoted for public use, for the domestic and
international travel and transportation. Even if MIAA charge fees, this is for
support of its operation and for regulation and does not change the character of
the land and buildings of MIAA as part of the public dominion.
As part of the public dominion the land and buildings of MIAA are outside the
commerce of man. To subject them to levy and public auction is contrary to
public policy. Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the airport
land and buildings from public use, these properties remain to be of public
dominion and are inalienable. As long as the land and buildings are for public use
the ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 34

 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the PHILIPPINE
RECLAMATION AUTHORITY (PRA), Petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF PARANAQUE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 191109
July 18, 2012

FACTS:

Philippine Reclamation Authority (PEA before) performs all the powers and
functions of the PEA relating to reclamation activities. PRA reclaimed several
portions of the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay, including those
located in Parañaque City, and was issued Original Certificates of Title over the
reclaimed lands.

On February 19, 2003, then Parañaque City Treasurer Carabeo issued Warrants
of Levy on PRA’s reclaimed properties (Central Business Park and Barangay San
Dionisio) located in Parañaque City based on the assessment for delinquent real
property taxes made by then Parañaque City Assessor Soledad Medina Cue for
tax years 2001 and 2002.

On March 26, 2003, PRA filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction against Carabeo before the RTC.

On April 3, 2003, after due hearing, RTC denied the petition for TRO.

On April 25, 2003, the RTC denied PRA’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary
PROPERTY LAW injunction for being moot and academic considering that the auction
CASE DIGESTS 35
sale of the subject properties on April 7, 2003 had already been consummated.

Due to the failure of both parties to arrive at a compromise agreement, PRA filed
a Motion for Leave to File and Admit Attached Supplemental Petition which
sought to declare as null and void the assessment for real property taxes, the levy
based on the said assessment, the public auction sale conducted on April 7, 2003,
and the Certificates of Sale issued pursuant to the auction sale. RTC dismissed
PRA’s petition. It ruled that PRA was not exempt from payment of real property
taxes. The RTC reasoned out that it was a GOCC under Section 3 of P.D. No.
1084.

Thus, PRA claims that based on Section 133(o) of the LGC, local governments
cannot tax the national government which delegate to local governments the
power to tax. It explains that reclaimed lands are part of the public domain,
owned by the State, thus, exempt from the payment of real estate taxes. Hence,
the assessment of real property taxes made on said lands, as well as the levy
thereon, and the public sale thereof on April 7, 2003, including the issuance of
the certificates of sale in favor of the respondent Parañaque City, are invalid and
of no force and effect.

On the other hand, the City of Parañaque argues that PRA since its creation
consistently represented itself to be a GOCC. Section 193 of the LGC of 1991 has
withdrawn tax exemption privileges granted to or presently enjoyed by all
persons, whether natural or juridical, including GOCCs. Hence, since PRA is a
GOCC, it is not exempt from the payment of real property tax.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reclaimed lands are part of the public domain and, hence,
exempt from real property tax
RULING:

Yes. Reclaimed lands such as the subject lands in issue are reserved lands for
public use. They are properties of public dominion. The ownership of such lands
remains with the State unless they are withdrawn by law or presidential
proclamation from public use.

Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and
submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain,
waters x x x and other natural resources" and consequently "owned by the State."
As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be alienated," unless they are
classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The mere reclamation of
these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the
State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law
or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession. Moreover, these
reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law has
reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.

The Court agrees with PRA that the subject reclaimed lands are still part of the
public domain, owned by the State and, therefore, exempt from payment of real
estate taxes.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 36

 YU CHANG vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 171726
February 23, 2011

FACTS:

Petitioner Soledad Yu Chang, for herself and in representation of her brother and
co-petitioner, Vicente Yu Chang, filed a petition for registration of title over a
piece of land. In their petition, they declared that they are the co-owners of the
subject lots; that they and their predecessors-in-interest “have been in actual,
physical, material, exclusive, open, occupation and possession of the above
described parcels of land for more than 100 years”; and that allegedly, they have
continuously, peacefully, and adversely possessed the property in the concept of
owners.

The trial court rendered a Decision granting petitioners' application. The CA

reversed the trial court's decision and dismissed petitioners’ application for land
registration on account that the land is classified as forest land and is thus not
subject to appropriation and alienation. The CA considered the petition to be
governed by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 or the Public
Land Act, as amended, and held that petitioners were not able to present
incontrovertible evidence that the parcels of land sought to be registered are
alienable and disposable.

Petitioners insist that the subject properties could no longer be considered and
classified as forest land since there are buildings, residential houses and even
government structures existing and standing on the land.
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 37
ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellate court erred in dismissing their application for
registration of title on the ground that they failed to prove compliance with the
requirements of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.

RULING:

The Court denied the motion for lack of merit. in order that petitioners’
application for registration of title may be granted, they must first establish the
following: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable
lands of the public domain and (2) that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide
claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier.24 Applicants must overcome
the presumption that the land they are applying for is part of the public domain
and that they have an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in their
names arising from an imperfect title.
The subject lots were declared alienable and disposable only on October 30, 1986.
Prior to that period, the same could not be the subject of confirmation of
imperfect title. Petitioners’ possession of the subject forest land prior to the date
when it was classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should
be excluded from the computation of the period of possession.32 To reiterate, it is
well settled that possession of forest land, prior to its classification as alienable
and disposable land, is ineffective since such possession may not be considered as
possession in the concept of owner.33 The adverse possession which can be the
basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence
until after forest land has been declared and alienable.
 SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, 
vs.
RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL
MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO
MACARAIG, as Executive Secretary, respondents.
G.R. No. 92013
July 25, 1990

FACTS:

The Roponggi property is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the
Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with
Japan

A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine

Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the subject of a
lease agreement with a Japanese firm - Kajima Corporation.

Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government

has been pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties
starting with the Roppongi lot.

The Court finds that each of the herein petitions raises distinct issues. The
petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 objects to the alienation of the Roppongi property to
anyone while the petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 adds as a principal objection the
alleged unjustified bias of the Philippine government in favor of selling the
property to non-Filipino citizens and entities. These petitions have been
consolidated
PROPERTY LAW andCASE
are resolved
DIGESTS at the same time for the objective is the same - to 38
stop the sale of the Roppongi property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the
Philippine Government

RULING:

The petitioners and respondents in both cases do not dispute the fact that the
Roppongi site and the three related properties were through reparations
agreements. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is
expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement
and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine
government and the Japanese government.

There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly

shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have
failed to do.

As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of

man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for
general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs,
and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical
person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and
cannot be the object of appropration. (Taken from 3 Manresa, 66-69; cited in
Tolentino, Commentaries on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1963 Edition, Vol.
II, p. 26).
The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:

ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private

ownership.
ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks shores
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use,
and are intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth.
ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the
character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.

The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of

the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public
service.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 39

 CORNELIO DEL FIERRO, GREGORIO DEL FIERRO, ILDEFONSO
DEL FIERRO, ASUNCION DEL FIERRO, CIPRIANO DEL FIERRO,
MANUELA DEL FIERRO, and FRANCISCO DEL FIERRO Petitioners, 
vs.
RENE SEGUIRAN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 152141
August 8, 2011

FACTS:

The heirs of Miguel and Generosa del Fierro filed a Complaint for reconveyance
and cancellation of titles against defendant Rene Seguiran, respondent herein,
before the RTC. They alleged that they are the owners and possessors of a parcel
of land identified as Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626. That Lodelfo and Narciso Marcial
unlawfully entered the land occupied by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sued them for
forcible entry and the municipal court ruled in favor of plaintiffs, which decision
was affirmed on appeal by the CFI. Consequently, Lodelfo and Narciso Marcial
were ejected from the premises. Meanwhile, on June 29, 1964, Marcial had
mortgaged the lots to the Rural Bank of San Marcelino, Inc., which foreclosed the
real estate mortgage on December 26, 1972, and consolidated ownership over the
lots on April 22, 1982. On October 28, 1981, defendant Rene S. Seguiran
purchased from Lodelfo Marcial (deceased) the subject lots. On November 9,
1981, defendant purchased the subject lots again from the Rural Bank of San
Marcelino, Inc.

Moreover, plaintiffs alleged that Lodelfo Marcial, predecessor-in-interest of

defendant, had no legal right to convey the said lots to plantiffs, since he was
merely a deforciant in the said lots. Further, defendant, with evident bad faith,
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 40
fraudulently applied with the Bureau of Lands for a free patent over the said lots,
alleging that he was the actual possessor thereof, which constitutes a false
statement, since the plaintiffs were the ones in actual possession. Despite
knowing that the said lots were the subject of legal controversy before the CFI,
defendant fraudulently secured a certification from the Court of Olongapo to
prove that the said parcels of land were not subject of any court action. As a
consequence of the foregoing illegal and fraudulent acts, defendant was able to
secure OCT Nos. P-7013 and P-7014 for Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626, respectively.

On May 20, 1988, defendant filed his Answer, claiming that when he bought the
land in dispute on October, 28, 1981, Lodelfo Marcial was no longer its owner,
but the Rural Bank of San Marcelino, Inc., since Marcial failed to redeem the land
within the one-year period of redemption. His only purpose for buying the land
from the mortgagor, Lodelfo Marcial in November 1981 was for the peaceful turn-
over of the property to him by Marcial. Defendant denied any fraud, illegality or
bad faith in securing OCT Nos. P-7013 and P-7014. He asserted that when he
secured a certification from the RTC on June 6, 1983, there was in truth no
pending case involving the subject properties in any court in Zambales; hence, no
bad faith could be attributed to him.

On April 23, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of defendant
Seguiran The trial court held that plaintiffs (petitioners) failed to prove the
identity of the property sought to be recovered. The numerous documents they
presented to prove ownership of Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626 showed that the
properties covered by sale or pacto de retro are located at Liozon, Palauig,
Zambales, while Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626 are located at Locloc, Palauig, Zambales.
Moreover, although the Del Fierros were declared as the possessors of the
property in the ejectment case, filed against Lodelfo and Narciso Marcial, the
property concerned in the said case is Lot No. 1197. There was no evidence as to
the original size of Lot No. 1197 and no proof that Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626 formed
part of Lot No. 1197. Based on the foregoing, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs’
complaint.

The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision and in addition, held that petitioners failed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the issuance of the certificates of title
in favor of respondent was attended by fraud.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners are entitled to reconveyance of Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626

RULING:

No. The requisites of reconveyance are provided for in Article 434 of the Civil
Code, thus:

Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant’s
claim.

Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that to successfully maintain an action to
recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right to
it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and second,
his title thereto.

In regard to the first requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, the person who

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 41
claims that he has a better right to the property must first fix the identity of the
land he is claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries
thereof.46 Anent the second requisite, i.e., the claimant's title over the disputed
area, the rule is that a party can claim a right of ownership only over the parcel of
land that was the object of the deed.

Petitioners’ failure to present sufficient evidence on the identity of the properties

sought to be recovered and their title thereto resulted in the dismissal of their
complaint.
 Spouses MANUEL and FLORENTINA DEL ROSARIO, Petitioners, 
vs.
GERRY ROXAS FOUNDATION, Inc., Respondent.
G.R. No. 170575
June 8, 2011

FACTS:

The petitioner Manuel del Rosario appears to be the registered owner of a lot
located in Roxas City which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title.

Sometime in 1991, the respondent, as a legitimate foundation, took possession

and occupancy of said land by virtue of a memorandum of agreement entered
into by and between it and the City of Roxas. Its possession and occupancy of said
land is in the character of being lessee thereof.

In February and March 2003, the petitioners served notices upon the respondent
to vacate the premises of said land. The respondent did not heed such notices
because it still has the legal right to continue its possession and occupancy of said
land.

On July 7, 2003, petitioners filed a Complaint6 for Unlawful Detainer against the

respondent before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Roxas City,
docketed as Civil Case No. V-2391. Said complaint contains, among others, the
following significant allegations:

3. Plaintiffs are the true, absolute and registered owner[s] of a parcel of

land, situated at Dayao, Roxas City and covered by and described in
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 42
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18397 issued to the plaintiffs by the
Register of Deeds for Roxas City

4. Sometime in 1991, without the consent and authority of the plaintiffs,

defendant took full control and possession of the subject property,
developed the same and use[d] it for commercial purposes.

7. Plaintiffs have allowed the defendant for several years, to make use of
the land without any contractual or legal basis. Hence, defendant’s
possession of the subject property is only by tolerance.

8. But [plaintiffs’] patience has come to its limits. Hence, sometime in the
last quarter of 2002, plaintiffs made several demands upon said defendant
to settle and/or pay rentals for the use of the property.

10. Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letters, defendant failed and

refused, as it continues to fail and refuse to pay reasonable monthly
rentals for the use and occupancy of the land, and to vacate the subject
premises despite the lapse of the fifteen-day period specified in the said
demand letters. Consequently, defendant is unlawfully withholding
possession of the subject property from the plaintiffs, who are the owners
thereof.

On November 24, 2003, the MTCC held that the plaintiffs [have] no cause of
action against herein defendant. The defendant is the lessee of the City of Roxas
of the parcel of land in question. There has been no previous contractual
relationship between the plaintiffs Del Rosarios and the defendant Gerry Roxas
Foundation, Inc. affecting the title of the land leased by the [Gerry] Roxas
Foundation. The Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc. has not unlawfully withheld the
possession of the land it is leasing from its lessor. Its right to the physical
possession of the land leased by it from the City of Roxas subsists and continues
to subsist until the termination of the contract of lease according to its terms and
pursuant to law.

On appeal, the RTC of Roxas City, Branch 17 rendered a Decision affirming the
MTCC Order.

The CA affirmed the assailed Decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the allegations in the complaint establish a cause of action for
unlawful detainer

RULING:

No. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or

building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful
detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the
only issue is who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer,
possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or
termination of the right to possess and the issue of rightful possession is the one
decisive, for in such action, the defendant is the party in actual possession and
the plaintiff's cause of action is the termination of the defendant's right to
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 43
continue in possession.
In their Complaint, petitioners maintained that the respondent took possession
and control of the subject property without any contractual or legal basis.
Assuming that these allegations are true, it hence follows that respondent’s
possession was illegal from the very beginning. Therefore, the foundation of
petitioners’ complaint is one for forcible entry – that is "the forcible exclusion of
the original possessor by a person who has entered without right." Thus, and as
correctly found by the CA, there can be no tolerance as petitioners alleged that
respondent’s possession was illegal at the inception.

Corollarily, since the deprivation of physical possession, as alleged in petitioners’

Complaint and as earlier discussed, was attended by strategy and force, this Court
finds that the proper remedy for the petitioners was to file a Complaint for
Forcible Entry and not the instant suit for unlawful detainer.
 FIORELLO R. JOSE, Petitioner, 
vs.
ROBERTO ALFUERTO, et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 169380
November 26, 2012

FACTS:

The dispute involves a parcel of land registered in the name of Rodolfo Chua Sing
located in Parañaque City. Chua Sing purchased the land in 1991 then leased the
property to the petitioner. Their contract of lease was neither notarized nor
registered with the Parañaque City Registry of Deeds.

The lease contract provided that:

That the term of this lease shall be FIVE (5) years and renewable for the same
period upon mutual agreement of the parties to commence upon the total
eviction of any occupant or occupants. The LESSOR hereby transfers all its rights
and prerogative to evict said occupants in favor of the LESSEE which shall be
responsible for all expenses that may be incurred without reimbursement from
the LESSOR. It is understood however that the LESSOR is hereby waiving, in
favor of the LESSEE any and all damages that may be recovered from the
occupants.

Significantly, the respondents already occupied the property even before the lease
contract was executed.

On April 28, 1999, soon after Chua Sing and the petitioner signed the lease
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 44
contract, the petitioner demanded in writing that the respondents vacate the
property within 30 days and that they pay a monthly rental of P1,000.00 until
they fully vacate the property.

The respondents refused to vacate and to pay rent causing the petitioner to file an
ejectment case against the respondents before the MeTC.

In this complaint petitioner alleged that defendants, having been fully aware of
their unlawful occupancy of the subject lot, have defiantly erected their houses
thereat without benefit of any contract or law whatsoever, much less any building
permit as sanctioned by law, but by mere tolerance of its true, lawful and
registered owner, plaintiff’s lessor.

The petitioner also stated that despite his written demand, the respondents failed
to vacate the property without legal justification.

The MeTC held that the respondents had no right to possess the land and that
their occupation was merely by the owner’s tolerance.

On appeal before the RTC, the respondents raised the issue, among others, that
no legal basis exists for the petitioner’s claim that their occupation was by
tolerance, "where the possession of the defendants was illegal at the inception as
alleged in the complaint, there can be no tolerance."

The RTC affirmed the MeTC decision.

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and MeTC decisions.  It ruled that the
respondents’ possession of the land was not by the petitioner or his lessor’s
tolerance. The petitioner, however, alleged that the respondents unlawfully
entered the property; thus, tolerance (or authorized entry into the property) was
not alleged and there could be no case for unlawful detainer.

The Court of Appeals emphasized that ejectment cases are summary proceedings
where the only issue to be resolved is who has a better right to the physical
possession of a property. The petitioner’s claim, on the other hand, is based on an
accion publiciana: he asserts his right as a possessor by virtue of a contract of
lease he contracted after the respondents had occupied the land.

ISSUE:

Whether an action for unlawful detainer is the proper remedy

RULING:

No. Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real
property. This action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after
the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any
contract, express or implied.

The allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the
jurisdiction of the court. The complaint must specifically allege the facts
constituting unlawful detainer. In the absence of these allegations of facts, an
action for unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy and the municipal trial
court or the MeTC does not have jurisdiction over the case
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 45
The petitioner nevertheless insists that he properly alleged that the respondents
occupied the premises by mere tolerance of the owner. No allegation in the
complaint nor any supporting evidence on record, however, shows when the
respondents entered the property or who had granted them permission to enter.
Without these allegations and evidence, the bare claim regarding "tolerance"
cannot be upheld.

In Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al., 28 the Court cited Prof. Arturo M. Tolentino’s
definition and characterizes "tolerance" as acts "those which by reason of
neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or
another person to do on the property; they are generally those particular services
or benefits which one’s property can give to another without material injury or
prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy."

The Court has consistently adopted this position: tolerance or permission must
have been present at the beginning of possession; if the possession was unlawful
from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would not be the proper remedy
and should be dismissed.
 BIENVENIDO BARRIENTOS, Petitioner, 
vs.
MARIO RAPAL, Respondent.
G.R. No. 169594
July 20, 2011

FACTS:

Mario Rapal acquired a 235 square meter parcel of land located in Quezon City,
where he constructed a semi-concrete house and took actual possession of the
property by himself and through his caretaker, Benjamin Tamayo.

Sometime in 1993, respondent allowed petitioner Bienvenido Barrientos and his

family to stay on the subject property as caretakers on the condition that
petitioner shall vacate the premises when respondent would need the property.
However, when respondent demanded petitioner to vacate the subject property,
petitioner refused to leave the lot.

Respondent filed a case for Unlawful Detainer against the petitioner before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City which rendered a Decision in
favor of the respondent.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the Decision of the MeTC and
resolved in favor of petitioner, reasoning that respondent has not shown any
prior lawful possession of the property in question.
On appeal, the CA rendered the assailed Decision reversing the decision of the
RTC and reinstating the decision of the MeTC.
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 46
The CA touched upon the issue of ownership since both claimed ownership over
the disputed property. The CA found that both parties presented weak evidence
of ownership. Hence, the CA determined who between the parties was first in
possession and concluded that respondent was, indeed, first in possession of the
lot.

ISSUE:

Whether the issue of ownership can be initially resolved for the purpose of
determining the issue of possession

RULING:

The petition is without merit.

Ejectment cases – forcible entry and unlawful detainer – are summary

proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession
or the right to possession of the property involved. The only question that the
courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical
possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the
possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is
questionable.13 In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any
claim of ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised
by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine
who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely
provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title to the property.
In the case at bar, both petitioner and respondent were claiming ownership over
the subject property. Hence, the CA correctly touched upon the issue of
ownership only to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the
subject property.

True, as found by the CA, both petitioner and respondent presented weak
evidence of ownership. Respondent on his part based his claim of ownership over
the subject property on the strength of a notarized Deed of Transfer of Possessory
Right from a certain Antonio Natavio. The subject land, however, was said to be a
portion of the estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, which this
Court has declared null and void in a different case, as such, respondent could
not derive any right therefrom.

Petitioner, on the other hand, anchored his contention that he has a better right
to possess the property on the fact the he is in actual possession of the property.

Having settled the issue of ownership, it was but just and proper for the CA to
have reminded the courts a quo to have settled the case by restricting their
resolution to the basic issue of possession.

From the various evidence submitted by the respondent, it can be clearly inferred
that respondent is entitled to the possession of the subject lot. 

Based on the evidence presented by the respondent, it can be deduced that

petitioner's occupation of the subject lot was by mere tolerance only. Petitioner
was initially permitted by respondent to occupy the lot as a caretaker.

Perusing
PROPERTYrespondent's complaint, respondent clearly makes out a case for
LAW CASE DIGESTS 47
unlawful detainer, since petitioner's occupation of the subject property was by
mere tolerance. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound
by an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
 GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner, 
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 76217
September 14, 1989

FACTS:

The Spouses Jose were the owners of a parcel of land.  They executed a special
power of attorney authorizing German Management & Services (German
Management) to develop their property into a residential subdivision.

German Management found that part of the property was occupied by the private
respondents and 20 other persons.  They advised the occupants to vacate the
premises but the latter refused.  Nevertheless, German Management proceeded
with the development of the property.

The private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against German
Management.  They alleged that German Management forcibly removed and
destroyed the barbed wire fence enclosing the private respondents farmholdings
without notice; bulldozed the rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other crops of
private respondents by means of force, violence and intimidation; trespassed,
coerced and threatened to harass, remove and eject private respondents from
their respective farmholdings.

ISSUE:

Whether German Management was justified in bulldozing and destroying the

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 48
crops of private respondents on the basis of the Doctrine of Self-Help

RULING:

No.  German Management's drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops
of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine of self-help enunciated in
Article 429 of the New Civil Code was unavailing because the doctrine of self-help
can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is
absent in the case at bar. 

Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use
such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.

At the time German Management entered the property, the private respondents
were already in possession thereof . There was no evidence that the spouses Jose
were ever in possession of the subject property.  On the contrary, private
respondents' peaceable possession was manifested by the fact that they even
planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees twelve to fifteen years prior to
petitioner's act of destroying their crops.

When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process
for the recovery of property.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT), petitioner, 
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA
ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-43938
April 15, 1988

FACTS:

Jose dela Rosa filed an application for registration of a parcel of land on his own
behalf and on behalf of his children. This application was separately opposed by
Benguet Consolidated, Inc. (Benguet) and Atok Big Wedge Corporation (Atok).

The petitioners claimed that they have acquired the land from their parents and
that they have been in possession of the land ever since. Benguet and Atok
opposed on the ground that they have mineral claims covering the property and
had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of
owner.

The trial court denied the application while the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant but subject
to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. In other words,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land
while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by
virtue of their mining claims.

ISSUE:
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 49
Whether or not the CA's ruling was correct

RULING:

No, the CA was incorrect.

Art. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of
everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any
plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to
servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the
reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.

Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on
the land while the mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer
cannot dig a well because he may interfere with the operations below and the
miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops above. How deep can the
farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on each other's
rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?

It is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to
its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a
reasonable height.

The rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land
must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural.
In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified
as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral — and completely mineral —
once the mining claims were perfected. As long as mining operations were being
undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become
agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was
cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 50

 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, 
vs.
LUCMAN G. IBRAHIM, OMAR G. MARUHOM, ELIAS G.MARUHOM,
BUCAY G. MARUHOM, FAROUK G. MARUHOM, HIDJARA G.
MARUHOM, ROCANIA G. MARUHOM, POTRISAM G. MARUHOM,
LUMBA G. MARUHOM, SINAB G. MARUHOM, ACMAD G.
MARUHOM, SOLAYMAN G. MARUHOM, MOHAMAD M. IBRAHIM,
and CAIRONESA M. IBRAHIM, respondents.
G.R. No. 168732
June 29, 2007

FACTS:

On November 23, 1994, respondent Lucman G. Ibrahim, in his personal capacity

and in behalf of his co-heirs instituted an action against petitioner National
Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) for recovery of possession of land and damages
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur.

In their complaint, Ibrahim and his co-heirs claimed that they were owners of
several parcels of land which NAPOCOR, through alleged stealth and without
respondents’ knowledge and prior consent, took possession of and constructed
therein underground tunnels which being used by NAPOCOR in siphoning the
water of Lake Lanao and in the operation of its projects.

On September 19, 1992, respondent Omar G. Maruhom requested the Marawi

City Water District for a permit to construct and/or install a motorized deep well
in Lot 3 located in Saduc, Marawi City but his request was turned down because
the construction
PROPERTY of the
LAW CASE deep well would cause danger to lives and property. On
DIGESTS 51
October 7, 1992, respondents demanded that NAPOCOR pay damages and vacate
the sub-terrain portion of their lands but the latter refused to vacate much less
pay damages. Respondents further averred that the construction of the
underground tunnels has endangered their lives and properties as Marawi City
lies in an area of local volcanic and tectonic activity. Further, these illegally
constructed tunnels caused them sleepless nights, serious anxiety and shock
thereby entitling them to recover moral damages and that by way of example for
the public good, NAPOCOR must be held liable for exemplary damages.

The RTC rendered a Decision against respondents Ibrahim.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ibrahim is the rightful owner of the sub-terrain area of the land

RULING:

Yes. The sub-terrain portion of the property belongs to Ibrahim.

The Supreme Court cited Article 437 of the Civil Code which provides that: The
owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it,
and he can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations
which he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to
special laws and ordinances. Xxx

The landowners’ right extends to such height or depth where it is possible for
them to obtain some benefit or enjoyment, and it is extinguished beyond such
limit as there would be no more interest protected by law. In this case, the
landowners could have dug upon their property motorized deep wells but were
prevented from doing so by the authorities precisely because of the construction
and existence of the tunnels underneath the surface of their property.

Hence, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil
under it. Therefore, Ibrahim owns the property as well as the sub-terrain area of
the land where the underground tunnels were constructed.

On the issue of just compensation, the Supreme Court also said that Ibrahim
should be paid a just compensation.

Ibrahim could have dug upon their property and built motorized deep wells but
was prevented from doing so by the authorities because of the construction of the
tunnels underneath the surface of the land.

Ibrahim still had a legal interest in the sub-terrain portion insofar as they could
have excavated the same for the construction of the deep wells.  It has been
shown that the underground tunnels have deprived the plaintiffs of the lawful use
of the land and considerably reduced its value. 

It was held that: If the government takes property without expropriation and
devotes the property to public use, after many years, the property owner may
demand payment of just compensation in the event restoration of possession is
neither convenient nor feasible. This is in accordance with the principle that
persons shall not be deprived of their property except by competent authority and
for public use and always upon payment of just compensation.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 52

 PALERO-TAN vs. URDANETA
AM # P-07-2399, Jun. 18, 2008
555 SCRA 28

FACTS:

Edna Palero-Tan a Court Stenographer charged Ciriaco I. Urdaneta, Jr. a Utility

Worker of the same court, with Conduct Unbecoming a Court Personnel, for
stealing her ring and bracelet. Edna claimed that it has been her practice to keep
her and her sister’s pieces of jewelry in the locked drawer of her table at her RTC
office because she fears that they might be lost at the boarding house she is
renting. And that the only person who was present and saw her take out the
jewelry from her table drawer was respondent, whose table is adjacent to hers.
On 28 July 2005, an officemate, Anecito D. Altone (Altone), confided to her that
he heard from his landlady, Anastacia R. Nable (Nable), that respondent and his
wife, Milagros, had a quarrel because the latter discovered a ring and a bracelet in
respondent’s coin purse.

Urdaneta denied that he stole complainant’s jewelry. He claimed that he found a

small plastic sachet containing a ring and a bracelet under his table, at the side
nearest the adjacent table of the complainant, and thinking that the jewelry
belonged to one of the litigants who approached him that morning, he took them
for safekeeping with the intention of returning them to whoever was the owner.
He thought that the ring and bracelet were "fancy" jewelry as they were merely
placed in an ordinary
plastic sachet. When nobody claimed the jewelry, he placed them inside his coin
purse and took them home. However, his wife, on 30 June 2005, found them and
accused him of buying the pieces of jewelry for his mistress, and to stop his wife’s
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 53
nagging, he threw the pieces of jewelry at a grassy lot beside their house.

ISSUE:

Whether or not finding a “lost property” charges the finder the duty to restore the
same to its owner.

RULING:

Yes. When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or mislaid by the owner
takes the thing into his hands, he acquires physical custody only and does not
become vested with legal possession. In assuming such custody, the finder is
charged with the obligation of restoring the thing to its owner. It is thus
respondent’s duty to report to his superior or his officemates that he found
something. The Civil Code, in Article 719, explicitly requires the finder of a lost
property to report it to the proper authorities, thus:

Article 719. Whoever finds a movable, which is not treasure, must return it to its
previous possessor. If the latter is unknown, the finder shall immediately deposit
it with the mayor of the city or municipality where the finding has taken place.

The finding shall be publicly announced by the mayor for two consecutive weeks
in the way he deems best. If the movables cannot be kept without deterioration,
or without the expenses which considerably diminish its value, it shall be sold at
public auction eight days after the publication. Six months from the publication
having elapsed without the owner having appeared, the thing found, or its value,
shall be awarded to the finder. The finder and the owner shall be obliged, as the
case may be, to reimburse the expenses.
Contrary to respondent’s claim, this Court is convinced that respondent had the
intention to appropriate the jewelry to himself had these not been discovered by
his wife. His claim that the ring and bracelet were worthless "fancy" jewelry is
immaterial because the basis for his liability is his act of taking something which
does not belong to him.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 54

 MARIANO FLOREZA, petitioner, 
vs.
MARIA D. de EVANGELISTA and SERGIO
EVANGELISTA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-25462
February 21, 1980

FACTS:

Plaintiffs Maria de Evangelista and Sergio Evangelista, who are mother and son,
are the owners of a residential lot in Rizal. In May 1945, the EVANGELISTAS
borrowed from FLOREZA the amount of P100.00. On or about November 1945,
with the consent of the EVANGELISTAS, FLOREZA occupied the above
residential lot and built thereon a house of light materials (barong- barong)
without any agreement as to payment for the use of said residential lot owing to
the fact that the EVANGELISTAS has then a standing loan of P100.00 in favor of
FLOREZA. 

The EVANGELISTAS again borrowed certain amounts totalling to P740.00

including the first loan. The last three items are evidenced by private documents
stating that the residential lot stands as security therefor and that the amounts
covered thereunder are payable within six years from date, without mention of
interest. The document executed on September 16, 1946 stated specifically that
the loan was without interest "walang anumang patubo."

On January 10, 1949, FLOREZA demolished this house of light materials and in
its place constructed one of strong materials assessed in his name under Tax
Declaration No. 4448.
PROPERTY LAW FLOREZA paid no rental as before. 
CASE DIGESTS 55
On August 1, 1949, the EVANGELISTAS, sold their residential lot to FLOREZA,
with a right to repurchase within a period of 6 years from date, or up to August 1,
1955, as evidenced by a registered notarial document.

On January 2, 1955, or seven months before the expiry of the repurchase period,
the EVANGELISTAS paid in full the repurchase price of P1,000.00.

On April 25, 1956, the EVANGELISTAS, through their counsel, wrote FLOREZA
a letter asking him to vacate the premises as they wanted to make use of their
residential lot besides the fact that FLOREZA had already been given by them
more than one year within which to move his house to another site. On May 4,
1956, the EVANGELISTAS made a formal written demand to vacate, within five
days from notice, explaining that they had already fully paid the consideration for
the repurchase of the lot.  FLOREZA refused to vacate unless he was first
reimbursed the value of his house.

RTC rendered judgment in favour of the Evangelistas.

The Court of Appeals concluded that Article 448 of the Civil Code, supra, was
inapplicable; that FLOREZA was not entitled to reimbursement for his house but
that he could remove the same at his expense

ISSUE:

Whether or not Floreza is entitled to reimbursement

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court uphold the Court of Appeals in its conclusion that Article
448 of the Civil Code is inapplicable to the factual milieu herein. Said codal
provision applies only when the builder, planter, or sower believes he had the
right so to build, plant, or sow because he thinks he owns the land or believes
himself to have a claim of title.

The house had already been constructed as far back as 1949 (1945 for the house
of light materials) even before the pacto de retro sale in 1949. Petitioner incurred
no useful expense, therefore, after that sale. The house was already there at the
tolerance of the EVANGELISTAS in consideration of the several loans extended
to them. Since petitioner cannot be classified as a builder in good faith within the
purview of Article 448 of the Civil Code, nor as a vendee a retro, who made useful
improvements during the lifetime of the pacto de retro, petitioner has no right to
reimbursement of the value of the house which he had erected on the residential
lot of the EVANGELISTAS, much less to retention of the premises until he is
reimbursed.

Also, it is clear that from the date that the redemption price had been paid by the
EVANGELISTAS on January 2, 1955, petitioner's right to the use of the
residential lot without charge had ceased. Having retained the property although
a redemption had been made, he should be held liable for damages in the form of
rentals for the continued use of the subject residential.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 56

 PAZ MERCADO, CAROLINA S. CHICO, LUCIANA CABRERA,
JOAQUIN IGNACIO, ELMER FLORES, AVELINA C. NUCOM, et
al., petitioners, 
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO PUNO, LOLITA C.
BULAONG, FLORENTINO AGULTO, SEVERINO SALAYSAY, SUSANA
BERNARDINO, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-44001
June 10, 1988

FACTS:
The private respondents Bulaong Group, had for many years been individual
lessees of stalls in the public market of Baliuag, Bulacan; from 1956 to 1972. The
market was destroyed by fire on February 17, 1956; the members of the Bulaong
Group constructed new stalls therein at their expense; and they thereafter paid
rentals thereon to the Municipality of Baliuag.
In 1972, the members of the group sub-leased their individual stalls to other
persons, referred to as the Mercado Group. After the Mercado Group had been in
possession of the market stalls for some months, as sub-lessees of the Bulaong
Group, the municipal officials of Baliuag cancelled the long standing leases of the
Bulaong Group and declared the persons comprising the Mercado Group as the
rightful lessees of the stalls in question, in substitution of the former.
The members of the Bulaong Group sued. They filed several individual
complaints with the Court of First Instance seeking recovery of their stalls from
the Mercado
PROPERTY Group
LAW CASE as well as damages. 1 Their theory was anchored on their
DIGESTS 57
claimed ownership of the stalls constructed by them at their own expense, and
their resulting right, as such owners, to sub-lease the stalls, and necessarily, to
recover them from any person withholding possession thereof from them.
On October 24,1975, respondent Judge rendered a summary judgment in all the
cases. 3 It rejected the claim of the Municipality of Baliuag that it had
automatically acquired ownership of the new stalls constructed after the old stalls
had been razed by fire, declaring the members of the Bulaong Group to
bebuilders in good faith, entitled to retain possession of the stalls respectively
put up by them until and unless indemnified for the value thereof. The decision
also declared that the Bulaong and Mercado Groups had executed the sub-letting
agreements with full awareness that they were thereby violating Ordinance No.
14; they were thus in pari delicto, and hence had no cause of action one against
the other and no right to recover whatever had been given or demand
performance of anything undertaken. The judgment therefore decreed (1) the
annulment of the leases between the Municipality and the individuals comprising
the Mercado Group (the defendants who had taken over the original leases of the
Bulaong Group); and (2) the payment to the individual members of the Bulaong
Group (the plaintiffs) of the stated, adjudicated value of the stalls, with interest IF
—
The members of the Mercado Group are now before this Court on an appeal
by certiorari, this time timely taken, assailing the above rulings of the Court of
Appeals. Their appeal must fail for lack of merit. No error can be ascribed to the
judgment of the Court of Appeals which is hereby affirmed in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether or ot the members of the Bulaong group are builders in good faith
RULING:
No. It was held that “to be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a
person assert title to the land on which he builds; i.e., that he be a possessor in
concept of owner, and that he be unaware ‘that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.’
Lessees cannot be considered builders in good faith (taken from Haystacks, by
Berne Guerrero)
The members of the Bulaong group were admittedly lessees of space in the public
market; they therefore could not, and in truth never did make the claim, that they
were owners of any part of the land occupied by the market so that in respect of
any new structure put up by them thereon, they could be deemed builders in good
faith (in accordance with Article 526 of the Civil Code). To be deemed a builder in
good faith, it is essential that a person assert title to the land on which he builds;
i.e., that he be a possessor in concept of owner, and that he be unaware “that
there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. It is
such a builder in good faith who is given the right to retain the thing, even as
against the real owner, until he has been reimbursed in full not only for the
necessary expenses but also for useful expenses. On the other hand, unlike the
builder in good faith, a lessee who “makes in good faith useful improvements
which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the
form or substance of the property leased,” can only claim payment of “one-half of
the value of the improvements” or, “should the lessor refuse to reimburse said
amount, remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer
damage thereby.”

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 58

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 59
 ROSENDO BALUCANAG, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. JUDGE ALBERTO J. FRANCISCO and RICHARD
STOHNER, respondents.
G.R. No. L-33422
May 30, 1983

FACTS:

The petitioner bought a lot owned by Mrs. Charvet which was then previously
leased by the latter to one Richard Stohner. The said lease contract provided that
the lessee may erect structures and improvements which shall remain as lessee's
property and he may remove them at any time. It further provided that should
the lessee fail to remove the same structures or improvements withing two
months after the expiration of the lease, the lessor may remove them or cause
them to be removed at the expense of the lessee. Stohner made fillings on the
land and constructed a house. When he failed to pay the rent, the petitioner,
through counsel, sent Stohner a demand letter ordering him to vacate the lot. The
lessee contended that he is a 'builder in good faith.'
ISSUE:

Whether or not the lessee a builder in good faith

RULING:

No, the lessee cannot be considered a builder in good faith. The provision under
Art. 448 of the New Civil Code (Philippine) on a builder of good faith applies only
toPROPERTY
the ownerLAW CASE
of the DIGESTS
land who believes he is the rightful owner thereof, but not to a 60
lessee who's interest in the land is derived only from a rental contract. Neither
can Stohner be considered a 'possessor in good faith'. A possessor in good faith is
a party who possesses property believing that he is its rightful owner but
discovers later on a flaw in his title that could indicate that he might not be its
legal owner. It cannot apply to a lessee because he knows right from the start that
he is merely a lessee and not the owner of the premises.

As a mere lessee, he introduces improvements to the property at his own risk

such that he cannot recover from the owner the reimbursements nor he has any
right to retain the premises until reimbursements. What applies in this case is
Art. 1678 (NCC) which provides that, " if the lessee, makes, in good faith, useful
improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended,
without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the
termination of the lease shall pay the lessee 1/2 of the value of the improvements
at the time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may
remove the improvements even though the principal thing may suffer damage
thereby. He shall not. however, cause any more impairment upon the property
leased than is necessary."
 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
GENEROSO DE JESUS, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact,
CHRISTIAN DE JESUS, respondent.
G.R. No. 149295
September 23, 2003

FACTS:

Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court
of Occidental Mindoro for recovery of ownership and possession, with damages,
over the questioned property. In his complaint, respondent stated that he had
acquired a parcel of land situated in Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, and found
out later that it was being encroached upon by a building of petitioner. Despite
two letters of demand sent by respondent, petitioner failed and refused to vacate
the area.
Petitioner, in its answer, asserted that when it acquired the lot and the building
sometime in 1981 from then Mayor Bienvenido Ignacio, the encroachment
already was in existence and to remedy the situation, Mayor Ignacio offered to
sell the area in question (which then also belonged to Ignacio) to petitioner at
P100.00 per square meter which offer the latter claimed to have accepted. The
sale, however, did not materialize when, without the knowledge and consent of
petitioner, Mayor Ignacio later mortgaged the lot to the Development Bank of the
Philippines.

The trial court decided the case in favor of respondent declaring him to be the
rightful owner
PROPERTY LAWofCASE
the DIGESTS
disputed 124-square-meter portion of the lot and ordering 61
petitioner to surrender possession of the property to respondent and to cause, at
its expense, the removal of any improvement thereon.
The Court of Appeals, on appeal, sustained the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is a builder in good faith

RULING:

No. In the context that such term is used in particular reference to Article 448, et
seq., of the Civil Code, a builder in good faith is one who, not being the owner of
the land, builds on that land believing himself to be its owner and unaware of any
defect in his title or mode of acquisition.

A builder in good faith can, under the foregoing provisions, compel the
landowner to make a choice between appropriating the building by paying the
proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. The choice
belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of
accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way
around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him,
nevertheless, is preclusive. He much choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel
the owner of the building to instead remove it from the land. [3] In order, however,
that the builder can invoke that accruing benefit and enjoy his corresponding
right to demand that a choice be made by the landowner, he should be able to
prove good faith on his part.
Given the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court, it should be
evident enough that petitioner would fall much too short from its claim of good
faith. 

Equally significant is the fact that the building, constructed on the land by
Ignacio, has in actuality been part of the property transferred to
petitioner. Article 448, of the Civil Code refers to a piece of land whose ownership
is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has built some works (or sown or
planted something) and not to a case where the owner of the land is the builder,
sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or otherwise
for, elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his
own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant. 

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 62

 URBANO JAVIER and LEONILA ALBIELA, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, JR., Hon. ANDRES REYES,
Hon. LUIS REYES, LIM CHUA, TAN TIAN ON alias TAN TIAN UNA
and TAN SIOK TAN alias TAN SIOK TUAN, respondents.
G.R. No. L-36566
November 7, 1979

FACTS:

Respondents, as plaintiffs, filed against herein petitioners a civil case for the
reconveyance of a parcel of land with improvements thereon. Petitioners herein,
took possession of the same in 1945 up to the time possession is returned to the
respondents. 9 Lot 12 is allegedly a portion of a big parcel of land designated as
Lot 6, PSU-5967, located in Quezon Province and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 16817 issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon
Province in the name of herein respondents.

It was further alleged that on April 10, 1930, Lot 12 was ordered excluded from
Psu-16536, G.L.R.O. Record No. 25133 and in Plan Psu-13449, G.L.R.O. Record
No. 26112 for the reason that the same was already awarded to herein
respondents as owners.

In an amended answer filed on November 11, 1959, defendants below, now

petitioners denied the material averments of the complaint and pointed out that
Lot 12 could never be a part of Lot 6, Plan Psu-5967, because between the two
lots there exists a big river known as the Guhit River which serves as the natural
boundary
PROPERTYbetween
LAW CASEthe municipalities of Dolores and Candelaria of Quezon
DIGESTS 63
Province; that Lot No. 6, Plan Psu-5967 is situated within the jurisdiction of
Dolores, Quezon while Lot No. 12 is situated within the jurisdiction of Candelaria,
Quezon. 12

Defendants-petitioners alleged inter alia: (1) that they acquired Lot No. 12 partly
by purchase and partly by inheritance and they, as well as their predecessors-in-
interest, have been in possession of the same adversely, publicly, continuously,
peacefully, and in the concept of owners against the whole world since the
Spanish time up to the present; (2) that they have title to it granted by the
Spanish government on March 11, 1888; (3) that the lot in question had been
adjudicated to defendants-petitioners' predecessors-in-interest by the Court of
First Instance of Tayabas (now Quezon) in the decision dated January 14, 1930
rendered in Land Registration Cases Nos. 1509 and 1679; (4) that they have
declared the land for tax purposes since 1906 paying taxes therefor; (5) that they
have cleared the land and planted on it numerous trees, like coconuts, coffee,
bananas, mangoes, lanzones, oranges, avocado, jack fruits and bamboos, without
any interference from plaintiffs-respondents or their predecessors-in-interest; (6)
that plaintiffs-respondents had never been the owners and possessors of Lot No.
12 or portion thereof, and if the same had been included in their title, i.e. TCT No.
16817 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon Province, the registration and issuance
of the same in their favor had been secured thru fraud and deceit, by making it
appear in the application for registration and the notices of publication that said
Lot No. 6 belonged to them and is within the jurisdiction of Dolores, Quezon,
which is not true since the same is within the jurisdiction of Candelaria, Quezon,
thus deceiving the whole world of the proper location of the land subject of
registration and publication; and (7) that if plaintiffs-respondents have cause or
causes of action the same have already been barred by the statute of limitations. 13
By way of counterclaim, defendants-petitioners claimed P5,000.00 for attorney's
fees and P1,000.00 for litigation expenses and that in the event that plaintiffs-
respondents are declared the lawful owners of the lot in question, they be
reimbursed the amount of P150,000.00 for the reasonable value of
improvements they introduced thereon consisting of a house, camarin made of
strong materials and various fruit trees. 14

On June 25, 1968 the court a quo rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs.
On appeal, the CA rendered a decision affirming that of the court a quo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant-petitioners are in good faith

RULING:

Yes. The SC agree with respondent Court of Appeals' finding that petitioners did
not act with evident bad faith in occupying the land in question. This being
likewise a question of fact, and there being substantial evidence in the records to
support the finding, We reiterate the established principle applied in Evangelista
v. Abad Santos, et al., supra, and a host of other cases cited, that as a rule the
same should not be disturbed.

As possessors in good faith, petitioners are entitled to the fruits received before
their possession was legally interrupted upon receipt of judicial summons in
connection with the filing of the complaint for reconveyance on October 17,
1959.  However, the records do not show when the summons were received by the
defendants-spouses,
PROPERTY LAW CASEJavier,
DIGESTSIn the absence of such proof and in the interest of 64
justice, We hold that possession in good faith was legally interrupted on
November 11, 1959, when their amended answer was filed,* — which is less than
a month from the date the summons was apparently received. For the difference
of a few days or about two (2) weeks in reckoning the starting date of possession
in bad faith will not materially affect the prevailing party's entitlement to the
fruits of the holding since the same will be reckoned seasonally. Petitioners
should also be refunded the necessary and useful expenses, with the right to
retain the land until reimbursed of the same, pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil
Code. Under the said provision, respondents have the option to refund the
amount of useful expenses or to pay the increase in value which the land may
have acquired by reason thereof. In this connection, petitioners have placed the
market value of improvements on the property consisting of various fruit trees,
bamboos, a house and camarin made of strong materials, at P150, 000.00 and
this amount does not appear to be disputed. The average share of the owner was
likewise compromised at sixty (60) cavans per year,  at an average price of seven
pesos (P7.00) per cavan as of the date of the hearing on September 23, 1960.

In view of Article 544 of the Civil Code, supra, petitioners shall be accountable

for the fruits of subject property only after 1959, not from 1945.
 NUGUID
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AND GUEVARRA
171 SCRA 213
March 1989

FACTS:

The deceased spouses Victorino and Crisanta dela Rosa (spouses dela Rosa) were
registered owners of a parcel of land in Orani, Bataan, and covered by OCT No.
3778. On or about May 4, 1931, Victorino dela Rosa (widowed by then) sold one-
half of the said property to Juliana Salazar for P95.00. This sale between him and
Salazar, though evidenced by a document, was not registered. Nevertheless,
Juliana Salazar constructed a house on the lot she purchased immediately after
the sale. On March 10, 1964, petitioner spouses Diosdado Nuguid and Marqiueta
Venegas (spouses Nuguid) caused the registration of a document entitled
"Kasulatan ng Partihan at Bilihan" (Kasulatan) dated June 6, 1961. In this
document, Marciana dela Rosa, together with the heirs of Victorino and Crisanta
dela Rosa, sold to spouses Nuguid the entire area of the property for the sum of
P300.00. Subsequently, OCT No. 3778 was cancelled by the Register of Deeds of
Bataan, and TCT No. T-12782 was issued in the spouses Nuguid’s names.

Private respondents claimed that the presented by spouses Nuguid was forged.
They also allegedly discovered the forged deed as well as the certificate of title in
the name of the petitioners much later, that is, on February 28, 1978, when
respondents Amorita Guevarra and Teresita Guevarra thought of having the title
of their grandmother Juliana Salazar, registered. On the other hand, spouse
Nuguid assert that in the latter part of 1960, Nicolas dela Rosa, uncle of
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 65
respondent Marciana dela Rosa and grandfather of the other heirs-signatories,
offered to sell the subject land to them. Apparently, Nicolas dela Rosa claimed
that he had already purchased the shares of the heirs over the subject property as
evidenced by a private document entitled "Kasunduan" (Kasunduan) dated
August 31, 1955, and as a matter of fact, he had in his possession the original
certificate of title covering the property in the name of the deceased Victorino and
Crisanta dela Rosa.

The CFI of Bataan dismissed the complaint filed by private respondents, but the
Court of Appeals reversed said decision and ordered the spouses Nuguid to
execute a deed of reconveyance in favor of herein respondents.

ISSUE:

Who is the rightful owner of the subject property

RULING:

The Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the CFI of Bataan. The basis for the
Court of Appeals' conclusion that petitioners were buyers in bad faith is
ambiguous because said court relied on the singular circumstance that the
petitioners are from Orani, Bataan, and should have personally known that the
private respondents were the persons in actual possession. However, at the time
of the purchase, the spouses Nuguid dealt with Pedro Guevarra and Pascuala
Tolentino, the latter being the actual occupants. The respondents Guevarras,
children of the said Pedro and Pascuala Guevarra, came into the picture only
after their parents died. As for the respondent heirs of Victorino dela Rosa, their
being in actual possession of any portion of the property was, likewise, simply
presumed or taken for granted by the Court of Appeals.
The private respondents cannot also honestly claim that they became aware of
the spouses Nuguid’s title only in 1978, because ever since the latter bought the
property in 1961, the spouse Nuguid have occupied the same openly, publicly,
and continuously in the concept of owners, even building their house thereon.
For seventeen years they were in peaceful possession, with the respondents
Guevarras occupying less than one-half of the same property.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 66

 EDEN BALLATAN and SPS. BETTY MARTINEZ and CHONG CHY
LING, petitioners, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GONZALO GO, WINSTON GO, LI CHING YAO,
ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE and JOSE N.
QUEDDING, respondents.
G.R. No. 125683
March 2, 1999

FACTS:

Eden Ballatan, together with other petitioners, is living in and registered owners
of Lot No. 24. Respondent Winston Go is living in and registered owners of Lot
No. 25 and 26. And Li Ching Yao is living in and the registered owner of Lot. 27.
The Lots are adjacent to each other.

When Ballatan constructed her house in her lot, she noticed that the concrete
fence and side pathway of the adjoining house of respondent Winston Go
encroached on the entire length of the eastern side of her property. She was
informed by her contractor of this discrepancy, who then told respondent Go of
the same. Respondent, however, claims that his house was built within the
parameters of his father’s lot; and that this lot was surveyed by engineer Jose
Quedding, the authorized surveyor of Araneta Institute of Agriculture (AIA).
Petitioner called the attention of AIA on the matter and so the latter authorized
another survey of the land by Engineer Quedding. The latter then did the survey
twice which led to the conclusion that Lots Nos 25, 26 (owned by respondent Go)
and 27 (owned by Li Ching Yao) moved westward to the eastern boundary of Lot
24 (owned by petitioner Ballatan.) –(it was later on discovered by the courts that
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 67
Go encroached 42 square meters from the property of Ballatan and Yao
encroached 37 square meters on Go’s property, all of which were in GOOD
FAITH) Ballatan made written demands to the respondent to dismantle and
move their improvements and since the latter wasn’t answering the petitioner
filed accion publiciana in court. Go’s filed their “Answer with Third-Party
Complaint” impleading as third party defendants respondents Li Ching Yao, the
AIA and Engineer Quedding.

RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner ordering respondent Go to demolish their

improvements and pay damages to Petitioner but dismissing the third-party
complaint. CA affirmed the dismissal of the third party-complaint as to AIA but
reinstated the the complaint against Yao and the Engineer. CA also affirmed the
demolition and damages awarded to petitioner and added that Yao should also
pay respondent for his encroachment of respondent Go’s property. Jose
Quedding was also ordered to pay attorney’s fees for his negligence which caused
all this fuzz.

ISSUE:

What is the proper remedy in this situation (everyone was in good faith)

RULING:

Art 448 is the proper remedy (Lower Courts are wrong in awarding the damages).
It was established in the case that the parties had no knowledge of the
encroachment until Ballatan noticed it there all of them were builders in Good
faith. In that scenario they have two options. 1st option is that the land owner will
buy the improvements and the 2nd option is to oblige the builders to buy the land
given that the value of the land is not considerably more than the buildings or
tree; otherwise the owner may remove the improvements thereon.

The builder, planter or sower, however, is not obliged to purchase the land if its
value is considerably more than the building, planting or sowing. In such case,
the builder, planter or sower must pay rent to the owner of the land. If the parties
cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease, the court must fix the
terms thereof. The right to choose between appropriating the improvement or
selling the land on which the improvement of the builder, planter or sower
stands, is given to the owner. If the option chooses is to sell the lot, the price must
be fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of payment.

Petitioner was given by SC 30 days to decide on what to do or which right to

exercise. Likewise, Go was also given time to do the regarding Yao’s
encroachment. Engineer Quedding was still asked to pay attorney’s fees.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 68

 HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO

vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and HEIRS OF SINFOROSO

PASCUAL

G.R. No. 68166

October 13, 1997

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Accretion along an area adjacent to the sea is public domain, even if the accretion
results from rivers emptying into the sea. It cannot be registered.

FACTS:

Sinforoso Pascual sits in the midst of a land registration case. The story begins on
1946 upon his desire to register land on the northern section of his existing property.
His current registered property is bounded on the east by Talisay River, on the West
byPROPERTY
Bulacan LAW
RiverCASE
and DIGESTS
on the North by the Manila bay. Both rivers flow towards the 69
Manila Bay. Because of constantly flowing water, extra land of about 17hectares
(that’s about the size of Disney Park!) formed in the northern most section of the
property. It is this property he sought to register.

The RTC denied the registration claiming this to be foreshore land and part of public
domain (remember, accretion formedby the sea is public dominion). His Motion for
Reconsideration likewise burned. In 1960, he attempted registry again, claiming that
the Talisay and Bulacan rivers deposited more silt resulting on accretion. He claimed
this land as riprarian owner. The Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the
Fiscal opposed.

Then a new party surfaced. Mr Emiliano Navarro jumped into the fray opposing the
same application, stating the he leased part of the property sought to be registered.
He sought to protect his fishpond that rested on the same property. Sinforoso was
not amused and filed ejectment against Mr. Navarro, claiming that Navarro used
stealth force and strategy to occupy a portion of his land. Pascual lost the case
against Navarro so he appealed. During the appeal, his original land registration
case was consolidated and tried jointly. (alas Pascual died) The heirs of Pascual took
over the case.
On 1975, the court decided that the property was foreshore land and therefore part
of public domain. The RTC dismissed the complaint of Pascual for ejectment against
Navarro and also denied his land registration request. Pascual’s heirs appealed and
the RTC was reversed by the IAC. The Apellate court granted petition for
registration! The reason? The accretion was caused by the two rivers, not manila
bay. Hence it wasn’t foreshore land. (BUT the confusion lies in the fact that the
accretion formed adjacent to Manila Bay… which is sea!) Aggrieved, the Director of
Forestry moved for reconsideration (Government insists it is foreshore and hence,
public domain). The Apellate court denied all motions of the Director and the
Government.

The matter went to the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accretion taking place on property adjacent to the sea can be
registered under the Torrens system

HELD:

It cannot be registered. This is land of Public domain. Pascual claimed ownership

under Article 457 of the Civil Code saying that the disputed 14-hectare land is an
accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers Art 457:
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property and requires the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3)
that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.

Unfortunately,
PROPERTY LAWPasucal and Heirs claim of ownership based on Art 457 is misplaced.
CASE DIGESTS 70
If there’s any land to be claimed, it should be land ADJACENT to the rivers Talisay
and Bulacan. The law is clear on this. Accretion of land along the river bank may be
registered. This is not the case of accretion of land on the property adjacent to
Manila Bay.

Furthermore, Manila Bay is a sea. Accretion on a sea bank is foreshore land and the
applicable law is not Art 457 but Art 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. This
law, while old, holds that accretion along sea shore cannot be registered as it
remains public domain unless abandoned by government for public use and
declared as private property capable of alienation.

Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:

Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of
the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the
waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard service, the Government
shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto
and as increment thereof.

The IAC decision granting registration was reversed and set aside. Registration
cannot be allowed.
DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO and LETICIA NAZARENO TAPIA
vs. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS, MR. & MRS. JOSE SALASALAN, MR. & MRS.
LEO RABAYA, AVELINO LABIS, HON. ROBERTO G. HILARIO, ROLLEO
I. IGNACIO, ALBERTO M. GILLERA and HON. ABELARDO G. PALAD,
JR.
G.R. No. 98045
June 26, 1996

FACTS:
Sometimes in 1979, PR Salasalan and Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their
houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. In
the latter part of 1982, PR allegedly stopped paying rentals. As a result, petitioners
filed a case for ejectment with the MTC of CDO. A decision was rendered against PR,
which decision was affirmed by the RTC of Misamis Oriental, before he died,
Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the Survey plan
with a view of perfecting his title over the accretion are being claimed by him. Before
the approved survey plan could be released to the applicant, however it was
protested by PR before the Bureau of Land.
Upon investigating of the RD of Bureau of Land, it was recommended that Survey
Plan in the name of Antonio Nazareno who denied the motion, Respondent Director
of Land then ordered him to vacate the portion adjudicated to private respondent be
placed in possession thereof. Upon the denial of the late Antonio Nazareno's motion
for reconsideration, petitioners Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Tapia
Nazareno, filed a case before the RTC, Branch 22 for annulment of the following:
order of investigation
PROPERTY by respondent Gillera, report and recommendation by
LAW CASE DIGESTS 71
respondent Labis, decision by respondent Hilario, order by respondent Ignacio
affirming the decision of respondent Hilario and order of execution by respondent
Palad. The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies which resulted in the finality of the administrative decision of the Bureau
of Lands, On Appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the
complain.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject land is public land.

RULING:

Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an accretion to his titled
property, applying Art. 457 of the Civil Code which provides:

“To the owner of lands adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effect of the current of the water. In the case of Meneses v.
CA, 2 this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457
of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites.

a. That the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;

b. That it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea).
c. That the land where takes place is adjacent to the bank of river (or the sea cost).”
These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owner of
lands adjoining the bank of rivers or stream any accretion gradually received from
the effect of the current of waters. Furthermore, the Bureau of Lands, classified the
subject land as an accretion are which was formed by deposits of sawdust in
Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river, in accordance with the ocular inspection
conducted by the Bureau of Land.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 72

 PEDRO P. ROXAS,
vs.
JULIA TUASON, THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN PEDRO MACATI, AND
ALEJANDRO AND CONSOLACION AGUIRRE,
G.R. No. L-3788
December 21, 1907

TORRES, J.:

FACTS:

Attorneys on behalf of Pedro P. Roxas, applied for the registration of the estate
owned by the said Roxas, known as the Hacienda de San Pedro Macati, in
accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act; said hacienda was
acquired by the petitioner by inheritance under the will of his late father, Jose
Bonifacio Roxas, y Ubaldo. The property consists of four different parcels of land.
The building constructed of strong materials, called the "Casa-Quinta" or "Casa de
Ingenieros," belonging also to said Roxas, is erected within parcel "C,". It does not
appear that said hacienda is mortgaged nor that any person has any right to or any
interest therein; and it is almost wholly occupied at the present time, under lease, by
about 429 tenants.

The owners of the adjoining properties having been summoned and notified by
means of subpoenas and notices published in the daily papers, one of them, Julia
Tuason, appeared and set forth her opposition to the registration and authentication
of the title of the petitioner, Roxas, as regards the parcel marked "C," for the reason
that two old monuments which had separated their respective properties had been
pulled down and new ones erected without her consent, and in her opinion the latter
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 73
included a considerable portion of the land owned by her.

Evidence consisting of both oral testimony and documents, which appear in the
record, having been adduced by both parties in the suit, the judge, rendered his
decision and ordered the registration of the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati in favor
of Pedro Roxas.

The representative of the petitioner affirms that the real boundary of the hacienda
on the side that adjoins the land of Tuason was and still is a creek or sapa separating
both properties, and that in former years said creek was wider that at the present
time.
The respondent, however, maintains that the boundary between the sitio called
Suavoy, formerly an island of that name, and the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati is
determined by straight lines drawn between some old monuments distant a few
yards from the bank of the said creek.

ISSUE:

The only subject of controversy between the petitioner, owner of the Hacienda of
San Pedro Macati, and the respondent Julia Tuason is the question of the boundary
line, between their respective contiguous premises.

RULING:

The record does not show that the boundary of the land of Julia Tuason was inclosed
by monuments belonging to her or that the creek which divides the sitio or Island of
Suavoy from the land of the said hacienda is included within the respondent's land,
since in the bill of sale executed by the procurador general of the Augustinian friars
to Julia Tuason, no mention is made of monuments erected thereon nor of any creek
existing in the large tract of land purchased by her, except that the land is situated in
the barrio of Suavoy and that it is bounded on two sides by the Hacienda of San
Pedro Macati.

The proven fact that said creek was wider in 1871, when it had a width of about 4
Spanish yards, is the best explanation as to why some of the monuments of the
Hacienda of San Pedro Macati are now at some distance from the bank of the same,
and no legal reason whatever exists why the slow increase which has taken place on
the hacienda's side should be considered as belonging to the respondent, inasmuch
as the latter does not own the bed of the creek and because it may be assumed that
the slow decrease in the width thereof benefited both properties equally since the
respondent has not been able to show or prove that her land has been thereby
reduced.

Article 366 of the Civil Code in dealing with the right of accession to real property
reads:

The accretions which banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effects of
the currents belong to the owners of the estates bordering thereon.

The provision in this article is perfectly applicable to the strip of land, which, on
account of the accretion, has come to be undeniable increase in the land of the
hacienda inasmuch as it has increased all along the bank of the creek, the gradual
effect of the currents; and even though the law does not require an express act of
possession of the accretion which has enlarged the estate, it is certain that the owner
of the hacienda has possessed it for more than thirty years through his tenants, who
PROPERTY
have been LAW CASE DIGESTS
cultivating their respective parcels of land together with the 74
corresponding portion of the said strip down to the bank of said creek.

For these considerations the question of the situation of the old monuments and the
placing of new ones in the intervening space is of no importance, inasmuch as it has
already been shown that the respondent has no title to the accretion which by
spontaneous increase formed the strip of land between the creek and the
monuments, and no proof is offered in the record that the land of Julia Tuason
reached the other side of the creek toward the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati.

The result of the evidence, as stated in the judgment appealed from, does not
maintain the claim of the respondent; on the contrary, it has been shown in a
convincing manner that the present natural limit of both properties is the aforesaid
creek; therefore, the opposition filed by Julia Tuason is untenable.
Therefore, by virtue of the considerations above set forth, it is our opinion that the
judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
 LEONIDA CUREG, et al.
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, (4TH CIVIL CASES DIVISION),
DOMINGO APOSTOL, SOLEDAD GERARDO, ROSA GERARDO, NIEVES
GERARDO, FLORDELIZA GERARDO, AND LILIA MAQUINAD
G.R. No. 73465
September 7, 1989

MEDIALDEA, J.:

FACTS:

On 5 November 1982, Domingo Apostol, Soledad Gerardo, Rosa Gerardo, Nieves

Gerardo, Flordeliza Gerardo and Lilia Maquinad filed a complaint for quieting of
title and damages with preliminary injunction against Leonida, Romeo, Pepito,
Hernando, Manuel, Antonio and Elpidio Carniyan with the RTC Isabela (Civil Case
Br. 111-373). A temporary restraining order was issued by the trial court on 12
November 1982. The complaint alleged that the Gerardos and Maquinad are the
legal and/or the forced heirs of the late Domingo Gerardo, who died in February
1944, the latter being the only issue of the late Francisco Gerardo, who died before
the outbreak of WWII; that since time immemorial and/or before 26 July 1894, the
late Francisco Gerardo, together with his predecessors-in-interest have been in
actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession, under a bona fide claim of
ownership and adverse to all other claimants, of a parcel of land, situated in
Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela.
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 75
Said land was declared for taxation purposes under in the name of Francisco
Gerardo, which cancelled TD C-9669, in the name of Francisco; that upon the death
of Francisco Gerardo, the ownership and possession of the land was succeeded by
Domingo Gerardo who, together with 3 legal or forced heirs, have also been in
actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession of the same. Primo Gerardo was
survived by Rosa, Nieves and Flordeliza Gerardo; while Salud Gerardo was survived
by Lilia Maquinad. In 1979, Soledad, Rosa, Nieves, and Flordeliza Gerardo along
with Lilia Maquinad verbally sold the land to Domingo Apostol, which sale and
conveyance was later reduced into writing by the vendors who executed an "Extra-
Judicial Partition with Voluntary Reconveyance.”

About the time of the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition, the land already
manifested signs of accretion of about 3 hectares on the north caused by the
northward movement of the Cagayan River; that Domingo Apostol declared the land
and its accretion for tax purposes under TD 08-13281 on 15 September 1982.
Sometime about the last week of September and or the first week of October 1982,
when the Gerardos, Maquinad and Apostol were about to cultivate their land
together with its accretion, they were prevented and threatened by the Carniyans
from continuing to do so.

The late Antonio Carniyan was the owner of a piece of land acquired from his father-
in-law Marcos Cureg on 5 October 1956 as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale
situated in Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela, and which was declared for taxation
purposes under TD 13131, with an assessed value of P70.00. Carniyan revised on 28
November 1968 his TD 13131 dated 24 July 1961 to conform with the correct area
and boundaries of his OCT P-19093 issued on 25 November 1968 pursuant to Free
Patent 399431 dated 21 May 1968; that the area under the new TD 15663 was
increased from 2,790 sq.ms. to 4,584 sq.ms. and the boundary on the north became
Cagayan River, purposely eliminating completely the original boundary on the north
which is Domingo Gerardo. The heirs of Antonio Carniyan (Cureg, et.al.) alleged in
their answer that the land claimed by the Gerardos and Apostol is non-existent; that
Antonio Carniyan was the owner of a piece of land bounded on the north by Cagayan
River and not by the land of Francisco Gerardo; that the "subject land" is an
accretion to their registered land and that they have been in possession and
cultivation of the "accretion" for many years.

The application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was denied. The
trial court rendered judgment declaring Domingo Apostol the absolute owner of the
parcel of land containing an area of 5.5000 hectares (N: Cagayan River; E: Domingo
Guingab; S: Antonio Carniyan; and W: by Sabina Mola) and with an assessed value
of P3,520; ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against Cureg,
et.al.

On 17 July 1984, Cureg appealed to the then IAC Court which affirmed the decision
of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the IAC erred in ruling that the subject land or "accretion" (which is
bounded on the north by the Cagayan River) belongs to the private respondents and
not to the petitioners

RULING:

YES. The object of the controversy in this case is the alleged "motherland" of private
respondents together with the accretion of about 3.5 hectares, the totality of which is
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 76
referred to in this decision as the "subject land."

In this case, petitioners claimed to be riparian owners who are entitled to the
"subject land" which is an accretion to the registered land while private respondents
claimed to be entitled to the 3.5 hectares accretion attached to their "motherland."

The land in question is an alluvial deposit left by the northward movement of the
Cagayan River and pursuant to Article 457 of the New Civil Code, it is said that "to
the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters."

The area covered by OCT P-19093 is only 4,584 sq. ms. The accretion attached to
said land is approximately 5.5 hectares. The increase in the area of Cureg's land,
being an accretion left by the change of course or the northward movement of the
Cagayan River does not automatically become registered land just because the lot
which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. As such, it must also be
placed under the operation of the Torrens System.
 JOAQUIN G. CHUNG, Jr., PAZ ROYERAS-SOLER, and MANSUETO
MACEDA
vs.
JACK DANIEL MONDRAGON, (deceased), substituted by his sisters
namely: TEOTIMA M. BOURBON, EMMA M. MILLAN, EUGENIA M.
RAMA and ROSARIO M. CABALLES; CLARINDA REGIS-SCHMITZ and
MARIA LINA MALMISA
G.R. No. 179754
November 21, 2012

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners Joaquin G. Chung, Jr., Paz Royeras-Soler, and Mansueto Maceda are
descendants of Rafael Mondragon (Rafael) by his first wife, Eleuteria Calunia
(Eleuteria), while respondent Jack Daniel Mondragon (Jack Daniel) is Rafaels
descendant by his second wife, Andrea Baldos (Andrea).

OCT No. 22447 is registered in the name of "Heirs of Andrea Baldos represented by
Teofila G. Maceda" and covers 16,177 square meters of land in Macrohon, Southern
Leyte (the land). Chung, et al. claim that from 1921 up to 2000, Rafael appeared as
owner of the land in its tax declaration, and that a free patent was issued in 1987 in
the name of Andreas heirs upon application of Teofila G.Maceda (Teofila), who is
petitioners sister.

On the other hand, respondents Bourbon, et al. claim that Andrea is the exclusive
owner of the land, having inherited the same from her father and that after Andrea
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 77
died, his son Fortunato Mondragon inherited the land; and when the latter died, his
son Jack Daniel (herein respondent) came into possession and enjoyment thereof.
Sometime in the year 2000, Jack Daniel sold a 1,500-square meter portion of the
land to his co-respondent Clarinda Regis-Schmitz (Regis-Schmitz).

On the claim that Jack Daniel had no right to sell a portion of the land and that the
sale to Regis-Schmitz created a cloud upon their title, Chung, Jr., et al. filed an
action to quiet title. The RTC dismissed the complaint of Chung, Jr., et al.
The CA sustained the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action to quiet title should prosper

RULING:
The petition lacks merit. The issues in a case for quieting of title are fairly simple;
the plaintiff need to prove only two things, namely: "(1) the plaintiff or complainant
has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and (2) that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be
casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

It is evident from the title that the land belongs to no other than the heirs of Andrea
Baldos, Rafaels second wife. The land could not have belonged to Rafael, because he
is not even named in OCT No. 22447.With greater reason may it be said that the
land could not belong to petitioners, who are Rafaels children by his first wife
Eleuteria. Unless Eleuteria and Andrea were related by blood such fact is not borne
out by the record they could not be heirs to each other. Add to this is the fact that
petitioners are not in possession of the land. Petitioners do not possess legal or
equitable title to the land.

Petition is DENIED.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 78

 NATIONAL SPIRITUAL ASSEMBLY OF THE BAHA'IS OF THE
PHILIPPINES

vs.

PASCUAL

G.R. No. 169272

July 11, 2012

BRION, J.:

FACTS:

On December 11, 2000, the petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC for "quieting of
title, injunction, annulment of alias writ of execution, with prayer for temporary
restraining order, preliminary prohibitory injunction, and damages" against Silverio
Songcuan and/or his heirs, the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources(DENR), and the Regional Executive Director of the DENR,
Regional Office No. 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. The petitioner alleged that it is the
lawful and absolute owner of two (2) parcels of land, known as Cadastral Lot Nos. 3
and 361, together with the two-storey building thereon, situated in Victory Sur,
Santiago City, acquired through a sale in 1967 from Armando Valdez and Emma
Valdez, respectively,
PROPERTY LAW CASEwho, in turn, acquired ownership from Marcelina Ordoño.
DIGESTS 79

The petitioner had been in open, continuous and adverse possession for a period of
more than thirty (30) years, and a cloud exists on its title because of an invalid
December 4, 1985 decision of the Bureau of Lands. This invalid decision rejected the
miscellaneous sales applications of the petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest for the
lots, and ordered all those in privity with them (specifically including the petitioner)
to vacate the lots and to remove their improvements thereon. The DENR Secretary
affirmed on February 7, 1989 the Bureau of Lands’ December 4, 1985 decision.
Recourse to the Office of the President (OP) had been unavailing, and the DENR
Regional Office No. 2 issued on December 10, 1996 and June 6, 2000 alias writs of
execution pursuant to the OP’s decision. In its June 20, 2001 order, the RTC denied
the motion to dismiss, finding that the Bureau of Lands’ December 4, 1985 decision
was not yet final and executory since the OP’s ruling on the appeal was
"unavailable." The respondent elevated his case to the CA via a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari, questioning the propriety of the RTC’s denial of his motion to dismiss.

In its December 29, 2004 decision, the CA set aside the RTC’s order and dismissed
the complaint for quieting of title for failure to state a cause of action. It found that
the respondent’s admission of the Bureau of Lands’ adverse December 4, 1985
decision precluded the respondent’s claim over the lots. The Bureau of Lands’
decision, being final and executory, is binding and conclusive upon the petitioner.
Even assuming that the OP’s ruling on the appeal was still "unavailable," the RTC
should have dismissed the complaint for prematurity; an action to quiet title is not
the proper remedy from an adverse decision issued by an administrative agency in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial function.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s complaint for quieting of title should be dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action.

RULING:

Yes. The petitioner’s status as possessor and owner of the lots had been settled in the
final and executory December 4, 1985 decision of the Bureau of Lands that the
DENR Secretary and the OP affirmed on appeal. Thus, the petitioner is not entitled
to the possession and ownership of the lots.

Jurisprudence teaches us that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies,

such as the Bureau of Lands, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority,
upon finality, have the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the
purview of the doctrine of res judicata.

The foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not
to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that x x x a right or fact
[that] has been judicially tried and determined by a [tribunal or] court of competent
jurisdiction x x x should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
them in law or estate[, so long as it remains unreversed].

Accordingly, the petitioner is now barred from challenging the validity of the final
and executory Bureau of Lands’ December 4, 1985 decision.

Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, there are two (2) indispensable
requisites
PROPERTYinLAW
an action to quiet title: (1) that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal
CASE DIGESTS 80
or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2)
that a deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding is claimed to be casting cloud on his
title.
 ANASTACIA VDA. DE AVILES, ET AL.,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CAMILO AVILES
G.R. No. 95748
November 21, 1996

PANGANIBAN, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Quieting of Title Not Proper Remedy For Settling Boundary Dispute. Quieting of
title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or
uncertainty with respect to title to real property.

FACTS:
Petitioners aver that they are the actual possessors of a parcel of land situated in
Malawa, Lingayen, Pangasinan, more particularly described as fishpond, cogonal,
unirrigated rice and residential land, bounded on the N by Camilo Aviles; on the E
by Malawa River, on the S by Anastacio Aviles and on the W by Juana and Apolonio
Joaquin, with an area of 18,900 square meters and declared under Tax Declaration
No. 31446. This property is the share of their father, Eduardo Aviles and brother of
the defendant, in the estate of their deceased parents.
Eduardo Aviles was in actual possession of the afore-described property since 1957.
In fact, the latter mortgaged the same with the Rural Bank and Philippine National
Bank branch in Lingayen. When the property was inspected by a bank
representative,
PROPERTY LAWEduardo Aviles, in the presence of the boundary owners, namely,
CASE DIGESTS 81
defendant Camilo Aviles, Anastacio Aviles and Juana and Apolonio Joaquin pointed
to the inspector the existing earthen dikes as the boundary limits of the property and
nobody objected. When the real estate mortgage was foreclosed, the property was
sold at public auction but this was redeemed by plaintiffs’ mother and the land was
subsequently transferred and declared in her name.
Defendant Camilo Aviles asserted a color of title over the northern portion of the
property with an area of approximately 1,200 square meters by constructing a
bamboo fence (thereon) and moving the earthen dikes, thereby molesting and
disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over said portion.
Defendant Camilo Aviles admitted the agreement of partition executed by him and
his brothers, Anastacio and Eduardo. The respective area(s) alloted to them was
agreed and measured before the execution of the agreement but he was not present
when the measurement was made. Defendant agreed to have a smaller area because
his brother Eduardo asked him that he wanted a bigger share because he has several
children to support. The portion in litigation however is part of the share given to
him in the agreement of partition.
At present, he is only occupying a smaller than his actual share. Tax Declarations
Nos. 23575, 481 and 379 covering his property from 1958 show that the area of his
property is 14,470 square meters. The riceland portion of his land is 13,290 square
meters, the fishpond portion is 500 square meters and the residential portion is 680
square meters, or a total of 14,470 square meters. That the topography of his land is
not the same, hence, the height of his pilapils are likewise not the same.
The trial court disposed of the case thus ordering the parties to employ the services
of a Land Surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, Region I, San Fernando, La Union, to
relocate and determine the extent and the boundary limit of the land of the
defendant on its southern side in order that the fourteen thousand four hundred
seventy (14,470) square meters which is the actual area given to the defendant be
determined. It ordered the complaint dismissed for lack of basis and merits.
Dissatisfied with the trial court’s decision, petitioners appealed to the respondent
appellate Court. In its now-assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part
the decision of the trial court, reasoning that a special civil action for quieting of title
is not the proper remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and that petitioners should
have instituted an ejectment suit instead. It affirmed the decision of the trial court
in dismissing the complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Hon. Court of Appeals is correct when it opined that the
complaint for quieting of title instituted by the petitioners against private
respondent before the court a quo is not the proper remedy but rather, it should be a
case for ejectment.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that Quieting of Title Not Proper Remedy For Settling
Boundary Dispute. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any
cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property.
The Civil Code authorizes the said remedy in the following language:
“Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein,
by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable,
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 82
or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to
remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon a title to real
property of any interest therein."
In fine, to avail the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that there is an
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a
cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owner’s title to or interest in real
property. Thus, petitioners have wholly misapprehended the import of the foregoing
rule by claiming that respondent Court erred in holding that there was “no xxx
evidence of any muniment of title, proceeding, written contract, xxx”, and that there
were, as a matter of fact, two such contracts, (i) the Agreement of Partition executed
by private respondent and his brothers (including the petitioners’ father and
predecessor-in-interest), in which their respective shares in the inherited property
were agreed upon, and (ii) the Deed of Sale evidencing the redemption by petitioner
Anastacia Vda. de Aviles of the subject property in a foreclosure sale. However, these
documents in no way constitute a cloud or cast a doubt upon the title of petitioners.
Rather, the uncertainty arises from the parties’ failure to situate and fix the
boundary between their respective properties.
As correctly held by the respondent Court, both plaintiffs and defendant admitted
the existence of the agreement of partition and in accordance therewith, a fixed area
was alloted (sic) to them and that the only controversy is whether these lands were
properly measured. There is no adverse claim by the defendant “which is apparently
valid, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable” and
which constitutes a cloud thereon.
Corollarily, and equally as clear, the construction of the bamboo fence enclosing the
disputed property and the moving of earthen dikes are not the “clouds” or “doubts”
which can be removed in an action for quieting of title.

An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose of
settling a boundary dispute. The precedent on this matter cited by the respondent
Court in its Decision is herewith reproduced in full.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 83

 MAURICIA ALEJANDRINO
vs.
 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA,
RTC-9, CEBU CITY, and LICERIO P. NIQUE
G.R. No. 11415
 September 17, 1998

ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
The late spouses Alejandrino left their six children named Marcelino, Gregorio,
Ciriaco, Mauricia, Laurencia and Abundio a lot in Cebu City. Upon the death of the
spouses, the property should have been divided among their children, however, the
estate of the Alejandrino spouses was not settled in accordance with the procedures
Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) allegedly purchased portion of the lots from
her brothers, Gregorio's, Ciriaco's and Abundio's share. It turned out, however, that
a third party named Nique, the private respondent in this case, also purchased
portions of the property from Laurencia, Abundio and Marcelino.
However, Laurencia (the alleged seller to Nique) later questioned the sale in an
action for quieting of title and damages. The trial court (Quieting of title case) ruled
in favor of Nique and declared him the owner of the lots. Laurencia appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals but later withdrew the same.
Nique filed a motion for the segregation of the portion of the property that had been
declared by the trial court (Quieting of title case) as his own by virtue of purchase.
The trial court segregated the property on the basis of the Extra-Judicial Settlement
between Mauricia and Laurencia.
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 84
ISSUE:
Whether or not partition of the lot was validly made
RULING:
Yes. Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as
long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-
owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right. 

Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling her pro indiviso share. The
legality of Laurencia's alienation of portions of the estate of the Alejandrino spouses
was upheld in the Quieting of title case which had become final and executory by
Laurencia's withdrawal of her appeal in the CA. When Nique filed a motion for the
segregation of the portions of the property that were adjudged in his favor, he was in
effect calling for the partition of the property. However, under the law, partition of
the estate of a decedent may only be effected by (1) the heirs themselves
extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the course of
administration proceedings, (3) by the testator himself, and (4) by the third person
designated by the testator. 

Extrajudicial settlement between Mauricia and Laurentia became the basis for the
segregation of the property in favor of Nique
However, evidence on the extrajudicial settlement of estate was offered before the
trial court and it became the basis for the order for segregation of the property sold
to Nique. Mauricia does not deny the fact of the execution of the deed of
extrajudicial settlement of the estate. She only questions its validity on account of
the absence of notarization of the document and the non-publication thereof. A
partition is valid though not contained in a public instrument. 

Moreover, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate reflected
the intention of both Laurencia and Mauricia to physically divide the property. Both
of them had acquired the shares of their brothers and therefore it was only the two of
them that needed to settle the estate. The fact that the document was not notarized
is no hindrance to its effectivity as regards the two of them. The partition of
inherited property need not be embodied in a public document to be valid between
the parties.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 85

 MANUEL T. DE GUIA
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Former Sixth Division) and JOSE B. ABEJO,
represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Hermenegilda Abejo-Rivera
G.R. No. 120864
October 8, 2003

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

The subject of the dispute in this case was the 2 undivided parcels of land used as a
FISHPOND. The property was originally co-owned by Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza
Abejo. Teofilo Abejo inherited the ½ portion of such undivided land from his
parents. De Guia, through a Contract of Lease, acquired possession of the entire
land. Jose Abejo, through a sale entered by him and his father (Teofilo Abejo),
acquired ownership of the ½ portion.Despite the expiration of the lease contract, De
Guia remained in possession of the entire lot without paying any rent. Jose Abejo
filed a complaint for recovery of possession. Abejo wanted De Guia to vacate the ½
portion and to pay damages in the form of rent.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not Abejo can demand payment of rent

2) Whether or not Abejo can demand De Guia to vacate

RULING:
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 86
1) Yes. Abejo can demand payment of rent. According to Article 485 co-owners will
share in the benefits (as well as charges) proportional to their respective interests..
Abejo as a co-owner, he has the right to use, right to enjoy and the right to the fruits
over the subject property. Since De Guia retained exclusive possession of the subject
property, Abejo has the right to demand rent for the ½ portion of the land.
2) No. De Guia cannot be compelled to vacate. As provided in Article 486, each co-
owner may use the thing owned in common. Since both Abejo and De Guia are co-
owners, they have the right to use the entire property. Thus, Abejo cannot compel De
Guia to vacate the ½ portion until co-ownership exists.
 DELIA BAILON-CASILAO, LUZ PAULINO-ANG, EMMA PAULINO-
YBANEZ, NILDA PAULINO-TOLENTINO, and SABINA BAILON
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CELESTINO AFABLE
G.R. No. 78178
April 15, 1988

CORTES, J.:

FACTS:

The fate of petitioners' claim over a parcel of land rests ultimately on a

determination of whether or not said petitioners are chargeable with such laches as
may effectively bar their present action. There is a parcel of land in the names of the
Bailons (Rosalia, Gaudencio, Sabina Bernabe, Nenita and Delia) as co-owners, each
with a 1/6 share. o Gaudencio and Nenita are now dead, (Nenita being represented
in this case by her children) Bernabe went to China and had not been heard from
since. It appears that Rosalia and Gaudencio sold a portion of the land to Donato
Delgado. Rosalia alone, then sold the remainder of the land to Ponciana Aresgado de
Lanuza. On the same date, Lanuza acquired from Delgado land which the Delgado
had earlier acquired from Rosalia and Gaudencio. Husband John Lanuza, acting
under a special power of attorney given by his wife, Ponciana, sold the two parcels of
land to Celestino Afable, Sr.

In all these transfers, it was stated in the deeds of sale that the land was not
registered under the provisions of Act No. 496 when the fact is that it is. It appears
that the land had been successively declared for taxation first, in the name of Ciriaca
Dellamas, mother of the co-owners, then in the name of Rosalia Bailon, then in that
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 87
of Donat o Delgado, then in Ponciana de Lanuza's name, and finally in the name of
Celestino Afable, Sr. The petitioners in this case, the Bailons, filed a case for recovery
of property against Celestino Afable. In his answer, Afable claimed that he had
acquired the land in question through prescription and said that the Bailons are
guilty of laches. LC declared Afable co-owner because he validly bought 2/6 of the
land (the shares of Rosalia and Gaudencio) CA affirmed. Prescription does not apply
against the Bailons because they are co-owners of the original sellers. But, an action
to recover may be barred by laches. CA held the Bailons guilty of laches and
dismissed their complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the doctrine of laches apply

RULING:

Initially, a determination of the effect of a sale by one or more co-owners of the

entire property held in common without the consent of all the co-owners and of the
appropriate remedy of the aggrieved co-owners is required. The rights of co-owner
of a certain property are clearly specified in NCC 493: Art. 493.

Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the acts and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate assign or mortgage it and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership SC has already ruled in other cases that even if a co-
owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not
those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. By virtue of the sales
made by Rosalia and Gaudencio, which are valid with respect to their proportionate
shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to private
respondent Celestino Afable, Afable thereby became a co-owner of the disputed
parcel of land Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the
entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not
null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred,
thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 88

 MARCELINO C. AGNE, ET AL vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PRESENTACION AGPOON GASCON,
JOAQUIN GASCON and HON. ROSALIO C. SEGUNDO, Presiding Judge,
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V
G.R. No. L-72255 February 6,1990

REGALADO, J.:

FACTS:

In 1971, Spouses Presentacion & Joaquin Gascon filed a Case for recovery of
possession and damages against Marcelino Agne et al. Their complaint states that
they are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated in Asingan, Pangasinan
which is now in the possession of Agne, et.al.; that it was during the Japanese
occupation when Agne et.al took possession of said land by means of fraud, stealth,
strategy and intimidation; that Gascon repeatedly demanded the surrender of the
physical possession of said property but Agne et.al refused.

Agne, et.al., replied that the land in question was formerly an abandoned bed of the
Agno-Chico River. It was formed due to a big flood occurred in 1920; causing the
said river to change its course. And by virtue of the provisions of Article 370 of the
Spanish Civil Code [which was law in force then], Agne, et.al., by operation of law,
became the owners by accession or accretion of the respective parts of said river bed
bordering their properties.

While the earlier-mentioned case was still pending, Agne, et.al. filed a complaint
against Dir. of Lands and sps Agpoon for annulment of title, reconveyance of and/or
action to clear title to the same property. They maintain that the land in question
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 89
belongs to them; that the patent granted by the Gov’t to Herminigildo Agpoon
[Presentacion’s father] and subsequent titles arising therefrom are all null and void.
They reasoned that the abandoned river bed is their private property; therefore, it
cannot be the subject of a public land grant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Agne et al are the owners of the alluvium or who between Agne et.al
[who is the riparian owner presently in possession], and the Sps. Gascon [the
registered owner by virtue of a free patent] has a better right over the abandoned
river bed.

RULING:

Yes. The Court held that it was Agne et.al that has a better right over the abandoned
river bed.

Under the old Civil Code, the law then in force, provides that “the beds of rivers
which remain abandoned because the course of the water has naturally changed
belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout their respective lengths. If the
abandoned bed divided estates belonging to different owners, the new dividing line
shall run at equal distance therefrom."

Further, riparian owners acquire automatic ownership of the abandoned bed w/o
need of any formal act of acquisition. Thus, once the river bed has been abandoned,
the riparian owners become the owners of the abandoned bed to the extent provided
by the article. The law does not require any formal act of acquisition on the part of
the riparian owners. The right in re to the principal is likewise a right in re to the
accessory, as it is a mode of acquisition provided by law. As a result of the right of
accretion, the accessory follows the nature of the principal.

The landowner’s right to additions by accretion has been said to rest in the law of
nature. It is analogous to the right of the tree owner to its fruits, and the owner of
flocks and herds to their natural increase. In the case at bar, Agne, et.al. are the
riparian owners of the lands adjoining the river bed and they are also the owners of
portions of said abandoned river bed without the necessity of any action or exercise
of possession on their part.

Their failure to register the accretion in their names and declare it for purposes of
taxation did not divest it of its private property character. While it might be true that
there is automatic ownership of the alluvium, nevertheless, automatic registration is
not included. Therefore, the deposited/added soil is not entitled to the protection of
imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered properties under the Torrens system.
However said rule is not applicable in the case at bar, since the title claimed by sps
Gascon is not based on acquisitive prescription but is anchored on a public grant
from the Gov’t. Such pub. grant presupposes that the property is a public land;
which is not true in this case since the subject land is a private property owned by
Agne et.al. Hence it is impt. To note that Ownership over the accession is governed
by the Civil Code while Imprescriptibility of registered land is a concern of the Land
Registration Act.

***Under the provisions of Act 2874 pursuant to which the title of Gascon's
predecessor in interest was issued, the President of the Philippines or his alter ego,
the Director of Lands, has no authority to grant a free patent for land that has ceased
to be a public land and has passed to private ownership, and a title so issued is null
and void.
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 90
 AGNES GAPACAN, EUGENIA GAPACAN-KIAKI and MARILYN
GAPACAN
vs.
MARIA GAPACAN OMIPET
G.R. No. 148943
August 15, 2002

BELLOSILLO, J.:

DOCTRINE: An action to Quiet Title is a valid remedy to ascertain property rights.

FACTS:

Gapacan is a native Igorot possessor of a parcel of land in Bauko, Mr. Province. The
property is divided into three and declared by him for taxation purposes. He has two
children. Maria and Antonio. Antonio left to work in mining while Maria remained
and eventually took over management and cultivation of the property. Antonio
returned to their home and thereafter executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real
Property which now makes him the legal owner of the property in question as it
transfers ownership from his sister to him. Since then, the family of Antonio
(Gapacan) had been occupying and cultivating the property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not property rights may be determined by an action to Quiet Title

RULING:
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 91
Yes. Art. 476 of the Civil Code provides that an action to quiet title may be brought
when there exists a cloud on the title to a real property or any interest therein.

The property owner whose property rights were being disturbed may ask a
competent court for a proper determination of the respective rights of the party-
claimants, places things in their proper place by:

1. Requiring the party with no right over the property to refrain from acts
injurious to the peaceful enjoyment of the property by rightful owner and
2. Mutually benefitting both parties with the view of dissipating any cloud
of doubt over the property.

The appellate court in resolving the present controversy is well within its authority
to adjudicate on the respective rights of the parties, that is, to pass upon the
ownership of the property; hence to declare the same as common property.

The court also noted that Omipet did not present sufficient evidence to overcome
Gapacan’s better right to possession. The Supreme Court ruled that CA was correct
in its determination that the land in dispute is common property and must be
partitioned.
 AGNES GAPACAN, EUGENIA GAPACAN-KIAKI and MARILYN
GAPACAN
vs.
MARIA GAPACAN OMIPET
G.R. No. 148943
August 15, 2002

BELLOSILLO, J.

Principle: a property owner whose property rights were being disturbed may ask
a competent court for a proper determination of the respective rights of the party-
claimants, not only to place things in their proper place, that is, to require the one
who has no right to refrain from acts injurious to the peaceful enjoyment of the
property not only of the rightful owner but also for the benefit of both with the
view of dissipating any cloud of doubt over the property.

FACTS:

Paicat Gapacan, a native Igorot of the Kankanai tribe, was the primitive possessor of
an unregistered land in Abatan, Bauko, Mt. Province, divided into three (3) parcels
of rice land and another parcel planted to camote. Paicat had two (2) children, Maria
and Antonio both surnamed Gapacan.

In his adulthood, Antonio left Abatan consequently, his sister Maria who remained
in Abatan took care of their aging father until his death during the Second World
War and eventually took over the cultivation of their father's land.
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 92
It came to pass that Antonio married and begot 2 daughters. After he retired Antonio
and his family returned to Abatan. Antonio executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real
Property showing that the property had been transferred to him by his sister Maria
Gapacan, making him in effect the legal owner of the property in question. The
Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property was allegedly thumbmarked by Maria's
husband, Pedro Omipet, in her behalf. Thus, by virtue of the Affidavit of Transfer of
Real Property, Antonio had the property in question declared in his name for
taxation purposes in 1954. Since then, Agnes Gapacan (the wife) and their daughters
had been occupying and cultivating the 3 parcels of rice land and a parcel devoted to
camote subject matter of the present controversy.
Petitioners even went to the extent of filing a case for Forcible Entry against Maria's
granddaughter and 3 others before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. Petitioners
alleged ownership of the disputed agricultural field which they claimed was covered
by a tax declaration in the name of the late Antonio Gapacan because of the failure of
the defendants to file their respective answers to the complaint within the
reglementary period, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered a decision ordering
defendants to vacate the land in dispute and restore possession thereof to the
plaintiffs.
Respondent Maria Gapacan Omipet filed a complaint for Quieting of Title before the
Regional Trial Court praying that she be declared the lawful owner of the property
and that herein petitioners be ordered to refrain from making further
encroachments. She alleged in her complaint that the disputed land was part of her
inheritance from her deceased parents which she in fact had declared in her name
for taxation purposes although the area was only 1,188 square meters for which was
issued in her name. She further contended that she merely lent the parcels of rice
land to petitioners when Antonio returned to Abatan after his retirement.
Hence, present petition for review seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court
of Appeals which declared an unregistered parcel of land identified as Lot 1 the
common property of both petitioners Agnes Gapacan, Eugenia Gapacan-Kiaki and
Marilyn Gapacan on one hand, and private respondent Maria Gapacan Omipet on
the other.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that private respondent had not sufficiently
shown that she had the legal, i.e., registered, title over the disputed property. Thus,
the ruling declaring the subject land as the common property of the party-litigants
and ordering its partition is a complete deviation from the cause of action of the case
and the findings of fact of the trial court.

RULING:

The argument is bereft of merit. Article 476 of the Civil Code provides that an action
to quiet title may be brought when there exists a cloud on the title to real property or
any interest therein. It goes without saying therefore that the appellate court in
resolving the present controversy is well within its authority to adjudicate on the
respective rights of the parties, that is, to pass upon the ownership of the subject
property; hence to declare the same as common property of the party-litigants.

Private respondent anchors her claim of absolute dominion over the subject
property on the ground that she inherited the same from her parents, further noting
that the family of Antonio Gapacan possessed the property by reason alone of her
tolerance. In view of this claim, it was incumbent upon private respondent to prove
by satisfactory evidence that she was legally designated the sole owner of the
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 93
property in litigation. Unfortunately, there was paucity of proof that that in fact was
the case. The tax declarations private respondent presented in evidence were clearly
founded on fraudulent claims of ownership which did not merit any probative value.
Evidently, those tax declarations not only covered a mere fraction of the total area
disputed but were based on a false and capricious assertion of ownership over the
entire subject property. The tax declarations therefore were secured for the exclusive
purpose of excluding Antonio, the other legal heir. To be sure, tax declarations in
themselves do not vest absolute ownership of the property upon the declarant, nor
do declarations of ownership for taxation purposes constitute adequate evidence of
ownership or of the right to possess realty.
On the question of the right of possession, as correctly pointed out by the appellate
court, the evidence preponderates in favor of Antonio Gapacan and subsequently his
heirs upon his death. It has been clearly established that Antonio and his family had
been in possession of the subject realty since 1971. However, Antonio could not
honestly claim the rights of a possessor in good faith since his tax declarations, and
more so, his Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property, were either spurious or founded
on false and unlawful claims. The parcels of land in question, as part of the
hereditaments of Paicat, a common ancestor of Maria and Antonio, were given to
neither of them in particular. It is difficult to believe that Maria and Antonio were
blissfully ignorant of their respective legal rights over the disputed realty. As the 2
surviving heirs of the Paicat Gapacan, neither Maria nor Antonio can claim absolute
ownership over the entire property to the prejudice of the other, for each, in legal
contemplation, is entitled to only 1/2 pro-indiviso share of his or her father's estate.
Prior to partition, Maria and Antonio, and upon the latter's death, the petitioners,
hold the disputed property in their capacity as co-owners.
The Decision of the Court of Appeal which declared Lot 1 as the common property of
both petitioners Agnes Gapacan, and daughters on one hand, and private
respondent Maria Gapacan Omipet on the other, and ordered its equitable partition
between the contending parties is AFFIRM.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 94

 RUSTICO ADILLE
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, EMETERIA ASEJO,
TEODORICA ASEJO, DOMINGO ASEJO, JOSEFA ASEJO and SANTIAGO
ASEJO
G.R. No. L-44546
January 29, 1988

SARMIENTO, J:

DOCTRINE: Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership,

must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of
repudiation, in turn is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the
co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-
owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive, and (4) he has been in
possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the
property for the period required by law.

FACTS:

Felisa Alzul owns a parcel of land in Legazpi City, Albay. In her lifetime, she married
twice. First,with Bernabe Adille which was Rustico Adille's father and second, with
Prospero Asejo from whom she had other children. In 1939, she entered in a pacto
de retro sale with a period of three years for repurchase. Unfortunately, she died in
1942 and was unable to settle her affairs accordingly. Rustico, acted on his own and
acquired the land along with a OCT, which he was able to procure stating that he was
the only child of Felisa and Bernabe. He has then been in charge of the land in
question and has kept his actions from his siblings. Although there is one, namely,
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 95
Emeteria who happens to live in the same land he resides in. He was then deemed
absolute owner of the land and through his actuations seek to keep the land for
himself not taking into account his other brothers nor his sister. It is because of this
that plaintiffs have come here and contend that trial court erred in:
I. ... declaring the defendant absolute owner of the property;
II. ... not ordering the partition of the property; and
III. ... ordering one of the plaintiffs who is in possession of the portion of the
property to vacate the land, p. 1 Appellant's brief.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a co-owner may acquire exclusive ownership over the property held
in common

RULING:

No. Given that Rustico acquired the property individually, tends to it and is in
possession together with the corresponding OCT, it does not discount the fact that
the perfection of such was done through fraudulent means. His function of
reacquisition only makes him a trustee in place of his other siblings. In addition, a
torrens title does not make for a mode of extinguishment with regard to co-
ownership. The court also refuses to recognize his claim of ownership by way of
prescription given that he registered said land in 1955 and has been in his possession
until 1974.
Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been
preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn is
subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such
an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence
thereon is clear and conclusive, and (4) he has been in possession through open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period
required by law.

Rustico's claim falls short because he did not repudiate. In fact, he had been keeping
substantive information for himself leaving all other co-owners oblivious with
concern to his acts. So, the court finds it fit that although the span of time is indeed
what prescription necessitates, it is still not conclusive nor meritorious to its effect.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error committed by the respondent Court

of Appeals, the petition is DENIED. The Decision sought to be reviewed is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to costs.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 96

 LILIA SANCHEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VICTORINO S.
ALVARO as Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 120, Caloocan City, and VIRGINIA
TERIA
G.R. NO. 152766
404 SCRA 540
JUNE 20, 2003

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS:

Lilian Sanchez constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot owned by her parents-
in-law. The lot was registered with Eliseo Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez, Lilian Sanchez,
Nenita Sanchez, Susana Sanchez and Felipe Sanchez as co-owners.

On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered in the name of private respondent
Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by the six co-
owners in her favor. Petitioner, however, claimed that she did not affix her signature
on the document and subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus prompting Teria to
file an action for recovery of possession of the lot.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to her 1/6 share of the co-owned property

RULING:

Yes. The lower courts failed to pass upon the issue of co-ownership present in the
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 97
case at hand.

Co-ownership, whether established by law or by agreement of the co-owners, the

property or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed with a fiducial nature so that each
co-owner becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-owners and he may not do any
act prejudicial to the interest of his co-owners. Thus, the legal effect of an agreement
to preserve the properties in co-ownership is to create an express trust among the
heirs as co-owners of the properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-
owner is a trustee for the others.

Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner

can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or
abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.

Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property
the right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may validly
lease his undivided interest to a third party independently of the other co-owners.
But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the
thing owned in common because his right over the thing is represented by a quota or
ideal portion without any physical adjudication.

Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes and
bounds of petitioner’s lot has not been designated. As she was not a party to
the Deed of Absolute Salevoluntarily entered into by the other co-owners, her right
to 1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition needs to be effected to protect her
right to her definite share and determine the boundaries of her property. Such
partition must be done without prejudice to the rights of private respondent Virginia
Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.
 ISAAC, SEVERINO, MARIA, TELESFORA, FELISA, SERAPIO, SIMEON
and MACARIA all surnamed PANGAN
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA GARCIA
G.R. No. 95748
November 21, 1996

PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:

In 1964, the petitioners filed an application for the registration of the land in their
names by virtue of their continuous and exclusive possession thereof since 1895, by
themselves and their father and grandfather before them. After proper notices by
publication and posting as required, the trial court issued an order of general
default, there being no opposition to the application, and proceeded to hear the
evidence of the applicants ex-parte. On the basis thereof, the application was
approved on March 31, 1966.

On June 8, 1966, the herein private respondent filed a petition to set aside the said
decision, which the trial Court granted, admitting at the same time her opposition to
the application and setting the case for reception of her evidence which sought to
show that the land was inherited by Leon Hilario's three children, but the son,
Felicisimo, waived his right thereto and thereby made his two sisters, Silvestra and
Catalina, its exclusive co-owners. As Catalina's daughter, she was entitled to one-half
of the property, the other half going to Silvestra's heirs, the petitioners herein and
the latter's grandchildren.
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 98
The trial judge issued an order dismissing the opposition and reinstating his original
order of March 31, 1966. His reason was that whatever rights Teodora might have
had over the property had been forfeited by extinctive prescription because she had
left the land in 1942 and had not since then asserted any claim thereto until 1966.

On appeal to the respondent court, this decision was reversed on the ground that the
appellees had not clearly proved that they had acquired the property by prescription.
Hence, the appellant was entitled to one-half of the property as heir, conformably to
her opposition in the court a quo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Teodora Garcia, by her failure to assert her right, allowed the
statutory period to lapse, thus enabling the petitioners to perfect their claim of
ownership by acquisitive prescription

RULING:

NO. It is a settled rule that possession by one co-owner will not be regarded as
adverse to the other co-owners but in fact as beneficial to all of them. Hence, as long
as his co-ownership is recognized, an action to compel partition will not prescribe
and may be filed at any time against the actual possessor by any of the other co-
owners. However, if the co-owner actually holding the property asserts exclusive
dominion over it against the other co-owners, the corollary of the rule is that he can
acquire sole title to it after the lapse of the prescribed prescriptive period. From that
moment, the question involved will be one of ownership and no longer mere
partition.

If the co-owner actually holding the property asserts exclusive dominion over it
against the other co-owners, the corollary of the rule is that he can acquire sole title
to it after the lapse of the prescribed prescriptive period.

For title to prescribe in favor of the co-owner, however, there must be a clear
showing that he has repudiated the claims of the other co-owners and that they have
been categorically advised of the exclusive claim he is making to the property in
question. It is only when such unequivocal notice has been given that the period of
prescription will begin to run against the other co-owners and ultimately divest them
of their own title if they do not seasonably defend it.

Adverse possession requires the concurrence of the following circumstances:

1. That the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the
cestui que trust;
2. That such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que
trust; and
3. That the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive.
On the basis of the evidence presented by the parties, the Court is not convinced that
the above requirements have been satisfied.
There was no adequate notice by the petitioners to the private respondent of the
rejection of her claim to her share in the subject property.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 99

 HEIRS OF FLORES
vs.
HEIRS OF DOLORES R. CICHON
G.R. No. 161720
November 22, 2005

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:

In 1935, Emilio Restar died intestate, leaving eight children-compulsory heirs. In

1960, Restar’s eldest child, Flores, caused the cancellation of Tax Declaration No.
6696 in Restar’s name covering a parcel of land located at Aklan which was
among the properties left by Restar, and the issuance of Tax Declaration No.
11134 in his name. Flores died on June 10, 1989. On November 5, 1998, the co-
heirs of Flores discovered this. On January 21, 1999, the heirs of Flores sisters
together with Flores surviving sisters filed a Complaint against Flores heirs for
partition of the lot, declaration of nullity of documents, ownership with damages
and preliminary injunction before the RTC of Aklan.
The respondents, alleged that during the lifetime of Flores, they were given their
shares of palay from the lot and even after Flores death up to 1991. Flores’ widow
Esmenia appealed to them to allow her to hold on to the lot to finance the
education of her children, to which they the plaintiffs agreed on the condition that
after the children had finished their education, it would be divided into eight (8)
equal parts; and upon their demand for partition of the lot, the defendants Heirs
of Flores refused, they claiming that they were the lawful owners thereof as they
had inherited it from Flores.
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 100
Heirs of Flores claimed that they had been in possession of the lot in the concept
of owner for more than thirty (30) years and have been paying realty taxes since
time immemorial. And they denied having shared with the plaintiffs the produce
of the lot or that upon Flores death in 1989, Esmenia requested the plaintiffs to
allow her to hold on to it to finance her childrens education, they contending that
by 1977, the children had already finished their respective courses.
Heirs of Flores further claimed that after World War II and under the new Tax
Declaration in 1945, Flores caused the transfer of parcels of ricelands to his
siblings as their shares from the estate of their father Restar; and an extra-
judicial partition was subsequently executed by Restars heirs, which was
notarized by one Atty. Jose Igtanloc, dividing and apportioning among
themselves four (4) parcels of land. 

RTC dismissed the complaint. CA reversed the decision of the RTC, it finding that
the defendants Heirs of Flores failed to prove that their possession of the lot
excluded their co-owners or that they derived title to it from a separate
conveyance to them by Restar.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners acquired ownership over the lot by extraordinary

prescription.
RULING:

While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a
co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription where there exists a
clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the
claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.
 
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in
good faith and with just title for a period of ten years. Without good faith and just
title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which
requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years.

Indeed, the following acts of Flores show possession adverse to his co-heirs: the
cancellation of the tax declaration certificate in the name of Restar and securing
another in his name; the execution of a Joint Affidavit stating that he is the owner
and possessor thereof to the exclusion of respondents; payment of real estate tax
and irrigation fees without respondents having ever contributed any share
therein; and continued enjoyment of the property and its produce to the
exclusion of respondents. And Flores adverse possession was continued by his
heirs.

The petition is GRANTED.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 101

EPITACIO DELIMA, PACLANO DELIMA, FIDEL DELIMA, VIRGILIO
DELIMA, GALILEO DELIMA, JR., BIBIANO BACUS, OLIMPIO BACUS
and PURIFICACION BACUS, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GALILEO DELIMA (deceased),
substituted by his legal heirs, namely: FLAVIANA VDA. DE DELIMA,
LILY D. ARIAS, HELEN NIADAS, ANTONIO DELIMA, DIONISIO
DELIMA, IRENEA DELIMA, ESTER DELIMA AND FELY
DELIMA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46296
September 24, 1991

MEDIALDEA, J.:

FACTS:

Lino Delima bought a lot from the friar lands. Lino later died in 1921 leaving as
his only heirs three brothers and a sister namely: Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima,
Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima. TCT No. 2744 of the property in question
was issued on August 3, 1953 in the name of the Legal Heirs of Lino, deceased,
represented by Galileo. Galileo was able to execute an affidavit of "Extra-judicial
Declaration of Heirs" adjudicating to himself the parcel of land and was able to
have TCT No. 2744 cancelled and secured the issuance of TCT No. 3009 in his
name alone to the exclusion of the other heirs.

Petitioners, who are the surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita Delima, filed with
the Court of First Instance of Cebu (now Regional Trial Court) an action for
reconveyance and/or partition of property and for the annulment of TCT No.
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 102
3009 with damages against their uncles Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima,.
Vicente Delima was joined as party defendant by the petitioners for his refusal to
join the latter in their action.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. Not satisfied with the
decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA reversed the trial
court's decision and upheld the claim of Galileo Delima that all the other brothers
and sister of Lino Delima, namely Eulalio, Juanita and Vicente, had already
relinquished and waived their rights to the property in his favor, considering that
he Galileo alone paid the remaining balance of the purchase price of the lot and
the realty taxes thereon.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners' action for partition is already barred by the statutory
period provided by law

RULING:

Yes. From the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and
exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the
question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership. In such case, the
imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked or applied
when one of the co-owners has adversely possessed the property as exclusive
owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by prescription.
It is settled that possession by a co-owner or co-heir is that of a trustee. In order
that such possession is considered adverse to the cestui que trust amounting to a
repudiation of the co-ownership, the following elements must concur: 1) that the
trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que
trust; 2) that such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui
que trust; and 3) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive
(Valdez v. Olorga, No. L-22571, May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 71; Pangan v. Court of
Appeals, No. L-39299, October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA 375).

Evidence shows that TCT No. 2744 in the name of the legal heirs of Lino Delima,
represented by Galileo Delima, was cancelled by virtue of an affidavit executed by
Galileo Delima and that on February 4, 1954, Galileo Delima obtained the
issuance of a new title in Ms name numbered TCT No. 3009 to the exclusion of
his co-heirs. The issuance of this new title constituted an open and clear
repudiation of the trust or co-ownership, and the lapse of ten (10) years of
adverse possession by Galileo Delima from February 4, 1954 was sufficient to vest
title in him by prescription. As the certificate of title was notice to the whole
world of his exclusive title to the land, such rejection was binding on the other
heirs and started as against them the period of prescription. Hence, when
petitioners filed their action for reconveyance and/or to compel partition on
February 29, 1968, such action was already barred by prescription. Whatever
claims the other co-heirs could have validly asserted before can no longer be
invoked by them at this time.

The petition is DENIED.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 103

 MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners, 
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN
MARIATEGUI and PAULINA MARIATEGUI, respondents.
G.R. No. L-57062
January 24, 1992

BIDIN, J.:

FACTS:

Lupo Mariategui was able to marry three times and had children in all three
marriages. Lupo died without a will on June 26, 1953.

Lupo left certain properties which he acquired when he was still unmarried.
Later, Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves a certain lot of
the Muntinglupa Estate. On April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828 was issued in the name
of the above-mentioned heirs.

Lupo’s children by his third marriage filed a complaint with the lower court,
alleging that they have been prejudiced in their rights. In answer, the other party
said that the complaint was not really for annulment of the deed of extrajudicial
partition but for recognition of natural children.

The lower court ruled in favor of Lupo’s heirs from the first and second marriage.
CA ruled that all the heirs of Lupo were entitled to equal shares in the estate.
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 104
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action for partition has prescribed

RULING:

No. There can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are
legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time
limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is
inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription does not run against private
respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the
heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly
repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for
partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the
co-owner

Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate
as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership.

Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their

co-heirs prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time
private respondents discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs.
Court of Appeals, supra). Hence, prescription definitely may not be invoked by
petitioners because private respondents commenced the instant action barely two
months after learning that petitioners had registered in their names the lots
involved. The petition is DENIED.
 BETTY B. LACBAYAN, Petitioner,
vs.
BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR., Respondent.
G.R. No. 165427
March 21, 2011

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Betty B. Lacbayan and Bayani S. Samoy met each other through a common friend
sometime in 1978. Despite respondent being already married, their relationship
developed until petitioner gave birth to respondents son on October 12, 1979.
During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three
more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company. Five
parcels of land were also acquired during the said period and were registered in
petitioner and respondents names, ostensibly as husband and wife. 
Later, their relationship turned sour and they decided to part ways sometime in
1991. In 1998, both parties agreed to divide the said properties and terminate their
business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement. Initially, respondent
agreed to petitioner’s proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique
Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three other
properties will go to respondent. However, when Betty wanted additional
demands to be included in the partition agreement, Bayani refused. Feeling
aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition of the said properties.

PROPERTY
Betty LAW CASE
contended that DIGESTS
she claimed that they started to live together as husband 105
and wife in 1979 without the benefit of marriage and worked together as business
partners, acquiring real properties amounting to P15,500,000.00.

Bayani contended that he purchased the properties using his own personal funds.

RTC and CA ruled in favor or respondent. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of
ownership
RULING:

No. In Municipality of Bian v. Garcia, the SC explained that the determination as

to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for
partition. Thus:

The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up

with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact
exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally
proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the
parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a
declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either
because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally
prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that
a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the
 premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the
defendant from the real estate in question is in order. x x x

While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the
same is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership
between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the
five real estate properties based on the TCTs covering the subject
properties. Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until
and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it
would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More
importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in
this case, does not even have any rightful interest over the subject
properties.

The petition is DENIED.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 106

 LEONOR B. CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
TEOFILA M. CATAPANG, Respondent.
G.R. No. 164110
February 12, 2008

QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the co-owners of a parcel of
land covering an area of 1,435 square meters located at Barangay Mahabang
Ludlod, Taal, Batangas. With the consent of Norma Maligaya, one of the
aforementioned co-owners, respondent Teofila M. Catapang built a house on a lot
adjacent to the abovementioned parcel of land sometime in 1992. The house
intruded, however, on a portion of the co-owned property.
Leonor visited the property and was surprised to see a part of respondents house
intruding unto a portion of the co-owned property. She then made several
demands upon respondent to demolish the intruding structure and to vacate the
portion encroaching on their property. Catapang, however, refused and
disregarded her demands.
Leonor filed a complaint for forcible entry against Catapang before the MCTC of
Taal, Batangas. The MCTC decided in favor of petitioner, ruling that consent of
only one of the co-owners is not sufficient to justify Catapang’s construction of
the house and possession of the portion of the lot in question.
PROPERTY
Motion LAW CASE DIGESTS
for reconsideration was denied by the RTC, respondent filed a petition for 107
review with the CA, which reversed the RTCs decision. The CA held that there is no
cause of action for forcible entry in this case because respondents entry into the
property, considering the consent given by co-owner Norma Maligaya, cannot be
characterized as one made through strategy or stealth which gives rise to a cause of
action for forcible entry.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the consent of one co-owner will warrant the dismissal of a
forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against the person who was given
the consent to construct a house on the co-owned property
RULING:

No. Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the
others, make alterations in the thing owned in common. It necessarily follows that
none of the co-owners can, without the consent of the other co-owners, validly
consent to the making of an alteration by another person, such as respondent, in the
thing owned in common. Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership
and any encumbrance or disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of
alteration. The construction of a house on the co-owned property is an act of
dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil
Code. There being no consent from all co-owners, respondent had no right to
construct her house on the co-owned property.

Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the complaint for
forcible entry filed against the builder. The consent given by Norma Maligaya in the
absence of the consent of petitioner and Luz Cruz did not vest upon respondent any
right to enter into the co-owned property. Her entry into the property still falls under
the classification through strategy or stealth.

The petition is GRANTED.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 108

 SPOUSES SOFRONIO SANTOS and NATIVIDAD SANTOS, FROILAN
SANTOS, CECILIA M. MACASPAC, and R TRANSPORT
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF DOMINGA LUSTRE, namely TARCISIO MANIQUIZ,
TERESITA BURGOS, FLORITA M. REYES and LERMIE MANIQUIZ,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 151016
August 6, 2008

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:

Dominga Lustre, before she died, owned a residential lot which she mortgaged to
spouses Sofronio and Natividad Santos. Later, Lustre sold the property to
Natividad who subsequently executed a Deed of Sale transferring the property to
their son, petitioner Froilan M. Santos.

Cecilia Macaspac and Tarcisio Maniquiz, both heirs of Dominga Lustre, filed with
the RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, a Complaint for Declaration of the Inexistence of
Contract, Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages against Froilan M.
Santos.

While the case was still pending, Dominga Lustres other heirs, namely, Eusebio
Maniquiz, Teresita Burgos, Tarcisio Maniquiz, Florita M. Reyes and Lermie
Maniquiz filed a Complaint for Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title and
Deed of Absolute Sale against spouses Sofronio and Natividad Santos, Froilan
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 109
Santos, Cecilia M. Macaspac, R Transport Corporation, and the Register of Deeds
of Cabanatuan City, with the same RTC. Cecilia Macaspac, plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 1330, was impleaded as defendant because she refused to join the other heirs
as plaintiffs.

Alleging that the plaintiffs’ right of action for annulment of the Deed of Sale and
TCT had long prescribed and was barred by laches, petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss, also on the ground of litis pendentia.
The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. They then filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA which dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the additional parties in the second case are indispensable or
necessary parties

RULING:

If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, as in Civil Case No. 1330, the
action will not prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who are
indispensable parties. The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only
as to the absent parties but even as to those present. The trial court does not
acquire jurisdiction over the indispensable parties who are not impleaded in the
case, and judgment thereon cannot be valid and binding against them. A decision
that is null and void for want of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court is not a
decision in contemplation of law; hence, it can never become final and executory.
 
Worth mentioning is the doctrine that any adverse ruling in the earlier case will
not, in any way, prejudice the heirs who did not join, even if such case was
actually filed in behalf of all the co-owners. In fact, if an action for recovery of
property is dismissed, a subsequent action by a co-heir who did not join the
earlier case should not be barred by prior judgment. Any judgment of the court in
favor of the co-owner will benefit the others, but if the judgment is adverse, the
same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners. 
 
Applying these principles to the instant case, we rule that there is no identity of
parties and thus, the second action is not barred by litis pendentia.

The petition is DENIED.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 110

 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
GENEROSO DE JESUS, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact,
CHRISTIAN DE JESUS, respondent.
G.R. No. 149295
September 23, 2003

VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent De Jesus filed a complaint against PNB before the Regional Trial
Court of Occidental Mindoro for recovery of ownership and possession, with
damages, over the questioned property. In his complaint, respondent stated that
he had acquired a parcel of land situated in Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro and
that on 26 March 1993, he had caused a verification survey of the property and
discovered that the northern portion of the lot was being encroached upon by a
building of petitioner to the extent of 124 square meters. Despite two letters of
demand sent by respondent, petitioner failed and refused to vacate the area.

Petitioner, in its answer, asserted that when it acquired the lot and the building
sometime in 1981 from then Mayor Bienvenido Ignacio, the encroachment
already was in existence and to remedy the situation, Mayor Ignacio offered to
sell the area in question (which then also belonged to Ignacio) to petitioner at
P100.00 per square meter which offer the latter claimed to have accepted. The
sale, however, did not materialize when, without the knowledge and consent of
petitioner, Mayor Ignacio later mortgaged the lot to the Development Bank of the
Philippines.
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 111
The trial court decided the case in favor of respondent declaring him to be the
rightful owner. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is a builder in good faith
RULING:
No. Good faith, here understood, is an intangible and abstract quality with no
technical meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other
things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to
defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An individual’s personal good
faith is a concept of his own mind and, therefore, may not conclusively be
determined by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention, and
freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon
inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of ones
right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach
another. Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware
that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
Given the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court, it should be
evident enough that petitioner would fall much too short from its claim of good
faith. Evidently, petitioner was quite aware, and indeed advised, prior to its
acquisition of the land and building from Ignacio that a part of the building sold
to it stood on the land not covered by the land conveyed to it. The petition is
DENIED.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 112

 SAMUEL PARILLA, CHINITA PARILLA and DEODATO PARILLA,
Petitioners,
vs.
DR. PROSPERO PILAR,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 167680
November 30, 2006

CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner-spouses Samuel and Chinita Parilla and their co-petitioner-son
Deodato Parilla, as dealers of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, have been in
possession of a parcel of land located at the poblacion of Bantay, Ilocos Sur which
was leased to it by respondent Dr. Prospero Pilar under a 10-year Lease
Agreement entered into in 1990.
 
When the lease contract between Pilipinas Shell and respondent expired in 2000,
petitioners remained in possession of the property on which they built
improvements consisting of a billiard hall and a restaurant, maintained a sari-
sari store managed by Leonardo Dagdag, Josefina Dagdag and Edwin Pugal, and
allowed Flor Pelayo, Freddie Bringas and Edwin Pugal to use a portion thereof as
parking lot.
 
Despite demands to vacate, petitioners and the other occupants remained in the
property.

Hence, respondent
PROPERTY LAW CASEwho has been residing in the United States, through his
DIGESTS 113
attorney-in-fact Marivic Paz Padre, filed a complaint for ejectment before the
Bantay MTC with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with
damages against petitioners and the other occupants of the property.
The MTC ordered herein petitioners and their co-defendants and all persons
claiming rights under them to vacate the property. Also, MTC ordered the
plaintiff-herein respondent to reimburse defendants representing the value of
the improvements introduced on the property.
Respondent appealed to the RTC of Vigan City that portion of the trial court’s
decision ordering him to reimburse petitioners the amount of Two Million Pesos.
The RTC affirmed the MTC Decision, however.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are builders in good faith under Article 448
RULING:
No. Jurisprudence is replete with cases which categorically declare that Article
448 covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or planters believe
themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, have a claim of title thereto, but
not when the interest is merely
that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or usufructuary. A tenant cannot be
said to be a builder in good faith as he has no pretension to be owner.
The right of the lessor upon the termination of a lease contract with respect to
useful improvements introduced on the leased property by a lessee is covered by
Article 1678 which reads:
Art. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements
which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended,
without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the
lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-
half of the value of the improvements at that time. Should the lessor
refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the
improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer damage
thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more impairment upon
the property leased than is necessary.
 
The petition is DENIED.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 114

 JAIME ABALOS and SPOUSES FELIX SALAZAR and CONSUELO
SALAZAR, GLICERIO ABALOS, HEIRS OF AQUILINO ABALOS,
Petitioners
vs.
HEIRS OF VICENTE TORIO, Respondents
G.R. No. 175444
December 14, 2011

PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:

On July 24, 1996, herein respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of

Possession and Damages with the MTC of Binmaley, Pangasinan against Jaime
Abalos and the spouses Felix and Consuelo Salazar. Respondents contended that:
they are the children and heirs of one Vicente Torio who died intestate on
September 11, 1973; at the time of the death of Vicente, he left behind a parcel of
land measuring 2,950 square meters, more or less, which is located at San Isidro
Norte, Binmaley, Pangasinan; during the lifetime of Vicente and through his
tolerance, Jaime and the Spouses Salazar were allowed to stay and build their
respective houses on the subject parcel of land; even after the death of Vicente,
herein respondents allowed Jaime and the Spouses Salazar to remain on the
disputed lot; however, in 1985, respondents asked Jaime and the Spouses Salazar
to vacate the subject lot, but they refused to heed the demand of respondents
forcing respondents to file the complaint.

Jaime and the Spouses Salazar filed their Answer with Counterclaim, denying the
material allegations in the Complaint and asserting in their Special and
Affirmative Defenses that: respondents' cause of action is barred by acquisitive
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 115
prescription; the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action and
the persons of the defendants; the absolute and exclusive owners and possessors
of the disputed lot are the deceased predecessors of defendants; defendants and
their predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, continuous and peaceful
possession of the subject lot as owners since time immemorial; defendants are
faithfully and religiously paying real property taxes on the disputed lot as
evidenced by Real Property Tax Receipts; they have continuously introduced
improvements on the said land, such as houses, trees and other kinds of
ornamental plants which are in existence up to the time of the filing of their
Answer.

MTC decided in favor of the herein respondents. Jaime and the Spouses Salazar
appealed the Decision of the MTC with the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan. Herein
petitioners, who were intervenors, did not file an appeal.

RTC ruled in favor of Jaime and the Spouses Salazar, holding that they have
acquired the subject property through prescription. Accordingly, the RTC
dismissed herein respondents' complaint.

Aggrieved, herein respondents filed a petition for review with the CA assailing the
Decision of the RTC. CA granted. Jaime and the Spouses Salazar filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated
November 13, 2006.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners acquired ownership over the disputed lot through
ordinary acquisitive prescription

RULING:

No. Possession in good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person
from whom the thing is received has been the owner thereof, and could transmit
his ownership. There is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession
of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right.

In the instant case, it is clear that during their possession of the property in
question, petitioners acknowledged ownership thereof by the immediate
predecessor-in-interest of respondents. This is clearly shown by the Tax
Declaration in the name of Jaime for the year 1984 wherein it contains a
statement admitting that Jaime's house was built on the land of Vicente,
respondents' immediate predecessor-in-interest. Petitioners never disputed such
an acknowledgment. Thus, having knowledge that they nor their predecessors-in-
interest are not the owners of the disputed lot, petitioners' possession could not
be deemed as possession in good faith as to enable them to acquire the subject
land by ordinary prescription. In this respect, the Court agrees with the CA that
petitioners' possession of the lot in question was by mere tolerance of
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest. Acts of possessory character
executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 116
purposes of acquisitive prescription. Possession, to constitute the foundation of a
prescriptive right, must be en concepto de dueo, or, to use the common law
equivalent of the term, that possession should be adverse, if not, such possessory
acts, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of prescription.

The petition is DENIED.

 PRECY BUNYI and MILA BUNYI, Petitioners,
vs.
FE S. FACTOR, Respondent.
G.R. No. 172547
June 30, 2009

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent Fe S. Factor is one of the co-owners of an 18-hectare piece of land

located in Almanza, Las Pias City. After selling seven (7) hectares of the family
property, the siblings, except Enrique Factor, respondent’s father, shared and
divided the proceeds of the sale among themselves, with the agreement that
Enrique would have as his share the portion of the property.

Enrique caused the construction of several houses in the compound including the
subject property, a rest house. Petitioners Precy Bunyi and her mother, Mila
Bunyi, were tenants in one of the houses inside the compound. When Enrique
Factor died, the administration of the Factor compound was transferred and
entrusted to Enrique’s eldest child, Gloria Factor-Labao. Gloria Factor-Labao,
together with her husband Ruben Labao and their son Reggie F. Labao, lived in
Metro Manila but visited and sometimes stayed in the rest house because Gloria
collected the rentals of the residential houses and oversaw the Factor compound.

When Gloria died, the administration and management of the Factor compound
including the subject rest house, passed on to respondent Fe S. Factor as co-
owner of the
PROPERTY property. As
LAW an act of goodwill and compassion, considering that
CASE DIGESTS 117
Ruben Labao was sickly and had no means of income, respondent allowed him to
stay at the rest house for brief, transient and intermittent visits as a guest of the
Factor family. Ruben Labao married petitioner Precy Bunyi. Later, Ruben Labao
died.

Respondent discovered that petitioners forcibly opened the doors of the rest
house and stole all the personal properties owned by the Factor family and then
audaciously occupied the premises. Respondent alleged that petitioners
unlawfully deprived her and the Factor family of the subject property’s lawful use
and possession. Respondent also added that when she tried to enter the rest
house on December 1, 2002, an unidentified person who claimed to have been
authorized by petitioners to occupy the premises, barred, threatened and chased
her with a jungle bolo. Thus, respondent Fe S. Factor filed a complaint for
forcible entry against herein petitioners Precy Bunyi and Mila Bunyi.

MeTC of Las Pias City ruled in favor of Fe S. Factor. Petitioners appealed the
decision to the, which, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the MeTC and
later denied their motion for reconsideration. CA denied the petition for review.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the complaint for forcible entry was proper

RULING:

YES. For one to be considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical
occupation of every square inch of the property at all times. Possession can be
acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is
subject to the action of ones will or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right. Possession can be acquired by juridical
acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of
possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, execution and
registration of public instruments, and the inscription of possessory information
titles.

The SC finds that respondent Fe S. Factor successfully proved the extent and
character of her possession over the disputed property. As a consequence of her
ownership thereof, respondent is entitled to its possession, considering
petitioners failure to prove prior possession. The Court stresses, however, that its
determination of ownership in the instant case is not final. It is only a provisional
determination for the sole purpose of resolving the issue of possession. It would
not bar or prejudice a separate action between the same parties involving the
quieting of title to the subject property.

The petition is DENIED.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 118

 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, 
vs.
SALVADOR PEÑAFLORIDA, JR., Y CLIDORO, appellant.
G.R. No. 175604
April 10, 2008

TINGA, J.:

FACTS:

SPO3 Vicente Competente narrated that in his capacity as chief of the

Investigation and Operation Division of the PNP station in Tigaon, Camarines
Sur, that he received a tip from an asset that a bundle of marijuana was being
transported by appellant to Huyon-huyon from another barangay in Tigaon,
Camarines Sur. Major Domingo Agravante, chief of police in Tigaon, then
organized a team composed of Competente as team leader, SPO2 Callo, SPO1
Portugal, PO3 Pillos and PO2 Edgar Latam. The team boarded the police mobile
car and proceeded to Sitio Nasulan in Barangay Huyon-huyon. They overtook
appellant who was on a bicycle. The police officers flagged appellant down and
found marijuana wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper together with other
grocery items. The amount of P1550.00 was also found in appellant’s possession.
The police officers confiscated these items and took photographs thereof.
Appellant was then brought to the headquarters where he was booked.

Appellant denied the accusations against him. That on his way home, they met
Boyet Obias who requested appellant to bring a package wrapped in a newspaper
to Jimmy Gonzales, he placed it in the basket in front of his bicycle and Gonzales
proceeded to the Tiagon town proper. On his way home, he was flagged down by
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 119
the police and was invited to go with them to the headquarters.

RTC ruled that there was violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, hence, the
instant case.

In assailing his conviction, appellant submits that there is doubt that he had
freely and consciously possessed marijuana. One of the issues raised is that, upon
receipt of the information from the asset, the police officers should have first
investigated and tried to obtain a warrant of arrest against appellant, instead of
arbitrarily arresting him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the presumption of animus possidendi shall be sustained

RULING:

YES. In criminal cases involving prohibited drugs, there can be no conviction

unless the prosecution shows that the accused knowingly possessed the
prohibited articles in his person, or that animus possidendi is shown to be
present together with his possession or control of such article. Animus
possidendi is only prima facie. It is subject to contrary proof and may be rebutted
by evidence that the accused did not in fact exercise power and control over the
thing in question, and did not intend to do so. The burden of evidence is thus
shifted to the possessor to explain absence of animus possidendi.
Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact. Since courts cannot
penetrate the mind of an accused and thereafter state its perceptions with
certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary. Animus possidendi, as a state of
mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the
prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding
circumstances. Its existence may and usually must be inferred from the attendant
events in each particular case.

Appellant failed to satisfactorily establish his lack of knowledge of possession in

the instant case. First, the marijuana was found in the bicycle he himself was
driving. Second, the police officers first readily saw in plain view the edges of the
marijuana leaves jutting out of the package. Third, it is incredulous that appellant
did not ask Obias what the package contained when the latter requested him to
do the delivery errand since the package was wrapped in a newspaper and
weighed almost one kilogram.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 120

 MARK SOLEDAD y CRISTOBAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 184274
February 23, 2011

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:

Sometime in 2004, private complainant Henry C. Yu received a call on his mobile

phone from a certain Tess or Juliet Villar (later identified as Rochelle Bagaporo),
a credit card agent, who offered a Citifinancing loan assistance at a low interest
rate. Yu invited Rochelle Bagaporo to go to his office in Quezon City then
indorsed Yu to her boss, a certain Arthur who was later identified as petitioner,
Mark Soledad. Soledad told Yu to submit documents. Yu submitted various
documents, such as his Globe handyphone original platinum gold card,
identification cards and statements of accounts. Subsequently, Yu followed up his
loan status but he failed to get in touch with either Soledad or Gobenchiong.
 
During the first week of August 2004, Yu received his Globe handyphone
statement of account wherein he was charged for two (2) mobile phone numbers
which were not his. Upon verification with the phone company, private
complainant learned that he had additional five (5) mobile numbers in his name,
and the application for said cellular phone lines bore the picture of Soledad and
his forged signature. Yu also checked with credit card companies and learned that
his Citibank Credit Card database information was altered and he had a credit
card application with Metrobank Card Corporation.
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 121
 
Thereafter, private complainant and Metrobanks junior assistant manager
Jefferson Devilleres lodged a complaint with the NBI which conducted an
entrapment operation.
 
During the entrapment operation, NBIs Special Investigator (SI) Salvador
Arteche together with some other NBI operatives, arrived in Las Pinas around
5:00 P.M. Arteche posed as the delivery boy of the Metrobank credit card. Upon
reaching the address written on the delivery receipt, Arteche asked for Henry Yu.
Soledad responded that he was Henry Yu and presented to Arteche two (2)
identification cards which bore the name and signature of private complainant,
while the picture showed the face of Soledad. Soledad signed the delivery receipt.
Thereupon, Arteche introduced himself as an NBI operative and apprehended
Soledad. Arteche recovered from [petitioner] the two (2) identification cards he
presented to Arteche earlier.

Soledad was charged with Violation of Section 9(e), R.A. No. 8484 for possessing
a counterfeit access device or access device fraudulently applied for. RTC found
Soledad guilty as charged. CA affirmed his conviction.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was legally in possession of the credit card subject of
the case
RULING:

YES. The term as defined in Article 523 of the Civil Code, that is, possession is the
holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. The acquisition of possession
involves two elements: the corpus or the material holding of the thing, and
the animus possidendi or the intent to possess it. Animus possidendi is a state of
mind, the presence or determination of which is largely dependent on attendant
events in each case. It may be inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of
the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances.
 
In this case, prior to the commission of the crime, petitioner fraudulently
obtained from private complainant various documents showing the latters
identity. He, thereafter, obtained cellular phones using private complainants
identity. Undaunted, he fraudulently applied for a credit card under the name
and personal circumstances of private complainant. Upon the delivery of the
credit card applied for, the messenger (an NBI agent) required two valid
identification cards. Petitioner thus showed two identification cards with his
picture on them, but bearing the name and forged signature of private
complainant. As evidence of the receipt of the envelope delivered, petitioner
signed the acknowledgment receipt shown by the messenger, indicating therein
that the content of the envelope was the Metrobank credit card.
 
Petitioner materially held the envelope containing the credit card with the intent
to possess. Contrary to petitioners contention that the credit card never came into
his possession because it was only delivered to him, the above narration shows
that he, in fact, did an active part in acquiring possession by presenting the
identification cards purportedly showing his identity as Henry Yu. Certainly, he
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 122
had the intention to possess the same. Had he not actively participated, the
envelope would not have been given to him. Moreover, his signature on the
acknowledgment receipt indicates that there was delivery and that possession
was transferred to him as the recipient. Undoubtedly, petitioner knew that the
envelope contained the Metrobank credit card, as clearly indicated in the
acknowledgment receipt, coupled with the fact that he applied for it using the
identity of private complainant.

The petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

 CRISTETA CHUA-BURCE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 109595
April 27, 2000

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:

Ramon Rocamora, manager of Metrobank, requested Fructuoso Penaflor,

Assistant Cashier, to conduct a physical bundle count of cash inside the vault,
which should total to P4 million. They found out that there was a shortage of
P150,000. After 4 investigations conducted by the bank and NBI, all of these
concluded that there was a shortage of P150,000.00, and the person primarily
responsible was the banks Cash Custodian, Cristeta Chua-Burce, the herein
accused. Accused was terminated from service.

To recover the missing amount, Metrobank filed a civil case against petitioner
and her husband, Antonio Burce. A crime for estafa was also filed against the
petitioner. The accused prayed for suspension of criminal case due to a
prejudicial question. It was first granted but denied by the CA. The criminal and
civil cases continued.

The criminal case ruled that she was guilty of estafa. The civil case also found her
liable for the shortage of P150,000. She appealed both rulings to the CA but the
court affirmed the two trial court rulings.
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 123
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the element of juridical possession is present for petitioner to be

convicted for estafa

RULING:

The first element is absent. When the money, goods, or any other personal
property is received by the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2)
on commission or (3) for administration, the offender acquires both material or
physical possession and juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical
possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing
which the transferee may set up even against the owner. In this case, petitioner
was a cash custodian who was primarily responsible for the cash-in-vault. Her
possession of the cash belonging to the bank is akin to that of a bank teller, both
being mere bank employees.

Petitioner herein being a mere cash custodian had no juridical possession over
the missing funds. Hence, the element of juridical possession being absent,
petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of estafa under Article 315, No. 1 (b)
of the Revised Penal Code.

The petition is granted and petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa under
Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
The challenged decision is AFFIRMED and the petition is DENIED, with costs
against the petitioner.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 124

 EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP., petitioner, 
vs.
THE SPOUSES LEONOR and GERARDO SANTOS, doing business
under the name and style of "SANTOS BOOKSTORE," and THE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 80298
April 26, 1990

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:

A person identifying himself as Professor Jose Cruz placed an order by telephone

with the petitioner company for 406 books, payable on delivery. The books were
subsequently delivered to him with the corresponding invoice, and he paid with a
personal check.

Cruz then sold the 120 of the books to Leonor Santos who after verifying the
seller's ownership from the invoice he showed her, paid him.

EDCA became suspicious when Cruz ordered another set of books even before his
check cleared. Upon investigation, EDCA found that he wasn’t the dean in De La
Salle College as he claimed to be. EDCA had the police capture Cruz, as well as
seize the books from Santos. Santos demanded the return of the books.

Ownership of the books was recognized in the private respondents by the

Municipal Trial Court, which was sustained by the Regional Trial Court, which
was in turn sustained
PROPERTY LAW CASE by the Court of Appeals. 
DIGESTS 125
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not EDCA was unlawfully deprived of the property?

RULING:

Santos was a good faith buyer after taking steps to verify the identity of the seller.
When she was showed the invoice, she reasonably believed that he was a
legitimate seller.

With regard to unlawful deprivation, EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the
property by mere failure of consideration. There was already a perfected contract
of sale. Proof was even substantiated when EDCA gave the invoice as proof of
payment upon delivery of the books. This did not amount to unlawful taking,
because by the delivery of EDCA to Cruz, ownership of the books already
transferred to him.

Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the
books which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact
that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA
and did not impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the books.

The challenged decision is AFFIRMED and the petition is DENIED, with costs
against the petitioner.
 BPI FAMILY BANK, Petitioner, 
vs.
AMADO FRANCO and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 123498
November 23, 2007

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:
Franco opened 3 accounts with BPI Family Bank with the total amount of
P2,000,000.00. The said amount used to open these accounts is traceable to a
check issued by Tevesteco. The funding for the P2,000,000.00 check was part of
the P80,000,000.00 debited by BPI from FMIC’s account (with a deposit of
P100,000,000.00) and credited to Tevesteco’s account pursuant to an Authority
to Debit which was allegedly forged as claimed by FMIC.
Tevesteco effected several withdrawals already from its account amounting to
P37,455,410.54 including the P2,000,000.00 paid to Franco.
Franco issued two checks which were dishonoured upon presentment for
payment due to garnishment of his account filed by BPI.
BPI claimed that it had a better right to the amounts which consisted of part of
the money allegedly fraudulently withdrawn from it by Tevesteco and ending up
in Franco’s account. BPI urges us that the legal consequence of FMIC’s forgery
claim is that the money transferred by BPI to Tevesteco is its own, and
considering that it was able to recover possession of the same when the money
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 126
was redeposited by Franco, it had the right to set up its ownership thereon and
freeze Franco’s accounts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner acted out of the impetus of self-protection and not
out of malevolence or ill will
RULING:

YES. The SC finds, as the trial court did, that BPI-FB acted out of the impetus of
self-protection and not out of malevolence or ill will. BPI-FB was not in the
corrupt state of mind contemplated in Article 2201 and should not be held liable
for all damages now being imputed to it for its breach of obligation. For the same
reason, it is not liable for the unearned interest on the time deposit.

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it
partakes of the nature of fraud. The SC have held that it is a breach of a known
duty through some motive of interest or ill will.

In the instant case, we cannot attribute to BPI-FB fraud or even a motive of self-
enrichment. As the trial court found, there was no denial whatsoever by BPI-FB
of the existence of the accounts. The computer-generated document which
indicated that the current account was "not on file" resulted from the prior debit
by BPI-FB of the deposits. The remedy of freezing the account, or the
garnishment, or even the outright refusal to honor any transaction thereon was
resorted to solely for the purpose of holding on to the funds as a security for its
intended court action, and with no other goal but to ensure the integrity of the
accounts.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 127

 ELISEO FAJARDO, JR., and MARISSA FAJARDO
vs.
FREEDOM TO BUILD, INC.
G.R. No. 134692
August 1, 2000

VITUG, J.:

FACTS:

Freedom to Build Inc., an owner-developer and seller of low-cost housing sold to

petitioner-spouses a house and lot in the De La Costa Homes, in Barangka,
Marikina, Metro Manila. The Contract to sell executed between the parties,
contained a Restrictive Covenant providing certain prohibitions, to wit:

“Easements. For the good of the entire community, the homeowner must
observe a two-meter easement in front. No structure of any kind (store,
garage, bodega, etc.) may be built on the front easement.

“Upward expansion. A second storey is not prohibited. But the second

storey expansion must be placed above the back portion of the house and
should not extend forward beyond the apex of the original building.

“Front expansion: 2nd Storey: No unit may be extended in the front

beyond the line as designed and implemented by the developer in the 60
sq. m. unit. In other words, the 2nd floor expansion, in front, is 6 meters
back from the front property line and 4 meters back from the front wall of
the house, just as provided in the 60 sq. m. units.”
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 128
The above restrictions were also contained in Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-
115384 covering the lot issued in the name of petitioner-spouses.

The controversy arose when the petitioners despite repeated demand from the
respondent, extended the roof of their house to the property line and expanded
the second floor of their house to a point directly above the original front wall.
Respondent filed before the RTC an action to demolish the unauthorized
structures.

The RTC rendered a judgment against the petitioner ordering them to

immediately demolish and remove the extension of their expanded housing unit
that exceeds the limitations imposed by the Restrictive Covenant, otherwise the
Branch Sheriff of this Court will execute the this decision at the expense of the
defendants.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition for
review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the for the lack of a specific provision, prescribing the penalty of
the demolition in the “Restrictive Covenant” in the event of the breach thereof,
the prayer of the respondent to demolish the structure should fail.

RULING:
The Court held that the argument of the petitioner-spouses has no merit; Article
1168 of the New Civil Code states that: “When the obligation consists in not doing
and the obligor does what has been forbidden him, it shall be undone at his
expense.”

This Court is not unaware of its ruling in Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton
Development Corporation, which has merely adjudged the payment of damages
in lieu of demolition. In the aforementioned case, however, the elaborate
mathematical formula for the determination of compensatory damages which
takes into account the current construction cost index during the immediately
preceding 5 years based on the weighted average of wholesale price and wage
indices of the National Census and Statistics Office and the Bureau of Labor
Statistics is explicitly provided for in the Deed of Restrictions entered into by the
parties. This unique and peculiar circumstance, among other strong justifications
therein mentioned, is not extant in the case at bar.

In sum, the Court holds that since the extension constructed exceeds the floor
area limits of the Restrictive Covenant, petitioner spouses can be required to
demolish the structure to the extent that it exceeds the prescribed floor area
limits.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision, dated 13 July 1998, of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 50085, sustaining that of the court a quo, is AFFIRMED. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 129

 ABELLANA, et al.
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 97039
April 24, 1992

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners are owners of a parcel of land on the NW side of Nonoc Subdivision,

Cebu. They sued to establish an easement of a right of way over a subdivision
road, which they claim they’ve acquired through prescription since their
ancestors have been using these since time immemorial.

They pray that the concrete wall surrounding the village be taken down to allow
easy access to the public highway.

RTC found for the petitioners. CA reversed, averring that road lots in
subdivisions are private property and may only be used as a public highway once
acquired by the government through donation, purchase or expropriation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the easement of a right of way may be acquired by prescription

RULING:
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 130
No. Art. 620 of the Civil Code provides that only continuous and apparent
easements may be acquired by prescription. The easement of a right of way
cannot be considered continuous because its use is at intervals and is dependent
on the acts of man.

WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the petition for review, the same is DENIED
with costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 BICOL AGRO-INDUSTRIAL PRODUCERS COOPERATIVE, INC.
(BAPCI), Petitioner
vs.
EDMUNDO O. OBIAS, PERFECTO O. OBIAS, VICTOR BAGASINA,
ELENA BENOSA, MELCHOR BRANDES, ROGELIO MONTERO,
PEDRO MONTERO, CLAUDIO RESARI, PILAR GALON,
ANTONIO BUISON, PRUDENCIO BENOSA, JR., MARIA
VILLAMER and ROBERTO PADUA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 172077
October 9, 2009

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

The Bicol Sugar Development Corporation (BISUDECO) was established at

Himaao, Pili, Camarines Sur. In the same year, BISUDECO constructed a road
("the disputed road") – measuring approximately 7 meters wide and 2.9
kilometers long. The disputed road was used by BISUDECO in hauling and
transporting sugarcane to and from its mill site (Pensumil) and has thus become
indispensable to its sugar milling operations.

Respondents unjustifiably barricaded the disputed road by placing bamboos,

woods, placards and stones across it, preventing petitioner’s and the other sugar
planter’s vehicles from passing through the disputed road, thereby causing
serious damage and prejudice to petitioner.

Petitioner alleged that BISUDECO constructed the disputed road pursuant to an

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 131
agreement with the owners of the ricefields the road traversed. The agreement
provides that BISUDECO shall employ the children and relatives of the
landowners in exchange for the construction of the road on their properties.
Petitioner contends that through prolonged and continuous use of the disputed
road, BISUDECO acquired a right of way over the properties of the landowners,
which right of way in turn was acquired by it when it bought BISUDECO’s assets.
Petitioner prayed that respondents be permanently ordered to restrain from
barricading the disputed road and from obstructing its free passage.

Respondents denied having entered into an agreement with BISUDECO

regarding the construction and the use of the disputed road. They alleged that
BISUDECO, surreptitiously and without their knowledge and consent,
constructed the disputed road on their properties and has since then
intermittently and discontinuously used the disputed road for hauling sugarcane
despite their repeated protests. Respondents claimed they tolerated BISUDECO
in the construction and the use of the road since BISUDECO was a government-
owned and controlled corporation, and the entire country was then under Martial
Law. Respondents likewise denied that the road has become a public road, since
no public funds were used for its construction and maintenance.

The RTC ruled that petitioner failed to present any concrete evidence to prove
that there was an agreement between BISUDECO and respondents for the
construction of the disputed road. Moreover, it held that petitioner did not
acquire the same by prescription.

The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that there was no conclusive proof to
sufficiently establish the existence of an agreement between BISUDECO and
respondents regarding the construction of the disputed road. Moreover, the CA
also declared that an easement of right of way is discontinuous and as such
cannot be acquired by prescription.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there is an existing agreement between BISUDECO and

Respondents?

2. Whether or not the principles of prescription, laches and estoppels is

applicable in this case?

RULING:

1. No. In order for petitioner to acquire the disputed road as an easement of right-
of-way, it was incumbent upon petitioner to show its right by title or by an
agreement with the owners of the lands that said road traversed.

Easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the

benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner. By its creation,
easement is established either by law (in which case it is a legal easement) or by
will of the parties (a voluntary easement). In terms of use, easement may either
be continuous or discontinuous. The easement of right of way – the privilege of
persons or a particular class of persons to pass over another’s land, usually
through one particular path or linen – is characterized as a discontinuous
easement because its use is in intervals and depends on the act of man. Because
of this character, an easement of a right of way may only be acquired by virtue of
a title.
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 132
Article 622 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law in the case at bar, viz:

Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous ones,

whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title.

It is clear that the plaintiff failed to present any concrete evidence to prove that
there was such an agreement between BISUDECO and defendants.

The lower court correctly disbelieved the plaintiffs-appellants’ contention that an

agreement existed because there is simply no direct evidence to support this
allegation. BAPCI submitted purely circumstantial evidence that are not
sufficiently adequate as basis for the inference than an agreement existed. By
themselves, the circumstances the plaintiffs-appellants cited – i.e., the
employment of sixteen (16) relatives of the defendants-appellants; the
defendants-appellants’ unjustified silence; the fact that the existence of the
agreement is known to everyone, etc. – are events susceptible of diverse
interpretations and do not necessarily lead to BAPCI’s desired conclusion.

2. No. "It is already well-established that a right of way is discontinuous and, as

such, cannot be acquired by prescription."
Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by
prescription of ten years.

Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are either continuous or
discontinuous according to the manner they are exercised, not according to the
presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the existence of such
easements. Thus, easement is continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant
without the intervention of any act of man, like the easement of drainage; and it
is discontinuous if it is used at intervals and depends on the act of man, like the
easement of right of way.

The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is exercised

only if a person passes or sets foot on somebody else’s land. Like a road for the
passage of vehicles or persons, an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is
discontinuous because the right is exercised only if and when a train operated by
a person passes over another's property. In other words, the very exercise of the
servitude depends upon the act or intervention of man which is the very essence
of discontinuous easements.

The presence of physical or visual signs only classifies an easement

into apparent or non-apparent. Thus, a road (which reveals a right of way) and a
window (which evidences a right to light and view) are apparent easements, while
an easement of not building beyond a certain height is non-apparent.

It has been held that the existence of a permanent railway does not make the
right of way a continuous one; it is only apparent. Therefore, it cannot be
acquired by prescription. It was also been held that a right of passage over
another's land cannot be claimed by prescription because this easement is
discontinuous and can be established only by title.

In this case, the presence of railroad tracks for the passage of petitioner’s trains
denotes the existence of an apparent but discontinuous easement of right of way.
And under Article 622 of the Civil Code, discontinuous easements, whether
apparent or not, may be acquired only by title. Unfortunately, petitioner
Bomedco never acquired any title over the use of the railroad right of way
whether by law, donation, testamentary succession or contract. Its use of the
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 133
right of way, however long, never resulted in its acquisition of the easement
because, under Article 622, the discontinuous easement of a railroad right of way
can only be acquired by title and not by prescription.

Easements are either continuous or discontinuous according to the manner they

are exercised, not according to the presence of apparent signs or physical
indications of the existence of such easements. Hence, even if the road in dispute
has been improved and maintained over a number of years, it will not change its
discontinuous nature but simply make the same apparent. To stress, Article 622
of the New Civil Code states that discontinuous easements, whether apparent or
not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title.

The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and each
case must be decided according to its particular circumstances.

Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether

apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title.

The eminent jurist, former Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, opines that this
provision seeks to prevent the imposition of a burden on a tenement based purely
on the generosity, tolerance and spirit of neighborliness of the owners thereof.

We applied the cited provision to the case in ruling that no easement of right of
way was acquired; based on the evidence presented, the plaintiff-appellant failed
to satisfactorily prove the existence of an agreement evidencing any right or title
to use the disputed road. We additionally rejected the plaintiff-appellant’s
position that it had acquired the easement of right of way through acquisitive
prescription, as settled jurisprudence states that an easement of right of way
cannot be acquired by prescription.

We find that the positive mandate of Article 622 of the Civil Code – the statutory
provision requiring title as basis for the acquisition of an easement of a right of
way – precludes the application of the equitable principle of laches.

This Court agrees with the CA. The fact that the law is categorical that
discontinuous easements cannot be acquired by prescription militates against
petitioner’s claim of laches. To stress, discontinuous easements can only be
acquired by title. On the other hand, as to the issue of estoppel, this Court
likewise agrees with the finding of the CA that petitioner did not present any
evidence that would show an admission, representation or conduct by
respondents that will give rise to estoppel.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The August 24,

2005 Decision and October 27, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 59016 are hereby AFFIRMED.
 
SO ORDERED.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 134

 APOLINARDITO C. QUINTANILLA
and PERFECTA C. QUINTANILLA,
Petitioners.
vs.
PEDRO ABANGAN and
DARYL'S COLLECTION INTL. INC.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 160613
February 12, 2008

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:

Sometime in the 1960s, Perfecta bought Lot No. 3771-B-1-A, with an area of
2,244 square meters, located at Inayawan, Cebu City (the dominant estate) from
one Dionisio Abasolo, who formerly owned all the properties therein. Thereafter,
Perfecta donated the dominant estate to Apolinardito, who is now the registered
owner thereof. Petitioners own QC Rattan Inc., a domestic corporation engaged
in the manufacture and export of rattan-made furniture. In the conduct of their
business, they use vans to haul and transport raw materials and finished
products. As they wanted to expand their business and construct a warehouse on
their property (the dominant estate), they asked for a right of way from Pedro
sometime in April 1994. However, it appears that Pedro, who was the owner of
Lot No. 3771-A-1, containing an area of 1,164 square meters (the servient estate)
and a lot near the dominant estate, sold the same to DARYL'S on March 24, 1994,
and thereafter, DARYL'S constructed a warehouse over the servient estate,
enclosing the same with a concrete fence. Petitioners, thus, sought the imposition
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 135
of an easement of right of way, six (6) meters in width, or a total area of 244
square meters, over the servient estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Apolinardito is entititled to a right of way.

RULING:

NO. We hold that Apolinardito as owner of the dominant estate together with
Perfecta failed to discharge the burden of proving the existence and concurrence
of all the requisites in order to validly claim a compulsory right of way against
respondents. It should be remembered that to be entitled to a legal easement of
right of way, the following requisites must be satisfied: (1) the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway;
(2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate; and (4) the right of way claimed is at the point
least prejudicial to the servient estate. The fourth requisite is absent. As between
a right of way that would demolish a fence of strong materials to provide ingress
and egress to a public highway and another right of way which although longer
will only require a van or vehicle to make a turn, the second alternative should be
preferred. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by
law as the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of
necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should
not be imposed. Worthy of note, is the undisputed fact that there is already a
newly opened public road barely fifty (50) meters away from the property of
appellants, which only shows that another requirement of the law, that is, there is
no adequate outlet, has not been met to establish a compulsory right of way. As
between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide
egress to a public highway, and another right of way which, although longer, will
only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be
preferred.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed

Court of Appeals Decision, dated April 21, 2003, and Resolution dated September
24, 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 136

 ANASTACIA QUIMEN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and YOLANDA Q. OLIVEROS, respondents.
G.R. No. 112331
May 29, 1996

BELLOSILLO,J.:

FACTS:

Anastacia Quimen, together with her 3 brothers and sister, inherited a piece of
property in Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the property equally among
themselves. The shares of Anastacia and 3 other siblings were next to the
municipal road. Anastacia’s was at the extreme left of the road while the lots on
the right were sold by her brothers to Catalina Santos. A portion of the lots
behind Anastacia’s were sold by her (as her brother’s adminstratix) brother to
Yolanda.

Yolanda was hesitant to buy the back property at first because it d no access to
the public road. Anastacia prevailed upon her by assuring her that she would give
her a right of way on her adjoining property (which was in front) for p200 per
square meter.

Yolonda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the
public highway a portion of anastacia’s property. But when yolanda finally
offered to pay for the use of the pathway anastacia refused to accept the payment.
In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her property.
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 137
After a few years, Yolanda purchased another lot from the Quimens (a brother),
located directly behind the property of her parents who provided her a pathway
gratis et amore between their house, extending about 19m from the lot of Yolanda
behind the sari-sari store of one brother, and Anastacia’s perimeter fence.

In 1987, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way
through Anastacia’s property. The proposed right of way was at the extreme right
of Anastacia’s property facing the public highway, starting from the back of the
sari-sari store and extending inward by 1m to her property and turning left for
about 5m to avoid the store in order to reach the municipal road. The way was
unobstructed except for an avocado tree standing in the middle.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, explaining that
the right of way through the brother’s property was a straight path and to allow a
detour by cutting through Anastacia’s property would no longer make the path
straight. They held that it was more practical to extend the existing pathway to
the public road by removing that portion of the store blocking the path as that
was the shortest route to the public road and the least prejudicial to the parties
concerned than passing through Anastacia’s property.

CA reversed and held that Yolanda was entitled to a right of way on Anastacia’s
property. The court, however, did not award damages to her and held that
Anastacia was not in bad faith when she resisted the claim.

Anastacia went to the SC alleging that her lot should be considered as a servient
estate despite the fact that it does not abut or adjoin the property of private
respondent. She denies ever promising Yolonda a right of way.
Anastacia also argues that when Yolanda purchased the second lot, the easement
of right of way she provided was ipso jure extinguished as a result of the merger
of ownership of the dominant and the servient estates in one person so that there
was no longer any compelling reason to provide private respondent with a right
of way as there are other surrounding lots suitable for the purpose.

She also strongly maintains that the proposed right of way is not the shortest
access to the public road because of the detour and that, moreover, she is likely to
suffer the most damage as she derives a net income of P600.00 per year from the
sale of the fruits of her avocado tree, and considering that an avocado has an
average life span of seventy (70) years, she expects a substantial earning from it.

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not there was a valid grant of an easement

2) Whether or not the right of way proposed by Yolonda is the least

onerous/least prejudicial to the parties

RULING:

YES to both.

1) A right of way in particular is a privilege constituted by covenant or granted by

law to a person or class of persons to pass over another’s property when his
tenement is surrounded by realties belonging to others without an adequate
outlet to the public highway. The owner of the dominant estate can demand a
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 138
right of way through the servient estate provided he indemnifies the owner
thereof for the beneficial use of his property.

The conditions for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are:

(a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an

adequate outlet to a public highway;
(b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity;
(c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and,
(d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate.

These elements were clearly present. The evidence clearly shows that the
property of private respondent is hemmed in by the estates of other persons
including that of petitioner; that she offered to pay P200.00 per square meter for
her right of way as agreed between her and petitioner; that she did not cause the
isolation of her property; that the right of way is the least prejudicial to the
servient estate. These facts are confirmed in the ocular inspection report of the
clerk of court, more so that the trial court itself declared that “[t]he said
properties of Antonio Quimen which were purchased by plaintiff Yolanda
Quimen Oliveros were totally isolated from the public highway and there appears
an imperative need for an easement of right of way to the public highway.

2) Article 650 of the NCC explicitly states that “the easement of right of way shall
be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.”
The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the
criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation.
When the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding
the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least
damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2)
circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the
least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.

Yolanda’s property was situated at the back of her father’s property and held that
there existed an available space of about 19m long which could conveniently serve
as a right of way between the boundary line and the house of Yolanda’ s father

The vacant space ended at the left back of the store which was made of strong
materials which explained why Yolanda requested a detour to the lot of Anastacia
and cut an opening of one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long to serve as her
right of way to the public highway.

The proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is 1m wide and 5m long at the
extreme right of Anastacia’s property will cause the least prejudice and/or
damage as compared to the suggested passage through the property of Yolanda’ s
father which would mean destroying the sari-sari store made of strong materials.

Absent any showing that these findings and conclusion are devoid of factual
support in the records, or are so glaringly erroneous, the SC accepts and adopts
them. As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials
to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way which although
longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 139
should be preferred.

WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by respondent Court

of Appeals, the petition is DENIED and the decision subject of review is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 UNISOURCE COMMERCIAL AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner, 
vs.
JOSEPH CHUNG, KIAT CHUNG and KLETO CHUNG, Respondents.
G.R. No. 17325
July 17, 2009

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is the registered

owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
176253 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The title contains a memorandum of
encumbrance of a voluntary easement which has been carried over from the
Original Certificate of Title of Encarnacion S. Sandico.

As Sandico’s property was transferred to several owners, the memorandum of

encumbrance of a voluntary easement in favor of Francisco M. Hidalgo was
consistently annotated at the back of every title covering Sandico’s property until
TCT No. 176253 was issued in petitioner’s favor. On the other hand, Hidalgo’s
property was eventually transferred to respondents Joseph Chung, Kiat Chung
and Cleto Chung under TCT No. 121488.

On May 26, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of

Voluntary Easement of Right of Way on the ground that the dominant estate has
an adequate access to a public road which is Matienza Street. The trial court
dismissed the petition on the ground that it is a land registration case. Petitioner
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 140
moved for reconsideration. Thereafter, the trial court conducted an ocular
inspection of the property. In an Order dated November 24, 2000, the trial court
granted the motion. In their Answer, respondents countered that the
extinguishment of the easement will be of great prejudice to the locality and that
petitioner is guilty of laches since it took petitioner 15 years from acquisition of
the property to file the petition.

The trial court ordered the cancellation of the encumbrance of voluntary

easement of right of way in favor of the dominant estate owned by respondents. It
found that the dominant estate has no more use for the easement since it has
another adequate outlet to a public road which is Matienza Street. Respondents
appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter, however, reversed the decision of the
trial court and dismissed the petition to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary
easement of right of way.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the easement is personal since the annotation did not prove that
it is binding on the heirs or assigns of Sandico

RULING:

The petition lacks merit. As defined, an easement is a real right on another’s

property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain
from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his
property, for the benefit of another person or tenement. Easements are
established either by law or by the will of the owner. The former are called legal,
and the latter, voluntary easements.
In this case, petitioner itself admitted that a voluntary easement of right of way
exists in favor of respondents. In its petition to cancel the encumbrance of
voluntary easement of right of way, petitioner alleged that “*t+he easement is
personal. It was voluntarily constituted in favor of a certain Francisco Hidalgo y
Magnifico, the owner of *the lot+ described as Lot No. 2, Block 2650.” It further
stated that “the voluntary easement of the right of way in favor of Francisco
Hidalgo y Magnifico was constituted simply by will or agreement of the parties. It
was not a statutory easement and definitely not an easement created by such
court order because ‘*the] Court merely declares the existence of an easement
created by the parties.” In its Memorandum dated September 27, 2001, before
the trial court, petitioner reiterated that “*t+he annotation found at the back of
the TCT of Unisource is a voluntary easement.”

Having made such an admission, petitioner cannot now claim that what exists is
a legal easement and that the same should be cancelled since the dominant estate
is not an enclosed estate as it has an adequate access to a public road which is
Callejon Matienza Street. As we have said, the opening of an adequate outlet to a
highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary
easements like in the case at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have
also qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency
as a property right, which survives the termination of the necessity. A voluntary
easement of right of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished only by
mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.

It is settled that the registration of the dominant estate under the Torrens system
without the annotation of the voluntary easement in its favor does not extinguish
the easement. On the contrary, it is the registration of the servient estate as free,
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 141
that is, without the annotation of the voluntary easement, which extinguishes the
easement.

The mere fact that respondents subdivided the property does not extinguish the
easement. Article 618 of the Civil Code provides that if the dominant estate is
divided between two or more persons, each of them may use the easement in its
entirety, without changing the place of its use, or making it more burdensome in
any other way.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 27,
2005 and the Resolution dated June 19, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 76213 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
 GUILLERMO M. TELMO, Petitioner.
vs.
LUCIANO M. BUSTAMANTE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 182567
Jul. 13, 2009

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent is a co-owner of a real property of 616 square meters in Brgy.

Halang, Naic, Cavite, known as Lot 952-A and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-957643 of the Register of Deeds of Cavite. Petitioner and Elizalde
Telmo (Telmos) are the owners of the two (2) parcels of land denominated as Lot
952-B and 952-C, respectively, located at the back of respondent’s lot. When his
lot was transgressed by the construction of the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road,
respondent offered for sale the remaining lot to the Telmos. The latter refused
because they said they would have no use for it, the remaining portion being
covered by the road’s 10-meter easement.

The complaint further alleged that, on May 8, 2005, respondent caused the
resurvey of Lot 952-A in the presence of the Telmos. The resurvey showed that
the Telmos encroached upon respondent’s lot. Petitioner then uttered, “Hangga’t
ako ang municipal engineer ng Naic, Cavite, hindi kayo makakapagtayo ng
anuman sa lupa n’yo; hindi ko kayo bibigyan ng building permit.”

On May 10, 2005, respondent put up concrete poles on his lot. However, around
7:00 p.m. of the same day, the Telmos and their men allegedly destroyed the
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 142
concrete poles. The following day, respondent’s relatives went to Brgy. Chairman
Consumo to report the destruction of the concrete poles. Consumo told them that
he would not record the same, because he was present when the incident
occurred. Consumo never recorded the incident in the barangay blotter.

Respondent complained that he and his co-owners did not receive any just
compensation from the government when it took a portion of their property for
the construction of the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road. Worse, they could not
enjoy the use of the remaining part of their lot due to the abusive, Illegal, and
unjust acts of the Telmos and Consumo. Respondent charged the latter criminally
—for violation of Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019— and administratively—for violation of Section 4 (a) (b),
(c), and (e) of Republic Act No. 6713.

After submitting their own counter-affidavits, the Office of the Deputy

Ombudsman for Luzon found petitioner and Danilo Consumo administratively
liable, but dismissed the charge against Elizalde Telmo for lack of jurisdiction
over his person, he being a private individual. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the Honorable Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon seriously erred
when he declared that there was no valid taking of respondent’s lot by means of
expropriation?

(2) Whether or not respondent’s concrete posts were in the nature of a nuisance
per se?
RULING:

(1) NO. Sec. 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings.—When any building or

structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the Building Official
shall order its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the decree of
danger to life, health, or safety. This is without prejudice to further action that
may be taken under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.

Sec. 214. Dangerous and Ruinous Buildings or Structures. Dangerous buildings

are those which are herein declared as such or are structurally unsafe or not
provided with safe egress, or which constitute a fire hazard, or are otherwise
dangerous to human life, or which in relation to existing use, constitute a hazard
to safety or health or public welfare because of inadequate maintenance,
dilapidation, obsolescence, or abandonment, or which otherwise contribute to the
pollution of the site or the community to an intolerable degree.

A careful reading of the foregoing provisions would readily show that they do not
apply to the respondent’s situation. Nowhere was it shown that the concrete posts
put up by respondent in what he believed was his and his co-owners’ property
were ever declared dangerous or ruinous, such that they can be summarily
demolished by petitioner.

What is more, it appears that the concrete posts do not even fall within the scope
of the provisions of the National Building Code. The Code does not expressly
define the word “building.” However, we find helpful the dictionary definition of
the word “building,” viz: *A+ constructed edifice designed usually covered by a
roof and more or less completely enclosed by walls, and serving as a dwelling,
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 143
storehouse, factory, shelter for animals, or other useful structure – distinguished
from structures not designed for occupancy (as fences or monuments) and from
structures not intended for use in one place (as boats or trailers) even though
subject to occupancy.

(2) NO. A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons
and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity.
Evidently, the concrete posts summarily removed by petitioner did not at all pose
a hazard to the safety of persons and properties, which would have necessitated
immediate and summary abatement. What they did, at most, was to pose an
inconvenience to the public by blocking the free passage of people to and from
the national road.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 13, 2005 and the Order dated March
17, 2006 of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon finding petitioner
Guillermo M. Telmo, Municipal Engineer of Naic, Cavite, administratively
culpable for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6713, imposing upon him
the penalty of fine equivalent to his six 6-month salary, must
be MODIFIED. Guillermo M. Telmo is instead found administratively guilty
of DISCOURTESY IN THE COURSE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES and is
hereby REPRIMANDED. Costs against petitioner.

 SO ORDERED.
 EMILIO GANCAYCO, Petitioner.
vs.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY AND
METRO MANILADEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 177807
October 11, 2011

SERENO, J.:

FACTS:

The consolidated petitions of Retired Justice Emilio Gancayco, City Government

of Quezon City and the Metro Manila Development Authority stemmed from a
local ordinance pertaining to Construction of Arcades, and the clearing of Public
Obstructions. Gaycanco owns a property, of which he was able to obtain a
building permit for a two-storey commercial building, which was situated along
EDSA, in an area which was designated as part of a Business/Commercial Zone
by the Quezon City Council. The Quezon City Council also issued Ordinance No.
2904, which orders the construction of Arcades for Commercial Buildings. The
ordinance was amended to not require the properties located at the Quezon City -
San Juan boundary, and commercial buildings from Balete - Seattle Street to
construct the arcades, moreover, Gancayco had been successful in his petition to
have his property, already covered by the amended ordinance, exempted from the
ordinance. MMDA on April 28, 2003, sent a notice to Gancayco, under
Ordinance no. 2904, part of his property had to be demolished, if he did not clear
that part within 15 days, which Gancayco did not comply with, and so the MMDA
had to demolish the party wall, or “wing walls.” Gancayco then filed a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Quezon
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 144
City, seeking to prohibit the demolition of his property, without due process and
just compensation, claiming that Ordinance no. 2904 was discriminatory and
selective. He sought the declaration of nullity of the ordinance and payment for
damages. MMDA contended that Gancayco cannot seek nullification of an
ordinance that he already violated, and that the ordinance had the presumption
of constitutionality, and it was approved by the Quezon City Council, taking to
note that the Mayor signed the ordinance. The RTC, however, declared that the
Ordinance was unconstitutional, invalid and void ab initio. MMDA appealed to
the Court of Appeals, and the CA partly granted the appeal, with the contention
that the ordinance was to be modified; it was constitutional because the intention
of the ordinance was to uplift the standard of living, and business in the
commercial area, as well as to protect the welfare of the general public passing by
the area, however the injunction against the enforcement and implementation of
the ordinance is lifted. With that decision, the MMDA and Gancayco filed
Motions for Reconsideration, which the CA denied, as both parties have no new
issues raised. Therefore they petitioned to the Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the wing wall of Gancayco’s property can be constituted as a

public nuisance. Whether or not MMDA was in their authority to demolish
Gancayco’s property

RULING:

The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court decided that
the wing wall of Gancayco’s building was not a nuisance per se, as under Art. 694
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, nuisance is defined as any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures of
endangers the health or safety of the others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3)
shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstruct or interferes with
the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5)
hinders or impairs the use of property. A nuisance may be a nuisance per se or a
nuisance per accidens. A nuisance per se are those which affect the immediate
safety of persons and property and may summarily be abated under the
undefined law of necessity. As Gaycanco was able to procure a building permit to
construct the building, it was implied that the city engineer did not consider the
building as such of a public nuisance, or a threat to the safety of persons and
property. The MMDA was only to enforce Authoritative power on development of
Metro Manila, and was not supposed to act with Police Power as they were not
given the authority to do such by the constitution, nor was it expressed by the
DPWH when the ordinance was enacted. Therefore, MMDA acted on its own
when it illegally demolished Gancayco’s property, and was solely liable for the
damage.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. SP No. 84648 is AFFIRMED.
 
SO ORDERED.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 145

 JAIME S. PEREZ, both in his personal and official capacity as Chief,
Marikina Demolition Office, Petitioner.
vs.
SPOUSES FORTUNITO L. MADRONA and YOLANDA B. PANTE,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 184478
March 21, 2012

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

FACTS:

Respondent-spouses Fortunito Madrona and Yolanda B. Pante are registered

owners of a residential property located in Greenheights Subdivision, Phase
II, Marikina City and covered by TCT No. 169365 of the Registry of Deeds of
Marikina.  In 1989, respondents built their house thereon and enclosed it with a
concrete fence and steel gate. In 1999, respondents received the following letter
dated May 25, 1999 from petitioner Jaime S. Perez, Chief of the Marikina
Demolition Office stating that the structure that they built encroached on the
sidewalk and that is in violation of PD 1096 of the National Building Code and RA
917 on Illegally occupied/constructed improvements within the road right-of-
way. The respondent-spouses are given 7 days to remove the said structure. As
response, respondent Madrona sent petitioner a letter  stating that the May 25,
1999 letter (1) contained an accusation libelous in nature as it is condemning him
and his property without due process; (2) has no basis and authority since there
is no court order authorizing him to demolish their structure; (3) cited legal bases
which do not expressly give petitioner authority to demolish; and (4) contained a
false accusation since their fence did not in fact extend to the sidewalk.  More
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 146
than a year later or on February 28, 2001, petitioner sent another letter with the
same contents as the May 25, 1999 letter but this time giving respondents ten
days from receipt thereof to remove the structure allegedly protruding to the
sidewalk.  This prompted respondents to file a complaint for injunction before
the Marikina City RTC on March 12, 2001.  Respondents likewise sought the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin petitioner and all persons acting under him from doing any
act of demolition on their property and that after trial, the injunction be made
permanent.  On March 16, 2001, the RTC issued a TRO against petitioner.
On July 27, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents.  The RTC
decision permanently enjoined defendant Perez from performing any act which
would tend to destroy or demolish the perimeter fence and steel gate of the
respondents’ property. The RTC held that respondents, being lawful owners of
the subject property, are entitled to the peaceful and open possession of every
inch of their property and petitioner’s threat to demolish the concrete fence
around their property is tantamount to a violation of their rights as property
owners who are entitled to protection under the Constitution and laws.  The RTC
also ruled that there is no showing that respondents’ fence is a nuisance per
se and presents an immediate danger to the community’s welfare, nor is there
basis for petitioner’s claim that the fence has encroached on the sidewalk as to
justify its summary demolition. CA affirmed,

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents’ structure is a nuisance per se that presents

immediate danger to the community’s welfare and can be removed without need
of judicial intervention since the clearing of the sidewalks is an infrastructure
project of the Marikina City Government and cannot be restrained by the courts
as provided in Presidential Decree No. 1818
RULING:

No. If petitioner indeed found respondents’ fence to have encroached on the

sidewalk, his remedy is not to demolish the same summarily after respondents
failed to heed his request to remove it.  Instead, he should go to court and prove
respondents’ supposed violations in the construction of the concrete
fence.  Indeed, unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it may not be abated
summarily without judicial intervention.  Our ruling in Lucena Grand Central
Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc., on the need for judicial intervention when the
nuisance is not a nuisance per se, is well worth mentioning. In said case, we
ruled:

Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial
proceedings.  That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which
affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity
(Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]).  The storage of
copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business.  By its nature,
it can not be said to be injurious to rights of property, of health or of
comfort of the community.  If it be a nuisance per accidens it may
be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose.  It is not per
se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial
intervention. [Underscoring supplied.]

In Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac where the

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 147
appellant-municipality similarly argued that the terminal involved
therein is a nuisance that may be abated by the Municipal Council
via an ordinance, this Court held: “Suffice it to say that in the
abatement of nuisances the provisions of the Civil Code (Articles
694-707) must be observed and followed.  This appellant failed to
do.

Respondents’ fence is not a nuisance per se.  By its nature, it is not

injurious to the health or comfort of the community.  It was built primarily
to secure the property of respondents and prevent intruders from entering
it. And as correctly pointed out by respondents, the sidewalk still exists.  If
petitioner believes that respondents’ fence indeed encroaches on the
sidewalk, it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that
purpose.  Not being a nuisance per se, but at most a nuisance per accidens,
its summary abatement without judicial intervention is unwarranted.

WHEREFORE, the March 31, 2008 Decision and September 10, 2008 Resolution

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 83675 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner Jaime S. Perez, Chief of the Demolition Office of
Marikina City is ORDERED to pay respondent Spouses Fortunito L. Madrona
and Yolanda B. Pante moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00 and
exemplary damages in the amount of P5,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. DAVID REY
GUZMAN, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, LOLITA G. ABELA,
and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN, MEYCAUAYAN
BRANCH, respondents.
G.R. No. 132964
February 18, 2000

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS:

David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the spouses
Simeon Guzman (naturalized American) and Helen Meyers Guzman (American
citizen). In 1968, Simeon died leaving to his heirs, Helen and David, an estate
consisting of several parcels of land in Bulacan.

In 1970, Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the

Estate, dividing and adjudicating to themselves all of the property, and registered
it to the RD a year after.

In 1981, Helen executed a Deed of Quitclaim, assigning, transferring and

conveying her ½ share of the properties to David. But since it was not registered,
she executed another Deed of Quitclaim to confirm the first.

In 1994, Atty. Batongbacal wrote the OSG andfurnished it with documents

showing that David’s ownership of ½ of the estate was defective. He argued that
Art. XII of the Constitution only allows Filipinos to acquire private lands in the
country. The only instances when a foreigner may acquire private property are by
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 148
hereditary succession and if he was formerly a natural-born citizen who lost his
Filipino citizenship. Moreover, it contends that the Deeds of Quitclaim executed
by Helen were really donations inter vivos.

Republic filed with RTC a Petition for Escheat praying that ½ of David’s interest
be forfeited in its favor. RTC dismissed. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a donation inter vivos

RULING:

No. Not all the elements of a donation are present. The transfer of the properties
by virtue of a Deed of Quitclaim resulted in the (1) reduction of her patrimony as
donor and the (2) consequent increase in the patrimony of David as donee.
However, Helen’s (3) intention to perform an act of liberality in favor of David
was not sufficiently established. The 2 Quitclaims reveal that Helen intended to
convey to her son certain parcels of land and to re-affirm it, she executed a waiver
and renunciation of her rights over these properties. It is clear that Helen merely
contemplated a waiver of her rights, title, interest over the lands in favor of
David, not a donation. She was also aware that donation was not possible.

Moreover, the essential element of acceptance in the proper form and registration
to make the donation valid is lacking. The SPA executed by David in favor of Atty.
Abela was not his acceptance, but an acknowledgment that David owns the
property referred to and that he authorizes Atty. Abela to sell the same in his
name. Further, there was nothing in the SPA to show that he indeed accept the
donation.

However, the inexistence of a donation does not make the repudiation of Helen in
favor David valid. There is NO valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had
already accepted her share of the inheritance when she, together with David,
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, dividing and
adjudicating between them all the properties. By virtue of that settlement, the
properties were registered in their names and for 11 years, they possessed the
land in the concept of owner. Thus, the 2 Quitclaims have no legal force and
effect. Helen still owns ½ of the property.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals which sustained the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, dismissing the petition
for escheat is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED. 

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 149

 GONZALO VILLANUEVA, Petitioner.
vs.
SPOUSES FROILAN and LEONILA BRANOCO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 172804
January 24, 2011

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

Gonzalo, here represented by his heirs, sued spouses Froilan and Leonila
Branoco in the RTC of Naval, Biliran for the recovery of a parcel of land in Leyte.
He claimed ownership over the property through purchase from Vere who in turn
purchased the property from Rodrigo in 1970. The respondents in this case
claimed ownership in their answer through purchase in 1983 from Rodriguez to
whom Rodrigo donated the property in 1965.

The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner, saying that by the time Rodriguez
sold the property to the respondents in this case she had no title to transfer
because the donation to her by Rodrigo was deemed cancelled when Rodrigo
decided to sell the property to Vere instead.

The respondents brought the case up to the Court of Appeals, which granted their
appeal. It found the following factors pivotal to its reading of the Deed as
donationintervivos: (1) Rodriguez had been in possession of the Property as
owner since 21 May 1962, subject to the delivery of part of the produce
toApoyAlve; (2) the Deeds consideration was not Rodrigos death but her "love
and affection" for Rodriguez, considering the services the latter rendered; (3)
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 150
Rodrigo waived dominion over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her,
implying its inclusion in Rodriguezs estate; and (4) Rodriguez accepted the
donation in the Deed itself, an act necessary to effectuate donationsintervivos,
not devises.Accordingly, the CA upheld the sale between Rodriguez and
respondents, and, conversely found the sale between Rodrigo and petitioners
predecessor-in-interest,Vere, void for Rodrigos lack of title.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner’s title is superior to that of respondents

RULING:

The petition is unmeritorious.

It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a

perfected donationintervivos.

First. Rodrigo stipulated that "if the hereinDonee predeceases me, the [Property]
will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of
xxxRodriguez," signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguezs
estate, waiving Rodrigos right to reclaim title.

Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the
Property, evident from Rodriguez’s undertaking to "give one [half] xxx of the
produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime." Indeed, if Rodrigo still
retained full ownership over the Property, it was unnecessary for her to reserve
partial usufructuary right over it.
Third. The existence of consideration other than the donors death, such as the
donors love and affection to thedoneeand the services the latter rendered, while
also true of devises, nevertheless "corroborates the express irrevocability of xxx
[intervivos] transfers." Thus, the CA committed no error in giving weight to
Rodrigos statement of "love and affection" for Rodriguez, her niece, as
consideration for the gift, to underscore its finding.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 6 June

2005 and the Resolution dated 5 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals.
 
SO ORDERED.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 151

 CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REMEDIOS FRANCO, FRANCISCO N. LOPEZ,
CECILIA P. VDA. DE LOPEZ, REDAN LOPEZ AND REMARENE
LOPEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 112127
July 17, 1995

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS:

In 1939, Don Ramon Lopez Sr. executed a deed of donation in favor of CPU
together with the following conditions:

a) The land should be utilized by CPU exclusively for the establishment & use of
medical college;
b) The said college shall not sell transfer or convey to any 3rd party;
c) The said land shall be called “Ramon Lopez Campus” and any income from
that land shall be put in the fund to be known as “Ramon Lopez Campus Fund”.

However, on May 31, 1989, PR, who are the heirs of Don Ramon filed an action
for annulment of donation, reconveyance & damages against CPU for not
complying with the conditions. The heirs also argued that CPU had negotiated
with the NHA to exchange the donated property with another land owned by the
latter.

Petitioner alleged that the right of private respondents to file the action had
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 152
prescribed.

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not petitioner failed to comply the resolutely conditions annotated

at the back of petitioner’s certificate of title without a fixed period when to
comply with such conditions

2) Whether or not there is a need to fix the period for compliance of the condition

RULING:

1. Under Art. 1181, on conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights as well the
extinguishment or loss of those already acquired shall depend upon the
happening of the event which constitutes the condition. Thus, when a person
donates land to another on the condition that the latter would build upon the
land a school is such a resolutory one. The donation had to be valid before the
fulfillment of the condition. If there was no fulfillment with the condition such as
what obtains in the instant case, the donation may be revoked & all rights which
the donee may have acquired shall be deemed lost & extinguished.

More than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been allowed
petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be
burdensome, to make the donation in its favor forever valid. But, unfortunately, it
failed to do so. Hence, there is no more need to fix the duration of a term of the
obligation when such procedure would be a mere technicality and formality and
would serve no purpose than to delay or lead to an unnecessary and expensive
multiplication of suits.
Records are clear and facts are undisputed that since the execution of the deed of
donation up to the time of filing of the instant action, petitioner has failed to
comply with its obligation as donee. Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an
unreasonable length of time. Hence, it is only just and equitable now to declare
the subject donation already ineffective and, for all purposes, revoked so that
petitioner as donee should now return the donated property to the heirs of the
donor, private respondents herein, by means of reconveyance.

2. Under Art. 1197, when the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature &
circumstance it can be inferred that the period was intended, the court may fix
the duration thereof because the fulfillment of the obligation itself cannot be
demanded until after the court has fixed the period for compliance therewith &
such period has arrived. However, this general rule cannot be applied in this case
considering the different set of circumstances existing more than a reasonable
period of 50yrs has already been allowed to petitioner to avail of the opportunity
to comply but unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is no need to fix a
period when such procedure would be a mere technicality & formality & would
serve no purpose than to delay or load to unnecessary and expensive
multiplication of suits.

Under Art. 1191, when one of the obligors cannot comply with what is incumbent
upon him, the obligee may seek rescission before the court unless there is just
cause authorizing the fixing of a period. In the absence of any just cause for the
court to determine the period of compliance there is no more obstacle for the
court to decree recission.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Br. 34, of 31 May
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 153
1991 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals
of 18 June 1993 is accordingly MODIFIED. Consequently, petitioner is directed to
reconvey to private respondents Lot No. 3174-B-1 of the subdivision plan Psd-
1144 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3910-A within thirty (30) days
from the finality of this judgment. Costs against petitioner. 

SO ORDERED.
 THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., plaintiff-
appellee, 
vs.
CARPONIA T. EBRADO and PASCUALA VDA. DE
EBRADO, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-44059
October 28, 1977

MARTIN, J.:

FACTS:

Cristor Ebrado was issued by The Life Assurance Co., Ltd., a policy for P5,882.00

with a rider for Accidental Death. He designated Carponia T. Ebrado as the
revocable beneficiary in his policy. He referred to her as his wife.

Cristor was killed when he was hit by a failing branch of a tree. Insular Life was
made liable to pay the coverage in the total amount of P11,745.73, representing
the face value of the policy in the amount of P5,882.00 plus the
additional benefits for accidental death.

Carponia T. Ebrado filed with the insurer a claim for the proceeds as
the designated beneficiary therein, although she admited that she and the insured
were merely living as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.

Pascuala Vda. de Ebrado also filed her claim as the widow of

the deceased insured. She asserts that she is the one entitled to the insurance
proceeds.
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 154
Insular commenced an action for Interpleader before the trial court as to who
should be given the proceeds. The court declared Carponia as disqualified.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a common-law wife named as beneficiary in the life insurance

policy of a legally married man can claim the proceeds in case of death of the
latter

RULING:

Common-law spouses are, definitely, barred from receiving donations from each
other. Article 739 of the new Civil Code provides:

The following donations shall be void:

1. Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the
time of donation;

Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in
consideration thereof;

3. Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants or ascendants by reason

of his office.

In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be
brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donee may be
proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.
We do not think that a conviction for adultery or concubinage is exacted before
the disabilities mentioned in Article 739 may effectuate. More specifically, with
record to the disability on "persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at
the time of the donation," Article 739 itself provides:

In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be
brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilty of the donee may be
proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed.

Carponia T. Ebrado is hereby declared disqualified to be the beneficiary of the
late Buenaventura C. Ebrado in his life insurance policy. As a consequence, the
proceeds of the policy are hereby held payable to the estate of the deceased
insured. Costs against Carponia T. Ebrado.

SO ORDERED.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 155

 ZAMBOANGA BARTER TRADERS KILUSANG BAYAN, INC.
represented by its President, ATTY. HASAN G. ALAM,
Petitioner.
vs.
HON. JULIUS RHETT J. PLAGATA, in his capacity as Executive Labor
Arbiter of NLRC-RAB No. IX, SHERIFF DANILO P. TEJADA of NLRC-
RAB No. IX and TEOPISTO MENDOZA,
Respondents.
GR No. 148433
Sept. 30, 2008

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure which seeks to set aside the decision of the CA and its Resolution
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. It likewise asked that the second
alias writ of execution issued by Hon. Julius Rhett J. Plagata, Executive Labor
Arbiter of NLRC-RAB IX, be annulled and declared without any legal effect, as
well as the ensuing levy, sale on execution of the subject property.

On 9 January 1973, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD No. 93 which

legalized barter trading in the Sulu Archipelago and adjacent areas, and
empowered the Commander of the Southwest Command of the AFP to coordinate
all activities and to undertake all measures for the implementation of said decree.
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 156
On 17 June 1981, ZBTKBI, thru its President, Atty. Hassan G. Alam, donated to
the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Maj. Gen. Delfin C. Castro,
Commander, Southern Command of the AFP, and Chairman, Executive
Committee for Barter Trade, a parcel of land covered by CTC No. T-61,628 of the
Registry of Deeds of Zamboanga City, identified as Lot No. 6 of consolidation
subdivision plan Pcs-09-000184, situated in the Barrio of Canelar, City of
Zamboanga, containing an area of 13,643 sq m. The Republic accepted the
donation with conditions contained in the Deed of Donation.

With the acceptance of the donation, TCT No. T-61,628 in the name of ZBTKBI
was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT. No. T-66,696 covering the same property
was issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.

Pursuant to condition No. 1 of the Deed of Donation, the Government and the
DPWH RO IX constructed a Barter Trade Market Building worth P5,000,000.00
at the said Lot No. 6. The building was completed on 30 March 1983 and was
occupied by members of ZBTKBI, as well as by other persons engaged in barter
trade.

Prior to said donation, on 16 March 1977, private respondent Teopisto Mendoza

was hired by ZBTKBI as clerk. Subsequently, in a letter dated 1 April 1981,
ZBTKBI, through its President, Atty. Hasan G. Alam, informed Mendoza that his
services were being terminated on the ground of abandonment of work.

Mendoza filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with payment of backwages and
separation pay at the DOLE ROIX on July 29, 1981. The case was assigned to
Executive Labor Arbiter Hakim S. Abdulwahid.
On 31 May, 1983, Executive Labor Arbiter Abdulwahid rendered his decision
finding the dismissal of Mendoza illegal and ordered ZBTKBI to reinstate
Mendoza to his former position or any equivalent position, and to pay him
backwages.

On 17 June 1983, ZBTKBI filed a Notice of Appeal with the NLRC. On 13 July
1983, Mendoza filed with the NLRC a Manifestation with Motion for Execution
praying that petitioner’s appeal not be given due course, and that a writ of
execution enforcing the decision of the Labor Arbiter be issued.

On 17 June 1988, the Office of the President issued Memorandum Circular No. 1
which totally phased out the Zamboanga City barter trade area effective 1 October
1988.

On 18 December 1989, Mendoza filed a Motion for Issuance of (Second) Alias

Writ of Execution, which public respondent Executive Labor Arbiter Julius Rhett
J. Plagata issued on 2 January 1990. Sheriff Anthony B. Gaviola levied whatever
interest, share, right, claim and/or participation of ZBTKBI had over a parcel of
land, together with all the buildings and improvements existing thereon, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 66,696 (formerly TCT No. 61,628) in
compliance of said writ.

On 13 June 1990, the afore-described property was sold at public auction for
P96,443.53, with Mendoza as the sole highest bidder. The property was not
redeemed. As a consequence, Sheriff Gaviola issued on 25 June 1991 a Sheriff’s
Final Certificate of Sale in favor of Mendoza over whatever interest, share, right,
claim and/or participation ZBTKBI had over the parcel of land.
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 157
Having failed to take possession of the land in question, Mendoza filed a Petition
(for Issuance of Writ of Possession) on 14 February 2000, which was granted on
5 May 2000, by Executive Labor Arbiter Plagata. The writ was issued to place the
complainant in possession (of) the rights, interests, shares, claims, and
participations of Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusan Bayan, Inc. in that parcel of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66,696 of the Registry of
Deeds for Zamboanga City, which were sold on execution to the complainant on
13 June 1990, and in whose favor a final certificate of sale for such rights,
interests, shares, claims, and/or participation was executed and issued on 25
June 1991.

Sheriff Tejada submitted a Sheriff’s Service Report dated 22 June 2000

informing Executive Labor Arbiter Plagata that the writ of possession was
returned duly served and fully satisfied. On the same date, Mendoza, thru a letter,
acknowledged that the writ of possession had been satisfied and implemented.

A petition for review on certiorari filed on 27 June 2001 which was denied by this
Court on 15 August 2001, for failure to show that a reversible error had been
committed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
on 8 September 2001, which Mendoza opposed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred that the donated property has already reverted to
petitioner-donor

RULING:
On the issue of ownership over the 13,643 square meters of land located at Barrio
Canelar, City of Zamboanga.

Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the donated
property was no longer owned by the Republic of the Philippines because
ownership thereof had already reverted to it (petitioner).

From the records, the subject property was donated by petitioner (donor) to the
Republic (donee) with the following conditions already adverted heretofore but
are being reiterated for emphasis:

1. That upon the effectivity or acceptance hereof the DONEE shall, thru the
authorized agency/ministry, construct a P5 Million Barter Trade market building
at the afore-described parcel of land;

2. That the aforesaid Barter Trade Market building shall accommodate at least
1,000 stalls, the allocation of which shall be determined by the Executive
Committee for Barter Trade in coordination with the Officers and Board of
Directors the Zamboanga Barter Traders’ Kilusang Bayan, Inc., provided,
however, that each member of the DONOR shall be given priority;
3. That the said Barter Trade Market building to be constructed as above-stated,
shall be to the strict exclusion of any other building for barter trading in
Zamboanga City, Philippines;
4. That in the event barter trading shall be phased out, prohibited, or suspended
for more than one (1) year in Zamboanga City, Philippines, the afore-described
parcel of land shall revert back to the DONOR without need of any further
formality or documentation, and the DONOR shall have the first option to
purchase the building and improvements thereon.
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 158
5. That the DONEE hereby accepts this donation made in its favor by the
DONOR, together with the conditions therein provided. (Underscoring supplied)

Thus, when the property was levied and sold on 1 March 1990 and 13 June 1990,
respectively, it was already petitioner that owned the same. It should be clear that
reversion applied only to the land and not to the building and improvements
made by the Republic on the land worth P5,000,000.00.

Petitioner further claims that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was
automatic reversion of the land, because it put the Republic in a disadvantageous
situation when it had a P5 million building on a land owned by another.

This claim is untenable. The Court of Appeals merely enforced or applied the
conditions contained in the deed of donation. The Republic accepted the
donation subject to conditions imposed by the donor. In condition number 4, the
Republic is given the right to sell the building it constructed on the land and the
improvements thereon. If ever such condition is disadvantageous to the Republic,
there is nothing that can be done about it, since it is one of the conditions that are
contained in the donation which it accepted. There being nothing ambiguous in
the contents of the document, there is no room for interpretation but only simple
application thereof.

The SC likewise find to be without basis petitioner’s claim that the Republic
should be reimbursed of the cost of the construction of the barter trade building
pursuant to condition number 4. There is nothing there that shows that the
Republic will be reimbursed. What is stated there is that petitioner has the first
option to purchase the buildings and improvements thereon. In other words, the
Republic can sell the buildings and improvements that it made or built.
Petitioner’s statement that neither party to the donation has expressly rescinded
the contract is flawed. As above ruled, the deed of donation contains a stipulation
that allows automatic reversion. Such stipulation, not being contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy, is valid and binding on the
parties to the donation. As held in Dolar v. Barangay Lublub (Now P.D. Monfort
North) Municipality of Dumangas, citing

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals:

The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic
revocation, judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining
a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by
virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial
intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was
proper.

The automatic reversion of the subject land to the donor upon phase out of barter
trading in Zamboanga City cannot be doubted. Said automatic reversion cannot
be averted, merely because petitioner-donor has not yet exercised its option to
purchase the buildings and improvements made and introduced on the land by
the Republic; or because the Republic has not yet sold the same to other
interested buyers. Otherwise, there would be gross violation of the clear import of
the conditions set forth in the deed of donation.

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The

decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 November 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No.
59520 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 159
 ALFONSO QUIJADA, CRESENTE QUIJADA, REYNELDA QUIJADA,
DEMETRIO QUIJADA, ELIUTERIA QUIJADA, EULALIO
QUIJADA, and WARLITO QUIJADA, petitioners,
 vs. 
COURT OF APPEALS, REGALADO MONDEJAR, RODULFO
GOLORAN, ALBERTO ASIS, SEGUNDINO RAS, ERNESTO
GOLORAN, CELSO ABISO, FERNANDO BAUTISTA, ANTONIO
MACASERO, and NESTOR MAGUINSAY, respondents.\
G.R. No. 126444
December 4, 1998

MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS:

Trinidad Quijada with her siblings inherited a 2-hectare land in Agusan Del Sur.
On 1956, they executed a conditional deed of donation in favor of the
Municipality of Talacogon for the subject land. The donation was subject to the
condition that the donated property shall be used solely and exclusively as part of
the campus of the proposed Provincial High School. If such proposal be
discontinued, the property shall automatically revert to the donor. Despite this
donation, Trinidad Quijada possessed the land. On 1962, she sold 1-hectare of the
land to Regalado Mondejar through a deed of sale. The remaining area was sold
to the same person verbally evidenced by receipts of payment. In 1987, the
Provincial High School failed to materialize. The Sangguniang Bayan of the
municipality enacted a resolution reverting the land back to the donors.

During that time, Mondejar subsequently sold portions of the property to

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 160
buyers.Upon the death of Trinidad Quijada, her heirs now seeks to recover
possession and ownership of the subject land by filing a petition for quieting the
title. Petitioners contend that there was no valid sale since the land was sold
when ownership was already transferred to the Municipality by the deed of
donation. Respondents contend otherwise.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a valid sale by the donor, Quijada to a third person,
Mondejar, even if it was conditionally donated to a donee, the Municipality of
Talacogan

RULING:

There is a valid sale by the donor. When the Municipality’s acceptance of the
donation was made known to the donor, the Municipality became the new owner
of the property despite the conditions in the deed of donation. Ownership is
immediately transferred and will only revert if the resolutory condition is not
fulfilled.

When a person donates a land to another on the condition that the latter would
build upon the land a school, the condition imposed is a resolutory one.

Despite these and as provided for by the Law on Sales, ownership by the seller of
the thing sold at the time of the perfection of the contract is not necessary.
Ownership is only relevant during its consummation where the thing sold will be
delivered. Such delivery, in this case, happened when the donor became the
owner upon the reversion of the property. Such title, in accordance to Article
1434 of the New Civil Code, passes by operation of law to the buyer.
Note: Lands which were previously donated may still be sold to a third person.
Such sale is still valid even if at the time the sale was perfected, the donor-seller
did not own the land. It is upon the consummation of a perfected sale where the
donor-seller is obliged to deliver the thing sold.

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the Court of

Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

PROPERTY LAW CASE DIGESTS 161