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Court No. - 74 A.F.R.

Case:- MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 4804 of 2020

Petitioner:- Pradeep Tomar And Another

Respondent:- State of U.P. and Another
Counsel for Petitioner:- Dhirendra Kumar Agrahari,Sudhir Mehrotra
Counsel for Respondent:- G.A.,Rama Shankar Mishra

Hon'ble J.J. Munir,J.

1. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution has been
filed seeking to set aside an order of the learned Judicial Magistrate-
I, Hapur, dated 24.11.2020, passed in Case Crime No. 516 of 2020,
under Section 363 IPC, P.S. Pilakhuwa, District Hapur, directing that
the prosecutrix Km. Shivani be permitted to go along with her
husband, the accused Pintoo son of Omvir.

2. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the second

opposite party by Mr. Rama Shankar Mishra, Advocate, which is
taken on record. The petitioner has filed a rejoinder.

3. Admit.

4. Heard forthwith.

5. Heard Mr. Sudhir Mehrotra, learned counsel for the

petitioners, Mr. Rama Shankar Mishra, learned counsel for opposite
party no.2 and Mr. S.S. Tiwari, learned AGA appearing on behalf of
the State.

6. The submission of Mr. Sudhir Mehrotra, learned counsel for

the petitioners, briefly said, is to the effect that the date of birth of the
prosecutrix, according to her High School Examination Certificate
issued by the U.P. Board of High School and Intermediate
Education, is 04.11.2004. She is, thus, a minor, aged 16 years and 2
months approximately. She would attain majority on 05.11.2022. Mr.
Mehrotra submits that the Magistrate has erred in permitting the
prosecutrix to accompany her husband, an accused in the crime,
going by the marriage acknowledged by the parties to be
solemnized on 21.09.2020 at the Pandav Kalin Neeli Chhatri Mandir
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Sanatan Dharam Vivah Padti Trust, Yamuna Bazar, Delhi. Mr.

Mehrotra submits that the prosecutrix, being a minor, cannot be
permitted to stay in a matrimonial relationship, where the marriage
would be void under Section 12 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage
Act, 2006 (for short, ‘the Act of 2006’). He submits that in any case
the prosecutrix, who is not a major, cannot be permitted to stay with
her husband and ought not to be allowed to accompany him. Doing
so, would be permitting statutory rape and also an offence under
Section 5/6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act,
2012.

7. Mr. Rama Shankar Mishra, on the other hand, submits that the
prosecutrix in her stand before the Magistrate has made it clear that
she has married the accused Pintoo of her free will and wishes to
stay with him. He emphasizes that the parties' marriage has been
registered under the U.P. Marriage Registration Rules, 2017 by the
Marriage Registration Officer, Ghaziabad on 21.09.2020. He has
drawn the attention of this Court towards a certificate of the
registration of marriage, dated 21.09.2020.

8. This Court has perused the impugned order and considered

the entire facts and circumstances. The prosecutrix is a little over 16
years of age. The Magistrate has been swayed to permit the
prosecutrix to go along with the accused, her husband on ground
that the father of the prosecutrix made an application that he would
not take her back home and that he had lodged an FIR, out of social
embarrassment. The Magistrate has relied upon the decisions of this
Court in Smt. Rajkumari vs. Superintendent, Nari Niketan, 1998
Cr.L.J 654 (All) and Smt. Ramsati @ Syamsati vs. State of U.P.,
Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 245 of 2015, decided on
07.09.2005 to hold that upon marriage of a minor according to her
wishes, she could be left free to live her life.

9. The law has changed much course since the decisions above
referred were rendered. In Independent Thought vs. Union of
India and another, (2017) 10 SCC 800, it has been held:
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“Rape or penetrative sexual assault
67. Whether sexual intercourse that a husband has with
his wife who is between 15 and 18 years of age is
described as rape (not an offence under Exception 2 to
Section 375 IPC) or aggravated penetrative sexual
assault [an offence under Section 5(n) of thePOCSO Act
and punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act] the fact
is that it is rape as conventionally understood, though
Parliament in its wisdom has chosen to not recognise it
as rape for the purposes of IPC. That it is a heinous
crime which also violates the bodily integrity of a girl
child, causes trauma and sometimes destroys her freedom
of reproductive choice is a composite issue that needs
serious consideration and deliberation.
72. If such is the traumatic impact that rape could and
does have on an adult victim, we can only guess what
impact it could have on a girl child—and yet it is not a
criminal offence in the terms of Exception 2 to Section
375 IPC but is an offence under the POCSOAct only. An
anomalous state of affairs exists on a combined reading
of IPC and the POCSO Act. An unmarried girl below 18
years of age could be a victim of rape under IPC and a
victim of penetrative sexual assault under the POCSO Act.
Such a victim might have the solace (if we may say so)
of prosecuting the rapist. A married girl between 15 and
18 years of age could be a victim of aggravated
penetrative sexual assault under the POCSO Act, but she
cannot be a victim of rape under IPC if the rapist is
her husband since IPC does not recognise such
penetrative sexual assault as rape. Therefore such a
girl child has no recourse to law under the provisions
of IPC notwithstanding that the marital rape could
degrade and humiliate her, destroy her entire psychology
pushing her into a deep emotional crisis and dwarf and
destroy her whole personality and degrade her very soul.
However, such a victim could prosecute the rapist under
the POCSO Act. We see no rationale for such an artificial
distinction.
73. While we are not concerned with the general question
of marital rape of an adult woman but only with marital
rape of a girl child between 15 and 18 years of age in
the context of Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC, it is
worth noting the view expressed by theCommittee on
Amendments to Criminal Law chaired by Justice J.S. Verma
(Retired). In Paras 72, 73 and 74 of the Report it was
stated that the outdated notion that a wife is no more
than a subservient chattel of her husband has since been
given up in the United Kingdom. Reference was also made
to a decision [C.R. v. United Kingdom, ECHR, Ser. A. No.
335-C (1995): (1995) 21 EHRR 363] of the European
Commission of Human Rights which endorsed the conclusion
that “a rapist remains a rapist regardless of his
relationship with the victim”. The relevant paragraphs
of the Report read as follows:
“72. The exemption for marital rape stems from a long
outdated notion of marriage which regarded wives as
no more than the property of their husbands.
According to the common law of coverture, a wife was
deemed to have consented at the time of the marriage
to have intercourse with her husband at his whim.
Moreover, this consent could not be revoked. As far
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back as 1736, Sir Matthew Hale declared: ‘The husband
cannot be guilty of rape committed by himself upon
his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial
consent and contract the wife hath given herself up
in this kind unto her husband which she cannot
retract.’ [ Sir Matthew Hale — History of the Pleas
of the Crown, 1 Hale PC (1736) 629. See further S.
Fredman, Women and the Law (OUP, 1997) pp. 55-57.]
73. This immunity has now been withdrawn in most
major jurisdictions. In England and Wales, the House
of Lords held in 1991 that the status of married
women had changed beyond all recognition since Hale
set out his proposition. Most importantly, Lord
Keith, speaking for the Court, declared, ‘marriage is
in modern times regarded as a partnership of equals,
and no longer one in which the wife must be the
subservient chattel of the husband’. [R. v. R.,
(1992) 1 AC 599, p. 616: (1991) 3 WLR 767: (1991) 4
All ER 481 at p. 484 (HL)]
74. Our view is supported by the judgment of the
European Commission of Human Rights in C.R. v. United
Kingdom [C.R.v. United Kingdom, ECHR, Ser. A. No.
335-C (1995): (1995) 21 EHRR 363] which endorsed the
conclusion that [Ed.: Emphasis has been supplied to
the matter between two asterisks.] a rapist remains a
rapist regardless of his relationship with the victim
[Ed.: Emphasis has been supplied to the matter
between two asterisks.]. Importantly, it acknowledged
that this change in the common law was in accordance
with the fundamental objectives of the Convention on
Human Rights, the very essence of which is respect
for human rights, dignity and freedom. This was given
statutory recognition in the Criminal Justice and
Public Order Act, 1994.”
(emphasis in original)
74. In Eisenstadt v. Baird [Eisenstadt v. Baird, 1972
SCC OnLine US SC 62: 31 L Ed 2d 349: 92 S Ct 1029: 405
US 438 (1972)] the US Supreme Court observed that a
“marital couple is not an independent entity with a
mind and heart of its own, but an association of two
individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup”. (SCC OnLine US SC para 21)
75. On a combined reading of C.R. v. United Kingdom
[C.R. v.United Kingdom, ECHR, Ser. A. No. 335-C (1995):
(1995) 21 EHRR 363] and Eisenstadt v. Baird [Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 1972 SCC OnLine US SC 62: 31 L Ed 2d 349: 92 S
Ct 1029: 405 US 438 (1972)] it is quite clear that a
rapist remains a rapist and marriage with the victim
does not convert him into a non-rapist. Similarly, a
rape is a rape whether it is described as such or is
described as penetrative sexual assault or aggravated
penetrative sexual assault. A rape that actually occurs
cannot legislatively be simply wished away or
legislatively denied as non-existent.
76. There is an apparent conflict or incongruity between
the provisions of IPC and the POCSO Act. The rape of a
married girl child (a girl child between 15 and 18 years
of age) is not rape under IPC and therefore not an
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offence in view of Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC
thereof but it is an offence of aggravated penetrative
sexual assault under Section 5(n) of the POCSO Act and
punishable under Section 6 of that Act. This conflict or
incongruity needs to be resolved in the best interest of
the girl child and the provisions of various
complementary statutes need to be harmonised and read
purposively to present an articulate whole.
79. There is no doubt that pro-child statutes are
intended to and do consider the best interest of the
child. These statutes have been enacted in the recent
past though not effectively implemented. Given this
situation, we are of opinion that a few facts need to be
acknowledged and accepted:
79.1.Firstly, a child is and remains a child regardless
of the description or nomenclature given to the child.
It is universally accepted in almost all relevant
statutes in our country that a child is a person below
18 years of age. Therefore, a child remains a child
whether she is described as a street child or a
surrendered child or an abandoned child or an adopted
child. Similarly, a child remains a child whether she is
a married child or an unmarried child or a divorced
child or a separated child or a widowed child. At this
stage we are reminded of Shakespeare's eternal view that
a rose by any other name would smell as sweet—so also
with the status of a child, despite any prefix.
79.2.Secondly, the age of consent for sexual intercourse
is definitively 18 years and there is no dispute about
this. Therefore, under no circumstance can a child below
18 years of age give consent, express or implied, for
sexual intercourse. The age of consent has not been
specifically reduced by any statute and unless there is
such a specific reduction, we must proceed on the basis
that the age of consent and willingness to sexual
intercourse remains at 18 years of age.
79.3.Thirdly, Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC creates an
artificial distinction between a married girl child and
an unmarried girl child with no real rationale and
thereby does away with consent for sexual intercourse by
a husband with his wife who is a girl child between 15
and 18 years of age. Such an unnecessary and artificial
distinction if accepted can again be introduced for
other occasions for divorced children or separated
children or widowed children.
80. What is sought to be achieved by this artificial
distinction is not at all clear except perhaps to
acknowledge that child marriages are taking place in the
country. Such child marriages certainly cannot be in the
best interest of the girl child. That the solemnisation
of a child marriage violates the provisions of the PCMA
is well known. Therefore, it is for the State to
effectively implement and enforce the law rather than
dilute it by creating artificial distinctions. Can it
not be said, in a sense, that through the artificial
distinction, Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC encourages
violation of the PCMA? Perhaps “yes” and looked at from
another point of view, perhaps “no” for it cannot
reasonably be argued that one statute (IPC) condones an
offence under another statute (the PCMA). Therefore the
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basic question remains—what exactly is the artificial
distinction intended to achieve?
Justification given by the Union of India
81. The only justification for this artificial
distinction has been culled out by the learned counsel
for the petitioner from the counter-affidavit filed by
the Union of India. This is given in the written
submissions filed by the learned counsel for the
petitioner and the justification (not verbatim) reads as
follows:
(i) Economic and educational development in the
country is still uneven and child marriages are still
taking place. It has been, therefore, decided to
retain the age of 15 years under Exception 2 of
Section 375 IPC so as to give protection to husband
and wife against criminalising the sexual activity
between them.
(ii) As per National Family Health Survey-III, 46% of
women between the ages 18-29 years in India were
married before the age of 18. It is also estimated
that there are 23 million child brides in the
country. Hence, criminalising the consummation of a
marriage union with a serious offence such as rape
would not be appropriate and practical.
(iii) Providing punishment for child marriage with
consent does not appear to be appropriate in view of
socio-economic conditions of the country. Thus, the
age prescribed in Exception 2 of Section 375 IPC has
been retained considering the basic facts of the
still evolving social norms and issues.
(iv) The Law Commission also recommended for raising
the age from 15 years to 16 years and it was
incorporated in the Criminal Law (Amendment)
Ordinance, 2013. However, after wide ranging
consultations with various stakeholders it was
further decided to retain the age at 15 years.
(v) Exception 2 of Section 375 IPC envisages that if
the marriage is solemnised at the age of 15 years due
to traditions, it should not be a reason to book the
husband in the case of offence of rape under IPC.
(vi) It is also necessary that the provisions of law
should be in such a manner that it cannot affect a
particular class of society. Retaining the age of 15
years in Exception 2 of Section 375 IPC has been
provided considering the social realities of the
nation.
82. The above justifications given by the Union of India
are really explanations for inserting Exception 2 in
Section 375 IPC. Besides, they completely sidetrack the
issue and overlook the provisions of the PCMA, the
provisions of the JJ Act as well as the provisions of
the POCSO Act. Surely, the Union of India cannot be
oblivious to the existence of the trauma faced by a girl
child who is married between 15 and 18 years of age or
to the three pro-child statutes and other human rights
obligations. That these facts and statutes have been
overlooked confirms that the distinction is artificial
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and makes Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC all the more
arbitrary and discriminatory.
83. During the course of oral submissions, three further
but more substantive justifications were given by the
learned counsel for the Union of India for making this
distinction. The firstjustification is that by virtue of
getting married, the girl child has consented to sexual
intercourse with her husband either expressly or by
necessary implication. The second justification is that
traditionally child marriages have been performed in
different parts of the country and therefore such
traditions must be respected and not destroyed. The
third justification is that Para 5.9.1 of the 167th
Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee of the
Rajya Sabha (presented in March 2013) records that
several Members felt that marital rape has the potential
of destroying the institution of marriage.
84. In law, it is difficult to accept any one of these
justifications. There is no question of a girl child
giving express or implied consent for sexual
intercourse. The age of consent is statutorily and
definitively fixed at 18 years and there is no law that
provides for any specific deviation from this. Therefore
unless Parliament gives any specific indication (and it
has not given any such indication) that the age of
consent could be deviated from for any rational reason,
we cannot assume that a girl child who is otherwise
incapable of giving consent for sexual intercourse has
nevertheless given such consent by implication,
necessary or otherwise only by virtue of being married.
It would be reading too much into the mind of the girl
child and assuming a state of affairs for which there is
neither any specific indication nor any warrant. It must
be remembered that those days are long gone when a
married woman or a married girl child could be treated
as subordinate to her husband or at his beck and call or
as his property. Constitutionally a female has equal
rights as a male and no statute should be interpreted or
understood to derogate from this position. If there is
some theory that propounds such an unconstitutional
myth, then that theory deserves to be completely
demolished.
85. Merely because child marriages have been performed
in different parts of the country as a part of a
tradition or custom does not necessarily mean that the
tradition is an acceptable one nor should it be
sanctified as such. Times change and what was acceptable
a few decades ago may not necessarily be acceptable
today. This was noted by a Constitution Bench of this
Court (though in a different context) in State of M.P.
v. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. [State of M.P. v.
Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd., (1964) 6 SCR 846: AIR 1964
SC 1179] that: (AIR p. 1182, para 6)
“6. … But, by the passage of time, considerations of
necessity and expediency would be obliterated, and
the grounds which justified classification of
geographical regions for historical reasons may cease
to be valid.”
90. We must not and cannot forget the existence of
Article 21 of the Constitution which gives a fundamental
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right to a girl child to live a life of dignity. The
documentary material placed before us clearly suggests
that an early marriage takes away the self-esteem and
confidence of a girl child and subjects her, in a sense,
to sexual abuse. Under no circumstances can it be said
that such a girl child lives a life of dignity. The
right of a girl child to maintain her bodily integrity
is effectively destroyed by a traditional practice
sanctified by IPC. Her husband, for the purposes of
Section 375 IPC, effectively has full control over her
body and can subject her to sexual intercourse without
her consent or without her willingness since such an
activity would not be rape. Anomalously, although her
husband can rape her but he cannot molest her for if he
does so he could be punished under the provisions of
IPC. This was recognised by LCI in its 172nd Report but
was not commented upon. It appears therefore that
different and irrational standards have been laid down
for the treatment of the girl child by her husband and
it is necessary to harmonise the provisions of various
statutes and also harmonise different provisions of IPC
inter se.
91. We have also adverted to the issue of reproductive
choices that are severely curtailed as far as a married
girl child is concerned. There is every possibility that
being subjected to sexual intercourse, the girl child
might become pregnant and would have to deliver a baby
even though her body is not quite ready for procreation.
The documentary material shown to us indicates that
there are greater chances of a girl child dying during
childbirth and there are greater chances of neonatal
deaths. The results adverted to in the material also
suggest that children born from early marriages are more
likely to be malnourished. In the face of this material,
would it be wise to continue with a practice,
traditional though it might be, that puts the life of a
girl child in danger and also puts the life of the baby
of a girl child born from an early marriage at stake?
Apart from constitutional and statutory provisions,
constitutional morality forbids us from giving an
interpretation to Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC that
sanctifies a tradition or custom that is no longer
sustainable.
Harmonious and purposive interpretation
101. The entire issue of the interpretation of the JJ
Act, thePOCSO Act, the PCMA and Exception 2 to Section
375 IPC can be looked at from yet another perspective,
the perspective of purposive and harmonious construction
of statutes relating to the same subject-matter. Long
ago, it was said by Lord Denning that when a defect
appears, a Judge cannot fold his hands and blame the
draftsman but must also consider the social conditions
and give force and life to the intention of the
legislature. It was said inSeaford Court Estates Ltd. v.
Asher [Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v.Asher, (1949) 2 KB
481 (CA) affirmed in Asher v. Seaford Court Estates
Ltd., 1950 AC 508 (HL)] that: (KB p. 499)
“… A Judge, believing himself to be fettered by the
supposed rule that he must look to the language and
nothing else, laments that the draftsmen have not
provided for this or that, or have been guilty of
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some or other ambiguity. It would certainly save the
Judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were drafted
with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the
absence of it, when a defect appears a Judge cannot
simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He
must set to work on the constructive task of finding
the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not
only from the language of the statute, but also from
a consideration of the social conditions which gave
rise to it, and of the mischief which it was passed
to remedy, and then he must supplement the written
word so as to give “force and life” to the intention
of the legislature.”
105. Viewed from any perspective, there seems to be no
reason to arbitrarily discriminate against a girl child
who is married between 15 and 18 years of age. On the
contrary, there is every reason to give a harmonious and
purposive construction to the pro-child statutes to
preserve and protect the human rights of the married
girl child.
Implementation of laws
106. The Preamble to our Constitution brings out our
commitment to social justice, but unfortunately, this
petition clearly brings out that social justice laws are
not implemented in the spirit in which they are enacted
by Parliament. Young girls are married in thousands in
the country, and as Section 13 of the PCMA indicates,
there is an auspicious day — Akshaya Trutiya — when mass
child marriages are performed. Such young girls are
subjected to sexual intercourse regardless of their
health, their ability to bear children and other adverse
social, economic and psychological consequences. Civil
society can do just so much for preventing such child
marriages but eventually it is for the Government of
India and the State Governments to take proactive steps
to prevent child marriages so that young girls in our
country can aspire to a better and healthier life. We
hope the State realises and appreciates this.
Conclusion
107. On a complete assessment of the law and the
documentary material, it appears that there are really
five options before us: (i) To let the incongruity
remain as it is — this does not seem a viable option to
us, given that the lives of thousands of young girls are
at stake; (ii) To strike down as unconstitutional
Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC — in the present case
this is also not a viable option since this relief was
given up and no such issue was raised; (iii) To reduce
the age of consent from 18 years to 15 years — this too
is not a viable option and would ultimately be for
Parliament to decide; (iv) To bring the POCSO Act in
consonance with Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC — this is
also not a viable option since it would require not only
a retrograde amendment to the POCSO Act but also to
several other pro-child statutes; (v) To read Exception
2 to Section 375 IPC in a purposive manner to make it in
consonance with the POCSO Act, the spirit of other pro-
child legislations and the human rights of a married
girl child. Being purposive and harmonious
constructionists, we are of opinion that this is the
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only pragmatic option available. Therefore, we are left
with absolutely no other option but to harmonise the
system of laws relating to children and require
Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC to now be meaningfully
read as: “Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man
with his own wife, the wife not being under eighteen
years of age, is not rape.” It is only through this
reading that the intent of social justice to the married
girl child and the constitutional vision of the Framers
of our Constitution can be preserved and protected and
perhaps given impetus.”

10. So far as the age of the prosecutrix is concerned, in the face

of the High School Certificate, there is no cavil that evidence about
her being a major, which is her stand, cannot be accepted. She
cannot be referred to medical examination for determination of her
age, so long as her date of birth founded on her High School
Certificate, is available. This certificate clearly indicates that she is a
minor. There, her date of birth is 04.11.2004. Section 94 of the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 makes
the following provision regarding presumption and determination of
age:

“94. Presumption and determination of age.– (1) Where,

it is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on
the appearance of the person brought before it under any
of the provisions of this Act (other than for the
purpose of giving evidence) that the said person is a
child, the Committee or the Board shall record such
observation stating the age of the child as nearly as
may be and proceed with the inquiry under section 14 or
section 36, as the case may be, without waiting for
further confirmation of the age.
(2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable
grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought
before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board,
as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age
determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining –
(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or
the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the
concerned examination Board, if available; and in the
absence thereof;
(ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or
a municipal authority or a panchayat;
(iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above,
age shall be determined by an ossification test or
any other latest medical age determination test
conducted on the orders of the Committee or the
Board:
Provided such age determination test conducted on the
order of the Committee or the Board shall be completed
within fifteen days from the date of such order.
 11
(3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be
the age of person so brought before it shall, for the
purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of
that person.”

11. The provisions of Section 94 (2) of the Act, which are

designed to determine the age of a juvenile, have been extended to
the victim in Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana; (2013) 7 SCC 263
and by a Division Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Priyanka
Devi through her husband vs. State of U.P. and others 2018 (1)
ACR 1061, to which I was a party. It has been held in Smt. Priyanka
Devi thus:

“13. Learned counsel for the petitioner lastly urged

that provisions of Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice
Act, 2015 do not apply to the case in hand as the same
are available for the purposes of determination of age
for a juvenile or a child in conflict with the law but
would not apply to the determination of age in the case
of a victim.
14. We are afraid that the aforesaid submission is not
correct. The issue was examined by the Supreme Court in
the case of Mahadeo S/o Kerba Maske v. State of
Maharashtra and Another; (2013) 14 SCC 637 where in
paragraph no. 12 of the report it was held as under:
"Under rule 12(3)(b), it is specifically provided
that only in the absence of alternative methods
described under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii), the
medical opinion can be sought for. In the light of
such a statutory rule prevailing for ascertainment of
the age of the juvenile in our considered opinion,
the same yardstick can be rightly followed by the
courts for the purpose of the ascertaining the age of
a victim as well."
(Emphasis supplied)
15. This issue has also been considered in an earlier
judgment of the Supreme Court in Jarnail Singh v. State
of Haryana; 2013 (7) SCC 263, where too it has been held
that rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 must apply both to a
child in conflict with law as well as to a victim of a
crime. Paragraph 23 of the said report reads thus:
"Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to
determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we
are of the view that the aforesaid statutory
provision should be the basis for determining age,
even for a child who is a victim of crime. For, in
our view, there is hardly any difference in so far as
the issue of minority is concerned, between a child
in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of
crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would
be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007
Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW-
PW6. The manner of determining age conclusively, has
 12
been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted
above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a
child is ascertained, by adopting the first available
basis, out of a number of options postulated in Rule
12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3),
an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has
overriding effect over an option expressed in a
subsequent clause. The highest rated option
available, would conclusively determine the age of a
minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or
equivalent) certificate of the concerned child, is
the highest rated option. In case, the said
certificate is available, no other evidence can be
relied upon. Only in the absence of the said
certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of
the date of birth entered, in the school first
attended by the child. In case such an entry of date
of birth is available, the date of birth depicted
therein is liable to be treated as final and
conclusive, and no other material is to be relied
upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3)
postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by
a corporation or a municipal authority or a
panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is
available, then no other material whatsoever is to be
taken into consideration, for determining the age of
the child concerned, as the said certificate would
conclusively determine the age of the child. It is
only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that
Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the
concerned child, on the basis of medical opinion."
16. Thus, principles applicable to the determination of
age in the case of a juvenile would in terms apply to
cases of determination of the age of a victim as well.
It may be pointed out that at the point of time when
Mahadeo (supra) was decided by their lordships of the
Supreme Court, the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 was in
force and their lordships were interpreting the
provision of Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care
and Protection of Child) Rules, 2007. The said Act of
2000 has since been repealed and has been replaced by
the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. The rules framed under
the Act of 2000 are thus no longer on the statute book.
However, the provisions that found place in Rule 12(3)
of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Child)
Rules, 2007 framed under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000
are now, with certain modifications engrafted into the
the Principal Act vide section 94 of the Juvenile
Justice Act, 2015. The inter se priority of criteria to
determine age under Rule 12(3) of the Rules, 2007
(supra) and section 94 of the Act, 2015 remains the same
albeit with certain modifications which are of no
consequences to the facts in hand. In short, provisions
of Rule 12(3) of the Rules, 2007 framed under the
Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 are para meteria to the
provision of Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act,
2015. This being the comparative position, the
principles of law laid down by their lordships in the
case of Mahadeo (supra) would apply with equal force to
the provisions of section 94(2) of the Juvenile Justice
Act, 2015 while determining the age of a victim of an
offence under Sections 363 and 366 IPC. Thus, the
submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners,
 13
on this score, is not tenable.”

12. The provisions of Section 94(2) makes it vivid that in the face
of a date of birth certificate from the school or the matriculation or
equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, the
other evidence about the age of a victim cannot be looked into. If the
date of birth certificate as envisaged in clause (i) of sub-Section (2)
of Section 94 of the Act is not available, the birth certificate given by
a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat is the next
evidence to be considered in the rung. It is only when the evidence
about age envisaged under clauses (i) and (ii) of Sub-Section (2) of
Section 94 of the Act is not available, that a victim can be referred to
a medico-legal examination for the determination of her age.
Therefore, even if it is the prosecutrix's stand, which this Court
assumes to be so that she is 18 years old, and has married Pintoo of
her free will, she cannot be regarded as a major or permitted to
prove herself a major, by asking herself to be referred to medical
examination by a Board of Doctors, so long as her High School
Certificate is clear on the point. After the decision of their Lordships
of the Supreme Court in Suhani vs. State of U.P., 2018 SCC
Online SC 781, there was some confusion whether a victim could
be referred to the medical examination of a Board of Doctors for
determination of her age, in the face of a recorded date of birth in
the High School certificate. But, after the decision of a Division
Bench of this Court in Smt. Nisha Naaz alias Anuradha and
another vs. State of U.P. and others 2019 (2) ACR 2075 holding
that the decision in Suhani does not lay down any law but is a
decision on facts, the principles in Smt. Priyanka Devi, following the
decision in Jarnail Singh, is law that would govern the fate of this
case. In Smt. Nisha Naaz alias Anuradha, it was held:

“14. A plain reading of Section 94 of the 2015, Act

would reveal that only in absence of: (a) the date of
birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation
or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination
Board; and (b) the birth certificate given by a
corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat, age
is to be determined by an ossification test or any other
latest medical age determination test conducted on the
 14
orders of the Committee or the Board. A Division Bench
of this court in the case of Smt. Priyanka Devi Vs.
State of U.P. and others in Habeas Corpus Petition
No.55317 of 2017, decided on 21st November, 2017, after
noticing the provisions of the 2015, Act and the earlier
2000, Act and the rules framed thereunder, came to the
conclusion that as there is no significant change
brought about in the 2015, Act in the principles
governing determination of age of a juvenile in conflict
with law, in so far as weightage to medico legal
evidence is concerned, the law laid down in respect of
applicability of those provisions for determination of a
child victim would continue to apply notwithstanding the
new enactment. The Division Bench in Priyanka Devi's
case (supra) specifically held that as there is on
record the High School Certificate, the medico legal
evidence cannot be looked into as the statute does not
permit.
15. The judgment of the apex court in Suhani's case
(supra) does not lay down law or guidelines to be used
for determination of the age of child victim. Further,
it neither overrules nor considers its earlier decisions
which mandated that the age of child victim is to be
determined by the same principles as are applicable for
determination of the age of juvenile in conflict with
law. From the judgment of the apex court in Suhani's
case (supra), it appears that the concerned victim
(petitioner no.1 of that case) was produced before the
court and the court considered it apposite that she
should be medically examined by the concerned department
of All India Institute of Medical Sciences (for short
AIIMS). Upon which, AIIMS, by taking radiological tests,
submitted report giving both lower as well as higher
estimates of age. On the lower side the age was
estimated as 19 years and on the higher side it was 24
years. Therefore, even if the margin of error was of 5
years, the victim was an adult. Hence, on the facts of
that case, in Suhani's case, the first information
report was quashed by the Apex Court. The decision of
the Apex Court was therefore in exercise of its power
conferred upon it by Article 142 of the Constitution of
India which enables it to pass such decree or make such
order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any
cause or matter pending before it. The said decision
cannot be taken as a decision that overrules the earlier
binding precedents which lay down the manner in which
the age of a child victim is to be determined.”

13. So long as the prosecutrix is a minor, she cannot be permitted

to accompany the accused Pintoo, whom she claims to have
married. In order to determine whether the prosecutrix was enticed
away from her guardian's lawful custody, or she went away of her
own, this Court ascertained the prosecutrix's stand, who is present in
Court. Her stand is recorded verbatim:
 15

Q. Aapka Naam?

Ans. Shivani

Q. Aapki Aayu Kya Hai?

Ans. 04.01.2002 (18 years)

Q. Aap Pintoo Ko Janti Hain?

Ans. Haan.

Q. Pintoo Kaun Hain?

Ans. Mere Pati.

Q. Pintoo Aapko Bahla Fusla Kar Le Gaya Tha?

Ans. Nahi, Mai Apni Marzi se Uske Saath Gayi Thi.

Q. Aap Apne Mata-Pita Ke Pass Jaana Chahti Hain?

Ans. Nahi. Main Apne Pati Ke Pass Jana Chahti Hun.

14. Looking to Shivani’s stand, it is evident that she has not been
enticed away by Pintoo. Rather, she has left her home of her own
accord and married him. In this view of the matter, the marriage
would not be void under Section 12 of the Act of 2006, but would be
voidable under Section 3 of the said Act.

15. The conclusion is evident from the provisions of Sections 3

and 12 of the Act of 2006 which read as under:

“3. Child marriages to be voidable at the option of

contracting party being a child.—(1) Every child
marriage, whether solemnised before or after the
commencement of this Act, shall be voidable at the
option of the contracting party who was a child at the
time of the marriage:
Provided that a petition for annulling a child marriage
by a decree of nullity may be filed in the district
court only by a contracting party to the marriage who
was a child at the time of the marriage.
(2) If at the time of filing a petition, the petitioner
is a minor, the petition may be filed through his or her
guardian or next friend along with the Child Marriage
Prohibition Officer.
 16
(3) The petition under this section may be filed at any
time but before the child filing the petition completes
two years of attaining majority.
(4) While granting a decree of nullity under this
section, the district court shall make an order
directing both the parties to the marriage and their
parents or their guardians to return to the other party,
his or her parents or guardian, as the case may be, the
money, valuables, ornaments and other gifts received on
the occasion of the marriage by them from the other
side, or an amount equal to the value of such valuables,
ornaments, other gifts and money:
Provided that no order under this section shall be
passed unless the concerned parties have been given
notices to appear before the district court and show
cause why such order should not be passed.
12. Marriage of a minor child to be void in certain
circumstances.—Where a child, being a minor—
(a) is taken or enticed out of the keeping of the lawful
guardian; or
(b) by force compelled, or by any deceitful means
induced to go from any place; or
(c) is sold for the purpose of marriage; and made to go
through a form of marriage or if the minor is married
after which the minor is sold or trafficked or used for
immoral purposes,
such marriage shall be null and void.”

16. It would, therefore, be open to the prosecutrix to acknowledge

the marriage or claim it to be void, once she attains the age of
majority. It would also be open to her, once she attains the age of
majority, to go wherever she likes and stay with whomsoever she
wants.

17. Since, she is not inclined to go back to her parents, for the
present, this Court is left with no alternative but to direct the State to
place her in a suitable State facility other than a Nari Niketan, may
be a Safe Home/Shelter Home.

18. The District Magistrate, Hapur and the Superintendent of

Police, Hapur are ordered to ensure that the prosecutrix is
immediately housed in a suitable Safe Home/Shelter Home, or other
State facility where she would be safe and taken care of.

19. The learned District Judge, Hapur is also directed to ensure

that a Lady Judicial Officer, posted in his Judgeship, will visit the
 17

prosecutrix once a month and inquire about her welfare. In case

there is anything objectionable, she will immediately report the
matter to the District Judge, who will take appropriate steps to
ensure the prosecutrix's welfare during her stay in the State
facility/Safe Home/ Shelter Home, wherever she is housed.

20. Shivani would be permitted to live in State facility/Safe Home/

Shelter Home till 04.11.2022, and thereafter, she may go wherever
she wants and stay with whomsoever she likes, including Pintoo,
whom she claims to be her husband.

21. In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The

impugned order dated 24.11.2020, passed by the learned Judicial
Magistrate-I, Hapur in Case Crime No. 516 of 2020 under Section
363 IPC, P.S. Pilakhuwa, District Hapur is hereby set aside. The
prosecutrix shall be dealt with in accordance with the directions
made hereinabove.

22. Let Shivani, who is present in person, be forthwith taken into

the care of the Court Officer and conveyed through the Registrar
General to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Prayagraj. The
Senior Superintendent of Police, Prayagraj shall cause the
prosecutrix to be conveyed in safety to the Superintendent of Police,
Hapur, who, along with the District Magistrate, Hapur will carry out
the directions carried in this order forthwith.

23. The Court Officer shall convey Shivani to the Registrar

General, who shall make immediate arrangement to take her into his
immediate care and ensure compliance of this order.

24. Let this order be communicated to the learned District Judge,

Hapur, the District Magistrate, Hapur, the Senior Superintendent of
Police, Prayagraj and the Superintendent of Police, Hapur by the
Joint Registrar (Compliance) within 24 hours.

Order Date:- 27.1.2021

Deepak