G.R. No.

207176               June 18, 2014 [Petitioner Edna] nonetheless, admits in Exhibit "1," that, she is indebted to [the respondent]. Thus, she
SPOUSES VICTOR and EUNA BINUA, Petitioners, must pay her just debt.6 (Emphasis ours)
vs.
LUCIA P. ONG, Respondent.
Petitioner Edna, however, failed to settle her obligation, forcing the respondent to foreclose the
DECISION
mortgage on the properties, with the latter as the highest bidder during the public sale.
REYES, J.:

The petitioners then filed the case for the Declaration of Nullity of Mortgage Contracts, alleging that the
Spouses Victor and Edna Binua (petitioners) seek the declaration of the nullity of the real estate
mortgage documents were "executed under duress, as the [petitioners] at the time of the execution of
mortgages executed by petitioner Victor in favor of Lucia P. Ong (respondent), on the ground that these
said deeds were still suffering from the effect of the conviction of [petitioner] Edna, and could not have
were executed under fear, duress and threat.
been freely entered into said contracts."7

Facts of the Case

On December 12, 2008, the RTC of Tuguegarao City, Branch 5 (RTC-Branch 5), rendered a
Decision8 dismissing the complaint for lack of factual and legal merit.9 The RTC-Branch 5 ruled:
In a Joint Decision1 dated January 10, 2006 by the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 2 (RTC-
Branch 2), in Criminal Cases Nos. 8230, 8465-70, petitioner Edna was found guilty of Estafa and was
When the [petitioners] executed the Deeds of Mortgage, did they act under fear, or duress, or threat?
sentenced to imprisonment from six ( 6) years and one ( 1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to thirty
Quite clearly, they did – because a judgment of conviction was hanging over Edna’s head sentencing her
(30) years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum, for each conviction. Petitioner Edna was also ordered to
to a prison term x x x. However, Article 1335 of the Civil Code is equally unmistakable. The last paragraph
pay the respondent the amount of ₱2,285,000.00, with ten percent (10%) interest, and damages.2
of the article reads: "A threat to enforce one’s claim through competent authority, if the claim is just or
legal, does not vitiate consent."
Petitioner Edna sought to avoid criminal liability by settling her indebtedness through the execution of
separate real estate mortgages over petitioner Victor’s properties on February 2, 2006, and covering the
The Court cannot see its way to an agreement with the [petitioners]. They asked for a "compromise"
total amount of ₱7,000,000.00. Mortgaged were portions of Lot No. 1319 covered by Transfer Certificate
consisting in the execution of a promissory note by deeds of mortgage. Edna profited from it – she did
of Title (TCT) No. T-15232 and Lot No. 2399 covered by TCT No. T-15227, both located in Tuguegarao
not go to jail. She was in fact acquitted. The judgment of Branch 2 of this Court attained finality for
City.3
failure of the accused to perfect a seasonable appeal. And now they come to Court asking it to set aside
the very deeds of mortgage they had signed to keep Edna away from prison?10
Thereafter, petitioner Edna filed a motion for new trial, which was granted by the RTC-Branch 2.
Consequently, the RTC-Branch 2 rendered a Decision4 on February 24, 2006, ordering petitioner Edna to
The petitioners brought their case to the Court of Appeals (CA) and in the assailed Decision 11 dated
pay the respondent the amount of ₱2,285,000.00 as actual damages, with ten percent (10%) interest,
November 13, 2012 and Resolution12 dated May 14, 2013, the RTC-Branch 5 decision was affirmed. The
and other damages.5 The RTC-Branch 2 ruled that the presentation of a promissory note dated March 4,
CA ruled that:
1997 novated the original agreement between them into a civil obligation. The decision further reads:

[T]he claim of [petitioner] Victor that he executed the real estate mortgages for fear that his wife would
During the hearing of the motion [for new trial], [petitioner Edna’s] counsel presented [petitioner Edna].
go to jail is obviously not the intimidation referred to by law. In asserting that the above-mentioned
In the course of her testimony, she narrated that a promissory note (Exhibit "1") dated March 4, 1997
circumstance constituted fear, duress and threat, [the petitioners] missed altogether the essential
was executed by her in favor of Lucia P. Ong, the herein private complainant.
ingredient that would qualify the act complained of as intimidation, that the threat must be of an unjust
act.13
xxxx
In the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the petitioners claim that:
With the surfacing and finally the introduction of Exhibit "1", the nature of the liability of [petitioner
Edna] changed from both criminal and civil in nature to purely civil in character.
I.

The Promissory Note novated the complexity of the nature of the course of action the [respondent] had
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE DECISION OFTHE COURT A
from the beginning against [petitioner Edna].
QUO BASED ON FINDINGS OF FACTS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD

xxxx
II.

However, after the Promissory Note (Exh. "1") was executed by the parties, the whole scenario was
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DECLARE NULL AND VOID THE MORTGAGE CONTRACTS
novated into purely civil in nature. It was the intention of both [the respondent] and [petitioner Edna] to
DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT SAID CONTRACTS WERE EXECUTED UNDER FEAR, DURESS AND THREAT
turn the debt into a mere loan, hence, this agreement of theirs being the law that binds them must be
respected.
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DECLARE NULL AND VOID THE MORTGAGE CONTRACTS the said documents,"24 and that the respondent took advantage of the misfortune of the petitioners and
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY WERE EXECUTED TO SECURE A MONETARY OBLIGATION THAT IMPOSES A was able to secure in her favor the real estate mortgages.25
MONTHLY INTEREST OF TEN PERCENT14
Article 1390(2) of the Civil Code provides that contracts where the consent is vitiated by mistake,
The petitioners contend that the CA erred when it sustained the findings of the RTC that the execution of violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud are voidable or annullable. Article 1335 of the Civil Code,
the promissory note changed petitioner Edna’s obligation to a civil one. According to the petitioners, the meanwhile, states that "[t]here is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a
RTC’s findings are not in accord with the RTC-Branch 2 Decision dated February 24, 2006, which ruled reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon
that petitioner Edna’s liability is purely civil and not based on the compromise agreement with the the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent." The same article,
respondent. The petitioners insist that the RTC-Branch 2 decision allegedly show "the lack of criminal however, further states that "[a] threat to enforce one’s claim through competent authority, if the claim
liability of x x x Edna Binua due to novation." The petitioners also contend that there was no evidence is just or legal, does not vitiate consent."
during trial regarding the existence of the promissory note or that the basis of petitioner Edna’s
exoneration from criminal liability was the execution of the mortgage.15
In De Leon v. Court of Appeals,26 the Court held that in order that intimidation may vitiate consent and
render the contract invalid, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the intimidation must be the
The petitioners also claim that the threat and coercion levelled by the respondent against petitioner determining cause of the contract, or must have caused the consent to be given; (2) that the threatened
Victor, i.e., the wrongful criminal conviction of petitioner Edna, and which resulted into the signing of the act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real and serious, there being an evident disproportion
mortgages, do not fall within the coverage of Article 1335 of the Civil Code.16 Finally, the petitioners between the evil and the resistance which all men can offer, leading to the choice of the contract as the
argue that the CA committed an error when it refused to rule on the legality of the ten percent (10%) lesser evil; and (4) that it produces a reasonable and well-grounded fear from the fact that the person
monthly interest rate imposed on petitioner Edna’s loan obligation.17 from whom it comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury.27

Ruling of the Court In cases involving mortgages, a preponderance of the evidence is essential to establish its invalidity, and
in order to show fraud, duress, or undue influence of a mortgage, clear and convincing proof is
necessary.28
First, the Court must emphasize that in a Rule 45 petition for review, only questions of law may be raised
because the Court is not a trier of facts and is not to review or calibrate the evidence on record; and
when supported by substantial evidence, the findings off act by the CA are conclusive and binding on the Based on the petitioners’ own allegations, what the respondent did was merely inform them of
parties and are not reviewable by this Court,18 unless the case falls under any of the exceptions.19 petitioner Edna’s conviction in the criminal cases for estafa. It might have evoked a sense of fear or
dread on the petitioners’ part, but certainly there is nothing unjust, unlawful or evil in the respondent's
act. The petitioners also failed to show how such information was used by the respondent in coercing
In this case, the Court notes that the petitioners’ arguments are exact repetitions of the issues raised in
them into signing the mortgages. The petitioners must remember that petitioner Edna's conviction was a
the CA, and the petitioners failed to advance any convincing reason that would alter the resolution in this
result of a valid judicial process and even without the respondent allegedly "ramming it into petitioner
case. Not only that, the petitioners’ arguments are also downright inaccurate, if not maliciously
Victor's throat," petitioner Edna's imprisonment would be a legal consequence of such conviction. In
misleading.
Callanta v. National Labor Relations Commission,29 the Court stated that the threat to prosecute for
estafa not being an unjust act, but rather a valid and legal act to enforce a claim, cannot at all be
The decisive factor in this case is the RTC-Branch 2 Decision dated February 24, 2006 in Criminal Case considered as intimidation.30 As correctly ruled by the CA, "[i]f the judgment of conviction is the only
Nos. 8230, 8465, 8466, 8467, 8468, 8469 & 8470. This was the decision that overturned petitioner Edna’s basis of the [petitioners] in saying that their consents were vitiated, such will not suffice to nullify the
previous conviction for estafa and adjudged her only to be civilly liable to the respondent. Said RTC real estate mortgages and the subsequent foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. No proof was
decision is already final and executory, 20 and this was not refuted by the petitioners. The Court has adduced to show that [the respondent] used [force], duress, or threat to make [petitioner] Victor
consistently ruled that "once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case regardless of any execute the real estate mortgages."31
claim that it is erroneous. Having been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction acting within its
authority, the judgment may no longer be altered even at the risk of occasional legal infirmities or errors
Finally, the petitioners assail the ten percent (10%) imposed by the RTC-Branch 2 in the criminal cases for
it may contain."21 Thus, said RTC decision bars a rehash, not only of the issues raised therein but also of
estafa. As previously stated, however, the decision in said case is already final and executory. 32 The Court
other issues that might have been raised, and this includes the existence of the promissory note upon
will not even consider the petitioners' arguments on such issue for to do so would sanction the
which petitioner Edna’s exoneration rested. As a matter of fact, the RTC decision embodied petitioner
petitioners' act of subverting the immutability of a final judgment.
Edna’s own admission that she is indebted to the respondent. The issue of whether petitioner Edna’s
liability under the note was, from the very beginning, civil and not criminal in nature has no relevance in
this case as the only issue to be resolved is whether the mortgage contracts were executed under duress. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Any other discussion pertinent to the RTC decision will transgress the principle of immutability of a final
judgment.22
SO ORDERED.

The petitioners claim that they were compelled by duress or intimidation when they executed the
mortgage contracts.1âwphi1 According to them, they "were still suffering from the effect of the
conviction of [petitioner] Edna, and could not have been freely entered into said contracts."23 The
petitioners also allege that the respondent subsequently "rammed the two (2) mortgage contracts
involving two (2) prime properties on [petitioner Victor’s] throat, so to speak[,] just so to make him sign