Facts:
Bernardo Hebron, a member of the Liberal Party, and respondent Eulalio D. Reyes, of the
Nacionalista Party, were elected mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, of Carmona, Cavite.
for a term of four (4) years, beginning from January 1, 1952. Petitioner discharged the duties
and functions of mayor continuously until May 22 or 24, 1954, when he received the following
communication from the Office of the President: “the President has decided for the good of the
public service, to assume directly the investigation to the administrative charges against
you for alleged oppression, grave abuse of authority and serious misconduct in office……
you are hereby suspended from office….. to last until the final termination of the administrative
proceedings.”
Respondent Eulalio D. Reyes acted as mayor of Carmona. Although the term of office of petitioner
herein expired on December 31, 1955, his claim to the Office of Mayor of Carmona, Cavite, has not
thereby become entirely moot, as regards such rights as may have accrued to him prior thereto.
Issue:
Whether a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, may be
removed or suspended directly by the President of the Philippines.
Ruling:
No. In Lacson v. Roque, it was held that the President has no "inherent power to remove or
suspend" them (referring to local elective officers). Removal and suspension of public
officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction
subject to constitutional limitation. There is neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting
the President sweeping authority to remove municipal officials. By article VII, section 10, paragraph
(1) of the Constitution (1935) the President "shall . . . exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law", but supervision does not contemplate control. The
proviso "as may be provided by law", is a clear indication of constitutional intention that the
provisions was not to be self-executing but requires legislative implementation.
While sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code read:
SEC. 2188. Supervisory authority of provincial governor over municipal officers. - The provincial
governor shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal
officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of
office…. he may in such case suspend the officer pending action….
SEC. 2189. Trial of municipal officer by provincial board. - ….. The preventive suspension of a
municipal officer shall not be for more than thirty days. At the expiration of the thirty days, the
suspended officer shall be reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the
proceedings against him…..
SEC. 2191. Action by Secretary of the Interior. - ……. Secretary of the Interior shall review the
case without unnecessary delay and shall make such order for the reinstatement, dismissal,
suspension, or further suspension of the official, as the facts shall warrant and shall render
his final decision upon the matter within thirty days after the date on which the case was
received…….
With this, the Executive may take appropriate measures to compel the provincial governor
and the provincial board to take said action, the provincial governor and the provincial board
may not be deprived by the Executive of the power to exercise the authority conferred upon them in
sections 2188 to 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code. The Executive is merely appellate in
character; that, said assumption of powers, in the case at bar, even exceeded those of the
Provincial Governor and Provincial Board, in whom original jurisdiction is vested by said
sections 2188 to 2190, for, pursuant thereto, "the preventive suspension of a municipal
officer shall not be for more than 30 days" at the expiration of which he shall be reinstated.