BATCH ONE CASES

1. MMDA vs Garin
FACTS:
The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was
issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) by MMDA and his driver's license confiscated for parking
illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on August 1995.
Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter to then
MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing his
preference for his case to be filed in court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary
injunction, contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep.
Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-
empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process
clause of the Constitution.
The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against
undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified —
and therefore unlimited — fines and other penalties on erring motorists.
The trial court rendered the assailed decision in favor of herein respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not MMDA, through Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 could validly exercise police power.
HELD:
Police Power, having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, cannot be exercised by
any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however,
may delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of
municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only
such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991. 15 A
local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has
substantial control of local affairs." 16 Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays, which exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With the
passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and
administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed
under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. Thus: The MMDA is, as termed in the charter
itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and
coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the
charter itself
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila
Development Authority." The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall "install and
administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations
of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or
revoke drivers' licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of Rep. Act
No. 4136 and P.D. No. 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding," and that "(f)or this purpose, the Authority
shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and
may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security
guards, or members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority,
subject to such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose."
 2. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. ATIENZA
FACTS:
Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Manila reclassified the area
from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed to cease
and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies
Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum
of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that “the scaling down of the
Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.” In the MOU, the oil companies were
required to remove 28 tanks starting with the LPG spheres and to commence work for the creation of
safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. In exchange, the City Mayor and the
DOE will enable the oil companies to continuously operate within the limited area resulting from joint
operations and the scale down program. The Sangguniang Panlungosod ratified the MOU in Resolution
No. 97.
Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
removal of the Pandacan Terminals.
RULING:
Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 because the Local
Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to “enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the governance of the city.” One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the
city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian
or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.
In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground
of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public
business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and
ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional

3. DIOCESE OF BACOLOD VS COMELEC

TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property
FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing
the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in
size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains
the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act
No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading
“Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-
RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on
the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the
passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted
against it form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of
politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political question,
hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.
 2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as
the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners’
fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.
HELD:
1. NO. The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty.
There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction
granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.

The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a
constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming
arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the
tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.

Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a truly
political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there
are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits.

A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of
constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny
and review of this court.

In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any instance
that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt
that a political question brings.

2. No. The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in
this case.

Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is
already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government before a court
may come into the picture.”

Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had
understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the
filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right.
The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested
in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.

3. No. Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they
had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions
pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong
to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the
preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.

4. Yes. The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high
degree of protection.
 Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners’
way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it,
holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named
candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The
tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party,
or party-list group.

By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored
messages are covered.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech.

Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the
other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than propose a
commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however,
definitely political speech.

5. Content-based regulation. Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on

the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes
controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.

The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not
easily divorced from the size of its medium.

Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the
clear and present danger rule as measure.

Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government
having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is
no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to
justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to
minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The
size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.

6. Yes. The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin
remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected
by the Constitution.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or

constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is
repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.

The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers should be
posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it
violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived
of his property without due process of law.

7. No. The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this
court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not
suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on
such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to
its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality states that:
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government
policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored form
 of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance.
Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a
person’s or institution’s religion.
4. PBM EMPLOYEES VS PBM
FACTS:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate
labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and
petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on
March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO thru Pagcu confirmed the
planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has
already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to
do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. The Management,
thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration for
that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. Workers who without
previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to
an illegal strike. Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be
required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be
utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, filed a charge against petitioners
and other employees who composed the first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No. 875(Industrial
Peace Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty in by
CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble violated.
HELD:
Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion,
namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent. This is not present in the case. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the
defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from
harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance
its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its
employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their
right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, theemployees and
laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons
afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The
pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees
from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their
property rights. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and
persecuted as they believed they were by thepeace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the
condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that
vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be
repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized
in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human
rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over
property rights has been sustained. To regard the demonstration against policeofficers, not against the
employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstratingemployees,
stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargainingagreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting
speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of
expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the Issue
raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of
the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a
substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued
alleged police persecution.
 5. BALACUIT VS CFI
FACTS:
Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the
Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969. This called for a reduction to ½ of the ticket
price given to minors from 7-12 years old. There was a fine from 200-600 pesos or a 2-6 month
imprisonment
The complaint was issued in the trial court. A TRO was then issued to prevent the law from being
enforced.  The respondent court entered its decision declaring the law valid.
Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is
ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power. Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not
within the power of’ the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section 15(n) of Republic Act No.
523 where it states that the Muncipal board can only fix license fees for theaters and not admission rates.
The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by invoking the general welfare
clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the cited law.
ISSUE:
W/N Ordinance 640 – prohibiting payment on theater tickets for children below seven (7) is
constitutional?
RULING:
NO, because it infringes theater owners’ right to property. There is nothing pernicious in
demanding equal price for both children and adults. The petitioners are merely conducting their legitimate
businesses. The object of every business entrepreneur is to make a profit out of his venture. There is
nothing immoral or injurious in charging the same price for both children and adults. In fact, no person is
under compulsion to purchase a ticket. It is a totally voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if he buys a
ticket to such performances.
Such ticket represents a right, Positive or conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms
of the original contract of sale. This right is clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that
right is also, necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any
condition to the contrary in the contract by which he obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell
it to whom he pleases and at such price as he can obtain. So that an act prohibiting the sale of tickets to
theaters or other places of amusement at more than the regular price was held invalid as conflicting with
the state constitution securing the right of property. 

6. LOZANO V. MATINEZ
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the validity of BP 22, also known as the Bouncing Check Law. BP 22 punishes
a person “who makes or draws and issues any check on account for value, knowing at the time of issue
that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank..”. It is aimed at putting a stop to
the practice of issuing checks that are worthless which causes injury to the public interest. Contentions on
the law are that: 1) it offends constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; 2) it impairs
freedom of contract; 3) it contravenes the equal protection clause; 4) it unduly delegates legislative and
executive powers; and 5) its enactment is flawed because the Interim Batasan violated the prohibition on
amendments in the Third Reading
ISSUE:
Whether or not BP 22 is a valid law (police power)
HELD:
The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, not the non-
payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The effects of issuance of a worthless check transcends
the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large since putting valueless commercial papers in circulation can pollute the channels of
trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. Hence, the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of police power and is not in conflict with the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
There is no valid ground to sustain the contention the BP 22 impairs freedom of contract since
contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. The statute does not deny the equal protection
clause since it only penalizes the drawer of the check and not the payee. Additonally, BP 22 does not
constitute an undue delegation of legislative powers. Contrary to the contention, the power to define the
offense and to prescribe the penalty are not delegated to the payee. On the last contention, the Interim
Batasan investigated the matter and reported that the clause in question was an authorized amendment of
the bill. With all the foregoing reasons, the constitutionality of BP 22 is upheld.

7. CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORPORATION V. DSWD ET AL.

FACTS:
Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines.
Public respondents, on the other hand, include the DSWD, DOH, DOF, DOJ, and the DILG, specifically
tasked to monitor the drugstores’ compliance with the law; promulgate the implementing rules and
regulations for the effective implementation of the law; and prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring
drugstore establishments.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9257 otherwise known as the
“Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.”
Sec. 4(a) of the Act states that The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: (a) the grant
of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels
and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all
establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services
for the death of senior citizens;
Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation
of private property. Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a
loss of profit and capital because according to them drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on
branded medicines, and the law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated
for the discount.
ISSUE:
WON RA 9257 is constitutional.
HELD:
YES. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent
domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been
purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the
greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable
of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. It is [t]he power vested in the legislature by
the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for
the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights
must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must
yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the
mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is
invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the
provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which
every law has in its favor.

8. ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND HOTEL OPERATORS V CITY OF MANILA

FACTS: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760 with the
following provisions questioned for its violation of due process:

 refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed
form in the lobby in open view;
 prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;
 usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue
also);
 making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and
 cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
 The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to SC on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the constitution?
HELD:
Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals. There is no violation o constitutional due process for being reasonable and the ordinance is enjoys
the presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. Taxation may be made to
implement a police power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is dependent upon the local
legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed and injunction lifted.

9. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. ATIENZA

FACTS:
Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Manila reclassified the area
from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed to cease
and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies
Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum
of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that “the scaling down of the
Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.” In the MOU, the oil companies were
required to remove 28 tanks starting with the LPG spheres and to commence work for the creation of
safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. In exchange, the City Mayor and the
DOE will enable the oil companies to continuously operate within the limited area resulting from joint
operations and the scale down program. The Sangguniang Panlungosod ratified the MOU in Resolution
No. 97.
Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
removal of the Pandacan Terminals.
RULING:
Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 because the Local
Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to “enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the governance of the city.” One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the
city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian
or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.
In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the
ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. It might seriously hinder the transaction
of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of
statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional.
 10. CRUZ VS PARAS
FACTS:
Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs. Petitioners
contended that the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to
prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to
due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in
effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.
RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting
Municipal or City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and
Operation of Certain Places of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.'
The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have
the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets,
dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places
of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction:
On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but
likewise "Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938.
As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may go
as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed
one bit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition.
Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise to
a constitutional question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84
and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordinance is valid
RULING:
NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but
an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.
The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed
in the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it
would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a
night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for
the health and safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the
Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs.
In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two
possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other
tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one
that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself.
Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation
of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be,
therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would
have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because
no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the
legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate
regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of
an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business.
Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise
of an assumed power to prohibit.
 11. VELASCO VS. VILLEGAS
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of Ordinance 4964, prohibiting barbershop to conduct massaging
customers in a separate room or in any room in the same building where the operator of the barbershop
and the room of massaging is the same. The contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property
of petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood without due process of law. Lower Court dismissed
the petition for declaratory relief.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance 4964 is unconstitutional?
HELD:
Decision affirmed. Order 4964 is a police power measure in order to forestall possible
immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers.

12. MAGTAJAS VS PRYCE PROPERTIES

FACTS:
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan
de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the [Link] trouble arose when in 1992, flush
with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de
Oro [Link] reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On
December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. [Link] was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a
sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was
joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31,
1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their
enforcement
ISSUE:
WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid
HELD:
No. Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress,
among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes
games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by [Link] rationale of the
requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is [Link] gambling is authorized
by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere
ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact
Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No.
3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are
contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

13. CITY OF MANILA VS. JUDGE LAGUIO

FACTS:
The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation
engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodging houses. It built and opened
Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of
Tourism as a hotel.
March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which
prohibited certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as
tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely
affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance prohibited the establishment of
sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, cabarets, motels, inns.
Owners and operators of the enumerated establishments are given three months to wind up business
operations or transfer to any place outside Ermita-Malate or convert said businesses to other kinds
allowable within the area. The Ordinance also provided that in case of violation and conviction, the
premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.
June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance,
insofar as it included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it
constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law.
Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
WON the Ordinance is constitutional.
HELD:
SC held that the ordinance is unconstitutional for several reasons.
First, it did not meet the valid exercise of police power. To successfully invoke the exercise
of police power, not only must it appear that (1)the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but (2)the means employed must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive. The object of the
ordinance was the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community. The closing
down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the ordinance have no
reasonable relation to its purpose. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will
not per se protect and promote social and moral welfare of the community. It will not itself eradicate
prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
Second. The modality employed constitutes unlawful taking. The ordinance is unreasonable
and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. The
ordinance forbids running of the enumerated businesses in Ermita-Malate area and instructs
owners/operators to wind up their business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said
business into allowed business. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it
cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of
the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of
individuals. There are two types of taking: A “possessory” taking and a “regulatory” taking. The latter
occurs when the government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property, as
in this case.
Third. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause. Equal protection requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give
undue favor to some. Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation provided the
classification is reasonable. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1)It must be
based on substantial distinction; (2)It must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3)It must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and (4)It must apply equally to all members of the class. In the Court’s view,
there are no substantial distinction between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other
similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually
meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The Court likewise cannot see the logic for
prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside this area. A
noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.
Fourth. The ordinance is repugnant to general laws, thus it is ultra vires. The ordinance is in
contravention of the Revised Administrative Code as the Code merely empowers the local government
units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated. Not only that, it likewise runs counter
to the provisions of P.D. 499. The P.D. Had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a
commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial
establishments.
 14. ORTIGAS V FEATI BANK
FACTS:
On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at
Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their rights in
favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed was executed with stipulations, one of
which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes only. This was annotated in the
Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma
Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started construction of a building on
both lots to be devoted for banking purposes but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written
demand to stop construction but Feati continued contending that the building was being constructed
according to the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the
West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in
favour of Feati.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and
commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of Titles.
HELD:
Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local
Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations
for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the municipality should be
“liberally construed in it’s favour”, “to give more power to the local government in promoting economic
conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the community”. This is found in the General Welfare
Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not
absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to
promote health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.
Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace and
order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive residential area
considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the surrounding industrial and
commercial establishments.

15. PRESLEY VS. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION

FACTS:
A complaint for specific performance and damages with preliminary injunction was
filed by plaintiff-appellee, Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA for short) against TeofiloAlmendras
and Rollo Almendras (now both deceased and substituted by defendant-appellant Enedina Presley)
for violation of the Deed Restrictions of Bel-Air Subdivision that the subject house and lot shall be
used only for residential and not for commercial purposes and for non-payment of association dues
to plaintiff BAVA amounting to P3,803.55. Presley, as lessee of the property, is the owner and operator
of 'Hot Pan de Sal Store' located in the same address. At the time the Almendrases bought their property
in question from Makati Development Corporation, the Deed Restrictions (Exh. "C") was already
annotated in their title (Exh. "B") providing (among others) 'that the lot must be used only for residential
purpose' (Exh. "B-1" and "B-2"). When BAVA came to know of the existence of the 'Pan de sal' store, it
sent a letter to the defendants asking them to desist from operating the store (Exh. "D"). Under the
existing Deed Restrictions aforesaid, the entire Bel-Air Subdivision is classified as a purely
residential area, particularly Jupiter Road which is owned by and registered in the name of BAVA.
During the pendency of the case with this Court, petitioner Enedina Fox Presley died on January 4, 1991.
She was substituted by her two daughters as heirs, namely Olivia V. Pizzaro and Consuelo V. Lacson.
The issues raised in the instant petition have already been dealt with in the consolidated cases decided by
this Court promulgated on December 22, 1988 entitled Sangalang Doctrine.
ISSUE:
 Does the Sangalang Doctrine can be consider in the case at bar? Does the Deed of
Restrictions entirely wrong?
HELD:
We have carefully examined the pleadings but have found no reason to reconsider the
Sangalang doctrine. In assailing the Court's decision, the private respondent has come out with mere
assertions and allegations. It failed to present any proofs or convincing arguments to substantiate its
claim that Jupiter Street is still classified as a residential zone. (See Filinvest v. Court of
Appeals, 182 SCRA 664 [1990]) No new zoning re-classification, ordinance, certification to the
effect or jurisprudence for that matter was brought to the attention of this Court which would
necessarily compel us to take a second look at the Sangalang Case. The Court cannot reverse a
precedent and rule favorably for the private respondent on the strength of mere inferences. The
respondent court in the case at bar was not at all entirely wrong in upholding the Deed of Restrictions
annotated in the title of the petitioners. It held that the provisions of the Deed of Restrictions are in
the nature of contractual obligations freely entered into by the parties. Undoubtedly, they are valid and
can be enforced against the petitioner. However, these contractual stipulations on the use of the land even
if said conditions are annotated on the Torrens title can be impaired if necessary to reconcile with the
legitimate exercise of police power. (Ortigas& Co. Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust Co., 94
SCRA 533 [1979])

16. KNIGHT OF RIZAL V. TORRE DE MANILA

FACTS:
DMCI Project Developers, Inc. (DMCI-PDI) acquired a 7,716.60-square meter lot in the City
ofManila, located near Taft Avenue, Ermita for the construction of Torre de Manila condominium
[Link]-PDI secured its Barangay Clearance, Zoning Permit and Building Permit. The City Council
ofManila issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office of the Building Official to temporarily suspend
theBuilding Permit of DMCI-PDI for the reason that it would dwarf and ruin the line of sight of the
RizalShrine from the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage point. Manila City Legal Officer Renato G. Dela
Cruzstated that there is no legal justification for the temporary suspension of the Building Permit since
theconstruction lies outside the Luneta Park and that the area of subject property has neither been
officiallydeclared as an anthropological area or heritage zone. National Historical Commission of the
Philippines(NHCP) shares the same view as [Link] a letter to Mayor Joseph Ejercito Estrada, DMCI-
PIDI President Alfredo R. Austria soughtclarification on its Zoning Permit. He stated that since the City
Planning and Development Office(CPDO) granted its Zoning Permit, DMCI-PDI continued with the
application for the Building [Link] Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals (MZBAA) issued
Zoning BoardResolution recommending the approval of DMCI-PDI's application for variance. The
MZBAA noted thatthe Torre de Manila project exceeds the prescribed maximum Percentage of Land
Occupancy (PLO) andFloor Area Ratio (FAR) as stipulated in Article V, Section 17 of City Ordinance
No. [Link], the Knights of Rizal (KOR), a "civic, patriotic, cultural, nonpartisan, non-sectarian
andnon-profit organization" created under Republic Act No. 646, filed a Petition for Injunction seeking
atemporary restraining order before the Supreme Court, and later a permanent injunction, against
theconstruction of DMCIPDI's Torre de Manila condominium project which the court treated as petition
formandamus. KOR argued that the subject matter is one of transcendental importance and paramount
publicinterest involving the desecration of the Rizal Monument. The KOR asserts that Torre de Manila
willdwarf all surrounding buildings within a radius of two kilometers and forever ruin the sightline of
theRizal Monument in Luneta Park. They also claims that the Torre de Manila project violates the
NHCP's
Guidelines on Monuments Honoring National Heroes, Illustrious Filipinos and Other
Personages, which state that historic monuments should assert a visual "dominance" over itssurroundings,
as well as the country's commitment under the International Charter for the Conservationand Restoration
of Monuments and Sites, otherwise known as the Venice Charter. Lastly, the KOR claimsthat the DMCI-
PDI's construction is in violation of the City of Manila's zoning ordinance.
DMCI-PDI argues that the KOR's petition should be dismissed on the ground that the
SupremeCourt has no jurisdiction over the action following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts as it has
not shownthat it suffered an actual or threatened injury as a result of the alleged illegal conduct of the
City ofManila and that KOR has no legal [Link] the other hand the City of Manila also asserts that the
issuance and revocation of a BuildingPermit undoubtedly fall under the category of a discretionary act or
duty performed by the proper officerin light of his meticulous appraisal and evaluation of the pertinent
supporting documents of theapplication in accordance with the rules laid out under the National Building
Code and PresidentialDecree No. 1096, while the remedy of mandamus is available only to compel the
performance of aministerial duty. The City of Manila maintains that the construction of the Torre de
Manila did not violateany existing law, since the edifice is around 789 meters away from the line of sight
of the RizalMonument.

ISSUE:
Can the Court issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of the City of Manila to stop
theconstruction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila project?
RULING:
NO. Mandamus does not lie against the City of [Link] stoppage of the construction of a
building in one's own property would violate substantivedue process. Under the Rules on Civil Procedure,
mandamus can only be issued when there is a clearlegal duty imposed upon the office or the officer
sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to
the performance of such act. In the present case, there isno legal duty on the part of the City of Manila to
consider the standards set under Ordinance No. 8119since it can only be applied the boundaries of Rizal
Park while the area where Torre de Manila is being built is a privately-owned property. Also, to declare
that the City of Manila failed to consider thestandards under Ordinance No. 8119 would involve making a
finding of [Link] power of the Court in mandamus petitions does not extend to direct the exercise of
judgmentor discretion. During the Oral Arguments, it was established that the granting of a variance is
neitheruncommon nor irregular. Current practice has made granting of a variance the rule rather than
theexception. Without further proof that the MZBAA acted whimsically, capriciously, or arbitrarily
inissuing said resolution, the Court must take the approval of the MZBAA, and subsequent ratification
bythe City Council of Manila, as the duly authorized exercise of discretion by the city officials. The
Courtcannot substitute its judgment for that of said officials who are in a better position to consider and
weighthe same in the light of the authority specifically vested in them by law. It is not for this Court to
dictateupon the other branches bf the government how their discretion must be exercised so long as these
branches do not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The violation of the NHCP guidelines and Venice Charter as KOR’s contention states, do
notconstitute clear legal bases for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. These were just mere guidelines.
TheVenice Charter is merely a codification of guiding principles for the preservation and restoration
ofancient monuments, sites, and buildings. The Venice Charter is not a treaty and therefore does not
become enforceable as [Link] KOR is also estopped from questioning the construction of the Torre de
Manila project undera basic principle that "one who seeks equity and justice must come to court with
clean hands”. Accordingto the NHCP, the KOR itself even proposed to build a Rizal Center on the park
as recently as 2013. The proposal was disapproved by the NHCR and the Department of Tourism as it
would have dwarfed theRizal Monument with its size and proximity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief
by a court of equity onthe ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to thecontroversy in issue. The KOR's petition should be dismissed on this
ground alone.
There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila due to its effect onthe
background, view, vista, sightline, or setting of the Rizal Monument.
Articles 1306 and 1409(1) of the Civil Code prescribes that - What is not expressly or
impliedly prohibited by law may be done, except when the act is contrary to morals, customs and I public
order. Inthis case, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila project is "contrary to morals,
customs,and public order" or that it brings harm, danger, or hazard to the community. The City of Manila
hasdetermined that DMCI-PDI complied with the standards set under the pertinent laws and local
ordinancesto construct its Torre de Manila [Link] 47 of Ordinance No. 8119 specifically
regulates the development of historic sites andfacilities. Section 48 regulates large commercial signage
and/or pylon. Nothing in both sections as well asin National Cultural Heritage Act, disallow the
construction of a building outside the boundaries of ahistoric site or facility, where such building may
affect the background of a historic site. In this case, theTorre de Manila stands 870 meters outside and to
the rear of the Rizal Monument and cannot possiblyobstruct the front view of the Rizal Monument.
Likewise, the Torre de Manila is not in an area that has been declared as a cultural property or national
treasure.
17. TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA VS BOT
FACTS:
 Petitioners who are taxicab operators assail the constitutionality of Memorandum Circular
No. 77-42 issued by the Board of Transportation (BOT) providing for the phasing out and replacement of
old and dilapidated taxicabs; as well as Implementing Circular No. 52 issued pursuant thereto by the
Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) instructing personnel of the BLT within the National Capital
Region to implement the said BOT Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be
allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances.
Petitioners allege that the questioned Circulars did not afford them procedural and substantive
due process, equal protection of the law, and protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification
and standard. Among others, they question the issuance of the Circulars without first calling them to a
conference or requiring them to submit position papers or other documents enforceability thereof only in
Metro Manila; and their being applicable only to taxicabs and not to other transportation services.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the constitutional guarantee of due process was denied to the taxicab operators and/or
other persons affected by the assailed Circular No. 52.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that there was no denial of due process since calling the taxicab
operators or persons who may be affected by the questioned Circulars to a conference or requiring them
to submit position papers or other documents is only one of the options open to the BOT which is given
wide discretionary authority under P.D. No. 101; and fixing a six- year ceiling for a car to be operated as
taxicab is a reasonable standard adopted to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly.
The Court also ruled that neither has the equal protection clause been violated by initially
enforcing the Circulars only in Metro Manila since it is of common knowledge that taxicabs in this city,
compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use, thus
making for a substantial distinction; nor by non-application of the Circulars to other transportation
services because the said Circulars satisfy the criteria required under the equal protection clause, which is
the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstances would
be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed.
It is clear from the provision of Section 2 of P.D. 101 aforequoted, that the leeway accorded
the Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of
any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the
submission of position papers or other documents from operators or persons who maybe affected, this
being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners
cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they
state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the
challenged Circulars. Operators of public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data and
information that may be desired by the BOT.
18. PPA V CIPRES STEVEDORING
FACTS:
Cargo handling operations in Dumaguete City were granted to respondent Cipres Stevedoring
since 1976. On 1990, petitioner Philippine Ports Authority issued Administrative Order 03-90 outlining
the guidelines and procedures in the selection and award of cargo handling contracts in all government
ports as well as cargo handling services. Respondent was able to continue with its business by virtue of
hold-over permit granted by PPA. While the second hold-over permit was in effect, PPA issued AO 03-
2000 expressly provides that all contract for cargo handling services of more than three years shall be
awarded through public bidding. Cipres filed for TRO contending that substantial number of workers in
the port of Dumaguete City faced the risk of displacement. Moreover, the possibility existed that the
contract for cargo handling in Dumaguete City would be awarded to an incompetent and inexperienced
participant in the bidding process unlike respondent which had already invested substantial capital in its
operations in the port of said city. RTC decided in favour of Cipres. PPA filed petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not AO 03-2000 is constitutional?
DECISION:
Petition granted. CA decision reversed and set aside. Stevedoring services are imbued with
public interest and subject to the state’s police power. The Manila South Harbor is public property owned
by the State. The operations of this premiere port of the country, including stevedoring work, are affected
with public interest. Stevedoring services are subject to regulation and control for the public good and in
the interest of general welfare.
PPA is empowered, after consultation with relevant government agencies, to make port
regulations particularly to make rules or regulation for the planning, development, construction,
maintenance, control, supervision and management of any port or port district in the country.51 With this
mandate, the decision to bid out the cargo holding services in the ports around the country is properly
within the province and discretion of petitioner which we cannot simply set aside absent grave abuse of
discretion on its part.

19. CHAVEZ VS ROMULO

FACTS:
This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in order to deter the
rising crime rates. Petitioner questions the ban as a violation of his right to property
ISSUE:
Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional and Whether or
not the right to carry firearms is a vested property right
HELD:
Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional [Link] evaluating a due
process claim; the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest exists.
The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a
property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that “a license is merely a
permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority
granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right.” In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
that:“Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.
It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution.”xxx In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of
PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866
which state that “the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under
such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of
residence.”
The Essay on Concealed Carry Everywhere
“right-to-carry” statutes that give citizens the ability to carry concealed handguns with the proper
license”, and this ... Yet it is still good to keep a firearm around just in case one of these scenarios ... that
wrong? Should all people have access to firearms? As stated in the second amendment, we as ... danger.
Giving citizens the chance to get these licenses shows trust, our individual freedoms, and “it ...
Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property
right protected under our Constitution. Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other
regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal
privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed.
A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the
statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a
license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity,
or privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights. The US Supreme Court, in
Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co, HELD: “The correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a
necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is always revocable.”

20. CITY OF MANILA VS CHINESE CEMETERY OF MANILA

FACTS:
The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private
cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that
such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are
within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other
routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create
irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and
monuments that would have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-
strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent
domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus,
the same filed an appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the
expropriation.
HELD:
The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual
reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal
corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions
accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to
exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not
the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions
imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire to.

21. MODAY VS CA
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed
Resolution No. 43-89, “Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a
One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday
for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities.” The same was
approved by the Mayor Bustillo but was disapproved by Sangguniang Panlalawigan citing, “expropriation
is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the
government center.” The Municipality petitioned for eminent domain in the RTC. They were allowed to
take possession of the land despite owner Percival Moday’s opposition. Moday filed motion for
reconsideration and was denied by the CA. Hence the current petition to reverse the decision and to
declare the resolution null and void. They contend that the expropriation was politically motivated and
Resolution No. 43-89 was correctly disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, there being other
municipal properties available for the purpose.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Municipal of Bunawan has authority to exercise eminent domain on the
ground of disapproval of Sangguniang Panlalawigan ?
DECISION:
The power of eminent domain inherently possessed by the national legislature may be validly
delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property
by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation.
Section 153 BP Blg 337
If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any municipal ordinance, resolution or
executive order is beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang bayan or the mayor, it shall declare
such ordinance, resolution or executive order invalid in whole or in part, entering its actions upon the
minutes and advising the proper municipal authorities thereof. The effect of such an action shall be to
annul the ordinance, resolution or executive order in question in whole or in part. The action of the
sangguniang panlalawigan shall be final.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm
action hich does not render said resolution null and void. The law grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the
Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. The provincial (board’s) disapproval of any resolution,
ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is
outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by law. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the
authority to disapprove for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of
eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution.

22. LAGCAO VS. JUDGE LABRA

FACTS:
After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was
already occupied by squatters. Thus a demolition order was issued. However, when the demolition order
was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters] to the MTCC, requesting
the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the
squatters. Acting on the mayors request, the MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition for a
period of 120 days. Unfortunately for Petitioners, during the suspension period, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site
pursuant to RA 7279.
In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the
expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the
concept of public use contemplated in the Constitution. They allege that it will benefit only a handful of
people.
ISSUE:
What is Eminent Domain? Was this validly exercised in this case?
RULING:
It is where a local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of
the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent.
No, it has not been validly invoked in this case due to the fact that The foundation of the right
to exercise eminent domain should be a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of public character.
Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated. In
this case, there was no showing at all why petitioners property was singled out for expropriation by the
city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no
reason for the choice of petitioners property as the site of a socialized housing project.
It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had already obtained a favorable
judgment of eviction against the illegal occupants of their property but Mayor Garcia requested the trial
court to suspend the demolition on the pretext that the City was still searching for a relocation site for the
squatters. However, instead of looking for a relocation site during the suspension period, the city council
suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for the expropriation of petitioners lot. It was trickery and bad
faith, pure and simple. The unconscionable manner in which the questioned ordinance was passed clearly
indicated that respondent City transgressed the Constitution, RA 7160 and RA 7279.
23. JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN FOUNDATION VS. MUN. OF PASIG
FACTS:
The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E.R. Santos Street, a municipal road
near the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly made
of light materials, were located. The road had to be at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire
Code, so that fire trucks could pass through in case of conflagration.
The municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791 square meter
property of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho. The
Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate
expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefor.
RTC Pasig. The municipality filed a complaint,amended gainst the Ching Cuancos for the
expropriation of the property under Section 19 of the LGC.
 The defendants answered that, as early as February 1993, they had sold the said property to
JILCSFI. JILCSFI filed a motion for leave to intervene as defendantinintervention, which was granted.
In its decision, the RTC held that, as gleaned from the declaration in Ordinance No. 21, there
was substantial compliance with the definite and valid offer requirement of Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160,
and that the expropriated portion is the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid.
Dissatisfied, JILCSFI elevated the case to the CA. The CA affirmed the order of the RTC.

ISSUES:
(1) WON the respondent complied with the requirement, under Section 19 of the Local Government
Code, of a valid and definite offer to acquire the property prior to the filing of the complaint;. (NO)
(2) WON the property which is already intended to be used for public purposes (i.e., building of a church
and school) may still be expropriated by the respondent; (YES)
(3) WON the requisites for an easement for rightofway under Articles 649 to 657 of the New Civil Code
may be dispensed with. (YES)
(4) WON respondent was able to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the
petitioner’s property and not elsewhere. (NO)
HELD:
(1) The respondent failed to prove that before it filed its complaint, it made a written definite and
valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an access road. The only evidence adduced by
the respondent to prove its compliance with Section 19 of the Local Government Code is the
photocopy of the letter purportedly bearing the signature of Engr. Jose Reyes, to only one of the
coowners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco.

This refers to your parcel of land located along E. Santos Street, Barangay Palatiw, Pasig, Metro
Manila embraced in and covered by TCT No. 66585, a portion of which with an area of fiftyone
(51) square meters is needed by the Municipal Government of Pasig for conversion into a road -
right of way for the benefit of several residents living in the vicinity of your property. Attached
herewith is the sketch plan for your information. In this connection, may we respectfully request
your presence in our office to discuss this project and the price that may be mutually agreed upon
by you and the Municipality of Pasig. Thank you.

The RTC rejected the document because the respondent failed to adduce in evidence the original
copy thereof. The respondent, likewise, failed to adduce evidence that copies of the letter were
sent to and received by all the coowners of the property, namely, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor
Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Kho.

Even if the letter was, indeed, received by the coowners, the letter is not a valid and definite offer
to purchase a specific portion of the property for a price certain. It is merely an invitation for only
one of the coowners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, to a conference to discuss the project and the price
that may be mutually acceptable to both parties.

There is no legal and factual basis to the CA’s ruling that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens
at the dorsal portion of petitioner’s TCT No. PT92579 is a substantial compliance with the
requisite offer.

Neither is the declaration in one of the whereas clauses of the ordinance that “the property owners
were already notified by the municipality of the intent to purchase the same for public use as a
municipal road,” a substantial compliance with the requirement of a valid and definite offer under
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. Presumably, the Sangguniang Bayan relied on the erroneous
premise that the letter of Engr. Reyes reached the coowners of the property.

(2) We reject the contention of the petitioner that its property can no longer be expropriated by the
respondent because it is intended for the construction of a place for religious worship and a
school for its members. The requirement is that the expropriation must be for a public purpose.

As aptly explained by this Court in Manosca v. Court of Appeals, thus:

It has been explained as early as Seña v. Manila Railroad Co., that: A historical research
discloses the meaning of the term “public use” to be one of constant growth. As society
 advances, its demands upon the individual increases and each demand is a new use to which the
resources of the individual may be devoted for “whatever is beneficially employed for the
community is a public use.

(3) We also reject the petitioner’s assertion that the respondent must comply with the requirements
for the establishment of an easement of right-of-way, more specifically, the road must be
constructed at the point least prejudicial to the servient state, and that there must be no adequate
outlet to a public highway. The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a
road. The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of
right-of-way under the New Civil Code.

Case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent
domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is
capricious and wantonly injurious.

(4) The respondent’s complaint also alleged that the said portion of the petitioner’s lot has been
surveyed as the best possible ingress and egress.

However, the respondent failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to prove its claims. There
is no showing in the record that an ocular inspection was conducted during the trial. The
petitioner was, there fore, deprived of its right to due process. It bears stressing that an ocular
inspection is part of the trial as evidence is thereby received and the parties are entitled to be
present at any stage of the trial. The findings of the trial court based on the conduct of the ocular
inspection must, therefore, be rejected.
24. SAN ROQUE VS REPUBLIC
25. Republic of the Philippines vs PLDT
FACTS:
Sometime in 1933, the defendant PLDT entered into an agreement with RCA
Communications Inc., an American corporation, whereby telephone messages coming from the US and
received by RCA’s domestic station, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT, and vice
versa.
The plaintiff through the Bureau of Telecommunications, after having set up its own
Government Telephone System, by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk
lines of the PLDT, entered into an agreement with RCA for a joint overseas telephone service.
Alleging that plaintiff is in competition with them, PLDT notified the former and receiving no
reply, disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the same; thus, prompting the plaintiff to file a case
before the CFI praying for judgment commanding PLDT to execute a contract with the Bureau for the use
of the facilities of PLDT’s telephone system, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the
defendant to restrain the severance of the existing trunk lines and restore those severed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant PLDT can be compelled to enter into a contract with the
plaintiff.
HELD:
“ x x x while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the
Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company
to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the
government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the
court.”
26. CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY
FACTS:
The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private
cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that
such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are
within their jurisdiction.
 Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other
routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create
irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and
monuments that would have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-
strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent
domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus,
the same filed an appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the
expropriation.
HELD:
The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual
reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal
corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions
accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to
exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not
the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions
imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire to.
27. PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS COMELEC
FACTS:
COMELEC issued resolution 2772 directing newspapers to provide provide free print space
of not less than one half (1/2) page for use as “Comelec Space” which shall be allocated by the
Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or
periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make known their qualifications, their stand on public
issues and their platforms and programs of government. Philippine Press Institute, a non-stock, non-profit
organization of newspaper and magazine publishers asks the Court to declare said resolution
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon
the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of Comelec alleged that the resolution does not
impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers. It merely
established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of “Comelec space”. And if it is
viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the
State- a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the
communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to
safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
ISSUE:
Whether the resolution was a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain?
HELD:
No. The court held that the resolution does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain. To compel print media companies to donate “Comelec-space” amounts to “taking” of
private personal property for public use or purposes without the requisite just compensation. The extent of
the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or
restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary value of the compulsory “donation,” measured
by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban
areas, may be very substantial indeed.
The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use are the necessity
for the taking and the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not
been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to
sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or
reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not been
suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by
the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the
enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be
assumed.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but
not without payment of “just compensation” (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of
paying compensation for “Comelec space” is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent
Commission.

28. BARANGAY SAN ROQUE V HEIRS OF PASTOR

FACTS:
Petitioner Brgy. San Roque, Talisay, Cebu filed before the MTC of Talisay, Cebu a complaint
to expropriate a property of the respondents heirs of Francisco Pastor. The MTC dismissed the complaint
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that "eminent domain is an exercise of the power to take
private property for public use after payment of just compensation. In an action for eminent domain,
therefore, the principal cause of action is the exercise of such power or right. The fact that the action also
involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC and not with this Court."
The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that the action for
eminent domain or condemnation of real property is a real action affecting title to or possession of real
property, hence, it is the assessed value of the property involved which determines the jurisdiction of the
court. Section 3, paragraph (3), of Republic Act No. 7691, provides that all civil actions involving title to,
or possession of, real property with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00 are within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the MTCs. The Tax Declaration shows that the assessed value of the land involved
is only P1,740.00. Hence, it is the MTC which has jurisdiction.
Petitioner thus appealed directly to the SC, raising a pure question of law.
ISSUE:
Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain or expropriation
where the assessed value of the subject property is below Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos?
HELD:
Test to determine whether a suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. A review of the jurisprudence of this Court
indicates that in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought.
If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance
would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in
suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for
support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now RTC).
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation
An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with
the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use.
The primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its
instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts
determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of
due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government’s exercise of eminent
domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
 True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the
court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the
expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of
the expropriation.
To emphasize, the question in the present suit is whether the government may expropriate
private property under the given set of circumstances. The government does not dispute respondents’ title
to or possession of the same. Indeed, it is not a question of who has a better title or right, for the
government does not even claim that it has a title to the property. It merely asserts its inherent sovereign
power to "appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the public necessity,
convenience or welfare may demand." (Brgy. San Roque vs. Heirs of Pastor, G.R. No. 138896. June 20,
2000)

29. REPUBLIC VS CASTELVI

FACTS:
In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease
agreement over a land in Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castellvi gave notice to
terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused because of the permanent installations and other facilities
worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the property. She then instituted
an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation
proceedings for the land in question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just
compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property that year .
The requisites for taking are:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;
4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s
property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the
republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof.
Requisite number 2 is not present according to the Supreme Court, “momentary” when
applied to possession or occupancy of real property should be construed to mean “a limited period” -- not
indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year
to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that
the Republic, through AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact
that the entry into the lant was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year
by consent of the owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement the republic, as lessee,
undertook to return the premises in substantially the same condition as at the time the property was first
occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as
may be inferred from the construction of permanent improvements. But this “intention” cannot prevail
over the clear and express terms of the lease contract.
The 5th requirement is also lacking. In the instant case the entry of the Republic into the
property and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property. Cstellvi remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as
owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the
provision in the lease contract whereby the Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when
the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property,
because the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paing, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the
time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.
 It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for purposes of eminent domain
cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property
as lessee thereof, and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi’s property should not be
determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an
error when it held that the “taking” of the property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the
complaint in this case.
Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property
sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes
place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

30. CITY GOVT OF QUEZON CITY VS ERICTA

FACTS:
An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation
ofestablishment of private cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total area of
the private memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and
have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private memorial park, contends that the taking or
confiscation of property restricts the use of property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable
purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the taking is not
a valid exercise of police power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed
and not for the benefit of the public.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property
RULING:
No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The
ordinace is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaing a public
cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of expropriation requires payment of just compensation. Passing
the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the property with just compensation or due process, would
amount to unjust taking of a real property. Since the property that is needed to be taken will be used for
the public's benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate will come forward and not the police power
of the state.
32. REPUBLIC VS FAJARDO
FACTS:
Fajardo was mayor in Baao, Camrines Sur when the municipal council passed the ordinance
that prohibits the construction of a building that blocks the view of the town plaza. Moreover, it redirects
the grant of permission to the mayor.
After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building beside the gasoline
station near the town plaza. His request was repeatedly denied. He continued with the construction under
the rationale that he needed a house to stay in because the old one was destroyed by a typhoon.
He was convicted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the building due to its obstructing
view.
He appealed to the CA, which in turn forwarded the petition due to the question of the
ordinance’s constitutionality.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is constitutional
HELD:
No, the ordinance doesn’t state any standard that limits the grant of power to the mayor. It is
an arbitrary and unlimited conferment. Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion
which is purely arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable
and invalid. The ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be
secured. All of the authorities cited above sustain this conclusion.
 The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive
appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and
amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation.
While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and the state may
eliminate structures offensive to the sight, the state may not permanently divest owners of the beneficial
use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance
of the community.
Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for urban purposes. To
do this legally, there must be just compensation and they must be given an opportunity to be heard.
An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for
any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the
property.
The validity was also refuted by the Admin Code which states:
SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. — The municipal council
shall have authority to exercise the following discretionary powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be
constructed or repaired within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof,
charging a fee which shall be determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less
than two pesos for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. The fees
collected under the provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school fund.
Since, there was absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either
established fire limits within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to be
constructed or repaired within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said
ordinance was not conceived and promulgated under the express authority of sec. 2243 (c)

33. NAPOCOR V. SAN PEDRO

FACTS:
Petitioner for the construction of its Transmission Line and Tower negotiated with respondent
for an easement of right of way over her property. respondent executed a Right of Way Grant in favor of
NPC. The payment voucher for the residential portion of the lot valued was then processed. However, the
NPC Board of Directors approved Board Resolution stating that it would pay only for easement over
agricultural lands, adopt median or average if there are several amounts involved. NPC filed a complaint
for eminent domain in the RTC against Maria and other landowners. According to NPC, in order to
construct and maintain its Northwestern Luzon Transmission Line Project it was necessary to acquire
several lots for an easement of right of way. The RTC rendered judgment, declaring as well-grounded,
fair and reasonable the compensation for the property. NPC appealed the amended decision to the CA,
asserting that the lower court gravely erred in fixing the just compensation for Respondents. the CA
rendered judgment dismissing the appeal, NPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied,
Hence the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the Right of way easement resulting to the deprivation of use of the property is
considered a taking.
HELD:
Yes, The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over
the land traversed by transmission lines, as in the present case, also falls within the ambit of the term
“expropriation.” While it is true that petitioner only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless
perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff
upon defendants that below said transmission lines. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain
results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no
cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of
condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may,
through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-of-way.”
 34. U.S. VS CAUSBY
FACTS:
Respondents owned a dwelling and a chicken farm near a municipal airport. The safe path of
glide to one of the runways of the airport passed directly over respondents' property at 83 feet, which was
67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn and 18 feet above the highest tree. It was used 4% of the
time in taking off and 7% of the time in landing. The Government leased the use of the airport for a term
of one month commencing June 1, 1942, with a provision for renewals until June 30, 1967, or six months
after the end of the national emergency, whichever was earlier. Various military aircraft of the United
States used the airport. They frequently came so close to respondents' property that they barely missed the
tops of trees, the noise was startling, and the glare from their landing lights lighted the place up brightly at
night. This destroyed the use of the property as a chicken farm and caused loss of sleep, nervousness, and
fright on the part of respondents. They sued in the Court of Claims to recover for an alleged taking of
their property and for damages to their poultry business. The Court of Claims found that the Government
had taken an easement over respondents' property, and that the value of the property destroyed and the
easement taken was $2,000; but it made no finding as to the precise nature or duration of the easement.
HELD:
1. A servitude has been imposed upon the land for which respondents are entitled to compensation
under the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 328 U. S. 260-267.
a. The common law doctrine that ownership of land extends to the periphery of the universe
has no place in the modern world. Pp. 328 U. S. 260-261.
b. The air above the minimum safe altitude of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics
Authority is a public highway and part of the public domain, as declared by Congress in
the Air Commerce Act of 1926, as amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. Pp.
328 U. S. 260-261, 328 U. S. 266.
c. Flights below that altitude are not within the navigable air space which Congress placed
within the public domain, even though they are within the path of glide approved by the
Civil Aeronautics Authority. Pp. 328 U.S. 263-264.
d. Flights of aircraft over private land which are so low and frequent as to be a direct and
immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land are as much an
appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional entry upon it. Pp. 328 U. S.
261-262, 328 U. S. 264-267.
2. Since there was a taking of private property for public use, the claim was "founded upon the
Constitution," within the meaning of § 141(1) of the Judicial Code, and the Court of Claims had
jurisdiction to hear and determine it. P. 328 U. S. 267.
3. Since the court's findings of fact contain no precise description of the nature or duration of the
easement taken, the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Court of Claims so
that it may make the necessary findings. Pp. 328 U. S. 267-268.
a. An accurate description of the easement taken is essential, since that interest vests in the
United States. P. 328 U. S. 267.
b. Findings of fact on every "material issue" are a statutory requirement, and a deficiency in
the findings cannot be rectified by statements in the opinion. Pp. 328 U. S. 267-268.
c. A conjecture in lieu of a conclusion from evidence would not be a proper foundation for
liability of the United States. P. 328 U. S. 268. 104 [Link]. 342, 60 F. Supp. 751, reversed
and remanded.
The Court of Claims granted respondents a judgment for the value of property destroyed and
damage to their property resulting from the taking of an easement over their property by low-flying
military aircraft of the United States, but failed to include in its findings of fact a specific description of
the nature or duration of the easement. 104 [Link]. 342, 60 F. Supp. 751. This Court granted certiorari.
327 U.S. 775. Reversed and remanded, p. 328 U. S. 268.

35. PPI VS COMELEC

FACTS:
COMELEC issued resolution 2772 directing newspapers to provide provide free print space
of not less than one half (1/2) page for use as “Comelec Space” which shall be allocated by the
Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or
periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make known their qualifications, their stand on public
issues and their platforms and programs of government. Philippine Press Institute, a non-stock, non-profit
organization of newspaper and magazine publishers asks the Court to declare said resolution
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon
the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of Comelec alleged that the resolution does not
impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers. It merely
established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of “Comelec space”. And if it is
viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the
State- a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the
communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to
safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
ISSUE:
Whether the resolution was a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain?
HELD:
No. The court held that the resolution does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain. To compel print media companies to donate “Comelec-space” amounts to “taking” of
private personal property for public use or purposes without the requisite just compensation. The extent of
the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or
restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary value of the compulsory “donation,” measured
by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban
areas, may be very substantial indeed.
The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use are the necessity
for the taking and the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not
been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to
sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or
reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not been
suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by
the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the
enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be
assumed.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but
not without payment of “just compensation” (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of
paying compensation for “Comelec space” is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent
Commission.
36. CITY OF MANDALUYONG VS FRANCISCO
FACTS:
On August 4, 1997, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig City a
complaint for expropriation against the respondents. Petitioner sought to expropriate three (3) adjoining
parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,847 square meters respondents constructed residential houses
several decades ago which they had since leased out to tenants until the present; on November 7, 1996,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of petitioner, upon petition of the Kapitbisig, an association of tenants and
occupants of the subject land, adopted Resolution No. 516, Series of 1996 authorizing Mayor Benjamin
Abalos of the City of Mandaluyong to initiate action for the expropriation of the subject lots and
construction of a medium-rise condominium for qualified occupants of the land
September 17, 1998, the trial court issued an order dismissing the Amended Complaint after
declaring respondents as “small property owners” whose land is exempt from expropriation under
Republic Act No. 7279. The court also found that the expropriation was not for a public purpose for
petitioner’s failure to present any evidence that the intended beneficiaries of the expropriation are landless
and homeless residents of Mandaluyong.
ISSUE:
Whether the RESPONDENT who is a SMALL PROPERTY OWNERS is EXEMPT FROM
EXPROPRIATION.”
HELD:
 Yes, R.A. No. 7279, the “Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992” introduced a
limitation on the size of the land sought to be expropriated for socialized housing. The law expressly
exempted “small property owners” from expropriation of their land for urban land reform.
R.A. 7279. Section 3 (q) defined that: “Small-property owners” are defined by two elements:
(1) those owners of real property whose property consists of residential lands with an area of not more
than 300 square meters in highly urbanized cities and 800 square meters in other urban areas; and (2) that
they do not own real property other than the same.

37. LAGCAO VS JUDGE LABRA

FACTS:
After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was
already occupied by squatters. Thus a demolition order was issued. However, when the demolition order
was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters] to the MTCC, requesting
the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the
squatters. Acting on the mayors request, the MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition for a
period of 120 days. Unfortunately for Petitioners, during the suspension period, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site
pursuant to RA 7279.
In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the
expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the
concept of public use contemplated in the Constitution. They allege that it will benefit only a handful of
people.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Power of Eminent Domain was validly exercised
RULING:
It is where a local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of
the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent.
No, it has not been validly invoked in this case due to the fact that The foundation of the right
to exercise eminent domain should be a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of public character.
Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated. In
this case, there was no showing at all why petitioners property was singled out for expropriation by the
city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no
reason for the choice of petitioners property as the site of a socialized housing project.
It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had already obtained a favorable
judgment of eviction against the illegal occupants of their property but Mayor Garcia requested the trial
court to suspend the demolition on the pretext that the City was still searching for a relocation site for the
squatters. However, instead of looking for a relocation site during the suspension period, the city council
suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for the expropriation of petitioners lot. It was trickery and bad
faith, pure and simple. The unconscionable manner in which the questioned ordinance was passed clearly
indicated that respondent City transgressed the Constitution, RA 7160 and RA 7279.

38. FILESTREAM INTERNATIONAL VS CA

FACTS:
Filstream International is the registered owner of parcels of land located in Antonio Rivera
St., Tondo II Manila. On January 7, 1993, it filed an ejectment suit against the occupants (private
respondents) of the said parcels of land on the grounds of termination of the lease contract and non- -
payment of rentals. The ejectment suit became final and executory as no further action was taken beyond
the CA.
During the pendency of the ejectment proceedings private respondents filed a complaint for
Annulment of Deed of Exchange against Filstream. The City of Manila came into the picture when it
approved Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing Mayor Alfredo Lim to initiate acquisition through legal means
of certain parcels of land. Subsequently, the City of Manila approved Ordinance No. 7855 declaring the
expropriation of certain parcels of land which formed part of the properties of Filstream. The said
properties were sold and distributed to qualified tenants pursuant to the Land Use Development Program
of the City of Manila. The City of Manila then filed a complaint for eminent domain seeking to
expropriate lands in Antonio Rivera St. The RTC issued a Writ of Possession in favor of the City.
Filstream filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to quash the writ of possession. The motion
to dismiss was premised on the following grounds: no valid cause of action; the petition does not satisfy
the requirements of public use and a mere clandestine maneuver to circumvent the writ execution issued
by the RTC of Manila in the ejectment suit; violation of the constitutional guarantee against non-
impairment of obligation and contract; price offered was too low hence violative of the just compensation
provision of the constitution.
The RTC denied the two motions. Filstream filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA which
dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form and substance, aside from the fact that copies of the
pleadings attached to the petition are blurred and unreadable.
ISSUES/RULING:
1. WON City of Manila may exercise right of eminent domain despite the existence of a final and
executory judgment ordering private respondents to vacate the lots.
YES. Petitioner Filstream anchors its claim by virtue of its ownership over the properties and
the existence of a final and executory judgment against private respondents ordering the latter’s ejectment
from the premises.
Private respondents’ claim on the other hand hinges on an alleged supervening event which
has rendered the enforcement of petitioner’s rights moot, that is, the expropriation proceedings
undertaken by the City of Manila over the disputed premises for the benefit of herein private respondents.
For its part, the City of Manila is merely exercising its power of eminent domain within its jurisdiction by
expropriating petitioner’s properties for public use.
There is no dispute as to the existence of a final and executory judgment in favor of petitioner
Filstream ordering the ejectment of private respondents from the properties subject of this dispute. Thus,
petitioner has every right to assert the execution of this decision as it had already became final and
executory.
However, it must also be conceded that the City of Manila has an undeniable right to exercise
its power of eminent domain within its jurisdiction. The right to expropriate private property for public
use is expressly granted to it under Sec 19 of the Local Government Code. Sec 100 of the Revised Charter
of the City of Manila further empowers the city government to expropriate private property in the pursuit
of its urban land reform and housing program. The city’s right to exercise these prerogatives
notwithstanding the existence of a final and executory judgment over the property to be expropriated had
already been previously upheld by the court in the case of Philippine Columbian Association vs Panis:
“The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to acquire
private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona-fide tenants or
occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the city.
That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not
diminish its public use character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all
who need them (Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 [1987]).
Corollary to the expanded notion of public use, expropriation is not anymore confined to vast
tracts of land and landed estates. It is therefore of no moment that the land sought to be expropriated in
this case is less than the half a hectare only (Pulido v. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 63 [1983]).
2. WON expropriation of Filstream’s lots were legally and validly undertaken.
NO. We take judicial notice of the fact that urban land reform has become a paramount task
in view of the acute shortage of decent housing in urban areas particularly in Metro Manila.
Nevertheless, despite the existence of a serious dilemma, local government units are not given an
unbridled authority when exercising their power of eminent domain in pursuit of solutions to these
problems. Constitutional provisions on due process and just compensation for the expropriation of
private property must be complied with. Other laws have also set down specific rules in the exercise of
the power of eminent domain, to wit:
 Sec 19 of LGC provides that such exercise must be pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution and pertinent laws.
  Sec 9 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (UDHA) provides an
order of priority in the acquisition of land for socialized housing, with private
lands listed as the last option.
 Sec 10 of UDHA provides that expropriation shall be resorted to only when other
modes of acquisition such as community mortgage, land swapping, donation to
the government, etc. have been exhausted, and, where expropriation is resorted
to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted.
Compliance with the above legislated conditions are deemed mandatory because these are the
only safeguards in securing the right of owners of private property to DUE PROCESS when their
property is expropriated for public use.
There is nothing in the records which would indicate that the City of Manila complied with
the above conditions. Filstream’s properties were expropriated and ordered condemned in favor of the
City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the acquisition of other lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA
7279 have proved futile. Evidently, there was a violation of petitioner Filstream’s right to due process.
It must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in exercising its power of
eminent domain for the general good considering that the right of the State to expropriate private property
as long as it is for public use always takes precedence over the interest of private property owners.
However we must not lose sight of the fact that the individual rights affected by the exercise of such right
are also entitled to protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of this superior right cannot override the
guarantee of due process extended by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated. (Filstream
International Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 125218 Jan. 23, 1998)

39. HEIRS OF JUANCHO ARDONA VS REYES

FACTS:
The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) Complaints with the Court of First Instance
of Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog
and Babag, Cebu City, The defendants filed their respective Opposition with Motion to Dismiss and/or
Reconsideration, manifestation adopting the answer.
In their motions to dismiss, the petitioners alleged, in addition to the issue of public use, that
there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property for tourism
purposes; that assuming that PTA has such power, the intended use cannot be paramount to the
determination of the land as a land reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by Legislative
fiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform program, it is the Court
of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance that has jurisdiction over the expropriation cases.
The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with The Philippine National Bank, Cebu
City Branch, an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 1533. the lower court issued separate orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the
premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession.
ISSUE:
Whether the actions to expropriate properties are constitutionally infirm in the taking of
private property for the promotion of tourism?
HELD:
No, petitioners have also failed to overcome the deference that is appropriately accorded to
formulations of national policy expressed in legislation. The expressions of national policy are found in
the revised charter of the Philippine Tourism Authority, Presidential Decree No. 564: 2. Acquisition of
Private Lands, Power of Eminent Domain. — To acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation
proceedings any private land within and without the tourist zones for any of the following reasons: (a)
consolidation of lands for tourist zone development purposes, (b) prevention of land speculation in areas
declared as tourist zones, (c) acquisition of right of way to the zones, (d) protection of water shed areas
and natural assets with tourism value, and (e) for any other purpose expressly authorized under this
Decree and accordingly, to exercise the power of eminent domain under its own name, which shall
proceed in the manner prescribed by law and/or the Rules of Court on condemnation proceedings. The
Authority may use any mode of payment which it may deem expedient and acceptable to the land owners:
Provided, That in case bonds are used as payment, the conditions and restrictions set forth in Chapter III,
Section 8 to 13 inclusively, of this Decree shall apply.
 40. PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR VS CA
FACTS:
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Petitioner passed Resolution
authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial
capitol site. The San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion, moved to dismiss the
complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. The trial court denied the
motion and authorized the Petitioner to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of
Court, The trial court issued a writ of possession in an order dated January18, 1990. The San Joaquins
filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Petitioner to take possession of their property and
a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order dated February
1990.
The San Joaquins petitioned before the Court of Appeals, In its answer to the petition, the
Petitioner claimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7
of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose. The
Solicitor General stated there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise
by the Petitioner of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that
the Petitioner must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to
expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents’ lands and the order denying the admission of
the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings
until after the Petitioner shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian
Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-
agricultural land.
ISSUE:
Whether the resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public
use?
HELD:
Yes, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of “public purpose” or
“public use” for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. Under the new concept, “public
use” means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and
the prosperity of the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project. The
expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The
establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people
of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the community
invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the
livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies
the public purpose requirement of the Constitution.

41. MANOSCA VS CA
FACTS:
Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig. Metro
Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492) square meters. When the parcel was
ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it
passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring
the land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was approved by the Minister of Education,
Culture and Sports At the same time, respondent Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an
order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property. The motion was opposed by petitioners.
After a hearing, the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional market and assessed values of the
property and authorizing the Republic to take over the property once the required sum would have been
deposited with the Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation
was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the
provision of the Constitution. Petitioners sought, in the meanwhile, a suspension in the implementation
of the 03rd August 1989 order of the trial court. On 15 February 1990, following the filing by respondent
Republic of its reply to petitioners’ motion seeking the dismissal of the case, the trial court issued its
denial of said motion to dismiss.6 Five (5) days later, or on 20 February 1990,7 another order was issued
by the trial court, declaring moot and academic the motion for reconsideration and/or suspension of the
order of 03 August 1989 with the rejection of petitioners’ motion to dismiss. Petitioners’ motion for the
reconsideration of the 20th February 1990 order was likewise denied by the trial court in its 16th April
1991 order. Petitioners then lodged a petition with the Court of Appeals which the appellate court
dismissed for failure to show any grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdictional competence on the
part of the trial court. A motion for the reconsideration of the decision was denied subsequently by
appellate court.
ISSUE:
Whether the expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would
constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni
Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
No, Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for taking property
by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, “public use” is one which confers same benefit or
advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of public
to use proposed facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use,
whether exercised by one or many members of public, a “public advantage” or “public benefit” accrues
sufficient to constitute a public use. The idea that “public use” is strictly limited to clear cases of “use by
the public” has long been discarded.

42. REYES VS NHA

FACTS:
Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for the expropriation of
sugarcane lands belonging to the petitioners. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the
expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated from
the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots
and the payment of just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
A few years later, petitioners contended that respondent NHA violated the stated public
purpose for the expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project when it failed to relocate the squatters
from the Metro Manila area, as borne out by the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court which
showed that most of the expropriated properties remain unoccupied. Petitioners likewise question the
public nature of the use by respondent NHA when it entered into a contract for the construction of low
cost housing units, which is allegedly different from the stated public purpose in the expropriation
proceedings. Hence, it is claimed that respondent NHA has forfeited its rights and interests by virtue of
the expropriation judgment and the expropriated properties should now be returned to herein petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in the light of the failure of
respondent NHA to use the expropriated property for the intended purpose but for a totally different
purpose.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA. Accordingly, petitioners cannot
insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the
contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the
concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. The term "public use" has now been
held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public
convenience." Thus, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use."
In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for
a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms,
entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns. Moreover, the Constitution itself allows
the State to undertake, for the common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing
program of urban land reform and housing which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic
services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. The
expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in
furtherance of social justice.

43. MCWD V J. KING AND SONS CO., INC

NO DIGEST
44. MODAY VS NHA
NO DIGEST
45. NHA VS HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO
FACTS:
NHA filed with RTC of Cebu Branch 11 a complaint as amended regarding the eminent
domain against Heirs of Guivelondo docketed as civil case.
The petitioner alleged that defendant heirs et. al were the rightful private owners of the land
which the petitioner intends to develop a socialized housing project.
The respondent heirs filed a manifestation of waiving their objections to petitioners power to
expropriate their properties, thereafter trial court declares plaintiff has a right to expropriate the properties
of the defendant heirs and appointed 3 commissioners who ascertain the just compensation of the said
properties be fixed at 11, 200.00 php. per square meter.
Petitioner NHA filed 2 motion for reconsideration that assails inclusion of lots 12, 13 and 19
as well as the amount of just compensation, however the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of
the trial courts partial judgment . but the trial court issued an omnibus order to deny the motion of
respondent granting the petitioner’s motion and of just compensation.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. Thereafter, heirs filed a
motion for execution since the trial court move for the entry of the partial judgment as modified by the
omnibus order.
The Court of Appeals rendered dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the ground of partial
judgment and omnibus order became a final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but then it was denied by the court. The
courts of appeals serve on petitioner for a notice of levy pursuant to writ of Execution and a Notice of
third garnishment from the Land bank of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the state can be compelled and coerced by the courts to continue with its inherent
power of eminent domain.
2. Whether or not judgment has become final and executory and if estoppel or laches applies to
government.
3. Whether or not writs of execution and garnishment may be issued against the state in an
expropriation where in the exercise of power of eminent domain will not serve public use or purpose
RULING:
The state as represented by the NHA for housing project can continue its inherent power of
eminent domain provided that the just compensation for the property sought is taken. After the rendition
of such order the plaintiff shouldn’t be permitted to dismiss or discontinue such proceedings except on
such terms of the court be equitable.
The order was final after the non-appealing of the petitioner as the lawful right to expropriate
the properties of respondent heirs of Guivelondo.
Petitioner NHA are not exempt from garnishment or execution, although it is public in
character since it is arbitrary and capricious for a government entity to initiate expropriation proceedings
that seize a private owner’s property.
 Petition was DENIED and the trial court’s decision denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss
expropriation proceeding was AFFIRMED. Its injunctive relief against the levy and garnishment of its
funds and personal properties was also DENIED. The temporary Restraining Order was LIFTED.
46. NPC POBRE V CA
NO DIGEST

47. ATO V GOPUCO

FACTS:
Respondent was the owner of a property located in the vicinity of the Lahug Airport in Cebu
City. in 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC) informed the owners of the various lots
surrounding the Lahug Airport, including the herein respondent, that the government was acquiring their
lands for purposes of expansion. Some landowners were convinced to sell their properties on the
assurance that they would be able to repurchase the same when these would no longer be used by the
airport. Others, including Respondent. Subsequently, when the Mactan International Airport commenced
operations, the Lahug Airport was ordered closed by then President Corazon C. Aquino in 1989.
Respondent wrote the Bureau of Air Transportation, through the manager of the Lahug Airport, seeking
the return of his lot and offering to return the money previously received by him as payment for the
expropriation. Respondent filed an amended complaint for recovery of ownership of the said lot against
the Petitioners. RTC dismissed the complaint and directed the respondent to pay the MCIAA exemplary
damages, litigation expenses and costs. Respondent appealed to the CA, which overturned the RTC
decision, ordered petitioners to reconvey the property. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied in
2003, hence this petition, which raises the following ISSUES:
ISSUE:
Whether private land is expropriated for a particular public use, and that particular public use
is abandoned, does its former owner acquire a cause of action for recovery of the property?
HELD:
No, When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the
exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public
use may be abandoned or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate
or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner. but If the land is expropriated for a particular
purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its
former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires
the property so expropriated.

48. REPUBLIC VS LIM

FACTS:
On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civil
action for expropriation with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, involving Lots of the Banilad
Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the
Philippine Army. After depositing ₱9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank, the Republic took
possession of the lots. Thereafter, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons
the sum of ₱4,062.10 as just compensation. In 1950, Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed
with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it “denied knowledge of
the matter.” Another heir, Nestor Belocura, brought the claim to the Office of then President Carlos
Garcia who wrote the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Secretary of National Defense to expedite
action on said claim. in 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio,
holding that they are the owners and have retained their right as such over Lots 932 and 939 because of
the Republic’s failure to pay the amount of ₱4,062.10, adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. In view
of “the differences in money value from 1940 up to the present,” the court adjusted the market value at
₱16,248.40, to be paid with 6% interest per annum from April 5, 1948, date of entry in the expropriation
proceedings, until full payment.
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged and foreclosed Lot 932 to Vicente
Lim for failure to pay. in 1992, respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title with the (RTC) seeking
an absolute and exclusive possession of the property. in 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondent. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA but the Ruling of the RTC was upheld and affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether the owner of the expropriated land is entitled for the repossession of his property
when party condemning refuses to pay the compensation which has been assessed or agreed upon?

HELD:
Yes, while the prevailing doctrine is that “the non-payment of just compensation does not
entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots,26 however, in cases where
the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in
the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their
property. This is in consonance with the principle that “the government cannot keep the property and
dishonor the judgment.” To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the government to pay
just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the
government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment
of just compensation which the court defined as not only the correct determination of the amount to be
paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered “just.”

49. VDA DE OUANO V REPUBLIC

FACTS:
In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAA’s predecessor agency, pursued a
program to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Through its team of negotiators, NAC met and
negotiated with the owners of the properties situated around the airport.
The landowners claim the government negotiating team, as a sweetener, assured them that
they could repurchase their respective lands should the Lahug Airport expansion project do not push
through or once the Lahug Airport closes or its operations transferred to Mactan-Cebu Airport.
On February 8, 1996, Ricardo L. Inocian and four others (all children of Isabel Limbaga who
originally owned six [6] of the lots expropriated); and Aletha Suico Magat and seven others, successors-
in-interest of Santiago Suico, the original owner of two (2) of the condemned lots (collectively, the
Inocians), filed before the RTC in Cebu City a complaint for reconveyance of real properties and damages
against MCIAA. The RT rendered a decision directing MCIAA to reconvey the lands.
Soon after the MCIAA jettisoned the Lahug Airport expansion project, informal settlers
entered and occupied Lot No. 763-A which, before its expropriation, belonged to the Ouanos.
Soon after the MCIAA jettisoned the Lahug Airport expansion project, informal settlers
entered and occupied Lot No. 763-A which, before its expropriation, belonged to the Ouanos. The
Ouanos then formally asked to be allowed to exercise their right to repurchase the aforementioned lot, but
the MCIAA ignored the demand.
The RTC dismissed the Ouanos’ complaint for reconveyance. The CA denied their appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimonial evidence of the petitioners proving the promises, assurances
and representations by the airport officials and lawyers are inadmissbale under the Statute of Frauds.
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
Under the rule on the Statute of Frauds, as expressed in Article 1403 of the Civil Code, a
contract for the sale or acquisition of real property shall be unenforceable unless the same or some note of
the contract be in writing and subscribed by the party charged. Subject to defined exceptions, evidence of
the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or secondary evidence of its contents.
MCIAA’s invocation of the Statute of Frauds is misplaced primarily because the statute
applies only to executory and not to completed, executed, or partially consummated contracts.
Genuine Necessity

Illustrative Case : Municipality of Meycayuan vs. IAC

157 SCRA 640 (1998)

Facts:

Respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed with the Office of the Municipal
Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan an application for a permit to fence a parcel of land. The fencing of said
property was allegedly to enable the storage of the respondent’s heavy equipment and various finished
products.

The Municipal Council of Meycauayan passed Resolution manifesting the intention to expropriate the
respondent’s parcel of land. It was opposed by the respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation
with the office of the Provincial Governor.

Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Board of Bulacan disapprove or annul the
resolution in question because there was no genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauyan to
expropriate the respondent’s property for use as a public road. Then Provincial Board of Bulacan passed
Resolution disapproving and annulling the Resolution passed by the Municipal Council of Meycauayan.

However, Petitioner (Municipality of Meycauayan) filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a special
civil action for expropriation, and upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the market value of the
land, with the PNB, the trial court issued a writ of possession in favor of the Petitioner.

The respondent went to IAC, on petition for review, which the appellate court affirmed the trial
court’s decision. But upon MR, the decision was reversed and held that there is no genuine necessity to
expropriate the land for use as public road as there were several other roads for the same purpose and another
more expropriate lot for the proposed public road.

Issue:

Whether or not Petitioner has the right to expropriate?

Held:

The Petitioner’s purpose in expropriating the respondent’s property is to convert the same into a
public road for the purposes to ease the traffic in the area of vehicles. However, it reveals that there are other
connecting links or several roads for the same purpose and another lot for proposed public road. The Petitioner
itself admits that there are four (4) such cross roads in existence.

The foundation of the right to exercise the power of eminent domain is genuine necessity and that
necessity must be of public character. Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public
good and there is genuine necessity of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire
into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine
necessity therefor.

It is still a judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party adversely
affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal protection clause will not allow.

There is absolutely no showing in the petition why the more appropriate lot for the proposed road
which was offered for sale has not been the subject of the petitioner’s attempt to expropriate assuming there is
a real need for another connecting road.

Petition DISMISSED.

Illustrative Case : Republic vs. De Knecht

GR No. 87351, February 12,1990

Fact: The Petitioner On February 20, 1979 filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal in Pasay City an
expropriation proceedings against the owners of the houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets
among them is the respondent and some fifteen other defendant who filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of
jurisdiction, pendency of appeal with the President of the Philippines, prematureness of complaint and
arbitrary and erroneous valuation of the properties, filed an ex parte urgent motion for the issuance by the trial
court of a restraining order to restrain the Petitioner from proceeding with the taking of immediate possession
and control of the property sought to be condemned. In June, 1979 the Petitioner filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession of the property to be expropriated which the lower court granted and created a
Committee of three to determine the just compensation for the lands involved in the proceedings. Respondent
filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition, and directed against the order of the lower court
dated June 14, 1979 praying that the Petitioner be commanded to desist from further proceeding in the
expropriation action and from implementing said order where the court granted in favor of the
respondentAdrian Avilado Antazo

On August 8, 1981 defendants Maria Del Carmen Roxas Vda. de Elizalde and others moved to dismiss the
expropriation action in compliance with the dispositive portion of the aforesaid decision of this Court which
had become final and in order to avoid further damage to same defendants who were denied possession of their
properties. On September 2, 1983, the Republic filed a motion to dismiss said case due to the enactment of the
Batas Pambansa Blg. 340 expropriating the same properties and for the same purpose. The lower court in an
order of September 2, 1983 dismissed the case by reason of the enactment of the said law. The motion for
reconsideration thereof was denied in the order of the lower court dated December 18, 1986.

Respondent appealed from said order to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a decision was rendered
on December 28, 1988 in favor of the respondents and setting aside the decision of the CA.

Issue: whether an expropriation proceeding that was determined by a final judgment of this Court may be the
subject of a subsequent legislation for expropriation.

Held: Yes, While it is true that said final judgment of the Supreme Court on the subject becomes the law of the
case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the petitioner to take private properties for public
use upon the payment of the just compensation is so provided in the Constitution and our laws. Such
expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the land
owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation.

Illustrative Case : De la Paz Masikip vs. Judge Legaspi

GR No.136349, January 23,2006

Fact: Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro
Manila. The Respondent City of Pasig, notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a portion of her
property to be used for the “sports development and recreational activities” of the residents of Barangay
Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig. Again respondent
wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly “in line with the program of the
Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.” petitioner
sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid,
and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to “provide land opportunities to
deserving poor sectors of our community.” respondent reiterated in a letter that the purpose of the
expropriation of petitioner’s property is “to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents.”
Subsequently, respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation and prayed that the trial court,
after due notice and hearing, issue an order for the condemnation of the property; The petitioner filed a Motion
to Dismiss the complaint. The trial court dismissed the motion on the ground that there is a genuine necessity
to expropriate the property. The motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied by the trial court
which prompted petitioner to file with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari who dismissed
the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was also denied.

Issue: Where the expropriation of private property for the benefit of a small community notwithstanding that
there is such a recreational facility only a short distance away, is considered to be for public use?

Held: No. The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from “the necessity”
and the taking must be limited to such necessity. the court held that the very foundation of the right to exercise
eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Moreover, the
ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the land. That
“necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an
absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public
with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the property owner consistent with such
benefit.” That respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate
petitioner’s property.

What is just compenstion

Illustrative Case :Eslaban vs. De Onorio

GR No. 146062, June 28,2001

Eslaban vs Onorio 360 SCRA 230 Facts: Clarita Vda. De Onorio is the owner of the land in Barangay M.
Roxas, Sto. Nino, South Cotabato. Such land is the subject for the construction of an irrigation canal of the
National Irrigation Administration (NIA). Mr. Santiago Eslaban Jr. is the project manager of NIA. The
partiesagreed to the construction of the canal provided that the government will pay for the area that has been
taken. A rightof-way agreement was entered into by the parties in which respondent was paid the amount of
P4, 180.00 as right of way damages. Subsequently, respondent executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and
Fees which waives her rights for the damage to the crops due to construction of the right of way. After which,
respondent demands that petitioner pay P111, 299.55 for taking her property but the petitioner refused.
Petitioner states that the government had not consented to be sued and that the respondent is not entitled for
compensation by virtue of the homestead patent under CA no. 141. The RTC held that the NIA should pay
respondent the amount of P107, 517.60 as just compensation for the 24,660 sq meters that have been used for
the construction of the canal. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the decision of the RTC. Issue: Whether or
Not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC. Held: The CA is correct in affirming the decision of the
RTC but modifications shall be made regarding the value of the just compensation. The following are the
points to be considered in arriving in this decision. First, Rule 7 par 5 of the Rule of Civil Procedure provides
that thecertification against forum shopping should only be executed by the plaintiff or the principal. The
petition for review was filed by Mr. Eslaban jr. while the verification or certification were signed by Mr. Cesar
Gonzales, an administrator of the agency. Neither of the two has the authority to sign such certificate for they
are not the plaintiff or principal. Such case is a sufficient ground for dismissing this petition. Second, PD NO.
1529 provides that the owner is required to recognize in favor of the government the easement of a “public
highway, way, private way established by law, or any government canal where the certificate of title does not
state that the boundaries thereof have been pre-determined. In the case at bar, the irrigation canal was
constructed on Oct 1981 after the property had been registered in May of 1976. In this case, prior expropriation
proceedings must be filed and just compensation shall be paid to the owner before the land could be taken for
public use. Third, In this case, just compensation is defined as not only the correct amount to be paid but the
reasonable time for the Government to pay the owner. The CA erred in this point by stating that the market
value (just compensation) of the land is determined in the filing of the complaint in [Link] determination of
such value should be from the time of its taking by the NIA in 1981. Lastly, the petitioner cannot argue that the
Affidavit of waiver of rights and fees executed by the respondent pertains to the payment of the value of the
land therefore exempting NIA to pay the value of the land taken. Such waiver pertains only to the crops and
improvements that were damage due to the construction of the right-of-way not the value of the land.
Wherefore, decision of CA affirmed with modification regarding the just compensation in the amount of P16,
047.61 per hectare. III.

Illustrative Case : RP VS. GINGOYON , DECEMBER 19,2005

FACTS
The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of the Court’s decision in Agan v. PIATCO,
promulgated in 2003 (2003 Decision). This decision nullified the “Concession Agreement for the Build-
Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III” entered
into between the Philippine Government (Government) and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co.,
Inc. (PIATCO), as well as the amendments and supplements thereto.

The agreement had authorized PIATCO to build a new international airport terminal (NAIA 3), as well as a
franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period of 25 years. The contracts
were nullified and that the agreement was contrary to public policy. At the time of the promulgation of the
2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities had already been built by PIATCO and were nearing completion.
However, the ponencia was silent as to the legal status of the NAIA 3 facilities following the nullification of
the contracts, as well as whatever rights of PIATCO for reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of
the facilities.
After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of
PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the Government to put the airport terminal into immediate operation.
The Government and PIATCO conducted several rounds of negotiation regarding the NAIA 3 facilities.

In 2004, the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay RTC. The Government sought
upon the filing of the complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate
possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared that it had deposited the
amount of P3,002,125,000.00 (3 Billion) in Cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the
NAIA 3 terminal’s assessed value for taxation purposes. The Government insists that Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court governs the expropriation proceedings in this case to the exclusion of all other laws. On the other hand,
PIATCO claims that it is Rep. Act No. 8974 which does apply.

ISSUE
Whether or not Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the expropriation proceedings in
this case?

HELD
The 2004 Resolution  in Agan sets the base requirement that has to be observed before the Government may
take over the NAIA 3, that there must be payment to PIATCO of just compensation in accordance with law
and equity. Any ruling in the present expropriation case must be conformable to the dictates of the Court as
pronounced in the Agan cases.

Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government.

Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure
projects. Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner
than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the national government expropriates property “for
national government infrastructure projects.” Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national government
for purposes other than national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and the deposit mode
prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply.

Rep. Act No. 8974 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it requires the immediate payment by the
Government of at least the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO and provides certain valuation
standards or methods for the determination of just compensation.

Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the implementation of Writ of Possession in favor of the Government over
NAIA 3 is held in abeyance until PIATCO is directly paid the amount of P3 Billion, representing the proffered
value of NAIA 3 under Section 4(c) of the law.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE : OFFICE OF THE SILICITOR GENERAL VS. AYALA LAND INC

GR NO. 1777056, SEPTEMBER 18, 2008

Facts:

Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and Shangri-la maintain and operate shopping malls in various locations
in Metro Manila. Respondent SM Prime constructs, operates, and leases out commercial buildings and other
structures, among which, are SM City, Manila; SM Centerpoint, Sta.

Mesa, Manila; SM City, North Avenue, Quezon City; and SM Southmall, Las Piñas.

The shopping malls operated or leased out by respondents have parking facilities for all kinds of motor
vehicles, either by way of parking spaces inside the mall buildings or in separate buildings and/or adjacent lots
that are solely devoted for use as parking spaces.

Respondents expend for the maintenance and administration of their respective parking facilities.

The parking tickets or cards issued by respondents to vehicle owners contain the stipulation that respondents
shall not be responsible for any loss or damage to the vehicles parked in respondents' parking facilities.

In 1999, the Senate Committees on Trade and Commerce and on Justice and Human Rights conducted a joint
investigation for the following purposes: (1) to inquire into the legality of the prevalent practice of shopping
malls of charging parking fees; (2) assuming arguendo... that the collection of parking fees was legally
authorized, to find out the basis and reasonableness of the parking rates charged by shopping malls; and (3) to
determine the legality of the policy of shopping malls of denying liability in cases of theft, robbery, or
carnapping,... by invoking the waiver clause at the back of the parking tickets.

In view of the foregoing, the Committees find that the collection of parking fees by shopping malls is contrary
to the National Building Code and is therefor [sic] illegal. While it is true that the Code merely requires malls
to provide parking spaces, without... specifying whether it is free or not, both Committees believe that the
reasonable and logical interpretation of the Code is that the parking spaces are for free.

Respondent SM Prime thereafter received information that, pursuant to Senate Committee Report No. 225, the
DPWH Secretary and the local building officials of Manila, Quezon City, and Las Piñas intended to institute,
through the OSG, an action to enjoin respondent SM Prime and... similar establishments from collecting
parking fees, and to impose upon said establishments penal sanctions under Presidential Decree No. 1096,
otherwise known as the National Building Code of the Philippines (National Building Code), and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations

(IRR).

The RTC then held that there was no sufficient evidence to justify any award for damages.

The RTC finally decreed in its 29 May 2002 Joint Decision in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210 that:

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the Court declares that Ayala Land[,] Inc., Robinsons Land Corporation,
Shangri-la Plaza Corporation and SM Prime Holdings[,] Inc. are not obligated to provide parking spaces in
their malls for the use of their patrons or public in general,... free of charge.

The fallo of the 25 January 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are DENIED. Accordingly, appealed Decision is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

Issues:

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE LOWER
COURT THAT RESPONDENTS ARE NOT OBLIGED TO PROVIDE FREE PARKING SPACES TO
THEIR CUSTOMERS OR THE PUBLIC.

Ruling:

The Court finds no merit in the present Petition.

There is nothing therein pertaining to the collection (or non-collection) of parking fees by respondents. In fact,
the term "parking fees" cannot even be found at all in the entire National Building Code and its IRR.

Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police power to justify the regulation by the
State, through the DPWH Secretary and local building officials, of privately owned parking facilities,
including the collection by the owners/operators of such facilities... of parking fees from the public for the use
thereof.

When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the State is no longer exercising
police power, but another of its inherent powers, namely, eminent domain. Eminent domain enables the State
to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon... payment of just compensation to the owner.

Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking facilities remain/s with respondents, the
prohibition against their collection of parking fees from the public, for the use of said facilities, is already
tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their... properties.

The State is not only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latter's properties for use as parking
spaces, but is also mandating that they give the public access to said parking spaces for free.

In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who use
the mall parking facilities has no basis in the National Building Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose
the same prohibition by generally invoking police... power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of
respondents' property without payment of just compensation.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED.

Principles:
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of the property of the owner.
The power to regulate, however, does not include the... power to prohibit.

Police power does not involve the taking or confiscation of property, with the exception of a few cases where
there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to... destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace
and order and of promoting the general welfare; for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article,
such as opium and firearms.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE : INTERNAL REVENUE VS. BICOLANDIA DRUG CORP

GR NO. 148083, JULY 21,2006

Facts:
RA 7432, otherwise known as "An Act to Maximize the Contribution of Senior Citizens to Nation Building,
Grant Benefits and Special Privileges and For Other Purposes," granted senior citizens several privileges, one
of which was obtaining a 20 percent discount from all establishments relative to the use of transportation
services, hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of
medicines anywhere in the country.

The law also provided that the private establishments giving the discount to senior citizens may claim the cost
as tax credit. BIR issued Revenue Regulations No. 2-94, which defined "tax credit" as follows: Tax Credit –
refers to the amount representing the 20% discount granted to a qualified senior citizen by all establishments
relative to their utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants,
halls, circuses, carnivals and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement, which discount shall be
deducted by the said establishments from their gross income for income tax purposes and from their gross sales
for value-added tax or other percentage tax purposes.

1995, respondent Bicolandia Drug Corporation, a corporation engaged in the business of retailing
pharmaceutical products under the business style of "Mercury Drug," granted the 20 percent sales discount to
qualified senior citizens purchasing their medicines in compliance with R.A. No. 7432. Respondent treated this
discount as a deduction from its gross income in compliance with RR No. 2-94, which implemented R.A. No.
7432. 1996, respondent filed its 1995 Corporate Annual ITR declaring a net loss position with nil income tax
liability. On December 27, 1996, respondent filed a claim for tax refund or credit in the amount of PhP
259,659.00

Resp alleged that CIR erred in treating the 20 percent sales discount given to senior citizens as a deduction
from its gross income for income tax purposes or other percentage tax purposes rather than as a tax credit.
1998 – resp appealed to CTA in order to toll the running of 2-year prescriptive period to file a claim for refund
pursuant to Section 230 of the Tax Code then. Petitioner maintained that Revenue Regulations No. 2-94 is
valid since the law tasked the Department of Finance, among other government offices, with the issuance of
the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the objectives of the law.

CTA DECISION: R.A. No. 7432 would prevail over Section 2(i) of RR No. 2-94, whose definition of "tax
credit" deviated from the intendment of the law; and as a result, partially granted the respondent's claim for a
refund. CA modified CTA decision; law provided for tax credit not a tax refund.

Issue:
Whether or not the RR 2-94 is void. Yes.
Whether or not the 20 percent sales discount granted to qualified senior citizens by the respondent pursuant to
R.A. No. 7432 may be claimed as a tax credit, instead of a deduction from gross income or gross sales. No.

Held:
Petition denied.

Law grants a tax credit not a tax deduction. RR 2-94 VOID. Resp entitled to tax credit. The problem stems
from the issuance of RR. 2-94, which was supposed to implement R.A. No. 7432, and the radical departure it
made when it defined the "tax credit" that would be granted to establishments that give 20 percent discount to
senior citizens. It equated "tax credit" with "tax deduction," contrary to the definition in Black's Law
Dictionary, which defined tax credit as: An amount subtracted from an individual's or entity's tax liability to
arrive at the total tax liability. A tax credit reduces the taxpayer's liability x x x, compared to a deduction which
reduces taxable income upon which the tax liability is calculated. A credit differs from deduction to the extent
that the former is subtracted from the tax while the latter is subtracted from income before the tax is computed.

Petitioner argues that the tax credit is in the nature of a tax refund and should be treated as a return for tax
payments erroneously or excessively assessed against a taxpayer, in line with Section 204(c) of RA 8424, or
the NIRC 1997. Payment first before tax credit can be claimed.
SC: NIRC speaks of a tax credit for tax due, so payment of the tax has not yet been made in that particular
example. CA correctly expressly recognized the differences between a "tax credit" and a "tax refund," and
stated that the same are not synonymous with each other.

RR No. 2-94 is still subordinate to R.A. No. 7432, and in cases of conflict, the implementing rule will not
prevail over the law it seeks to implement. While seemingly conflicting laws must be harmonized as far as
practicable, in this particular case, the conflict cannot be resolved in the manner the petitioner wishes.

Petitioner argues that should private establishments, which count respondent in their number, be allowed to
claim tax credits for discounts given to senior citizens, they would be earning and not just be reimbursed for
the discounts given.

It cannot be denied that R.A. No. 7432 has a laudable goal. The concerns of the affected private establishments
were also considered by the lawmakers. If the private establishments appear to benefit more from the tax credit
than originally intended, it is not for petitioner to say that they shouldn't. The tax credit may actually have
provided greater incentive for the private establishments to comply with R.A. No. 7432, or quicker relief from
the cut into profits of these businesses.

From the above discussion, it must be concluded that Revenue Regulations No. 2-94 is null and void for failing
to conform to the law it sought to implement. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or
regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go
beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. R.A. No. 7432 has been amended by Republic Act No. 9257,
the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003." In this, the term "tax credit" is no longer used.

This time around, there is no conflict between the law and the implementing Revenue Regulations. Under
Revenue Regulations No. 4-2006, "(o)nly the actual amount of the discount granted or a sales discount not
exceeding 20% of the gross selling price can be deducted from the gross income, net of value added tax, if
applicable, for income tax purposes, and from gross sales or gross receipts of the business enterprise
concerned, for VAT or other percentage tax purposes. Under the new law, there is no tax credit to speak of,
only deductions. But RA 7432 was the law in force then.

“In cases of conflict between the law and the rules and regulations implementing the law, the law shall always
prevail. Should Revenue Regulations deviate from the law they seek to implement, they will be struck down.”
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE: LBP VS. HONEYCOMB FARMS CORP.

GR NO. 169903, FEBRUARY 29,2012

FACTS: Honeycomb Farms Corporation (Honeycomb Farms) was the registered owner of two parcels of
agricultural land in Cataingan, Masbate. Honeycomb Farms voluntarily offered these parcels of land, with a
total area of 495.1374 hectares, to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for coverage under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). From the entire area offered, the government chose to acquire
only 486.0907 hectares.

The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), as the agency vested with the responsibility of determining the land
valuation and compensation for parcels of land acquired pursuant to the CARL, and using the guidelines set
forth in DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 17, series of 1989, as amended by DAR AO No. 3, series of
1991, fixed the value of these parcels of land.

When Honeycomb Farms rejected the LBPs and the DARs valuation for being too low, Honeycomb Farms
filed a case with the RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), against the DAR Secretary and the LBP,
praying that it be compensated for its landholdings in the amount of P12,440,000.00, with damages and
attorneys fees.

The RTC constituted a Board of Commissioners to aid the court in determining the just compensation for the
subject properties. Since the Board of Commissioners could not reach a common valuation for the properties,
the RTC made its own valuation. First, the RTC took judicial notice of the fact that a portion of the land,
measuring approximately 10 hectares, is commercial land, since it is located a few kilometers away from Sitio
Curvada, Pitago, Cataingan, Masbate, which is a commercial district. The lower court thus priced the 10
hectares at P100,000.00 per hectare and the remaining 476 hectares at P32,000.00 per hectare. Both parties
appealed to the CA.

The LBP argued that the RTC committed a serious error when it disregarded the formula for fixing just
compensation embodied in DAR AO No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR AO No. 11, series of 1994.
The LBP also argued that the RTC erred in taking judicial notice that 10 hectares of the land in question is
commercial land.

In contrast, Honeycomb Farms maintains that the DAR AOs were issued merely to serve as guidelines for the
DAR and the LBP in administratively fixing the valuation to be offered by the DAR to the landowner for
acceptance or rejection. However, it is not mandatory for courts to use the DAR AOs to fix just compensation
as this would amount to an administrative imposition on an otherwise purely judicial function and prerogative
of determination of just compensation for expropriated lands specifically reserved by the Constitution to the
courts.

The CA affirmed with modification the assailed RTC judgment with respect to the computation of the amount
fixed by the trial court and the award of attorneys fees is deleted.

ISSUES: Did the CA commit a serious error of law when it failed to apply the mandatory formula for
determining just compensation fixed in DAR AO No. 11, series of 1994?

Did the RTC correctly take judicial notice of the nature of the subject land?

HELD: It is the RTC, sitting as a SAC, which has the power to determine just compensation for parcels of
land acquired by the State, pursuant to the agrarian reform program. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps.
Banal, the DAR, as the administrative agency tasked with the implementation of the agrarian reform program,
already came up with a formula to determine just compensation which incorporated the factors enumerated in
Section 17 of RA 6657.
In Landbank of the Philippines v. Celada, the Court emphasized the duty of the RTC to apply the formula
provided in the applicable DAR AO to determine just compensation, stating that: While [the RTC] is required
to consider the acquisition cost of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and
income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declaration and the assessments made by the government
assessors to determine just compensation, it is equally true that these factors have been translated into a basic
formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. As the government
agency principally tasked to implement the agrarian reform program, it is the DAR's duty to issue rules and
regulations to carry out the object of the law. [The] DAR [Administrative Order] precisely "filled in the
details" of Section 17, R.A. No. 6657 by providing a basic formula by which the factors mentioned therein
may be taken into account. The [RTC] was at no liberty to disregard the formula which was devised to
implement the said provision.

These rulings plainly impose on the RTC the duty to apply the formula laid down in the pertinent DAR
administrative regulations to determine just compensation. Clearly, the CA and the RTC acted with grievous
error when they disregarded the formula laid down by the DAR, and chose instead to come up with their own
basis for the valuation of the subject land.

***

While the lower court is not precluded from taking judicial notice of certain facts, it must exercise this right
within the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.

The classification of the land is obviously essential to the valuation of the subject property, which is the very
issue in the present case. The parties should thus have been given the opportunity to present evidence on the
nature of the property before the lower court took judicial notice of the commercial nature of a portion of the
subject landholdings. GRANTED

HOW DETERMINED ?

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE : EPZA VS. DULAY

149 SCRA 305 (1987)

Facts: On 15 January 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation 1811, reserving a certain
parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and covering a
total area of 1,193,669 square meters, more or less, for the establishment of an export processing zone by
petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. The
proclamation included, among others, 4 parcels of land with an aggregate area of 22,328 square meters owned
and registered in the name of the San Antonio Development Corporation. The EPZA, therefore, offered to
purchase the parcels of land from the corporation in accordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92,
Presidential Decree (PD) 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the
property. EPZA filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, a complaint
for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession against the corporation, to expropriate
the aforesaid parcels of land pursuant to PD 66, as amended, which empowers EPZA to acquire by
condemnation proceedings any property for the establishment of export processing zones, in relation to
Proclamation 1811, for the purpose of establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone. On 21 October 1980,
Judge Ceferino E. Dulay issued a writ of possession authorizing EPZA to take immediate possession of the
premises. At the pre-trial conference on 13 February 1981, the judge issued an order stating that the parties
have agreed that the only issue to be resolved is the just compensation for the properties and that the pre-trial is
thereby terminated and the hearing on the merits is set on 2 April 1981. On 17 February 1981, the judge issued
the order of condemnation declaring EPZA as having the lawful right to take the properties sought to be
condemned, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the filing of the complaint. The
respondent judge also issued a second order appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and
report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. On 19 June 1981, the
three commissioners submitted their consolidated report recommending the amount of P15.00 per square meter
as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation for the properties. On 29 July 1981, EPZA filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the order of 19 February 1981 and Objection to Commissioner's Report on the grounds
that PD 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just
compensation through commissioners; and that the compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by
PD 1533. On 14 November 1981, the trial court denied EPZA's motion for reconsideration. On 9 February
1982, EPZA filed the petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary restraining order, enjoining the
trial court from enforcing the order dated 17 February 1981 and from further proceeding with the hearing of
the expropriation case Issue: Whether the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in
Presidential Decree 1533 is valid and constitutional, and whether the lower values given by provincial
assessors be the value of just compensation Held: Presidential Decree 76 provides that "For purposes of just
compensation in cases of private property acquired by the government for public use, the basis shall be the
current and fair market value declared by the owner or administrator, or such market value as determined by
the Assessor, whichever is lower." Section 92 of PD 464 provides that "In determining just compensation
which private property is acquired by the government for public use, the basis shall be the market value
declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower." Section 92 of PD 794, on the other hand, provides that "In
determining just compensation when private property is acquired by the government for public use, the same
shall not exceed the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the
property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower." Lastly, Section 1 of PD
1533 provides that "In determining just compensation for private property acquired through eminent domain
proceedings, the compensation to be paid shall not exceed the value declared by the owner or administrator or
anyone having legal interest in the property or determined by the assessor, pursuant to the Real Property Tax
Code, whichever value is lower, prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate Government office
to acquire the property." The provisions of the Decrees on just compensation unconstitutional and void as the
method of ascertaining just compensation under the said decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on
judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the Supreme Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is
reserved to it for final determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one
of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what
amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. Further, various factors can come into play in the
valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation. The values given by provincial assessors are
usually uniform for very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the
poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into account. The value of land is based on such generalities
as its possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land described as "cogonal" has
been cultivated for generations. Buildings are described in terms of only two or three classes of building
materials and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Thus, tax values can serve as guides
but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE :

BELEN VS. CA, 195 SCRA 58

FACTS:

A small portion of land (Lot No. 10, Block 18 at Sunog Apog, Tondo, Manila) measuring a hundred (100)
square meters, more or less, belonging to the Manotoc Services, Inc., was leased to Pedro M. Belen, which the
latter has built a house.

Respondents Alfredo Juliano and his family occupied a portion of the said land and later on bought a house
standing thereon, not belonging to Belen and moved in without the latter's knowledge.

On learning of this, Belen had a talk with Juliano, and they came to an agreement that Juliano could continue
staying on the land temporarily and would pay one-half of the rental to Manotok Realty, Inc. Belen v. Court of
Appeals

Later a fire razed both Belen's and Juliano's houses to the ground. Belen told Juliano not to build anything on
the land any more. However, on Juliano's pleas, Belen acceded to Juliano's continued stay on the land on the
explicit condition that his occupancy should not be longer than two and a half (2 1/2) years. 

Juliano failed to leave after the stipulated term. Belen v. Court of Appeals

Read: Manosca v. Court of Appeals

 Metropolitan Trial Court: Ordered defendant to vacate the land.

 Regional Trial Court: Reversed the judgment of MTC by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1670.
 Court of Appeals: Resolved against Belen. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Manotok Realty, Inc divested its title to the National Housing Authority and was there an
appropriate action of eminent domain. Belen v. Court of Appeals

HELD:

The petition was hereby granted and the challenged judgment of the Court of Appeals, reversed.

Presidential Decree No. 1670 was struck down as "unconstitutional and therefore, null and void." 

Also refer to: 

 G.R. No. 55166 (Manotok, et al. v. National Housing Authority, et al.) 

 G.R. No. 55167 (Tiongson, et al. v. National Housing Authority, et al)

The decrees do not by themselves, provide for any form of hearing or procedure by which the petitioners can
question the propriety of the expropriation of their properties or the reasonableness of the just
compensation. Belen v. Court of Appeals

Having failed to provide for a hearing, the Government should have filed an expropriation case under Rule 67
of the Revised Rules of Court but it did not do so.

Obviously, it did not deem it necessary because the enactment of the questioned decrees which rendered, by
their very passage, any questions with regard to the expropriation of the properties, moot and academic.

Read: People vs. Copro

In effect, the properties under the decrees were "automatically expropriated."

This becomes more evident when the NHA wrote the Register of Deeds and requested her to cancel the
certificate of titles of the petitioners, furnishing said Register of Deeds only with copies of the decrees to
support its request. Belen v. Court of Appeals

This is hardly the due process of law which the state is expected to observe when it exercises the power of
eminent domain.

The Court found that both the decrees, being "violative of the petitioners' (owners') right to due process of
law," failed "the test of constitutionality," and that, additionally, they were tainted by another infirmity as
regards "the determination of just compensation." Belen v. Court of Appeals

This Court further observed that contrary to Rule 67 and established precedents, the decrees provided for the
determination of just compensation at a time earlier than that "of the actual taking of the government or at the
time of the judgment by the court, whichever came first."

Apart from this, the fixing of the value of the property was left by the decrees to the City Assessor.  

PD 1670 being void ab initio, all acts done in reliance thereon and in accordance therewith must also be
deemed void ab initio, including particularly the taking of possession of the property by the National Housing
Authority and its attempts to convert the same into a housing project and the selection of the beneficiaries
thereof. 

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE : REPUBLIC VS. CA , 227 SCRA 401

Facts: These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965, by
Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The
land was divided into 9 lots and according to the application of registration of the parcel of land, Lots 1-5 were
sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in
1964.

The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge
Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through
theBureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.

In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by
virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation.

Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on
September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909
and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous
and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its construction of adits, its
affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its
payment of taxes on the land.

Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral
claimslocated by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the
office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators on November 2,
1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as
evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of
annual taxes thereon.

The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be
registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated
February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.

Trial Court: The trial court denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim
of possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered.

CA: Reversed the trial court. Affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same
time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.

Basis of CA Ruling: The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is “no conflict of interest” between the
owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-
known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything
underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is
classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of title . This
is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application.

Issue: Whether respondent court’s decision, i.e. “the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the
same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claim,” is correct.

Held: No. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue
of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the 1935 Constitution prohibited the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the
time of its adoption.

The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive
prescription. The use of the land could not be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies
for agricultural and mineral purposes. It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and
included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet
and Atok at that time. Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution
against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was made
subject to existing rights. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and
under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired
exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the
purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land had become the private property of the
locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.

The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely
mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally
classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral — and completely mineral — once the mining
claims were perfected. As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not
cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was
cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.

This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit of the
State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and
even private land devoted to “agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than
mining.” Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of
such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State
to which such minerals belong.

The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could be used for
both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are
discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be
discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign
prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including
the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken
therein. For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation under the Mining
Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE : SPS. LEE VS. LBP

GR NO. 170422, MARCH 7 ,2008

Facts:

On 7 August 2001, petitioners received a notice of coverage informing them that their landholding[3] is
covered by the government's compulsory acquisition scheme pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (R.A. No. 6657). On 1 June 2001, they... received from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) a
copy of the notice of land valuation and acquisition which contains an offer of P315,307.87[4] as
compensation for 3.195 hectares of the property. Petitioners rejected the offer.

On 27 September 2001, the DARAB issued a decision[5]... declaring that the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) fully complied with the criteria set forth in R.A. No. 6657 in determining the value of the land, and
ordered the LBP to pay petitioners the original amount offered by DAR. Petitioners sought reconsideration of
the decision,... but their motion was denied by the Provincial Adjudicator

Aggrieved, petitioners filed an original petition[7] for the determination of just compensation before the
Regional Trial Court of Balanga City, Bataan.

They offered the same exhibits and transcript of the oral testimonies and the... appraisal report presented in
Civil Case No. 7171,[9] a prior just compensation case involving a parcel of land adjacent to the property
subject of this case, where the special agrarian court (SAC) pegged the value of the property at P250.00 per
square... meter. LBP, for its part, presented the testimony of one Theresie P. Garcia, an agrarian affairs
specialist. The SAC, citing the appraisal report and its decision in Civil Case No. 7171, decided in favor of
petitioners and ordered LBP to pay them P7,978,750.00 as just... compensation.[

LBP filed a Petition for Review[11] before the Court of Appeals and argued that the SAC erred in giving
considerable weight on the appraisal report of the private appraisal firm thereby disregarding the provisions of
R.A. No. 6657 and its implementing... regulations.

The Court of Appeals likewise found the value proposed by LBP to be extremely low considering the disparity
between the said amount and that suggested by the appraisal company.

Issues:

a... the SAC should have appointed competent and disinterested commissioners to assist it in valuating the
property in question,... following Section 5, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Ruling:

The Court of Appeals seems to imply that the appointment of commissioners is mandatory in agrarian reform
cases. We do not agree. While the Rules of Court provisions apply to proceedings in special agrarian courts,
[38] it is clear that unlike in... expropriation proceedings under the Rules of Court the appointment of a
commissioner or commissioners is discretionary on the part of the court or upon the instance of one of the
parties. And when the court does resort to the commissioners-type of appraisal, it is not... circumscribed to
appoint three commissioners, unlike the modality under Rule 67.

Principles:

Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 which enumerates the factors to be considered in determining just compensation
reads:

SECTION 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition
of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the
owner, tax declarations, and the... assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social
and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property
as well as the non- payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institutions on... the said
land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

The Court of Appeals seems to imply that the appointment of commissioners is mandatory in agrarian reform
cases. We do not agree. While the Rules of Court provisions apply to proceedings in special agrarian courts,
[38] it is clear that unlike in... expropriation proceedings under the Rules of Court the appointment of a
commissioner or commissioners is discretionary on the part of the court or upon the instance of one of the
parties. And when the court does resort to the commissioners-type of appraisal, it is not... circumscribed to
appoint three commissioners, unlike the modality under Rule 67.

WHEN DETERMINED ?

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE : ANSALDO VS. TANTUICO

GR NO. 50147, AUGUST 3, 1990

Facts: Two lots of private ownership were taken by the Government and used for the widening of a road more
than forty-three years ago, without benefit of an action of eminent domain or agreement with its owners, albeit
without protest by the latter. The lots belong to Jose Ma. Ansaldo and Maria Angela Ansaldo, are covered by
title in their names, and have an aggregate area of 1,041 square meters. These lots were taken from the
Ansaldos sometime in 1947 by the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communication and made
part of what used to be Sta. Mesa Street and is now Ramon Magsaysay Avenue at San Juan, Metro Manila.
Said owners made no move whatever until 26 years later. They wrote to ask for compensation for their land on
22 January 1973. Their claim was referred to the Secretary of Justice who rendered an opinion dated 22
February 1973, that just compensation should be paid in accordance with Presidential Decree (PD) 76, and
thus advised that the corresponding expropriation suit be forthwith instituted to fix the just compensation to be
paid to the Ansaldos. Pursuant to the said opinion, the Commissioner of Public Highways requested the
Provincial Assessor of Rizal to make a redetermination of the market value of the Ansaldos' property in
accordance with PD 76. The new valuation was made, after which the Auditor of the Bureau of Public
Highways forwarded the Ansaldos' claim to the Auditor General with the recommendation that payment be
made on the basis of the "current and fair market value and not on the fair market value at the time of taking."
The Commission on Audit, however, declined to adopt the recommendation. In a decision handed down on 26
September 1973, the Acting Chairman ruled that "the amount of compensation to be paid to the claimants is to
be determined as of the time of the taking of the subject lots," i.e. 1947. The ruling was reiterated by the
Commission on 8 September 1978, and again on 25 January 1979 when it denied the Ansaldos' motion for
reconsideration. The Ansaldos appealed to the Supreme Court Issue: Whether the valuation of just
compensation should be determined at the time of taking in 1947, especially in light of the absence of any
expropriation proceeding undertaken before the said taking. Held: Where the institution of an expropriation
action precedes the taking of the property subject thereof, the just compensation is fixed as of the time of the
filing of the complaint. This is so provided by the Rules of Court, the assumption of possession by the
expropriator ordinarily being conditioned on its deposits with the National or Provincial Treasurer of the value
of the property as provisionally ascertained by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings. There are
instances, however, where the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit. In
these instances, the just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing
of the action of eminent domain. There was undoubtedly a taking of the Ansaldos' property when the
Government obtained possession thereof and converted it into a part of a thoroughfare for public use. It is as of
the time of such a taking, to repeat, that the just compensation for the property is to be established. The value
of the Ansaldos' property must be ascertained as of the year 1947, when it was actually taken, and not at the
time of the filing of the expropriation suit, which, by the way, still has to be done. It is as of that time that the
real measure of their loss may fairly be adjudged. The value, once fixed, shall earn interest at the legal rate
until full payment is effected, conformably with other principles laid down by case law. The Court thus
directed the Department of Public Works and Highways to institute the appropriate expropriation action over
the land in question so that the just compensation due its owners may be determined in accordance with the
Rules of Court, with interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the time of taking until full payment is
made

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE : NAPOCOR VS. TIANGCO

GR NO. 170846, FEBRUARY 6, 2007

Facts:

Herein respondents are the owners of a parcel of land in Barangay Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal and registered in
their names. petitioner NPC requires the respondents’ aforementioned property, across which its 500Kv
Kalayaan-San Jose Transmission Line Project will traverse. NPC’s Segregation Plan for the purpose shows
that the desired right-of-way will cut through the respondents’ land. After repeated unsuccessful negotiations
with the respondents, NPC filed with the RTC a complaint for expropriation against them which the RTC
issued Condemnation Order, granting NPC the right to take possession of the area sought to be expropriated.
Which RTC subsequently ordered directing NPC to pay and deposit with the Rizal Provincial Treasurer an
amount representing the temporary provisional value of the area subject of the expropriation prior to the
possession. The RTC rendered judgment expropriating in favor of [NPC] a parcel of land covering a total area
and ordered the amount of P40,594.07 as just compensation for the 19,423 square meters of land affected by
the expropriations; and the amount of P324,750.00 as reasonable compensation for the improvements on the
land expropriated. The respondents moved for reconsideration, presenting for the first time a document entitled
“BIR Circular of Appraisal,” which shows that for the year 1985, 1992, 1994 that the lands valued at ₱30.00,
₱80.00, ₱100.00 per square meter respectively. NPC and the respondents went on appeal to the CA whereat the
separate appeals who modified the decision of the RTC that the compensation awarded for the 19,423 square
meters of land affected is increased to ₱116,538.00, and the reasonable compensation for the improvements
thereon is likewise increased to P325,025.00.

Issue: Whether the Just Compensation Is it to be based on the 1984 or the 1993 valuation?

Held: Neither of the two determinations made by the the CA and RTC is therefore correct. A new one must be
arrived at, taking into consideration the foregoing pronouncements.

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. In this case, this simply means the property’s fair market value at the time of the filing of the
complaint, or “that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but
not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor.” The measure is not the
taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss.

In the determination of such value, the court is not limited to the assessed value of the property or to the
schedule of market values determined by the provincial or city appraisal committee; these values consist but
one factor in the judicial valuation of the property. The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking
is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation should be given to the landowner All the
facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, as well as its improvements and capabilities,
should be considered.

MANNER OF PAYMENT

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE : ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. DAR

GR NO.175 SCRA 343 (1989)

Facts: These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious challenges to the
constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Proclamation No.
131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.

G.R. No. 79777

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of
powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken
for public use without just compensation. G.R. No. 79310

G.R. No. 79310

This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They contend that taking
must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and
in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.

G.R. No. 79744

The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the constitutional provision that no private
property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.

G.R. No. 78742

Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the
Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted
decree.

Issue:  Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain

Ruling: There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that
logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. Property condemned
under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of
collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in
the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of
property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned.
To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an
exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But
where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may
own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain
for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the
use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess
and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise
not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain

TRIAL WITH COMMISSONERS

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE : MERALCO VS. PINEDA , 206 SCRA 196 (1992)

Facts: For the purpose of constructing a 230 KV Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Tower 220 at Pililla,
Rizal, the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) needed portions of the land of Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Gil de
Guzman, Lucito Santiago and Teresa Bautista (simple fee owners), consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321
square meters. Despite MERALCO's offers to pay compensation and attempts to negotiate with Arayon, et. al.,
the parties failed to reach an agreement. On 29 October 1974, a complaint for eminent domain was filed by
MERALCO against 42 defendants (including Teofilo Arayon Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucito Santiago, and Teresa
Bautista) with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXII, Pasig, Metro
Manila. Despite the opposition of Arayon, et. al., the court issued an Order dated 13 January 1975 authorizing
MERALCO to take or enter upon the possession of the property sought to be expropriated. On 13 July 1976,
Arayon, et. al., filed a motion for withdrawal of deposit claiming that they are entitled to be paid at P40.00 per
square meter or an approximate sum of P272,000.00 and prayed that they be allowed to withdraw the sum of
P71,771.50 from MERALCO's deposit-account with the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Pasig Branch.
However, Arayon, et. al.'s motion was denied in an order dated 3 September 1976. Pursuant to a government
policy, MERALCO on 30 October 1979 sold to the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) the power
plants and transmission lines, including the transmission lines traversing Arayon, et. al.'s property. On 11
February 1980, the court issued an Order appointing the members of the Board of Commissioners to make an
appraisal of the properties. On 5 June 1980, MERALCO filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that it has lost all its interests over the transmission lines and properties under expropriation because of their
sale to the NAPOCOR. In view of this motion, the work of the Commissioners was suspended. On 9 June
1981, Arayon, et. al. filed another motion for payment, but despite the opposition of MERALCO, the court
issued an order dated 4 December 1981 granting the motion for payment of Arayon, et. al. (P20,400 or P3.00
per square meter without prejudice to the just compensation that may be proved in the final adjudication of the
case). On 15 December 1981, Arayon, et. al. filed an Omnibus Motion praying that they be allowed to
withdraw an additional sum of P90,125.50 from MERALCO's deposit-account with PNB. By order dated 21
December 1981, the court granted the Omnibus Motion. Arayon, et. al. filed another motion dated 8 January
1982 praying that MERALCO be ordered to pay the sum of P169,200.00. On 12 January 1982, MERALCO
filed a motion for reconsideration of the Orders and to declare Arayon, et. al. in contempt of court for forging
or causing to be forged the receiving stamp of MERALCO's counsel and falsifying or causing to be falsified
the signature of its receiving clerk in their Omnibus Motion. On 9 February 1982, the court denied
MERALCO's motion for reconsideration and motion for contempt. In said order, the Court adjudged in favor
of Arayon, et. al. the fair market value of their property taken by MERALCO at P40.00 per square meter for a
total of P369.720.00; the amount to bearing legal interest from 24 February 1975 until fully paid plus
consequential damages in terms of attorney's fees in the sum of P10,000.00; all these sums to be paid by
MERALCO the former with costs of suit, minus the amount of P102,800.00 already withdrawn by Arayon, et.
al. Furthermore, the court stressed in said order that "at this stage, the Court starts to appoint commissioners to
determine just compensation or dispenses with them and adopts the testimony of a credible real estate broker,
or the Judge himself would exercise his right to formulate an opinion of his own as to the value of the land in
question. Nevertheless, if he formulates such an opinion, he must base it upon competent evidence."
MERALCO filed a petition for review on certiorari Issue: Whether the court can dispense with the assistance
of a Board of Commissioners in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation.
Held: In an expropriation case where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial
before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just
compensation. The appointment of at least 3 competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just
compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. While it is
true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of the
value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners have applied illegal principles
to the evidence submitted to them or where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where
the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive (Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil.
286) Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with
capriciously or for no reason at all. Moreover, in such instances, where the report of the commissioners may be
disregarded, the trial court may make its own estimate of value from competent evidence that may be gathered
from the record. The "Joint Venture Agreement on Subdivision and Housing Projects" executed by ABA
Homes and Arayon, et. al. relied upon by the judge, in the absence of any other proof of valuation of said
properties, is incompetent to determine just compensation. The judge's act of determining and ordering the
payment of just compensation without the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is a flagrant violation of
MERALCO's constitutional right to due process and is a gross violation of the mandated rule established by
the Revised Rules of Court.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE :LECA REALITY VS. REPUBLIC

GR NO. 155605, SEPTEBER 27, 2006

FACTS:
1. Manuela Corporation (Manuela) is a duly registered domestic corporation, principally engaged in the
business of leasing commercial spaces in shopping malls to retailers. At the time, respondent owned and
operated M Star One, M Star, Starmall, Metropolis Star, and Pacific Mall.
2. Manuela obtained several loans from two syndicates of lenders to finance the costs of two of its buildings.
Aside from its Php2.174 billion loan from banks, the company also had Php1.476 billion indebtedness to
Hero Holdings, Inc. and its trade suppliers, and other parties.
3. The region was then beset by the 1997 Asian financial crisis which prompted banks to stop their lending
activities. This severely affected Manuela whose malls did not operate sufficiently, causing serious losses
to the company. The adjusted interest rates on Manuela’s loans were around 18% to 30%, which
contributed to its liquidity problems.
4. The company, however, exerted all efforts to cushion the financial blow by “closing down non-income
generating businesses, concentrating on its business of leasing commercial spaces, intensifying collection
efforts, reducing personnel, negotiating for restructuring of loan with creditors, and working out a viable
 payment scheme without giving undue preference to any creditor.” In spite of all these initiatives,
Manuela still failed to pay its financial obligations.
5. This forced the company to ask the court to issue a Stay Order and approve its proposed Rehabilitation
Plan, which if successfully implemented will “enable it to settle its remaining obligations in an orderly
manner, restore its financial viability, and allow it to resume its normal operations.” The trial court
subsequently issued the Stay Order, which stated:’
a) a stay in the enforcement of all claims, whether for money or otherwise and whether such
enforcement is by court action or otherwise, against petitioner MANUELA, its guarantors and
sureties not solidarily liable with it; …
e) directing the payment in full of all administrative expenses incurred after the issuance of this
Stay Order.

6. The trial court appointed Marilou Adea as rehabilitation receiver. Adea recommended the approval of
Manuela’s Rehabilitation Plan and convened with Manuela’s creditors for the latter to air their concerns.
7. Leca Realty Corporation (Leca) filed its Comment and/or Formal Claim against Manuela amounting to
Php193.7 million, comprised of unpaid rentals, security deposits, interests, and penalty charges. After
Leca’s receipt of Adea’s Report and Recommendation, petitioner questioned the reduction of Manuela’s
liability, “considering its contractual nature which cannot be impaired during the process of
rehabilitation.” The trial court eventually approved the Rehabilitation Plan. Leca’s appeal to the Court of
Appeals was dismissed for lack of merit.
8. The disagreement is grounded on the fact that the rental rates agreed upon by Leca and Manuela were
reduced in the Rehabilitation Plan. There was a gross discrepancy between the amounts of rent agreed
upon by the parties and those provided in the Rehabilitation Plan.
9. Leca filed another petition before the appellate court alleging violation of its constitutional right to non-
impairment contract and the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation. The Court of
Appeals, in denying the petition, ruled:
The pendency of the rehabilitation proceedings cannot be interpreted to impair the contractual
obligations previously entered into by the contracting parties because the automatic stay of all
actions is sanctioned by P.D. [No.] 902-A which provides that “all actions for claims against
corporations, partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending before any
court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly.”
10. Thus, Leca filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the pendency of the rehabilitation proceedings can justify impairment of contractual obligations
previously entered into by the parties?
HELD:
No, the pendency of the rehabilitation plan can no justify the impairment of contractual obligations. The
amount provided in the rehabilitation plan is null and void.

RATIO:
Petitioner, in support of its contention, cites in its Memorandum the treatises of Ateneo Law Dean Cesar L.
Villanueva and former SEC Commissioner Danilo L. Concepcion, both known authorities on Corporation
Law.  In his Article which appeared in the Ateneo Law Journal, Dean Villanueva said:
The nature and extent of the power of the SEC to approve and
enforce a rehabilitation plan is certainly an important issue.  Often, a
rehabilitation plan would require a diminution, if not destruction, of contractual
and property rights of some, if not most of the various stakeholders in the
petitioning corporation.  In the absence of clear coercive legal provisions, the
courts of justice and much less the SEC would have no power to amend or
destroy the property and contractual rights of private parties, much less relieve
a petitioning corporation from its contractual commitments.

On the other hand, Professor Concepcion stated that what is allowed in rehabilitation proceedings i s only the
suspension of payments, or the stay of all actions for claims of distressed corporations, and upon its
successful rehabilitation, the claims must be settled in full.

The Supreme Court, in agreeing with Leca, cited its ruling in The Insular LifeAssurance Company, Ltd. v.
Court of Appeals, which provides:

When the language of the contract is explicit leaving no doubt as to the intention of the drafters
thereof, the courts may not read into it any other intention that would contradict its plain import. The
Court would be rewriting the contract of lease between Insular and Sun Brothers under the guise of
construction were we to interpret the ‘option to renew’ clause as Sun Brothers propounds it, despite
the express provision in the original contract of lease and the contracting parties’ subsequent acts. As
the Court has held in Riviera Filipina, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, ‘a court, even the Supreme Court,
has no right to make new contracts for the parties or ignore those already made by them, simply to
avoid seeming hardships. Neither abstract justice nor the rule of liberal construction justifies the
creation of a contract for the parties which they did not make themselves or the imposition upon one
party to a contract of an obligation not assumed.
The Court voided the Rehabilitation Plan insofar as it amends the rental rates agreed upon by the parties. It
opined that the change is not justified as the amount of rent is an “essential condition of any lease contract;”
thus, any alteration on the rate is tantamount to impairment of stipulation of the parties.

LEGAL INTEREST FOR EXPROPRIATION CASES

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE : NPC VS. ANGAS, 208 SCRA 542 ( 1992)

Facts:

petitioner National Power Corporation, a government-owned and controlled corporation and the agency
through which the government undertakes the on-going infrastructure and development projects throughout the
country, filed two... complaints for eminent domain against private respondents with the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Lanao del Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 2248 and Civil Case No. 2277,
respectively. The complaint which sought to expropriate certain specified lots... situated at Limogao,
Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur was for the purpose of the development of hydro-electric power and production of
electricity as well as the erection of such subsidiary works and constructions as may be necessarily connected
therewith.

Both cases were jointly tried upon agreement of the parties. After responsive pleadings were filed and issues
joined, a series of hearings before court-designated commissioners were held.

Issues:

The basic issue in this original action for certiorari and mandamus filed by the National Power Corporation is
whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation for expropriated lands, the
law applicable is Article 2209 of the

Civil Code which prescribes a 6% legal interest rate or Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal
interest rate at 12% per annum.

Ruling:

Private respondents' contention is bereft of merit. The term "judgments" as used in Section 1 of the Usury Law,
as well as in Central Bank Circular No. 416, should be interpreted to mean only judgments involving loan or
forbearance of money, goods or credits, following the... principle of ejusdem generis. Under this doctrine,
where general terms follow the designation of particular things or classes of persons or subjects, the general
term will be construed to comprehend those things or persons of the same class or of the same nature as... those
specifically enumerated (Crawford, Statutory Construction, p. 191; Go Tiaco vs. Union Ins. Society of
Camilan, 40 Phil. 40; Mutuc vs. COMELEC, 36 SCRA 228)

In the case at bar, the transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits but
expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public purpose, the payment of which is without stipulation
regarding interest, and the interest adjudged by the... trial court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The
legal interest required to be paid on the amount of just compensation for the properties expropriated is
manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the delay in the payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind
of... interest involved in the joint judgment of the lower court sought to be enforced in this case is interest by
way of damages, and not by way of earnings from loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code shall apply.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE : WYCOCO VS. JUDGE CASPILLO

GR NO. 146733 , JANUARY 13, 2004

FACTS:

This case is a consolidated petition of one seeking review of the decision of CA modifying the decision
of RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court, and another for mandamus to compel the RTC to issue a writ of
execution and to direct Judge Caspillo to inhibit.

Feliciano F. Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare land. Wycoco voluntarily offered to
sell the land to the Department of Agrarian Reform for P14.9 million. DAR offered P2,280,159.82. The area
which the DAR offered to acquire excluded idle lands, river and road located therein. Wycoco rejected the
offer, prompting the DAR to indorse the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) for the purpose of fixing the just compensation in a summary administrative proceeding. Thereafter,
the DARAB requested LBP to open a trust account in the name of Wycoco and deposited the compensation
offered by DAR. In the meantime, the property was distributed to farmer-beneficiaries.

On April 13, 1993, Wycoco filed the instant case for determination of just compensation with the
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City against DAR and LBP.

On March 9, 1994, the DARAB dismissed the case on its hand to give way to the determination of just
compensation by the RTC.

Meanwhile, DAR and LBP filed their respective answered that the valuation of Wycoco’s property was
in accordance with law and that the latter failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not participating in the
summary administrative proceedings before the DARAB which has primary jurisdiction over determination of
land valuation.

On November 14, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Wycoco. It ruled that there is no
need to present evidence in support of the land valuation in as much as it is of public knowledge that the
prevailing market value of agricultural lands sold in Licab, Nueva Ecija is from P135,000.00 to 150,000.00 per
hectare. The court thus took judicial notice thereof and fixed the compensation for the entire 94.1690 hectare
land at P142,500.00 per hectare or a total of P13,428,082.00. It also awarded Wycoco actual damages for
unrealized profits plus legal interest.

The DAR and the LBP filed separate petitions before the Court of Appeals. The petition brought by
DAR on jurisdictional and procedural issues was dismissed. This prompted Wycoco to file a petition for
mandamus before this Court praying that the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City be
executed, and that Judge Caspillo be compelled to inhibit himself from hearing the case.

The petition brought by LBP on both substantive and procedural grounds was likewise dismissed by the
Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals modified its decision by deducting from the compensation
due to Wycoco the amount corresponding to the 3.3672 hectare portion of the 94.1690 hectare land which was
found to have been previously sold by Wycoco to the Republic.

LBP contended that the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case acting as Special Agrarian Court.

2. Assuming that it acquired jurisdiction, whether or not the compensation arrived at supported by
evidence.

3. Whether or not Wycoco can compel DAR to purchase the entire land.

4. Whether or not the awards of interest and damages for unrealized profits is valid.

HELD:

1. Yes, the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court, acquired jurisdiction of the case. Sections 50 and 57
of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) provides:

Section [Link]-judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR)….

Section [Link] Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act.

2. No, the compensation arrived is not supported by evidence. In arriving at the valuation of Wycoco’s
land, the trial court took judicial notice of the alleged prevailing market value of agricultural lands without
apprising the parties of its intention to take judicial notice thereof. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence
provides:

Sec. 3. Judicial Notice. When Hearing Necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its own
initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and
allow the parties to be heard thereon.
 After trial and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or on request of a
party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive
of a material issue in the case.

The trial court should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead of practically
assuming a valuation without basis. Only the market value was taken into account in determining the just
compensation. Since other factors were not considered, the case was remanded for determination of just
compensation.

3. No, the DAR cannot be compelled to purchase the entire property voluntarily offered by Wycoco.
The power to determine whether a parcel of land may come within the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program is essentially lodged with the DAR. That Wycoco will suffer damages by the DAR’s non-
acquisition of the approximately 10 hectare portion of the entire land which was found to be not suitable for
agriculture is no justification to compel DAR to acquire the whole area.

4. Yes, Wycoco’s claim for payment of interest is partly meritorious. The trust account opened as the
mode of payment of just compensation should be converted to a deposit account. The conversion should be
retroactive in application in order to rectify the error committed by the DAR in opening a trust account and to
grant the landowners the benefits concomitant to payment in cash or LBP bonds. Otherwise, petitioner’s right to
payment of just and valid compensation for the expropriation of his property would be violated. The interest
earnings accruing on the deposit account of landowners would suffice to compensate them pending payment of
just compensation.

The award of actual damages for unrealized profits should be deleted because Wycoco failed to show
proof of loss.

Wycoco’s petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 146733 was dismissed. The decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, acting as Special Agrarian Court cannot be enforced because there is a need to
remand the case to the trial court for determination of just compensation. Likewise, the prayer for the
inhibition of Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo was denied for lack of basis.

WRIT OF POSSESSION

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE : CITY OF MANILA VS. OSCAR SERRANO

GR NO. 142304 , JUNE 20, 2001

Facts: On 21 December 1993, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance 7833, authorizing the
expropriation of certain properties in Manila's First District in Tondo, covered by TCTs 70869, 105201,
105202, and 138273 of the Register of Deeds of Manila, which are to be sold and distributed to qualified
occupants pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila. One of the properties sought
to be expropriated, denominated as Lot 1-C, consists of 343.10 square meters, and was in the name of Feliza de
Guia. Lot 1-C was assigned to Edgardo De Guia, one of the heirs of Alberto De Guia, in turn one of the heirs
of Feliza de Guia. On 29 July 1994, the said property was transferred to Lee Kuan Hui, in whose name TCT
217018 was issued. The property was subsequently sold on 24 January 1996 to Demetria De Guia to whom
TCT 226048 was issued. On 26 September 1997, the City of Manila filed an amended complaint for
expropriation (Civil Case 94-72282) with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila, against the supposed
owners of the lots covered by TCTs 70869 (including Lot 1-C), 105201, 105202, and 138273, which included
herein respondents Oscar, Felicitas, Jose, Benjamin, Estelita, Leonora, Adelaida, all surnamed Serrano. On 12
November 1997, the Serranos filed a consolidated answer, praying the exemption of Lot 1-C from
expropriation. Upon motion by the City, the trial court issued an order, dated 9 October 1998, directing the
City to deposit the amount of P1,825,241.00 equivalent to the assessed value of the properties. After the City
had made the deposit, the trial court issued another order, dated 15 December 1998, directing the issuance of a
writ of possession in favor of the City. The Serranos filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
On 16 November 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision holding that although Lot 1-C is not exempt
from expropriation because it undeniably exceeds 300 square meters which is no longer considered a small
property within the framework of RA 7279, the other modes of acquisition of lands enumerated in §§59-10 of
the law must first be tried by the city government before it can resort to expropriation, and thus enjoined the
City from expropriating Lot 1-C. In its resolution, dated 23 February 2000, the Court of Appeals likewise
denied two motions for reconsideration filed by the City. The City filed a petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether it was premature to determine whether the requirements of RA
7279, §§9-10 have been complied with. Held: Rule 67, §2 provides that "Upon the filing of the complaint or at
any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon
the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an
amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank
subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the
deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand
to the authorized government depositary. If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally
ascertained and the amount to be deposited shall be fixed by the court. After such deposit is made the court
shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property
involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties." Thus, a writ of
execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of a complaint for expropriation
sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the
assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance
of the writ of possession becomes ministerial. Herein, these requirements were satisfied and, therefore, it
became the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue the writ of possession. The distinction between the
Filstream and the present case is that in the former, the judgment in that case had already become final while
herein, the trial court has not gone beyond the issuance of a writ of possession. Hearing is still to be held to
determine whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the requirements provided in RA 7279. Whether the
City has complied with these provisions requires the presentation of evidence, although in its amended
complaint petitioner did allege that it had complied with the requirements. The determination of this question
must await the hearing on the complaint for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the condemnation of the
properties sought to be expropriated. Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of
the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the
determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the court with
the assistance of not more than three commissioners

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE : REPUBLIC VS. GINGOYON

GR NO. 166429, DECEMBER 19, 2005

Facts: The Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA 3) was conceived, designed and
constructed to serve as the country’s show window to the world. Regrettably, it has spawned controversies.
Regrettably too, despite the apparent completion of the terminal complex way back it has not yet been
operated. This has caused immeasurable economic damage to the country, not to mention its deplorable
discredit in the international community. In the first case that reached this Court, Agan v. PIATCO,the
contracts which the Government had with the contractor were voided for being contrary to law and public
policy. The second case now before the Court involves the matter of just compensation due the contractor for
the terminal complex it built. We decide the case on the basis of fairness, the same norm that pervades both the
Court’s 2004 Resolution in the first case and the latest expropriation law. The present controversy has its roots
with the promulgation of the Court’s decision in Agan v. PIATCO,promulgated in 2003 (2003 Decision). This
decision nullified the “Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III” entered into between the Philippine Government
(Government) and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well as the amendments
and supplements thereto. The agreement had authorized PIATCO to build a new international airport terminal
(NAIA 3), as well as a franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period of 25
years. The contracts were nullified, among others, that Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of PIATCO, did not
possess the requisite financial capacity when it was awarded the NAIA 3 contract and that the agreement was
contrary to public policy. At the time of the promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities had
already been built by PIATCO and were nearing completion. However, the ponencia was silent as to the legal
status of the NAIA 3 facilities following the nullification of the contracts, as well as whatever rights of
PIATCO for reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of the facilities. PIATCO and several
respondents-intervenors filed their respective motions for the reconsideration of the 2003 Decision. These
motions were denied by the Court in its Resolution dated 21 January 2004 (2004 Resolution). However, the
Court this time squarely addressed the issue of the rights of PIATCO to refund, compensation or
reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of the NAIA 3 facilities. After the promulgation of the
rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed intent
of the Government to put the airport terminal into immediate operation. The Government and PIATCO
conducted several rounds of negotiation regarding the NAIA 3 facilities. It also appears that arbitral
proceedings were commenced before the International Chamber of Commerce International Court of
Arbitration and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, although the Government
has raised jurisdictional questions before those two bodies. Then, on 21 December 2004, the Government11
filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay City Regional Trial Court (RTC), together with an
Application for Special Raffle seeking the immediate holding of a special raffle. The Government sought upon
the filing of the complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate possession and
control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared that it had deposited the amount of
P3,002,125,000.0012 (3 Billion) in Cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3
terminal’s assessed value for taxation purposes. The case was raffled to Branch 117 of the Pasay City RTC,
presided by respondent judge Hon. Henrick F. Gingoyon (Hon. Gingoyon). On the same day that the
Complaint was filed, the RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the
Government, authorizing it to “take or enter upon the possession” of the NAIA 3 facilities. Citing the case of
City of Manila v. Serrano, the RTC noted that it had the ministerial duty to issue the writ of possession upon
the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and upon deposit made by the
government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. The RTC
found these requisites present, particularly noting that “[t]he case record shows that [the Government has]
deposited the assessed value of the [NAIA 3 facilities] in the Land Bank of the Philippines, an authorized
depositary, as shown by the certification attached to their complaint.” Also on the same day, the RTC issued a
Writ of Possession. According to PIATCO, the Government was able to take possession over the NAIA 3
facilities immediately after the Writ of Possession was issued. However, on 4 January 2005, the RTC issued
another Order designed to supplement its 21 December 2004 Order and the Writ of Possession. In the 4
January 2005 Order, now assailed in the present petition, the RTC noted that its earlier issuance of its writ of
possession was pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it was observed
that Republic Act No. 8974 (Rep. Act No. 8974), otherwise known as “An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of
Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and For Other Purposes” and
its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules) had amended Rule 67 in many respects.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8794 should be applied in the instant expropriation case and not Rule 67.

Held: Yes. At the very least, Rule 67 cannot apply in this case without violating the 2004 Resolution. Even
assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not govern in this case, it does not necessarily follow that Rule 67
should then apply. After all, adherence to the letter of Section 2, Rule 67 would in turn violate the Court’s
requirement in the 2004 Resolution that there must first be payment of just compensation to PIATCO before
the Government may take over the property.

It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of
“immediate payment” in cases involving national government infrastructure projects.

As acknowledged in the 2003 Decision, the development of NAIA 3 was made pursuant to a build-operate-
and-transfer arrangement pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957, as amended,which pertains to infrastructure or
development projects normally financed by the public sector but which are now wholly or partly implemented
by the private sector. Under the build-operate-and-transfer scheme, it is the project proponent which
undertakes the construction, including the financing, of a given infrastructure facility.

There can be no doubt that PIATCO has ownership rights over the facilities which it had financed and
constructed. The 2004 Resolution squarely recognized that right when it mandated the payment of just
compensation to PIATCO prior to the takeover by the Government of NAIA 3. The fact that the Government
resorted to eminent domain proceedings in the first place is a concession on its part of PIATCO’s ownership.
Indeed, if no such right is recognized, then there should be no impediment for the Government to seize control
of NAIA 3 through ordinary ejectment proceedings.

Since the rights of PIATCO over the NAIA 3 facilities are established, the nature of these facilities should now
be determined.

The law classifies the NAIA 3 facilities as real properties just like the soil to which they are adhered. Any sub-
classifications of real property and divergent treatment based thereupon for purposes of expropriation must be
based on substantial distinctions, otherwise the equal protection clause of the Constitution is violated. There
may be perhaps a molecular distinction between soil and the inorganic improvements adhered thereto, yet there
are no purposive distinctions that would justify a variant treatment for purposes of expropriation. Both the land
itself and the improvements thereupon are susceptible to private ownership independent of each other, capable
of pecuniary estimation, and if taken from the owner, considered as a deprivation of property. The owner of
improvements seized through expropriation suffers the same degree of loss as the owner of land seized through
similar means. Equal protection demands that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. For purposes of expropriation, parcels of land are
similarly situated as the buildings or improvements constructed thereon, and a disparate treatment between
those two classes of real property infringes the equal protection clause.

Even as the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8974 call for that law’s application in this case, the threshold test must
still be met whether its implementation would conform to the dictates of the Court in the 2004 Resolution.
Unlike in the case of Rule 67, the application of Rep. Act No. 8974 will not contravene the 2004 Resolution,
which requires the payment of just compensation before any takeover of the NAIA 3 facilities by the
Government. The 2004 Resolution does not particularize the extent such payment must be effected before the
takeover, but it unquestionably requires at least some degree of payment to the private property owner before a
writ of possession may issue. The utilization of Rep. Act No. 8974 guarantees compliance with this bare
minimum requirement, as it assures the private property owner the payment of, at the very least, the proffered
value of the property to be seized. Such payment of the proffered value to the owner, followed by the issuance
of the writ of possession in favor of the Government, is precisely the schematic under Rep. Act No. 8974, one
which facially complies with the prescription laid down in the 2004 Resolution.

Clearly then, we see no error on the part of the RTC when it ruled that Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the instant
expropriation proceedings.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE : REPUBLIC VS. HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEV. CORP

551 SCRA 303

Facts:
On December 29, 2000, Petitioner, represented by Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), filed before the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan a Consolidated Complaint for Expropriation against landowners whose properties would be
affected by the expansion of the North Luzon Expressway. Respondent HTRDC was one of the affected
landowner.

On March 18, 2002, TRB filed a motion for the issuance of a Writ of Possession, manifesting that it deposited
a sufficient amount to cover the payment of 100% of the zonal value of the affected properties, in the total
amount of PhP 28,406,700.00, with Land Bank South Harbor Branch. The RTC issued, on March 19, 2002, the
Writ of Possession.

On March 3, 2003, HTRDC filed with the RTC a Motion to Withdraw Deposit, praying that the respondent be
allowed to withdraw the amount of PhP 22,968,000.00, out of the TRB’s advance deposit of PhP
28,406,700.00, including the interest which accrued thereon. The RTC issued an Order, on April 21, 2003,
directing Land bank South Harbor Branch to release in favor of HTRDC the amount of PhP22, 968,000.00.
However, the issue on the interest earned by the amount deposited in the bank, if there any, should still be
threshed out.

On March 11, 2004, the RTC ordered that the interest earnings from the deposit of P22,968,000.00 respecting
100% of the zonal value of the affected properties in this expropriation proceedings under the principle of
accession are considered as fruits and should pertain to HTRDC. TRB filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The
RTC granted the motion and ruled that the issue on the payment of interest should be ventilated before the
Board of Commissioners which will be created later for the determination of just compensation. HTRDC filed
a Motion for Reconsideration. The motion was denied by the RTC.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals by HTRDC, the CA ruled that the interest which accrued on the amount
deposited in the expropriation accounts belongs the HTRDC by virtue of accession.

The Republic filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC. They argued the HTRDC is entitled only
to an amount equivalent to the zonal value of the expropriated property, nothing more and nothing less as
provided under Sec. 4 of RA 8974. They further argued that it is only during the determination of just
compensation when the court will appoint commissioners and determine claims for entitlements to interest.

ISSUE: W/N the interest earned by the deposited amount in the expropriation account would accrue to
HRTDC by virtue of accession?

HELD:
Yes, the Court ruled that HTRDC is determined to be the owned of only a part of the amount
deposited in the expropriation account, in the sum of PhP 22,968,000.00. Hence, it is entitled by right of
accession to the interest that had accrued to the said amount only. When the TRB deposited the amount as
advance payment for the expropriated property with an authorized government depositary bank for purposes of
obtaining a writ of possession, it is deemed to be a constructive delivery of the amount corresponding to the
100% zonal valuation of the expropriated property. Since HTRDC is entitled thereto and undisputably the
owner of the principal amount deposited by TRB, conversely, the interest yield, as accession, in a bank deposit
should likewise pertain to the owner of the money deposited.

Further, the Court pointed out that TRB does not object to HTRDC’s withdrawal of the amount of
PhP22,968,000.00 from the expropriation account, provided that it is able to show (1) that the property is free
from any lien or encumbrances and (2) that it is the absolute owner thereof. The said conditions do not put in
abeyance the constructive delivery of the said amount to HTRDC pending the latter’s compliance therewith.

Art. 1187, NCC provides that the effects of a conditional obligation to give, once the condition have
been fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the obligation. Hence, when HTRDC complied
with the given condition, as determined by the RTC in its Order dated (April 21, 2003), the effects of
constructive deliver retroacted to the actual date of the deposit of the amount in the expropriation account of
DPWH.

EXPROPRIATION OF UTILITIES , LANDED ESTATES AND MUNICIPAL PROPERTY

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE : CITY OF BAGUIO VS. NAWASA 106 PHIL. 114 ( 1959)

Facts: The City of Baguio filed on 25 April 1956, in the Court of First Instance of Baguio, a complaint for
declaratory relief against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), a public corporation
created by Republic Act 1383, contending that said Act does not include within its purview the Baguio
Waterworks System; that assuming that it does, said Act is unconstitutional because it has the effect of
depriving the City of the ownership, control and operation of said waterworks system without compensation
and without due process of law, and that it is oppressive, unreasonable and unjust to plaintiff and other cities,
municipalities and municipal districts similarly situated. On 22 May 1956, NAWASA filed a motion to
dismiss. On 21 June 1956, the Court, acting on the motion to dismiss as well as on the answer and rejoinder
filed by both parties, denied the motion and ordered NAWASA to file its answer to the complaint. On 6 July
1956, NAWASA filed its answer reiterating and amplifying the grounds already advanced in its motion to
dismiss. On 14 August 1956, the parties submitted a written stipulation of facts and filed written memoranda.
And after allowing the City to file a supplementary complaint, the Court on 5 November 1956, rendered
decision holding that the waterworks system of the City of Baguio falls within the category of "private
property," as contemplated by our Constitution and may not be expropriated without just compensation.
NAWASA filed a motion for reconsideration, and upon its denial, it took the present appeal. Issue: Whether
the Baguio Waterworks partakes of the nature of public property or private/patrimonial property of the City.
Held: The Baguio Waterworks System is not like any public road, park, street or other public property held in
trust by a municipal corporation for the benefit of the public but it is rather a property owned by the City in its
proprietary character. While the cases may differ as to the public or private character of waterworks, the
weight of authority as far as the legislature is concerned classes them as private affairs. (sec. 239, Vol. I,
Revised, McQuillin Municipal Corporations, p. 239; Shrik vs. City of Lancaster, 313 Pa. 158, 169 Atl. 557).
And in this jurisdiction, this Court has already expressed the view that a waterworks system is patrimonial
property of the city that has established it. (Mendoza vs. De Leon, 33 Phil. 509). And being owned by a
municipal corporation in a proprietary character, waterworks cannot be taken away without observing the
safeguards set by our Constitution for the protection of private property. The State may, in the interest of
National welfare, transfer to public ownership any private enterprise upon payment of just compensation. At
the same time, one has to bear in mind that no person can be deprived of his property except for public use and
upon payment of just compensation. Unless the City is given its due compensation, the City cannot be deprived
of its property even if NAWASA desires to take over its administration in line with the spirit of the law
(Republic Act 1383). The law, insofar as it expropriates the waterworks in question without providing for an
effective payment of just compensation, violates our Constitution.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE : ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE VS. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA

22 SCRA 1334 (1968)

Facts: Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial
capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On 12 October 1936, Commonwealth Act (CA) 39 was approved
converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Section 50 of the Act also provided that
"buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place
will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General." The
properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings constructed thereon, located in the
City of Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga
Province. The lots are utilized as the Capitol Site (1 lot), School site (3 lots), Hospital site (3 lots),
Leprosarium (3 lots), Curuan school (1 lot), Trade school (1 lot), Burleigh school (2 lots), burleigh (9 lots),
high school playground (2 lots), hydro-electric site (1 lot), san roque (?1 lot), and another 23 vacant lots. In
1945, the capital of Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog and on 16 June 1948, Republic Act (RA)
286 created the municipality of Molave and making it the capital of Zamboanga Province. On 26 May 1949,
the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, pursuant to CA 39, fixed the value of the properties
and buildings in question left by Zamboanga Province in Zamboanga City at P1,294,244.00. However, on 14
July 1951, a Cabinet Resolution was passed, conveying all the said 50 lots and buildings thereon to
Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as of 1945, when the provincial capital of the Zamboanga Province was
transferred to Dipolog. On 6 June 1952, RA 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into
Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the assets and obligations of the old province were
to be divided between the two new ones, Section 6 of the law provided that “upon the approval of the Act, the
funds, assets and other properties and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga shall be divided equitably
between the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the
Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Auditor General." On 11 January 1955, the Auditor General
apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct Province of Zamboanga, apportioning 54.39% for
Zamboanga del Norte and 45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur. On 17 March 1959, the Executive Secretary, by
order of the President, issued a ruling holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as owner (should
be co-owner pro-indiviso) of the properties mentioned in Section 50 of CA 39, and is entitled to the price
thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. This effectively revoked the Cabinet Resolution of 14 July 1951. The
Secretary of Finance then authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct an amount equal to 25%
of the regular internal revenue allotment for the City of Zamboanga for the quarter ending 31 March 1960, then
for the quarter ending 30 June 1960, and again for the first quarter of the fiscal year 1960-1961. The
deductions, all aggregating P57,373.46 was credited to the province of Zamboanga del Norte, in partial
payment of the P704,220,05 due it. However, on 17 June 1961, RA 3039 was approved amending Section 50
of CA 39 by providing that "all buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of
Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the
said City of Zamboanga." On 12 July 1961, the Secretary of Finance ordered the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to stop from effecting further payments to Zamboanga del Norte and to return to Zamboanga City the
sum of P57,373.46 taken from it out of the internal revenue allotment of Zamboanga del Norte. Zamboanga
City admits that since the enactment of RA 3039, P43,030.11 of the P57,373.46 has already been returned to it.
This constrained Zamboanga del Norte to file on 5 March 1962, a complaint entitled "Declaratory Relief with
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction" in the CFI Zamboanga del Norte against Zamboanga City, the Secretary of
Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. On 4 June 1962, the lower court ordered the issuance of
preliminary injunction as prayed for. After trial and on 12 August 1963, judgment was rendered declaring RA
3039 unconstitutional as it deprives the province of its private properties, ordered the city to pay the province
the sum of P704,200.05 and in relation to this ordered the finance secretary to direct the Commissioner of
Internal revenue to deduct from its regular quarterly internal revenue allotment equivalent to 25%, 25% from
the regular quarterly internal revenue allotment for the City and to remit the same to the province until the sum
has been fully paid; ordered the province to execute the corresponding public instrument deeding to the city the
50 parcels of land and the improvements thereon under the certificates of title upon full payment; dismissed the
counterclaim of the city; and declared permanent the preliminary mandatory injunction issued on 8 June 1967.
The province filed a motion to reconsider praying that the City be ordered instead to pay the P704,220.05 in
lump sum with 6% interest per annum. Over the city’s opposition, the lower court granted the province’s
motion. Hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Zamboanga del Norte is entitled to its share
of the value of the properties belonging to the former Zamboanga province that were transferred to the City of
Zamboanga. Held: Article 423 of the Civil Code provides that “the property of provinces, cities and
municipalities, is divided into property for public use and patrimonial properly." Article 424 of the same code
provides that “property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of the provincial
roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for
public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them
is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws."
Applying the norm in the Civil Code, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School
playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga province. Even the
capitol site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are
not for public use inasmuch as they would not fall under the phrase "public works for public service." Under
the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the
preceding enumerated properties in the first paragraph of Article 424. The playgrounds, however, would fit
into this category. The records do not disclose, however, whether the buildings were constructed at the expense
of the former Province of Zamboanga. Considering however the fact that said buildings must have been
erected even before 1936 when CA 39 was enacted and the further fact that provinces then had no power to
authorize construction of buildings at their own expense, it can be assumed that said buildings were erected by
the National Government, using national funds. Hence, Congress could very well dispose of said buildings in
the same manner that it did with the lots in question. On the other hand, Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied
to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are
patrimonial properties since they are not being utilized for distinctly governmental purposes. The fact that
these 26 lots are registered strengthens the proposition that they are truly private in nature. Thus, Zamboanga
del Norte is still entitled to collect from the City of Zamboanga the former's 54.39% share in the 26 properties
which are patrimonial in nature, said share to be computed on the basis of the valuation of said 26 properties as
contained in Resolution 7, dated 26 March 1949, of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General.
The share, however, cannot be paid in lump sum, except as to the P43,030.11 already returned to the City, as
the return of said amount to the city was without legal basis. RA 3039 took effect only on 17 June 1961 after a
partial payment of P57,373.46 had already been made. Since the law did not provide for retroactivity, it could
not have validly affected a completed act. Hence, the amount of P43,030.11 should be immediately returned by
the City to the province. The remaining balance, if any, in the amount of plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 lots
should then be paid by the City in the same manner originally adopted by the Secretary of Finance and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and not in lump sum.
 BATCH TWO CASES
TAXATION
Tax Exemption
YMCA vs CIR, 33 PHIL 217 (1916)

Fact: The Young Men’s Christian Association came to the Philippine with the army of occupation in
1898. When the large body of troops in Manila was removed to permanent quarters at Fort William
McKinley in February, 1905, an independent association for Manila was organized under the direction of
the Army and navy departments. Shortly after the organization of the association the directors made a
formal request to the international committee of the Young Men’s Christian Association in New York
City for the assistance and cooperation of its foreign department. A site for the new building was selected
on Calle Concepcion, Ermita, and the building contract was let on the 8th of January following. The
cornerstone was laid with appropriate ceremonies on July 10, 1908, and the building was formally
dedicated on October 20, 1909.

The purposes of the association, as set forth in its charter and constitution, are:

o develop the Christian character and usefulness of its members, to improve the spiritual, intellectual,
social and physical condition of young men, and to acquire, hold, mortgage, and dispose of the necessary
lands, buildings and personal property for the use of said corporation exclusively for religious, charitable
and educational purposes, and not for investment or profit.

The purposes of this association shall be exclusively religious, charitable and educational, in developing
the Christian character and usefulness of its members and in improving the spiritual, mental, social and
physical condition of young men.

Issue: Whether the building and grounds of the Young Men’s Christian Association of Manila are subject
to taxation Exemption?

Held: Yes, There is no doubt about the correctness of the contention that an institution must devote itself
exclusively to one or the other of the purpose mentioned in the statute before it can be exempt from
taxation; but the statute does not say that it must be devoted exclusively to any one of the purposes therein
mentioned. It may be a combination of two or three or more of those purposes and still be entitled to
exempt. The Young Men’s Christian Association of Manila cannot be said to be an institution used
exclusively for religious purposes, or an institution used exclusively for charitable purposes, or an
institution devoted exclusively to educational purposes; but we believe it can be truthfully said that it is an
institution used exclusively for all three purposes, and that, as such, it is entitled to be exempted from
taxation.

Lladoc vs CIR, 14 SCRA 292 (1965)

Fact: Sometime in 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc., of Bacolod City, donated P10,000.00 in cash to Rev. Fr.
Crispin Ruiz, then parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of herein petitioner, for
the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality. The total amount was actually spent for the
purpose intended. On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate, Inc., filed the donor’s gift tax return. Under
date of April 29, 1960, the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for
donee’s gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental, of which petitioner was the
priest. The tax amounted to P1,370.00 including surcharges, interests of 1% monthly from May 15, 1958
to June 15, 1960, and the compromise for the late filing of the return. Petitioner lodged a protest to the
assessment and requested the withdrawal thereof. The protest and the motion for reconsideration
presented to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue were denied. The petitioner appealed to the Court of
Tax Appeals on November 2, 1960. In the petition for review, the Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc claimed,
among others, that at the time of the donation, he was not the parish priest in Victorias; that there is no
legal entity or juridical person known as the “Catholic Parish Priest of Victorias,” and, therefore, he
should not be liable for the donee’s gift tax. It was also asserted that the assessment of the gift tax, even
against the Roman Catholic Church, would not be valid, for such would be a clear violation of the
provisions of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether the petitioner is liable for the assessed donee’s gift tax on the donated for the construction
of the Victorias Parish Church. 

Held: Yes, exempts from taxation cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents, appurtenant thereto,
and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only
from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra
distinguished from excise taxes. In the present case, what the Collector assessed was a donee’s gift tax;
the assessment was not on the properties themselves. It did not rest upon general ownership; it was an
excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties.
Manifestly, gift tax is not within the exempting provisions of the section just mentioned. A gift tax is not
a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the
imposition of which on property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an
impairment of the Constitution. As well observed by the learned respondent Court, the phrase “exempt
from taxation,” as employed in the Constitution (supra) should not be interpreted to mean exemption from
all kinds of taxes. And there being no clear, positive or express grant of such privilege by law, in favor of
petitioner, the exemption herein must be denied.
Abra Valley College vs AquinoA, 162 SCRA 106 (1988)

Fact: Petitioner, filed a complaint in the court a quo to annul and declare void the “Notice of Seizure’ and
the “Notice of Sale” of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes
and penalties. The “Notice of Sale” was caused to be served upon the petitioner by the respondent
treasurers for the sale at public auction of said college lot and building, which sale was held on the same
date. Dr. Paterno Millare, then Municipal Mayor of Bangued, Abra, offered the highest bid which was
duly accepted. the respondent filed through counstel a motion to dismiss the complaint. Nonetheless, the
trial court disagreed because of the use of the second floor by the Director of petitioner school for
residential purposes. He thus ruled for the government and rendered the assailed decision. Hence
petitioner instead availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary
injunction before the Supreme Court. 

Issue: Whether the Educational Institution Properties which is not exclusively used for educational
purposes is not eligible for tax exemption.

Held:   Yes, Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the conclusion that the school
building as well as the lot where it is built, should be taxed, not because the second floor of the same is
being used by the Director and his family for residential purposes, but because the first floor thereof is
being used for commercial purposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it
is only fair that half of the assessed tax be returned to the school involved. Moreover, the exemption in
favor of property used exclusively for charitable or educational purposes is ‘not limited to property
actually indispensable’ therefor but extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of said purposes. But it must be stressed however, that while  the court allows a
more liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase “exclusively used for educational purposes”,
reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to
and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of the
school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence, The
lease of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the
imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education.

Double Taxation
Punzalan vs Municipal Board of Manila, 95 Phil 46 (1954)

Fact: The municipal board of the City of Manila on July 25, 1950, imposes a municipal occupation tax on
persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of the tax “by a fine of not
more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more than six months, or by both such fine and
imprisonment in the discretion of the court.” Among the professions taxed were those to which plaintiffs
belong. The ordinance was enacted pursuant to paragraph (1) of section 18 of the Revised Charter of the
City of Manila (as amended by Republic Act No. 409), which empowers the Municipal Board of said city
to impose a municipal occupation tax, not to exceed P50 per annum, on persons engaged in the various
professions above referred to.

Having already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
plaintiffs, upon being required to pay the additional tax prescribed in the ordinance, paid the same under
protest and then brought the present suit for the purpose already stated. The lower court upheld the
validity of the provision of law authorizing the enactment of the ordinance but declared the ordinance
itself illegal and void on the ground that the penalty there in provided for non-payment of the tax was not
legally authorized. From this decision both parties appealed to this Court, and the only question they have
presented for our determination is whether this ruling is correct or not, for though the decision is silent on
the refund of taxes paid plaintiffs make no assignment of error on this point.

Issue: whether double taxation of certain classes is authorized by law?

Held: Yes, the Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in the
exercise of that discretion it may tax all, or it may select for taxation certain classes and leave the others
untaxed.

License Fee
Physical Therapy Org. Vs Municipal Board, GR 10448 August 30, 1957

Fact: The petitioner-appellant, an association of registered massagists and licensed operators of massage
clinics in the City of Manila and other parts of the country, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of
Manila for declaratory judgment regarding the validity of Municipal Ordinance No. 3659, promulgated by
the Municipal Board and approved by the City Mayor. To stop the City from enforcing said ordinance,
the petitioner secured an injunction upon filing of a bond in the sum of P1,000.00. A hearing was held,
but the parties without introducing any evidence submitted the case for decision on the pleadings,
although they submitted written memoranda. Thereafter, the trial court dismissed the petition and later
dissolved the writ of injunction previously issued. The petitioner appealed said order of dismissal directly
to this Court. In support of its appeal, petitioner-appellant contends among other things that the trial court
erred in holding that the Ordinance in question has not restricted the practice of massotherapy in massage
clinics to hygienic and aesthetic massage, that the Ordinance is valid as it does not regulate the practice of
massage, that the Municipal Board of Manila has the power to enact the Ordinance in question by virtue
of Section 18, Subsection (kk), Republic Act 409, and that permit fee of P100.00 is moderate and not
unreasonable. Inasmuch as the appellant assails and discuss certain provisions regarding the ordinance in
question, and it is necessary to pass upon the same, for purposes of ready reference, we are reproducing
said ordinance in toto.

Issue: Whether the license fee of P100.00 for operator of the Ordinance is unreasonable, nay,
unconscionable.

Held: No, The amount of the fee or charge is properly considered in determining whether it is a tax or an
exercise of the police power. The amount may be so large as to itself show that the purpose was to raise
revenue and not to regulate, but in regard to this matter there is a marked distinction between license fees
imposed upon useful and beneficial occupations which the sovereign wishes to regulate but not restrict,
and those which are inimical and dangerous to public health, morals or safety. In the latter case the fee
may be very large without necessarily being a tax. Evidently, the Manila Municipal Board considered the
practice of hygienic and aesthetic massage not as a useful and beneficial occupation which will promote
and is conducive to public morals, and consequently, imposed the said permit fee for its regulation.

DUE PROCESS
Meaning of Life, Liberty and Property
Libanan vs Sandiganbayan, 233 SCRA 163

Facts: Petitioner Libanan is the incumbent vice-governor of Eastern Samar and was a former member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan prior to the 1992 elections. He was charged in conspiring to other
members to prevent and exclude Docena, a qualified replacement of a deceased member, from exercising
his rights and prerogatives as a member of the said body. In effect, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
suspending their respective public position and office for ninety (90) days. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, alleging three grounds: [1] Order of Suspension if executed shall affront the petitioner’s
right for due process; [2] the suspension would assault his covenant to the people of Samar as their vice-
governor; and [3] the reasons sought to be prevented by the suspension no longer exist. Petitioner
contends that the order of suspension, being predicated on his acts supposedly committed while still a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan, can no longer attach to him now that he is the duly elected and
incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar.

Issue: Whether or not the Order of Suspension given by the Sandiganbayan is valid?

Held: Yes. The Court ruled that the term "office" used in the law could apply to any office which the
officer charged might currently be holding and not necessarily the particular office under which he was
charged. The suspension order cannot amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law.
Public office is "a public agency or trust,"and it is not the property envisioned by the Constitutional
provision which petitioner invokes. Hence, SC dismissed the petition. Sandiganbayan’s decision is
affirmed.

Substantive Due Process

Villegas vs Hu Chong Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 275 (1978)

Fact: September 17, 1968 of respondent Judge rendered in favor of the respondent and against the
petitioner, declaring Ordinance No. 6 37 of the City of Manila null and void. The Ordinance No. 6537
was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by the herein petitioner
who prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any position or occupation or
business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an
employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons
employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance
programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working in their
respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are
not paid monetarily or in kind. Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less
than three (3) months to six (6) months or fine of not less than P100.00 but not more than P200.00 or both
such fine and imprisonment, upon conviction. Private respondent who was employed in Manila, filed a
petition with the praying for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to
stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537
null and void. Adrian Avilado Antazo

Issue: Whether the Petitioner’s ordinance is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to
aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

Held: Yes, While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an employment
permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or
disapproval of applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second
part which requires the payment of P50.00 as employee’s fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure.
There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. It
is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation. It is
unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences
in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. The Ordinance does not lay down any
criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an
ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor’s
action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or
refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to
grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and
unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful. Requiring a person before he
can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is
tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of
livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory,
once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee
includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection
clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

Rubi vs Prov Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660 (1919)

Facts: Rubi and various other Manguianes in the province of Mindoro were ordered  by the provincial
governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on
a reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by
imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and
for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were
considered to be of “very low culture”. One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the
reservation but was later caught and was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the
reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the
province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the
reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of
the Administrative Code, which provides: With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course
is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation
on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.

Issue: Whether due process was followed in the restraint of liberty and imprisonment due to violation of
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code.

Held: The provision is valid, as an exception to the general rule. The legislature is permitted to delegate
legislative powers to the local authorities on matters that are of purely local concerns. Action pursuant to
Section 2145 does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him
the equal protection of the laws and confinement in accordance with the said section does not constitute
slavery and involuntary servitude. Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of
their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

Void for Vagueness/ overbreadth

Estrada vs Sandiganbayan, GR 148560 November 19 2001

Facts: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder,
wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin
but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based
on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable
doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already
punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this
terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge
on the validity of the mentioned law.

Issues: Wether or not Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.

Held: No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are
subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The
amended information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating with reasonable certainty the
various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed. We discern nothing in the
foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Petitioner however
bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms “combination” and
“series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These omissions, according
to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad
and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence
violative of his fundamental right to due process.

A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or because of
the employment of terms without defining them. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects – it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct  to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to
vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech.  
The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by
the possibility that the protected speech of other may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take
chances as in the area of free speech.
Ong vs Sandiganbayan GR 126858, September 16, 2005
No Digest

Republic vs Extelcom GR 147096, January 15, 2002

Fact: Bayantel filed an application with the NTC for a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity
(CPCN) to install, operate and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS)
with prayer for a Provisional Authority (PA). Shortly thereafter the NTC issued directing all interested
applicants for nationwide or regional CMTS to file their respective applications before the Commission
and prior to the issuance of any notice of hearing by the NTC with respect to Bayantel’s original
application, Bayantel filed an urgent ex-parte motion to admit an amended application. the notice of
hearing issued by the NTC with respect to this amended application was published in the Manila
Chronicle. Copies of the application as well as the notice of hearing were mailed to all affected parties.
Subsequently, hearings were conducted on the amended application. But before Bayantel could complete
the presentation of its evidence, the NTC grant of two (2) separate Provisional which resulted in the
closing out of all available frequencies for the service being applied for by herein applicant, and in order
that this case may not remain pending for an indefinite period of time, ordered ARCHIVED without
prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency becomes available. NTC issued
Memorandum re-allocating five (5) megahertz (MHz) of the radio frequency spectrum for the expansion
of CMTS networks. Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive Case, citing the availability of new
frequency bands for CMTS operators, the NTC granted BayanTel’s motion to revive the latter’s
application and set the case for hearings. Extelcom filed an Opposition praying for the dismissal of
Bayantel’s application which was denied for lack of merit. Extelcom filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and prohibition,which was granted. Petitioner filed MR but subsequently denied by
the CA. Hence, the NTC filed the instant petition. 

Issue: Whether the 1993 Revised Rules of the NTC is operative and should be applied to the Respondent
even with the absence of Publication Requirement? [Link]

Held: No, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public
of the contents of the laws. The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those issuances which
should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation, publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is
a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect. The Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the NTC fall squarely within the scope of these laws, as explicitly mentioned in the case
Tañada v. Tuvera. which is clear and categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be published
if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only
exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of
instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties. Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be published in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation before it can take effect. Even the 1993 Revised
Rules itself mandates that said Rules shall take effect only after their publication in a newspaper of
general circulation. In the absence of such publication, therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that governs. 

Impartial Court or Tribunal

Turney vs Ohio 273 US 510

Tabuena vs Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332 (1997)

Facts: Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the president’s
office and in cash what the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) owes the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to the 7 January 1985 memorandum of then Minister Trade
and Industry Roberto Ongpin. Tabuena agreed. About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-
Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated 8 January 1986 reiterating
in black and white such verbal instruction. In obedience to President Marcos’ verbal instruction and
memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo G. Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused the release of P55
Million of MIAA funds by means of three (3) withdrawals. On 10 January 1986, the first withdrawal was
made for P25 Million, following a letter of even date signed by Tabuena and Dabao requesting the PNB
extension office at the MIAA the depository branch of MIAA funds, to issue a manager’s check for said
amount payable to Tabuena. The check was encashed, however, at the PNB Villamor Branch. Dabao and
the cashier of the PNB Villamor branch counted the money after which, Tabuena took delivery thereof.
The P25 Million in cash was delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez. Mrs. Gimenez did
not issue any receipt for the money received. Similar circumstances surrounded the second
withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another P25 Million, made on 16 January 1986. The third and last
withdrawal was made on 31 January 1986 for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuena’s co-signatory to the
letter- request for a manager’s check for this amount. Peralta accompanied Tabuena to the PNB Villamor
branch as Tabuena requested him to do the counting of the P5 Million. After the counting, the money was
loaded in the trunk of Tabuena’s car. Peralta did not go with Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs.
Gimenez’ office. It was only upon delivery of the P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all
the amounts she received from Tabuena. The receipt was dated January 30,1986. Tabuena and Peralta
were charged for malversation of funds, while Dabao remained at large. One of the justices of the
Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves;
the volume of the questions asked were more the combined questions of the counsels. On 12 October
1990, they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Tabuena and Peralta filed separate petitions for
review, appealing the Sandiganbayan decision dated 12 October 19990 and the Resolution of 20
December 1991.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the crime of malversation.

Held: Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of malversation. Tabuena acted in strict
compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum. The order emanated from the Office of the President and
bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it the
presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law
makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution
constrains one to act swiftly without question. Records show that the Sandiganbayan actively took part in
the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves. The questions of the court were in the
nature of cross examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation. Tabuena and Peralta
may not have raised the issue as an error, there is nevertheless no impediment for the court to consider
such matter as additional basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an appeal throws the whole
case open to review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found
in the judgment appealed from whether they are made the subject of assignments of error or not.

Prejudicial Publicity
Webb v de leon, 247 SCRA 652 (1995)

Facts: On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed with the Department of Justice a
letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6)
other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita
Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF
Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991. Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel
of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary
investigation.

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica
Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and
May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not
examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies. Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de
Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without
conducting the required preliminary examination. Petitioners complain about the denial of their
constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also
assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is
probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape and homicide 2. Whether or not respondent Judges
de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary
examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them 3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them
their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation 4. Whether or not the DOJ
Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the
information as an accused.

Held: 1. NO. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found
probable cause against the petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not
be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

2. NO. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. In arrest cases, there
must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it.
Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may
issue a warrant for the accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of petitioners that
respondent judges should have conducted “searching examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants
of arrest against them.
3. NO. The DOJ Panel precisely ed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel
to study the evidence submitted more fully.

4. NO. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to
prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of the courts and beyond executive and legislative
interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government
whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary
component of this power is the right to prosecute their violators.

With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro, the Court believes that these
have been sufficiently explained and there is no showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made
to distort the truth.

With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary
investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the
publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the
DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of
the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing.
People vs Sanchez GR 121039, Oct 18, 2001

Facts: Accused-appellant Antonio Sanchez and others were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape with homicide. In his  motion for reconsideration, he avers that he is a victim of trial and
conviction by publicity.

Issue: Whether or not the attendant publicity deprived Webb and the others of their right to fair trial?

Held: We cannot sustain appellant’s claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial
publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all
high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial
is not incompatible to a free press. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation
and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against
appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The
totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed position as a result
of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial.
Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
Re: Request for Live TV Coverage of the Trial of Former President Joseph Estrada, AM no
01-4-03 SC Sept 13, 2001

Facts: On March 13, 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association
representing duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a
letter requesting the Supreme Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder
and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in
order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our
history." The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 5 April 2001 to the Chief
Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On 17 April 2001, the
Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the petition.

Issue: Whether or not media coverage be allowed to air Estrada’s trial to the public.
Held: NO. In Estes v. Texas, US The Supreme Court held that television coverage of judicial proceedings
involves an inherent denial of due process rights of the criminal defendant: "Witnesses might be
frightened, play to the cameras, become nervous. They are then subject to extraordinary out-of-court
influences that might affect their testimony. Telecasting increases the trial judge's responsibility to avoid
actual prejudice to the defendant. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment and
subjects him to excessive public exposure and distracts him from an effective presentation of his defense.
Finally, the television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an
accused and his case in the eyes of the public."

The right of people to information does not prescribe that TV cameras be installed in the courtroom. This
right might be fulfilled by less distracting, degrading and more judicial means. In a criminal case, a life is
at stake, and the due process rights of the accused shall take precedence over the people's right to
information. The accused has the right to a public trial, and the exercise of such a right is his to make,
because it is his life and liberty that is in the balance. A public trial is not the same as a publicized trial.
IBP: "TV coverage can negate the rule on the exclusion of the witness intended to ensure a fair
trial...could allow the 'hooting throng' to arrogate upon themselves the task of judging the guilt of the
accused...will not subserve the ends of justice, but will only pander to the desire of publicity of a few
grandstanding lawyers."cCourt is not unmindful of the recent technological advances but to chance
forthwith the life and liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety
nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.

Notice of Hearing
Summary dismissal Board v Torcita 330 SCRA 153 (2000)

Fact: On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Java, in
the front seat and his wife with two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken by a Mazda pick-up owned by
Congressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo Consejo with four (4) passengers in the persons
of Alex Edwin del Rosario, Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristina Dawa. After the Mazda pick-up
has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and after a vehicular collision almost took place, it accelerated speed
and proceeded to Hacienda Aimee, a sugarcane plantation owned by the congressman. The red Cortina
Ford followed also at high speed until it reached the hacienda where Torcita and Java alighted and the
confrontation with del Rosario and Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita identified himself but the same had no
effect. PO2 Java whispered to him that there are armed men around them and that it is dangerous for them
to continue. That at this point, they radioed for back-up. Torcita, upon the arrival of the back-up force of
PNP Cadiz City, proceeded to the place where Capt. Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario were. On 6
July 1994, 12 verified administrative complaints were filed against Torcita for Conduct Unbecoming of a
Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of
Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun [Link] 12 administrative complaints were consolidated into
1 major complaint for conduct unbecoming of a police officer.

The Summary Dismissal Board, however, did not find sufficient evidence to establish that Torcita
threatened anybody with a gun, nor that a serious confrontation took place between the parties, nor that
the urinating incident took place, and held that the charges of violation of domicile and illegal search
were not proven. Still, while the Board found that Torcita was "in the performance of his official duties"
when the incident happened, he allegedly committed a simple irregularity in performance of duty (for
being in the influence of alcohol while in performance of duty) and was suspended for 20 days and salary
suspended for the same period of time.
Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the Philippine National Police (PNP,
Region VI, Iloilo City), but the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Whereupon, Torcita filed a
petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City (Branch 31), questioning the legality of the
conviction of an offense for which he was not charged (lack of procedural due process of law). The Board
filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied.

The RTC granted the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive portion of the questioned decision
insofar as it found Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of duty. The Board appealed
from the RTC decision, by petition of review to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the same for the
reason that the respondent could not have been guilty of irregularity considering that the 12 cases were
eventually dismissed. The Board filed the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Torcita may be proceeded against or suspended for breach of internal discipline, when the
original charges against him were for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave
Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun
Ban.

Held: NO. Notification of the charges contemplates that the respondent be informed of the specific
charges against him. The absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually found guilty
is not a proper observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to the legal process. While the
definition of the more serious offense is broad, and almost all-encompassing a finding of guilt for an
offense, no matter how light, for which one is not properly charged and tried cannot be countenanced
without violating the rudimentary requirements of due process. Herein, the 12 administrative cases filed
against Torcita did not include charges or offenses mentioned or made reference to the specific act of
being drunk while in the performance of official duty. There is no indication or warning at all in the
summary dismissal proceedings that Torcita was also being charged with breach of internal discipline
consisting of taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of his duties. The omission is fatal to the
validity of the judgment finding him guilty of the offense for which he was not notified nor charged.
Further, the cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed breach of internal
discipline by taking drinks while in the performance of same" should have been substantiated by factual
findings referring to this particular offense. Even if he was prosecuted for irregular performance of duty,
he could not have been found to have the odor or smell of alcohol while in the performance of duty
because he was not on duty at the time that he had a taste of liquor because he was on a private trip
fetching his wife. Hence , the decision of the petitioners Board was rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction. Petition dismissed.
Banco Espanol-Filipino v Serano 323 SCRA 445

Fact: Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila
to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29,
1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but
since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was
also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy,
China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication
in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The
decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the
highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years
after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate
of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and
the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that
the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of
the action and if due process of law was observed

Held: The word “jurisdiction” is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have
reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a
particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property
which is the subject to the litigation. The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the
nature and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to
the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.

Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result
from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court
over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times
within the potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of
the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is
seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the final
event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the
proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court,
without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming
to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the
petitioner against all the world. In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is
said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking
an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is,
in its narrow application, used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein
the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are
based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an
individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the
obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other
disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy,
are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only
between the parties.

It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the
action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the
proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be
considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem.
Pichay Jr. V Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, et al GR 139466,
October 17, 2000
Fact: On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O.
12) creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate
or hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption,... among others, against
presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the President. On November 15,
2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the
PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs ,
more particularly to its newly-established On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V.
Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit[2] for grave misconduct against petitioner
Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco,
Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which arose from the
purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377)
shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.

On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.
requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their respective written explanations under oath. In
compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a
case involving the same transaction and charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v.
Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the Office of
the Ombudsman. Now alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available to him in the
ordinary course of law, petitioner has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition

Issues: I. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE

LEGISLATURE TO CREATE A PUBLIC OFFICE.

II. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO

APPROPRIATE FUNDS.

III. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO

DELEGATE QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.

IV. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR ENCROACHING UPON THE POWERS OF THE

OMBUDSMAN.

V. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS.

VI. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

Held: The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under E.O. 292
Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987,
vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. E.O. 292 sanctions the following... actions undertaken for such
purpose: Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the
immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support
System, by abolishing, consolidating, or merging units thereof or. transferring functions from one unit to
another; Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as
well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and
transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as
transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other departments or agencies. Clearly, the abolition
of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA is
properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated legislative authority to
reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 13, Generally, this authority to implement organizational
changes is limited to transferring either an office or a function from the Office of the President to another
Department or Agency, and the other way around. Only Section 31(1) gives the President a... virtual
freehand in dealing with the internal structure of the Office of the President Proper by allowing him to
take actions as extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units, apart from the less drastic move of
transferring functions and offices from one unit to... another. The abolition of the PAGC did not require
the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as the duties and functions that pertained to the
defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is an existing office within the
Office of the President Proper. The reorganization required no more than a mere alteration of the
administrative structure of the ODESLA through the establishment of a third division the Investigative
and Adjudicatory Division through which ODESLA could take on the additional functions it has been
tasked to discharge under E.O. 202. The Reorganization was Pursued in Good Faith. A valid
reorganization must not only be exercised through legitimate authority but must also be pursued in good
faith. A reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is done for purposes of economy and
efficiency. It appears in this case that the streamlining of functions within the Office of the President
Proper was pursued with such purposes in mind.  In its Whereas clauses, E.O. 13 cites as bases for the
reorganization the policy dictates of eradicating corruption in the government and... promoting economy
and efficiency in the bureaucracy. Indeed, the economical effects of the reorganization is shown by the
fact that while Congress had initially appropriated P22 Million for the PAGC's operation in the 2010
annual budget, no separate... or added funding of such a considerable amount was ever required after the
transfer of the PAGC functions to the IAD-ODESLA.

Apparently, the budgetary requirements that the IAD-ODESLA needed to discharge its functions and
maintain its personnel would be sourced from the following year's appropriation for the President's
Offices under the General Appropriations Act of 2011. Petitioner asseverates, however, that since
Congress did not indicate the manner by which the appropriation for the Office of the President was to be
distributed, taking therefrom the operational funds of the IAD-ODESLA would amount to an illegal
appropriation by the President.

The contention is without legal basis.

There is no usurpation of the legislative... power to appropriate public funds. In the chief executive dwell
the powers to run government. Placed upon him is the power to recommend the budget necessary for the
operation of the Government, which implies that he has the necessary authority to evaluate and determine
the structure that... each government agency in the executive department would need to operate in the
most economical and efficient manner. Hence, the express recognition under Section 78 of R.A. 9970 or
the General Appropriations Act of 2010 of the President's authority to "direct changes in the
organizational units or key positions in any department or agency." The aforecited provision, often and
consistently included in the general appropriations laws, recognizes the extent of the President's power to
reorganize the executive offices and... agencies under him, which is, "even to the extent of modifying and
realigning appropriations for that purpose."

And to further enable the President to run the affairs of the executive department, he is likewise given
constitutional authority to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law using the savings in other
items of the appropriation for his office.
In fact, he is explicitly allowed by law to transfer any fund appropriated for the different departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department which is included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau... or office included in
the General Appropriations Act or approved  after its enactment.[20]

Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IADODESLA from the total amount
appropriated by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the President, the necessary funds for the
IADODESLA may be properly sourced from the President's own office budget... without committing any
illegal appropriation.  After all, there is no usurpation of the

Executive Order No. 13 Does Not Violate Petitioner's Right to Due Process and the Equal Protection... of
the Laws. Presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This
proceeds from the well settled principle that, in the absence of a contrary law, the power to remove or to
discipline is lodged in the same authority on which the power to appoint is... vested. Having the power to
remove and/or discipline presidential appointees, the President has the corollary authority to investigate
such public officials and look into their conduct in office. Petitioner is a presidential... appointee
occupying the high-level position of Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily, he comes under the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, who is well within his right to order an investigation into matters
that require his informed decision.

Also, contrary to petitioner's assertions, his right to due process was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA
took cognizance of the administrative complaint against him since he was given sufficient opportunity to
oppose the formal complaint filed by Secretary Purisima. In... administrative proceedings, the filing of
charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against
him constitute the minimum requirements of due process, which simply means having the opportunity to
explain... one's side. Hence, as long as petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his side and present
evidence, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with because what the law abhors is 
an absolute lack of opportunity to be... heard. The records show that petitioner was issued an Order
requiring him to submit his written explanation under oath with respect to the charge of grave misconduct
filed against him. His own failure to submit his explanation despite notice defeats his... subsequent claim
of denial of due process.

Finally, petitioner doubts that the IAD-ODESLA can lawfully perform its duties as an impartial tribunal,
contending that both the IAD-ODESLA and respondent Secretary Purisima are connected to the
President. The mere suspicion of partiality will not suffice to invalidate the... actions of the
IADODESLA. Mere allegation is not equivalent to proof. Bias and partiality cannot be presumed.
Petitioner must present substantial proof to show that the lAD-ODES LA had unjustifiably sided against
him in the conduct of the investigation. No such evidence has been presented as to defeat the presumption
of regularity m the perfonnance of the fact-finding investigator's duties. The assertion, therefore, deserves
scant consideration.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. Petitioner
has failed to discharge the burden of... proving the illegality of E.O. 13, which IS indubitably a valid
exercise of the President's continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President. WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Chavez v Romulo, 431SCRA534
Fact: This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in order to deter the
rising crime rates. Petitioner questions the ban as a violation of his right to property.

Issue: Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional

Held: Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision. In evaluating a due
process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest exists.
The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a
property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that “a license is merely a
permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority
granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right.” In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that:
“Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.” In our jurisdiction,
the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that “the Chief of Constabulary
may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize
lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence.” Following the American doctrine, it is
indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected under our Constitution.

Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time.
It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing
restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to
such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is
that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a
revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the
meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights. The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental
Ins. Co, held: “The correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary consequence of the
main power. A mere license by the State is always revocable.”
Secretary of Justice vs Lantion GR 139466

Fact: On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1069
"Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign
Country". On 13 November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America. The
Senate, by way of Resolution 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of the said treaty. It also
expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the
admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal
diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the Requesting State). On 18 June 1999,
the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale 0522
containing a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States.

Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S.
District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Jimenez
was charged in the United States for violation of (a) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to
defraud the United States, 2 counts) (b) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts), (c) 18
USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts), (d) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries, 6
counts), and (E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts).

On the same day, the Secretary issued Department Order 249 designating and authorizing a panel of
attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition
documents, Jimenez (on 1 July 1999 requested copies of the official extradition request from the US
Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith, and that he be given ample time to
comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. The Secretary denied
the request. On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition against the
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, for mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez the extradition
documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the
extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to
set aside the Justice Secretary’s letter dated 13 July 1999); and prohibition (to restrain the Justice
Secretary from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court;  and to
enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to
the extradition of Jimenez to the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The
Secretary filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. On 18 January 2000, by a vote of 9-6,
the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies of
the,extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file
his comment with supporting evidence.

Issue: Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.

Held: NO. The human rights of person and the rights of the accused guaranteed in the Constitution should
take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting party, the doctrine of incorporation is applied
whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with a situation where there is a conflict between a rule of
the international law and the constitution. Efforts must first be made in order to harmonize the provisions
so as to give effect to both but if the conflict is irreconcilable, the municipal law must be upheld. The fact
that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy
of international law over the municipal law in the municipal sphere. In states where the constitution is the
highest law of the land, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the
constitution.

In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or
employment but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land.
The convergence of petitioners favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation of private
respondents liberty is easily comprehensible. We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity
jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence
of, and never against, statutory law or judicial [Link] constitutional issue in the case at bar
does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondents due process rights, although not
guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the
organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty.
That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.
Thus, Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting
evidence. 
People vs Estrada GR130487

Facts: Roberto Estrada entered St John’s Cathedral and sat on the Bishop’s chair while the Bishop is
giving the sacrament of confirmation. The assistant requested Estrada to vacate the chair but the latter
declined. Someone called Rogelio Mararac the security guard. Upon approaching and tapping Estrada to
vacate the chair he was then stabbed to death by the same. counsel for accused-appellant filed a “Motion
to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination.” Appellant’s counsel informed the
court that accused-appellant had been exhibiting abnormal behavior for the past weeks. This was denied
and dring hearing did not take the witness stand. His counsel presented instead testimony of Dr. Maria
Soledad Gawidan, a resident physician in the Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio General Hospital.
She confirmed that appellant had been confined at the BGH and that he suffered from “Schizophrenic
Psychosis, Paranoid Type—schizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type. Court found Estrada guilty
of the crime murder.

Issue: Whether or not the hearing / proceeding is null on the ground of violating the requirements of due
process

Decision: RTC decision vacated and mental examination of accused remanded. The fact that accused-
appellant was able to answer the questions asked by the trial court is not conclusive evidence that he was
competent enough to stand trial and assist in his defense. The trial court took it solely upon itself to
determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some
other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of determining the state of a person’s mental
health. To determine the accused-appellant’s competency to stand trial, the court, in the instant case,
should have at least ordered the examination of accused-appellant, especially in the light of the latter’s
history of mental illness.
Mariveles Shipyard vs CA GR 11987 October 24, 2003

Secretary of Justice vs Lantion GR no 13946, October 17, 2000

Facts: On January 18, 2000, petitioner was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition
request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter reasonable period within which to file his
comment with supporting evidence. Private respondent states that he must be afforded the right to notice
and hearing as required by our Constitution. He likens an extradition proceeding to a criminal proceeding
and the evaluation stage to a preliminary investigation. Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration assailing the mentioned decision.

Issue: Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process

Held: No. Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will
call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The process of
extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or
innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule,
constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be
invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation. As
held by the US Supreme Court in United States v. Galanis: “An extradition proceeding is not a criminal
prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in this country do not shield
an accused from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty.”

As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition
proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not
necessarily apply to the former. The procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances
“must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the
private interest that has been affected by governmental action.” The concept of due process is flexible for
“not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.” In tilting the
balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses that it is not ruling that the private
respondent has no right to due process at all throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial
proceedings. Procedural due process requires a determination of what process is due, when it is due, and
the degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior determination should be made as to whether
procedural protections are at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends on the extent to which
an individual will be “condemned to suffer grievous loss.”

As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty affords an
extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is filed in court. The
time for the extraditee to know the basis of the request for his extradition is merely moved to the filing in
court of the formal petition for extradition. The extraditee’s right to know is momentarily withheld during
the evaluation stage of the extradition process to accommodate the more compelling interest of the State
to prevent escape of potential extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information of the basis
of the request for his extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the
need to be more deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of the government, the Executive, which
has been endowed by our Constitution with greater power over matters involving our foreign
relations. Needless to state, this balance of interests is not a static but a moving balance which can be
adjusted as the extradition process moves from the administrative stage to the judicial stage and to the
execution stage depending on factors that will come into play. In sum, we rule that the temporary hold on
private respondent’s privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which
will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to
the United States. There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.
Buiongan v De la Cruz, GR 170288, September 22, 2006

Fact: By virtue of Municipal Ordinance, the Municipality of Carmen, Bohol appropriated an amount for
the purchase of a road roller for the municipality. However, the Municipal Development Council
recommended that the amount be realigned and used for the asphalt laying of a portion of a Street.
Thereafter, it was discovered that there was yet no ordinance approving the realignment of the funds.
Thus, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Ordinance, approving the realignment of the fund. Malmis was paid
the contract price. private respondents filed a complaint against the petitioners before the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas alleging illegality in the conduct of the bidding, award and notice to
commence work since there was no fund appropriated for the purpose. the Office of the Deputy found
probable cause and recommended the filing of an information for violation of Article 2207 of the Revised
Penal Code against the petitioners. Upon review, the Case Assessment, Review and Reinvestigation
Bureau of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, issued the assailed Memorandum modifying the charge
against petitioners for allegedly giving unwarranted benefit to Malmis and violation of Section 3(h) of
R.A. No. 3019 against petitioner Budiongan for allegedly “directly or indirectly having financial or
pecuniary interest in a contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity.” Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Office of the Special Prosecutor
which was denied for lack of merit in the Resolution dated October 19,
2005. [Link]

Issue: Whether the refusal or failure to conduct a re-investigation has violated petitioners’ right to due
process? [Link]

Held: No, The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a right
conferred by statute. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the
Information or otherwise render the same defective. It does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the
case or constitute a ground for quashing the Information. If absence of a preliminary investigation does
not render the Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case, then the denial of a
motion for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction
over the case. Petitioners were not deprived of due process because they were afforded the opportunity to
refute the charges by filing their counter-affidavits. The modification of the offense charged did not come
as a surprise to the petitioners because it was based on the same set of facts and the same alleged illegal
acts. Moreover, petitioners failed to aver newly discovered evidence nor impute commission of grave
errors or serious irregularities prejudicial to their interest to warrant a reconsideration or reinvestigation of
the case as required under Section 8, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Thus, the modification of the offense charged, even without affording the petitioners a new preliminary
investigation, did not amount to a violation of their rights.

Marohombsar v Judge Adiong, AM RTJ-02-1674 January 22, 2004

Fact: Complainant Marohombsar was the defendant in Civil Case for “injunction with prayer for
preliminary injunction.” The case was filed by Yasmira Pangadapun, daughter of Judge Yusoph
Pangadapun of RTC Branch 10, Marawi City. In the said complaint, Pangadapun questioned the legality
of Marohombsar’s appointment by DSWD Regional Secretary Salic-Malna as provincial social welfare
officer V of the DSWD-ARMM.  Upon the filing of the said complaint, respondent judge issued a TRO
and set the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Summons,
together with a copy of the complaint and a notice indicating that a preliminary conference would be held
was also served on both parties. Marohombsar filed an ex parte urgent motion to dissolve the TRO.
Pangadapun was asked to comment and, pending the filing of the same, the TRO was extended.
Respondent issued an order stating that a preliminary conference had been held and that both parties had
waived the raffle of the case. He reset the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Respondent extended the TRO to let Pangadapun submit her comment. During the
hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, none of the lawyers
appeared. Hence, respondent considered it submitted for resolution and issued the preliminary injunction
the following day. In his partial Comment respondent denied that: (1) he issued the TRO in favor of
Pangadapun without benefit of a hearing; (2) in his order dated March 22, 1999, he made it appear that a
preliminary conference was held where the parties agreed to waive the raffle of the case, when in fact
there was none; (3) he falsified the records of the case and (4) he granted the preliminary injunction
without a hearing. He alleged that the complaint was purely a harassment case filed by a disgruntled party
because of the latter’s failure to obtain a favorable resolution from him. Although respondent judge
admitted that Judge Yusoph Pangadapun and Judge Abdulhakim Ibrahim were his distant relatives and
townmates, he stressed that “never in our careers in the judiciary have we interfered nor influenced one
another on any pending case before our courts.”[Link]

Issue: Whether the complainant was denied due process because the preliminary injunction was issued
without [Link]

Held: No, In applications for preliminary injunction, the dual requirement of prior notice and hearing
before injunction may issue has been relaxed to the point that not all petitions for preliminary injunction
need undergo a trial-type hearing, it being doctrinal that a formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all times
and in all instances, essential to due process. The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present any evidence he may have in support of his defense. In
the present case, complainant was able to move for a reconsideration of the order in question; hence her
right to due process was not in anyway transgressed. The court ruled that a party cannot claim that he has
been denied due process when he has availed of the opportunity to present his position. Even assuming
for the sake of argument that respondent judge erred in ordering the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, in Equatorial Realty vs. Anunciacion, Jr.  that, as a matter of public policy, the acts of a judge
in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous, provided
he acts in good faith and without malice. Respondent judge, or any other member of the bench for that
matter, is presumed to have acted regularly and in the manner that preserves the ideal of the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge implicit in the guarantee of due process.

Exceptions to notice and hearing requirements.

Philcomsat v Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218 (1989)

Fact: The petition seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis
Alcuaz of the NTC which directs the provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged by
petitioner for certain specified lines of its services by fifteen percent (15%) with the reservation to make
further reductions later, for being violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of
legislative power and a denial of procedural, as well as substantive, due process of law. Petitioner was
exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However,
pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent
NTC, including all its facilities and services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said Executive Order
No. 196, respondents required petitioner to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and
necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to
charge rates therefor. petitioner filed with respondent NTC an application for authority to continue
operating and maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously operating and maintaining since
1967, to continue providing the international satellite communications services it has likewise been
providing since 1967, and to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services. Pending
hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to operate and maintain the
above mentioned facilities, provide the services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for.
petitioner was granted a provisional authority which was valid for six (6) months which was extended 3
times, but the last extension directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction
of fifteen percent (15%) on the present authorized rates. Hence this [Link]

Issue: whether the Respondent violates procedural due process for having been issued without prior
notice and hearing in exercising its power to fix the rate of the Petitioner?[Link]
Held: Yes, the respondent violated the procedural due process. if the authorities that where the function
of the administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law, Aside
from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character
of the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the
great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are
not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of
executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a
judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and
prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and
hearing.

Var Orient Shipping Co, Inc. Vs Achacoso, 161 SCRA 232 (1988)

Fact: The petitioners filed a complaint with the Workers’ Assistance and Adjudication Office, Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against the private respondents, crew members of the
MPV “Silver Reefer,” for having allegedly violated their Contracts of Employment with the petitioners
which supposedly resulted in damages arising from the interdiction of the vessel by the International
Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) at Kiel Canal, Germany, in March 1986. After joinder of the issues,
the case was heard on March 4, 1987 where the parties agreed to submit their respective position papers
and thereafter the case would be submitted for decision. Only the private respondents submitted a position
paper. On the basis of the pleadings and memoranda the public respondent rendered a decision on
September 9,1987 the dispositive part of which Dismiss of the instant case.A copy of the decision was
sent by registered mail and delivered by the postman to the petitioners’ counsel through the receptionist
but According to Attorney Figura, he did not receive the envelope containing the decision. Petitioners
allegedly learned about the decision only when the writ of execution was served on them by NLRC
Deputy Sheriff . petitioners, through new counsel, filed an ‘urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution’ on
the ground that the decision had not been received by the petitioners, hence, it was not yet final and
executory. The public respondent denied the motion. In due time, this petition was filed wherein the
petitioners allege that:

Issue: Whether the Petitioner were denied due process of law because the respondent POEA
Administrator resolved the case without any formal hearing?[Link]

Held: No, The petitioners’ allegation that the issuance of the writ of execution was premature because the
decision had not been received by their counsel is unconvincing. Petitioners failed to submit an affidavit
of the receptionist Marlyn Aquino explaining what she did with the decision which she received for Atty.
Figura. Under the circumstances, the respondent Administrator’s ruling that the decision had been
properly served on petitioners’ counsel and that it is now final and unappealable, should be sustained.
Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners ‘allegation that they were denied due process because the
decision was rendered without a formal hearing. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to
be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The fact is that at the hearing
of the case on March 4,1987, it was agreed by the parties that they would file their respective memoranda
and thereafter consider the case submitted for decision. This procedure is authorized by law to expedite
the settlement of labor disputes. However, only the private respondents submitted memoranda. The
petitioners did not. On June 10, 1987, the respondents filed a motion to resolve. The petitioners’ counsel
did not oppose either the “Motion to Resolve” or the respondents “Motion for Execution of Decision”
dated October 19, 1987, both of which were furnished them through counsel. If it were true, as they now
contend, that they had been denied due process in the form of a formal hearing, they should have opposed
both motions.

Administrative & Quasi-Judicial Due Process

Ang tibay vs CIR, 69 PHIL 635 (1940)

Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU
alleged that the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted
to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be
proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native
dealers in leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company
or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The
CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the
NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.

Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.

Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court
whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No.
103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not
intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially
passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the
parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more  active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of
disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It
has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter
controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and
landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.

As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not
narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal
evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore
or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of
this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support
thereof;

(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

(3) The decision must have something to support itself;

(4) The evidence must be substantial;

(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected;

(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;

(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely
affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted,
and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case
receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with
the requirements set forth. So ordered.

Montemayor vs Araneta University Foundation, && SCRA 321 (1977)

Facts: Felix Montemayor was a faculty of Araneta University Foundation serving as Head of Humanities
and Psychology Department. The Chaplain filed a complaint of immorality against him. A committee was
created to investigate the allegation. With the assistance of counsel, he filed a motion to dismiss or to hold
the hearing in abeyance. The committee found him responsible of the act complained of and
recommended for his demotion by one degree. The President adopted such recommendation and
thereafter referred the same to the Board of Trustees of private respondent for appropriate action.
Subsequently new charges was filed by different faculty members against him and a new committee was
formed to investigate the allegations. Montemayor asked for postponement of the hearing and was denied.
The hearing proceeded without him and found him guilty of the same charges and recommended for the
discontinuance of his service. He then filed a complaint with NLRC. NLRC decided in favour of the
Foundation. Hence the present petition.

Issue: Whether or not the proceeding relating to Montemayor’s dismissal was done in violation of due
process?

Held: Petition dismissed. In Montemayor’s absence the matter was heard and was sufficiently found by
the committee to be guilty of his conduct unbecoming and recommended his removal. Such deficiency
was remedied when Montemayor was able to present his case with the Labour Commission. Records will
show that after all efforts on conciliation had failed parties agreed to submit their dispute for compulsory
arbitration. Several hearings were conducted. he legal aspect as to the procedural due process having been
satisfied was then summarized by the Solicitor General thus: “All the foregoing clearly shows that
petitioner was afforded his day in court. Finally, and more significant, is the fact that petitioner claims
denial of due process in the proceeding had before the investigating committees and not in the
proceedings before the NLRC wherein, as shown heretofore, he was given the fullest opportunity to
present his case.

Alcuaz vs PSBA 161 SCRA (1988)

Fact: Petitioners are all bona fide students of the Respondents, while respondents, are the Philippine
School of Business Administration (hereinafter referred to as PSBA) Quezon City.  As early as March 22,
1986, the students of the respondent school and the respondent PSBA, Q.C. had already agreed on certain
matters which would govern their activities within the school. In spite of the above-stated agreement,
petitioners felt the need to hold dialogues. Among others they demanded the negotiation of a new
agreement, which demand was turned down by the school, resulting in mass assemblies and barricades of
school entrances. “Subsequently dialogues proved futile.” Finally, petitioners received uniform letters
from respondents giving them 3 days to explain why the school should not take / mete out any
administrative sanction on their direct participation and/or conspiring with others in the commission of
tumultuous and anarchic acts which was answered by the counsel for the students in a reply letter. During
the regular enrollment period, petitioners and other students similarly situated were allegedly blacklisted
and denied admission for the second semester. President of the Student Council filed a complaint with the
Director of the MECS against the PSBA for barring the enrollment of the Student Council Officers and
student leaders. Simultaneously on the same date, the student council wrote the President, Board of
Trustees, requesting for a written statement of the school’s decision regarding their enrollment. Another
demand letter was made by Counsel for the students Atty. Alan Romulo Yap, also to the President, Board
of Trustees, to enroll his clients within forty-eight (48) hours. All these notwithstanding, no relief
appeared to be forthcoming, hence this petition. Respondents filed their manifestation and motion stating
that pursuant to this court’s order the school authorities created a special investigating committee to
conduct an investigation, which submitted a report with recommendations. Respondents adopted the
recommendations of the Committee and prayed that the case be dismissed for having become moot. In the
resolution the motion of petitioners to compel respondents to readmit or re-enroll herein petitioners was
denied except in the case of three (3) student petitioners cleared by the investigating committee and who
had been recommended to be readmitted or re-enrolled. The Court further resolved to require respondent
school to show cause why it should not be adjudged in contempt for refusing to reinstate the intervenors-
faculty members in the interim which the Respondents filed the manifestation informing this Court that
they did not refuse to reinstate the intervenors/faculty members; that they were in fact actually reinstated
in compliance with the Court’s temporary mandatory order. Hence, the motion for contempt should be
dismissed. 

Issue: Whether there has been deprivation of due process for petitioners who have been barred from re-
enrollment and for intervenors teachers whose services have been terminated as faculty members, on
account of their participation in the demonstration or protest charged by respondents as “anarchic” rallies,
and a violation of their constitutional rights of expression and assembly. 

Held: No,  According to the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of
procedural due process are:

the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;

they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
desired:

(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;

(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf and

(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.

First, both students and teachers were given three (3) days from receipts of letter to explain in writing
why the school should not take / mete out any administrative sanction on them in view of their
participation in the commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts on the dates stated.
Second, The records show that a letter was sent by Atty. Alan Rollo Yap, in behalf of all PSBA students
to the President of the School Mr. Juan D. Lim, explaining why said students are not guilty of the charges
filed against them. Similarly, a faculty member of the PSBA filed as answer in a letter to the same
President of the school, where he denied the charges against him.

Third to fifth was conducted in the investigation conducted by the committee.  which after careful
scrutiny of the Report and Recommendation of the Special Investigating Committee shows it does not fall
under any of the above exceptions. On the contrary, it is readily apparent that the investigation conducted
was fair, open, exhaustive and adequate. Accordingly, there appears to be no cogent reason to disturb the
finding of said committee and as manifested by the respondents, the report of said committee has virtually
rendered this petition moot and academic.

Office of the Court Administrator vs Pascual 259SCRA604

Summary dismissal Board V. Torcita 330 SCRA 153

Fact: On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Java, in
the front seat and his wife with two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken by a Mazda pick-up owned by
Congressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo Consejo with four (4) passengers in the persons
of Alex Edwin del Rosario, Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristina Dawa. After the Mazda pick-up
has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and after a vehicular collision almost took place, it accelerated speed
and proceeded to Hacienda Aimee, a sugarcane plantation owned by the congressman. The red Cortina
Ford followed also at high speed until it reached the hacienda where Torcita and Java alighted and the
confrontation with del Rosario and Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita identified himself but the same had no
effect. PO2 Java whispered to him that there are armed men around them and that it is dangerous for them
to continue. That at this point, they radioed for back-up. Torcita, upon the arrival of the back-up force of
PNP Cadiz City, proceeded to the place where Capt. Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario were.

On 6 July 1994, 12 verified administrative complaints were filed against Torcita for Conduct
Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile,
and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun [Link] 12 administrative complaints were
consolidated into 1 major complaint for conduct unbecoming of a police officer. The Summary Dismissal
Board, however, did not find sufficient evidence to establish that Torcita threatened anybody with a gun,
nor that a serious confrontation took place between the parties, nor that the urinating incident took place,
and held that the charges of violation of domicile and illegal search were not proven. Still, while the
Board found that Torcita was "in the performance of his official duties" when the incident happened, he
allegedly committed a simple irregularity in performance of duty (for being in the influence of alcohol
while in performance of duty) and was suspended for 20 days and salary suspended for the same period of
time. Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the Philippine National Police
(PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City), but the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Whereupon, Torcita
filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City (Branch 31), questioning the
legality of the conviction of an offense for which he was not charged (lack of procedural due process of
law). The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied.

The RTC granted the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive portion of the questioned decision
insofar as it found Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of duty.

The Board appealed from the RTC decision, by petition of review to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the same for the reason that the respondent could not have been guilty of irregularity considering
that the 12 cases were eventually dismissed.

The Board filed the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Torcita may be proceeded against or suspended for breach of internal discipline, when the
original charges against him were for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave
Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun
Ban.

Held: NO. Notification of the charges contemplates that the respondent be informed of the specific
charges against him. The absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually found guilty
is not a proper observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to the legal process. While the
definition of the more serious offense is broad, and almost all-encompassing a finding of guilt for an
offense, no matter how light, for which one is not properly charged and tried cannot be countenanced
without violating the rudimentary requirements of due process.

Herein, the 12 administrative cases filed against Torcita did not include charges or offenses mentioned or
made reference to the specific act of being drunk while in the performance of official duty.

EQUAL PROTECTION
Sexual Discrimination
Phil. Association f Service Exporters vs Drilon 163 SCRA 386 (1988)

Fact: The petitioner, engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for
overseas placement, challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of
the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of “GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS,” in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for
“discrimination against males or females;” that it “does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to
domestic helpers and females with similar skills;” and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held
likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not
executive, in character. In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the
Constitution, providing for worker participation “in policy and decision-making processes affecting their
rights and benefits as may be provided by law.” 4 Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in
the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter’s non-impairment
clause, in addition to the “great and irreparable injury” that PASEI members face should the Order be
further enforced.

Issue: Whether the Department Order of the Respondent is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
and Discriminatory against Sexes

Held: No, the petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified.
There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to “female contract workers,” but it does
not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that “equality before the
law” under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It
admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply
equally to all members of the same class. The Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen
our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked
by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant
Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers,
are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights,
the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the
Government’s efforts. The State through the labor Secretary Exercise the police power which is a power
coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly termed the “law of overwhelming necessity.” It may
be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to
the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.”

Administration of Justice
Pp v Hernandez 99 Phil 515 (1956)

Trillanes IV v Pimentel, GR 179817 June 27 2008

Facts: On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the  Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and
publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials. After a series of
negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that evening. In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the
Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged with coup d’état before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained in detention and won a seat in the Senate.
Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed
to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests. Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate
sessions and fulfill his functions as senator. The RTC however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition
for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside orders of the RTC.
Issues: 1. Whether or not Trillanes‘ case is different from that of the Jalosjos case
2. Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to work and serve
his mandate as senator
3. Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of detention prisoners
who are held without bail

Held: No. The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that
election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in
their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules also state that no person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited
provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’état cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is
beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is
clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime
charged. In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a
hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court’s judgment of conviction, justifies the
detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the
proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is “regardless of the stage of the criminal action.” 
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to
detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The Court in People v.
Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not
practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive,
while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no “prior term” to speak of. In a
plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal
cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner’s
electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, “they did so
with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action with the knowledge that he could achieve
only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering mis impression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the
people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by
jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the
people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of
law. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse
to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the “mandate of the people” are multifarious.
The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed
to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006,
file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as
senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands
of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these
prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.

Pp vs Jalosjos 324 SCRA 689

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at
the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense. Jalosjos’ primary argument is the "mandate
of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte
chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty
to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible
by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints
arising from pending criminal cases.

Jalosjos further argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several
motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons. Jalosjos avers
that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that
since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal
branch of government to respect his mandate.

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives and to leave his cell.

Held: To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings will virtually
make him a free man. When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did
so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he
could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To
give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a
terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office. To
allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a
week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an
aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws." This
simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to
any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed. Does being an elective official result in a
substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial
differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons
validly confined under law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to
free a person validly in prison. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed
by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups
may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

The court, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift
him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful
arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the
same class.

USA v Puruganan, Sept 3, 2002

Farinas v Exec Sec 417 SCRA 503

Facts: A petition was filed seeking the Court to declare unconstitutional Section 14 of RA 9006 or “The
Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections Through Fair
Election Practices” as it repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code mandating the ipso jure
resignation from public office of one who filed his certificate of candidacy, except for President and Vice-
President.
It is the petitioners’ contention that the repeal of Section 67 is a rider on the said law, the same embracing
more than one subject, inconsistent to what the constitution mandates. Further, it violated the
equal protection clause since the said law didn’t repeal provision relating to appointive officials.
Appointive officials would still be considered ipso jure resigned upon filing of their respective certificates
of candidacy.

Held: Section 14 is not a rider. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code,
which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding,
to the other provisions of the contested law, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for
election propaganda, doesn’t violate the “one subject- one title rule”. The Court has held that an act
having a single general subject, indicated in its title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and
they may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general subject.

The repeal of Section 67 is not violative of the equal protection clause. Equal protection is not absolute
especially if the classification is reasonable. There is reasonable classification between an elective official
and an appointive one. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are
elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On
the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing
authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security
of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Another substantial distinction is
that by law, appointed officials are prohibited from engaging in partisan political activity or take part in
any election except to vote.

PAGCOR v BIR Gr 172087, March 15, 2011

Facts: Petitioner further seeks to prohibit the implementation of Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
Revenue Regulations No. 16-2005 for being contrary to law. With the enactment of R.A. No. 9337[10] on
May 24, 2005, certain sections of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 were amended. Different
groups came to this Court via petitions for certiorari and prohibition[11] assailing the validity and
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 10% Value Added Tax (VAT) on sale of goods and properties 10%
VAT on importation of goods 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties... the Court
dismissed all the petitions and upheld the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337.

On the same date, respondent BIR issued Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 16-2005,[13]  specifically
identifying PAGCOR as one of the franchisees subject to 10% VAT imposed under Section 108 of the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended by R.A. No. 9337.

Furthermore, according to the OSG,... public respondent BIR exceeded its statutory authority when it
enacted RR No. 16-2005, because the latter's provisions are contrary to the mandates of P.D. No. 1869 in
relation to R.A. No. 9337.

Issues: Whether or not PAGCOR is still exempt... hether or not PAGCOR is still exempt... t from VAT
with the enactment of R.A. No. 9337.

Held: Anent the validity of RR No. 16-2005, the Court holds that the provision subjecting PAGCOR to
10% VAT is invalid for being contrary to R.A. No. 9337.  Nowhere in R.A. No. 9337 is it provided that
petitioner can be subjected to VAT.  R.A. No. 9337 is clear only as to... the removal of petitioner's
exemption from the payment of corporate income tax, which was already addressed above by this Court.
As pointed out by the OSG, R.A. No. 9337 itself exempts petitioner from VAT pursuant to Section 7 (k)
thereof... the following transactions shall be exempt from the value-added tax: Transactions which are
exempt under international agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory or under special laws

Petitioner is exempt from the payment of VAT, because PAGCOR's charter, P.D. No. 1869, is a special
law that grants petitioner exemption from taxes. Moreover, the exemption of PAGCOR from VAT is
supported by Section 6 of R.A. No. 9337 The following services performed in the Philippines by VAT-
registered persons shall be subject to zero percent (0%) rate;

Services rendered to persons or entities whose exemption under special laws... subjects the supply of such
services to zero percent (0%) rate... although R.A. No. 9337 introduced amendments to Section 108 of
R.A. No. 8424 by imposing VAT on other services not previously covered, it did not amend the portion
of Section 108 (B) (3) that subjects to zero percent rate services performed by

VAT-registered persons to persons or entities whose exemption under special laws or international
agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory effectively subjects the supply of such services to 0%
rate.
 Public Policy
Central Bank Employees Assoc v. BSP GR 148208 Dec 15, 2004

Facts: The new Central Bank Act took effect and gave way for the creation of Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas. Other Governmental Financial Institutions (GFIs) also amended their charters. After almost 8
years following the amendment of the GFIs’ charters, BSP’s employees, through petitioner, filed a
petition for prohibition against the BSP and the Executive Secretary to restrain the respondents from
further implementing the last proviso in Sec. 15, Art. II of the New Central Bank Act (i.e., the exemption
from the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) of all employees with salary grade of 19 and the non-
exemption of those having a salary grade under 19). They alleged its constitutionality for being an invalid
“class legislation”.

Petitioner’s Contentions:

The said proviso violates equal protection clause because only the officers of the BSP (those holding the
salary grade of 19 and up) are exempted from the SSL. Those belonging from 19 and up and those 19
below do not really differ from one other in terms of the nature of work and expertise. Other GFIs, which
are the same as the BSP, exempt all their rank-and-file personnel from SSL without any distinction.

BSP’s contention:

The proviso is not unconstitutional as it can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in
harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as the mandate of the Monetary Board to “establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management.”

Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary:

The proviso is not unconstitutional as the classification is based on actual and real differentiation, even as
it adheres to the enunciated policy of the new SB Act to establish professionalism and excellence within
the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the national government.

Issue: Wether or not the proviso is unconstitutional for being violative of equal protection clause.

Held: YES, the proviso is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause. Equal
protection clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon
which different rules shall operate – so long as the classification is not unreasonable. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons themselves, but on persons
according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights.

In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and
above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting
competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file and the
resulting discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely
arbitrary in the legislative sense. However, in the subsequent passages of the amendment on the charters
of other GFI, the surrounding circumstances of the case changed. The subsequent amendments of the
other GFIs’ charter (i.e., express authorization to determine and institute its own compensation and wage
structure, and explicit exemption – without distinction as to salary grade or position – all employees of
the GFI from the SSL) resulted to the oppressive results of Congress’ inconsistent and unequal
policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven other GFI. In the case at bar, it is precisely
the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar only to the seven
GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were
denied (not to mention the anomaly of the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the law is not only
superficial, but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between
the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs. The subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven
other GFIs and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees of the exemption from SSL breached
the latter’s right to equal protection. The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality  but it
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
 PNB v Palma GR 157279, August 9, 2005

Facts: Salary Standardization Law took effect on 01 July 1989. The Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10) to implement
R.A. 6758. It enumerated the other allowances/fringe benefits which are not integrated into the basic
salary rates prescribed under R.A. 6758, but were allowed to be continued only for incumbents as of 30
June 1989. The same was ruled ineffective due to non-publication. Respondents filed petition for
mandamus alleging that they were deprived of the said allowances enjoyed by other employees. They
contend that the withholding of their entitlement to the same benefits is an unfair discrimination and a
violation of their equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not unconstitutionality of RA 6758 on the ground of violation of equal protection

clause be attacked collaterally?

Held: Respondents further argue that upholding the distinction among the employees on the basis of the
date of their hiring is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. For reasons of public
policy, the constitutionality of a law cannot be attacked in a collateral way. A law is deemed valid unless
declared null and void by a competent court; more so when the issue has not been duly pleaded in the trial
court. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity. Respondents not only
failed to challenge the constitutionality of RA 6758; worse, they used it in seeking compensation from
petitioner. The settled rule is that courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of
the necessity of deciding it. A valid classification was made by the law in segregating other employees
from the incumbents who were already receiving the benefits on July 1, 1989.

Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan 248 SCRA 700 (1995)

Fact: Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI), through its board member charged petitioner Parañaque
Mayor Olivarez with Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for unreasonably refusing to
issue a mayor’s permit despite request and follow-ups to implement Parañaque Sangguniang Bayan
Resolution which petitioner himself approved. the resolution authorized BCCI to set up a night
manufacturer’s fair during the Christmas fiesta celebration of and at Baclaran for 60 days for which they
will use a portion of the service road of Roxas Boulevard from the corner of Opena to Rivera Streets.
BCCI requesting assistance for the issuance of a mayor’s permit, BCCI counsel Atty. Renato Dilag to
petitioner formally demanding implementation of Resolution. petitioner replied letter to Atty. Dilag
stating among others that the non-implementation of Resolution was due to BCCI’s failure to apply for
appropriate permit and license to operate the Night Manufacturer’s Fair which was one of the conditions
in the authorization.

Issue: Whether the petitioner disregarded right to the Equal Protection of BCCI?

Held: Yes, petitioner failed to show, in apparent disregard of BCCI’s right to equal protection, that BCCI
and the unidentified Baclaran-based vendors’ associations were not similarly situated as to give at least a
semblance of legality to the apparent haste with which said executive order was issued. It would seem
that if there was any interest served by such executive order, it was that of herein petitioner. As the mayor
of the municipality, the officials referred to were definitely under his authority and he was not without
recourse to take appropriate action on the letter-application of BCCI although the same was not strictly in
accordance with normal procedure. There was nothing to prevent him from referring said letter-
application to the licensing department, but which paradoxically he refused to do. Whether petitioner was
impelled by any material interest or ulterior motive may be beyond us for the moment since this is a
matter of evidence, but the environmental facts and circumstances are sufficient to create a belief in the
mind of a reasonable man that this would not be completely improbable, absent countervailing
clarification. Lastly, it may not be amiss to add that petitioner, as a municipal mayor, is expressly
authorized and has the power to issue permits and licenses for the holding of activities for any charitable
or welfare purpose, pursuant to the Local Government Code of. Hence, he cannot really feign total lack of
authority to act on the letter-application of BCCI.

Coconut Oil Refiners v Torres GR 132527 july 29,2005

Facts: This is a Petition to enjoin and prohibit the public respondent Ruben Torres in his capacity as
Executive Secretary from allowing other private respondents to continue with the operation of tax and
duty-free shops located at the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and the Clark Special Economic
Zone (CSEZ). The petitioner seeks to declare Republic Act No. 7227 as unconstitutional on the ground
that it allowed only tax-free (and duty-free) importation of raw materials, capital and equipment. It reads:
The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate customs territory ensuring
free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into and exported out of the Subic Special Economic
Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and
equipment. However, exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic
Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the
Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of thePhilippines [RA 7227, Sec 12 (b)].

Petitioners contend that the wording of Republic Act No. 7227 clearly limits the grant of tax incentives to
the importation of raw materials, capital and equipment only thereby violating the equal protection clause
of the Constitution.

He also assailed the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A for being violative of their right to
equal protection. They asserted that private respondents operating inside the SSEZ are not different from
the retail establishments located outside.

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 7227 is valid on the ground that it violates the equal protection
clause.

Held:  The SC ruled in the negative. The phrase ‘tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital
and equipment was merely cited as an example of incentives that may be given to entities operating
within the zone. Public respondent SBMA correctly argued that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, on which petitioners impliedly rely to support their restrictive interpretation, does not apply when
words are mentioned by way of example.

The petition with respect to declaration of unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A cannot be,
likewise, sustained. The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based
which was based on reasonable classification. A classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial
distinction, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) apply equally to all members of the same class. Applying the foregoing test to the present case, this
Court finds no violation of the right to equal protection of the laws. There is a substantial distinctions
lying between the establishments inside and outside the zone. There are substantial differences in a sense
that, investors will be lured to establish and operate their industries in the so-called ‘secured area and the
present business operators outside the area. There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them
the benefits and incentives accorded in R.A. 7227.

Beltran v Secretary of Health GR 133640, November 25, 2005

Facts: The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is
a primordial governmental concern. The National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the
State’s police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety. What may be regarded as
a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule that will
cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is
prohibited but classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2,
1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation
and by regulating blood banks in the country. It was approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May
15, 1994 and was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on August 18, 1994. The law took effect
on August 23, 1994.

On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH).
Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides, Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks – All commercial blood banks
shall be phased-out over a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a
maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary. ” Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. — The
Department shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a period of two (2) years,
extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to
extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and
public safety.”

Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have already been
operating commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled “An Act Regulating the
Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the Establishment and Operation of Blood Banks
and Blood Processing Laboratories.”
The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and operation by licensed
physicians of blood banks and blood processing laboratories.

On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a petition for
certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of the
aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

Issue:  Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 and its implementing rules is valid on the ground that it
violates the equal protection clause.

Held: Petition granted. The assailed law and its implementing rules are constitutional and valid.   What
may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always easily determined.
No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation, discriminating against some and
favoring others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or
capriciously is permitted.

The classification, however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make
real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and, (d) must apply equally to each member of the class.

Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act of 1994, was enacted for the promotion of
public health and welfare. Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the law to create a
situation in which unjustifiable discrimination and inequality shall be allowed.

To effectuate its policy, a classification was made between nonprofit blood banks/centers and commercial
blood banks. We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons: First, it was
based on substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical
service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood
donation, the latter treats blood as a sale of commodity. Second, the classification, and the consequent
phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law, that is, to provide the nation
with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood
transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves the
phase out of commercial blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise, and they
source their blood supply from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood
donors as shown by the USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine blood banking system. Third, the
Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the
peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing conditions. Lastly,
the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without [Link] promotion of public health
is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a primordial governmental concern.

Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the State’s police power in
order to promote and preserve public health and safety.  Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to
challenge the constitutionality of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to over overcome the presumption of
constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act constitutes a wise legislation, considering the issues
being raised by petitioners, is for Congress to determine.

Mirasol vs DPWH GR no 158793 June 8, 2006

Fact: Petitioners filed before the court a petition for declaratory judgment with application for temporary
restraining order and injunction. It seeks the declaration of nullification of administrative issuances for
being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act 2000 (Limited Access Highway Act) which was
enacted in 1957. Previously, pursuant to its mandate under RA 2000, DPWH issued on June 25, 1998
Dept. Order no. 215 declaring the Manila Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as limited access
facilities. Petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners sought the
declaration of nullity of the aforesaid administrative [Link] petitioners prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along NLEX,
SLEX, Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) toll Expressway under DO 215. RTC, after due hearing, granted the
petitioner’s application for preliminary injunction conditioned upon petitioner’s filing of cash bond in the
amount of P100, 000 which petitioners complied.

DPWH issued an order (DO 123) allowing motorcycles with engine displacement of 400 cubic
centimeters inside limited access facilities (toll ways). Upon assumption of Hon. Presiding
Judge Cornejo, both the petitioners and respondents were required to file their Memoranda.
The court issued an order dismissing the petition but declaring invalid DO 123. The petitioners moved for
reconsideration but it was denied. RTC ruled that DO 74 is valid but DO 123 is invalid being violative of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution

Issue: Whether RTC’s decision is barred by res judicata?

Held: NO. The petitioners are mistaken because they rely on the RTC’s Order granting their prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction. Since petitioners did not appeal from that order, the petitioners presumed
that the order became a final judgment on the issues. The order granting the prayer is not an adjudication
on the merits of the case that would trigger res judicata. A preliminary injunction does not serve as a final
determination of the issues, it being a provisional remedy.

Trillanes IV vs Pimentel GR 179817 June 27, 2008

Fact: On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and
publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials. After a series of
negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that evening. In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the
Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged with coup d’état before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained in detention and won a seat in the Senate.
Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be
Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests. Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend
senate sessions and fulfill his functions as senator. The RTC however denied his motion. Thus, he filed
Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside orders of the RTC.

Issues: 1. Whether or not Trillanes‘ case is different from that of the Jalosjos case 2. Whether or not
Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to work and serve his mandate as
senator 3. Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of detention
prisoners who are held without bail

Held: No distinction between Trillanes’ case and that of Jalosjos case. The distinctions cited by petitioner
were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty
of movement. The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules also state that no person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall
be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That
the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’état cases, both being punishable by reclusion
perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties,
there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime
charged. In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a
hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court’s judgment of conviction, justifies the
detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the
proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is “regardless of the stage of the criminal action.” 
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to
detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The Court in People v.
Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not
practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive,
while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no “prior term” to speak of. In a
plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal
cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner’s
electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, “they did so
with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action with the knowledge that he could achieve
only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering mis impression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the
people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by
jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the
people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of
law. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse
to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the “mandate of the people” are multifarious.
The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed
to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December
2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as
senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands
of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these
prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.

Int’l School Alliance of Educators vs. Quisumbing GR no 128845, June 1, 2000

Fact: Private respondent, the School, hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty,
classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to
determine whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire. Should the
answer to any of four tests queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is classified as a local
hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign-hire. The School grants foreign-hires salary rate twenty-five
percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two “significant economic
disadvantages” foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the “dislocation factor” and (b) limited tenure.
When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner
International School Alliance of Educators, “a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining
representative of all faculty members” of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between
foreign and local-hires. This issue eventually caused a deadlock between the parties. Petitioner filed a
notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the parties to a
compromise prompted the DOLE to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. DOLE Acting Secretary, issued
an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary
Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in an Order dated
March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires
is an invalid and unreasonable classification and violates the Equal Protection Clause.

Held:  Yes, Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. The
foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of
“equal pay for equal work.” Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its
“international character” notwithstanding. The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence
that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires. The employer in this case has failed to show
evidence that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups
have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions. In this
case, the court find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no
reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the
School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not
deserve the sympathy of the Court.

ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (CHAPTER 10)

ALveno vs Dizon 76 Phil 637 (1946)

Fact: On 12 February 1945, while the battle for Manila was raging, soldiers of the United States Army,
accompanied by men of Filipino Guerrilla Forces, placed Aurelio S. Alvero under arrest, having been
suspected of collaboration with the enemy, and seized and took certain papers from his house in Pasay,
Rizal.

On or about 4 October 1945, Alvero was accused of treason, in criminal case 3 of the People’s Court;
after which, on 1 December 1945, he filed a petition, demanding the return of the papers allegedly seized
and taken from his house. Alvero also filed a petition for bail, at the hearing of which the prosecution
presented certain papers and documents, which were admitted as part of its evidence, and said petition
was denied.

At the trial of the case on the merits, the prosecution again presented said papers and documents, which
were admitted as part of its evidence, and were marked as exhibits.

On 26 February 1946, the judges issued an order denying the petition for the return of the documents, and
admitted as competent evidence the documents presented by the prosecution. On the same date that said
order was issued, denying the petition for the return of said documents, Alvero asked for the
reconsideration of said order, which was also denied. Alvero filed a petition for certiorari with injunction
with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the documents seized by United States Army personnel at Alvero’s home can be used as
evidence against the latter.

Held: The right of officers and men of the United States Army to arrest Alvero, as a collaborationist
suspect, and to seize his personal papers, without any search warrant, in the zone of military operations, is
unquestionable, under the provisions of article 4, Chapter II, Section I, of the Regulations relative to the
Laws and Customs of War on Land of the Hague Conventions of 1907, authorizing the seizure of military
papers in the possession of prisoners of war; and also under the proclamation, dated 29 December 1944,
issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, as Commander in Chief of the United States Army, declaring his
purpose to remove certain citizens of the Philippines, who had voluntarily given aid and comfort to the
enemy, in violation of the allegiance due the Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of
the Philippines, when apprehended, from any position of political and economic influence in the
Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the duration of the war.

The purpose of the constitutional provisions against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent
violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home,
by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such
usurpations when attempted. But it does not prohibit the Government from taking advantage of unlawful
searches made by a private person or under authority of state law.

Herein, as the soldiers of the United States Army, that took and seized certain papers and documents from
the residence of Alvero, were not acting as agents or on behalf of the Government of the Commonwealth
of the Philippines; and that those papers and documents came into the possession of the authorities of the
Commonwealth Government, through the Office of the CIC of the United States Army in Manila, the use
and presentation of said papers and documents, as evidence for the prosecution against Alvero, at the trial
of his case for treason, before the People’s Court, cannot now be legally attacked, on the ground of
unlawful or unreasonable searches and seizures, or on any other constitutional ground, as declared by the
Supreme Court of the United States in similar cases.

Pp vs Andre Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991)

Fact: In 1987, the appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich,
Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name,
passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, “WALTER
FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland” Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could
examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply
contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant’s
representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. Before delivery of appellant’s
box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita
(Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened
appellant’s box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, He made an opening on one of
the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a
letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he
extracted from the cellophane wrapper. He brought the letter and a sample of appellant’s shipment to the
Narcotics Section of the NBI and informed the them that the rest of the shipment was still in his office.
Therefore, Job Reyes and three NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes’ office at Ermita. The
package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the
package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained
tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked
underneath the cigars. The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents
thereof, after signing a “Receipt” acknowledging custody of the said effects . Thereafter, an Information
was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Issue: Whether the search and seizure committed by the private individual inviolate the constitutional
right of the accused against unlawful searches and seizures?

Held: No, The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.
Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed. Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may
only be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign
authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights
should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd
interpretation of the constitution. That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be
invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to
protection.

Del Castillo vs PP GR 185128, January 30, 2012

Fact: Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner Del Castillo was engaged in selling shabu,
police officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy
operation at the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC. Upon arrival to the residence
of Del Castillo to implement the search warrant, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run
towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because
he and his men were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place. They all went back to the
residence of Del Castillo and requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his
men returned with two barangay tanods who searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where
the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing,
but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including four (4)
plastic packs containing white crystalline substance.

Thus, an information was filed against Del Castillo for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425
and was found guilty by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed with the Supreme
Court the petition for certiorari contending among others that CA erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed to be in
possession of the same just because they were found inside the nipa hut.

Issue: Can petitioner Del Castillo be held liable for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 by
mere presumption that the petitioner has dominion and control over the place where the shabu was found?

Held: No. While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the
person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is
under petitioner’s control or possession. The records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner
owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as
well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical
materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession.

The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs
in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs. With the prosecution’s failure
to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner’s control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as
to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law’s own starting perspective on
the status of the accused — in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless
the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof
sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in
judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.

Bache and Co. Vs Ruiz 37 SCRA 323

Fact: Respondent Commissioner, wrote a letter to respondent Judge Ruiz requesting the issuance of a
search warrant against petitioners for violation of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to all
other pertinent provisions thereof, and authorizing a Revenue Examiner to make and file the application
for search warrant which was attached to the letter. In the afternoon of the following day, respondent De
Leon and his witness, respondent Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. They brought
with them the following papers: respondent Vera’s aforesaid letter-request; an application for search
warrant already filled up but still unsigned by respondent De Leon; an affidavit of respondent Logronio
subscribed before respondent De Leon; a deposition in printed form of respondent Logronio already
accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but
still unsigned by respondent Judge. At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by
means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of respondents De Leon
and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, respondent Judge was informed that the depositions had
already been taken. The stenographer, upon request of respondent Judge, read to him her stenographic
notes; and thereafter, respondent Judge asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if
his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. Respondent
Judge signed respondent de Leon’s application for search warrant and respondent Logronio’s deposition,
Search Warrant was then sign by respondent Judge and accordingly issued. Three days later, the BIR
agents served the search warrant petitioners at the offices of petitioner corporation. Petitioners’ lawyers
protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the
warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded six boxes of documents.
Petitioners filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that the search warrant be
quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be issued,
that the search warrant be declared null and void, and that the respondents be ordered to pay petitioners,
jointly and severally, damages and attorney’s fees. On March 18, 1970, the respondents, thru the Solicitor
General, filed an answer to the petition. After hearing, the court, presided over by respondent Judge,
issued on July 29, 1970, an order dismissing the petition for dissolution of the search warrant. Hence,
Petitioners came to this Court.

Issue: Whether a corporation is entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure?

Held: Yes,  A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name and with
a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities
appropriate to such body. Its property cannot be taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded
against by due process of law, and is protected against unlawful discrimination. we are of the opinion that
an officer of a corporation which is charged with a violation of a statute of the state of its creation, or of
an act of Congress passed in the exercise of its constitutional powers, cannot refuse to produce the books
and papers of such corporation, we do not wish to be understood as holding that a corporation is not
entitled to immunity, against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Stonehill vs Diokno 20 SCRA 383

Fact: Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the
corporations of which they were officers, to search “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers),” as “the subject of the offense; stolen or
embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense,” which is described in the applications adverted to above as “violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code.”

The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the
Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants.

The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be
split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

Issue: Whether petitioners can validly assail the search warrant against the corporation.

Held: No. As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that
said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality
of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the
documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above,
since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

Zurcher vs Standford Daily 436 US 547

Respondents, a student newspaper that had published articles and photographs of a clash between
demonstrators and police at a hospital, and staff members, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against, among others, petitioners, law enforcement and district attorney personnel, claiming that a search
pursuant to a warrant issued on a judge's finding of probable cause that the newspaper (which was not
involved in the unlawful acts) possessed photographs and negatives revealing the identities of
demonstrators who had assaulted police officers at the hospital had deprived respondents of their
constitutional rights. The District Court granted declaratory relief, holding that the Fourth Amendment as
made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth forbade the issuance of a warrant to search for materials
in possession of one not suspected of crime unless there is probable cause, based on facts presented in a
sworn affidavit, to believe that a subpoena duces tecum would be impracticable. Failure to honor the
subpoena would not, alone, justify issuance of a warrant; it would also have to appear that the possessor
of the objects sought would disregard a court order not to remove or destroy them. The court also held
that, where the innocent object of the search is a newspaper, First Amendment interests make the search
constitutionally permissible

"only in the rare circumstance where there is a clear showing that (1) important materials will be
destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction; and (2) a restraining order would be futile."

The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held:

1. A State is not prevented by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments from issuing a warrant to search
for evidence simply because the owner or possessor of the place to be searched is not reasonably
suspected of criminal involvement. The critical element in a reasonable search is not that the property
owner is suspected of crime, but that there is reasonable cause to believe that the "things" to be searched
for and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought.

2. The District Court's new rule denying search warrants against third

Page 436 U. S. 548

parties and insisting on subpoenas would undermine law enforcement efforts, since search warrants are
often used early in an investigation before all the perpetrators of a crime have been identified, and the
seemingly blameless third party may be implicated. The delay in employing a subpoena  duces
tecum could easily result in disappearance of the evidence. Nor would the cause of privacy be served,
since search warrants are more difficult to obtain than subpoenas.

3. Properly administered, the preconditions for a search warrant (probable cause, specificity with respect
to the place to be searched and the things to be seized, and overall reasonableness), which must be applied
with particular exactitude when First Amendment interests would be endangered by the search, are
adequate safeguards against the interference with the press' ability to gather, analyze, and disseminate
news that respondents claim would ensue from use of warrants for third-party searches of newspaper
offices.

Wilson vs Layne, 98-0083, may 24, 1999

Fact: While executing a warrant to arrest petitioners’ son in their home, respondents, deputy federal
marshals and local sheriff’s deputies, invited a newspaper reporter and a photographer to accompany
them. The warrant made no mention of such a media “ride-along.” The officers’ early morning entry into
the home prompted a confrontation with petitioners, and a protective sweep revealed that the son was not
in the house. The reporters observed and photographed the incident but were not involved in the
execution of the warrant. Their newspaper never published the photographs they took of the incident.
Petitioners sued the officers in their personal capacities for money damages, contending that the officers’
actions in bringing the media to observe and record the attempted execution of the arrest warrant violated
their Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court denied respondents’ motion for summary judgment on
the basis of qualified immunity. In reversing, the Court of Appeals declined to decide whether the
officers’ actions violated the Fourth Amendment, but concluded that because no court had held at the time
of the search that media presence during a police entry into a residence constituted such a violation, the
right allegedly violated was not “clearly established” and thus respondents were entitled to qualified
immunity.

Issue: Whether the search warrant and seizure violated the right of the petitioner went the respondent
invited members of media to “ride-along” during the serving of the said warrant.

Held: Yes, media “ride-along” in a home violates the Fourth Amendment, but because the state of the law
was not clearly established at the time the entry in this case took place, respondent officers are entitled to
qualified immunity. Respondent violates the Fourth Amendment rights of homeowners for police to bring
members of the media or other third parties into their home during the execution of a warrant when the
presence of the third parties in the home was not in aid of the warrant’s execution. The Amendment
embodies centuries-old principles of respect for the privacy of the home, which apply where, as here,
police enter a home under the authority of an arrest warrant in order to take into custody the suspect
named in the warrant. It does not necessarily follow from the fact that the officers were entitled to enter
petitioners’ home that they were entitled to bring a reporter and a photographer with them. The Fourth
Amendment requires that police actions in execution of a warrant be related to the objectives of the
authorized intrusion. Certainly the presence of the reporters, who did not engage in the execution of the
warrant or assist the police in their task, was not related to the objective of the authorized intrusion, the
apprehension of petitioners’ son. Taken in their entirety, the reasons advanced by respondents to support
the reporters’ presence–publicizing the government’s efforts to combat crime, facilitating accurate
reporting on law enforcement activities, minimizing police abuses, and protecting suspects and the
officers–fall short of justifying media ride-alongs. Although the presence of third parties during the
execution of a warrant may in some circumstances be constitutionally permissible, the presence of these
third parties was not.

Burgos vs Chief of Staff 133 SCRA 800

Facts:
Petitioners assail the validity of 2 search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by
respondent Judge Cruz-Pano of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, under which
the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D,
RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan
Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing
machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous
papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession
and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum"
newspaper, were seized. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises
were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of
said newspapers were discontinued. Respondents contend that petitioners should have
filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them before impugning
the validity of the same before this Court. Respondents also assail the petition on
ground of laches (Failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it). Respondents further state that since petitioner had already used
as evidence some of the documents seized in a prior criminal case, he is stopped from
challenging the validity of the search warrants.
Petitioners submit the following reasons to nullify the questioned warrants:
1. Respondent Judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision
as well as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
2. The search warrants pinpointed only one address which would be the former
abovementioned address.
3. Articles belonging to his co-petitioners were also seized although the warrants were
only directed against Jose Burgos, Jr.
4. Real properties were seized.

Chandler vs Miller, April 15, 1997, D-96-126

Facts:Under a Georgia statute, all candidates for elected state office must pass a urinalysis drug test
within 30 days prior to their qualifying for nomination or election. Chandler, on behalf of several state
office nominees from the Libertarian Party, challenged the statute's constitutionality, naming Georgia's
governor and two other regulatory officials as defendants. On appeal from an adverse District Court
ruling, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Issue:
Did Georgia's drug testing statute violate the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against illegal search and
seizures?

Ruling:Yes. In an 8-to-1 opinion, the Court noted that while the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits
officials from conducting search and seizures without individualized suspicion, there does exist a
narrowly defined category of permissible suspicionless searches and seizures. The Court held, however,
that Georgia's statute did not fall in this exceptional category, since it failed to show why its desire to
avoid drug users in its high political offices should outweigh candidates' privacy interests. In addition to
Georgia's failure to provide evidence of a drug problem among its state officials, the Court concluded that
even if such a problem did exist, the affected officials would most likely not perform the kind of high-
risk, safety sensitive tasks, which might justify the statute's proposed incursion on their individual privacy
rights.

People vs Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432 (1999)

Fact: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, CID began patrolling
the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area he intercepted a radio call
from ALMOITE requesting police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat. CID and six of his men.
When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried what appeared a
multicolored strawbag. He then walked towards the road. By this time, ALMOITE, CID and BADUA, the
latter two conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms, became suspicious of the man as he
suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing the approaching officers. BADUA,
however, prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to his right arm. Although CID introduced
themselves as police officers, the man appeared impassive. Speaking in English, CID then requested the
man to open his bag, but he seem not to understand. CID thus tried speaking Tagalog, then Ilocano, but
still to no avail. CID then resorted to what he termed “sign language;” he motioned with his hands for the
man to open the bag. This time, the man apparently understood and acceded to the request. A search of
the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. which was
later found out that it was Shabu. CID then gestured to the man to close the bag, which he did. As CID
wished to proceed to the police station, he signaled the man to follow, but the latter did not to
comprehend. Hence, CID placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and escorted the latter to the
police headquarters. CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession of methaphetamine
hydrochloride before the RTC. The RTC convicted Chua Ho San guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Chua
Ho San prays for his acquitttal and the reversal of the judgment of the RTC.

Issue: Whether the accused who was acting suspiciously constitute Probable Cause impelling the police
officers from effecting an in flagrante delicto arrest.

Held: No, the Court, finds that these do not constitute “probable cause.” None of the telltale clues, e.g.,
bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, confidential report
and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and place
where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior and suspicious bulge in the
waist — accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. The term
probable cause had been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused
is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In cases of in fragrante delicto, arrests, a peace
officer or a private person may without a warrant, arrest a person, when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting
officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such facts or as recent case law adverts to, personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause.

The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. While a contemporaneous search
of a person arrested may be effected to deliver dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the
commission of the crime and which search may extend to the area within his immediate control where he
might gain possession of a weapon or evidence he can destroy, a valid arrest must precede the search. The
process cannot be reversed. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the
validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases,
e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.

PP vs Molina GR no 133917, February 19, 2001

Facts: Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an information regarding the
presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. The first time he came to see the said marijuana
pusher in person was during the first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer
when a motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, Gregorio Mula y Malagura
(@”Boboy”), as the pusher. As to Nasario Molina y Manamat (@ “Bobong”), SPO1 Paguidopon had no
occasion to see him prior to 8 August 1996. At about 7:30 a.m. of 8 August 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon
received an information that the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Maa, Davao City any time that
morning. Consequently, at around 8:00 a.m. he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct 3, Matina,
Davao City, which immediately dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2
Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house of
SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by. At around 9:30 a.m.,
while the team were positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a “trisikad” carrying Mula and Molina
passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to Mula and Molina as the pushers. Thereupon, the
team boarded their vehicle and overtook the “trisikad.” SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house, 30 meters
from where Mula and Molina were accosted. The police officers then ordered the “trisikad” to stop. At
that point, Mula, who was holding a black bag, handed the same to Molina. Subsequently, SPO1
Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked Molina to open the bag. Molina replied, “Boss,
if possible we will settle this.” SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried
marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers. On 6
December 1996, the accused Mula and Molina, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence,
contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been
obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
demurrer was denied by the trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the accused, but this
was likewise denied. The accused waived presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint memorandum.
On 25 April 1997, the trial court rendered the decision, finding the accused guilty of the offense charged,
and sentenced both to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised
Penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court
on automatic review.

Issue: Whether Mula and Molina manifested outward indication that would justify their arrest, and the
seizure of prohibited drugs that were in their possession.

Held: The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable
fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the existence of a
probable cause. Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under
Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions.
Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be
admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor
vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the
accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search). The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid
warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the
search. Still, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process
cannot be reversed. Herein, Mula and Molina manifested no outward indication that would justify their
arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, they could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit
or have committed a crime. It matters not that Molina responded “Boss, if possible we will settle this” to
the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the “suspicion”
of the arresting officers that Mula and Molina were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which
standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it
not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, Mula and Molina could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable
or otherwise. Further, it would appear that the names and addresses of Mula and Molina came to the
knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested, and such cannot lend a semblance of
validity on the arrest effected by the peace officers. Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of Mula and
Molina does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their
person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be
admitted as evidence against them.

Columbia Pictures vs CA GR no 110318, August 28, 1996

FACTS:
Columbia Pictures, et al. had lodged a formal complaint with the NBI, vis-à-vis their anti-film piracy
drive. Eventually, the NBI obtained a search warrant against Sunshine Video seeking to seize pirated
video tapes, among others. The NBI carried out the seizure, and filed a return with the trial court.
However, the trial court eventually granted a motion to lift the order of search warrant – the contention
was that the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were allegedly copied
were never presented in the proceedings for the issuance of the search warrants. The CA dismissed the
appeal brought before it. Hence, Columbia Pictures, et al. brought the case before the SC. Sunshine
Video contended that Columbia Pictures, et al. (being foreign corporations doing business in the
Philippines) should have a license in order to maintain an action in Philippine courts – and without
such license, it had no right to ask for the issuance of a search warrant. Sunshine video submitted
that the fact that Columbia Pictures, et al. were copyright owners or owners of exclusive rights of
distribution in the Philippines of copyrighted motion pictures, AND the fact that Att. Domingo had been
appointed as their atty.-in-fact constituted “doing business in the Philippines”, under the Rules of the
Board of Investments.

ISSUE:
Do Colombia Pictures, et al. have legal personality to sue in the Philippines?

HELD:
YES. Under the Sec. 133 of the Corp. Code, no foreign corporation shall be permitted to transact business
in the Philippines, as this phrase is understood under the Corporation Code, unless it shall have the license
required by law, and until it complies with the law in transacting business here, it shall not be permitted to
maintain any suit in local courts. However, such license is not necessary if it is not engaged in business in
the Philippines. Any foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines may maintain an action in
our courts upon any cause of action, provided that the subject matter and the defendant are within the
jurisdiction of the court.

No general rule or governing principles can be laid down as to what constitutes "doing" or "engaging in"
or "transacting" business. The true tests, however, seem to be whether the foreign corporation is
continuing the body or substance of the business or enterprise for which it was organized (as
distinguished from merely casual, sporadic, or occasional transactions and isolated acts) or whether it has
substantially retired from it and turned it over to another. Based on Article 133 of the Corporation
Code and gauged by statutory standards, petitioners are not barred from maintaining the present
action. There is no showing that, under our statutory or case law, petitioners are doing, transacting,
engaging in or carrying on business in the Philippines as would require obtention of a license before they
can seek redress from our courts.

As a general rule, a foreign corporation will not be regarded as doing business in the State simply because
it enters into contracts with residents of the State, where such contracts are consummated outside the
State. It has moreover been held that the act of a foreign corporation in engaging an attorney to represent
it in a Federal court sitting in a particular State is not doing business within the scope of the minimum
contact test. The mere institution and prosecution or defense of a suit, particularly if the transaction which
is the basis of the suit took place out of the State, do not amount to the doing of business in the State.

Ho vs Pp 208 SCRA 365

FACTS:

When Gilda Cinco search the bag of Ho Wai Pang in the Baggage Declaration at the arrival area, she
found boxes of chocolate which when she saw inside had white substance. They were then brought to the
PNP after the procedures in the airport.

The RTC found Pang guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The CA while affirming the RTC
decision took note that their right to counsel during custodial investigation was violated.

ISSUE: Whether the violation of the petitioner's right to counsel made the evidence taken from the
petitioner inadmissible.

RULING:

The SC held in the negative. The SC reiterated that infractions to the accused during the custodial
investigation render only extrajudicial confession or admissions of the suspect inadmissible as evidence.

Also, the guilt of Pang was based on the testimony of Cinco when she caught Pang in flagrante delicto
transporting shabu.

Betoy v Judge, CAM MTC-05-1608, Feb 26, 2006

Facts: In a Letter-Complaint dated July 2000, signed by Bernardo Betoy, Sr. (complainant) charges Judge
Mamerto Y. Coliflores (respondent) with Grave Abuse of Discretion and Authority, Conduct
Unbecoming as a Judge and Gross Negligence Resulting to Procedural Lapses (Dereliction of
Duty).Complainant attached to the Letter-Complaint an Affidavit executed by his wife Lucia Betoy.

Issue: Whether respondent retired Judge was found guily of gross ignorance of the law.
Ruling: Yes. Respondent retired Judge Mamerto Y. Coliflores is found guilty of gross ignorance of the
law. He is fined P20,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
Under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, gross ignorance of the law or procedure
is classified as a serious charge. Section 11(A) of the same Rule provides that the penalty to be imposed if
a respondent is found guilty of a serious charge is either a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not more
thanP40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months, or dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the
Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.

Pp vs Salanguit, D-96-12, April 15, 1997

Facts: On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the Regional Trial Court, Branch
90, Dasmariñas, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan
St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who tes[fied that as a
poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused- appellant. The sale took place
in accused-appellant’s room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a
cabinet inside his room. The applica[on was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding
Judge Dolores L. Español. Prosecu[on Version: At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of
about 10 policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve
the warrant. The police opera[ves knocked on accused-appellant’s door, but nobody opened it. They heard
people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police opera[ves then forced the door open and
entered the house. A`er showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his
group started searching the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plas[c bags containing a
white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks
of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint having a total weight of
approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused
to sign it. Version of Defense: On the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to leave their
house, they heard a commo[on at the gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly, about 20 men in
civilian acre, brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate and descended through an opening in the
roof. When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside a folder
was waved in front of him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the paper was
withdrawn and he had no chance to read it. Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one
place of the house while the policemen conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag
containing money, a licensed .45 caliber firearm, jewelry, and canned goods. A`ermath: A`er the search,
the accused together with the confiscated contraband were taken to the police sta[on. The RTC convicted
the accused of viola[on of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 6425 and to suffer the penalty of indeterminate
sentence with a minimum of six (6) months of arresto mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional and in viola[on of Sec. 8 of the same law and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reculsion perpetua and a fine of Php 700,000.00 Issues: 1. Whether or not the Search Warrant
issued is valid. 2. Whether or not the marijuana seized falls under the plain view doctrine. 3. Whether or
not the force used in the raid was necessary. Page 1 of 2 Held: 1. Accused assailed the validity of the
warrant on three grounds: (1) that there was no probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that
the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense; and (3) that the place to be searched
was not described with sufficient par[cularity. • On the first ground, it was tes[fied by SPO1 Edmund
Badua, the intelligence officer who acted as a poseur-buyer that when he went inside the house of the
accused, he saw the accused get the shabu in the cabinet which is in the room of the accused. Hence, there
was probable cause as to the shabu but no tes[mony was offered in regards to the drug paraphernalia. This
does not mean however that the search warrant as a whole is void or invalid. Accordingly, it was held that
the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellant’s house for an
undetermined quan[ty of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with respect to the search for drug
paraphernalia, is not. • On the second ground, the accused avers that one warrant should be issued for
shabu, one warrant should be issued for marijuana and one warrant should be for drug paraphernalia. The
Court held that one warrant would suffice since all acts were covered under Republic Act No. 6425, a
special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into “prohibited” and
“regulated” drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which
belong to the same class or species. • On the third ground, while the address stated in the warrant is
merely “Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City,” the trial court took note of the fact that the records of
Search Warrant contained several documents which iden[fied the premises to be searched, to wit: 1) the
applica[on for search warrant which stated that the premises to be searched was located in between No. 7
and 11 at Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the deposi[on of witness which described the
premises as “a house without a number located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City; and 3) the pencil
sketch of the loca[on of the premises to be searched. In fact, the police officers who raided appellant’s
house under the leadership of Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could not have been mistaken as
Inspector Aguilar resides in the same neighborhood in Binhagan where appellant lives and in fact
Aguilar’s place is at the end of appellant’s place in Binhagan. Moreover, the house raided by Aguilar’s
team is undeniably the house of the accused and it was really the accused who was the target. The raiding
team even first ascertained through their informant that appellant was inside his residence before they
actually started their opera[on. 2. The marijuana found was covered with newspaper and thus does not fall
under the doctrine of plain view. What was in plain view were the newspaper and not the marijuana.
Accordingly, the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence but the confisca[on is valid and must be upheld. 3.
The occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused to open the door despite the fact that
the searching party knocked on the door several [mes. Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious
movements of the people inside the house. These circumstances jus[fied the searching party’s forcible
entry into the house, founded as it is on the apprehension that the execu[on of their mission would be
frustrated unless they do so. Furthermore, no tes[monies from disinterested par[es were offered to
corroborate the story of the accused that the police used excessive force in enforcing the warrant.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96,
Quezon City, finding accused- appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal drugs
under §16 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and sentencing
him to suffer a prison term ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordering the confisca[on of 11.14 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the
same court finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs
under §8 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to pay a fine of P700,000.00 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged. However, the confisca[on of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as
the 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposi[on as ordered by the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
 Microsoft Corp vs Maxicorp GR 140946, September 13, 2004

In 1996, Dominador Samiano, Jr., an agent of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted a
surveillance against Maxicorp, Inc. He observed that Microsoft Softwares were being produced and
packaged within the premises of Maxicorp. Samiano, together with a civilian witness (John Benedict
Sacriz) then bought a computer unit from Maxicorp. The unit was pre-installed with a pirated copy of
Windows. For their purchase, they were issued a receipt, however, the receipt was in the name of a
certain “Joel Diaz”.
Subsequently, Samiano applied for a search warrant before the RTC. He brought with him Sacriz
as witness. He also brought the computer unit they bought as evidence as well as the receipt. He even
added an additional witness (Felixberto Pante), a computer technician, who showed the judge that the
software in the computer unit bought by Samiano from Maxicorp was pirated.
The RTC judge, convinced that there is a probable cause for a case of copyright infringement and
unfair competition committed by Maxicorp, issued the corresponding warrant. Maxicorp assailed the
legality of the warrant before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorp and
in its decision it highlighted the fact that the receipt issued was not in Samiano’s or Sacriz’ name hence
the proceeding in the trial court was infirm from the onset.
I: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in ruling in favor of Maxicorp.?
R: NO. The testimonies of the two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary evidence
they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From what they have witnessed,
there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair competition to the
prejudice of Microsoft. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the counterfeit
software were not only displayed and sold within Maxicorp’s premises, they were also produced,
packaged and in some cases, installed there.
The fact that the receipt issued was not in Samiano’s name nor was it in Sacriz’ name does not
render the issuance of the warrant void. No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific
kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in
the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation. Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to
reverse the RTC’s findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI Agent Samiano’s purchase of
counterfeit goods is not in his name.

Pita vs Court of Appeals 178 SCRA 362

Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City
of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary
Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and
confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks,
magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent
and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in
the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student organizations.

Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-
edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.

Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against
Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of
Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiff’s magazines or from
preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational
magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a
temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy
Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction. The Court granted the
temporary restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the
seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner.

Held: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society from
pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author,
publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, It is easier said than done to say, that if the
pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes, the
pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is
"whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are
open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being
obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency.
Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case and
that the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by
it." The government authorities in the instant case have not shown the required proof to justify a ban and
to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1)
finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure,
by way of a search warrant. The court provides that the authorities must apply for the issuance of a search
warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and that;

1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene and pose a
clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action;
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to be resolved
on a case-to-case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion;

Sta. Rosa Mining CO. Vs. Fiscal ZABALA, 153 SCRA 267 (1987)

Facts:

On March 21, 1974, petitioner filed a complaint for attempted theft of materials (scrap iron) forming part
of the installations on its mining property at Jose Panganiban,... Camarines Norte against private
respondents Romeo Garrido and Gil Alapan with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte...
case was assigned to third Assistant Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes for preliminary investigation who, after
conducting said investigation, issued a resolution dated August 26, 1974 recommending that an
information for Attempted

Theft be filed against private respondents on a finding of prima facie case which resolution was approved
by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre

Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte an Information dated October 17,
1987 docketed as Criminal Case No. 821, charging private... respondents with the crime of Attempted
Theft.

private respondents requested the Secretary of Justice for a review of the Resolutions of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal

Chief State Prosecutor ordered the Provincial Fiscal by telegram to "Please elevate entire records PFO
Case 577 against Garrido et al., review in five days and defer all proceedings pending... review."... letter-
request for review was opposed by petitioner in a letter to the Secretary of Justice dated November 23,
1974 alleging, among other things, that an information for Attempted Theft had already been filed against
private respondents for which reason the request... for review has become a moot question as the
Provincial Fiscal has lost jurisdiction to dismiss the charge for attempted theft.

Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the records, reversed the findings of prima facie case of the
Provincial Fiscal and directed said prosecuting officer to immediately move for the dismissal... of the
criminal case.

motion to dismiss dated September 16, 1975 was then filed by the Provincial Fiscal but the court denied
the motion on the ground that there was a prima facie evidence against private respondents and set the
case for trial... respondents sought reconsideration of the court's ruling but in an Order dated February 13,
1976, the motion filed for said purpose was likewise denied.

Fiscal Ilustre was appointed a judge in the Court of First Instance of Albay and respondent Fiscal Zabala
became officer-in-charge of the Provincial Fiscal's Office of Camarines

Norte... respondent Fiscal filed a Second Motion to Dismiss the case.  This second motion to dismiss was
denied by the trial court... respondent fiscal manifested that he... would not prosecute the case and
disauthorized any private prosecutor to appear therein.  Hence, this petition for mandamus.
petitioner prays for the issuance of the writ of mandamus "commanding respondent fiscal or any other
person who may be assigned or appointed to act in his place or stead to prosecute

Issues:

the court below denied the fiscal's motion to dismiss on the ground that there was a prima facie case
against private respondents.  The question presented for determination now... is - after a case has been
filed in court, can a fiscal be compelled to prosecute the same,

Ruling:

There is no question that the institution of a criminal action is addressed to the sound discretion of the in-
vestigating fiscal.  He may or he may not file the information according to whether the evidence is in his
opinion sufficient to establish... the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt

However, after the case had already been filed in court, "fiscals are not clothed with power, without the
consent of the court, to dismiss or nolle prosequi criminal actions actually ins tituted and pending further...
proceedings.  The power to dismiss criminal actions is vested solely in the court... writ prayed for should
issue.

the fiscal must proceed with his duty of presenting evidence to the court to enable the court to arrive at its
own independent... judgment as to the culpability of the accused.  The fiscal should not shirk from his
responsibility much less leave the prosecution of the case at the hands of a private prosecutor.   At all
times, the criminal action shall be prosecuted... under his direction and control

In the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the government since an
offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State... if the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie
case exists, he simply cannot move for the dismissal of the case and, when denied, refuse to prosecute the
same.  He is obliged by law to proceed and prosecute the... criminal action.  He cannot impose his opinion
on the trial court.  At least what he can do is to continue appearing for the prosecution and then turn over
the presentation of evidence to another fiscal or a private... prosecutor subject to his direction and control

The mere fact that the Secretary of Justice had, after reviewing the records of the case, directed the
prosecuting fiscal to move for the dismissal of the case and the motion to dismiss filed pursuant to said
directive is denied by the trial... court, is no justification for the refusal of the fiscal to prosecute... petition
is hereby Granted

Paderanga vs Drilon GR 96080, April 19, 1991

Facts:

In this special civil action for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction/restraining order, petitioner seeks to enjoin herein public respondents from including the
former as an accused in Criminal Case No. 86-39 for... multiple murder, through a second amended
information, and to restrain them from prosecuting him.

In an amended information filed on October 6, 1988, Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely Roxas,""Fely Roxas"
and "Lolong Roxas," was included as a co-accused.  Roxas retained petitioner Paderanga as his counsel.

As counsel for Roxas, petitioner filed, among others, an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, to Quash the
Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify the Arraignment on October 14, 1988.  The trial court, in an order dated
January 9, 1989, denied this omnibus motion but directed the City

Prosecutor "to conduct another preliminary investigation or reinvestigation in order to grant the accused
all the opportunity to adduce whatever evidence he has in support of his defense."

In the course of the preliminary investigation, through a signed affidavit, Felizardo Roxas implicated
herein petitioner in the commission of the crime charged.

Issues:
(1) that the preliminary investigation as to him was not complete; and (2) that there exists no prima facie
evidence or probable cause to justify his inclusion in the second amended information.

Ruling:

the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit

Principles:

Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information.  It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no... purpose except that of determining
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy.[8]

The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal.  He has the quasi-
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court.[9] Hence, the
general rule is that an injunction will not... be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution.

The case of Brocka, et al. vs. Enrile, et al.[11] cites several exceptions to the rule, to wit:... a.   To afford
adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;... b.  When necessary for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;... c.  When there is a prejudicial
question which is subjudice;... d.  When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;... e. 
Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;... f.   When double jeopardy is
clearly apparent;... g.  Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;... h.  Where it is a case of
persecution rather than [Link] the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance; andWhen there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on
that ground has been denied.

Abdula vs Guiani, 326 SCRA 1 (2000)

FACTS:
A petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the warrant of arrest issued by herein
respondent Japal guiani, then presiding judge of Branch 14 of RTC of Cotabato City, was filed before the
Supreme Court. Murder complaint was filed but was dismissed by the provincial prosecutor on the
ground that there was no prima facie case for murder, for  a number of accused (6). However, he
recommended the filing of an information for murder against one of the respondents (accused) only
before the sala of the respondent judge Guiani. Guiani returned the case to the provincial prosecutor for
further investigation since there was no necessary resolution required under the Rules of Court to show
how the investigating prosecutor arrived at such a conclusion (charging only one of the 8 respondent-
accused). Upon the return of the records of the case, it was assigned for reinvestigation to another
prosecutor who then recommended the filing of charges against 5 accused, 2 of whom are herein
petitioners.

On January 2, 1995, information was filed against petitioner-spouses and 3 others. The following
day, January 3, respondent Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of petitioners. On January 4, petitioners
filed an urgent Ex-Parte motion for the setting aside the warrant of arrest. On January 11, a petition for
review was filed with the DOJ. Despite said filing, respondent judge did not act upon petitioner’s pending
Motion to Set Aside the Warrant of Arrest. Thus, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying the
warrant of Arrest be set aside and declared void ab initio.

Issue:
WON the Warrant of Arrest should be set aside and declared void ab initio.

Held:
 The Court reiterated the provisions of Section 2, Art. III, 1987 Constititution: “The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and NO SEARCH WARRANT OR
WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE
DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AFTER EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR
AFFIRMATION OF THE COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES HE MAY PRODUCE and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”

The Court held that the 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine probable
cause "personally," a requirement which does not appear in the corresponding provisions of our previous
constitutions. The Court said that the emphasis demonstrates the intent of the framers to place a greater
degree ofresponsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under previous Constitutions. Accordingly,
what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses. The Court furthered, following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: 

(1)     personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by thefiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or
(2)    if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at
a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

In Ho vs. People, it enumerated the existing jurisprudence on the matter as follows:

Lest we be too repetitive, we only wish to emphasize three vital matters once more: First, as held
in Inting, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from
that which is to be made by the judge.

Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should
be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him
under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in
finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The judge must decide independently.
Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor’s bare report, upon which to legally
sustain his own findings on the existence or nonexistence of probable cause to issue an arrest order. The
responsibility of determining personally and independently the existence or non-existence of probable
cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of the land.

Lastly, the Court said that it is not required that complete or entire records of the case during the
preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. What is required, rather, is that the
judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits,
sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his
independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the
existence of probable cause. 

Pp vs Mamaril GR 147607, January 22, 2004

Facts:  SPO2 Chito Esmenda applied before the RTC for a search warrant authorizing the search for
marijuana at the family residence of appellant Mamaril. During the search operation, the searching team
confiscated sachets of suspected marijuana leaves. Police officers took pictures of the confiscated items
and prepared a receipt of the property seized and certified that the house was properly searched, which
was signed by the appellant and the barangay officials who witnessed the search.  The PNP Crime
Laboratory issued a report finding the seized specimens positive for the presence of marijuana. Moreover,
the examination on the urine sample of appellant affirmed that it was positive for the same.  Appellant
denied that he was residing at his parent’s house, and that he was at his parent’s house when the search
was conducted only because he visited his mother. He also said that he saw the Receipt of Property
Seized for the first time during the trial, although he admitted that the signature on the certification that
the house was properly search was his. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a search
warrant Ruling:  Yes. The issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable
cause.  Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.  In determining the
existence of probable cause, it is required that: o The judge must examine the complaint and his witnesses
personally o The examination must be under oath o The examination must be reduced in writing in the
form of searching questions and answers  The prosecution failed to prove that the judge who issued the
warrant put into writing his examination of the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers before issuance of the search warrant.  When the Branch Clerk of Court was
required to testify on the available records kept in their office, he was only able to present before the court
the application for search warrant and supporting affidavits. Neither transcript of the proceedings of a
searching question and answer nor the sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses showing
that the judge examined them in the form of searching questions and answers in writing was presented.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are not sufficient.  Such written examination is
necessary in order that the judge may be able to properly determine the existence and non-existence of
probable cause. Therefore, the search warrant is tainted with illegality by failure of the judge to conform
with the essential requisites of taking the examination in writing and attaching to the record, rendering the
search warrant invalid.  No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be, their
seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant. Consequently, the evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search
warrant cannot be used in evidence against appellant.

Webb vs De Leon, 247 SCRA 652

FACTS: On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of
Justice a letter- complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and
six other persons with the crime of Rape with Homicide for the rape and killing on June 30, 1991 of
Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their
home at Number 80 W. Vinzons St., BF Homes, Parañaque, Metro Manila.

ISSUES/HELD: 1. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their
discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against
them. No, the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing warrants of arrest against the
petitioners. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial
Court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.” a. Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution
provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complaint and the witnesses he may produce
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. In arrest cases,
there must be probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested
committed it. Before issuing warrants of arrest, the judges merely determine personally the probability,
not the certainty of guilt, of an accused. 2. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its
discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape with homicide.
No, the DOJ did not gravely abuse its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them
with the crime of rape with homicide. a. The DOJ ruled that the alleged misdescription and
inconsistencies of the statements of Alfaro did not erode her credibility. b. A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspects. c. Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be
determined in a summary manner. 3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel lost its impartiality due to the
prejudicial publicity waged in the press and broadcast media by the NBI. No, the court found nothing in
the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of the
petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. The length of time the
investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they
accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. a. The conflicting
demands of freedom of speech and of the press, the public’s right to information and an accused’s right to
a fair and impartial trial collide and compete for prioritization. The possibility of media abuses and their
threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and the
public.

Soliven vs MAbasias. 167 SCRA 393

Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Beltran argues that "the reasons
which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit". He contends
that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may
subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction.
This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness
stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. Beltran also contends that
he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character of the publication. He also says
that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom.

ISSUE:Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge
issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause

HELD: What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before their courts.

CID vs Judge dela Rosa, GR 95122-23, May 31, 1991

Facts: On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the
Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of natural mother
Mariana Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961, Willian, then twelve years old, arrives in Manila from Hongkong
together with a daughter and a son of Santiago. They had with them certificate of registration and identity
issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the
secretary of foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens.

On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens and issued an
identification certificate to William. The boarf of commissioners waws directed by the Secretary of
Justice to Review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen
such included the case of William. As a result of the decision of the board of special inquiry which
recommended for the reversal of the decision of the Board of Commissioners. Acting commissioner
issued an order affirming the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.

On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration and Deportatiion ordered the arrest of William and
was released upon posting P 200,000 cash bond. Thus on the 29thof the same month, he filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. A motion to dismiss was filed but denied.
 

Issue:Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a Filipino citizen

Held: William Gatchalian is declared as a Filipino Citizen. Having declared the assailed marriage as
valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father, a Filipino as legitimate child.
Respondent belongs to a class of Filipinos who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption
of the constitution.

Mata v BAyona, 128 SCRA 388 (1984)

Facts:

petitioner is accused under PD 810, as amended by PD

1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai
Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as 'Masiao tickets' without any authority from the Philippine
Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government... authorities concerned."[1]

Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the
said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the
same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its... whereabouts, and to which in quiry respondent
Judge replied, "it is with the court". The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to
the records.

This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles
seized

The motion was denied by respondent Judge on March 1, 1979, stating... that the Court has made a
thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote,
members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a
certification to that effect; and that the fact that... documents relating to the search warrant were not
attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does
not specify when these documents are to be attached to the records.

Issues:

declare the search warrant to be invalid and all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible
as evidence in the... case

Ruling:

We hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court.

Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the
Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce". More... emphatic and detailed is the
implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides that the judge
must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce and take their... depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in
addition to any affidavits presented to him.

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the
record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the

Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, and to hold
liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform
with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record,
rendering the search warrant invalid.

Principles:

"depositions"... is sometimes used in a broad sense to describe any written statement verified by oath; but
in its more technical and appropriate sense the meaning of the word is limited to written testimony of a
witness given in the... course of a judicial proceeding advance of the trial or hearing upon oral
examination.

A deposition is the testimony of a witness, put or taken in writing, under oath or affirmation before a
commissioner, examiner or other judicial officer

Paper Industries vs Asuncion GR no 122092, May 19, 1999

FACTS: Petitioners pray, inter alia for the nullification of Search Warrant No. 799. Petitioners submit
that Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to
quash such warrant as probable cause has not been sufficiently established and it was of the nature of a
general search warrant and on the additional ground that the warrant was unlawfully served or
implemented.
ISSUE: Whether the warrant is valid
RULING: NO. In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed to
examine personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared
during the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were
not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described with
particularity. Search Warrant No. 799 is declared null and void.

Prudente vs Judge Daynit 180 SCRA 69 (1989)

FACTS: The Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Manila, Judge Abelardo Dayrit, for the issuance of Search Warrant for violation of PD No.
1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm, etc). In the deposition of witness (P/Lt. Florencio C. Angeles), it was
made mentioned of “result of our continuous surveillance conducted for several days. We gathered
information from verified sources that the holders of said firearms and explosives as well as ammunitions
aren’t licensed to possess said firearms and ammunition. Further, the premises is a school and the holders
of these firearms are not student who were not supposed to possess firearms, explosives and ammunitions.
Person to be searched in Nemesio Prudente at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Sta. Mesa,
Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or possession firearms, explosives hand grenades and ammunitions
which are illegally possesses at the office of Department of Military Science and Tactics and at the office
of the President.
Petitioner moved to quash the Search Warrant. He claimed that:
[Link], had no personal knowledge of the facts
[Link] examination of the said witness was not in form of searching questions and answers
[Link] warrant was a general warrant
[Link] of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under
oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday, urgent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid?
Ruling: No. Valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be determined
personally by the Judge, after examination under oath and affirmation of the complainant, and that
witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things
to be seized. The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense and the Judge must,
before issuing Search Warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, In
writing and under oath, the complainant and any witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known to
them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
“Probable Cause” for a valid search warrant, has been defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that
objects sought in connection which the offense are in the place sought to be searched. This probable case
must be shown to be personal knowledge and of the complainant and witnesses he may produce and not
based on mere hearsay.

20th Century Fox Film Corp vs CA 164 SCRA 655 (1988)

Facts: Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation sought the assistance of the NBI in conducting
searches and seizures in connection with the NBI’s anti-film piracy campaign. Petitioner alleged that
certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of
copyrighted films in violation of PD No. 49 (the old Intellectual Property Law).
The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and
subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by the
private respondents. The lower court issued the desired search warrants. The NBI, accompanied by the
petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and seized the items described in the three warrants.
Issue: Did the judge properly lift the search warrants he issued earlier?
Ruling: YES, the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier. This linkage of the
copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause.
Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a
search warrant.
The Court DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the questioned decision and resolution of the CA.

Nolascovs Cruz Pano, 132 SCRA 152 (1985)

FACTS: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary
Security Group (CSG). Milagros had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest took
place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of the same day, her premises were searched and 428
documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized. Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a
search warrant to be served at Aguilar-Roque’s leased residence allegedly an underground house of the
CPP/NPA. On the basis of the documents seized, charges of subversion and rebellion by the CSG were
filed by but the fiscal’s office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive
materials. Aguilar-Roque asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it was illegally
obtained and that the search warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently
describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not
been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant’s witness. ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant was valid? HELD: NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution,
guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides
that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the things to be seized. It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of
personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which
includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National
Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals
not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the
crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be
lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as,
in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general
warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be
seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered null and
void for being too general.

Del Rosario vs PP GR 142295, May 31, 2001

Facts: In 1996, the police received a report that Rosario was in possession of firearms without the
necessary licenses. Police applied for a SW to enable them to search the house of appellant. When they
entered, they informed him that they had a SW and that they were authorized to search his house. The
search yielded the following items: a caliber .45 pistol, 5 magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and two radios
found in the room of the daughter; and a caliber .22 revolver with 8 pieces of live ammunition found in
the kitchen of the house. When asked about his license to possess, he failed to produce any. This
prompted the police to seize the firearms. For his defense, appellant contends that he had a license for the
caliber .45 pistol recovered in his bedroom and that the other items seized were planted by the police
officers. Appellant likewise assails the manner in which the search was carried out, the officers just
barged into his house without asking permission. Furthermore, he claimed that the barangay officials
arrived only after the police already had finished the search.

Issue: Whether or not the seizure of items not mentioned in the search warrant was illegal.

Ruling: No. Seizure is limited to those items particularly described in a valid search warrant. Searching
officers are without discretion regarding what articles they shall seize. Evidence seized on the occasion of
such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and excluded for being the proverbial "fruit of a
poisonous tree." It shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. the firearm was
not found inadvertently and in plain view. It was found as a result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of
petitioner's house. This firearm, to emphasize, was not mentioned in the search warrant. Thus, the seizure
is illegal.

Vallejo vs CA 427 SCRA 658, April 14, 2004

FACTS: A SW was applied for and subsequently issued by respondents to be served in the Registry of
Deeds, provincial capitol of Isabela in which it enumerated the things to be seized:
1. Undetermined number of Fake Land Titles, Official Receipts in the Cashier's Office, Judicial Form
No. 39 known as Primary Entry Book under No. 496 and other pertinent documents related therewith;
2. Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the drawers of every table of employees of the Registry (sic)
of Deeds;
3. Undetermined number of land Transfer transactions without the corresponding payment of Capital
Gains Tax and payment of documentary Stamps.
A motion to quash the SW was filed by the respondent contending that the things to be seized were not
described with particularity and was in a nature of a general warrant, therefore, is a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures but was denied by the RTC and the
CA.  Hence, the present petition for certiorari. (The OSG in its comment agreed with petitioners.)

ISSUE: WON the warrant issued by the RTC was valid.

HELD:
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. – A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. – The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of description is not
required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of
the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission.
Any description of the place or thing to be searched that will enable the officer making the search
with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient. Thus, the specific property to be
searched for should be so particularly described as to preclude any possibility of seizing any other
property(test of particularity).
As correctly pointed out by the petitioner and the OSG, the terms expressly used in the warrant were too
all-embracing, with the obvious intent of subjecting all the records pertaining to all the transactions of the
petitioner's office at the Register of Deeds to search and seizure. Such tenor of a seizure warrant
contravenes the explicit command of the Constitution that there be a particular description of the things to
be seized

PP vs Veloso, 148 Phil 169

Facts:In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an
organization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the House
of Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the club. The police of
Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing more than a gambling
house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had been to the club
and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of
the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduño of the municipal
court.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the accused,
Jose Ma. Veloso, guilty of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority, in violation of article 252
of the Penal CodeThe errors assigned by counsel for the accused as appellant, go to the proposition that
the resistance of the police was justifiable on account of the illegality of the John Doe search warrant.
Issue:Whether there was a valid SW?

Ruling:YES. John Doe warrants are valid if the best description possible is given in the arrest warrant. It
must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it is to be served, by stating his occupation, personal
appearance or peculiarities, place of residence or other circumstances which he may be identified.
The Court agree with the trial judge and with the Attorney-General in their conclusions to the
effect that the search warrant was valid, and that the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority. Undoubtedly, Jose Ma. Veloso,
as Juan de la Cruz, would have resisted the police just as stoutly, as the Honorable Jose Ma. Veloso did.
The penalty, accordingly, falls within that provided by the Penal Code.

Bache & CO. Vs Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823

Facts: On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J Ruiz
requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of the NIRC, in
relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and
authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the application for search warrant which was
attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon and his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search
warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case;so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy
Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz
was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer read to him her stenographic
notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his
deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. J   Ruiz signed
de Leon’s application for search warrant and Logronio’s deposition. The search was subsequently
conducted.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.
1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness. Personal examination
by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine
the existence or non-existence of a probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. The search warrant in question
was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled in Stonehill “Such is
the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants,
that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that ‘a
 search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.’
Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that ‘no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized. The documents, papers
and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search Warrant “Unregistered and private
books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers
ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts,
promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications,
accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and
withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.”
The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. A
search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is
as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the description expresses a conclusion of
fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure or when the
things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is
being issued.

Marquez vs Desierto GR 135882, June 27, 2001

Facts:Pursuant to an investigation regarding the PEA – AMARI project, Ombudsman Desierto ordered
petitioner Marquez to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to
various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner is
the branch manager.. 

The order of the Ombudsman to produce for in camera inspection the subject accounts with the Union
Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, was based on a pending investigation at the Office of the
Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative
to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI.

Marquez filed a petition for declaratory relief, seeking to clarify if such an action will violate RA. No.
1405.

Issue: Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned account is
allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A. No.1405). 

Held: No. Before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court
of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the
subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the
account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only
the account identified in the pending case.

 In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is
existing is an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the office of the ombudsman
would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the
Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank
account for inspection.

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that” [e]very person
shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons” and
punishes as actionable torts several acts for meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds
public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and
liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The
Revised Penal Code makes a crime of the violation of secrets by an officer, revelation of trade and
industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-
Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code.

Republic vs Eugenio GR 174629, Feb 14, 2008

Sec. 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank accounts may be
examined by any person, government official, bureau or offial; namely when: (1) upon written permission
of the depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and (4) the money deposited
or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Section 8 of R.A. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, has been recognized by this Court as constituting an additional exception to the
rule of absolute confidentiality, and there have been other similar recognitions as well.[

Facts: Under the authority granted by the Resolution, the AMLC filed an application to inquire into or
examine the deposits or investments of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong before the RTC of
Makati, Branch 138, presided by Judge (now Court of Appeals Justice) Sixto Marella, Jr. The application
was docketed as AMLC No. 05-005. The Makati RTC heard the testimony of the Deputy Director of the
AMLC, Richard David C. Funk II, and received the documentary evidence of the AMLC.[14] Thereafter,
on 4 July 2005, the Makati RTC rendered an Order (Makati RTC bank inquiry order) granting the AMLC
the authority to inquire and examine the subject bank accounts of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng
Yong, the trial court being satisfied that there existed p]robable cause [to] believe that the deposits in
various bank accounts, details of which appear in paragraph 1 of the Application, are related to the
offense of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act now the subject of criminal prosecution
before the Sandiganbayan as attested to by the Informations, Exhibits C, D, E, F, and G  Pursuant to the
Makati RTC bank inquiry order, the CIS proceeded to inquire and examine the deposits, investments and
related web accounts of the four.[16]

Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, Dennis Villa-Ignacio, wrote a letter
dated 2 November 2005, requesting the AMLC to investigate the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO, and
several other entities involved in the nullified contract. The letter adverted to probable cause to believe
that the bank accounts were used in the commission of unlawful activities that were committed a in
relation to the criminal cases then pending before the Sandiganbayan. Attached to the letter was a
memorandum on why the investigation of the [accounts] is necessary in the prosecution of the above
criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan. In response to the letter of the Special Prosecutor, the AMLC
promulgated on 9 December 2005 Resolution No. 121 Series of 2005,[19] which authorized the executive
director of the AMLC to inquire into and examine the accounts named in the letter, including one
maintained by Alvarez with DBS Bank and two other accounts in the name of Cheng Yong with
Metrobank. The Resolution characterized the memorandum attached to the Special Prosecutors letter as
extensively justif[ying] the existence of probable cause that the bank accounts of the persons and entities
mentioned in the letter are related to the unlawful activity of violation of Sections 3(g) and 3(e) of Rep.
Act No. 3019, as amended.

Issue: Whether or not the bank accounts of respondents can be examined.

Held: Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be specifically legislated. Section 2 of the
Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank accounts may be examined by any
person, government official, bureau or offial; namely when: (1) upon written permission of the depositor;
(2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in
cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and (4) the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation. Section 8 of R.A. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
has been recognized by this Court as constituting an additional exception to the rule of absolute
confidentiality, and there have been other similar recognitions as well.
The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section 11, the AMLC may inquire
into a bank account upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of the AMLA, it having been
established that there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to unlawful activities
as defined in Section 3(i) of the law, or a money laundering offense under Section 4 thereof. Further, in
instances where there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to kidnapping for
ransom,[certain violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,hijacking and other
violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and murder, then there is no need for the AMLC to
obtain a court order before it could inquire into such accounts. It cannot be successfully argued the
proceedings relating to the bank inquiry order under Section 11 of the AMLA is a litigation encompassed
in one of the exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act which is when money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation. The orientation of the bank inquiry order is simply to serve as a
provisional relief or remedy. As earlier stated, the application for such does not entail a full-blown trial.
Nevertheless, just because the AMLA establishes additional exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act it does
not mean that the later law has dispensed with the general principle established in the older law that all
deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines x x x are hereby
considered as of an absolutely confidential nature. Indeed, by force of statute, all bank deposits are
absolutely confidential, and that nature is unaltered even by the legislated exceptions referred to above.

Unilab vs Isip, GR 163858, June 28, 2005

Facts:NBI raided the first and second floors of a building for the seizure of finished or unfinished
UNILAB products particularly counterfeit Revicon multivitamins. No fake Revicon multivitamins were
found; instead there were boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox, which were granted by the court to be turned
over to the custody of BFAD for examination. The respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the
Search Warrant or to Suppress Evidence. They asserted that the NBI officers seized Disudrin and Inoflox
products which were not included in the list of properties to be seized in the search warrant and were not
illegal per se, like explosives and shabu, as to justify their seizure in the course of unlawful search.

Issue:Whether the seizure of the Disudrin and Inoflox products was justified by the plain view doctrine

Ruling:No. Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant but on plain view of the executing
officer may be seized by him. However, the seizure by the officer of objects/articles/papers not described
in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the confluence of the essential requirements for the doctrine to apply, namely: (a)
the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise
properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover
incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items
they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.

The petitioner and the NBI failed to present any of the NBI agents who executed the warrant, or any of
the petitioners representative who was present at the time of the enforcement of the warrant to prove that
the enforcing officers discovered the sealed boxes inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents
were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the NBI agent/agents who
enforced the warrant had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were
incriminating and that they were immediately apparent.

PP vs Chua Ho San GR no 128222, June 17, 1999

Facts: Police officers received a report that the respondent will be delivering drugs that
night in a hotel in Angeles. When they spotted the latter coming out from his car the
police officer confronted him and introduced themselves as Police and subjected him to a
body search which yielded for some illegal contrabands.
Issue: Whether there is a valid warrantless arrest.
Held: [Link] the case at bar" neither the in flagrante delicto nor the stop and frisk principles is
applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police
operatives on accused-appellant. In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very
moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the
arresting officer. Accordingly, for this exception to apply two elements must concur 1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime: and 2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer

Luz vs PP, GR 197722

Facts:
PO3 Emmanuel L. Alteza testified that he saw the accused driving a motorcycle without a helmet and so
he flagged him down. He invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he
flagged down the accused is almost in front of the sub-station to where he is assigned as a traffic enforcer.
The accused violated a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while
driving said motor vehicle. While the officers were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal
ordinance, PO3 Alteza noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on reaching something from his
jacket. He was alerted and told the accused to take out the contents of his jacket’s pocket as the latter may
have a weapon inside it. The accused obliged, slowly put out the contents of his jacket’s pocket which
included two plastic sachets of suspected shabu.
The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs as the substances are positive of
methampethamine hydrochloride. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
Upon a petition for reiew on certiorari, petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure,
because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was
erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance.
Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the search conducted
upon him.

Issue:
Whether or not the arrest, searches and seizure were invalid.

Held:
Yes, there was no valid arrest. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not,
ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested. There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that
resulted from it was likewise illegal.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a
traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter. At
the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to
have been under arrest. rior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the
police station may be characterized merely as waiting time.
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of
the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and
calls for the acquittal of the accused.

Antiquera v PP GR 180661, Dec 11, 2013

Facts:
Police officers were conducting a police visibility patrol in Pasay City when they saw two unidentified
men rush out of a house and boarded a jeep. Believing that there was a crime, the police officers
approached the house. When they peeked through the partially opened door, they saw Antiquera and Cruz
engaged in a pot session. The police officers entered the house, introduced themselves and arrested
Antiquera and Cruz. While inspecting the vicinity, PO1 Cabutihan saw a jewellery box which contained
shabu and unused paraphernalia. The RTC found them guilty of illegal possession of paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs. The court affirmed the decision of RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the arrest was invalid.

Held:
Yes, there was unlawful arrest because the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in
flagrante delicto. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from
the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no
activity that warranted their entering it. Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting
officers that authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule.
Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal.

Atty. Miguel Morales case – AM No P-082519, November 19, 2008

FACTS:

 The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an unsigned, undated letter of complaint
regarding Atty. Miguel Morales of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC). The letter alleged that
Atty. Morales was consuming his work hours filing and attending to personal cases, and was
using office supplies, equipment and utilities.
 Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Reuben Dela Cruz conducted a spot investigation and gained
access to Morales’ personal computer. Pleadings to two of Atty. Morales’ personal cases were
found among the computer files. The computer was seized and taken to the custody of the OCA.
 Morales filed a motion for the release of his computer. The Court granted his motion but ordered
that the files be retrieved first.
 Morales filed a letter-complaint addressed to then CJ Davide against DCA Dela Cruz for alleged
conspiracy and culpable violation of the Consti. Morales asserted that the “raid” conducted by
DCA Dela Cruz without search and seizure orders violated his right to privacy and the articles
seized should therefore be considered inadmissible.

ISSUE:
 1. Are the pleadings found in Atty. Morales’ personal computer admissible in the administrative
case against him?

RULING: DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence

1. No
 Article III Section 2 of the Constitution enshrines the inviolable right of the people to be
secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Additionally, Article III Section 3(2) bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of
such right. Any violation of this right renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
 One of the exceptions to the rule is consented warrantless search. DCA Dela Cruz claims that
they were able to obtain the pleadings with Atty. Morales’ consent.
 However, the Court finds his assertion insufficient to make the present case fall under the
exception. Consent to a search must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. It must be shown by clear and convincing
evidence.
 To constitute a valid consent, it must be shown that: (1) the right exists, (2) that the persons
involved had the knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of the right, and
(3) that the person had actual intention to relinquish the right.
 In this case, it was not shown that Atty. Morales had an actual intention to relinquish his
right. He may have agreed to opening his computer and printing the files during the spot
investigation, but he immediately filed an administrative case against the DCA and his team,
specifically invoking his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

PP vs Suzuki, GR 120670, October 23, 2003

Facts: Appellant was found guilty of illeal possession of prohibited drugs and was sentenced to death.
Hence, the instant review.
The facts of the case are:
Appellant was in the airport for his flight to Manila. PASCOM and NARCOM agents were in the airport
to follow on reports on drug trafficking.
When he walked through the metal detector, the alarm sounded. He was bodily frisked and nothing was
found on his person so they proceeded to check his luggage but appellant refused then consented
eventually and opened it. There they found packs of aluminum foil and when opened, it was found to be
marijuana.

Issue: WON the PASCOM agents were authorized to conduct the search. WON accused consented to the
search. WON the search was conducted was incidental to a lawful arrest. WON the confiscated items
were in plain view.
Held:
In [Link] and [Link] we validated the search conducted on the departing passengers and the
consequent seizure of the shabu found in their persons, thus:
"Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property
to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society
is prepared to recognize as [Link]"
It should be stressed, however, that whenever the right against unreasonable search and seizure is
challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right
by giving consent to the search or seizure. 9
Here, appellant voluntarily gave his consent to the search conducted by the PASCOM agents.
It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case. 12 Given the circumstances obtaining here, we find the search
conducted by the airport authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of his constitutional rights.
Hence, when the search of the box of piaya revealed several marijuana fruiting tops, appellant is deemed
to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 13 The packs of marijuana obtained in the course of such
valid search are thus admissible as evidence against appellant. 14
Nonetheless, we find the trial court’s reliance on the plain view doctrine misplaced. Such doctrine finds
application only when the incriminating nature of the object is in the "plain view" of the police
officer.15 Here, it is beyond cavil that the marijuana seized from appellant is contained in the box
of piaya, wrapped in aluminum foil and not immediately apparent to the airport authorities.

Neither was the search incidental to a lawful arrest since appellant was not yet arrested at the time of the
search. To be considered a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there must be a lawful
arrest before the search can be made.

PP vs Correa, 285 SCRA 679 (1998)

Facts: The respondents were placed under surveillance on account of confidential and intelligence
reports that respondents were engaged in illegal drug [Link] Police Operatives from the Drug
Enforcement Unit tailed the subject jeepney and upon reaching the intersection of Bambang Extension
and Jose Abad Santos Avenue, the operatives stopped and parked their vehicles around the suspect's
vehicle and accosted the respondents who were the passengers of the owner-type jeepney. The operatives
inspected and able to seized the suspected contrabands. The respondents together with their cargo of
drugs and their vehicle, were brought to the police station for investigation.

Issue:Whether the evidences presented before the court is inadmissible being the fruit of an illegal search
conducted without any search warrant.

Held:No. The respondents never protested when the operative opened the tin can loaded in the appellants'
vehicle and found eight (8) bundles of marijuana. As well they did not raise any protest when they,
together with their cargo of drugs and their vehicle, were brought to the police station for investigation.
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his person or premises, he is
precluded from later complaining thereof. The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like
every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.

Veroy vs Layague, 210 SCRA 97 (1992)

Facts: The Police raided the house of herein petitioners in Davao City on information that the said
residence was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the help
of the caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner was not present and they did not have a
search warrant. The following day they conducted the search pursuant to the authority granted by
petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy. They recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine, a bag etc. The spouse
Veroy were held liable for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion).

Issues: Whether the herein petitioner will be held liable for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866
following the unreasonable searches and seizures in their dwelling.

Held: No. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. The rule having been violated and no
exception being applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by
the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action
against them for illegal possession of firearms. Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant,
still in mala prohibita, while there is no need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same
existed. Without the knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime. The criminal case against the
petitioners for illegal possession of firearms is DISMISSED

Lopez vs Commissioner of Customs, 68 SCRA 320 (1975)

Facts: The Davao anti-smuggling team apprehended the vessel MV Jolo Lima which was chatered by
Velasco. The MV Jolo lema carried smuggled copra and coffee. The captain told the team that Velasco
was in a hotel. The anti-smuggling team entered the hotel but, Velasco was not there. But, the wife of
Velasco gave the documents of the smuggled product.

Issue: Whether there was consent on part of occupant of hotelroom rented by velasco?
Ruling: Yes, because there was a person inside who gave their request. Thus, the unreasonable search
may be waived by somebody other than the person himself. Therefore such consent is sufficient in law to
dispense with the need for a search warrant.

Pp vs Tudtud, et al GR 144307 September 26, 2003

Facts: A man who identified himself as a police officer approached the respondent, pointing a .38
caliber revolver. The man told him not to run. The Police officer tried to inspect the plastic bag Tudtud
was carrying, and instructed him to open the bag, which revealed no contrabands. The officer then
directed him to open a carton box some two meters away which according to him not his, but proceeded
to open it out of fear after the man again pointed his revolver at him. They discovered pieces of dried fish,
underneath which was something wrapped in cellophane and turned out to be marijuana. The police thus
arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their rights and brought them to the police station.
The two did not resist.

Issue: Whether there was a violation of constitutional rights on unreasonable search and seizure in the
case at bar.

Held: Yes. Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional
guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the
public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional
rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to
the basic principles of government. The officers who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in
disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss
of liberty. It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law
violated is the Constitution itself.

Silahis Int’l Hotel vs Soluta, February 20, 2006

Facts: Petitioner Jose Marcel Panlilio, Vice President for Finance of petitioner Silahis International
Hotel, Inc. (Silahis), with his personal secretary, a Bulletin reporter, and a security guard entered the
union office located at the hotel basement. The same is with the permission of union officer Henry Babay.
Babay was apprised about the suspected illegal activities. During the search they discovered marijuana
flowering tops in the union office. An Information indicting the union officers was then filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for violation of Republic Act 6425, as amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang
179 (The Dangerous Drugs Act). The RTC acquitted the accused on the ground that the marijuana tops
are inadmissible as evidence. Soluta and his fellow union officers including the union thereafter filed
before the RTC a complaint against Silahis, Panlilio and those who cooperated for malicious prosecution
and violation of their constitutional right against illegal search. The RTC granted such petition. It ruled
that Silahis and Panlilio are jointly and severally liable to pay for damages in favor of Soluta et al. Silahis
and Panlilio appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court‘s
decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Silahis and Panlilio violated the constitutional right of Soluta et al.

HELD:

As constitutional rights, like the right to be secure in one‘s person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable search and seizures, occupy a lofty position in every civilized and democratic community
and not infrequently susceptible to abuse, their violation, whether constituting a penal offense or not,
must be guarded against. The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers
but also private individuals civilly liable for violation of rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil
Code. That is why it is not even necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with
malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection
of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff. In the
present case, as priorly stated, Silahis and Panlilio had, by their own claim, already received reports in
late 1987 of illegal activities allegedly undertaken in the union office and Maniego conducted
surveillance of the union officers. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, Silahis, Panlilio and their
companions barged into and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for
them to obtain one, and notwithstanding the objection of Babay. The course taken by Silahis and
company stinks in illegality, it not falling under any of the exceptional instances when a warrantless
search is allowed by law. Silahis and Panlilio‘s violation of individual Soluta et al.‘s constitutional right
against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the
Civil Code. As for Silahis et al.‘s contention that property rights justified the search of the union office,
the same does not lie. For Soluta et al., being the lawful occupants of the office, had the right to raise the
question of validity of the search and seizure. Neither does Silahis et al.‘s claim that they were allowed by
union officer Babay to enter the union office lie. Babay‘s account of why Silahis and company went to
the union office – to consider Panlilio‘s suggestion to settle the mauling incident is more credible, as is
his claim that he protested the search, and even asked if they were armed with a search warrant. While it
is doctrinal that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be
waived expressly or impliedly, a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There must be clear and
convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish it to constitute a waiver thereof. There must be
proof of the following: (a) that the right exists; (b) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual
or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the said person had an actual intention to
relinquish the right. In other words, the waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made.
The evidence shows otherwise, however

Espano vs CA GR 120431 April 1, 1998

FACTS: On 14 July 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., Pat. Romeo Pagilagan and other police officers, namely,
Pat. Wilfredo Aquilino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police District (WPD),
Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in
the area. They saw Rodolfo Espano selling "something" to another person. After the alleged buyer left,
theyapproached Espano, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two
plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana . When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there was
more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of
marijuana. Espano was brought to the police headquarters where he was charged with possession of
prohibited drugs. On 24 July 1991, Espano posted bail and the trial court issued his order of release on 29
July 1991. On 14 August 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, convicting Espano of the crime
charged. Espano appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, on 15
January 1995 affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. Espano filed a petition for review with the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the search of Espano’s home after his arrest does not violate against his right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
RULING: Espano's arrest falls squarely under Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was
caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of
information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets,
Manila. The police officer saw Espano handing over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left,
they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the
two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime. As for
the 10 cellophane bags of marijuana found at Espano's residence, however, the same inadmissible in
evidence. The articles seized from Espano during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search made
incidental to a lawful arrest. The warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten
cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search
warrant at the time. Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of Espano. The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purposes shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." An exception to the said rule is a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense. It may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control. Herein, the ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at
petitioner's house after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions.

Roldan vs Arca GR no L-25434, July 25, 1975

FACTS:

- Respondent company filed a case against Roldan, Jr. for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI
which had been seized and impounded by petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine
Navy. The CFI Manila granted it, thus respondent company took Possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI.

- Petitioner requested the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also
respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of some provisions of the
Fisheries Act. On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were actually seized for illegal fishing with
dynamite.

The Fiscal filed an ex parte motion to hold the boats in custody as instruments and therefore evidence of
the crime, and cabled the Fisheries Commissioner to detain the vessels. On October 2 and 4, likewise,
the CFI of Palawan ordered the Philippine Navy to take the boats in custody. Judge Francisco Arca
issued an order granting the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and issued the
preliminary writ upon the filing by the company of a bond of P5,000.00 for the release of the two
vessels. On 19 October 1965, the Commission and the Navy filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order issuing the preliminary writ

Judge Arca denied the said motion for reconsideration. The Commission and the Navy filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain Judge Arca from enforcing his
order dated 18 October 1965, and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction there under issued.

ISSUE: WON a police officer can search without warrant

HELD: YES. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and air crafts for violations of the
customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant,
because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant
must be sought before such warrant could be secured; hence it is not practicable to require a search
warrant before such search or seizure can be constitutionally effected. The same exception should apply
to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws. They are usually equipped with powerful
motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard.

Under our Rules of Court, a police officer or a private individual may, without a warrant, arrest a
person (a) who has committed, is actually committing or is about to commit an offense in his presence;
(b) who is reasonably believed to have committed an offense which has been actually committed; or (c)
who is a prisoner who has escaped from confinement while serving a final judgment or from temporary
detention during the pendency of his case or while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In the case at bar, the members of the crew of the two vessels were caught inflagrante illegally fishing
with dynamite and without the requisite license. Thus their apprehension without a warrant of arrest
while committing a crime is lawful. Consequently, the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and
dynamites therein was equally valid as an incident to a lawful arrest. In the case at bar, the members of
the crew of the two vessels were caught in flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and without the
requisite license. Thus their apprehension without a warrant of arrest while committing a crime is
lawful. Consequently, the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was equally valid
as an incident to a lawful arrest.

PP vs DOria, GR No 125299, January 22, 1999

Facts:Doria was entrapped and arrested in a buy-bust operation after the members of the North
Metropolitan District, PNP NARCOM, received information from 2 civilian informants that one “Jun”
was engaged in illegal drug activities. During the arrest, the marked bills handed to him as payment for
the marijuana could not be found on him. He revelead that he left the money at the house of his associate
named “Neneth”, whose house he led the police to. The team found the door of Neneth’s house open and
a woman inside, whom Jun identified as his associate. While asked about the marked bills, a carton box
under the dining table was noticed by one of the policemen, PO3 Manlangit. The content of which is
wrapped in plastic similar to the marijuana sold to them. The box contained 10 bricks of what appeared to
be dried marijuana leaves. Simultaneous with the box’s discovery, was the recovery of the marked bills.
Neneth was arrested and the box together with its contents and marked bills were turned over to the
investigators at the headquarters. This was

Issue:Whether the box that contained bricks of marijuana is considered in plain view during the seizure

Ruling:No. Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the
search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be
deemed legal as an incident to her arrest.

In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were
marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents. On cross-examination, however, he
admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping
as the "buy-bust marijuana." A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the plastic wrapper was not
colorless and transparent as to clearly manifest its contents to a viewer. Each of the 10 bricks of marijuana
in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags-- white, pink or blue
in color. PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that the contents of the box could be
items other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant
Gaddao about its contents. It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box
was marijuana. The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant
was in violation of the law and the Constitution. It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been
excluded and never considered by the trial court.

Luz vs Pp, GR 197788, Feb 29, 2012

Facts:
PO3 Emmanuel L. Alteza testified that he saw the accused driving a motorcycle without a helmet and so
he flagged him down. He invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he
flagged down the accused is almost in front of the sub-station to where he is assigned as a traffic enforcer.
The accused violated a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while
driving said motor vehicle. While the officers were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal
ordinance, PO3 Alteza noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on reaching something from his
jacket. He was alerted and told the accused to take out the contents of his jacket’s pocket as the latter may
have a weapon inside it. The accused obliged, slowly put out the contents of his jacket’s pocket which
included two plastic sachets of suspected shabu.
The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs as the substances are positive of
methampethamine hydrochloride. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
Upon a petition for reiew on certiorari, petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure,
because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was
erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance.
Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the search conducted
upon him.

Issue:
Whether or not the arrest, searches and seizure were invalid.

Held:
Yes, there was no valid arrest. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not,
ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested. There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that
resulted from it was likewise illegal.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a
traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter. At
the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to
have been under arrest. rior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the
police station may be characterized merely as waiting time.
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of
the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and
calls for the acquittal of the accused.

PP vs Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 (1991)

Facts: The appellant is sending a package to Switzerland thru the packing and export forwarder business
owned by Job Reyes. Following standard operating procedure, the owner opened the package for
inspection prior to delivery to the Bureau of Post/Customs and smelled a peculiar odor from the box
which prompted him to investigate further and found some dried leaves inside. He took samples and
forwarded the content of the shipment to NBI for lab test. He was then investigated by the narcotics
division of the NBI and was requested to bring the package to their office. The lab result showed the
samples were that of marijuana leaves. Thereafter, NBI took charge of the inventory of the package and
an information was filed against the appellant in violation of RA 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act). It was
contended that the court erred in admitting the evidence in a violation of his constitutional rights against
illegal search and seizure and privacy of communication.

Issue: Whether or not the evidence obtained should be inadmissible to court?

Ruling: The court held that as a general rule evidence obtained thru illegal and unreasonable search and
seizures by law enforcers and other government agencies are inadmissible to court. The case at bar
however has a peculiar character where the evidence was obtained by a private person without the
intervention of State authorities. In the absence of government interference, the Constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked against the State. The Bill of Rights provided
by the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against act of private individuals and such restraint is only
directed against the government and any of its agencies. Thus the court affirmed that the evidence is
deemed admissible to the case and affirmed the decision of the lower court finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.

Pp vs Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402

Facts: The PC (Philippine Constabulary) officer received a tip from one of their informers that the
accused was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was identified by
name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening and approached him as he descended from
the gangplank after the informer pointed at him. They detained him and inspected the bag he was
carrying. It was found to contained three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by the NBI
forensic examiner. On the basis of the finding, the corresponding charge was then filed against
Aminnudin.

Issue:

            Whether or not accused constitutional right against unreasonable serach and seizure is violated

Ruling:

            The Supreme Court Held that warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the rules of court not
justified unless the accused was caught in flagrante or a crime was about to be committed or had just been
committed.

A vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law
because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be
secured.

            In the present case, from the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had
at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who
was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of
his arrival was certain. And from the information they have received, they could have persuaded a judge
that there was a probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. The Bill
of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team had
determine on his own authority that a search warrant was not necessary.

            The evidence of probable cause should be determined by a judge and not law enforcement agents.

ACQUITTED

Pp vs Libnao, et. al, GR 136860 January 20, 2003

FACTS: This is a case finding appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga guilty of
violating Art. II, Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). The intelligence
operatives of the PNP stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on suspected
drug dealers in the area. They learned from their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a
companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a month in big bulks. On Oct. 20, 1996,
at about 1AM, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle. It had two female
passengers seated inside, who were later identified as the herein appellant and her co-accused. In front of
them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the twos uneasy behavior when asked about its
ownership and content, the officers invited them to Kabayan Center No.2. Upon reaching the center, P03
Ferrer fetched Brgy. Captain Pascual to witness the opening of the black bag. As soon as the brgy.
Captain arrived, the black bag was opened in the presence of the appellant, her co-accused and personnel
of the center. Found inside were eight bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered with newspaper.
The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Lab in Pampanga. Forensic Chemist Babu
conducted a lab exam on them and concluded that the articles were marijuana. For their part, both accused
denied the accusation against them. Libnao argued that her arrest was unlawful, capitalizes on the absence
of a warrant for her arrest. She also takes the issue of the fact that she was not assisted by a lawyer when
police officers interrogated her. She claimed that she was not duly informed of her right to remain silent
and to have competent counsel of her choice. Hence, she argues that the confession or admission obtained
therein should be considered inadmissible in evidence against her. ISSUE: Whether both the accused can
be convicted based on the prosecution’s evidence. HELD: Yes. The above contentions deserve scant
attention. The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac Police
Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance operation for 3 months in the area. The
surveillance yielded information that once a month, appellant and her co-accused Nunga transport drugs
in big bulks. It is also clear that at the time Libnao was apprehended, she was committing offense. She
was making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Art. II, Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6425.
Under the ROC, one of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when
the person to be arrested is caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto. Appellant also faults the trial
court for appreciating and taking into account the object and documentary evidence of the prosecution
despite the latter’s failure to formally offer them. She argues that absent any formal offer, they must be
deemed inadmissible. The contention is untenable. Evidence not formally offered can be considered by
the court as long as they have been properly identified by testimony duly recorded and they have
themselves been incorporated in the records of the case. All the documentary and object evidence in this
case were properly identified, presented and marked as exhibits in court, including the bricks of
marijuana. Even without their formal offer; therefore, the prosecution can still establish the case because
witnesses properly identified those exhibits, and their testimonies are recorded. Furthermore, appellant’s
counsel had cross-examined the prosecution witnesses who testified on the exhibits. Against the credible
positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellants defense of denial and alibi cannot stand. The
defense of denial and alibi has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily
be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most cases involving violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. It has to be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The appeal is
DENIED.

PP vs Nuevas GR No 170233 Feb 22, 2007

FACTS:
- Police officers Fami and Cabling, during a stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug
trafficking in Olongapo City, came across Jesus Nuevas, who they suspected to be carrying drugs.
Upon inquiry, Nuevas showed them a plastic bag which contained marijuana leaves and bricks
wrapped in a blue cloth. He then informed the officers of 2 other persons who would be making
marijuana deliveries.
- The police officers then proceeded to where Nuevas said his associates, Reynaldo Din and
Fernando Inocencio, could be located. Din was carrying a plastic bag which contained marijuana
packed in newspaper and wrapped therein. When the police officers introduced themselves, Din
voluntarily handed the plastic bag over to them. After the items were confiscated, the police
officers took the three men to the police office.
 - Police officer Fami then revealed that when the receipt of the evidence was prepared, all 3
accused were not represented by counsel. He likewise disclosed that he was the one who escorted
all the accused during their physical examination. He also escorted all 3 to the Fiscal’s office
where they were informed of the charges against them.
- The 3 were found guilty by the trial court, and the case was automatically elevated to the CA for
review. However, Nuevas withdrew his appeal. Thus, the case was considered closed and
terminated as to him. The CA affirmed the trial court.
ISSUE and RULING:
WON Din and Inocencio waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
NO. The search conducted in Nuevas’ case was made with his consent. However, in Din’s case, there was
none. There is reason to believe that Nuevas indeed willingly submitted the plastic bag with the
incriminating contents to the police officers. It can be seen that in his desperate attempt to exculpate
himself from any criminal liability, he cooperated with the police, gave them the plastic bag, and even
revealed his associates, offering himself as an informant. His actuations were consistent with the
lamentable human inclination to find excuses, blame others, and save oneself even at the cost of others’
lives. Thus, the Court would have affirmed Nuevas’ conviction had he not withdrawn his appeal. On the
other hand, with respect to the search conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds that no such consent
had actually been given. The police officers gave inconsistent, dissimilar testimonies regarding the
manner by which they got hold of the plastic bag. Neither can Din’s silence at the time be construed as an
implied acquiescence to the warrantless search. Thus, the prosecution failed to clearly show that Din
intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. On the other hand, Inocencio’s
supposed possession of the dried marijuana leaves was sought to be shown through his act of looking into
the plastic bag that Din was carrying. The act attributed to Inocencio is insufficient to establish illegal
possession of the drugs or even conspiracy to illegally possess the same. The prosecution failed to show
by convincing proof that Inocencio knew of the contents of the bag and that he conspired with Din to
possess the illegal items.

When warrantless search may be permitted:

(1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
(2) Search of evidence in “plain view”;
(3) Search of a moving vehicle;
(4) Consented warrantless search;
(5) Customs search;
(6) Stop and frisk; and
(7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.

Elements of search of evidence in plain view:

(a) Prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present
in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) Inadvertent discovery of the evidence by the police who have the right to be where they are;
(c) The evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) “Plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter
cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or
seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search and seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles
procured.

A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The arrest, however, must
precede the search; the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous
with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of
the search.

An object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed
package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However,
if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its
contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized.

It must be seen that the consent to the search was voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
detention and search—the consent must be unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated
by duress or coercion.

The consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent
was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obstrusive searches, it is
fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that:
(1) The right exists;
(2) The person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right;
and
(3) The said person had an actual intention to relinquish such right.

PP vs Tiu Won Chua, 405 SCRA 280

Facts:
Accused Tiu Won Chua a.k.a. Timothy Tiu and Qui Yaling y Chua a.k.a. Sun Tee Sy y Chua
were charged and convicted by the lower court for violation of Section 16, Article III of the dangerous
drug act of 1972, for their illegal possession of a regulated drug, shabu.
They appealed the decision of the lower court questioning the legality of the search warrant and
the search and arrest conducted pursuant thereto, and the correctness of the judgment of conviction
imposed by the RTC. Accused contends that the defect in the issuance of the search warrant, for it was
issued in the name of Timothy Tiu and did not include appellant Qui Yaling, would make the search
conducted and consequently, the arrest, illegal. That the evidence presented cannot be serve as basis for
their conviction being fruits of an illegal search.

Issues:
1. Whether or not their was a valid search warrant.
2. Whether or not the court correctly imposed judgment of conviction to the accused.

Ruling:
1. There are only four requisites for a valid warrant, i.e,: (1) it must be issued upon "probable cause"; (2)
probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) such judge must examine under oath
or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; and (4) the warrant must
particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. A mistake in the
name of the person to be searched does not invalidate the warrant, especially since in this case, the
authorities had personal knowledge of the drug-related activities of the accused by virtue of the
surveillance and test-buy operations of the said authorities. In fact, a "John Doe" warrant satisfies the
requirements so long as it contains a descriptio personae such as will enable the officer to identify the
accused. Moreover, a mistake in the identification of the owner of the place does not invalidate the
warrant provided the place to be searched is properly described. However, the court affirms the
illegality of the search conducted on the car for it was not part of the description of the place to be
searched mentioned in the warrant.

2. In a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) appellants were
in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such
possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the appellants were freely and consciously aware of
being in possession of the drug. Since the crime is malum prohibitum, hence, lack of criminal intent
 or good faith does not exempt appellants from criminal liability. Mere possession of a regulated drug
without legal authority is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act. In the case at bar, the
prosecution sufficiently proved that the packs of shabu were found inside a room in the unit subject of
the search warrant, more particularly inside the man’s handbag and ladies’ handbag owned
respectively by the accused. As to the penalties imposed, the court did not sustain the trial court’s
decision attributing to both appellants the illegal possession of the same amount of shabu. Since no
conspiracy was proven, the amount of the shabu from each accused was made the basis of the penalty
imposed. Thus, since 234.5 grams of shabu were found inside the man’s handbag, deemed to be
owned by Tiu Won, he is guilty of violating Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, while Qui
Yaling, whose handbag contained only 20.3673 grams of shabu is guilty of violating Section 20
thereof. Section 16, in connection with Section 20 (1 st paragraph), provides the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos where the
amount of shabu involved is 200 grams or more. Where the amount is less than 200 grams, Section 20
punishes the offender with the penalty ranging from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua.

Padilla vs CA, GR no 121917, March 12, 1997

FACTS: One night, Enrique Manarang noticed the accused appellant’s car running fast. After a while, a
screech of tires was heard and thus, made the officer run out and investigate. Not so long, the car
continued to run, so a hot-pursuit took place. Manarang then radioed the incident to the Police.
When the car was put to a stop, the driver rolled down the windows with his hands raised. The officers
then noticed that it was the famous actor, Robin Padilla. While apprehended, because of the hit-and-run
incident, the police saw the revolver tucked in the left waist of Robin. So, the police insisted that the gun
be shown in the office if it was legal. The crowd had formed and Robin was shaking their hands and
pointing to the police while saying “iyan kinuha ang baril ko”, as if it was in the movies. The gesture then
revealed a magazine clip of a rifle which made the police suspect that there is a rifle inside the vehicle.
Then the rifle was seen. The other firearms were voluntarily surrendered by Robin.
Now, Robin’s defense was that his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions
taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule.
Robin Padilla was arrested, tried, and convicted for illegal possession of firearms. He was in possession
of a .357 caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson with 6 live ammunitions, One M-16 baby Armalite Rifle
with ammunitions, One .380 Pietro Barreta with 8 live ammunitions, and six live double action
ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest is illegal and the evidences is inadmissible.

RULING: [Link] policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified as he had in
fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between
the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves at the Abacan
bridge in response to Manarang's report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching Pajero of
petitioner, its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and
railings thereof. These formed part of the arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then,
the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay
information.

Pp vs De Gracia, 233 SCRA 729

Facts: The incidents took place at the height of the coup d’etat staged bu ultra-rightiest elements headed
by the Reform the Armed forces Movemnt-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the
Government. Rolando de Gracia wasapprehended by the military operatives, holding a C-4 in the building
of Eurocar Office during the raid. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according
to them, at the time there was so much disorder considering that the neardy Cmp Aguinaldo was being
mopped upby the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of Eurocar office and
that the courts were consequently closed.
Issue: Whether the military operatives made a valid search and seizure during the height of the coup
d’etat.
Held: [Link] raid of, and the consequent seizure of firearms and ammunition in, the Eurocar Sales
Office at the height of coup d’etat was held valid, considering the exigent and emergency situation
obtaining. The military operatives had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed,
and they had no opportunity to apply for a search warrant from the courts because the latter were closed.
Under such urgency and exigency, a search warrant could be validly dispensed with"
Pp vs de la cruz, Gr no 8320, April 18, 1990

Facts:
 dela Cruz and San Antonio were currently living together when Macapagal (victim, San Antonio’s ex-live-in
partner) went to their apartment, holding a gun (9mm caliber pistol) and banged the door of the bedroom ahere
dela Cruz was demanding him to go out

 Dela Cruz opened the door, and upon seeing that Macapagal was pointing the gun at him, he immediately went
back to the room and closed the door.

 The next time he went out, he, too, was already holding a gun (.35 caliber revolver).

 The two immediately grappled each other and not long after, shots were heard and Macapagal fell dead on the
floor.

 Appellant told San Antonio to call the police and when they arrive, he surrendered the gun he used and told the
police that he shot Macapagal in self defense.

 According to the autopsy, Macapagal sustained 4 wounds. 3 of which were non-penetrating (upper jaw, below
the left shoulder, right side of the waist). The shot that took his life was on the left side of the chest penetrating
the heart.

 Dela Cruz had no license to carry the firearm.

 
Issue: W/N the accused is able to prove to the court the elements of self-defense in order to extenuate him from the
crime.
 
Held: No.
 
Ratio:
 Three conditions must concur to extenuate him:

1. Unlawful aggression by the person injured or killed

 presuppose an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person – not
a mere threatening or intimidating attitude – but most importantly at the time the defensive action was taken
against the aggressor.

 In this case, the victim banged at the bedroom door with his gun but the appellant, upon seeing the victim
pointing a gun at him was able to prevent at this stage harm to himself by promptly closing the door. He could
have stopped there. Instead, he confronted the victim.

1. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel that unlawful aggression

 The number of wounds sustained by the victim would negate this component of self defense. The four gunshot
wounds indicate a determined effort to kill.

1. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself

 When the appellant confronted the victim, instead of taking precautionary measures, appellant could no longer
argue that there was no provocation on his part

 Claim of self defense rejected

Camara vs. Municipal Court 387 US 523 (1967)

Facts: On November 6, 1963, an inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco
Department of Public Health entered an apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for
possible violations of the city’s Housing Code.” The inspector was informed that the Appellant was using
part of his leasehold as a personal residence. The inspector confronted the Appellant and demanded to
inspect the premises because residential use was not allowed on the first floor of the apartment building.
The Appellant did not allow the inspector to enter because he did not have a warrant. The inspector
attempted to obtain access to Appellant’s apartment a second time two days later, and again the Appellant
refused to grant him access. The Appellant then was sent a summons ordering him to appear at the district
attorney’s office. The Appellant did not appear and a few weeks later two other inspectors attempted to
gain access to his apartment and were again refused because they did not have a search warrant. A
complaint was then filed against the Appellant for violation of the Housing Code. His demurrer was
denied and he filed a writ of prohibition. The court of Appeals held the housing section “does not violate
Fourth Amendment rights because it is part of a regulatory scheme which is essentially civil rather than
criminal in nature, inasmuch as that section creates a right of inspection which is limited in scope and
may not be exercised under reasonable conditions.”
Issue: Whether administrative inspection programs, as presently authorized and conducted, violate Fourth
Amendment rights asthose rights are enforced against the States through Fourteenth Amendment.
Ruling: Yes. (Frank v. Maryland) to the exten that it sanctioned such warrantless inspections, must be
overruled.” In Frank v. Maryland, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of one who refused to permit
a warrantless inspection of private premises for the purposes of locating and abating a suspected public
nuisance.” The Frank opinion has been generally been interpreted as carving out an additional exception
to the rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” The majority here
observed, the practical effect of this system is to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the official
in the field. This is precisely the discretion to invade private property which we have consistently
circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the need to search. We simply cannot
say that the protections provided by the warrant procedure are not needed in this context; broad statutory
safeguards are no subtle for individualized review, particularly when those safeguards may only be
invoked at the risk of a criminal penalty.
Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness of a search other than by
balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails. But the majority thought that a
number if persuasive inspections. First, such programs have a long history of judicial and public
acceptance. Second, the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet
it is doubtful that any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results. Many such conditions
– faulty wiring is an obvious example – are not observable from outside the building and indeed may not
be apparent to the inexpert occupant himself. Finally, because the inspections are neither personal in
nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the
urban citizen’s privacy. Further, after concluded that the area inspection is a reasonable search of private
property within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the majority observed it is obvious that “probable
cause” to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for
conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling.

Umil vs Ramos GR 81567 July 9,1990

FACTS:On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt
Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a
"sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. That
the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2)
Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road
hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed by the
hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10,  Lot 4, South City
Homes, Binan, Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded man was
Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical
Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the
eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.
ISSUE: Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.

RULING:Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it can be
said that he was committing as offense when arrested.  The crimes rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance therefore in connection
therewith constitute direct assaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing crimes.
Del Castillo vs People GR no 185128, January 30, 2012

FACTS

Pursuant to a confidential information that Ruben Del Castillo (petitioner) was engaged in selling shabu,

police officers, headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, secured a search warrant from the RTC. In the

search warrant, the place of Del Castillo’s residence was specifically designated and described.

The same police operatives then went to Gil Tudtud St., Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant to

petitioner. But upon their arrival, someone shouted “raid”, which prompted them to proceed to Del

Castillo’s house and cordon/surround it. However, before these police operatives can implement the

search warrant, Del Castillo allegedly fled and ran to a nipa hut located 20 meters away from Del

Castillo’s residence. SPO3 Masnayon and his men chased Del Castillo but failed to do so because they

are not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place. Thereafter, all the police officers went back to

said residence and sought the assistance of the barangay tanods.

In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner named Dolly

del Castillo, Masnayon and his men searched Del Castillo’s house, including the nipa hut where he

allegedly ran for cover. The policemen who searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but

one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including four (4)

plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Later, these packs were found to be shabu after they

were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.

On the basis of such finding, an Information for Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended was

filed against Del Castillo. During arraignment, with the assistance of counsel, he pleaded not guilty. Then,

trial on the merits ensued. Eventually, the Regional Trial Court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of the crime charged.

Del Castillo, aggrieved by the trial court’s decision, appealed his case to the Court of Appeals. However,

the appellate court affirmed the court a quo’s decision, opining that Del Castillo had constructive

possession of the nipa hut where the crystalline substance were found. Thus, such substance, which

turned out to be shabu, are under his dominion and control. Also, it denied Del Castillo’s Motion for

Reconsideration.

Undaunted, Del Castillo filed before the Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court. He argued that the packs of white crystalline substance found in the nipa hut are

inadmissible in evidence against him. This is because the prosecution failed to prove that he is the owner

of said hut and that he uses the same as his electric shop.
ISSUE

Can Del Castillo be convicted of the crime charged?

RULING

No. This is because the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the nipa hut, in which

the illegal drugs were found, is under Del Castillo’s control and dominion or constructive possession,

which is an element of the crime charged.

Among other things, the prosecution must prove the accused’s possession of the prohibited drug. Here,

the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution do not provide proof as to the ownership of the nipa

hut where the seized articles (packs of crystalline substances) were found. During their direct testimonies,

they just said, without stating their basis, that the same structure was the shop of petitioner. In addition,

the RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of

electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession.

Thus, the Supreme Court ruled:

“The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs

in the place under his control and dominion, and the character of the drugs. With the prosecution’s failure

to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner’s control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as

to his guilt.

In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law’s own starting perspective on the status of

the accused – in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary

is proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that

would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the

constitutional presumption of innocence.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 27819, which

affirmed the Decision dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal

Case No. CBU-46291 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ruben del Castillo is

ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED

Pp vs Baula, GR no 132671, November 15, 2000

Facts:
  After the gruesome killing of Patronicia Caburao, the investigating police went to the residence of
the accused-appellant, Baula et al.

 In the process of questioning the appellants, the police saw bloodstained bolo, short pants, polo
shirts and was subsequently confiscated without search warrant and directed to the NBI for
forensic exams. The exam resulted that the bloods found in the confiscated articles bears the same
blood type “O” as that of the victim.

 Thus, the accused were arrested, charged and was convicted in the crime of murder by the RTC
Lingayen and sentenced to suffer RP. Hence this appeal for review on the decision of the lower
court in the ground that the articles sought (bloodstained bolo, shirt and short pants) cannot be
admitted as evidence against the accused since it was seized without a valid search and seizure
warrant.

Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search conducted was valid under a consented search

Held: NO

 The articles are unlawfully searched and seized.

 A search incidental to a valid arrest is one of the statutory exceptions to the constitutional
mandate that no search and seizure shall be effected without a valid warrant. In this instance, the
arrest should be lawful before search and seizure by the arresting officer would be conducted. A
warrantless arrest may be effected by the arresting officer when in his presence the person
arrested is have committed, committing or attempting to commit the crime. It cannot be reversed;
otherwise, it would unlawful and unconstitutional and the seized article would be inadmissible
evidence.

 In the case at bar, Accused-appellants were not being arrested at the time that the subject articles
were allegedly taken from them but were just being questioned by the police officers conducting
the investigation about the death of Patrocinia Caburao. The investigating officers had no
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed the crime. Being in no
position to effect a warrantless arrest, the police officers were thus likewise barred from effecting
a warrantless search and seizure.

 An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidence
yielded by that search.

 The Court finds it less than credible the stance of the prosecution that the polo shirt and short
pants have been voluntarily given. An alleged consent to a warrantless search and seizure cannot
be based merely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty. This presumption,
by itself, cannot prevail against the constitutionally protected rights of an individual, and zeal in
the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself
abhors.

 Thus, the bloodstained polo, bolo and shorts are inadmissible as evidence.

Pp vs Calimlim GR no 123980, Aug 30,2001

Facts: Lanie S. Limin was 14 years old and had been living with the family of Kagawad Manny Ferrer
and Cresencia Ferrer for the past 3 years. On the night of 2 April 1995, she was left alone in one of the
two houses of the Ferrers since her usual companions, the sons of Manny and Cresencia, were out for the
night (disco). The Ferrers were in the other house about 15 meters away. At around 11:30 P.M., she was
awakened when she heard somebody, later identified as Manuel Calimlim y Muyano, enter her room.
Calimlim immediately poked a knife at the left side of her neck and said "Accompany me because I killed
my wife." She was then dragged to the pig pen, about 8-9 meters away from the place where she slept.
Afterwards, she was again forcibly taken back to her room, then to her cousin's room and to the kitchen.
In each of these places, Calimlim forcibly had sexual intercourse with her while he poked a knife against
her neck. According to Limin, she first recognized Calimlim while they were in the kitchen when she was
able to remove the cloth covering his face. She stated that she knew Calimlim because she had seen him
always following her whenever she went to school. Limin claimed that she did not struggle nor shout nor
resist because she was afraid that appellant might kill her. After the fourth intercourse, Calimlim
threatened that he would kill her if she reported the incidents. Despite the threat, she told her cousin,
Manicris Ferrer, who then reported the matter to Dr. Nancy Quinto who lived nearby. The rapes were
reported to the station of SPO1 Mario Suratos by Kagawad Ferrer. Dr. Ricardo Ferrer conducted the
physical examination on Lanie, and found that there was minimal vaginal bleeding and there were
lacerations in the hymen, the positions of which were at 9:00 o'clock, 6:00 o'clock and 3:00 o'clock, all
fresh, indicating that there were insertions within the past 24 hours. There was also a whitish vaginal
discharge which was found positive for spermatozoa. Manuel Calimlim denied the accusations. Calimlim
was charged in 4 informations for rape in Criminal Cases U-8525, 8638 to 8640. On 17 November 1995,
the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 46, Urdaneta, Pangasinan found Calimlim guilty
of 4 counts of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death, to pay the offended party the amount
of P50,000.00 as damages, and to pay the costs, in each of the cases. Hence, the automatic review.

Issue: Whether Calimlim may raise the illegality of the warrantless arrest conducted against him,
especially as the arrest was made a day after the crime was committed.

Held: Calimlim avers that his arrest violated Section 5 of Rule 113, 40 since his arrest was made one day
after the crime was committed, but without any judicial warrant, although the police had ample time to
get one. This he claims is also in violation of Article III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution. But here it will be
noted that Calimlim entered a plea of not guilty to each of the informations charging him of rape. Thus,
he had effectively waived his right to question any irregularity which might have accompanied his arrest
and the unlawful restraint of his liberty. This is clear from a reading of Section 9 of Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that "the failure of the accused to assert any ground
of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a
motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections
except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of section 3 of this
Rule." Given the circumstances of his case, the exceptions do not apply here and the Court is constrained
to rule that Calimlim is estopped from raising the issue of the legality of his arrest. Moreover, the illegal
arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after a trial free from error. The defense's claim of warrantless arrest which is illegal cannot
render void all other proceedings including those leading to the conviction of Calimlim, nor can the state
be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to his culpability.

PP vs Dela Cruz, 571 SCRA 469

Facts:
On November 15, 2002, charges against accused-appellant were made before the RTC for Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and Possession of Dangerous Drug. The RTC acquitted accused-
appellant of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition but convicted him of possession of dangerous
drugs. On December 7, 2005, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the RTC Decision claiming
that: (1) the version of the prosecution should not have been given full credence; (2) the prosecution
failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he was guilty of possession of an illegal drug; (3) his arrest
was patently illegal; and (4) the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the illegal drug
allegedly in his possession.

The CA sustained accused-appellant’s conviction. It pointed out that accused-appellant was

positively identified by prosecution witnesses, rendering his uncorroborated denial and allegation of
frame-up weak. As to accused-appellant’s alleged illegal arrest, the CA held that he is deemed to have
waived his objection when he entered his plea, applied for bail, and actively participated in the trial
without questioning such arrest.  

Accused-appellant claims that the presence of all the elements of the offense of possession of
dangerous drug was not proved beyond reasonable doubt since both actual and constructive possessions
were not proved. He asserts that the shabu was not found in his actual possession, for which reason the
prosecution was required to establish that he had constructive possession over the shabu. He maintains
that as he had no control and dominion over the drug or over the place where it was found, the
prosecution likewise failed to prove constructive possession.
Issue: Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of violation of
section 11, Article II, RA 9165 despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the commission of the
offense charged beyond reasonable doubt?

Ruling: The SC acquitted accused-appellant of violation of sec. 11(2) of RA 9165. The prosecution in
this case clearly failed to show all the elements of the crime absent a showing of either actual or
constructive possession by the accused-appellant.

The elements in illegal possession of dangerous drug are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. On the third element, the court have held that the
possession must be with knowledge of the accused or that animus possidendi existed with the possession
or control of said articles.

In the instant case, there is no question that accused-appellant was not the owner of the nipa hut that was
subject of the buy-bust operation. He did not have dominion or control over the nipa hut. Neither was
accused-appellant a tenant or occupant of the nipa hut, a fact not disputed by the prosecution. The target
of the operation was Boy Bicol. Accused-appellant was merely a guest of Boy Bicol.  

Since accused-appellant was not in possession of the illegal drugs in Boy Bicol’s nipa hut, his
subsequent arrest was also invalid. The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant was effected under Sec.
5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto.  For this type
of warrantless arrest to be valid, two requisites  must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. The prosecution
was not able to adequately prove that accused-appellant was committing an offense. Although accused-
appellant merely denied possessing the firearm, the prosecution’s charge was weak absent the
presentation of the alleged firearm. His arrest, independent of the buy-bust operation targeting Boy Bicol,
was therefore not lawful as he was not proved to be committing any offense.

PP vs Enrile 222 SCRA586 (1993)

FACTS: Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis
of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion and Supplemental
Opposition that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him. Sandiganbayan
denied Enrile’s motion on the ground of its prematurity considering that he had not yet voluntarily
surrendered or been placed under the custody of the law. Subsequently, warrant for his arrest was issued,
however, Enrile voluntarily surrendered. Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention and to Fix Bail,
heard by the Sandiganbayan but was denied because it is only after the prosecution shall have presented
its evidence and the Court shall have made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against
accused can he demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix
the amount of his bail.

ISSUE: WON the contention of the Sandiganbayan in denying the accused for fixing bail correct?

RULING: For purposes of bail, admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his being a flight
risk are among the factors that are considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However, it is
premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior showing that the evidence of the
guilt against accused is not strong. Thus, bail denied.

Pp vs Pasudag, GR 128822, May 4, 2001

Facts: Around 1:30 in the afternoon, SPO2 Pepito Calip urinated at a bushy bamboo fence behind the
public school. About five (5) meters away, he saw a garden of about 70 square meters. There were
marijuana plants in between corn plants and camote tops. He inquired from a storekeeper nearby as to
who owned the house with the garden. The storeowner told him that Alberto Pasudag owned it. He went
to the Police Station and reported to Chief of Police. The latter dispatched team to conduct an
investigation. At around 2:30 in that same afternoon, the team arrived and went straight to the house of
accused Pasudag. SPO3 Fajarito looked for accused Pasudag and asked him to bring the team to his
backyard garden which was about five 5 meters away. Upon seeing the marijuana plants, the policemen
called for a photographer, who took pictures of accused Pasudag standing besides one of the marijuana
plants. They uprooted 7 marijuana plants. The team brought accused Pasudag and the marijuana plants to
the police station. At the police station, accused Pasudag admitted, in the presence of Chief of Police that
he owned the marijuana plants.  On March 18, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision finding the
accused guilty as charged and, taking into consideration his educational attainment (he reached only grade
IV), Hence, this appeal. In his brief, accused-appellant contended that the trial court erred in finding that
the marijuana plant submitted for laboratory examination was one of the seven (7) marijuana plants
confiscated from his garden; that the trial court erred in concluding that the confiscation report was not an
extrajudicial admission which required the intervention of his counsel; and in convicting him on the basis
of inference that he planted, cultivated and cultured the seven (7) plants, owned the same or that he
permitted others to cultivate the same. The Solicitor General contended that accused-appellant admitted
before the lower court that tile specimen was one of the plants confiscated in his backyard; that appellant
was not under custodial investigation when he signed the confiscation report; and that the inferences
deduced by the lower court strengthened the conviction of accused-appellant.

Issue: Whether the arrest of the accused requires urgency or necessity for the warrantless search

Held: No, the Court ruled that search and seizure conducted without the requisite judicial warrant is
illegal and void ab initio. The prosecution’s evidence clearly established that the police conducted a
search of accused’s backyard garden without a warrant; they had sufficient time to obtain a search
warrant; they failed to secure one. There was no showing of urgency or necessity for the warrantless
search, or the immediate seizure of the marijuana plants. The Court is not unmindful of the difficulties of
law enforcement agencies in suppressing the illegal traffic of dangerous drugs. However, quick solutions
of crimes and apprehension of malefactors do not justify a callous disregard of the Bill of Rights.”We
need not underscore that the protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and
only under specific instances are searches allowed without warrants.” “The mantle of protection extended
by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high handedness of law
enforcers, regardless of the praise worthiness of their intentions.” With the illegal seizure of the marijuana
plants subject of this case, the seized plants are inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant.

Pp vs Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402, (1998)

Facts:

      The PC (Philippine Constabulary) officer received a tip from one of their informers that the accused
was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was identified by name.
Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening and approached him as he descended from the
gangplank after the informer pointed at him. They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It
was found to contained three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by the NBI forensic
examiner. On the basis of the finding, the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.

Issue:

            Whether or not accused constitutional right against unreasonable serach and seizure is violated

Ruling:

            The Supreme Court Held that warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the rules of court not
justified unless the accused was caught in flagrante or a crime was about to be committed or had just been
committed.

A vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law
because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be
secured.

            In the present case, from the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had
at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who
was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of
his arrival was certain. And from the information they have received, they could have persuaded a judge
that there was a probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. The Bill
of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team had
determine on his own authority that a search warrant was not necessary.

            The evidence of probable cause should be determined by a judge and not law enforcement agents.

Pp vs Plana, Gr 128285, November 27, 2001

Fact: At around 10:30 in the morning, Felix Lagud was walking on Feeder road. He just came from his
farm and was on his way home. A movement at about fifty meters to his left side caught his attention. He
saw the accused who seemed to be wrestling. He came nearer so he would be able to see them more
clearly. From about a distance of twenty (20) meters, he saw the three men holding a girl while another
man was on top of her. The girl was being raped and she was later stabbed. Frightened that the assailants
would see him, Lagud ran away. At about 11:00, certain members of the RSAF came to the house of
accused-appellant Plana. Accused-appellant Perayra was still there because he slept over at said house.
The RSAF questioned them if they saw a girl named Helen Perote. They answered no. Accused-
appellants Plana and Perayra then accompanied the law enforcers to see a certain “Lando.” The
authorities inquired from Lando if there was a woman who boarded his “bering” transportation. Lando
answered in the negative. Accused-appellants Plana and Perayra were then instructed by the police to go
to the police detachment. Since it was already late, accused-appellants Plana and Perayra asked if they
could just go there in the morning of the following day. The following day, in the morning, accused-
appellant Perayra reported to the police detachment after he learned that the authorities wanted to ask him
questions. At the detachment, he was surprised to learn that he was one of the suspects in the rape-slaying
of Helen. Accused-appellants were all brought to the municipal hall in Dumarao, Capiz where they were
detained.

Issue: Whether trial court erred in not censuring the actuation of the police authorities in detaining
appellants without benefit of Court filed neither information nor judicial order of detention as well as the
violation of their constitutional rights of the accused during their so-called custodial invitation and
interrogation.

Held: No, it is a fact that the accused were detained without judicial order and prior to the filing of the
information, suffice it to say, that they already waived their right to question the irregularity, if any, in
their arrest. Accused-appellants respectively entered a plea of “not guilty” at their arraignment. By so
pleading, they submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in their arrest, for
the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over their persons.

Pp vs Conde, GR no 113269, April 1, 2001

Fact: Apollo Romero, was home sitting by the window and drinking coffee when he saw four men block
the path of two decease Indian nationals (bombay) on a motorcycle. One of the men, later identified as
Oscar Conde, poked a gun at the two Indians while his three companions approached and stabbed the
Indians. After the stabbing, the four men fled. Romero was about 25 to 35 meters away from the place
where the crime was committed. PO3 Rodencio Sevillano, testified that he was assigned with the
Intelligence and Investigation Division (IID) of the PNP, he was told to investigate the abovecited
incident. The police arrested the three accused. Police recovered the weapons used in the robbery, when
Felicidad Macabare, Conde’s wife, went to the police station to talk to the accused. These weapons were
discovered inside her bag after a routine inspection. Sevillano admitted, however, that they did not have a
warrant of arrest when they apprehended the accused. Nor did they have a search warrant when they
inspected Felicidad’s bag and when they searched the house of a certain Jimmy where they found the
stolen items.

Issue: Whether the conviction of the accused is valid even if their arrest was conducted in violation for
their right against warrantless arrest.

Held: Yes, the arrest was a clear violation of their constitutional right; unfortunately, appellants did not
assert their constitutional rights prior to their arraignment. This is fatal to their case. An accused is
estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the Information
against him before his arraignment. When the appellants entered their pleas on arraignment without
invoking their rights to question any irregularity, which might have accompanied their arrests, they
voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the judicial process. Any objection,
defect, or irregularity attending their arrests should had been made before they entered their pleas. It is
much too late for appellants to raise the question of their warrantless arrests. Their pleas to the
information upon arraignment constitute clear waivers of their rights against unlawful restraint of liberty.
Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error. The warrantless arrest, even if illegal,
cannot render void all other proceedings including those leading to the conviction of the appellants and
his co-accused, nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record
point to their culpability.

Demaisip vs CA 193 SCRA 373

Facts: Petitioner was tried for and convicted for illegal possession of [Link] Court of Appeals
admitted in evidence the Marijuana seized from him and affirmed his conviction.

Issue : Whether or not the petitioner may object to the admissibility of the evidence obtained thereby were
deemed waived when no objection tot he legality of the search warrant was raised during the trial of the
case nor to the admissibility of the evidence obtained through the said warrant. Decision appealed from is
affirmed.

Roan vs Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687

Facts:The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984. The
petitioner's house was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was
discovered. However, the officers conducting the search found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver
and 18 live bullets which they confiscated and the bases of the charge against the petitioner.

Issue:Whether those seized from the petitioner could have been taken even without a warrant?

Ruling:No. Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, the
Court found out that there was no valid search warrant. The applicant who asked for the issuance of the
search warrant was based on mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as required
by settled jurisprudence. In short, the military officers who entered the petitioner's premises had no right
to be there and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets. It does not follow that because
an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in
mala prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they
are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary.

Pp vs Estrada, June 26, 2000

FACTS: Atty. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of the Bureau
of Food and Drugs (BFAD), filed with the RTC of Quezon City, an application for the issuance of a
search warrant against "Aiden Lanuza of Cebu City," for violation of The Consumer Act of the
Philippines (selling medicines without appropriate license from DOH). Judge Estrada issued Search
Warrant No. 958 (95). Private respondent Aiden Lanuza filed a motion to quash the warrant which the
respondent Judge granted.
ISSUE: Whether the quashal of the warrant was valid
RULING: YES. The respondent Judge acted correctly in granting the motion to quash the search
warrant. The search warrant merely indicated the address of the compound which is 516 San Jose de la
Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. This description of the place to be searched is too general and does not
pinpoint the specific house of private respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the residence
of private respondent sought to be searched has characterized the questioned search warrant as a general
warrant, which is violative of the constitutional requirement.

Vivares, et al vs STC

The individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally powerful
desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he balances
the desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the
environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in which he lives. – Alan Westin, Privacy
and Freedom (1967) FACTS: Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school students at St.
Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for
a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures
of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela on her
Facebook profile. At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department,
learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the
waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls in the
photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia and Julienne, among others. Using STC’s computers,
Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of
the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes
inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that
showvirtually the entirety of their black brassieres. Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there were
times when access to or the availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’
Facebook friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user. Investigation ensued. Then Julia,
Julienne and other students involved were barred from joining the commencement exercises. Petitioners,
who are the respective parents of the minors, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data.
RTC dismissed the petition for habeas data on the following grounds: 1. Petitioners failed to prove the
existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for
the issuance of the writ of habeas data. 2. The photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without
restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way. 3. STC gathered the photographs
through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s policies and rules
on discipline.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the
life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case. (Is there a right to informational privacy in
online social network activities of its users?)

HELD: (Note that you can skip the preliminary discussions and check the ruling at the latter part) Nature
of Writ of Habeas Data It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an independent and summary
remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks
to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. In developing
the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational privacy, among
others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data as “a procedure designed to safeguard
individual freedom from abuse in the information age.” Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements 1.
The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy 2. An actual or threatened violation of the right
to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim (proven by at least substantial evidence) Note that the
writ will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person.
The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy,
more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can
include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files in
possession or in control of respondents. Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also
be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. Meaning of “engaged”
in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information Habeas data is a protection against unlawful
acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting,
or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such
individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data. To “engage” in something is
different from undertaking a business endeavour. To “engage” means “to do or take part in something.” It
does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the
person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party
or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a
business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is
immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity. As such, the writ of
habeas data may be issued against a school like STC. Right to informational privacy Right to
informational privacy is the right of individuals to control information about themselves. Several
commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree that given the millions of
OSN users, “in this Social Networking environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable
expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking.” So the underlying
question now is: Up to what extent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs? Facebook Privacy Tools To
address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with different
privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile as well as information uploaded by
the user. In H v. W, the South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to “customize their
privacy settings,” but did so with this caveat: “Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every
effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are not foolproof.” For instance, a Facebook
user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images (photos), posted on his or her personal
bulletin or “wall,” except for the user’s profile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy
setting: 1. Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo; 2. Friends of Friends –
only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo; 3. Friends – only the user’s
Facebook friends can view the photo; 4. Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends
and/or networks of the Facebook user; and 5. Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to broaden or
limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among others, from another
user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of
their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to “when and to what extent to disclose facts about
themselves – and to put others in the position of receiving such confidences.” NONE. The Supreme Court
held that STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy as the subject digital photos were
viewable either by the minors’ Facebook friends, or by the public at large. Without any evidence to
corroborate the minors’ statement that the images were visible only to the five of them, and without their
challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at
best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration. It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed
Escudero’s sworn account that her students, who are the minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the
photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to
view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that it is reasonable to
assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by
the public at large. Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised
that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot
invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. No privacy invasion by STC; fault
lies with the friends of minors Respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy
invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were
mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the
information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts.
Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the
minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to
Escudero. Different scenario of setting is set on “Me Only” or “Custom” Had it been proved that the
access to the pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through the “Me Only” privacy setting,
or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the “Custom”
setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the
particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse,
becomes more manifest and palpable.

Disini vs Secretary of Justice, GR no 203335, February 11, 2014

Facts: The case arises out of consolidated petitions to the Supreme Court of the Philippines on the
constitutionality of several provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, Act No. 10175. The
Petitioners argued that even though the Act is the government’s platform in combating illegal cyberspace
activities, 21 separate sections of the Act violate their constitutional rights, particularly the right to
freedom of expression and access to information. In February 2013, the Supreme Court extended the
duration of a temporary restraining order against the government to halt enforcement of the Act until the
adjudication of the [Link] Supreme Court of Philippines declared Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 as unconstitutional. It held that Section 4(c)(3) violated the right to
freedom of expression by prohibiting the electronic transmission of unsolicited commercial
communications. It found Section 12 in violation of the right to privacy because it lacked sufficient
specificity and definiteness in collecting real-time computer data. It struck down Section 19 of the Act for
giving the government the authority to restrict or block access to computer data without any judicial
warrant. Issue: Whether or not R.A. 10175 is unconstitutional Ruling: Justice Abad delivered the Court’s
opinion. The government of Philippines adopted the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 for the purpose
of regulating access to and use of cyberspace. Several sections of the law define relevant cybercrimes and
enable the government to track down and penalize violators. Among 21 challenged sections, the Court
declared Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of the Act as unconstitutional. Section 4(c)(3) prohibits the
transmission of unsolicited commercial electronic communications, commonly known as spams, that seek
to advertise, sell, or offer for sale of products and services unless the recipient affirmatively consents, or
when the purpose of the communication is for service or administrative announcements from the sender
to its existing users, or “when the following conditions are present: (aa) The commercial electronic
communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt of further
commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same source; (bb) The commercial electronic
communication does not purposely disguise the source of the electronic message; and (cc) The
commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading information in any part of
the message in order to induce the recipients to read the message.” The government argued that
unsolicited commercial communications amount to both nuisance and trespass because they tend to
interfere with the enjoyment of using online services and that they enter the recipient’s domain without
prior permission. The Court first noted that spams are a category of commercial speech, which does not
receive the same level of protection as other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression ,”but is
nonetheless entitled to protection.” It ruled that the prohibition on transmitting unsolicited
communications “would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads
addressed to him.” Accordingly, the Court declared Section4(c)(3) as unconstitutional. Section 12 of the
Act authorizes the law enforcement without a court warrant “to collect or record traffic data in real-time
associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system.” Traffic data
under this Section includes the origin, destination, route, size, date, and duration of the communication,
but not its content nor the identity of users. The Petitioners argued that such warrantless authority curtails
their civil liberties and set the stage for abuse of discretion by the government. They also claimed that this
provision violates the right to privacy and protection from the government’s intrusion into online
communications. According to the Court, since Section 12 may lead to disclosure of private
communications, it must survive the rational basis standard of whether it is narrowly tailored towards
serving a government’s compelling interest. The Court found that the government did have a compelling
interest in preventing cybercrimes by monitoring real-time traffic data. As to whether Section 12 violated
the right to privacy, the Court first recognized that the right at stake concerned informational privacy,
defined as “the right not to have private information disclosed, and the right to live freely without
surveillance and intrusion.” In determining whether a communication is entitled to the right of privacy,
the Court applied a two-part test: (1) Whether the person claiming the right has a legitimate expectation of
privacy over the communication, and (2) whether his expectation of privacy can be regarded as
objectively reasonable in the society. The Court noted that internet users have subjective reasonable
expectation of privacy over their communications transmitted online. However, it did not find the
expectation as objectively reasonable because traffic data sent through internet “does not disclose the
actual names and addresses (residential or office) of the sender and the recipient, only their coded Internet
Protocol (IP) addresses.” Even though the Court ruled that real-time traffic data under Section 12 does not
enjoy the objective reasonable expectation of privacy, the existence of enough data may reveal the
personal information of its sender or recipient, against which the Section fails to provide sufficient
safeguard. The Court viewed the law as “virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to
engage in “fishing expedition,” choosing whatever specified communication they want.” Accordingly, the
Court struck down Section 12 for lack of specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the right to
privacy. Section 19 authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to a computer data
found to be in violation of the Act. The Petitioners argued that this section also violated the right to
freedom of expression, as well as the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Court first recognized that computer data constitutes a personal property, entitled to protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Also, the Philippines’ Constitution requires the government
to secure a valid judicial warrant when it seeks to seize a personal property or to block a form of
expression. Because Section 19 precluded any judicial intervention, the Court found it unconstitutional.

Gaanan vs IAC 145 SCRA 113 (1986)

FACTS:

A direct assault case against Leonardo Laconico was filed by complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client
Manuel Montebon. The said complainants made a telephone call to Laconico to give their terms for
withdrawal of their complaint. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)

Laconico, later on, called appellant Gaanan, who is also a lawyer, to come to his office to advise him
about the proposed settlement. When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly
listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed
conditions for the settlement. After enumerating the conditions, several calls were made to finally confirm
if the settlement is agreeable to both parties.

As part of their agreement, Laconico has to give the money to the complainant's wife at the office of the
Department of Public Highways. But, he insisted to give the money to the complainant himself.

After receiving the money, the complainant was arrested by the agents of the Philippine Constabulary,
who were alerted earlier before the exchange. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)
Appellant stated on his affidavit that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the
case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for
robbery/extortion which he filed against the complainant. 

In defense, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act as
the appellant heard the telephone conversation without complainant's consent.

Read: De Guzman vs. Comelec

Trial Court: both Gaanan and Laconico were guilty of violating Sect. 1 of RA No. 4200.
IAC: affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Hence, this petition. The case at bar involves an interpretation of the Republic Act No. 4200 or also
known as Anti-Wiretapping Act. Petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not
included in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to
the same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court (IAC)

However, respondent argues that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term "device"
within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete set of a
telephone apparatus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that
its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications
between the two parties using a telephone line. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)

HELD:

No.

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200

 Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties
to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described.
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next
preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the
effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person
or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such
record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned
in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
(IAC)

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of
secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to
overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.

Read: Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other
devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the
wire or cable of a telephone line.

Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement", although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be
construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which
would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or
presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they
are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone
conversation. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)

The petition is granted and the petitioner is acquitted of the crime of violation of Republic Act No. 4200.

Ramirez vs CA, GR no 93833, September 28, 1995

Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner in the RTC alleging that the private respondent in a
confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious
mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy.” In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event
and sought moral damages, attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00,
in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court’s discretion. The transcript on
which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and
other related violations of private communication, and other purposes. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash
the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation
of R.A. 4200. the RTC granted the Motion. From the RTC’s order, the private respondent filed a Petition
for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the CA. Respondent CA
declared the RTC’s order null and void, and holding that the allegations sufficiently constitute an offense
punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. Petitioner filed a MR which the CA denied. Hence, the instant
petition.

Issue: Whether the recording of a “Private Conversation” without the consent of both of the party is a
violation of R.A. 4200.

Held: Yes, Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides that it shall be unlawful for
any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap
any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph
or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described. The aforestated
provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to
any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other
than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all
persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”.
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter
(will) qualify as a violator. The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, therefore plainly
supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the
private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish

1. Alejano vs CAbuay GR no 160792, August 25, 2015

Facts: Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers,
entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (“Oakwood”). The soldiers
disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings.
The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration and called for the resignation
of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members. Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date,
the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations with government
emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then
returned to their barracks. Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major
Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The
transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers’ involvement in
the Oakwood incident. Government prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with the RTC against
the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident. the CA rendered its decision ordered Gen. Cabuay, who
was in charge of implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the
rights of the detainees in accordance with Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate
court directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made in court regarding visiting hours and the
detainees’ right to exercise for two hours a day. The appellate court declared that while the opening and
reading of Trillanes’ letter is an abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does
not justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint,
which is the proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings.

Issue: Whether the opening, inspection and reading of the letter of the detainees is an infringement of a
citizen’s privacy rights.

Held: No, the SC do not agree with the CA that the opening and reading of the detainees’ letters violated
the detainees’ right to privacy of communication. The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The
inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed
letters for the inspection of contraband. The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities
were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the
letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees’ personal courier
and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were
not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP
Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the
detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes
for inspection in the presence of the detainees. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section
4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact
of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy
rights. The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300 soldiers in committing
coup d’etat, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua. The junior officers are not ordinary detainees but
visible leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an armed takeover of a civilian building in the heart of
the financial district of the country. As members of the military armed forces, the detainees are subject to
the Articles of War. Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk persons from the Abu
Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, we must give the military custodian a wider range of deference in
implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center. The military custodian is in a better position
to know the security risks involved in detaining the junior officers, together with the suspected Abu
Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the appropriate regulations depend largely on the security risks
involved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by the military custodian in the absence of patent
arbitrariness.

Pollo vs Chairperson Karina David, GR no 181881, October 2011

Facts: Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter complaint alleging of an
anomaly taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent then formed a team and issued a
memo directing the team “to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna
(PALD) and Legal divisions.” Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of
PALD and LSD computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were
examined by the CSC’s Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17
diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner,
numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or lettersin connection with administrative
cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-
Cause Order, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or
counter-affidavit within five days from notice. In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against
him and accused the CSC Officials of “fishing expedition” when they unlawfully copied and printed
personal files in his computer. He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees). He assailed the formal charge and filed an Omnibus
Motion ((For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis
having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power
pertaining solely to the court. The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the
petitioner’s answer to the charge. In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the
motion of the prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation
which then proceeded ex parte. The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the CA
which was dismissed by the latter on the ground that it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the respondents. He filed a motion for reconsideration which was further denied by the appellate court.
Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the
petitioner constituted an illegal search and was a violation of his constitutional right to privacy Ruling:
The search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files was lawful and did not
violate his constitutional [Link] this case, the Court had the chance to present the cases illustrative of the
issue raised by the petitioner. Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US Supreme Court held that
the act of FBI agents in electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public
telephone booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a “search and seizure”. Because the
petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal
telephone call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. Moreso, the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan noted that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a
two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).
Petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files. As to the
second point of inquiry, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search authorized by the CSC Chair,
the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer reasonable in its inception and
scope. The Court noted that unlike in the case of Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel
Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila A.M. Nos. P-08-2519 and P-08-2520,
November 19, 2008, 571 SCRA 361, the case at bar involves the computer from which the personal files
of the petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government property the use of
which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor.

PP vs Albofera, 152 SCRA 123

Facts: Sometime in 1980, Rodrigo Esma was tending his onion farm when the accused called him and
informed him they would ran after somebody. There Lawi-an told Albofera that the forester was around
making a list of people engaged in “caingin” Whereupon, Albofera asked Esma to join him in going after
the forester. The two were able to overtake the forester. Albofera at once put his arm on the shoulder of
Carancio and asked him to go with them to the upper portion because they will do something there.
Thereafter, the persons gathered decided to kill Carancio. Esma did not join the group but remained in the
house of Lawi-an.

The following day, at about 9:00 o’clock in the morning, Sisneros was at his farm when accused Lawi-an
and Jun Menez passed by and called him. When Sisneros got near the two, accused Lawi-an told him that
the forester was already killed and warned him not to reveal this matter to anybody otherwise he would be
killed. In June 1981, Sisneros reported the killing of that forester to his brother. The police authorities
arrested accused Albofera on July 2, 1981. Accused Romeo Lawi-an was subsequently arrested on July 4,
1981. In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented a letter written in the Visayan dialect by accused
Alexander Albofera, while under detention, to witness Rodrigo Esma several days before the latter
testified on October 20, 1982.

Rodrigo Esma’s Affidavit referred to in the letter taken on July 21, 1981, mentioned accused “Albofera
and “alias Jun” “as having killid the victim. After trial, the lower Court found the circumstantial evidence
sufficient to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt of both accused for the crime charged, and
sentenced them to death in its Decision of October 5, 1984.

Issue: Whether the letter of the Accused to prosecution witness is inadmissible in evidence against him
which violates his rights of privacy of communication and correspondence.

Held: No, the submission is untenable. The foregoing provision implements another Constitutional
provision on the security of a citizen against unreasonable search and seizure. The production of that
letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful search and seizure nor was it through
unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera’s privacy. Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it
was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma himself, who produced and Identified the same in the course of his
testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing really self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly
pleaded that Esma change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera’s) favor.
Furthermore, nothing Albofera stated in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at a determination
of his culpability.

Zulueta vs CA, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)

Facts: 
Cecilia Zulueta is the Petitioner who offset the private papers of his husband Dr. Alfredo Martin. Dr.
Martin is a doctor of medicine while he is not in his house His wife took the 157 documents consisting of
diaries, cancelled check, greeting cards, passport and photograph, private respondents between her Wife
and his alleged paramours, by means of forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet. Cecilia Zulueta filed the
papers for the evidence of her case of legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against Zulueta,
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. the trial court rendered judgment for Martin,
declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of  Martin’s
Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any
person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00,
as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs of the suit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the
petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue:
The papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful means are admissible
as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical practice. 

Ruling/Held:
The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring “the
privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is
the wife who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity, who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. 
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies between husband and
wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking
them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed
his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available
to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as
to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each
one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each
owes to the other.

2. Waterhouse Drug Corporation vs NLRC, GR no 113271, October 16, 1997

Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.

YSP Inc., a supplier of medicine, sold to Waterous, thru Catolico, 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per
unit. However, previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the price per bottle is P320.00.
Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was found that the cost per bottle
was indeed overpriced.

YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference represents refund of
jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice, which was paid to Ms. Catolico. Said check
was sent in an envelope addressed to Catolico.

Catolico denied receiving the same. However, Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. confirmed that
she saw an open envelope with a check amounting P640 payable to Catolico.

Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.
NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible,
by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.

Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti,  the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference by
government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the
ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Issue: W/N the check is admissible as evidence

Held:  Yes.

Ratio: (People vs. Marti) Marti ruling: The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals.

It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On
the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil
liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of
Catolico from employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the
termination of Employment.

SJS vs. Dangerous Drug Board and PDEA GR no 157871, November 3, 2008

Exclusionary rule
3. Silverthome Lumber vs US, 251 US 385 (1920)

Facts: Before the Court are 3 consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of Section 361 of RA
9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public
and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses. According to
Aquilino Pimentel Jr., a senator of the RP and a candidate for re-election in May 2004 elections, said
mandatory drug testing imposes an additional qualification for Senators beyond that which are provided
by the Constitution. No provision in the Constitution authorizes the Congress or the COMELEC to
expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator. Meanwhile, SJS contends that Section
36(c)(d)(f) and (g) are constitutionally infirm as it constitutes undue delegation of legislative power when
they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. It also
violates the equal protection clause as it can be used to harass a student or employee deemed undesirable.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached. In addition to the abovementioned
contentions, Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as a citizen and taxpayers maintains that said provision should
be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due
process and equal protection guarantees. Issue: WON Section 36 (c), (d), (f) and (g) are unconstitutional
Held: Section 36 (c) and (d) are constitutional while (f) and (g) are not. Ratio: Section 36 (c) and (d) – as
to students and employees of private and public offices Using US authorities, the Court ruled in favor of
the constitutionality of Section 36(c) applying the following reasonable deductions: (1) schools and their
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually
fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and
schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their
students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4)
schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-
discriminatory. Therefore, the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to
require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and
policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements. Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug
test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is
justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. For another, the random drug testing shall be
undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity.
As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall 1 SEC. 36. Authorized Drug
Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the
drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results.
x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will
determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm
a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing: x x x x (c)
Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to
the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the
parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x; (d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. -
Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to
undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes
of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs
shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the
provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law; x x x x (f)
All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test; (g) All
candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall
undergo a mandatory drug test. JJMO employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the
confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more
important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access -
controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results
tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees'
privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages
of test results, and is relatively minimal. The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the
right to privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion
into one's private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities. And
while there has been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted
search, "translation of the abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures' into workable
broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task," to borrow from C. Camara v.
Municipal Court. Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights
of the public and defers to the state's exercise of police power. The first factor to consider in the matter of
reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search
within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. Just as defining as the first factor is the
character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of
the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law
authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"? To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a
measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect the well - being of the citizens,
especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. Taking into account the foregoing
factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern
likely to be met by the search, and the well - defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide
authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is,
under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional. Like their counterparts in the
private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision and
restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a
high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for
private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional
command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost
responsibility and efficiency. On the charge of being an undue delegation, the provision in question is not
so extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of
drug testing. It expressly provides how drug testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools and
officers/employees of public/private offices should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall
undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as
contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of officers/employees, the
testing shall take into account the company's work rules. In either case, the random procedure shall be
observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an
unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the
test results are established. Section 36 (f) – as to persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with
criminal offenses The Court found the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before
the public prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and
"suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory
drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither
are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled
out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before
the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug
testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution,
contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to
privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably
forced to incriminate themselves. JJMO Section 36 (g)- as to candidates for public office It is basic that if
a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and
has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it
conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of
government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits
it imposes must be observed. Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to
certain limitations. Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive
and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable
subjects of legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights
and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of
candidates for senators. In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly
impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If
Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to
be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not
be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.

4. Pp vs Aruta, GR no 120915, April 3, 1998

Facts: The respondent was crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a
reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It
was only when the informant pointed to the respondent and identified her to the agents as the carrier of
the marijuana. Upon inspection of her bag, it was found to contain dried marijuana. The team confiscated
the bag and the respondent was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.
Issue: Whether the discovery of marijuana inside the bag of the respondent by the NARCOM officers
justified as seizure of evidence in plain view to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest.
Held: No. In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest, the search and
seizure of respondent bag would also not be justified as seizure of evidence in plain view under the
second exception. The marijuana was obviously not immediately apparent as shown by the fact that the
NARCOM agents still had to request her to open the bag to ascertain its contents.

aberca vs Ver, 169 SCRA 590 (1989)

FACTS

Task Force Makabansa (TFM) was ordered by General Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive strikes against
Communist- Terrorist underground houses. TFM raided several houses, employing in most cases
defectively judicial search warrants, arrested people without warrant of arrest, denied visitation rights,
and interrogated them with the use of threats and tortures. A motion to dismiss was filed by  defendants,
stating that 1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry about their detention because the writ of
habeas corpus was suspended; 2) defendants are immune from liability for acts done in their official
duties; 3) there was no cause of action. On Nov 8, 1983, Judge Fortun granted the motion to dismiss,
which prompted plaintiffs to file a MR on Nov 18, 1983. He later inhibited himself and was replaced
Judge Lising, who denied the MR for being filed out of time. Another MR was filed, and was only
modified to include Maj. Aguinaldo and MSgt. Balaba for officers accountable in the said complaint.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not immunity from suit may be invoked?

2. Whether petitioners have the right to question the alleged violation of their rights in the constitution?

3. Whether the superior officers who gave the orders are liable?

HELD

1. NO, Article 32 of the Civil Code provides a sanction to rights and freedom enshrined in the
constitution. These rights cannot be violated just because of an order given by a superior. The rule of law
must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Even though they just followed the orders of their superior, these
do not authorize them to disregard the rights of the petitioners, and therefore cannot be considered “acts
done in their official duties”. Article 32 speaks of any public officer or private individual, and violation of
these constitutional rights does not exempt them from responsibility.
2. YES, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not prevent petitioners from
claiming damages for the illegal arrest and detention in violation of their constitutional rights by
seeking judicial authority. What the writ suspends is merely the right of an individual to seek release
from detention as a speedy means of obtaining liberty. It cannot suspend their rights and cause of action
for injuries suffered due to violation of their rights.
3. YES, Article 32 speaks of the liabilities of people who are in direct violation of the rights stated, as
well as people who are indirectly responsible for such acts. In the case at hand, the superior officers are
the ones who gave the order, and can be considered indirectly responsible. It was also stated in the
complaint who were the ones who directly and indirectly participated in those acts. By filing a motion to
dismiss, they admitted all the facts stated in the complaint.

FREEDOMOF ASSOCIATION
5. Occena vs COMELEC, 127 SCRA 404

FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gozales instituted a prohibiting proceedings against
the validity of three batasang pambansa resolutions (Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for
residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency,
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention;
and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148
to 2 with 1 abstention.) The petitioners contends that such resolution is against the constitutions in
proposing amendments: 

ISSUE: Whether the resolutions are unconstitutional? 

HELD: In dismissing the petition for lack of merit, the court ruled the following: 

1. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its amendments and how it may be exercised
was validly obtained. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National
Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the
majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments similar with the
interim and regular national assembly. 15 When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call
of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue of
such impotence. 

2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in character as to amount to a revision rather
than amendments. To dispose this contention, the court held that whether the Constitutional Convention
will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and
propose an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no
moment, because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign
people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the present
Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no argument against the validity of the law
because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate,
whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become
immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people." 

3. That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for
proper submission. The language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above questions. The
Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only
a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes
required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency
through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional
convention is concerned. Further, the period required by the constitution was complied as follows: "Any
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or
revision." 21 The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a
constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the
plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.

6. In Re Edillon, 84 SCRA (1979)

Facts:
The respondent is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors
recommended to the Supreme Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys
for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rules of Court 139-A and
the provisions of Paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of
the IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.

Edilion contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the
sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing to
be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues and that as a consequence of this, compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes the above provisions of the Rules of Court and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of
no legal force and effect.

Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may compel the respondent to pay his membership fee to the IBP.

Held:
The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of a distinguished
from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to
comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment of reasonable annual
fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not
in violation of his constitutional free to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate
with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote
in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.

The Supreme Court concluded that the provisions of Rules of Court (Article 139-A) and of the By-
Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

The Supreme Court disbarred the respondent and his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys of
the Court.

7. Rotary Int’l vs Rotary Club (481 US 537 (1987)

Facts of the case

When the Duarte chapter of Rotary International violated club policy by admitting three women into its
active membership its charter was revoked and it was expelled. The California Court of Appeals,
however, in reversing a lower court decision, found that Rotary International's action violated a California
civil rights act prohibiting sexual discrimination.

Question
Did a law which required California Rotary Clubs to admit women members violate Rotary
International's First Amendment rights of association?

CONCLUSION:
No. Considering the size, purpose, selectivity, and exclusivity of Rotary's membership, the Court found
that the relationship among the club's members was not of the intimate or private variety which warrants
First Amendment protection. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Powell argued that because many
of Rotary's activities (including their meetings) are conducted in the presence of strangers, and because
women members would not prevent the club from carrying out its purposes, there was no violation of
associational rights. Furthermore, even if there were a slight encroachment on the rights of Rotarians to
associate, that minimal infringement would be justified since it "serves the State's compelling interest" in
ending sexual discrimination.

8. Kapisanan vs GSIS, December 6, 2006

9. United Pepsi Cola vs Laguesma, March 25, 1998

FACTS:
Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears that on March 20, 1995 the union filed a
petition for certification election on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc.
However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible
for union membership under the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, which provides:

Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees. —
Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory
employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but
may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.

Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the order, dismissed.

Hence, this petition. Pressing for resolution its contention that the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor
Code, so far as it declares managerial employees to be ineligible to form, assist or join unions,
contravenes Art. III, §8 of the Constitution which provides:

The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

ISSUES:

(1) whether the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. are managerial employees and

(2) whether Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from forming, joining or assisting labor
unions, violates Art. III, §8 of the Constitution.

HELD: YES and NO

As a class, managers constitute three levels of a pyramid: (1) Top management; (2) Middle Management;
and (3) First-line Management [also called supervisors].

FIRST-LINE MANAGERS — The lowest level in an organization at which individuals are responsible
for the work of others is called first-line or first-level management. First-line managers direct operating
employees only; they do not supervise other managers. Examples of first-line managers are the “foreman”
or production supervisor in a manufacturing plant, the technical supervisor in a research department, and
the clerical supervisor in a large office. First-level managers are often called supervisors.

MIDDLE MANAGERS — The term middle management can refer to more than one level in an
organization. Middle managers direct the activities of other managers and sometimes also those of
operating employees. Middle managers’ principal responsibilities are to direct the activities that
implement their organizations’ policies and to balance the demands of their superiors with the capacities
of their subordinates. A plant manager in an electronics firm is an example of a middle manager.

TOP MANAGERS — Composed of a comparatively small group of executives, top management is

responsible for the overall management of the organization. It establishes operating policies and guides
the organization’s interactions with its environment. Typical titles of top managers are “chief executive
officer,” “president,” and “senior vice-president.” Actual titles vary from one organization to another and
are not always a reliable guide to membership in the highest management classification.

A distinction exists between those who have the authority to devise, implement and control strategic and
operational policies (top and middle managers) and those whose task is simply to ensure that such
policies are carried out by the rank-and-file employees of an organization (first-level
managers/supervisors). What distinguishes them from the rank-and-file employees is that they act in the
interest of the employer in supervising such rank-and-file employees.

“Managerial employees” may therefore be said to fall into two distinct categories: the “managers” per se,
who compose the former group described above, and the “supervisors” who form the latter group.

#1: It appears that this question was the subject of two previous determinations by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment, in accordance with which this case was decided by the med-arbiter.

To qualify as managerial employee, there must be a clear showing of the exercise of managerial attributes
under paragraph (m), Article 212 of the Labor Code as amended. Designations or titles of positions are
not controlling. As to the route managers and accounting manager, we are convinced that they are
managerial employees. Their job descriptions clearly reveal so (Worker’s Alliance Trade Union (WATU)
v. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc., Nov. 13, 1991)

This finding was reiterated in Case No. OS-A-3-71-92. entitled In Re: Petition for Direct Certification
and/or Certification Election-Route Managers/Supervisory Employees of Pepsi-Cola Products [Link].
* doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary administrative proceedings
Thus, we have in this case an expert’s view that the employees concerned are managerial employees
within the purview of Art. 212.
At the very least, the principle of finality of administrative determination compels respect for the finding
of the Secretary of Labor that route managers are managerial employees as defined by law in the absence
of anything to show that such determination is without substantial evidence to support it.
The Court now finds that the job evaluation made by the Secretary of Labor is indeed supported by
substantial evidence. The nature of the job of route managers is given in a four-page pamphlet, prepared
by the company, called “Route Manager Position Description,” the pertinent parts of which read:

A. BASIC PURPOSE
A Manager achieves objectives through others.
As a Route Manager, your purpose is to meet the sales plan; and you achieve this objective through the
skillful MANAGEMENT OF YOUR JOB AND THE MANAGEMENT OF YOUR PEOPLE.
These then are your functions as Pepsi-Cola Route Manager. Within these functions — managing your
job and managing your people — you are accountable to your District Manager for the execution and
completion of various tasks and activities which will make it possible for you to achieve your sales
objectives.
Xxxx
Distinction is evident in the work of the route managers which sets them apart from supervisors in
general. Unlike supervisors who basically merely direct operating employees in line with set tasks
assigned to them, route managers are responsible for the success of the company’s main line of business
through management of their respective sales teams. Such management necessarily involves the planning,
direction, operation and evaluation of their individual teams and areas which the work of supervisors does
not entail.

The route managers cannot thus possibly be classified as mere supervisors because their work does not
only involve, but goes far beyond, the simple direction or supervision of operating employees to
accomplish objectives set by those above them.

While route managers do not appear to have the power to hire and fire people (the evidence shows that
they only “recommended” or “endorsed” the taking of disciplinary action against certain employees), this
is because thisis a function of the Human Resources or Personnel Department of the company.

# 2: Constitutionality of Art. 245

Art.245 is the result of the amendment of the Labor Code in 1989 by R.A. No. 6715, otherwise known as
the Herrera-Veloso Law. Unlike the Industrial Peace Act or the provisions of the Labor Code which it
superseded, R.A. No. 6715 provides separate definitions of the terms “managerial” and “supervisory
employees,” as follows:

Art. 212. Definitions. . . .

(m) “managerial employee” is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute
management policies and/or to hire transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend
such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but
requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not falling within any of the above definitions
are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of this Book.

The distinction between top and middle managers, who set management policy, and front-line
supervisors, who are merely responsible for ensuring that such policies are carried out by the rank and
file, is articulated in the present definition. 30 When read in relation to this definition in Art. 212(m), it
will be seen that Art. 245 faithfully carries out the intent of the Constitutional Commission in framing
Art. III, §8 of the fundamental law.
*Framer’s Intent: MR. LERUM. My amendment is on Section 7, page 2, line 19, which is to insert
between the words “people” and “to” the following: WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OR
PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS. In other words, the section will now read as follows: “The right of the
people WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS to form
associations, unions, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.”

Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, §8 infringed by a ban against managerial
employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art. III, §8 is subject to the condition that its exercise
should be for purposes “not contrary to law.” In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for
prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor organizations.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION
10. Islamic Da’wah Council of the Phils vs Executive Secretary, GR no. 153888, July 9, 2003

Facts: Petitioner Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) is a corporation that operates
under Department of Social Welfare and Development, a non-governmental organization that extends
voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. It claims to be a federation
of national Islamic organizations and an active member of international organizations such as the
Regional Islamic Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) and The World Assembly
of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue halal certifications in the Philippines. Thus,
among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and
issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. 

Petitioner alleges that, the actual need to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food
producers' request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and procedures based on the Qur'an and
the Sunnah for the analysis of food, inspection thereof and issuance of halal certifications. In that same
year, petitioner began to issue, for a fee, certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers.
Petitioner even adopted for use on its halal certificates a distinct sign or logo registered in the Philippine
PatentOffice.
 

On 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 465 creating the Philippine Halal
Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its implementation. Under the EO,
respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related
regulatory activities. 

Issue: Whether or Not EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State. 

Held: It is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal
certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can
lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. According to petitioner, a food product becomes halal only
after the performance of Islamic religious ritual and prayer. Thus, only practicing Muslims are qualified
to slaughter animals for food. A government agency like herein respondent OMA cannot therefore
perform a religious function like certifying qualified food products as halal. Without doubt, classifying a
food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and
Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached
on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims
what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal
certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and
Sunnah on halal food. 

In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim
organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the
premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the
exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the muslim Filipinos' right
to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with
ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and
safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims.

Non-establisment clause
11. Garces vs Estenzo, 104 SCRA 510

Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:

a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This
provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed.
Funds for the said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations.
b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of
San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of
his successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the
saint’s feast day.

These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image was
temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father
Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the church’s
property since church funds were used in its acquisition.

Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the
priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a
representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions.
The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and
Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.
Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated.

Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was
purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any
religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity intended to
facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was
placed in a layman’s custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the
image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the council’s funds that were used to buy the image,
therefore it is their property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided
to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every
government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is
violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and
banning the use of public money or property.

12. Aglipay vs Ruiz, 64 Phil 201

Facts:

Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent
Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of
the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such
issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose –
for the benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?

Held/Reason:

The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not
contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only ‘to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the government just took advantage of an event considered of
international importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the
Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate is
not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs’.
Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby
manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of
religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.’

13. Ang Ladlad LGBT party vs COMELEC, GR no 190582, April 8, 2010

ACTS: Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians,
gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied
for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground
that the organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a
Petition for registration with the COMELEC.

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-
represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender
identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative
societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied
with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual
members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.

On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division)
dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that: This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds.
Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus a
marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity. and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which refers to a
persons capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual
relations with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as Any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which (3) shocks, defies; or
disregardsdecency or morality.

It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that
Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy are inexistent and void from the beginning.

Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows as follows:

Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows.

When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed
Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while
three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo
T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and
speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:

Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that it has
properly proven its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlads expressed
sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.

Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBTs is elevated, there can be no
denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either male or female
protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.

There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices. Neither is
there any attempt to any particular religious groups moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted
as moral parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-based,
but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian
upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and
these are not publicly accepted moral norms.

On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions
and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the
issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously
announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.

ISSUE: Should Ang Ladlad's application for accreditation be granted?

HELD: The lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list
system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally
burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-
represented sectors.

It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals
insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between
heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. The Court disagree
with the OSGs position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal
protection clause. It should not single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or
differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply
unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized
under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made "an unwarranted
and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case."

xxx
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society
of the validity of its position through normal democratic means. It is in the public square that deeply held
convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon.

In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public square.
Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment
has access to the public square where people deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the
bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these citizens have
equal access to the public square. In this representative democracy, the state is prohibited from
determining which convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation. Through a
constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle
in this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized
into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or
median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits it
specifies including protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority, however small not only for a
majority, however large but for each of us" the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It
promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this
freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or
disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the
populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better
reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of
the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to
elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is
not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR
Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to
include "sexual orientation." Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.

Anti-evolution laws
14. Epperson vs Arkansas, 33 US 27 (1968)

Epperson v. State of Arkansas, case in which the U.S. Supreme Court on November 12, 1968, ruled (9–0)
that an Arkansas law barring the teaching of evolution in public schools violated the First Amendment’s
establishment clause, which generally prohibits the government from establishing, advancing, or giving
favour to any one religion.

Three years after the Scopes Trial of 1925—in which a teacher was found guilty of violating a Tennessee
law that barred the instruction of evolution in that state’s public schools—Arkansas enacted a statute that
made it illegal for teachers in state-supported schools or universities “to teach the theory or doctrine that
mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animals” or “to adopt or use…a textbook that
teaches” such a theory. Those who violated the statute could be charged with a misdemeanour and
dismissed. Until 1965 the science textbooks used in the school system of Little Rock, Arkansas, did not
contain a section on evolution. For the 1965–66 academic year, however, school administrators adopted a
textbook that included information on the theory. Susan Epperson, a biology teacher, was confronted with
the task of teaching from the new textbook. Fearing that she might be dismissed, Epperson sought a
declaration that the Arkansas statute was void. She also sought to enjoin the state and school officials
from dismissing her for violating the statute.

A chancery court in Arkansas ruled that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment, which safeguards
the First Amendment’s freedom of speech and thought from state interference. The Supreme Court of
Arkansas, however, reversed the decision, holding that it was within the state’s authority to specify public
schools’ curriculum. That court failed to address the other constitutional issues.

The case was argued before the U.S. Supreme Court on October 16, 1968. In its analysis the court
concluded that the statute sought to prevent public school teachers from presenting evolution because it
was contrary to the belief of a particular religious group—one that thought the Bible’s book of Genesis
should be the only source of information as to the origins of humankind. Based on that finding, the court
held that the law was unconstitutional because the government “must be neutral in matters of religious
theory, doctrine, and practice” and must be neutral between religions and between religion and
nonreligion. In addition, the government should not “aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious
theory against another.” Thus, the court ruled that the Arkansas statute violated the First Amendment’s
establishment clause, which was protected on the state level by the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision
of the Arkansas Supreme Court was overturned.

Prayer and Bible reading in ublic schools

 15. Engel vs Vitale 370 US 421 (1962)

Facts
A New York State law required public schools to open each day with the Pledge of Allegiance and a
nondenominational prayer in which the students recognized their dependence upon God. The law allowed
students to absent themselves from this activity if they found it objectionable. A parent sued on behalf of
his child, arguing that the law violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as made
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Issue
Whether school-sponsored nondenominational prayer in public schools violates the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment.

Ruling
Yes (6-1)

Reasoning
The majority, via Justice Black, held that school-sponsored prayer violates the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. The majority stated that the provision allowing students to absent themselves from
this activity did not make the law constitutional because the purpose of the First Amendment was to
prevent government interference with religion. The majority noted that religion is very important to a vast
majority of the American people. Since Americans adhere to a wide variety of beliefs, it is not appropriate
for the government to endorse any particular belief system. The majority noted that wars, persecutions,
and other destructive measures often arose in the past when the government involved itself in religious
affairs.

16. Abington Schools Dist vs Schempp, 374 US 203 (1973)

Facts.
The United States Supreme Court consolidated two cases to address the constitutionality of legislation
mandating readings from Christian scripture at the start of each school day. In one case, Schempp
(Plaintiff) sought an injunction against the enforcement of a Pennsylvania state law. In the second case,
an atheist couple petitioned for a writ of mandamus to rescind a rule imposed by the Board of School
Commissioners of Baltimore City.

Issue.

Whether legislation mandating the reading of religious scripture as part of a public school curriculum
violates the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.

Held.

Yes. The Free Exercise Clause is not a vehicle for the majority to employ state authority to promote the
public exercise of religious practices.
The Fourteenth Amendment makes the First Amendment applicable to the states. The Establishment
Clause prohibits the government from manufacturing its own religion, and it also forbids the government
from passing any law that affords a preference to one religion over any other. In order to avoid violating
the Establishment Clause, legislation must serve a secular governmental purpose and the primary effect of
the legislation must not be to advance or inhibit religion. The Free Exercise Clause prohibits the
government from imposing any restrictions upon the individual freedom to engage in religious practices.
Legislation violates the Free Exercise Clause if it imposes coercive limitations upon the practice of
religion. By contrast, coercion is not a necessary element for legislation to violate the Establishment
Clause. The legislation before us does not necessarily require students to participate in religious practices,
but it does require students to endure the exercise of religion as part of the regular public school
curriculum. The readings take place in public facilities under the oversight of public employees. The
readings are religious in nature and the laws in both cases make these religious exercises mandatory. The
argument that these exercises seek to advance the secular goals of promoting moral values and the
teaching of literature is belied by admissions of the religious character of the exercises. The states argue
that forbidding religious exercises in schools works the result of imposing a state-sponsored religion of
secularism. Although we agree that the government may not impose laws hostile to the exercise of
religion, we do not agree that invalidating these laws amounts to a state-sanctioned preference for those
who do not endorse religion over those who embrace a particular ideology. Study of religious scriptures
may be presented as a secular aspect of an academic curriculum, but the laws at issue here impose a
mandatory exercise of religion. The doctrine of state neutrality does not infringe upon the free exercise of
religion by its prohibition against laws that mandate its public exercise, irrespective of the fact that the
majority may support its public exercise.

17. Stone v Graham, 449 US 39 (1980)

In Stone v. Graham the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Kentucky statute that
required the Ten Commandments to be posted on the walls of every classroom in the state. The copies of
the Ten Commandments had been purchased with private contributions, and the following language
appeared at the bottom of each copy in small print: “The secular application of the Ten Commandments is
clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law
of the United States.” Applying the test articulated by the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court
concluded that the Kentucky statute was unconstitutional because it had no secular legislative purpose.
The Court noted that while several of the Commandments are secular in nature, the first part of the
Commandments concerns the religious duties of believers. Merely posting the Commandments on the
wall, the Court concluded, served no educational function, as the Commandments were not integrated into
the secular curriculum; the display could give students the impression that the state was promoting the
religious beliefs the Commandments represent. Regardless of the private funding and the explanatory
language at the bottom of the display, the Court determined that by posting the Commandments under the
auspices of the legislature, the state provided official support of religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause.

Public Aid to religion

18. Aglipay vs Ruiz 64 Phil 201 (1937)
Facts:

Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent
Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of
the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such
issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose –
for the benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?

Held/Reason:

The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not
contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only ‘to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the government just took advantage of an event considered of
international importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the
Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate is
not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs’.
Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby
manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of
religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.’

19. Mueller v allen, 463 US 388 (1983)

Facts. A Minnesota statute that provides a tax deduction for parents of school aged children for school
related expenses is alleged to be unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
of the Constitution as it applies not just to public schools, but to private schools as well. The appeals court
ruled that statute did not violate the Establishment Clause of the Constitution and the Supreme Court of
the United States (Supreme Court) affirmed. The Supreme Court stated that it rejects the argument that
any government program that in some manner aids an institution with a religious affiliation violates the
Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court instead stated the rule in Lemon, whether the statute has the
primary effect of advancing the sectarian aim of the non-public schools was the more appropriate test.
The Supreme Court found the Minnesota statute in question did not have a primary effect of advancing
sectarian aims, as the deduction is available for educatio
nal expenses incurred by all parents, applying to those whose children that attend pubic schools and those
who attend nonsectarian private schools and those who attend sectarian private schools. The Supreme
Court also stated that there was not excessive government entanglement in religion under the third inquiry
of the Lemon test.

Issue. Whether a Minnesota income tax deduction available for expenses incurred in sending children to
public as well as non-public schools violates the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.

Held. Affirmed. The statute does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the
Constitution.
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution prohibits the government from
establishing laws that promote religion. If the law just generally promotes religion, not favoring one sect
over another, the law will be valid under the Lemon test if it (i) has a secular purpose; (ii) the law has a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (iii) does not produce excessive government
entanglement in religion.

20. Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602 (1971)

Facts. Pennsylvania has a statute that reimburses religious schools for teacher salaries, textbooks, and
other instructional materials. Rhode Island has a similar statute that allows the state to pay private school
teachers a 15% salary supplement.

Issue. Is it constitutional for the state to provide financial assistance to religious schools for the cost of
teaching secular subjects?
Held. No. The statutes result in excessive entanglement between the government and religion. Excessive
entanglement is determined by the character and purpose of the institution benefited, the nature of the aid
given, and the resulting relationship between the government and church.

Discussion. The framers of the United States Constitution specifically and purposefully prohibited the
establishment of a state church because of the inherent problems. The Establishment Clause was designed
to avoid state “sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious
activity.”

21. Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US 38 (1985

Facts.
In 1978 Alabama passed a law authorizing a one-minute period of silence in public schools for
meditation. In 1981 Alabama passed a law authorizing a one-minute period of silence in public
schools for meditation or voluntary prayer. Appellees challenge the later statute authorizing a
period of silence for meditation or voluntary prayer.

Issue.

Whether a law authorizing a period of silence in public schools for mediation or voluntary prayer
is unconstitutional under the First Amendment if it is wholly motivated by a purpose of
advancing religion.

Held.

Yes. The Alabama law is unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment because it has no secular purpose.
A law authorizing a period of silence in public schools for mediation or voluntary prayer, which
has no secular purpose, is unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. Pursuant to the purpose test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), a law is
unconstitutional under the First Amendment if it is wholly motivated by a purpose to advance
religion. In this case, the legislative record for the law contains a statement from the bill’s
sponsor, Senator Holmes, that the proposed law was an effort to return voluntary prayer to public
schools. Senator Holmes told the district court that he did not have any other purpose in mind
when proposing the bill, and the Governor of Alabama admitted that the law’s purpose was to
clarify the state’s intent that prayer be included as a daily part of classroom activities. There is no
evidence presented of any secular purpose behind the law. The 1978 statute authorizing silent
meditation already protected the right of students to engage in voluntary prayer during that period
of silence. The 1981 statute’s addition of the voluntary prayer authorization indicates that the
state favors the practice of voluntary prayer. This endorsement is inconsistent with the
government’s duty to remain neutral toward religion. The Establishment Clause is violated when
the power and support of the government places even indirect pressure on religious minorities to
conform to the officially approved religion. This is particularly true in the context of public
schools, where attendance is mandatory and where children do not often strive for nonconformity.

22. Islamic Da’wah Counsil vs Executive Secretary, GR no 153888, July 9, 2003

Facts: Petitioner Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) is a corporation that operates
under Department of Social Welfare and Development, a non-governmental organization that extends
voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. It claims to be a federation
of national Islamic organizations and an active member of international organizations such as the
Regional Islamic Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) and The World Assembly
of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue halal certifications in the Philippines. Thus,
among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and
issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. 

Petitioner alleges that, the actual need to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food
producers' request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and procedures based on the Qur'an and
the Sunnah for the analysis of food, inspection thereof and issuance of halal certifications. In that same
year, petitioner began to issue, for a fee, certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers.
Petitioner even adopted for use on its halal certificates a distinct sign or logo registered in the Philippine
PatentOffice.
 

On 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 465 creating the Philippine Halal
Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its implementation. Under the EO,
respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related
regulatory activities. 

Issue: Whether or Not EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State. 

Held: It is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal
certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can
lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. According to petitioner, a food product becomes halal only
after the performance of Islamic religious ritual and prayer. Thus, only practicing Muslims are qualified
to slaughter animals for food. A government agency like herein respondent OMA cannot therefore
perform a religious function like certifying qualified food products as halal. Without doubt, classifying a
food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and
Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached
on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims
what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal
certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and
Sunnah on halal food. 

In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim
organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the
premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the
exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the muslim Filipinos' right
to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with
ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and
safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims.

Intramural religious disputes

23. Fonacier vs CA, 96 Phil 417 (1955)

Facts: Case was filed by Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI), represented by its supreme bishop
Gerardo Bayaca, against Bishop Fonacier seeking to render an accounting of his administration of
all the temporal properties and to recover the same on the ground that he ceased to be the supreme
bishop of IFI. Isabelo De los Reyes Jr. had been elected as the Supreme Bishop.

Petitioner claims that he was not properly removed as Supreme Bishop and his legal successor
was Juan Jamias. He claims that the there was an accounting of his administration and was turned
over to bishop Jamias. Also, that Isabelo De los Reyes and Bayaca have abandoned their faith and
formally joined the Prostestant Episcopal Church of America.

CFI rendered judgment declaring Isabelo De Los Reyes, Jr. as the sole and legitimate Supreme
Bishop of IFI and ordered Fonacier to render an accounting of his admistration

CA affirmed the decision of the CFI

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should still be regarded as the legitimate supreme bishop of
IFI.
 Held: Supreme Court affirmed CA’s decision. The legitimate Supreme Bishop of IFI is Isabelo
De los Reyes, Jr. The Supreme Court affirms the validity of the election of Bishop Delos Reyes
as the Supreme Bishop based on their internal laws

To finally dispose of the property issue, the Court, citing Watson v. Jones,368 declared that the
rule in property controversies within religious congregations strictly independent of any other
superior ecclesiastical association (such as the Philippine Independent Church) is that the rules
for resolving such controversies should be those of any voluntary association. If the congregation
adopts the majority rule then the majority should prevail; if it adopts adherence to duly
constituted authorities within the congregation, then that should be followed.

24. Ratuc vs Bishop Porferio dela Cruz, March 10, 2005

FACTS : he antecedents show that petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church
(PIC) in Socorro, Surigao del Norte. Respondents Porfirio de la Cruz and Rustom Florano were the
bishop and parish priest, respectively, of the same church in that locality. Petitioners, led by Dominador
Taruc, clamored for the transfer of Fr. Florano to another parish but Bishop de la Cruz denied their
request. It appears from the records that the family of Fr. Florano’s wife belonged to a political party
opposed to petitioner Taruc’s, thus the animosity between the two factions with Fr. Florano being
identified with his wife’s political camp. Bishop de la Cruz, however, found this too flimsy a reason for
transferring Fr. Florano to another parish Taruc tried to organize an open mass to be celebrated by a
certain Fr. Renato Z. Ambong during the town fiesta of Socorro. When Taruc informed Bishop de la Cruz
of his plan, the Bishop tried to dissuade him from pushing through with it because Fr. Ambong was not a
member of the clergy of the diocese of Surigao and his credentials as a parish priest were in doubt On
June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine
Independent Church Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for
damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court of
Surigao City, Branch 32. They impleaded Fr. Florano and one Delfin T. Bordas on the theory that they
conspired with the Bishop to have petitioners expelled and excommunicated from the PIC. They
contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their right to
due process of law

ISSUE : WON the court has jurisdiction

HELD : The SC hold the Church and the State to be separate and distinct from each other. "Give to
Ceasar what is Ceasar’s and to God what is God’s." upon the examination of the decisions it will be
readily apparent that cases involving questions relative to ecclesiastical rights have always received the
profoundest attention from the courts, not only because of their inherent interest, but because of the far
reaching effects of the decisions in human society. [However,] courts have learned the lesson of
conservatism in dealing with such matters, it having been found that, in a form of government where the
complete separation of civil and ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon, the civil courts must not allow
themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical nature The SC agree with the Court of
Appeals that the expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a
matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization
The amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and abandonment of faith or
abjuration alleged by appellant, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical
law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to the power of excluding from the church those
allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the
province of the civil courts

Free Exercise Clause

25. Estrada v. Escritor AM no p-02-1651, June 22, 2006

Facts:

Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio,
a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well.
Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally
married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses
and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

Issue:

Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

Held:

No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The
free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As
Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its
prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a
free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the
concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts
to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and
secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only
to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room
for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has
to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is
not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal
arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom
of religion.

26. German vs Barangan, 135 SCRA 514

Facts: Petitioners converged at J.P. Laurel Street to hear Mass at the St. Jude Chapel, which adjoined
Malacañang. Respondent barred them for security reasons. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus.

Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the constitutional freedom.

Held: Petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship but to conduct an anti-
government demonstration since they wore yellow T-shirts, raised their clenched fists and shouted anti-
government slogans. While every citizen has the right to religious freedom, the exercise must be done in
good faith. Besides, the restriction was reasonable as it was designed to protect the lives of the President
and his family, government officials and diplomatic and foreign guests transacting business with
Malacanang. The restriction was also intended to secure the executive offices within the Malacanang
grounds from possible external attacks and disturbances. (Minority opinion) The sole justification for a
prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of the freedom of religion is the existence of a grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public
interest that the State has a right to prevent. The burden to show the existence of grave and imminent
danger lies on the officials who would restrain petitioners. Respondents were in full control and had the
capability to stop any untoward move. There was no clear and present danger of any serious evil to public
safety or the security of Malacanang.

Flag Salute
27. West Va Board of Education vs BArnette, 319 US 624 (1943)

Facts. In 1942, the Petitioner adopted a rule that forced all teachers and pupils to pledge allegiance the
nation’s flag each day. If the student refused he would be found insubordinate and expelled from school.
He would not be readmitted to school until he conformed. Meanwhile, he was considered to be
“unlawfully absent” and subject to delinquency hearings. The parents could be fined $50 per day with a
jail term not to exceed 30 days. The Respondent asked for an exception for all Jehovah’s Witnesses
because this pledge goes against their religious belief. But he was denied an exception.

Issue. Does this rule compelling a pledge violate the First Amendment of the Constitution?
Held. Yes. Compelling a salute to the flag infringes upon an individual’s intellect and right to choose their
own beliefs.

Discussion. The majority focuses on the right of persons to choose beliefs and act accordingly. As long as
the actions do not present a clear and present danger of the kind the state is allowed to prevent, then the
Constitution encourages diversity of thought and belief. The state has not power to mandate allegiance in
hopes that it will encourage patriotism. This is something the citizens will choose or not.

28. Ebralinag vs Division Superintendent March 1, 1993

Facts:

In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the
Jehovah’s Witness, and enrolled in various public and private schools, which refused to sing the Phil.
National Anthem, salute the flag and recite the patriotic pledge.

Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS and her Assistant
issued Division Memorandum No. 108, dated Nov. 17, 1989, directing District Supervisors, High School
Principals and Heads of Private Educational institutions to remove from service, after due process,
teachers and school employees, and to deprive the students and pupils from the benefit of public
education, if they do not participate in daily flag ceremony and doesn’t obey flag salute rule.

Members of the Jehovah’s Witness sect find such memorandum to be contrary to their religious belief and
choose not to obey. Despite a number of appropriate persuasions made by the Cebu officials to let them
obey the directives, still they opted to follow their conviction to their belief. As a result, an order was
issued by the district supervisor of Daan Bantayan District of Cebu, dated July 24, 1990, ordering the
‘dropping from the list’ in the school register of all Jehovah’s Witness teachers and pupils from Grade 1
to Grade 6 who opted to follow their belief which is against the Flag Salute Law, however, given a chance
to be re-accepted if they change their mind.

Some Jehovah’s Witness members appealed to the Secretary of Education but the latter did not answer to
their letter.

On Oct. 31, 1990, students and their parents filed special civil actions for Mandamus, Certiorari and
prohibition, alleging that the respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of
their right to due process, their right to free public education and their right to freedom of speech, religion
and worship. Petitioners prayed for the voiding of the order of expulsion or ‘dropping from the rolls’
issued by the District Supervisor; prohibiting and enjoining respondent from barring them from classes;
and compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to admit and order their(Petitioners) re-
admission I their respective schools.

On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, commanding
the respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders.

On May 31, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions defending the expulsion
orders issued by the respondents.

Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage
in ‘external acts’ or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of
country through observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag
ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings.
Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.

Issue:

Whether or not the expulsion of the members of Jehovah’s Witness from the schools violates right receive
free education.

Held:

The expulsion of the members of Jehovah’s Witness from the schools where they are enrolled will violate
their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty
of the state to ‘protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education, and to make such
education accessible to all (Sec. I, Art XIV). Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the Flag
Ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. If they quietly stand at attention
during flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose ‘a
grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any legitimate
public interest that the state has a right and duty to prevent.

It is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-1944 when every Filipino,
regardless of religious persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the Japanese flag and bowed before
every Japanese soldier, perhaps if petitioners had lived through that dark period of our history, they would
not quibble now about saluting the Phil. Flag.

Freedom to propagate religious Dotrines

29. American Bible Society vs City of Manila 181 Phil. 386 (1957)

Facts: Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly

registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in
November, 1898. The defendant appellee is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised
in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila.
During the course of its ministry, plaintiff sold bibles and other religious materials at a very minimal
profit.
On May 29 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting
the business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with the necessary
Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances
Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding permit
and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd
quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45 (Annex A).
Plaintiff now questions the imposition of such fees.
Issue: Whether or not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the free
exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant).
Held: Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that:
(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,
and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights. The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate religious information.
It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in
some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was
engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Court
believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to
appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and
worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.
With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that it imposes any charge upon
the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices.

It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, however
inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of
Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is powerless to license or tax the business of
plaintiff Society.