Name: JESSIE JAMES O. YAPAO Assignment No.
I. Discuss and give an example for each of the 15 Presumptions in Aids of
Construction.
Introduction
In construing a doubtful or ambiguous statute, the Courts will presume that it was
the intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible and just law, and one which
should change the prior law no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific
purpose of the act in questions. The construction should be in harmony with these
assumptions whenever possible. But presumptions of this kind cannot prevail against
the clear and explicit terms of the law. In other words, if the language of the law is clear,
courts should not resort to presumptions.
What are these presumptions?
a. Presumption of Validity;
b. Presumption against Constitutionality;
c. Presumption of Good Faith;
d. Presumption Against Injustice;
e. Presumption Against Inconsistency;
f. Presumption Against Absurdity;
g. Presumption Against Ineffectiveness;
h. Presumption Against Irrepealable Laws;
i. Presumption Against Implied Repeals;
j. Presumption Against Violation of Public Policy;
k. Presumption of Knowledge of Existing Laws;
l. Presumption of Acquiescence to Judicial Construction;
m. Presumption of Jurisdiction;
n. Presumption of Acting Within the Scope of Authority; and
o. Presumption Against Violation of International Law
1. Presumption of Validity
Ordinances, like laws, enjoy a presumption of validity. However, this
presumption may be rendered naught by a clear demonstration that the ordinance is
irreconcilable with a constitutional or legal provision, that it runs afoul of morality or
settled public policy, that it prohibits trade, or that it is oppressive, discriminatory, or
unreasonable. Thus, unless invalidity or unreasonableness is ostensibly
apparent, one seeking a judicial declaration of the invalidity of an ordinance is duty-
bound to adduce evidence that is convincingly indicative of its infirmities or defects.
Courts must exercise the highest degree of circumspection when called upon to
strike down an ordinance; for, to invalidate legislation on baseless suppositions
would be, to borrow the words of a former Chief Justice, "an affront to the wisdom
not only of the legislature that passed it, but also of the executive that approved it. "
Example:
In this petition for review on certiorari, the City of Cagayan de Oro (petitioner)
seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals' (CA) Decision dated June 10, 2015 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 02771-MIN, which set aside the Resolution dated February 8, 2008 of
Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City (Cagayan RTC) in Civil
Case No. 2005-206.
2. Presumption against Constitutionality
Laws are presumed constitutional. To justify nullification of a law, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with
the constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt. In the case of Aris, Inc. vs. NLRC,
200 SCRA 246, the reason of this case can be traced to the doctrine of separation of
powers which enjoins on each department a proper respect for the acts of the other
departments. The theory is that, as the joint act of the legislative and executive
authorities, a law is supposed to have been carefully studied and determined to be
constitutional before it was finally enacted. Hence in the case of La Union Electric
Cooperative, Inc. vs. Yaranon, 179 SCRA 828 [1989], as long as there is some other
basis that can be used by the courts for its decision, the constitutionality of the
challenged law will not be touched upon and the case will be decided on other
available grounds.
The onerous task of rebutting the ambiguity weighs heavily on the party
challenging the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any shade of
doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for in the absence of
such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-
founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, “To doubt is to
sustain” (Joseph Ejercito Estrada vs Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines,
G.R No. 148560, November 19, 2001, 369 SCRA 394). As in the case of Abakada
Guro Party List vs. Ermita, 469 SCRA 1, September 1, 2005 that every law enjoys in
its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The Court cannot strike down a law as
unconstitutional simply because of its yokes.
Example:
In the case of ||| (Aris (Phil.) Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 90501, [August 5, 1991], 277 PHIL 282-295), the charge then that the
challenged law as well as the implementing rule are unconstitutional is absolutely
baseless. Laws are presumed constitutional. To justify nullification of a law, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with
the-constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt. In Paredes, et al. vs. Executive
Secretary, we stated:
"2. For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between
two possible constructions, one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and
the other yielding such a result, the former is to be preferred. That which will
save, not that which will destroy, commends itself for acceptance. After all,
the basic presumption all these years is one of validity. The onerous task of
proving otherwise is on the party seeking to nullify a statute. It must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence that there is an infringement of a
constitutional provision, save in those cases where the challenged act is
void on its face. Absent such a showing, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice. Justice
Malcolm's aphorism is apropos: To doubt is to sustain.'
3. Presumption of Good Faith
Well-settled is the rule that good faith is always presumed and the Chapter on
Human Relations of the Civil Code directs every person, inter alia, to observe good
faith which springs from the fountain of good conscience. Specifically, a public
officer is presumed to have acted in good faith in the performance of his duties.
Mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable absent any clear showing
that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. ‘Bad
faith’ does not simply connote bad moral judgment or negligence. There must be
some dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a
breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will. It partakes of the
nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes." (Collantes v.
Marcelo, 556 Phil. 794, 806 [2007].)
Example:
In a certain case which are in good faith in building their conjugal house in
1995 on the lot they believed to be their own by purchase. They also have in their
favor the legal presumption of good faith. It is the defendants who had the burden to
prove otherwise. They failed to discharge such burden until the Regional Trial Court,
Br. 40, Dagupan City, promulgated an adverse ruling in Civil Case No. 97-0187-D.
Thus, Art. 448 comes in to protect the plaintiffs-owners of their improvement without
causing injustice to the lot owner. Art. 448 comes in to protect the plaintiff-owners of
their improvement without causing injustice to the lot owner. Art. 448 provided a just
resolution of the resulting "forced-ownership" by giving the defendants lot owners
the option to acquire the conjugal house after payment of the proper indemnity or to
oblige the builder plaintiffs to pay for the lot. It is the defendants-lot owners who are
authorized to exercise the option as their right is older, and under the principle of
accession where the accessory (house) follows the principal.
4. Presumption against Injustice
We test a law by its results and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably,
the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is
never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislatures, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of, but in consonance
with, justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure,
there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a
particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word
and the will, that injustice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
Our judges are not automatons. They do not and must not unfeelingly apply the
law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause
and consequence. “Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law” as
what Justice Holmes quoted “where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them”. While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to
interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we may not
read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out
of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, in the case of Alonzo vs IAC that we defer
not to the letter that killeth but to the spirit that vivieth, to give effect to the lawmaker’s
will.
Example:
In the case of Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 94723,
[August 21, 1997], 343 PHIL 539-560, according to the Supreme Court, petitioner
deserved the damages awarded to her by the court. This Court has no original and
exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief; however, exceptions to the
rule have been recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications and
raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one for mandamus. The
application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if the Court rule
that the questioned Section 113 of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempt
from attachment, garnishment, or an order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign
transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like
accused Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code, which provides
that "in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
5. Presumption Against Inconsistency
The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is
presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent
or conflicting statutes. Repeals by implication are not favored, and will not be decreed
unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be
passed with deliberation with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but
reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or
abrogate any former law relating to some matter, unless the repugnancy between the
two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily
from the language used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the
earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure renewed. Hence,
every effort must be used to make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction,
they can be reconciled, the later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier.
Example:
In the case of Mecano vs. COA, G.R No. 103982 December 11, 1992, implied
repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the same
subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that
they cannot be reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is, that
one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other.
6. Presumption Against Absurdity
Statutes must receive a sensible construction such as will give effect to the
legislative intention so as to avoid an unjust or absurd construction.
Example:
In the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc.,
G.R. Nos. 28502-03, [April 18, 1989], 254 PHIL 367-373, that in July 15, 1960, it
was the Government that was using . . . (ESSO's) funds of P221,033.00. In the
circumstances, we find it unfair and unjust for . . . (the Commissioner) to exact the
interest on the said sum of P221,033.00 which, after all, was paid to and received
by the Government even before the incidence of the deficiency income tax of
P367,994.00. (Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. Commissioner, C.T.A. Case No. 1327,
Sept. 30, 1965). On the contrary, the Government should be the first to blaze the
trail and set the example of fairness and honest dealing in the administration of tax
laws.
"Accordingly, we hold that the tax credit of P221,033.00 for 1959 should first be
deducted from the basic deficiency tax of P367,994.00 for 1960 and the resulting
difference of P146,961.00 would be subject to the 18% interest prescribed by
Section 51 (d) of the Revenue Code. According to the prayer of . . . (ESSO) . . .
(the Commissioner) is hereby ordered to refund to . . . (ESSO) the amount of
P39,787.94 as overpaid interest in the settlement of its 1960 income tax liability.
However, as the collection of the tax was not attended with arbitrariness
because . . . (ESSO) itself followed . . . (the Commissioner's) manner of computing
the tax in paying the sum of P213,189.93 on August 10, 1964, the prayer of . . .
(ESSO) that it be granted the legal rate of interest on its overpayment of
P39,787.94 from August 10, 1964 to the time it is actually refunded is denied. (See
Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan Estate, Inc., G.R. No. L-12752, Jan.
30, 1965)."
7. Presumption Against Ineffectiveness
It is presumed that the legislature intends to impart to its enactments such as
meaning as will render them operative and effective, and to prevent persons from
eluding or defeating them. Accordingly, in case of any doubts or obscurity, the
construction will be such as to carry out those objects. I n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a
s t a t u t e , t h e C o u r t s h o u l d s t a r t w i t h t h e assumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective statute.
Example:
In the case of Danilo Paras v. COMELEC, G.R No. 123169, November 4, 1996
held that it is the rule of the statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e, that every part of the statute must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole’s enactment. The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local
official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together
with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be
subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus,
subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include
the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government
Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the
end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No 7808 to be held every
three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase "regular
local election," as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be
conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code. In the
interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a
vain thing in the enactment of a statute. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided
under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise
expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered
insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.||| (Paras v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 123169 (Resolution), [November 4, 1996], 332 PHIL 56-67).
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated
under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the
barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been
scheduled on May 1997.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and
academic. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996,
enjoining the recall election should be as it is hereby made permanent.(Paras v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 123169 (Resolution), [November 4, 1996], 332 PHIL
56-67).
8. Presumption Against Irrepealable Laws
It is presumed that the lawmaking body does not intend that its laws shall
be irrepealable because Congress cannot enact irrepealable laws nor limit
its future legislative act. The need of today and the situation obtaining now will not
most likely be the same in the years to come. Laws should adopt to changing times.
Example:
Laws are not irrepealable, and it behooved this applicant to fully establish that
his nation granted reciprocal rights to our citizens at the time his application is
heard. The burden of proof in this regard lay on this applicant, not on the
Government, since the lack of mutuality is a disqualification for him, and under
the Philippine naturalization law the applicant must show not only that he
possesses the requisite qualifications but also that he has none of the
disqualifications specified by the statute. (Chua v. Republic, G.R. No. L-19776,
|||
[September 29, 1964], 120 PHIL 838-846)
9. Presumption Against Implied Repeals
Well-settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication is not favored and that
courts must generally assume their congruent application. Th two laws must be
absolutely incompatible, and clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of
implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et
concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted
and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.
The fundamental is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing
laws on the subject and not to have an enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, in the case
of Hon. Juan M. Hagad vs. Hon. Mercedes Gozo Dadole, G.R No. 108072, December
12, 1995, 251 SCRA 242 that all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal,
and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the
subject.
Example:
Laws are not irrepealable, and it behooved this applicant to fully establish that
his nation granted reciprocal rights to our citizens at the time his application is heard.
The burden of proof in this regard lay on this applicant, not on the Government, since
the lack of mutuality is a disqualification for him, and under the Philippine
naturalization law the applicant must show not only that he possesses the requisite
qualifications but also that he has none of the disqualifications specified by the
statute.
Appellant also assigns as error that the lower court held against him that he
did not attach to his petition his certificate of arrival in the Philippines. He avers that
the pre-war records of the Bureau of Immigration were lost during the last Pacific
was, and that he so informed the Solicitor's General's Office. But as observed by the
latter, under section 7 of the Naturalization Law, it is mandatory for the applicant to
attach to his petition for naturalization a copy of his certificate of arrival, for without it
or other proof of lawful admission his residence is presumptively unlawful (Chan vs.
Republic, L-14460, June 30, 1960; Sy Hong vs. Comm. of Immigration, L-10224,
May 11, 1957); and if the certificate had been lost, the least that applicant should
have done was to aver such loss and submit secondary proof of the existence and
contents of the lost certificate.
It is unnecessary to determine whether this applicant can be said to hold a
lucrative position or profession, considering that his salary is only P325.00 a month,
and with it he has to support a wife and three children, besides himself.
Finding that the court a quo did not commit any of the errors assigned, and
that the appeal is without merit, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with
costs against appellant. (Chua v. Republic, G.R. No. L-19776, [September 29,
1964], 120 PHIL 838-846)
10. Presumption Against Violation of Public Policy
|| It is presumed that the legislature designed to favor and foster rather than
to contravene the public policy which is based upon the principles of natural justice,
good morals, and the settled wisdom of the law as applied to the ordinary affairs of life.
Example:
American jurisprudence bestows a qualified presumption in favor of presidential
communication privilege. This means that the initial point is against disclosure of the
contents of the communication between the President and her close advisors. The
burden of proof is on the agency or body seeking disclosure to show compelling reasons
to overcome the presumption. Respondent Senate Committees, however, insist that
there should be no presumption in favor of presidential communication privilege. It
banks on this Court's statement in Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita that "the
extraordinary character of the exemption (executive privilege) indicates that
the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in
favor of disclosure". It is argued that the dicta in Ermita is contrary and even
antithetical to the qualified presumption under American jurisprudence. Respondents
likewise cite several provisions of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution favoring public disclosure over secrecy in its attempt to reverse
the presumption. (Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, G.R. No. 180643 (Resolution), [September 4, 2008], 586 PHIL 135-220)
11. Presumption of Knowledge of Existing Laws
In enacting a law, the lawmaking body is presumed to have the full knowledge of
existing laws on the subject. Hence, if there are two laws on the same subject
enacted in different dates, the latter law cannot be held to have abrogate the
former law unless repugnancy is clear, convincing and irreconcilable.
Example:
To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that
such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the
notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check
by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check. Rather, the clear
import of the law is to establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds under the following conditions (1) presentment within 90 days from
date of the check, and (2) the dishonor of the check and failure of the maker to make
arrangements for payment in full within 5 banking days after notice thereof. That the
check must be deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of the conditions for
the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds to arise. It is not an
element of the offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain
sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable time thereof. Under Section
186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, "a check must be presented for payment within
a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to
the extent of the loss caused by the delay." By current banking practice, a check
becomes stale after more than six (6) months, or 180 days. Private respondent herein
deposited the checks 157 days after the date of the check. Hence said checks cannot
be considered stale. Only the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds was
lost, but such knowledge could still be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. As
found by the trial court, private respondent did not deposit the checks because of the
reassurance of petitioner that he would issue new checks. Upon his failure to do so, LPI
was constrained to deposit the said checks. After the checks were dishonored, petitioner
was duly notified of such fact but failed to make arrangements for full payment within
five (5) banking days thereof. There is, on record, sufficient evidence that petitioner
had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the
time of issuance of the checks. (Wong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117857, [February
2, 2001], 403 PHIL 830-843)
12. Presumption of Acquiescence to Judicial Construction
When the court has construed a statute in a particular manner and the
lawmaking body made no move to alter or amend the said statute, it is presumed
that the legislature has acquiesced to that interpretation.
Example:
Acquiescence by the landowner of their cultivation of the land does not create
an implied tenancy if the landowners have never considered petitioners Federico and
Buenaventura as tenants of the land and if the essential requisites of a tenancy
relationship are lacking. There was no intention to institute the petitioners as
agricultural tenants. In the case of Epitacio Sialana v. Mary Y. Avila, et al. it was
held that ". . . for an implied tenancy to come about, the actuations of the parties
taken in their entirety must be demonstrative of an intent to continue a prior lease
established by the landholder . . . ."
With respect to petitioner Francisco Landicho, the Court of Appeals also
correctly held that although Francisco was the legal tenant of the subject land, he
voluntarily surrendered his tenancy rights when he knowingly and freely executed the
1987 Kasulatan. This conclusion finds basis in the investigation conducted by the
PARO, where during the mediation conference, petitioner Francisco Landicho
admitted that he voluntarily surrendered his tenancy rights over the subject
parcels of land in consideration of PhP3,000.00. The tenancy relationship was
validly extinguished through the execution of the 1987 Kasulatan and upon the
voluntary surrender of the landholdings pursuant to Section 8 of Republic Act No.
3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, to wit: EATCcI
SEC. 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. —
The agricultural leasehold relation established under this Code shall be
extinguished by:
(1) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the
agricultural lessor;
(2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee,
written notice of which shall be served three months in advance;
or
(3) Absence of the persons under Section nine to succeed to the lessee,
in the event of death or permanent incapacity of the lessee.
The petitioners also failed to support their claim that the Aragons took
advantage of Francisco's old age and illiteracy and employed fraudulent schemes in
order to deceive him into signing the Kasulatan. It has been held that "[a] person is
not incapacitated to contract merely because of advanced years or by
reason of physical infirmities. It is only when such age or infirmities impair the mental
faculties to such extent as to prevent one from properly, intelligently, and fairly
protecting her property rights, is she considered incapacitated." (Landicho v. Sia,
G.R. No. 169472, [January 20, 2009], 596 PHIL 658-682)
13. Presumption of Jurisdiction
A statute will not be construed in such a manner as to oust or restrict the
jurisdiction of superior courts, or to vest a new jurisdiction in them, unless there are
express words or a necessary implication to that effect. (G.R. No. L-41001,
September 30, 1976; U.S v. Palacio, 33 Phil. 208)
Example:
In G.R. No. L-41001, the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, admits that "there
appears to be some logic in the conclusion" of the Court of Appeals that "neither Act
No. 1360 nor Act No. 1657 could have meant to supply the City of Manila the authority
to sell the subject property which is located at the south end — not the north — of the
reclaimed area." It argues, however, that when Act No. 1360, as amended, authorized
the City of Manila to undertake the construction of the Luneta extension by reclaiming
land from the Manila Bay, and declared that the reclaimed land shall be the "property
of the City of Manila," the State expressly granted the ownership thereof to the City of
Manila which. consequently, could enter into transactions involving it; that upon the
issuance of O.C.T. No. 1909, there could be no doubt that the reclaimed area owned
by the City was its patrimonial property; that the south end of the reclaimed area could
not be for public use for. as argued by TDC, a street, park or promenade can be
property for public use pursuant to Article 344 of the Spanish Civil Code only when it
has already been so constructed or laid out, and the subject land, at the time it was
sold to the Elk's Club, was neither actually constructed as a street, park or promenade
nor laid out as a street, park or promenade; that even assuming that the subject
property was at the beginning property of public dominion, it was subsequently
converted into patrimonial property pursuant to Art. 422 of the Civil Code, inasmuch as
it had never been used, regarded, or utilized since it was reclaimed in 1905 for
purposes other than that of an ordinary real estate for sale or lease; that the subject
property had never been intended for public use, is further shown by the fact that it
was neither included as a part of the Luneta Park under Plan No. 30 of the National
Planning Commission nor considered a part of the Luneta National Park (now Rizal
Park) by Proclamation No. 234 dated December 19, 1955 of President Ramon
Magsaysay or by Proclamation Order No. 274 dated October 4, 1967 of President
Ferdinand E. Marcos; that, such being the case, there is no reason why the subject
property should not be considered as having been converted into patrimonial property,
pursuant to the ruling in Municipality vs. Roa, 7 Phil. 20, inasmuch as the City of
Manila has considered it as its patrimonial property not only bringing it under the
operation of the Land Registration Act but also by disposing of it; and that to consider
now the subject property as a public plaza or park would not only impair the
obligations of the parties to the contract of sale dated July 13, 1911, but also authorize
deprivation of property without due process of law. ||| (Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-41001 & L-41012, [September 30, 1976], 165 PHIL 161-190)
14. Presumption of Acting Within the Scope of Authority
It is presumed that the legislature acted within the scope of its authority. Hence, if
a statute admits of more than one interpretation, one that places the statute outside of
legislative competence , and one that places the statute within the limits of legislative
competence, the court should adopt the later interpretation.
15. Ambiguity Against the Violation of International Law
Answer:
This presumption is in conformity with the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies in our Constitution. It states that the Philippines as a democratic and republican
state adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and
amity with all nations. (Art. II, Sec. 2, Phil. Constitution).
Thus, Letter of Instruction No. 229 requiring the installation of early warning
devices, (EWD) to vehicles was held to be a valid police power measure. Moreover, it is
in conformity with the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals which was
ratified by the Philippine Government in P.D 207. In the case of Agustin vs. Edu, G.R.
No. L-49112, February 2, 1979, it is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to
which it had pledged its word.
In another case involving the holding of a rally in front of the U.S Embassy, it was
held that the Philippines is a signatory of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
adopted in 1961. It provides that the receiving State is under a special duty to take
appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusions or
damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its
dignity. To that extent that the Vienna convention is a restatement of the generally
accepted principles of international law, it should be a part of the law of the land. That
being the case, if there were a clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or
disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, there would be
justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the
embassy. (Reyes vs. Bagatsing, G.R No. L-65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553)
