Midterms: 457 to 501

Heirs of Emiliano NAvarro Vs IAC

Heirs of Navarro v. IAC

HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT & HEIRS OF
SINFOROSO PASCUAL

Facts:
On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application for foreshore lease covering a
tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately
seventeen (17) hectares. This application was denied on January 15, 1953. So was his
motion for reconsideration. Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now
deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries
covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan.
Initially the application was denied, eventually however the grant was given. Pascual claimed
that this land is an accretion to his property, The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River
flow downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's
property resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the
riparian owner. On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant
Solicitor General, filed an opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his
predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the same being a
portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. On
November 10, 1975, the courta quorendered judgment finding the subject property to be
foreshore land and, being a part of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of land
registration proceedings. On appeal, the respondent court reversed the findings of the courta
quoand granted the petition for registration of the subject property but excluding certain
areas. A motion for reconsideration was filed by in the CA but the same was denied.
Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code, petitioners vigorously
argue that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the
Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the eastern and western boundaries,
respectively, of petitioners' own tract of land.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners can rightfully claim the land under the principle of accretion

Held:
The petitioner’s claim is misplaced. The principle of accretion is only applicable to owners
whose estates are adjacent to rivers as stated in Article 457 of the Civil Code. The disputed
land is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the
foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side.
As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of to Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866. The disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay
being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the disputed property is, under Article 4 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public domain. As part of the public domain, the
herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs
to the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated
by any private person, except through express authorization granted in due form by a
competent authority."Only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the
right and the power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is
no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of establishment of special
industries or for coast guard services.Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the executive
or legislative department has already declared the disputed land as qualified, under Article 4
of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property of petitioners as owners of the
estates adjacent thereto.

Meneses vs CA
FACTS: On March 1, 1977, Darum, then the District Land Officer of Los Baños, Laguna,
issued to Pablito Meneses 2 Free Patent and 2 OCT covering lots located in Los Baños,
Laguna.

Pablito acquired said property from Bautista through a Deed of Waiver and Transfer of
Rights executed in 1975 in consideration of Bautista’s “love and affection” for and “some
monetary obligations” in favor of Meneses. After the execution of said document, Meneses
took possession of the land, introduced improvements thereon, declared the land as his own
for tax purposes and paid the corresponding realty taxes. In turn, Bautista acquired the land
from his aunt. He had been occupying the land since 1956.

On the other hand, the Quisumbing family traces ownership of their land as far back as 1919
when their matriarch was issued an OCT covering a lot, with the Laguna de Bay as its
northwestern boundary. The same parcel of land was registered on 1973 under a TCT in the
names of her heirs, all surnamed Quisumbing.

The Quisumbings applied for registration and confirmation of title over an additional area
which had gradually accrued to their property by the natural action of the waters of Laguna
de Bay. The CFI of Biñan confirmed the Quisumbings’ title thereto.

In 1979, the Quisumbings filed a case before the CFI of Calamba against Lorenzo and
Pablito Meneses, Darum and Almendral for nullification of the free patents and titles issued
to Pablito Meneses. They alleged that Lorenzo Menesis, then the Mayor of Los Baños, using
his brother Pablito as a “tool and dummy,” illegally occupied their “private accretion land” and
confederating with District Land Officer Darum and Land Inspector Almendral, obtained free
patents and OCTs to the land.

In 1984, the trial court rendered the decision finding that the lands registered by the
Meneses brothers are accretion lands to which the Quisumbings have a valid right as
owners of the riparian land to which nature had gradually deposited the disputed lots. (The
lots occupied by Meneses, as found by the court, are to be accretion lands forming parts of
the bigger accretion land owned by the Quisumbings. )
Meanwhile, the Meneses brothers and Darum appealed the to the CA, which affirmed in toto
the lower court’s decision.The defendants-appellants filed two MRs of the CA decision but it
was denied, hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON

1. The lands in question were not accretion lands but lands of the public domain

2. Conspiracy to commit fraud, deceit and bad faith attended the issuance of the free patent
and titles to Pablito Meneses; and

HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision CA is AFFIRMED

Grande Vs CA
FACTS:
● Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at the
province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother
● When it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary
was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the title).
● Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took
place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof
had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of
19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered area
● petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela against
respondents, to quiet title to said portion formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint that
they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession
thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the land under claim of
ownership.
● respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open,
and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present.

CFI: rendered a decision adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering
respondents to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to petitioners
● the fact that defendants declared the land for taxation purposes since 1948, does not mean that
they become the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for it is a new provision of the New Civil
Code that ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil
Code). The land in question being an accretion to the mother or registered land of the plaintiffs,
the accretion belongs to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code).

CA: in favor of the plaintiffs

● First, since by accession, the land in question pertains to the original estate, and since in this
instance the original estate is registered, the accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of
Section 46 of Act No. 496, which states that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession";
● second, the adverse possession of the defendant began only in the month of September, 1948, or
less than the 10-year period required for prescription before the present action was instituted.
ISSUE: W/N respondents have acquired the alluvial property in question through prescription.
RULING: YES. There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366
of the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of
the land which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land
just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property
imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered land
purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension, become  ipso
facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens
system of that ownership is quite another.
Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land
Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and
thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by
occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation
of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. The fact remain,
however, that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property up to the time they
instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore,
never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of
imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was
subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in possession
of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up
to the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of
Appeals after an examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can
not be reviewed by us.

JAGUALING VS CA

SUBJECT: Accession; Art. 465

FACTS:
● Private respondent Janita Eduave claims that she inherited the disputed land
from his father, Felomino Factura, and acquired sole ownership of the property
by virtue of a Deed of Extra Judicial Partition with sale. Also, the land is declared
for tax purposes.
● In 1964, the land was eroded due to typhoon Ineng, destroying the bigger
portion and the improvements leaving only a coconut tree.
● In 1966, due to the movement of the river deposits on the land that was not
eroded increased the area to almost half a hectare.
● In 1970, the appellant started to plant bananas.
● In 1973, the petitioners asked petitioners’ permission to plant corn and bananas
provided that they prevent squatters to come to the area.
● The PR engaged the services of a surveyor who conducted a survey and placed
concrete monuments over the land. She also paid taxes on the disputed land, and
mortgaged the land to the Luzon Surety and Co.. Also, an application for
concession with the Bureau of Mines to extract gravel was granted to the PR.
● PR filed with the RTC an action to quiet title and/or remove a cloud over the
property in question against petitioners.

RTC: dismissed the complaint. Ruled that the island is a delta forming part of the river
bed which the government may use to reroute, redirect or control the course of the
Tagaloan River, hence, outside the commerce of man and part of the public domain (Art.
420.)
CA: reversed the RTC’s decision. Ruled that the island was formed by the branching off
of the Tagoloan River and subsequent thereto the accumulation of alluvial deposits.
Declared PR as the lawful and true owners of the disputed land and ordered petitioner
to vacate.
ISSUE: Whether the one who has actual possession of an island that forms in a non-
navigable and non-floatable river and the owner of the land along the margin nearest
the island had a better right of ownership.

HELD: The owner of the land along the margin nearest the island had a better right.
The trial court disregarded the testimony of the private respondents (payment of land
taxes, monuments places by the surveyor, agreement entered into to extract gravel and
sand, presentation in evidence the testimony of 2 witnesses) without explaining why it
doubted their credibility and instead merely relied on the self-serving denial of
petitioners.

The CA properly applied Art. 463 1 of the Civil Code which allows the ownership over a
portion of land separated or isolated by river movement to be retained by the owner
thereof prior to such separation or isolation.
- It is clear petitioners do not dispute that the land in litigation is an island that appears
in a non-flotable and non-navigable river; they instead anchor their claim on adverse
possession for about 15 years. It is not even controverted that PR are the owners of a
parcel of land along the margin of the river and opposite the island. On the other hand,
private respondents do not dispute that the island in question has been in the actual
physical possession of petitioners; private respondents insist only that such possession
by petitioners is in the concept of caretakers thereof with the permission of private
respondents.

Art. 4652 of the Civil Code apply in the case. Under this provision, the island belongs to
the owner of the land along the nearer margin as sole owner thereof; or more
accurately, because the island is longer than the property of private respondent, they
are ipso jure to be the owners of that portion which corresponds to the length of their
property along the margin of the river.

It is well-settled that lands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner. This
preferential right is, under Art. 465, also granted the owners of the land located in the
margin nearest the formed island for the reason that they are in the best position to
cultivate and attend to the exploitation of the same. In fact, no specific possession over
the accretion is required. If however, the riparian owner fails to assert his claim thereof,
the same may yield to the adverse possession of 3rd parties.
- the petitioners, however, cannot acquire the said property by adverse possession for
the required number of years under the doctrine of acquisitive prescription because the
latter is not in good faith in occupying the land. Hence, not qualifying as possessors in
good faith, they may acquire ownership over the island only through uninterrupted
adverse possession for a period of 30 years. By their own admission, petitioners have

1 “Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or part
thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is
separated from the estate by the current. “

2 “Art. 465. Islands which through successive accumulation of alluvial deposits are formed in non -
navigable and non flotable rivers, belong to the owners of the margins or banks nearest to each of them,
or to the owners of both margins if the island is in the middle of the river, in which case it shall be divided
longitudinally in halves. If a single island thus formed be more distant from one margin than from the
other, the owner of the nearer margin shall be the sole owner thereof. “
been in possession of the property for only about 15 years. Thus, the island cannot be
adjudicated in their favor.

Since the case is not between parties as opposing riparian owners contesting ownership
over an accession but rather between a riparian owner and the one in possession of the
island, there is no need to make final determination regarding the origins of the island.

LUCITA CANTOJA VS HARRY LIM

Petitioner in this case is the widow of the late Roberto Cantoja, Sr.

            On 16 November 1989, the late Roberto Cantoja Sr. filed with the
Office of the DENR, General Santos City, an application for a Foreshore
Lease Contract over an area situated in Makar, General Santos City. 

Harry S. Lim filed his protest questioning the grant of the FLA to
Cantoja.  The protest was based on petitioner’s allegation that Cantoja
committed fraud and misrepresentation in declaring in his application that the
subject foreshore area adjoined his (Cantoja’s) property.  To prove this
allegation, petitioner presented his Transfer Certificate which adjoins the
foreshore area subject of the lease.
 
            Special Investigator Marohomsalic found that Cantoja was in actual
possession of the foreshore area which was utilized as “dock-board of the
Cantoja’s Fishing Business.  
 
          Geodetic Engineer Bernardo L. Soria, submitted his report stating, inter
alia, that “there was no overlapping of the lot and FLI.

            Meanwhile the DENR instituted a Civil Case for

annulment/cancellation of petitioner’s TCT        No. 8423.  The suit was
anchored on the findings and recommendations of Special Investigator
Romulo J. Marohomsalic that “the area in question is  xxx partly foreshore
and partly river bed of the Makar and therefore inalienable.”
 
          The Court of Appeals reinstated the decision of the DENR Secretary, which cancelled
and rescinded the Foreshore Lease Contract covering the foreshore area D in favor of
Cantoja.
 
           The Court of Appeals held that Cantoja committed misrepresentation amounting to
fraud in his application for lease when he declared in his application that his lot adjoins that
of the foreshore area sought to be leased.  
        
 
The Issue
         
          The primary issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in cancelling the
Foreshore Lease Contract granted to Cantoja covering the foreshore area  under survey
plan  Fli-XI-5B-000002-D.
      
 The Ruling of the Court
 

          It is undisputed that respondent is the registered owner of the land adjacent to the
foreshore area leased to Cantoja. Respondent’s predecessor-in-interest, Jacinto Acharon,
was issued the land by virtue of a free patent grant. Thus, prior to Cantoja’s foreshore lease
application and the grant of the foreshore lease contract, respondent already owned the land
adjacent to the foreshore land. The sketch plan dated 12 December 1995 submitted by the
Geodetic Engineer clearly shows that respondent’s property is in between the foreshore land
and Cantoja’s property. As stated by the DENR Secretary in his Decision [7] dated 2 May
2000:
 
          Being the owner of the land adjoining the foreshore area, respondent is the riparian or
littoral owner[9] who has preferential right to lease the foreshore area as provided under
paragraph 32 of the Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, dated 30 April 1936, which reads:
 
32. Preference of Riparian Owner. – The owner of the property adjoining
foreshore lands, marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon
shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to
apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the
public service, subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this
nature, provided that he applies therefor within sixty (60) days from the date
he receives a communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his
preferential right.
 
         
   
            In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral
owner (riparian according to paragraph 32) to the foreshore land formed by
accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action  of the sea.
 
            The reason for that preferential right is the same as the justification for
giving accretions to the riparian owner, which is that accretion compensates
the riparian owner for the diminutions which his land suffers by reason of the
destructive force of the waters. So, in the case of littoral lands, he who loses
by the encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession. 
           
          In this case, Cantoja committed fraud when he misrepresented himself as the riparian
or littoral owner in his application for the foreshore lease. Under stipulation no. 15 of the
Foreshore Lease Agreement, any fraud or misrepresentation committed by the applicant is a
ground for cancellation or rescission of the Foreshore Lease Agreement. 

JULIAN SANTULAN VS THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Lease of a parcel land in Public domain- Doctrine of Reparian Rights

Facts:
Petitioner Julian Santulan and Antonio Lusin who have been succeeded by their heirs were
rival claimants with respect to the lease of a parcel of foreshore land of public domain with
an area of about 4 ½ hectares located at Barrio Kaingin, Kawit Cavite. The Petitioner
Santulan surveyed the land on December 5, 1942 and filed an application on Dec. 29, 1942
to lease for five (5) years for agricultural purposes an area of 36, 120 sq. meters and
including the application for revocable permit to occupy the said land for planting of Bakawan
which later develop to fishpond seven years later after acquiring ordinary fishpond permit
from BFAR. On the other hand, private respondent Lusin was reported and was being
summoned that he was illegally entered the area covered by the petitioners fishpond permit
and was refrain from introducing improvements.
However, private respondent Lusin filed applications 1n 1942 and 1945 for a revocable-
permit and a lease of a foreshore for the purpose of producing salt in the said land. He also
contends that he had been in the continues and exclusive possession of the land since 1920
when it was still under water, and that he had used it as a site of his fish corrals, and
allegedly converted two (2) hectares into fishpond enclosed with mud dikes and provided
with a concrete sluice gate and another sluice gate made of wood. On the northern part of
the land bordering the bay were bamboo stakes placed at close intervals to serve as water
breakers to protect the mud dikes from being washed away by the action of the sea. The
private respondent said that he introduced the alleged improvements from 1951 to 1953.
The 1942 foreshore lease applications of Petitioner Santulan and private respondent Lusin
gave rise to Bureau of Lands Conflict.

Issue:
Whether or not the continues and exclusive possession of the private respondent could
nullify the petitioner’s preferential right to lease the land by reason of his riparian rights?

Ruling:
The Director of Land ruled that the disputed land was subject to “reparian rights” which may
he invoked by petitioner Julian Santulan as owner of the upland in accordance with section
32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1. It was found out that the disputed land is
foreshore land covered and uncovered by the flow and ebb of the ordinary tides that is an
extension of Santulan’s Lot No. 986 of the Kawit cadastre, with an area of 17, 301 square
meters, registered in his name in 1937 under Original Certificate of Title No. 6 which was
issued by virtue of a free patent, and the said foreshore land was allegedly formed by soil
deposits accumulated by the alluvial action of the sea, and the petitioner was the first to
enter the land and to make dikes thereon.
Private Respondent Antonio Lusin was found out to be possessor in bad faith, and latter’s
allegation with respect to the possession and improvements could not nullify the petitioner’s
preferential right to lease the land by reason of his riparian rights. Therefore, the rejection of
the private respondent’s revocable permit and foreshore lease is proper.

Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated April 30. 1936

32. Preference of the Reparian Owner � The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands,
marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers,
shall be given preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the
public service, subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he
applies therefore within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a communication from the Director
of Lands advising him of his preferential right.
Strictly speaking, "riparian" refers to rivers. A riparian owner is a person who owns land situated on
the bank of a river.
“Riparian owner" embraces not only the owners of lands on the banks of rivers but also the littoral
owners, meaning the owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. The
littoral is the coastal region including both the land along the coast and the water near the coast or the
shore zone between the high and low watermarks.

SIAIN ENT VS FF CRUZ

That the foreshore area had been reclaimed does not remove it from its classification of
foreshore area subject to the preferential right to lease of the littoral owner.

Western Visayas Industrial Corporation (WESVICO) filed a foreshore lease application over
the foreshore land adjacent to certain lots registered in its name. It eventually withdrew the
application and filed a petition for registration over the same foreshore land with the then
Court of First Instance of Iloilo. The case was, however, archived as WESVICO‘s
representative could no longer be contacted, and later on, WESVICO has ceased
operations.

F.F. Cruz & Co. (F.F. Cruz) filed with the Bureau of Lands, Iloilo City a foreshore lease
application over a foreshore land, a portion of which is adjacent to the lot previously
occupied by WESVICO. Sian Enterprises Inc. (SIAIN) purchased the properties previously
owned by WESVICO from the Development Bank of the Philippines. It subsequently filed a
foreshore lease application over the foreshore land adjacent to the properties it bought from
DBP.

Upon learning that 130 linear meters of the foreshore land subject of F.F. Cruz’s foreshore
lease application overlapped that covered by its foreshore lease application, SIAIN filed a
protest 8 alleging that it being the owner of the property adjoining the overlapping area, it
should be given preference in its lease.

F.F. Cruz, argued that SIAIN must not be given preferential right since the area in dispute is
classified as ―reclaimed‖ and that the ownership was not by means of accretion. This
argument has been sustained by the Land Management Bureau.

Upon appeal to the DENR Secretary, SIAIN was upheld, declaring that there was no basis to
declare the area as ―reclaimed‖. F.F. Cruz however appealed to the Office of the President
which overturned the decision of the DENR Secretary and found that the area is reclaimed.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, the present petition. SIAIN
contends that the evidence overwhelmingly proves that the disputed area is foreshore land
and not reclaimed land which thus entitles it preferential rights over the

ISSUES:

Whether the disputed land is a ―foreshore‖ or ―reclaimed‖ area

HELD:
That the foreshore area had been reclaimed does not remove it from its classification of
foreshore area subject to the preferential right to lease of the littoral owner.

It bears noting that it was not the reclamation that brought the disputed foreshore area into
existence. Such foreshore area existed even before F.F. Cruz undertook its reclamation. It
was ―formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action of the sea.‖ Following
Santulan, the littoral owner has preferential right to lease the same.

Contrary to the ruling of the Office of the President, as affirmed by the appellate court, littoral
owner WESVICO cannot be considered to have waived or abandoned its preferential right to
lease the disputed area when it subsequently filed an application for registration thereover.
For being a part of the public domain, ownership of the area could not be acquired by
WESVICO. Its preferential right remained, however. Its move to have the contested land
titled in its name, albeit a faux pas, in fact more than proves its interest to utilize it.

As correctly argued by SIAIN, were WESVICO‘s petition for registration which, as stated
earlier, was archived by the trial court, pursued but eventually denied, WESVICO would not
have been barred from filing anew a foreshore lease application. Parenthetically, the petition
for registration of WESVICO was archived not on account of lack of interest but because it
ceased operations due to financial reasons.

BRUNA ARANAS DE VUYSER VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS,

IGNACIO TANDAYAG

This is an appeal, perfected before the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Surigao, declaring a parcel of land formed along the shore by the action
of the sea as part of the public domain.

Plaintiff-appellant is the registered owner of Lot No. 4217 of the Surigao Cadastre, which borders
the Surigao Strait. Contiguous to said lot is a parcel of land which was formed by accretion from
the sea, the subject- matter of this controversy. Defendants Ignacio Tandayag and his wife
Candida Tandayag have been occupying this foreshore land under a Revocable Permit issued
by the Director of Lands. For the use and occupation thereof, said spouses paid the Bureau of
Lands the amount of P6.50 annually. They have a house on said lot, which plaintiff alleged had
been purchased by the Tandayags from one Francisco Macalinao, a former lessee of the
plaintiff.

Claiming ownership of the said land, plaintiff filed an action against the spouses Tandayag in the
Court of First Instance of Surigao to recover possession of this land as well as rents in arrears for
a period of six years. The complaint was subsequently amended to implead the Director of Land
as defendant, allegedly for having illegally issued a revocable permit to the Tandayags.

After due trial, the court a quo rendered a decision dismissing the complaint, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the court hereby renders judgment in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiff, dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff for lack of cause of action; declaring the
defendants Ignacio Tandayag and his wife, Candida de Tandayag as the lawful occupants of the
land in question, which is part of the public domain; condemning the plaintiff to pay to the
defendant in concept of damages in the amount of P250.00; plus the costs. (p. 67, Decision,
Original Records.)

From this judgment, plaintiff appealed directly to this Court on a pure question of law.

The plaintiff's claim of ownership over the land in question is bereft of legal basis. Such alluvial
formation along the seashore is part of the public domain and, therefore, not open to acquisition
by adverse possession by private persons. It is outside the commerce of man, unless otherwise
1
declared by either the executive or legislative branch of the government.

In asserting the right of ownership over the land, plaintiff invokes Article 4 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of August 3, 1866 which provides:

Art. 4. Lands added to the shore by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the
sea, form part of the public domain, when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea,
and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries,
or for the coastguard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the
owners of the estate adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof.

Plaintiff's reliance on the above article is quite misplaced. The true construction of the cited
provision is that the State shall grant these lands to the adjoining owners only when they are no
longer needed for the purposes mentioned therein. In the case at bar, the trial court found that
plaintiff's evidence failed to prove that the land in question is no longer needed by the
government, or that the essential conditions for such grant under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of
Waters, exists.

Plaintiff, however, argues that the approval by the Director of Lands of the defendants'
Revocable Permit Application is tantamount to an implied declaration on the part of the Director
of Lands of the fact that the disputed lot is no longer needed for public use. We fail to see such
implication.

In his letter, dated June 16, 1955, approving the defendants' Revocable Permit Application, the
Director of Lands did not declare the land as no longer needed for public use. Pertinent portions
2
of said letter reads:

With reference to your revocable permit application no. v-8040, I wish to inform you that as the
District Engineer of that province has in his 1st indorsement dated July 7, 1954 certified that the
land applied for by you is/may be needed by the Government for future public improvements
(Boulevard and seawall protection purposes) you may be allowed to continue with your
temporary occupation and provisional use of the premises under a revocable permit renewable
every year in the meantime that the land is not actually needed by the Government for the
purposes aforestated, subject however to the following conditions:

That no further structures shall be constructed on the land and that any structure constructed
thereon shall be removed and/or by you at your expense upon thirty (30) days notice if and when
the Government is ready to actually use the land for Boulevard and seawall protection purposes.
(p. 113, Exhibit 4.)

From the foregoing, it is clear that the State never relinquished ownership over the land.

Since the land is admittedly property of public dominion, its disposition falls under the exclusive
3
supervision and control of the Bureau of Lands. Under the Public Land Act, an application for
the sale or lease of lands enumerated under Section 59 thereof, should be filed with the Bureau
4
of Lands. In compliance therewith, the spouses Tandayag filed the appropriate application,
while plaintiff did not. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, "like any other private party, she
(plaintiff) must apply for a permit to use the land, like what appellee spouses did. Not having
submitted to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands which has administration and control over the
area in question, by filing the corresponding application for permit, appellant has no right
5
whatsoever in the foreshore land as to be entitled to protection in the courts of justice."

6
In Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, a case involving two parcels of land formed along the
shore by the action of the sea, this Court has this to say.

The record does not disclose that Aldecoa & Co. had obtained from the Spanish Government of
the Philippines the requisite authorization legally to occupy the said two parcels of land of which
they now claim to be the owners; wherefore, the occupation or possession which they allege they
hold is a mere detainer that can merit from the law no protection such as is afforded only to the
person legally in possession.

The rationale behind the grant of revocable permit was propounded by the Attorney General in
his opinion of July 24, 1920, in this wise:

The lease of reclaimed lands and of the foreshore was formerly provided by Act No. 1654. Under
said Act, said lands could only be leased in the manner and under the conditions provided by the
said law. No revocable permits were allowed. Then Act No. 2570 was passed amending Sec. 5
of Act No. 1654 so as to authorize the temporary use of the foreshore under a revocable permit.
This measure was apparently deemed necessary as well as expedient in order to legalize the
habitual use of the coast and shores of these islands by the people, who had erected thereon
light material houses and dwellings, temporary structures used in connection with fishing and
other maritime industries, as well as to authorize the provisional occupation and use
contemplated by the law providing for its format lease. The countless houses and provisional
constructions that fringed the shores of the archipelago especially in Mindanao, and the constant
and every day use and occupation of the foreshore by the people in fishing, salt and other
industries common to the sea, as above stated, evidently prompted the legislature to all the
temporary use of the foreshore in this manner by means of revocable permit.

In fine, the grant of a Revocable Permit to the defendants Tandayag for the temporary use and
occupation of the disputed land is valid, having been legally issued by the Bureau of Lands,
acting for and in behalf of the Secretary (now Minister) of Agriculture and Natural Resources who
is empowered to grant revocable permits under Section 68 of the Public land Act which we
quote:

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may grant to qualified persons temporary
permission upon the payment of a reasonable charge, for the use of any portion of the lands
covered by this chapter for any lawful private purpose, subject Lo revocation, at any time when,
in his judgment the public interest shall require.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against the plaintiff-
appellant.

AGNE VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS

NATURE: Two separate petitions for review on certiorari of the order of the defunct Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, dismissing the complaint filed by herein petitioners
in said case; and the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court affirming in toto the
decision of the trial court in favor of herein private respondents.
These two petitions, arising from the same facts and involving the same parties and common
questions of law, were ordered consolidated in our resolution of August 9, 1989.

FACTS:
Private respondents filed a complaint with the CFI which narrates that they are the registered
owners of the parcel of land situated in Barrio Bantog, Asingan, Pangasinan relying on a
TCT owned by Presentacion Agpoon which she inherited from her father who registered the
land on May 1937 by virtue of a free patent. which was occupied by the petitioners by taking
advantage of the conditions during the Japanese occupation by means of fraud, stealth,
strategy and intimidation. Repeated demands were made to the petitioner but the latter
refused.

On the other hand petitioner contends that the land was formerly a part of the river bed of
Agno Chico Rivers which was diverted due to a big flood. The abandoned river bed, by
operation of law, became a private land and was owned in OCEAN by the petitioner since
1920. The latter introduced improvements therein by planting trees and agricultural crops.
While the case was pending the petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of title,
reconveyance of and/or action to clear title to a parcel of land. The main contention of the
petitioners was that the said patent and subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto are null
and void since the said land, an abandoned river bed, is of private ownership and, therefore,
cannot be the subject of a public land grant

CFI dismissed the petition to dismiss of the petitioners by merely citing the statement in the
case of Antonio, et al. vs. Barroga, et al. that an action to annul a free patent many years
after it had become final and indefeasible states no cause of action.

ISSUE:
1. As between the riparian owner presently in possession and the registered owner by virtue
of a free patent, who has a better right over the abandoned river bed in dispute.

2. Whether or not the certificate of title issued in favor of the private respondents can be
cancelled on the ground that it is null and void ab initio since the land in question is a private
land from the time the free patent was issued.

HELD:

1. We rule in favor of petitioners. Once the river bed has been abandoned, the riparian
owners become the owners of the abandoned bed. The failure of herein petitioners to
register the accretion in their names and declare it for purposes of taxation did not divest it of
its character as a private property. Although we take cognizance of the rule that an accretion
to registered land is not automatically registered and therefore not entitled or subject to the
protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system.The
said rule is not applicable to this case since the title claimed by private respondents is not
based on acquisitive prescription but is anchored on a public grant from the Government,
which presupposes that it was inceptively a public land.

2. The title can be cancelled. We reiterate that private ownership of land is not affected by
the issuance of a free patent over the same land because the Public Land Act applies only to
lands of the public domain. Only public land may be disposed of by the Director of Lands,
Since as early as 1920, the land in dispute was already under the private ownership of
herein petitioners and no longer a part of the lands of the public domain, the same could not
have been the subject matter of a free patent. The patentee and his successors in interest
acquired no right or title to the said land. Necessarily, Free Patent No. 23263 issued to
Herminigildo Agpoon is null and void and the subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto
cannot become final and indefeasible.

Now, a certificate of title fraudulently secured is null and void ab initio if the fraud consisted
in misrepresenting that the land is part of the public domain, although it is not. Being null and
void, the free patent granted and the subsequent titles produce no legal effects whatsoever.

The long and continued possession of petitioners under a valid claim of title cannot be
defeated by the claim of a registered owner whose title is defective from the beginning.

Therefore, the rule on incontrovertibility of a certificate of title after one year from entry, is not
applicable when the ground for cancellation is the nullity of the patent and the title issued
pursuant thereto.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of respondent court in its AC-G.R. CV

No. 60388-R and the questioned order of dismissal of the trial court in its Civil Case No.
2649 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered
ORDERING private respondents to reconvey the aforesaid parcel of land to petitioners.

AGUSTIN VS IAC

FACTS:
Private respondents, Maria Melad and Pablo Binuyag are among those who are occupying
the western bank of the Cagayan River while on the eastern bank is owned by petitioner
Eulogio Agustin. From 1919 to 1968, the Cagayan river has eroded the lands on the eastern
bank including Agustin’s Lot depositing alluvium on the land possessed by Pablo Binuyag. In
1968, after a typhoon which caused a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course and
returned it to its 1919 bed and it cut through the lands of respondents whose lands were
transferred on the eastern side. To cultivate the lands they had to cross the river. When they
were cultivating said lands, (they were planting corn) Agustin accompanied by the mayor
and some policemen claimed the land and drove them away. So Melad and Binuyag filed
separate complaints for recovery of their lots and its accretions. The Trial Court held ordered
Agustin et. al to vacate the lands and return them to respondents. On appeal, the IAC
affirmed in toto the judgment thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents own the accretion and such ownership is not affected by
the sudden and abrupt change in the course of the Cagayan River when it reverted to its old
bed

HELD: YES
Art. 457 states that the owner of the lands adjoining river banks own the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters. Accretion benefits a
riparian owner provided that these elements are present: 1) deposit be gradual and
imperceptible 2) it resulted from the effects of the current of the water and 3) the land is
adjacent to the river bank. When the River moved from 1919 to 1968, there was alluvium
deposited and it was gradual and imperceptible.

Accretion benefits the riparian owner because these lands are exposed to floods and other
damage due to the destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to
encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers
should in some way be compensated by the right of accretion. Also, respondent’s ownership
over said lots was not removed when due to the sudden and abrupt change in the course of
the river; their accretions were transferred to the other side. Art. 459 states when the current
of a river x x x segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it
to another estate, the owner of segregated portion retains ownership provided he removes
the same w/in 2 years. And Art. 463 states that whenever the current of a river divides itself
into branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains
ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated from the estate by the current.

RONQUILLO VS CA

FACTS:
Del Rosario owns a registered land adjacent to Estero Calubcub which is already dried up
due to the dumping of garbage by the sorrounding neighborhood and not by any natural
causes. Defendant now occupies said dried up land until Del Rosario, claiming ownership
over the same, required him to vacate on the basis of Article 370 of the Civil Code which
provides that riparian owner owns the dried up river bed abandoned by natural changes.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 370 applies

RULING: No.
The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to accretions to
lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering our earlier
finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the active
intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and, hence,
the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.

The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the
land of the public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership.

VIAJAR VS CA

led rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian owner
against the diminution of the area of his registered land through gradual changes in the
course of an adjoining stream or river.

FACTS:
Private respondents Spouses Ladrido are owners of Lot 7511 of the Cadastral Survey of
Pototan Iloilo. Petitioners are owners of the Lot 7340, which they bought from the Te. Viajar
had lot 7340 relocated and found out that the property was in the possession of Ladrido. She
demanded the return but the latter refused. She instituted a civil action for recovery of
possession and damages. She also impleaded Te as defedant for the reason that if Ladrido
is going to be favored then the sale was to be annulled and plaintiff must be reimbursed.
During the trial it was proven that during the cadastral survey in 1926, the two lots were
separated by the Suague River and that a part of the land of Lot 7340 and the old river bed
were in the possession of the defendants and that the plaintiffs have never been in actual
physical possession.

CFI ruled in favor of the defendants which the CA confirmed. There was a mention in the
case that the issue from which the decision of the CFI was not the issue appealed in the CA
so the affirmation made by the CA should be void.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the change in the course of the Suague River was gradual or sudden

2) Whether or not the plaintiffs are protected by the Torrens System (in relation to the
dimunition of the area of their land because the plaintiffs are contending that Art 457 must be
interpreted as applicable only to unregistered lands)

RULING:
It was established in the trial that for a period of 40 years the Suague river overflowed its
banks yearly and the property of the defendant gradually received deposits of soil from the
effects of the current of the river.

It is a well settled rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the
riparian owner against the dimunition of the area of his registered land through gradual
changes in the course of an adjoining stream or river. Accretions which the banks of the river
may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the owners of
the banks.

BINALAY VS MANALO
A sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is not the alluvial process contemplated in
Art. 457. The accumulation of the soil deposits must be slow and hardly imperceptible in
order for the riparian owner to acquire ownership thereof. Also, the land where the accretion
takes place is adjacent to the banks of the rivers (or the sea coast).
FACTS
Manalo acquired 2 lots which were originally owned by Judge Taccad from 2 different people
(the latter’s daughter and from an earlier purchaser). These lots were later consolidated into
Lot 307, a total of 10.45 hectares. The lot was beside the Cagayan River, which, due to
flooding, would place a portion of the land underwater during the rainy season (September to
December). On sunny days, however, the land would be dried up for the entire dry season
(January to August). When a survey of the land was conducted on a rainy month, a portion
of the land that Manalo bought was then underwater and was thus left unsurveyed and
excluded from Lot 307.

The big picture is this: Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain point to
form two braches (western and eastern) and then unites at the other end, further north, to
form a narrower strip of land. The eastern branch of the river cuts through Lot 307, and is
flooded during the rainy season. The unsurveyed portion, on the other hand, is the bed of
the eastern branch. Note that the fork exists only during the rainy season while the
“island”/elongated strip of land formed in the middle of the forks becomes dry and perfect for
cultivation when the Cagayan river is at its ordinary depth. The strip of land in the middle of
the fork totaled 22.7 hectares and was labeled Lot 821-822. Lot 821 is directly opposite Lot
307 and is separated by the eastern branch of the river’s fork.

Manalo claims that Lot 821 belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged portion of
the land to which it is adjacent. Petitioners (Binalay, et al) who possess the Lot 821, on the
other hand, insist that they own it. They occupy the other edges of the lot along the river
bank (i.e. the fertile portions on which they plant tobacco and other agricultural products) and
also cultivate the western strip during the summer.

Manalo filed 2 cases for forcible entry which were both dismissed. Later on, he filed a
complaint for quieting of title, possession, and damages against petitioner. The trial court
and the CA ruled in favor of Manalo, saying that Lot 821 and Lot 307 cannot be considered
separate and distinct from each other. They reasoned that when the land dries up for the
most part of the year, the two are connected. [Note: The CA applied the ruling in Gov’t of the
Phil Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose, which was actually inappropriate because the subject
matter in this case was a lake so that the definition of a “bed” was different.]

ISSUE:
Whether or not Manalo owns Lot 821 by way of accretion

RULING: No.
The disputed property is not an accretion. It is the action of the heavy rains that cause the
highest ordinary level of waters of the Cagayan River during the rainy season. The
depressed portion is a river bed and is thus considered property of public domain.

The SC observed the following:

a) The pictures identified by Manalo during his direct examination depict the depressed
portion as a river bed. The dried up portion had dike-like slopes (around 8m) on both sides
connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are vertical and very prominent.

b) The eastern bed already existed even before Manalo bought the land. It was called “Rio
Muerte de Cagayan.”

c) Manalo could not have acquire ownership of the land because article 420 of the civil code
states that rivers are property of public dominion. The word “river” includes the running
waters, the bed, and the banks. [The seller never actually owned that part of the land since it
was public property]

d) The submerged area (22.72 ha) is twice the area of the land he actually bought. It is
difficult to suppose that such a sizable area could have been brought about by accretion.

More importantly, the requisites of accretion in article 457 were not satisfied. These are: 1)
that the deposition of the soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; 2) that it be the
result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and 3) the land where the accretion
takes place is adjacent to the banks of the rivers (or the sea coast). The accretion should’ve
been attached to Lot 307 for Manalo to acquire its ownership. BUT, the claimed accretion
lies on the bank of the river; not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite it – across the river.
Aside from that, the dike-like slopes which were very steep may only be formed by a sudden
and forceful action like flooding. The steep slopes could not have been formed by the river in
a slow and gradual manner.

REYNANTE VS CA

Facts:
More than 50 years ago, petitioner Jose Reynante was taken as tenant by the late Don
Cosme Carlos, owner and father-in-law of herein private respondents, over a fishpond
During the tenancy, petitioner Jose Reynante constructed a nipa hut where he and his
family lived and took care of the nipa palms (sasahan) he had planted on lots 1 and 2
These lots are located... between the fishpond... and the Liputan (formerly Meycauayan)
River.
Petitioner harvested and sold said nipa palms without interference and prohibition from
anybody. Neither did the late Don Cosme Carlos question his right to plant the nipa...
palms near the fishpond or to harvest and appropriate them as his own.
After the death of Don Cosme Carlos, his heirs... entered into a written agreement
denominated as "SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NG PAGSASAULI NG KARAPATAN"...
with petitioner Jose Reynante whereby the... latter for and in consideration of the sum
of P200,000.00 turned over the fishpond he was tenanting to the heirs of Don Cosme
Carlos and surrendered all his rights therein as Caretaker
Pursuant to the said written agreement, petitioner surrendered the fishpond and the two
huts located therein to private respondents. Private respondents thereafter leased the
said fishpond to one Carlos de la Cruz. Petitioner continued to live in the nipa hut
constructed by... him on lots 1 and 2 and to take care of the nipa palms he had planted
therein.
private respondents formally demanded that the petitioner vacate said portion since
according to them petitioner had already been indemnified for the surrender of his
rights as tenant.
Despite receipt thereof, petitioner refused and failed to relinquish... possession of lots 1
and 2.
private respondents filed a complaint for forcible entry with preliminary mandatory
injunction against petitioner alleging that the latter by means of strategy and stealth,
took over the physical, actual and material possession of lots 1 and 2 by... residing in
one of the kubos or huts bordering the Liputan River... the trial court rendered its
decision dismissing the complaint and finding that petitioner had been in prior
possession of lots 1 and 2.
Private respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court... renders judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs and against defendant and hereby reverses the decision of the Court a
quo.
From said decision, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals rendered its decision... the decision of the court a quo, being
consistent with law and jurisprudence, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Issues:
who between the petitioner and private respondents has prior physical possession of
lots 1 and 2;... b) whether or not the disputed lots belong to private respondents as a
result of accretion.
Ruling:
An action for forcible entry is merely a quieting process and actual title to the property
is never determined.
A party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the
owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior... possession, if he has in his
favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until
he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion
reinvindicatoria
On the other hand, if a plaintiff cannot prove prior physical possession, he has no right
of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the owner of the...
property... the Court of Appeals could not legally restore private respondents'
possession over lots 1 and 2 simply because petitioner has clearly proven that he had
prior possession over lots 1 and 2.
The evidence on record shows that petitioner was in possession of the questioned lots
for more than 50 years. It is undisputed that he was the caretaker of the fishpond
owned by the late Don Cosme Carlos for more than 50 years and that he constructed a
nipa hut adjacent to... the fishpond and planted nipa palms therein. This fact is
bolstered by the "SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY"
On the other hand, private respondents based their claim of possession over lots 1 and
2 simply on the written agreement signed by petitioner whereby the latter surrendered
his rights over the fishpond.
"An examination of the document signed by the defendant (Exhibit 'B'), shows that
what was surrendered to the plaintiffs was the fishpond and not the 'sasahan' or the
land on which he constructed his hut where he now lives.
There is nothing that indicates that the tenant was giving other matters not mentioned
in a... document
With regard to the second issue, it must be noted that the disputed lots involved in this
case are not included in Transfer Certificate of Title
That... tract of land... falls within Alienable and Disposable Land
The respondent Court of Appeals ruled that lots 1 and 2 were created by alluvial
formation and hence the properly of private respondents pursuant to Article 457 of the
New Civil Code
Granting without conceding that lots 1 and 2 were created by alluvial formation and
while it is true that accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the
effect of the current become the property of the owner of the banks, such accretion to
registered land... does not preclude acquisition of the additional area by another person
through prescription.
Assuming private respondents had acquired the alluvial deposit (the lot in question), by
accretion, still their failure to register said accretion for a period of fifty (50) years
subjected said accretion to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
It is undisputed that petitioner has been in possession of the subject lots for more than
fifty (50) years and unless private respondents can show a better title over the subject
lots, petitioner's possession over the property must be respected.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals... is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE

Heirs Uberas vs. CFI of Negros Occidental

G.R. No. L-48268, 86 SCRA 145 (October 30, 1978)

FACTS: Siblings Segundo, Albino, Francisca, Pedro, and Alejandra Uberas inherited a
parcel of land from their parents. Petitioners (children and successors in interest of Segundo
Uberas and Albino Uberas) filed a complaint against respondents (surviving spouse and
children of Pedro Uberas and Alejandra Uberas) for quieting of title, recovery of possession
and ownership, partition, and reconveyance with damages of the property in suit.
Defendants sought for dismissal on the ground that the action is barred by prescription. But
plaintiffs argued that the action is imprescriptible because it is to quiet the title to the property
in question, for partition, and for declaring heirship and deed of sale executed by defendants
as void ab initio. The RTC dismissed the case on the ground of prescription, holding that the
action is essentially for reconveyance based upon an implied trust resulting from fraud. In
this case, plaintiffs aver that Pedro Uberas executed the declaration of heirship with malice
and bad faith to deprive the compulsory heirs.

ISSUE: Whether the case is one for quieting of title and therefore imprescriptible.

RULING: This case is an action for quieting of title, which is imprescriptible. The teaching in
Faja vs. CA applies, that is, an action to quiet title to property in the possession of
plaintiff is imprescriptible and that where there are material facts to be inquired into and
resolved on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties which will determine the legal
precepts to be applied, as in this case, the complaining party should be given full opportunity
to prove his case. RTC should not have summarily dismissed the case on the alleged
ground of prescription notwithstanding contrary factual averments in the complaint which
would clearly rule out prescription. The SC set aside respondent court’s order of dismissal
and remanded the case to respondent court for trial and determination on the merits.

DBT Mar-bay Construction, Inc vs Ricaredo Panes, etc.

Ponente: Nachura

Facts:
A parcel of land was conveyed by Regalado to DBT through a dacion en pago for services
rendered. On June 24, 1992, the respondents Panes and his sons filed a complaint for
quieting of title with damages and petition for injunction against Regalado and DBT.

In the complaint, Ricaredo alleged that he is the lawful owner of the land which he had
declared for taxation purposes in his name. Respondents alleged that per certificate issued
by the DENR the land was verified to be correct and on file.

Respondents also claimed the Ricaredo and his immediate family had been and still are in
actual possession of the subject property, and their possession preceded the 2nd world war.
To perfect his title, Ricaredo filed with the RTC QC.

Respondents averred that in the process of complying with the registration, it was found out
that a portion of the land was with the subdivision plan of Regalado which was conveyed by
Regalado to DBT.

On December 28, 1993, then defendants Spouses Jaime and Rosario Tabangcura (Spouses
Tabangcura) filed their Answer with Counterclaim, claiming that they were buyers in good
faith and for value when they bought a house and lot covered by TCT No. 211095 from B.C.
Regalado, the latter being a subdivision developer and registered owner thereof, on June 30,
1986. When respondent Abogado Mautin entered and occupied the property, Spouses
Tabangcura filed a case for Recovery of Property before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 97
which rendered a decision in their favor.

On its part, DBT, traversing the complaint, alleged that it is the legitimate owner and
occupant of the subject property pursuant to a dacion en pago executed by B.C. Regalado in
the former’s favor; that respondents were not real parties-in-interests because Ricaredo was
a mere claimant whose rights over the property had yet to be determined by the RTC where
he filed his application for registration; that the other respondents did not allege matters
or invoke rights which would entitle them to the relief prayed for in their complaint; that
the complaint was premature; and that the action inflicted a chilling effect on the lot buyers of
DBT.

RTC's Ruling:
The testimony of Ricaredo that he occupied the property since he was only 16 had not been
rebutted; Ricaredo's occupation and cultivation of the land for more than 30 years vested
him equitable ownership.
DBT filed a motion for reconsideration based on the grounds of prescription and laches.
While this motion was still pending, judge Bacalla died.

Then an intervenor claimed that portions of the subject land was part of the estate of certain
Don Jose de Ocampo.

CA's Ruling: CA reversed and set aside the RTC Orders dated November 8, 2001 and June
17, 2002 and reinstated the RTC Decision dated June 15, 2000. The CA held that the
properties described and included in TCT No. 200519 are located in San Francisco del
Monte, San Juan del Monte, Rizal and Cubao, Quezon City while the subject property is
located in Brgy. Pasong Putik, Novaliches, Quezon City. Furthermore, the CA held that Engr.
Vertudazo's testimony that there is a gap of around 1,250 meters between Lot 503 and Psu
123169 was not disproved or refuted. The CA found that Judge Juanson committed a
procedural infraction when he entertained issues and admitted evidence presented by
DBT in its Motion for Reconsideration which were never raised in the pleadings and
proceedings prior to the rendition of the RTC Decision. The CA opined that DBT's claims of
laches and prescription clearly appeared to be an afterthought. Lastly, the CA held that
DBT's Motion for Reconsideration was not based on grounds enumerated in the Rules of
Procedure.

Issues:
(1) Did the RTC err in upholding DBT's defenses of prescription and laches as raised in the
latter's Motion for Reconsideration? (2) Which between DBT and the respondents have a
better right over the subject property?

Held:
(1) Affirmative. The facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise
sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's
complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence. However, the conclusion reached by
the RTC in its assailed Order was erroneous. The RTC failed to consider that the action
filed before it, was not simply for reconveyance, but an action for quieting of title
which is imprescriptible.

Therefore, laches will not apply to this case, because respondents' possession of the
subject property has rendered their right to bring an action for quieting of title imprescriptible
and, hence, not barred by laches. Moreover, since laches is a creation of equity, acts or
conduct alleged to constitute the same must be intentional and unequivocal so as to avoid
injustice.

Thus, respondents' claim of acquisitive prescription over the subject property is

baseless. Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, acquisitive prescription of ownership of lands
registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively,
Act No. 496, as amended by PD No. 1529, provides that no title to registered land in
derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession.
Consequently, in the instant case, proof of possession by the respondents is immaterial and
inconsequential.

Note:
 - action for reconveyance can be barred by prescription. When an action for reconveyance
is based on fraud, it must be filed within four (4) years from discovery of the fraud, and such
discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the original certificate of title.

On the other hand, an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten (10) years from the date of the issuance of the original certificate of title or
transfer certificate of title. The rule is that the registration of an instrument in the Office of the
RD constitutes constructive notice to the whole world and therefore the discovery of the
fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time of registration.

DERAY NOTES:
IF THE PROPERTY IN IN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY, THE ACTION IS
IMPRESCRIPTIBLE. IT IS PRESUMED THAT HE IS THE OWNER THEREOF.

IF THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT IN POSSESION, THE ACTION TO QUIET MAY PRESCRIBED.

ALSO PRINCPLE OF LACHES MAY ALSO BAR THE ACTION TO QUIET TITLE.
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD IS 10 YEARS PER ART 1134. WHEN PRESCIRPTION IS
EXTRA ORDINARY, OT PRESCRIBES AFTER 30 YRS ART 1137
ORDINARY PRESCRIPTION - POSSSESSION
EXTRAORD - POSSESSION IS IN BAD FAITH

CABACUNGAN vs. LAIGO

G.R. No. 175073 August 15, 2011

FACTS:

Margarita Cabacungan owned three parcels of unregistered land in La Union which are
covered by tax declaration all in her name. Sometime in 1968, Margarita’s son, Roberto
Laigo, Jr. applied for a non-immigrant visa to the United States, and to support his
application, he allegedly asked Margarita to transfer the tax declarations of the properties in
his name. For said purpose, Margarita, unknown to her other children, executed an Affidavit
of Transfer of Real Property whereby the subject properties were transferred by donation to
Roberto.

Roberto adopted respondents Pedro Laigo and Marilou Laigo. In July 1990, Roberto sold the
aforementioned three parcel of land. One parcel of land was sold to spouses Mario and Julia
Campos and the rest were sold to Pedro Laigo and Marilou Laigo. These sales were not
known to Margarita and her other children.

During Roberto’s wake, Margarita came to know of the sales as told by Pedro himself.
Margarita, represented by her daughter, Luz, instituted a complaint for the annulment of said
sales and for the recovery of ownership and possession of the subject properties as well as
for the cancellation of Ricardo’s tax declarations.
Spouses Campos advanced that they were innocent purchasers for value and in good faith.
Further, they noted that Margarita’s claim was already barred by prescription and laches
owing to her long inaction in recovering the subject properties.

Marilou and Pedro contends to be buyers in good faith and for value. They also believed that
Margarita’s cause of action had already been barred by laches, and that even assuming the
contrary, the cause of action was nevertheless barred by prescription as the same had
accrued way back in 1968 upon the execution of the affidavit of transfer by virtue of which an
implied trust had been created. In this regard, they emphasized that the law allowed only a
period of ten (10) years within which an action to recover ownership of real property or to
enforce an implied trust thereon may be brought, but Margarita merely let it pass.

Margarita and the Spouses Campos amicably entered into a settlement whereby they
waived their respective claims against each other. Margarita died two days later and was
substituted by her estate.

On February 8, 1999, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the compromise
agreement and dismissing the complaint against the Spouses Campos. Trial on the merits
ensued with respect to Pedro and Marilou.

Trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. It explained that the 1968 Affidavit of
Transfer operated as a simple transfer of the subject properties from Margarita to Roberto. It
found no express trust created between Roberto and Margarita by virtue merely of the said
document as there was no evidence of another document showing Roberto’s undertaking to
return the subject properties. It concluded that an "implied or constructive trust" was created
between the parties, as if affirming that there was indeed an agreement to have the
properties returned to Margarita in due time.

Moreover, the trial court barred recovery from respondents who were found to have acquired
the properties supposedly in good faith and for value. It also pointed out that recovery could
no longer be pursued in this case because Margarita had likewise exhausted the ten-year
prescriptive period for reconveyance based on an implied trust which had commenced to run
in 1968 upon the execution of the Affidavit of Transfer.

The appellate court had found no implied trust relation in the transaction between Margarita
and Roberto, nevertheless, it held that the ten-year prescriptive period under Article 1144 of
the Civil Code, in relation to an implied trust created under Article 1456, had already been
exhausted by Margarita because her cause of action had accrued way back in 1968 and that
while laches and prescription as defenses could have availed against Roberto, the same
would be unavailing against Pedro and Marilou because the latter were supposedly buyers
in good faith and for value.

ISSUES:

Whether or not an action for reconveyance under a constructive implied trust in accordance
with Article 1456 does not prescribe.

HELD:
The Court disagree with the Court of Appeals’ finding that there was no evidence on record
showing that an implied trust relation arose between Margarita and Roberto. It finds that
petitioner had offered evidence to prove the intention of Margarita to transfer to Roberto only
the legal title to the properties in question, with expectation that Roberto would return the
same to her on accomplishment of that specific purpose for which the transaction was
entered into.

It explained that trust is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable
ownership of property and another person owning the legal title to such property, the
equitable ownership of the former entitling him to the performance of certain duties and the
exercise of certain powers by the latter.

Express or direct trusts are created by the direct and positive acts of
the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by oral declaration in
words evincing an intention to create a trust. Implied trusts arise by legal
implication based on the presumed intention of the parties or on
equitable principles independent of the particular intention of the parties.

Constructive trusts, on the one hand, come about in the main by

operation of law and not by agreement or intention. They arise not by
any word or phrase, either expressly or impliedly, evincing a direct
intention to create a trust, but one which arises in order to satisfy the
demands of justice. Constructive trusts are illustrated in Articles 1450,
1454, 1455 and 1456
Roberto is merely a depositary of legal title having no duties as to the management,
control or disposition of the property except to make a conveyance when called upon
by the cestui que trust. Hence, the sales he entered into with respondents are a
wrongful conversion of the trust property and a breach of the trust.

The Court finds that an action for reconveyance under a constructive implied trust in
accordance with Article 1456 does not prescribe unless and until the land is registered or the
instrument affecting the same is inscribed in accordance with law, inasmuch as it is what
binds the land and operates constructive notice to the world.

In the present case, however, the lands involved are unregistered lands. There is no way by
which Margarita, during her lifetime, could be notified of the furtive and fraudulent sales
made in 1992 by Roberto in favor of respondents, except by actual notice from Pedro
himself in August 1995. Hence, it is from that date that prescription began to toll. The filing of
the complaint in February 1996 is well within the prescriptive period. Finally, such delay of
only six (6) months in instituting the present action hardly be sufficient to justify a finding of
inexcusable delay or to create an inference that Margarita has allowed her claim to stale by
laches.
The Court granted the petition, affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court and
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. It also directed the cancellation of the tax
declarations covering the subject properties in the name of Roberto D. Laigo and his
transferees, nullified the deeds of sale executed by Roberto D. Laigo in favor of respondents
Pedro Roy Laigo and Marilou Laigo and directed said respondents to execute reconveyance
in favor of petitioner.

Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, Mercedes, Manuel,

Miriam and Rodolfo Jr.-- all surnamed Reyes
G.R. No. 154645; July 13, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS

Lourdes Reyes is the widow of Rodolfo Reyes who died on September 12, 1981. Lourdes
and Rodolfo married in 1947 in Manila and have four (4) children: Mercedes, Manuel,
Miriam, and Rodolfo Jr. Rodolfo, in the course of their marriage, had illicit relations with
Milagros Joaquino with whom he also had three (3) children: Jose Romillo, Imelda May and
Charina. Rodolfo and Milagros decided to buy a house and lot which executed in the name
Milagros. Lourdes alleges that the funds used to purchase this property were conjugal funds
and earnings of the deceased. Aside from the house, Rodolfo allegedly "put into custody"
some of the couple's conjugal properties under the care of his paramour. These properties
include his earnings and retirement benefits from working as the Vice President and
Comptroller of Warner Barnes and Company and two cars.

Lourdes prayed that the properties be declared conjugal, that Milagros surrenders the
possession thereof, and that damages be awarded. Milagros, on the other hand, contends
that she purchased the mentioned properties in her exclusive capacity. She also contends
that she had no knowledge of the Rodolfo's first marriage was never a beneficiary of the
latter's earnings, and that her living together with Rodolfo for nineteen (19) years, along with
the fact that she had children with him, be considered by the court in rendering judgment.
Lourdes, however, died and was later represented by her children with Rodolfo.
Subsequently, the trial court granted Lourdes' complaint. Upon appeal to the Court of
Appeals, Milagros reiterated her stand and questioned the findings of the trial court. CA
affirmed the ruling of the trial court and likewise held that the property had been paid out of
the conjugal funds of Rodolfo and Lourdes, because the funds used to pay the house off
was sourced from Rodolfo's earnings as part of the conjugal partnership.

ISSUES

1. Do the properties in question pertain to the conjugal partnership of gains?

2. Does the petitioner have the right of co-ownership with the deceased?

RULING
1. Yes. Under Article 145 thereof, a conjugal partnership of gains (CPG) is created
upon marriage end lasts until the legal union is dissolved by death, annulment, legal
separation or judicial separation of property. Conjugal properties are by law owned in
common by the husband and wife. As to what constitutes such properties are laid out in
Article 153 of the Code, which we quote:
"(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the spouses, or of either of
them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from the
common property or from the exclusive property of each spouse."
Under Article 160 of the Code, all properties of the marriage, unless proven to pertain to the
husband or the wife exclusively, are presumed to belong to the CPG. For the rebuttable
presumption to arise, however, the properties must first be proven to have been acquired
during the existence of the marriage.
2. No. Article 144 of the Civil Code mandates a co-ownership between a man and a
woman who are living together but are not legally married. For Article 144 to apply, the
couple must not be incapacitated to contract marriage.

It has been held that the Article is inapplicable to common-law relations amounting to
adultery or concubinage, as in this case. The reason therefore is the absurdity of creating a
co-ownership in cases in which there exists a prior conjugal partnership between the man
and his lawful wife.

In default of Article 144 of the Civil Code, Article 148 of the Family Code has been
applied.The latter Article provides:

"Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In
the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money
and evidence of credit.
"If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If
the party which acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
"The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith."
Thus, when a common-law couple have a legal impediment to marriage, only the property
acquired by them -- through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry --
shall be owned by them in common and in proportion to their respective contributions.
The present controversy hinges on the source of the funds paid for the house and lot in
question. Upon the resolution of this issue depends the determination of whether the
property is conjugal (owned by Rodolfo and Lourdes) or exclusive (owned by Milagros) or
co-owned by Rodolfo and Milagros.

All told, respondents have shown that the property was bought during the marriage of
Rodolfo and Lourdes, a fact that gives rise to the presumption that it is conjugal. More
important, they have established that the proceeds of the loan obtained by Rodolfo were
used to pay for the property; and that the loan was, in turn, paid from his salaries and
earnings, which were conjugal funds under the Civil Code.

Under the circumstances, therefore, the purchase and the subsequent registration of the
realty in petitioner’s name was tantamount to a donation by Rodolfo to Milagros. By
express provision of Article 739(1) of the Civil Code, such donation was void, because it
was "made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time
of the donation."
Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the
spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may
give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to
persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage."
Hence, the property belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains and that the petitioner
paramour shall not be co-owners with the married deceased

HEIRS OF MARCIANA G. AVILA v. CA, GR No. L-45255,

1986-11-14 Avila vs CA (1412)

Marciana Avila, a teacher, acquired in a public bidding a certain parcel of land. Despite the
provision of Section 579 of the Revised Administrative Code prohibiting public school
teachers from buying delinquent properties, nobody, not even the government questioned
her participation in said auction sale.

Sometime later, those lots were issued in favor of Paz Chavez. In opposition thereto, private
respondents filed a petition for review of the decrees. Final decision of CA ruled against the
validity of the transfer to Avila.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the acquisition of land is valid.

HELD: NO.
Petitioners claim that ownership and possession are separated in aforesaid CA decision, so
that they assert that they are entitled to the possession of Lot 594, although they are not
entitled to its registration in their names.

Such contention is without merit.

While it is true that Marciana Avila, their mother and predecessor-in-interest, purchased the
questioned property at a public auction conducted by the government; paid the purchase
price; and was issued a final bill of sale after the expiration of the redemption period, it is
however undisputed that such purchase was prohibited under Section 579 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended, which provides:

Section 579. Inhibition against purchase of property at tax sale.- Official and employees of
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines are prohibited from purchasing, directly or
indirectly, from the Government, any property sold by the Government for the non-payment
of any public tax. Any such purchase by a public official or employee shall be void.

Thus, the sale to her of Lot 594 is void. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, a void
contract is inexistent from the beginning. It cannot be ratified neither can the right to set
up the defense of its illegality be waived. (Arsenal, et al. vs, The Intermediate Appellate
Court. et al., G.R. No. 66696, July 14, 1986). Moreover, Marciana Avila was a party to an
illegal transaction, and therefore, under Art. 1412 of the Civil Code, she cannot recover
what she has given by reason of the contract or ask for the fulfillment of what has
been promised her.

Furthermore, in a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the applicant and
ordering its registration in his name necessarily carries with it the delivery of possession
which is an inherent element of the right of ownership. (Abulocion et al. v. CFI of Iloilo, et al.,
100 Phil. 553 [1956]). Hence, a writ of possession may be issued not only against the person
who has been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone unlawfully and
adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings
up to the issuance of the final decree. Under the circumstances, possession cannot be
claimed by petitioners, because their predecessor-in-interest besides being at fault is not the
successful claimant in the registration proceedings and hence not entitled to a writ of
possession.

ANASTACIA VDA. DE AVILES, ET AL., Petitioners, v. COURT

OF APPEALS and CAMILO AVILES, Respondents.
FACTS: "PLAINTIFFS aver that they are the actual possessors of a parcel of land situated in
Malawa, Lingayen, Pangasinan, bounded on the N by Camilo Aviles; on the E by Malawa
River, on the S by Anastacio Aviles and on the W by Juana and Apolonio Joaquin. This
property is the share of their father, Eduardo Aviles and brother of the defendant, in the
estate of their deceased parents.

SINCE 1957, Eduardo Aviles was in actual possession of the property. In fact, the latter
mortgaged the same with the Rural Bank and PNB. When the property was inspected by a
bank representative, Eduardo Aviles, in the presence of the boundary owners pointed to the
inspector the existing earthen dikes as the boundary limits of the property and nobody
objected. When the real estate mortgage was foreclosed, the property was sold at public
auction but this was redeemed by plaintiffs’ mother and the land was subsequently
transferred and declared in her name.

Defendant Camilo Aviles asserted a color of title over the northern portion of the property by
constructing a bamboo fence (thereon) and moving the earthen dikes, thereby molesting and
disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over said portion.

Camilo Aviles admitted the agreement of partition executed by him and his brothers,
Anastacio and Eduardo. In accordance therewith, the total area of the property of their
parents which they divided is 46,795 square meters and the area alloted (sic) to Eduardo
Aviles is 16,111 square meters more or less, to Anastacio Aviles is 16,214 square meters
more or less, while the area alloted to defendant Camilo Aviles is 14,470 square meters
more or less.
The respective area(s) alloted to them was agreed and measured before the execution of
the agreement but he was not present when the measurement was made. Defendant agreed
to have a smaller area because his brother Eduardo asked him that he wanted a bigger
share because he has several children to support. The portion in litigation however is part of
the share given to him in the agreement of partition. At present, he is only occupying an area
of 12,686 square meters which is smaller than his actual share of 14,470 square meters. Tax
Declarations covering his property from 1958 show that the area of his property is 14,470
square meters. The riceland portion of his land is 13,290 square meters, the fishpond portion
is 500 square meters and the residential portion is 680 square meters, or a total of 14,470
square meters. That the topography of his land is not the same, hence, the height of his
pilapils are likewise not the same."

TRIAL COURT- Ordered to relocate and determine the extent and the boundary limit of the
land of the defendant on its southern side in order that the fourteen thousand four hundred
seventy (14,470) square meters which is the actual area given to the defendant be
determined;

CA- REVERSED the above decision. A special civil action for quieting of title is not the
proper remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and that petitioners should have instituted an
ejectment suit instead.
ISSUE: WON complaint for quieting of title instituted by the petitioners against private
respondent before the court a quo is not the proper remedy but rather, it should be a case
for ejectment.

HELD: Quieting of Title Not Proper Remedy For Settling Boundary Dispute

The facts presented unmistakably constitute a clear case of boundary dispute, which is not
cognizable in a special civil action to quiet title.

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or
uncertainty with respect to title to real property. 9

The Civil Code authorizes the said remedy in the following language:

"Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently
valid or effective but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable,
and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to
quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon a title to real property
or any interest therein."cralaw virtua1aw library
In fine, to avail of the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that there is an
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud,
doubt, question or shadow upon the owner’s title to or interest in real property. Thus,
petitioners have wholly misapprehended the import of the foregoing rule by claiming that
respondent Court erred in holding that there was "no . . . evidence of any muniment of title,
proceeding, written contract, . . .", and that there were, as a matter of fact, two such
contracts, viz., (i) the Agreement of Partition executed by private respondent and his
brothers (including the petitioners’ father and predecessor-in-interest), in which their
respective shares in the inherited property were agreed upon, and (ii) the Deed of Sale
evidencing the redemption by petitioner Anastacia Vda. de Aviles of the subject property in a
foreclosure sale. However, these documents in no way constitute a cloud or cast a doubt
upon the title of petitioners. Rather, the uncertainty arises from the parties’ failure to situate
and fix the boundary between their respective properties.

As correctly held by the respondent Court," (i)n fact, both plaintiffs and defendant admitted
the existence of the agreement of partition dated June 8, 1957 and in accordance therewith,
a fixed area was alloted (sic) to them and that the only controversy is whether these lands
were properly measured. There is no adverse claim by the defendant "which is apparently
valid, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable" and which
constitutes a cloud thereon.

Corollarily, and equally as clear, the construction of the bamboo fence enclosing the
disputed property and the moving of earthen dikes are not the "clouds" or "doubts" which
can be removed in an action for quieting of title.

FELIX BUCTON AND NICANORA GABAR BUCTON,

petitioners, vs.ZOSIMO GABAR, JOSEFINA LLAMOSO
GABAR AND THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS,
respondents.

FACTS:This action for specific performance filed by the plaintiffs prays, inter-alia, that
defendants-spouses be ordered to execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of sale of the western
half of a parcel of land having an area of 728 sq. m. covered by TCT No. II of the office of
the Register of Deeds of Misamis Oriental. Plaintiffs' evidence tends to show that sometime
in 1946 defendant Josefina Llamoso Gabar bought the above-mentioned land from the
spouses Villarin on installment basis, to wit, P500 down, the balance payable in installments.
Josefina entered into a verbal agreement with her sister-in-law, plaintiff Nicanora Gabar
Bucton, that the latter would pay one-half of the price (P3,000) and would then own one-half
of the land.In January, 1947 the spouses Villarin executed the deed of sale of the land
abovementioned in favor of defendant Josefina Llamoso Gabar, Exhibit I, to whom was
issued on June 20, 1947 TCT No. II, cancelling OCT No. 6337. Plaintiffs then sought to
obtain a separate title for their portion of the land in question. Defendants repeatedly
declined to accommodate plaintiffs.ISSUE:Whether or not there was a sale between
Josefina and Nicanora.HELD:Yes. There is no question that petitioner Nicanora paid
P1,500.00 to respondent Josefina as purchase price of one-half of the lot now covered by
TCT No. II, for respondent Court of Appeals found as a fact "that plaintiffs really paid for a
portion of the lot in question pursuant to their agreement with the defendants that they would
own one-half (1/2) of the land." That sale, although not consigned in a public instrument or
formal writing, is nevertheless valid and binding between petitioners and private
respondents, for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale or real estate
produces legal effects between the parties.Although at the time said petitioner paid
P1,000.00 as part payment of the purchase price on January 19, 1946, private respondents
were not yet the owners of the lot, they became such owners on January 24, 1947, when a
deed of sale was executed in their favor by the Villarin spouses. In the premises, Article
1434 of the Civil Code, which provides that "when a person who is not the owner of a thing
sells or alienates and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such
title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee," is applicable. Petitioners therefore
became owners of the one-half portion of the lot in question by virtue of a sale which, though
not evidenced by a formal deed, was nevertheless proved by both documentary and parole
evidence

Calacala vs Republic
G.R. No. 154415, July 28, 2005

Doctrine: An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on
equity. For an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur,
namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the
real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Garcia,J:

Facts: The spouses Camilo Calacala and Conchita Calacala, predecessors-in-interest of the
herein petitioners, are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated at Barangay
Balincanaway, Rosales, Pangasinan. This land was used as a property bond in a pending
criminal case. The accused failed to appear at his scheduled arraignment thus, the CFI of
Pangasinan ordered for the forfeiture of the bond in favor of the government. The Republic
bid for 3,500 and as the winning bidder and as a result a Certificate of Sale was issued. The
spouses were given a period of one year therefrom within which to redeem their property but
they never did up to the time of their deaths.
Claiming ownership of the same land as legal heirs of the deceased spouses,
petitioners filed with the RTC at Rosales, Pangasinan a complaint for Quieting of Title and
Cancellation of Encumbrance. Republic interposed a Motion to Dismiss grounded on the (1)
complaint’s failure to state cause of action and (2) prescription of petitioners’ right to redeem.
Petitioners contend that when respondent Republic moved to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action, it thereby hypothetically admitted all the allegations therein,
specifically the averment that despite the lapse of nineteen (19) years, respondent did not
secure the necessary Certificate of Final Sale and Writ of Possession and failed to execute
an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership.

Issue: Whether or not the proper remedy in the instant complaint is quieting of title and
cancellation of encumbrance.

Ruling: Instant petition denied.

Under Article 476 and 477 of the New Civil Code, the remedy may be availed of only when:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed
to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its
prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. These requisites are wanting in the
instant case. Petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest lost whatever right they had over land in
question from the very moment they failed to redeem it during the 1-year period of
redemption. Republic’s failure to execute the acts referred to by the petitioners within ten
(10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale cannot, in any way, operate to
restore whatever rights petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest had over the same. Also,
petitioners never put in issue, as in fact they admit in their pleadings, the validity of the
Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale. It was not proven that the cloud, although appeared to be valid
was in fact and in truth invalid or inoperative.
Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court, quieting of title is a
common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect
to title to real property. Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure an
adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the
complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever
afterward free from any danger of hostile claim.’ In an action for quieting of title, the
competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other
claimants, not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights
to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that
he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he
could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to
abuse the property as he deems best.

Heirs of Jose Olviga vs. Heirs of Cornelio Glor

G.R. No. 104813, 21 October 1993

Facts: In 1950, then twelve-year-old Eutiquio Pureza and his father cleared and cultivated
Lot 13, Pls-84 of Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision which measured more or less
54,406 sq.m. They introduced in 1954 improvements such as trees of coconut, jackfruit,
mangoes, avocado and bananas. Upon the land's release for disposition, the Bureau of
Lands surveyed it in Eutiquio Pureza's name.
Godofredo (Jose Olviga's son and brother of petitioners Virgilio and Lolita Olviga-Olila)
protested the survey but without respect to the half-a-hectare portion "sa dakong panulukan
ng Amihanan-Silanganan" which he claimed. Godofredo's protest is of public record in the
Bureau of Lands and it stated that he admitted the lot belonged to Eutiquio except for the
half-a-hectare portion included in the survey.

Eutiquio filed a homestead application in 1960 for Lot 13, but since no action was done on
his application, he transferred his rights to the lot in 1961 to Cornelio Glor, Sr.. The Bureau
of Lands' records did not disclose why there was no action for Eutiquio's homestead
application and the proposed transfer of rights to the land to Cornelio, Sr. The elder Cornelio
was sickly and since his wife Angelita was unschooled, she and her children failed to follow
up Eutiquio's homestead application in the cadastral proceedings held at the Municipal Court
of Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision. Angelita testified that she was never notified about
the outcome of said proceedings. The non-posting of the hearing of cadastral proceedings
was confirmed by Virgilio.

The Olvigas were Glors' neighbors. Jose claimed on the other hand adjoining lands Lot 12
and 13 in the cadastral proceeding. He falsely omitted that there were persons claiming
possession and adverse interests in Lot 13 and Eutiquio's sale of rights to Cornelio Sr. in
1961. Thus in 1967, the lands were awarded without contest to Jose Olviga and
subsequently registered under Original Certificate of Title No. 0-12713. Jose requested later
in 1971 that the land be splitted into two separate lots with separate titles. TCT Nos. T-
103823 and T-103824 were subsequently issued to Lots 12 and 13 respectively, and he later
on transferred Lot 13 to his daughter Lolita and her husband Jaime Olila.

Cornelio's widow Angelita filed in the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon an action
against the heirs of Jose Olviga to reconvey that parcel of land to her and her heirs. The
RTC rendered judgment in Angelita's favor after due trial, and it ordered the Olvigas' to
reconvey the land and pay attorney's fees.

Jose Olviga's heirs appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals, but it affirmed
the trial court's judgment in its 13 January 1992 decision (CA-G.R. CV No. 30542). It also
found that spouses Jaime and Lolita Olviga-Olila were not in possession of the disputed land
nor innocent purchasers for value and that the Glors and their predecessor-in-interest
Eutiquio Pureza were the possessors.

Issues addressed by the Supreme Court: The Olviga heirs asked for petition for review of the
CA's decision and the following issues were raised,

1. Whether or not plaintiffs' action is for quieting of title that does not prescribe, and
assuming their demand is for reconveyance of the land being based on implied trust,
prescribes in ten (10) years?

The Supreme Court held that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years, the point of reference being the
date of registration of the deed of the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the
property. But this rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property,
since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the
right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe.

2. Whether the Glors' cause of action accrued not in 1967 but in 1988, and as mere
homestead transferees, cannot maintain an action for reconveyance?

It was also held that the Glors and their predecessors-in-interest Cornelio Glor, Sr. and
Eutiquio Pureza were in actual possession of the property since 1950. Their undisturbed
possession gave them continuing right to seek aid of a court of equity to determine nature of
Olviga's adverse claim, who in 1988, disturbed their possession. Thus, the right to quiet the
property's title which seeks reconveyance and annulment of any certificate of title, accrues
only from the time the possessor was made aware of the adverse claim and it is only from
that time that the statutory period of prescription commences to run against him/her. It also
stated that the actual possessor of a piece of land claiming to be its owner may wait until
disturbance of his/her possession or the attack of his/her title before taking steps in
vindication of his/her right because his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right
to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse
claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one
who is in possession.

CASE DIGEST: HEIRS OF VALIENTES VS. RAMAS

G.R. No. 157852: December 15, 2010

HEIRS OF DOMINGO VALIENTES, Petitioners, v. Hon. ReInerio (Abraham) B. Ramas,

Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 29, 9th Judicial Region, San Miguel, Zamboanga del
Sur and Vilma V. Minor, Respondents.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of Valientes who, before his death, was the owner of
a parcel of land in Zamboanga delSur. In 1939, Valientes mortgaged the subject property to
secure his loan to the spouses Belen. In the 1950s, the Valientes family purportedly
attempted, but failed, to retrieve the subject property from the spouses Belen. Through an
allegedly forged document captioned VENTA DEFINITIVA purporting to be a deed of sale of
the subject property between Valientes and the spouses Belen, the latter obtained title over
the land. On February 28, 1970, the legitimate children of the late Valientes, had their
Affidavit of Adverse Claim. Upon the death of the spouses Belen, their surviving heirs
executed an extra-judicial settlement with partition and sale in favor of private respondent
Minor, the present possessor of the subject property. On June 20, 1979, Minor filed with the
then CFI a "PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF MEMORANDUM OF ENCUMBRANCE
APPEARING IN THE TITLE IN HER POSSESSION" which the RTC granted. On the other
hand, petitioners filed a complaint for the cancellation of the title in Minors possession and its
reconveyanceto them. On this complaint, Minor filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of forum shopping and litis pendentia, which the RTC dismissed. Undeterred, Minor
filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was granted. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration based on this decision which was denied. They appealed it to the CA,
which although found that there was no forum shopping nor litis pendentia, dismissed the
case on the ground of prescription and laches.

ISSUE:

Whether or not prescription or laches has already set in to bar the filing of the case at hand.

HELD: Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED

CIVIL CODE; PRESCRIPTION

When the plaintiff is in possession of the subject property, the action, being in effect that of
quieting of title to the property, does not prescribe. In the case at bar, petitioners are not in
possession of the subject property. In this case, if it were to be considered as that of
enforcing an implied trust, should have therefore been filed within ten years from the
issuance of TCT to spouses Belen.But, the case was instituted beyond the prescriptive
period.

As to the alternative defense of petitioners, applying Arts. 1141, 1134 and 1137 of the Civil
Code, thus entitling them to a 30 year period to assail the title, the Court ruled that the
applicable law in this instant case is Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree (since it is more specific that the general rules of the above
mentioned articles of the Civil Code). Under the Torrens System as enshrined in P.D. No.
1529, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued become incontrovertible
upon the expiration of one year from the date of entry of the decree of registration, without
prejudice to an action for damages against the applicant or any person responsible for the
fraud.

It took petitioners 28 before filing this case. This period is unreasonably long for a party
seeking to enforce its right to file the appropriate case. Thus, petitioners claim that they had
not slept on their rights is patently unconvincing.

G.R. No. L-38387 January 29, 1990

HILDA WALSTROM, petitioner-appellant, vs. FERNANDO

MAPA, JR., VICTORINO A. MAPA, MARIA C.M. DE GOCO,
FERNANDO MAPA, III, MARIO L. MAPA, and THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET, respondents-
appellees.
Facts:
Cacao Dianson, has a free patent application, he filed with the District Land Office in Baguio
City a letter protesting the construction in April, 1956 by Josefa Abaya Mapa of on the parcel
of land (described as "portion A") of one of the parcels of land covered by his Free Patent
Application.
The controversy was referred to Bureau of Lands Investigator Antonio Mejia. He found that
Josefa Abaya Mapa has filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application, the same was awarded to
her on May 12, 1934. The purchase price has been paid in full in 1943 evidenced by an
Official Receipt. Cacao Dianson filed a Free Patent Application for the same parcel of land
on June 1, 1956, alleging that the said land was first occupied by his father, Dianson, in
1884.
The regional land officer of Dagupan City decided that Free Patent Application of Cacao
Dianson should exclude Portion "A" which is covered by the Miscellaneous Sales Application
of Josefa Abaya Mapa. Two years after the death of Dianson, Walstrom filed a motion for
reconsideration, claiming that Dianson is her predecessor in interest, the motion for
reconsideration resulted in setting aside the decision of the Regional land officer. Mapa then
appealed to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources reinstated the decision of
the Regional land officer, then Gabriela Walstrom filed for motion for reconsideration but was
denied. While Walstrom filed for a second motion for reconsideration of the order of DANR,
Mapa filed a motion for execution. DANR granted the motion for execution. Walstrom then
filed a petition for relief with the DANR but then pending the petition, she died. The heirs of
Mapa pursued the case. This petition of Walstrom remained unresolved, according to
petitioner Hilda Walstrom, daughter of Gabriela Walstrom, she was compelled to file an
action in the court because the 1 year prescriptive period provided for in Sec 38 of Land
Registration act was about to lapse.
Issues:
*Whether or not Walstrom’s civil complaint against the respondents praying for nullification of
the Mapa’s sales patent and certificates of title issued by the register of deeds under Section
38 of Act 496 or the Land Registration Act is valid.
Ruling of the Court
SEC. 38 of Act 496 or the Land Registration Act provides that a decree of registration may
be reopened or reviewed by the proper Regional Trial Court upon the concurrence of five
essential requisites, to wit: (a) that the petitioner has a real and a dominical right; (b) that he
has been deprived thereof;(c) through fraud; (d) that the petition is filed within one year from
the issuance of the decree; and (e) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an
innocent purchaser for value.
An examination of the records of the case shows non-concurrence of the essential elements
enumerated above.
The first element is patently not present because the petitioner cannot allege that she has
already a real and dominical right to the piece of property in controversy since the decision
of the regional land officer was upheld by the DANR secretary. That the petitioner's Free
Patent Application shall exclude the disputed portion "A" of Lot No. 1, which, instead, shall
be included in the Mapas' Miscellaneous Sales Application.
The second element is also absent, the petitioner cannot aver that she was deprived of
property because she did not have a real right over portion "A".
As to the third element, the records are bereft of any indication that there was fraud in the
issuance of the certificates of title.
The court also finds that the lower court was correct in holding that the case does not fall
under any of the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. Instead of
invoking Section 38, the petitioner should have pressed for the speedy resolution of her
petition with the DANR. The petitioner’s fear that since the one-year prescriptive period for
seeking judicial relief provided for in Sec. 38 of the Land Registration Act was about to lapse,
she was compelled to file the action to nullify said patent is not correct.
The court has ruled before in Amerol vs. Bagumbaran that notwithstanding the irrevocability
of the Torrens title already issued in the name of another person, he can still be compelled
under the law to reconvey the subject property to the rightful owner. After all, the Torrens
system was not designed to shield and protect one who had committed fraud or
misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith.
In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible.
What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful and legal
owner, or to one with a better right.
Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust is not absolute
nor is it imprescriptible. An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
must perforce prescribe in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.

The court upheld the decision of the trial court.