37. G.R. No.
L-24440 March 28, 1968
THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE
vs.
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE and
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
Facts:
Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the then
Zamboanga Province. Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the
Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City, and Section 50 of the act
provides that the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired
and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor
General. The Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General,
pursuant to Commonwealth Act 39, fixed the value of the properties and
buildings in question.
Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into
two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. The assets and
obligations of the old province were to be divided between the two new
ones, and Sec. 6 of that law provides that, the funds, assets and other
properties and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga shall be
divided equitably between the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the
Province of Zamboanga del Sur. The Auditor General apportioned the
assets and obligations of the defunct Province of Zamboanga.
Republic Act 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act
39, which provides that, all buildings, properties and assets belonging to
the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of
Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City
of Zamboanga. Consequently, the Secretary of Finance ordered
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to stop from effecting further payments
to Zamboanga del Norte and to return to Zamboanga City the sum taken
from it out of the internal revenue allotment of Zamboanga del Norte.
Plaintiff-appellee Zamboanga del Norte filed a complaint entitled
"Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction" in the Court of
First Instance. The lower court declared Republic Act No. 3039
1
unconstitutional insofar as it deprives plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte of its
private properties. The defendants then brought the case before the Court
on appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act 3039 is unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff
province of property without due process and just compensation.
Held:
No, the validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the lots and
buildings in question. Arts. 423 of the Civil Code provides that, the property
of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public use
and patrimonial property. And Article 424 of the Civil Code provides that,
property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists
of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares,
fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service
paid for by said provinces, cities, or [Link] other property
possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this
Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
Applying the said provisions, under the principles constituting the law of
Municipal Corporations, all of the properties in question which are devoted
to public service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. And to be
considered public, it is enough that the property be held and, devoted for
governmental purposes like local administration, public education, public
health, etc.
Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site,
school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the high
school playground sites since these were held by the former Zamboanga
province in its governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the
absolute control of Congress. But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to
deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the value of the rest of the
remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since they are not being
utilized for distinctly, governmental purposes. Since the remaining lots
2
were registered, it strengthens the proposition that they are truly private in
nature.
Therefore, it results then that Zamboanga del Norte is still entitled to collect
from the City of Zamboanga the former's share in the remaining properties
which are patrimonial in nature. Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby
ordered to return to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte in lump sum the amount,
which the former took back from the latter out of the sum previously paid to
the latter
3
38. G.R. No. L-12457 January 22, 1919
SERVILLANO AQUINO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EMETERIO TAÑEDO, defendant-appellant
FACTS:
In 1913, Aquino purchased several parcels of land for the price of P45,000
from Tañedo, who acknowledged receipt of the sum of P10,000, as a part
of this price. The contracting parties stipulating that the rest should be paid
on certain dates. By virtue of this contract, the Aquino took possession of
the lands purchased. By virtue of another contract, both agreed to consider
the previous contract as rescinded and of no value. As a result, Aquino
returned to Tañedo the lands together with all the documents pertaining
thereto. Tañedo, instead of returning the price received by him, subscribed
in another document to acknowledge that he owes Aquino P10, 000, and
P2, 000 as interest thereon. Tañedo paid Aquino the P2,000 in accordance
with the contract but no time was fixed for the payment of the other
P10,000.
Aquino filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, wherein he
demanded of the defendant the payment of the P10,000. Both parties
stipulated that, in the event that the court should find that the defendant's
obligation was not due, they should move the court merely to fix the period
in which this sum should be paid. The Court rendered judgment, fixing a
period of three months for the payment of P10,000 by Tañedo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Aquino is obliged to return the value of the product of the
lands, collected by him during the time he was in possession of them until
the plaintiff returned the lands to Tañedo.
Held:
4
No, article 1295 of the Civil code, prescribes that the rescission obliges the
return of the things which were the objects of the contract, with their fruits
and the price with interest. Article 1295 refers to contract that are
rescindible in accordance with law in the cases expressly fixed thereby, but
it does not refer to contracts that are rescinded by mutual consent and for
the mutual convenience of the contracting parties.
Also under artilcle 451 of Civil Code, it provides that, the fruits collected by
a possessor in good faith become his own and he is not obliged to return
them to the defendant. In the absence of any covenant, this provisions
should be applied to the present case. Equity also lies on the plaintiff's
side, because, as the record shows, for the improvement of the land and in
order to produce the fruits which he collected, he incurred expenses in an
amount such that the products collected by him may, reasonably, be
considered equivalent to the interest for tone year on the P10,000 which he
had paid to the defendant.
5
39.G.R. No. 198774, April 04, 2016
TEOFILO ALOLINO, Petitioner, v. FORTUNATO FLORES AND
ANASTACIA MARIE FLORES, Respondents.
FACTS:
Alolino constructed a bungalow-type house, where he added a
second floor, and extending his two-storey house up to the edge
of his property. There are terraces on both floors, and three
windows on the perimeter wall of each floor.
In 1994, Spouses Flores constructed their house/sari sari store on
the vacant municipal/barrio road immediately adjoining the rear
perimeter wall of Alolino's house. The spouses could not secure a
building permit since there was a construction on a municipal
road. The spouses structure is only about two (2) to three (3)
inches away from the back of Alolino's house, covering five
windows and the exit door, which deprived Alolino of the light and
ventilation he had previously enjoyed and prevented his ingress
and egress to the municipal road through the rear door of his
house.
Alolino demanded that the spouses remove their structure but the
latter refused. He complained about the illegal construction to the
Building Official of the Municipality of Taguig. He also filed a
complaint with the Barangay of Tuktukan. The Building Official
issued a Notice of Illegal Construction against the spouses to stop
further construction.
Alolino filed another complaint with the Building Official of Taguig
when the spouses began constructing a second floor to their
structure, again without securing a building permit. The building
official issued a second Notice of Illegal Construction.
For failure of the spouses to comply, Alolino filed a complaint
against the respondents with the RTC praying for the removal of
the encroaching structure, the enforcement of his right to
easement of light and view, and the payment of damages. After
6
the answer of the spouses, the RTC rendered a judgment
ordering the respondents to remove their illegal structure
obstructing Alolino's right to light and view.
The spouses appealed the decision to the CA which reversed the
RTC decision. Alolino moved for reconsideration which the CA
denied. Thus, Alolino filed the present petition for review
on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Alolino had acquired an easement of light
and view by virtue of a title because the respondents constructed
their house on a barrio road.
Held: No, section 5 of Book II, Title VII, Chapter 2 of the Civil
Code (Articles 667-673) governs legal easements of light
and view provides for the creation of a legal easement of light
and view which can only be acquired through prescription or by
virtue of a voluntary title. Therefore, Alolino does not have an
easement of light and view or an easement of right of way over
the respondents' property or the barrio road it stands on.
7
40.G.R. No. 198594
HELEN CALIMOSO, MARILYN P. CALIMOSO and LIBY P.
CALIMOSO, Petitioners,
vs.
AXEL D. ROULLO, Respondent.
FACTS:
Roullo’s Complaint for Easement of Right of Way alleged that his lot is
isolated by several surrounding estates, owned by petitioners, and that the
shortest and most convenient access to the nearest public road, passes
through the petitioners’ lot. Petitioners objected to the establishment of the
easement alleging that the respondent has other right-of-way alternatives.
The RTC granted the respondent’s complaint and ordered the petitioners to
provide the respondent an easement of right-of-way, and it ordered the
respondent to pay the petitioners proper indemnity of the portion of the lot
subject of the [Link] petitioners appealed the RTC’s decision to the
CA, which affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. The petitioners moved to
reconsider the CA’s decision but were denied. Thus, the petitioners filed
the present petition for review on certiorari
Issue: Whether or not the right-of- way passing through the petitioners’ lot
satisfies the fourth requirement of being established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate.
Held: No, to be entitled to an easement of right-of-way, the following
requisites are, the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and
has no adequate outlet to a public highway; there is payment of proper
indemnity; the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate; and the right-of-way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest.
Under Article 650 of the Civil Code, it provides that the easement of right-
of-way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. If these two
criteria (shortest distance and least damage) do not concur in a single
8
tenement, we have held in the past that the least prejudice criterion
must prevail over the shortest distance criterion.
In this case, although this right-of-way has the shortest distance to a public
road, it is not the least prejudicial considering the destruction it may
caused. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required
by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement; that a longer way
may be adopted to avoid injury to the servient estate, such as when there
are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round-about way.
Therefore, Roullo cannot be granted the right-of- way passing through the
petitioners’ lot.
9
41.G.R. No. 201354, September 21, 2016
PABLO M. PADILLA, JR. AND MARIA LUISA P.
PADILLA, Petitioners, v. LEOPOLDO MALICSI, LITO CASINO,
AND AGRIFINO GUANES, Respondents
FACTS: In 1984, petitioner Spouses Padilla bought a parcel of land in
Cabanatuan City. Sometime in 1998, Spouses Padilla discovered
that respondents constructed houses on their lot. After the refusal
of the respondents to vacate the premises upon demand of the
Spouses Padilla, the matter was referred to Katarungang
Pambarangay where it failed for the conciliation proceedings and
amicable settlement. Spouses Padilla filed a complaint for
recovery of possession against respondent Malicsi, along with
three others, who alleged that they are possessor in good faith,
and that the areas occupied by their houses was agreed to be
sold to them, provided that pending full payment, it would be
paid in rent.
In 2009, Spouses Padilla, exercising their option to sell the land
under Article 448 of the Civil Code, filed a Motion and
Manifestation with Offer to Sell. But Malicsi [Link] did not accept
the offer. Thereafter, the Regional Trial Court ruled that Malicsi,
et al. cannot be considered as builders in good faith. Malicsi, et
al. appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set
aside the Regional Trial Court Decision by declaring the
respondents as builders in good faith. Thus the petitioners
spouses elevated the case to this Court by way of petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents are builders in good faith
10
HELD:
No, in the case of Sarmiento v. Agana and Spouses Macasaet v.
Spouses Macasaet, where the CA had relied to support its
reversal of the Regional Trial Court Decision, there can be found
such peculiar circumstance of close family relations, which is
absent in the present case. Therefore, the respondents, as
builders in bad faith, have no right to recover their expenses over
the improvements they have introduced to petitioners' lot as
provided under Article 449 of the Civil Code, which provides that,
he who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another,
loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.
Although as provided under Article 452 of the Civil Code, a
builder in bad faith is entitled to recoup the necessary expenses
incurred for the preservation of the land, the respondents herein
neither alleged nor presented evidence to show that they
introduced improvements for the preservation of the land.
Furthermore, as provided under Article 450 of the Civil Code,
petitioners as landowners became the owners of the
improvements on the lot, including the residential buildings
constructed by respondents, if they chose to appropriate the
accessions. However, they could instead choose the demolition of
the improvements at respondents' expense or compel
respondents to pay the price of the land. In this case, considering
that petitioners pray for the reinstatement of the RTC Decision
ordering respondents to vacate the lot and surrender its
possession to them, petitioners are deemed to have chosen to
appropriate the improvements built on their lot without any
obligation to pay indemnity to respondents.
11
42.G.R. No. 193618, November 28, 2016
HEIRS OF LEOPOLDO DELFIN AND SOLEDAD DELFIN,
NAMELY EMELITA D. FABRIGAR AND LEONILO C.
DELFIN, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY, Respondent
Ponente: LEONEN, J.:
FACTS:
In a Complaint for "Payment of Parcel(s) of Land and
Improvements and Damages" the Delfin Spouses claimed that
they have a property in Iligan City, which they bought in 1951
from Natingo and Carbonay, who had been in actual possession
of the property since time immemorial, it has been planted by
them, and that, respondent National Housing Authority forcibly
took possession of a portion of the property, contending that it
was part of a military reservation area under Proclamation No.
2151. The Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision in favor of the
Delfin Spouses. The National Housing Authority filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the same was denied. On the National
Housing Authority's appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court as it ruled that, the
characterization of the property is no longer an issue but the
Delfin Spouses failed to establish their possession of the property
since June 12, 1945, as required in Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act.
During the pendency of their petition, the spouses died but the
surviving heirs, Emelita D. Fabrigar and Leonilo C. Delfin was
denied in their Motion for Substitution before the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUES:
12
Whether or not petitioners may claim the title pursuant to Section
48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (the Public Land Act), and
not by prescription.
HELD:
Yes, petitioners acquired title over the Iligan Property pursuant to
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.. Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act,requires that two (2) requisites be satisfied before
claims of title to public domain lands may be confirmed: first,
that the land subject of the claim is agricultural land; and second,
open, continuous, notorious, and exclusive possession of the land
since June 12, 1945.
In this case, as to the first requirement: There was no need for
appellees to establish that the property involved was alienable
and disposable public land. This characterization of the property
is conceded by [respondent] who cites Proclamation No. 2151 as
declaring that the disputed property was a certain disposable
parcel of public land. And second, although the Delfin Spouses'
testimonial evidence and tax declarations showed that their
possession went only as far back as 1952, the Deputy Public Land
Inspector in its letter to the Director of Land, nevertheless
attested that the property had already been occupied as early as
June 1945.
Having shown that the requisites of Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act have been satisfied and having established their rights
to the Iligan Property, it follows that petitioners must be
compensated for its taking.
13
14
43.G.R. No. 213568, July 05, 2016
ALICIA P. LOGARTA, Petitioner, v. CATALINO M.
MANGAHIS, Respondent.
Ponente:
FACTS: Respondent Mangahis, the registered owner of a parcel of land in
Laguna, with had authorized a Zamora (Zamora) to sell the subject
property, who, in turn, delegated his authority to Peña.
In 2001, Peña entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Carmona
Realty, represented by petitioner Logarta for the sale to Carmona Realty of
contiguous parcels of land in Laguna which included the subject property.
In 2008, respondent filed a petition 1 to cancel the subject entries on the
MOA on the ground that the instrument was a private document that had no
legal effect since the Notary Public that acknowledged it was not
commissioned, which was opposed by the petitioner. The RTC granted the
petition and ordered the cancellation of the subject entries. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but was denied. Petitioner appealed to the CA
but it dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed the RTC ruling. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but was denied by the CA.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the CA and the RTC erred in ordering the cancellation of
the subject entries.
HELD:
Yes, Section 70 of PD 1529 authorizes regional trial courts to cancel
adverse claims after the lapse of thirty (30) days from registration. A
voluntary dealing affecting less than the ownership of the subject property,
is subject to Section 54 of PD 1529, which states that, the cancellation of
annotations involving interests less than ownership is within the power of
the Register of Deeds.
15
In this case, the MOA shows that it is essentially a conditional sale where
Carmona Realty's payment is subject to the submission of certain
documents by Peña, which is Mangahis’ authorized representative. There
was no showing that respondent refused or failed to present the owner's
duplicate of TCT which would have prompted Carmona Realty to cause the
annotation of the MOA as an adverse claim instead of a voluntary dealing.
Therefore, the RTC and the CA erred in ordering the cancellation of the
subject entries, when it should have dismissed the petition for cancellation
of the subject entries for being the wrong remedy.
16
44. G.R. No. 185857-58 June 29, 2016
TRIFONIA D. GABUTAN vs.
DANTE D. NACALABAN, HELEN N. MAANDIG, SUSAN N. SIAO, and
CAGAYAN CAPITOL COLLEGE
FACTS:
Godofredo Nacalaban purchased a property in Cagayan de Oro City, TCT
was issued in his name and he built a house on it. In 1974, Godofredo died,
and was survived by his wife, Baldomera, and their children. In 1979,
Baldomera issued a Certification in favor of her mother, Melecia. The
house was declared for taxation purposes, where it is shown that Melecia
owned the building on the land owned by Godofredo.
In 1994, Baldomera died. Her children executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate of Deceased Person with Sale where they adjudicated
unto themselves the property and sold it to the College. Thereafter, a TCT
of property was issued in the name of the College.
In 1997, Melecia died and was survived by her children. The College
demanded to the heirs of Melecia who were occupying the house on the
property, to vacate the premises.
The petitioners filed a Complaint for Reconveyance of Real Property,
Declaration of Nullity of Contracts, Partition and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Attachment and Injunction against Nacalaban, et al. and the
College which was opposed by the defending party.
17
The College filed a separate Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and
Damages with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) against the Heirs
of Melecia, which was opposed by the petitioners.
The heirs of Melecia were given 30 days from notice to vacate the property
by the MTCC. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but was
denied. Thus, the Heirs of Melecia filed a petition for review before the CA.
Meanwhile, in the reconveyance case, the RTC rendered a Decision in
favor of Gabutan.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the action for reconveyance was proper
2. Whether the College is a buyer in good faith
HELD:
[Link], an action for reconveyance is imprescriptible because the plaintiffs
are in possession of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an
implied or a constructive trust prescribes 10 years from the alleged
fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the
property. However, an action for reconveyance based on implied or
constructive trust is imprescriptible if the plaintiff or the person enforcing the
trust is in possession of the property.
In this case, an implied resulting trust was created between Melecia and
Godofredo when the Heirs of Melecia established that it was Melecia's
money that was used in buying the property, but its title was placed in
Godofredo's name. Therefore, the action for reconveyance filed by the
petitioners was proper.
2. Yes, College is a buyer in bad faith. To prove good faith, a buyer of
registered and titled land need only show that he relied on the face of the
title to the property. He need not prove that he made further inquiry for he is
not obliged to explore beyond the four comers of the title. Such degree of
proof of good faith, however, is sufficient only when the following conditions
concur: first, the seller is the registered owner of the land; second, the
latter is in possession thereof; and third, at the time of the sale, the buyer
was not aware of any claim or interest of some other person in the
18
property, or of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his
capacity to convey title to the property.
In this case, the College has the burden to prove the status of being a
purchaser in good faith as it is required to prove the concurrence of the
above conditions.
19
