THE FOREIGN POLICY

OF GREECE
by Constantine A. Stephanou
Jean Monnet Chair, Professor, Panteion University

Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis (U.N.)

THE BACKGROUND clash of civilisations. Greeks are fa-

CONDITIONS mous for their openness and hos-
Cultural setting pitality (philoxenia). It is therefore
Greece, in 3000 year long history not surprising that Christians, Mus-
has succeeded in preserving its lims and Jews living around the
Mediterranean, the Black Sea and
strong national identity, what is
elsewhere are attracted to Greece,
usually referred to as “Hellenism”.
the meeting point of civilisations.
This being said, many facets of this
identity have been diffused world- Geopolitical setting
wide and became part of other civil- Greece’s unique position at the
isations. Hellenism runs over and crossroads of civilisations is cou-
above the religious divide and pled to its exceptional strategic lo-
what came to be known as the cation. It is the hub of transport and

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communications from Europe to as substantial military contingents

the Middle East and is essential to for peace-keeping purposes.
the logistic support of neighbouring
countries. The strategic importance Promoting European
of Greece has been a crucial factor Political Union
in the shaping of the foreign poli- Greek public opinion has consis-
cies of external powers. Greece, tently been pro-European. In the Eu-
however, has been cautious in ex- robarometer polls, the deepening
ploiting its strategic position, align- and widening of the European
ing itself with the western democ- Union receive overwhelming sup-
racies in the two World Wars and port. Moreover, the leaders of the
contributing with its large merchant two major political parties, New
marine to the victories. Democracy and PASOK, frequently
refer to the federal future of the Eu-
GENERAL FOREIGN POLICY ropean Union. Until, however, such
OBJECTIVES a state is reached, Greece is strong-
Promoting peace and security ly attached to the principle of equal
Greece has been a staunch sup- footing in EU institutions and sup-
porter of the United Nations and ports a strong role for the so-called
the specialised agencies since supranational institutions, namely
their inception and has been ac- the European Commission and the
tively involved in their activities. European Parliament.
Greece always deplored the block-
ing of Security Council resolutions In addition, Greece is likely to sup-
by permanent members and the port any measure enhancing the
politicisation of some specialised diplomatic capability of the Union,
agencies, which impaired their ef- as long as this does not lead to the
fectiveness. formation of a closed directoire of
the larger member states. Europe
Regional defence pacts such as should speakwith one voice not only
NATO are, in Greece’s view, an on trade and economic affairs but on
essential element of collective se- security as well. Following the Treaty
curity. From 1952, when Greece be- amendments at Maastricht and Am-
came a member of NATO, until sterdam extending the scope of the
1974, the main threats to Greece’s European Union to the so-called
security were deemed to originate Petersberg military tasks, Greece
from the Warsaw Pact. The inva- has actively contributed to efforts
sion and occupation of Northern aimed at building a European Secu-
Cyprus and the claims in the rity and Defence Identity (ESDI) and
Aegean by another NATO member, to establish a 60,000 men European
Turkey, have since affected Greek Rapid Reaction Force by 1 July 2003.
defence planning and expenditure. Greece pledged to contribute a
Nevertheless, Greece kept fulfilling 3,500 men contingent, to be com-
its obligations as a NATO member posed of professional military.
and, following the historical
changes of 1989 and the emer- Preserving the US-Greek
gence of NATO’s new role, Greece strategic partnership
has provided facilities for NATO’s US-Greek relations have been
operations in the Balkans, as well based on the common commit-

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ment of the two countries to free- neighbours and a conciliation and

dom and democracy. US assis- arbitration agreement with Turkey.
tance was of critical importance for In the post World War II Balkans
the economic recovery of Greece in the Iron Curtain was an impedi-
the 1950s. Nevertheless, Greek ment to cooperation, with the ex-
public opinion has held the United ception, however, of relations with
States responsible for interference non-aligned Yugoslavia. In the
in Greek politics during the same 1980s, Greece provided unam-
period and for supporting the mil- biguous support to international
itary dictatorship that ruled Greece initiatives on arms reductions and
from 1967 to 1974. More recently, confidence building measures.
however, it has been the United
States rather than Greece that Since the end of the cold war and
have complained about the con- the democratic transition in Bulgar-
duct of its partner. The United ia and Romania, Greece has active-
States have been critical of Greek ly supported the inclusion of these
disarmament initiatives during countries into the Euro-atlantic
the last period of the Cold War and structures. Greece believes that the
of Greek attitudes towards libera- gradual extension of the European
tion movements, deemed by the Union and NATO to the Balkans is
United States to be terrorist move- the most effective way to ensure
ments. Nevertheless, Greek gov- stability and prosperity in the re-
ernments have invariably support- gion. Greece has played an active
ed US involvement in the security role in shaping EU policies and re-
of Southeastern Europe and the lated initiatives for political and
Eastern Mediterranean, because of economic reforms and institution-
the permanent threat of instability building in the Balkans, such as
in the region. In Greece’s view, the the South East Europe Cooperation
United States are capable of con- Initiative (SECI), the Royaumont Ini-
taining crises by projecting military tiative and, since the end of the
power in the area, although inter- Kosovo war, the Stability Pact for
vention should always be compat- Southeastern Europe and the EU
ible with the provisions of the initiatives for the Western Balkans
U.N. Charter. Moreover, coopera- which were given a boost at the Eu-
tion with other major powers, such ropean Council meeting of Thessa-
as Russia and China, is essential loniki in June 2003.
for the smooth functioning of the
United Nations. Good-neighbourly relations and
participation in regional coopera-
tion ventures are now political
PROMOTING STABILITY, conditionalities for joining the EU.
DEMOCRACY AND In contrast to bilateral cooperation,
ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN multilateral cooperation among
SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE Balkan countries is minimal, when
Stability and security compared to cooperation among
Greece has a long record of pro- Nordic, Baltic or Central European
moting the cause of stability in the countries. Intra-balkan cooperation
Balkans. In the 1930s Greece ne- was given a boost following
gotiated a Balkan Pact with its Greece’s initiative to host in 1997

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Signing the Treaty of Accession, April 16, 2003

(C. Simitis, Prime Minister - G. Papandreou, Minister of Foreign Affairs)

the first meeting of the South East tingent, to the “Alba” operation,
Europe Cooperation Process at aimed at restoring Albania’s infra-
the level of Heads of Government structure after the economic col-
in Heraklion, Crete. The second lapse of this country in the early
meeting took place in 1998 in An- 1990’s. Greece is still contributing
talya, Turkey, setting the stage for to the reconstruction efforts and
annual high-level meetings, aimed considers the Greek minority living
at building trust among the leaders in Southern Albania as a bridge be-
of the Balkan nations. These meet- tween the two countries.
ings led to the adoption of the
Charter on good-neighbourly rela- Economic deprivation has led to a
tions and cooperation and, more large influx of immigrants from
recently, to the conclusion of the the former communist countries.
agreement establishing the South- On the other hand, political
east Europe Energy Community. refugees from Turkey, Irak and
other countries also arrived in
Economic recovery large numbers. Greek NGOs have
The Balkan and Black Sea coun- provided critical support to asylum
tries have traditionally belonged to seekers and refugees. Although
the economic periphery of Europe. the number of persons enjoying
For those countries that were be- the status of refugee, approxi-
hind the Iron Curtain, transition mately 7,000, may appear relative-
from the command economy to the ly small, it is substantial compared
market economy entailed sub- to the number of refugees living in
stantial hardship to local societies. states with larger populations.
Greece has provided significant re- Moreover, asylum seekers, of
sources, including a military con- which there are approximately

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Greek Presidency at the Security Council (U.N.)

Minister of Foreign Afffairs Dora Bakoyanni

50,000 in Greece, are entitled to countries. Greektechnical assistance

work, once their application for to these countries has been provided
asylum is properly registered; under the “Phare”, “Tempus” and
more recently, they have obtained “Tacis” programmes. Greece availed
full health coverage. itself of the Interreg programme in or-
der to finance projects of interest to
The Greek government has also tak- neighbouring Balkan countries. Both
en steps aimed at the legalisation of Greekpublicand private sector enter-
economic immigrants. Almost a mil- prises have invested heavily in the
lion illegal immigrants (more than area. Greece isnow the largestforeign
half Albanians) living in Greece investor in the Former Yugoslav Re-
have availed themselves of the op- public of Macedonia and among the
portunity to be legalised since 1996. main investors in Albania, Bulgaria
Once legalised they are subject to and Romania. Greekenterpriseshave
Greek labour and social security been assisted by Greekbanks, most
law; in addition, they are eligible for of which are present in the Balkan
Greek citizenship after eight years of capitals and provide significant
residence in Greece. Moreover, even amounts of venture capital. Greek
illegal immigrants may benefit from contractors already participate in
the National Health System - and large infrastructure projects in the
their children may enroll in the State Balkan and BlackSea areas. Finally,
Education System. Thessaloniki hosts among other in-
ternational institutions, the Black
Greece has actively promoted assis- Sea Development Bank and the
tance to the Balkan and Black Sea Agency for Balkan Reconstruction.

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Greece and the Yugoslav the region, as well as for its partic-
tinderbox ipation in international economic
The end of communist rule has re- organisations, while also ensuring
vived ethnic feelings in the Balkans the flourishing of all ethnic groups
and has led to the break-up of Yu- in an inclusive society. On the
goslavia. This process took place in other hand, an agreement is un-
a disorderly manner. Minorities likely to be reached unless Serbia,
did not receive international guar- a key country in Southeastern Eu-
antees, and national sensitivities rope, is given a prospect of early
of neighbouring countries were accession to the EU.
not taken care of. Greece objected
to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Greece’s knowledge and under-
Macedonia (FYROM) carrying the standing of the intricacies of
name Macedonia. At best, it could Southeastern Europe, as well as its
lead to a confusion with the North- willingness to contribute to the po-
ern Greek Province of Macedonia litical and economic development
or, worse, it could imply expansion- of its neighbourhood - and to as-
ist designs by the newly-born State. sume the related risks - makes it
In October 1995 the two countries a key player in the area, and the
signed an interim agreement pro- country through which most public
viding, among other things, for aid and private investment is chan-
U.N. mediation on the name issue. neled and / or coordinated.
Greece has supported the conclu-
sion of the Stabilisation and Asso-
ciation agreement between the GREECE AND TURKEY:
EU and FYROM which provides a From a strained
prospect of accession to the latter. to a normal relationship
Greece and FYROM have developed The Aegean disputes
very substantial economic ties, Although both Greece and Turkey
but a compromise on the name is- joined NATO in 1952, they have had
sue, acceptable to both of them, different perceptions of their secu-
will weigh heavily on Greece’s po- rity interests. In Greece, although
sition regarding the accession of FY- there have been varied assess-
ROM to NATO and the EU. ments of the security threat posed
by Turkey, the general perception
Greece, through the Hellenic aid has been that since 1974 this coun-
agency, has provided substantial try wanted to change the Aegean
development aid to the countries status quo in a manner which
of Southeast Europe. On the other would annex Greece’s Eastern
hand, Greece understands Alban- Aegean islands into Turkish zones
ian and Serb sensitivities in the of functional responsibility (conti-
Kosovo conflict and has deployed nental shelf, Flight Information Re-
approximately 1,500 military per- gion, sea and rescue responsibil-
sonnel for the peace-keeping op- ities, NATO command responsibil-
eration. Greece considers that the ities etc.). These goals, coupled
proposals submitted by the U.N. with Turkish demands for the de-
mediator in early 2007 provide a militarisation of the islands facing
good basis for a compromise, al- Turkey - which have been mili-
lowing for the self-government of tarised after the Turkish invasion of

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Cyprus - were deemed by Greece as The Cyprus conflict

evidence of a policy aimed at un- A main cause of friction between
dermining Greek sovereignty over Greece and Turkey is the Cyprus
the aforementioned islands. conflict. The Turkish invasion and
occupation in 1974 of 36% of the
Moreover, the non-recognition by territory of the Republic of Cyprus
Turkey of the 10 mile limit of Greek (where the Turkish Cypriots repre-
air-space and the Turkish position sented only 18% of the population,
that the expansion of the Greek ter- the rest being almost exclusively
ritorial sea to 12 miles (in accor- Greek-Cypriots) resulted in the
dance with the U.N. Law of the Sea displacement of 200,000 Greek
Convention) would constitute a Cypriots from the North to the
casus belli, were perceived by South (subsequently replaced by
Greece as evidence of Turkish ag- 100,000 settlers from Turkey). A
gressiveness. It may also be re- just settlement of the Cyprus issue,
called that in 1976 and 1987 Greek- based on a bi-zonal and bi-com-
Turkish disputes over the continen- munal federation, as agreed in
tal shelf and, in January 1996 un- the 1977 and 1979 summits be-
folded claims over an uninhabited tween the Greek Cypriot and Turk-
islet of the Imia group, came close ish Cypriot leaders could pave the
to triggering a war between the two way for expanded cooperation be-
countries. Furthermore, air warfare tween Greece and Turkey.
over the Aegean (frequent dog-
fights with sophisticated aircraft) In April 2004 a plan for the reuni-
carried serious risks of escalation. fication of Cyprus drafted by the
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan
Relations with Turkey have drastical- failed to meet the expectations of
ly improved since the Summer of the Greek Cypriots, as the plan
1999. A few weeks after the launch- –though trying to be reasonably
ing of negotiations aimed at promot- balanced– did not set a definite
ing good neighbourliness and func- timetable for the withdrawal of
tional cooperation, Turkey and Turkish troops and substantial
Greece were hit by catastrophic numbers of settlers, while also ex-
earthquakes. The unprecedented tending the right of intervention of
solidarity demonstrated by the peo- the three guarantor powers, the
ples of the two countries paved the UK, Greece and Turkey; these
way to a fundamental reassessment rights deemed contrary to interna-
of the relationship in the two capi- tional law, were also perceived as
tals. Important bilateral agreements incompatible with membership of
were signed (in February 2000) the EU. Nevertheless, the two
and committees were established communities in Cyprus are gradu-
to promote cooperation in various ally moving closer to each other. In-
fields. Moreover, confidence-build- deed, following the decision of the
ing measures have been finally im- Turkish Cypriot administration to
plemented and new measures were allow the free movement of per-
discussed in the NATO framework. sons, many Turkish Cypriots are
Moreover, the Greek position on EU- now employed by Greek Cypriot
Turkish relations changed dramat- companies. Greece has supported
ically, as explained below. the Government of Cyprus on the

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issue of Turkish Cypriot exports to Republic and preparing the ground

the EU, which should bear the for its accession to the EU in May
seal of the Republic of Cyprus or an 2004, together with the nine other
EU seal if an agreement was European countries which signed
reached on the opening of the their accession agreements in
port of Famagusta. Athens, on 16 April 2003.

The Cypriot government has demon- Greek foreign policy came, however,
strated its willingness to facilitate many times at odds with EU policy
the contacts and cooperation be- on Turkey. Greece’s opposition to
tween the two communities, by de- the Customs Union Agreement and
molishing the wall on the Green Line related financial assistance to Turkey
as a confidence-building measure. was lifted on 6 March 1995, only af-
ter Greece secured a promise by the
Further to the possibilities offered Council that accession negotiations
to the T/C by the E.U. Financial Reg- with Cyprus would start six months
ulation and the Green Line regula- after the end of the Intergovernmen-
tion, there are also bilateral meas- tal Conference scheduled to prepare
ures recently announced by the the EU for enlargement.
Cypriot government to boost the
economy in the occupied part of The European partners of Greece,
Cyprus, as well to improve the most of which are members of
well being of the T/C. NATO, have been reluctant to sup-
port Greece in cases of direct con-
EU involvement frontation between this country
in Greek-Turkish disputes and Turkey. Nevertheless, in the
Belonging to the European Com- dispute over the Imia islets, the
munity was perceived as a valu- Council of Ministers called on
able security asset when Greece Turkey to refer its claim to the In-
submitted its application for mem- ternational Court of Justice. There-
bership in 1975. Greece has since after, the Luxemburg summit of the
benefited from its participation European Council in December
in EC / EU policy-making but has 1997 refused to include Turkey
had trouble convincing its partners among the countries eligible for EU
to contribute to the settlement of membership on the grounds that
Greek-Turkish disputes. this country did not meet the po-
litical requirements, including ac-
The aforementioned involvement ceptance of the compulsory juris-
actually started with a dispute diction of the International Court of
that is not Greek-Turkish as such, Justice. Interestingly, Greece made
the Cyprus conflict. EU partners known to Turkey that, notwith-
displayed solidarity on this issue, standing the fact that this country
insofar as it was related to Interna- had not accepted the compulsory
tional Law, by refusing to recognise jurisdiction of the Court, it would
the secession and independence itself accept its jurisdiction in any
of the self-proclaimed Turkish Re- proceedings instituted by Turkey.
public of Northern Cyprus in 1983
and by developing the relationship Turkish accession to the EU
with the internationally recognised Greece was long perceived by

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Turkey as a country conspiring to tablished between Prime Ministers

achieve its permanent exclusion Karamanlis and Erdogan, leading
from Europe. Nevertheless, after to a de-escalation of Greek -Turkish
the rebuff of Turkey by the Euro- conflicts to issue conflicts rather
pean Popular Party (Christian De- than existential threats. Turkish ac-
mocrats) in 1997, the then Foreign cession to the EU, a not too distant
Minister Theodore Pangalos ac- prospect if Turkey continues its ad-
knowledged publicly that Turkey is justment process, will entail,
part of Europe from a historical among other things, a common cit-
viewpoint, and since the Elsinki izenship and a common currency
E.U. Summit in 1999, all Greek between the two neighbours. This
governments have actively sup- would give a new boost to the eco-
ported Turkey’s european perspec- nomic relations which have flour-
tive. In Greece΄s view, Turkey is en- ished in the context of the Customs
titled to a fair treatment, i.e. equiv- Union and would open a new era
alent to that of the other candidate of partnerships in business, civil
countries. Respect of international society etc.
law and human rights by candidate
countries remains, nevertheless, a Conclusion
high priority for Greece.
In Greece’s view, security and sta-
bility in the Mediterranean, Balkan
As a result of the fundamental re-
and Black Sea areas are interrelat-
assessment of Greek-Turkish rela-
ed. The self-restraint of govern-
tions following the earthquakes
ments in the pursuit of national in-
that hit the two countries in 1999,
terests, although an important
Greece lifted its objections to EU
factor, cannot by itself achieve
financial assistance to Turkey, part
the said goals. Long-term security
of which was redirected to serve
and stability depend on the eco-
the reconstruction efforts in the
nomic development of the afore-
area affected by the earthquakes.
mentioned areas, as well as on cul-
Moreover, at the Helsinki Summit
tural interchange between the
of the European Council in Decem-
peoples involved. Greece believes
ber 1999, Greece agreed on the in-
that a just settlement of the Pales-
clusion of Turkey among the can-
tinian conflict, along the lines of
didates for EU membership; the fi-
U.N. resolutions will give a new im-
nal statement of the summit also
petus to Euro-Arab relations, while
included a provision calling upon
also ensuring the long-term secu-
Turkey to submit border disputes
rity of Israel. Moreover, the anchor-
with its neighbours to the Interna-
ing of the European periphery to
tional Court of Justice.
the Euro-atlantic institutions re-
mains a top priority of Greek for-
The New Democracy government
eign policy.
which came into power in March
2004 has supported unambigu-
ously the Turkish bid for EU mem-
bership and the opening of acces-
sion of negotiations, which was fi- USEFUL LINKS
nally made possible in October Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2005. Strong personal ties were es- www.ypex.gov.gr

144 about GREECE