PROPERTY CASES

BATCH 7

Case 1: Solid Manila v Bio Hong Trading

Case 2: CID v Javier
Case 3: Cortes v Tu-Tibo
Case 4: Abellana vs. CA
Case 5: Ronquillo v Roco
Case 6: Gargantos v Tan Yanon
Case 7: Valderama v North Negros Sugar Central
Case 8: Javellana v IAC
Case 9: Benedicto v CA
Case 10: Costabella Corp v CA
Case 11: Villanueva v Velasco
Case 12: Cristobal v CA
Case 13: Quimen v CA
Case 14: Floro v Llenado
Case 15: Francisco v IAC
Case 16: Sta Maria v CA
Case 17: NIA v CA
Case 18: Abellana v CA
Case 19: Encarnacion v CA
Case 20: David Chan v CA
Case 21: Almendras v CA
Case 22: Cortes v Yu-Tibo
Case 23: Dionisio v Ortiz
Case 24: Purugganan v Paredes
Case 25: Valisno v Adriano
Case 26: Trias v Araneta
Case 27: La Vista v CA
CASE 14

FLORO v. LLENADO

244 SCRA 713

Facts:

Mr. Simeon Floro owned the Floro Park Subdivision situated in Bulacan. The subdivision has
its own access roads from the MacArthur Highway through road lot 4. Another fellow,
Orlando A. Llenado, owned the Llenado Homes Subdivision. He obtained the same from Mr.
de Castro, when it was known as the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision, Llenado Homes was
bounded on the south by the Palanas Creek, 5 which separates it from the Floro Park
Subdivision. To the west sat the ricelands belonging to Marcial Ipapo. The controversy
brewed since Llenado Homes did not have any passage to the MacArthur Highway. However,
a proposed access road passing the abandoned riceland of Marcial Ipapo has been specifically
provided in the subdivision plan of the former Emmanuel Homes Subdivision. This plan was
approved by the HLURB.

Because the access road through the Ipapo Riceland did not exist yet, the Llenados sought,
and were granted, oral permission by the Floros to use Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park .
At this point, remember that the agreement was merely provisional as the parties were still
drafting a contract.

Later, Floro discovered grave damage to the lots in question from the passage of heavy
machinery. He then barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks, wooden posts and adobe
stones. He essentially implied Llenados to keep out off property.
Llenado pursued an easement claim with the RTC. The RTC denied the request. On appeal by
LLenado, and ordered that Mr. Floro remove the barricades. Mr. Floro went to the SC

ISSUE:

Whether the requirements for legal easement existed to allow Llenado to claim the same
against Mr. Floro?

HELD:

NO. The court held that to be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the
preconditions provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established. These
include:
(1) that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet
to a public highway; (2) that proper indemnity has been paid; (3) that the isolation was not
due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) that the right of way claimed is at a
point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
For this case, it is apparent that the elements have not been met. The original subdivision
development plan presented by Llenado indicates an existing and prior agreement with Ms.
Ipapo to create a right of way through the abandoned Ipapo ricefield. Ipapo had long agreed
to these terms but Llenado apparently thought it too much work and cost to develop such
road. It was easier for him to create an easement via the Floro property.

The court ruled time and again that one may not claim a legal easement merely out of
convenience. Convenience motivated Llenando to abandon the Ipapo access road
development and pursue an access road through the Floro estate. He was stacking the cards
in his favor to the unnecessary detriment of his neighbor. The court refused to countenance
his behavior.

Case 16

STA. MARIA V. CA|FAJARDO

285 SCRA 351
Compulsory Servitude of Right of Way

Requirements of compulsory servitude of right of way: 1) surrounded by immovables and no

adequate outlet to a public highway; 2) payment of indemnity; 3) isolation is not due to the
owner of the dominant estate; 4) least prejudicial (and shortest if possible)

FACTS:

Plaintiff spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo are the registered owners of a piece of land,
Lot No. 124, in Bulacan.

Plaintiff's aforesaid Lot 124 is surrounded by Lot 1, a fishpond, on the northeast portion
thereof; by Lot 126, owned by Florentino Cruz, on the southeast portion; by Lot 6-a and a
portion of Lot 6-b owned respectively by Spouses Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria and Florcerfida
Sta. Maria, on the southwest; and by Lot 122, owned by the Jacinto family, on the northwest.

On February 17, 1992, Fajardo filed a complaint against defendants Sta. Maria for the
establishment of an easement of right of way. Plaintiffs alleged that their lot, Lot 124, is
surrounded by properties belonging to other persons, including those of the defendants; that
since plaintiffs have no adequate outlet to the provincial road, an easement of a right of way
passing through either of the alternative defendants' properties which are directly abutting
the provincial road would be plaintiffs' only convenient, direct and shortest access to and
from the provincial road; that plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest have been passing through
the properties of defendants in going to and from their lot; that defendants' mother even
promised plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest to grant the latter an easement of right of way as
she acknowledged the absence of an access from their property to the road; and that
alternative defendants, despite plaintiffs' request for a right of way and referral of the dispute
to the barangay officials, refused to grant them an easement. Thus, plaintiffs prayed that an
easement of right of way on the lots of defendants be established in their favor. They also
prayed for damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.

RTC and CA both found for Fajardo and granted the easement of right of way. On appeal, the
Sta. Maria's allege that Fajardo failed to prove that it was not their own actions which caused
their lot to be enclosed or cut-off from the road.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs failed to prove the third requisite or that the isolation was not
caused by the plaintiffs themselves?

HELD:

The plaintiffs sufficiently proved that they did not by themselves cause the isolation.
As to the third requisite, we explicitly pointed out; thus: "Neither have the private
respondents been able to show that the isolation of their property was not due to their
personal or their predecessors-in-interest's own acts." In the instant case, the Court of
Appeals have found the existence of the requisites. The petitioners, however, insist that
private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have, through their own acts of constructing
concrete fences at the back and on the right side of the property, isolated their property from
the public highway. The contention does not impress because even without the fences private
respondents' property remains landlocked by neighboring estates belonging to different
owners.

Again, for an estate to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil
Code, to wit:
1. the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);

2. there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);

3. the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last
par.); and
4. the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar
as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway
may be the shortest (Art. 650).

Case 26

Trias v. Araneta
15 SCRA 241

FACTS:
JM Tuason and Co. owned a piece of land that was part of a subdivision. Thru broker
Araneta Inc (of Araneta Coliseum fame), this civic-minded company sold the land to Mr Lopez
with the condition that said lot should never be used to erect a factory. This imposition was
annotated to the TCT.
A series of transfers and conveyances later, the lot ended up in the hands of the
gorgeous Ms. Rafael Trias. She was dismayed with the annotation that stated “5. That no
factories be permitted in this section.”
Ms. Trias felt that the annotation impaired her dominical rights and therefore illegal
and existed as mere surplusage since existing zoning regulations already prevented the
erection of factories in the vicinity. Worse, the annotation possibly hindered her plans to
obtain a loan. She accordingly raised the issue to the court and received relief.
Later on, Gregorio Araneta moved for reconsideration stating that the imposition
resulted from a valid sales transaction between her predecessors in interest. He alleged that
the court held no authority to overrule such valid easement and impaired the right to
contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition was valid.

HELD:
The imposition was valid. The prohibition is an easement validly imposed under art
594 which provides that “every owner of a piece of land may establish easements he deems
suitable xxx and not in contravention to the law, public policy and public order”
 The court ruled that the easement existed to safeguard the peace and quiet of
neighboring residents. The intention is noble and the objectives benign. In the absence of a
clash with public policy, the easement may not be eroded.
The contention of surplusage is also immaterial. Zoning regulations may be repealed
anytime, allowing the erection of factories. With the annotation, at the very least, the original
intent to bar factories remains binding.

CASE 12
Case 19

ENCARNACION V. COURT OF APPEALS- Easement of Right of Way

An easement of right of way exists as a matter of law when a private property has no access
to a public road and the needs of such property determines the width of the easement which
requires payment of indemnity which consists of the value of the land and the amount of the
damages caused.

FACTS: Tomas Encarnacion is the owner of the dominant estate which is bounded on the
north by the servient estates of Eusebio de Sagun and Mamerto Masigno, on the south by a
dried river and the Taal Lake. The servient estate is bounded on the north by the National
Highway.
Prior to 1960, persons going to the national highway would just cross the servient estate at
no particular point. In 1960, Sagun and Masigno enclosed their lands with a fence but
provided a road path 25 meters long and about 1 meter in width. At this time, Encarnacion
started his plant nursery business on his land. When his business flourished, it became more
difficult to transfer the plants and garden soil through the use of a pushcart so Encarnacion
bought an owner-type jeep for transporting the plants. However, the jeep could not pass
through the road path so he approached Sagun and Masigno asking them if they would sell
to him 1 ½ meters of their property to add to the existing road path but the 2 refused the
offer.

Encarnacion then instituted an action before the RTC to seek the issuance of a writ of
easement of a right of way over an additional width of at least 2 meters. The RTC dismissed
the complaint for there is another outlet, which is through the dried river bed. This was
affirmed by the CA thus the case at bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not Encarnacion is entitled to a widening of an already existing easement

of right-of-way

RULING: YES. Encarnacion has sufficiently established his claim. Generally, a right of way
may be demanded: (1) when there is absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2)
when, even if there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient. In the
case at bar, although there is a dried river bed, t it traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and
there is no egress or ingress from the highway. For the jeep to reach the level of the
highway, it must literally jump 4-5 meters up. And during rainy season, it is impassable due
to the floods. When a private property has no access to a public road, it has the right of
easement over adjacent servient estates as a matter of law. With the non-availability of the
dried river bed as an alternative route, the servient estates should accommodate the needs of
the dominant estate. Art. 651 provides that “the width of the easement of right of way shall
be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate …” To grant the additional
easement of right of way of 1 ½ meters, Encarnacion must indemnify Sagun and Masigno the
value of the land occupied plus amount of the damages caused until his offer to buy the land
is considered

CASE 25

VALISNO V. ADRIANO

Doctrine of Apparent Sign

Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are
appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not
specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water
ditch running across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a
third person.

FACTS:

Plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a land in Nueva Ecija, with TCT
No. NT-16281. He bought the land from the respondent’s sister, Honorata Adriano Francisco.
The land which is planted with watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco, and other vegetables
adjoins that of the respondent Adriano on the bank of the Pampanga River. Both parcels of
land had been inherited by Honorata and Felipe from their father. At the time of the sale of
the land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a canal
about seventy (70) meters long, traversing the Respondent's land. In 1959, Respondent
levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that Plaintiff was deprived of the irrigation water
and prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare land.
 Plaintiff filed in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications a complaint for
deprivation of water rights.
A decision was rendered ordering Adriano to reconstruct the irrigation canal. Instead of
restoring the irrigation canal, the appellee asked for a reinvestigation of the case by the
Bureau of Public Works and Communications. A reinvestigation was granted.
In the meantime, Plaintiff rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense because his need for
water to irrigate his watermelon fields was urgent.

Later, he filed a complaint for damages in the RTC claiming that he suffered damages
when he failed to plant his fields that year for lack of irrigation water, and when he
reconstructed the canal.

Meanwhile, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications reversed the Bureau's
decision by issuing a final resolution dismissing Valisno's complaint. The Secretary held that
Eladio Adriano's water rights which had been granted in 1923 ceased to be enjoyed by him in
1936 or 1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed. His non-use of the water right since then
for a period of more than five years extinguished the grant by operation of law, hence the
water rights did not form part of his hereditary estate which his heirs partitioned among
themselves.

ISSUE:
Whether the Plaintiff has acquired the easement of water over Respondent’s land.

RULING: Yes.

The existence of the irrigation canal on Respondent’s land for the passage of water
from the Pampanga River to Honorata's land prior to and at the time of the sale of Honorata's
land to the plaintiff was equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue using it as
provided in Article 624 of the Civil Code (Doctrine of Apparent Sign):

Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates,
established or maintained by the owner of both shall be considered, should either of them be
alienated, as a title in order that he easement may continue actively and passively, unless at
the time, the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the
title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the
execution of the deed.

The deed of sale in favor of Plaintiff included the "conveyance and transfer of the
water rights and improvements" appurtenant to Honorata's property. According to the
Plaintiff, the water right was the primary consideration for his purchase of Honorata's
property, for without it the property would be unproductive.

Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which
are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not
specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water
ditch running across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a
third person. The fact that an easement by grant may also have qualified as an easement of
necessity does detract from its permanency as property right, which survives the
determination of the necessity.

As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been established, he is

entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference, such as the
appellee's act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from the
Pampanga River.

CASE NO 22
CORTES VS YU-TIBO
2 PHIL 24; March 12, 1903

FACTS:

House No. 65 Calle Rosario, the property of the plaintiff’s wife, has a certain window
through which it receives light and air, said windows opening on the adjacent house, No. 63
of the same street. These windows have been in existence since the year 1843. The
defendant, the tenant of the said house No. 63, has commenced certain work with the view
to raising the roof of the house in such a manner that one-half of the windows in said house
No. 65 has been covered, thus depriving the building of a large part of the air and light
formerly received through the window.

The contention of the plaintiff is that by the constant and uninterrupted use of the
windows during a period of fifty-nine years he acquired by prescription an easement of light
in favor of the house No. 65, and as a servitude upon house No. 63, and, consequently, has
acquired the right to restrain the making of any improvements in the latter house which
might in any manner be prejudicial to the enjoyment of the said easement. He contends that
the easement of light is positive; and that therefore the period of possession for the purposes
of the acquisition of a prescriptive title is to begin from the date on which the enjoyment of
the same commenced, or from the time that said windows were opened with the knowledge
of the owner of the house No. 63, and without opposition on this part.

The defendant, on the contrary, contends that the easement is negative, and that
therefore the time for the prescriptive acquisition thereof must begin from the date on which
the owner of the dominant estate may have prohibited, by a formal act, the owner of the
servient estate from doing something which would be lawful but for the existence of the
easement.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the easement of light is a negative easement; and

(2) Whether or not the plaintiffs have acquired right to such easement by
prescription.

HELD:

(1) The easement of light in this case is a NEGATIVE easement.

Since the window from which the light and air were received was opened on the
plaintiff’s own property as an exercise of dominion, as such, it does not establish in itself any
easement. The mere toleration of such an act does not imply on the part of the abutting
owner a waiver of his right to freely build upon his land as high as he may see fit.

(2) The plaintiffs have NOT acquired right to such easement by prescription.

It being a negative easement, it cannot be acquired by prescription under article 538 of

the Civil Code, except by counting the time of possession from the date on which the owner
of the dominant estate may, by a formal act have prohibited the owner of the servient estate
from doing something which it would be lawful from him to do were it not for the easement.
Since no formal prohibition has been executed by the plaintiff in this case, it has not acquired
right over the easement of light by prescription  since the prescriptive acquisition of the title
thereto must be counted, not from the time of the opening of the windows, but from the time
at which the owner thereof has executed some act of opposition tending to deprive the
owner of the servient tenement of his right to build upon it to such height as he might see fit
in the legitimate use of his rights of ownership.
CASE 3

Cortes v. Yu-Tibo
2 Phil. 24

DOCTRINE: An easement of light and view is a negative easement. When easement is

negative, there should be a formal act of opposition for prescription to run.

FACTS:
Cortes’ wife owns a house (No. 65) in which certain windows open on the adjacent property
(No. 63), a neighboring house on the same street. This setting has been in existent since
1843. The tenant of the adjacent property raised the roof of house No. 63 in such a manner
that half of the windows of house No. 65 has been covered, thus depriving it of a large part
of air and light.

Plaintiff contends that by the constant and uninterrupted use of the windows for 59 years, he
acquired from prescription an easement of light in favor of house No. 65, and as a servitude
upon house No. 63. Consequently, he has acquired the right to restrain the making of any
improvement in the latter house which may be prejudicial to the enjoyment of the easement.
Further, he contends that the easement of light is positive; and that therefore the period of
possession for the purposes of the acquisition of a prescriptive title is to begin from the date
on which the enjoyment of the same commenced, or, in other words, from the time that said
windows were opened with the knowledge of the owner of the house No. 63, and without
opposition on this part.

Defendant contends that the easement is negative, and therefore the time for the
prescriptive acquisition must begin from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate
may have prohibited, by a formal act, the owner of the servient estate from doing something
which would be lawful but for the existence of the easement.

Lower court ruled in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff appealed the case.

ISSUE:
WON the easement is positive/negative

HELD:
Easement is negative.

The easement of light which is the object of this litigation is of a negative character, and
therefore pertains to the class which cannot be acquired by prescription as provided by article
538 of the Civil Code, except by counting the time of possession from the date on which the
owner of the dominant estate has, in a formal manner, forbidden the owner of the servient
estate to do an act which would be lawful were it not for the easement.

In consequence, the plaintiff, not having executed any formal act of opposition to the right of
the owner of house No. 63 to make improvements which might obstruct the light of house
No. 65, at any time prior to the complaint, has not acquired, nor could he acquire by
prescription, such easement of light, no matter how long a time have elapsed. Because the
period which the law demands for such prescriptive acquisition could not have commenced to
run, the act with which it must necessarily commence not having been performed

Case 4
Abellana v. CA
208 SCRA 316

DOCTRINES:
 ● The use of a footpath or road may be apparent but it is not a continuous easement
because its use is at intervals and depends upon the acts of man.
● A right of way is not acquirable by prescription.

FACTS:
The petitioners who live on a parcel of land abutting the northwestern side of the Nonoc
Homes Subdivision, sued to establish an easement of right of way over a subdivision road
which, according to the petitioners, used to be a mere footpath which they and their
ancestors had been using since time immemorial, and that, hence, they had acquired,
through prescription, an easement of right of way therein. The construction of a wall by the
respondents around the subdivision deprived the petitioners of the use of the subdivision
road which gives the subdivision residents access to the public highway. They asked that the
high concrete walls enclosing the subdivision and cutting of their access to the subdivision
road be removed and that the road be opened to them.

The private respondents denied that there was a pre-existing footpath in the place before it
was developed into a subdivision. They alleged furthermore that the Nonoc Subdivision roads
are not the shortest way to a public road for there is a more direct route from the petitioners'
land to the public highway.

After trial, the trial court ordered to demolish the subject fences or enclosures at the dead
ends of Road Lots 1 and 3 of the Nonoc Homes Subdivision at their expense and to leave
them open for the use of the plaintiffs and the general public.

However, on appeal by the defendants and intervenors (now private respondents), the
appellate court reversed the appealed judgment. It found that requisites essential for the
grant of an easement of right of way are not obtaining in this case hence no alternative
presents itself except reversal of the judgment.

The appellate court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision.
Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred:

1. [Link] not holding that the easement claimed by them is a legal easement
established by law (Art. 619. Civil Code) and acquired by them by virtue of a title under
Art. 620, Civil Code and P.D. No. 957 through the National Housing Authority which has
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate subdivision and condominium projects;

2. [Link] not holding that the footpaths and passageways which were
converted into subdivision road lots have acquired the status of public streets in view of
Section 4 of Municipal Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1969 of Talisay, Cebu which provides
that subdivision roads shall be used not only for the exclusive use of the homeowners but
also for the general public, and Section 5 of Ordinance No. 5, Series of 1974, which
provides that "those subdivision road lots whose use by the public are (sic) deemed
necessary by the proper authorities shall be made available for public use"; and

3. [Link] not determining whether or not the closure of the dead ends of road
lots 1 and 3 of the Nonoc Homes Subdivision by the private respondents was legal.

HELD: NO
Petitioners' assumption that an easement of right of way is continuous and apparent and may
be acquired by prescription under Article 620 of the Civil Code, is erroneous. The use of a
footpath or road may be apparent but it is not a continuous easement because its use is at
intervals and depends upon the acts of man. It can be exercised only if a man passes or puts
his feet over somebody else's land. Hence, a right of way is not acquirable by prescription.
Neither may petitioners invoke Section 29 of P.D. 957 which provides:

Sec. [Link] of Way to Public Road. — The owner or developer of a subdivision

without access to any existing public road or street must secure a right of way to a
public road or street and such right of way must be developed and maintained
according to the requirement of the government authorities concerned.

The above provision applies to the owner or developer of a subdivision (which petitioners are
not) without access to a public highway.

The petitioners' allegation that the footpaths which were converted to subdivision roads have
acquired the status of public streets, is not well taken. In the first place, whether or not
footpaths previously existed in the area which is now known as the Nonoc Homes
Subdivision, is a factual issue which this Court may not determine for it is not a trier of facts.

The municipal ordinances which declared subdivision roads open to public use "when deemed
necessary by the proper authorities" simply allow persons other than the residents of the
Nonoc Homes Subdivision, to use the roads therein when they are inside the subdivision but
those ordinances do not give outsiders a right to open the subdivision walls so they can enter
the subdivision from the back. As the private respondents pointed out in their Comment:

The closure of the dead ends of road lots 1 and 3 is a valid exercise of proprietary rights. It is
for the protection of residents in the subdivision from night prowlers and thieves. And the
public is not denied use of the subdivision roads, only that the users must get inside the
subdivision through the open ends of the road lots that link the same to the public road. It is
common to most, if not all subdivisions in Cebu, Metro Manila and other places, that points of
ingress to and egress from the subdivision are the points where the subdivision roads
intersect with public roads. It is of judicial notice that most, if not all, subdivisions are
enclosed and fenced with only one or few points that are used as ingress to and egress from
the subdivisions.

WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the petition for review, the same is DENIED with costs
against the petitioners.

CASE 9
Benedicto v. CA
25 SCRA 145

DOCTRINE: Under Art. 624, an easement may continue by operation of law. Alienation of
the dominant and servient estates to different persons is not a ground for the extinguishment
of easements, absent a statement extinguishing it.

FACTS:
Private respondent Antonio Cardenas was the owner of 2 parcels of land situated in Cebu
City. An apartment building was constructed on Lot A, while on Lot B stands a 4-door
apartment, a 2-storey house, a bodega, and a septic tank for the common use of the
occupants of Lots A and B. A small portion of the apartment building on Lot A also stands on
Lot B.

Cardenas sold Lot A to petitioner Eduardo C. Tañedo. On the same day, Cardenas also
mortgaged Lot B to Tañedo as a security for the payment of a loan. Cardenas agreed that he
would sell Lot B only to Tañedo in case he should decide to sell it. However, Cardenas sold
Lot B to the respondent spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim.

Upon learning of the sale, Tañedo offered to redeem the property from Romeo Sim, but the
latter refused. Instead, Sim blocked the sewage pipe connecting the building of Eduardo
Tañedo built on Lot A, to the septic tank in Lot B. He also asked Tañedo to remove that
portion of his building enroaching on Lot B.

As a result, Tañedo filed an action for legal redemption and damages against Spouses Sim
and Antonio Cardenas, invoking the provisions of Art. 1622 of the Civil Code. Respondent
judge, Juanito A. Bernad, dismissed the complaint for legal redemption, as well as petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
W/N the alienation of Lots A and B is a ground for the extinguishment of the easement of
drainage. -- NO

HELD:
The finding of the trial court that Tañedo's right to continue to use the septic tank on Lot B
ceased upon the subdivision of the land and its subsequent sale to different owners who do
not have the same interest, also appears to be contrary to law.

Article 631 of the Civil Code enumerates the grounds for the extinguishment of an easement.
From its provisions, the alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons is
not one of the grounds for the extinguishment of an easement. On the contrary, use of the
easement is continued by operation of law. Article 624 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or
maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as
a title in order that the easement may continue actively and passively, unless, at the time the
ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of
conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution
of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in
common by two or more persons.

In the instant case, no statement abolishing or extinguishing the easement of drainage was
mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot A to Tañedo. Nor did Cardenas stop the use of the drain
pipe and septic tank by the occupants of Lot A before he sold said lot. Hence, the use of the
septic tank is continued by operation of law. Accordingly, the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim
the new owners of the servient estate (Lot B), cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the
use of the servitude.

Case 23
Dionisio vs Ortiz

Facts:
The petitioners are co-owners of lots contiguous to each other situated in the Sitio of
Kangkong, District of Balintawak, Quezon City.
The private respondents are also co-owners of lots which are adjacent to the lots owned by
the petitioners. Lot 272-B has an area of 1,427 sq. m. which was later subdivided into two
lots where Lot 272-A was assigned to Chua Lee and Chua Bun Tong pursuant to a
memorandum agreement executed by and between them. They are also owners of another
lot at the upper portion of Lot 272-B with an area of 914 sq. m.
By virtue of an agreement entered intobetween the owners of the contiguous lots and the
members of the Quezon City Industrial Estates Association (QCIEA), a right of way was
granted over Howmart Road which is a private road traversing the contiguous lots owned by
the petitioners, among others, in favor of the QCIEA members. In return for its use, QCIEA
paid compensation to the petitioners for this right of way. The private respondents are bona
fide members of the QCIEA.
In order to have access to Howmart Road, there is a gate in private respondents' 914 sq. m.
lot fronting Howmart Road and another gate in Lot 272-A. As a result of the subdivision of
Lot 272, the private respondents opened a new gate in Lot 272-B also fronting Howmart
Road which is now the gate in question.
On October 5, 1989, under the instructions of Maxima Dionisio, certain persons commenced
the digging of four holes in a parallel line and afterwards put up steel posts wielded to a steel
plate in front of the newly constructed gate of private respondents amidst the latter's
[Link] petitioners claim that the surreptitiously constructed gate opened directly
into the house of Maxima Dionisio, exposing them to air and noise pollution arising from the
respondents' delivery trucks and service vehicles.
On November 7, 1989, the private respondents instituted a civil action for damages against
the petitioners. The complaint sought the immediate issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction ordering the petitioner to remove the barricade erected by them in front of the iron
gate.
The petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the
Order of Judge Ortiz.
Fifteen days later, the petitionersremoved the barricade in front of the gate of the private
respondents after they failed to obtain a temporary restraining order (TRO) from the Court of
Appeals enjoining the lower court from implementing its order.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that the issue has already become
moot and academic since the petitioners have already complied with the Order of the lower
court.
The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the private respondents have an easement of right of way over Howmart
Road?
Ruling:
Easement is not compulsory.
he private respondents' claim that they have every right to use Howmart Road as
passageway to EDSA by reason of the fact that public respondents are bonafide members of
the QCIEA which has a standing oral contract of easement of right of way with the
petitioners. The contract is still subsisting even after its alleged expiration in December, 1988
as evidenced by the two (2) letters signed by Maxima Dionisio and Atty. Telesforo Poblete,
counsel for the Dionisio Family addressed to the QCIEA requesting for an increase in the
compensation for said right of way. In such a case, it is alleged that the petitioners did not
have the right to put the barricade in question in front of the private respondents' gate and
stop them from using said gate as passageway to Howmart Road.

There is no question that a right of way was granted in favor of the private respondents over
Howmart Road but the records disclose that such right of way expired in December, 1988.
The continued use of the easement enjoyed by QCIEAincluding the private respondents is by
the mere tolerance of the owners pending the renegotiation of the terms and conditions of
said right of way. This is precisely shown by the two letters to the QCIEA requesting for an
increase in compensation for the use of Howmart Road. Absent an agreement of the parties
as to the consideration, among others, no contract of easement of right of way has been
validly entered into by the petitioners and QCIEA (see Robleza v. Court of Appeals, (74 SCRA
354 [1989]). Thus, the private respondents' claim of an easement of right of way over
Howmart Road has no legal or factual basis.
We have held in several cases that in order to be entitled to an injunctive writ, one must
show an unquestionable right over the premises and that such right has been violated
n the case at bar, the private respondents have not shown that there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ.

The records show that there are two (2) gates through which the private respondents may
pass to have direct access to EDSA: (1) the northern gate which opens directly to EDSA; and
(2) the southern gate along Howmart Road. The records also disclose that the petitioners and
the other lot owners previously prohibited and prevented members of QCIEA from opening
new gates. The claim that they were forced to open a new gate by reason of the subdivision
of Lot 272 where a wall was constructed between these 2 lots is untenable. The private
respondents can not assert a right of way when by their own or voluntary act, they
themselves have caused the isolation of their property from the access road. Article 649 of
Civil Code justifies petitioners' claim, to wit:

Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any
immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and
without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the
neigboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.

Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all
the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall
consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the
servient estate.

In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the estate
surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate without a
permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by such
encumbrance.

This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's
own acts.
The Court of Appeals has the power to recallor lift the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction so issued if it finds that the party is not so entitled. However, in dismissing the
petition the court, in effect affirmed the lower court's finding that the private respondents
were indeed entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction. But as we have earlier found, the
private respondents are not entitled to the injunctive relief considering that they have no
clear right over Howmart Road.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED

Case No. 10
Costabella Corp. v. CA (193 SCRA 333)

FACTS:
Petitioners owned a lot wherein they started constructing their beach hotel. Before such
construction, the private respondent, in going to and from their respective properties and the
provincial road, passed through a passageway, which traversed the petitioner’s property. As a
result of the construction, this passageway, including the alternative route, was obstructed.
Private respondent filed for injunction plus damages and they also alleged that the petitioner
had constructed a dike on the beach fronting the latter’s property without the necessary
permit, obstructing the passage of the residents and local fishermen, and trapping debris of
flotsam on the beach. The private respondent also claim that they have acquired the right of
way through prescription. They prayed for the re-opening of the “ancient road right of way”
(what they called the supposed easement in this case) and the destruction of the dike.
Petitioner answered by saying that their predecessor in interest’s act of allowing them to pass
was gratuitous and in fact, they were just tolerating the use of the private respondents. CA
ruled in favor of the private respondents.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not easement of right and way can be acquired through prescription?
2) Whether or not the private respondents had acquired an easement of right of way in the
form of a passageway, on the petitioner’s property?

HELD:
1) No. Easement of right of way is discontinuous thus it cannot be subject to acquisitive
prescription.

2) No. One may validly claim an easement of right of way when he has proven the: (1) the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at point least prejudicial to
the servient estate. The private respondent failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet
from their respective properties to a public highway; in fact the lower court confirmed that
there is another outlet for the private respondents to the main road (yet they ruled in favor of
the private respondents).

Apparently, the CA lost sight of the fact that the convenience of the dominant estate was
never a gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. There must be a real necessity and
not mere convenience for the dominant estate to acquire such easement. Also, the private
respondents made no mention of their intention to indemnify the petitioners. The SC also
clarified that “least prejudicial” prevails over “shortest distance” (so shortest distance isn’t
necessarily the best choice).

Case 1

G.R. No. 90596             April 8, 1991

SOLID MANILA CORPORATION vs. BIO HONG TRADING CO., INC. and COURT OF
APPEALS
SARMIENTO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land covered by a transfer certificate of title. The same
lies in the vicinity of another parcel, registered in the name of the private respondent
corporation.

The private respondent's title came from a prior owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties
thereto reserved as an easement of way. As a consequence, an annotation was entered in
the private respondent's title with the following conditions: (1) That the private alley shall be
at least three (3) meters in width; (2) That the alley shall not be closed so long as there's a
building exists thereon (sic); (3) That the alley shall be open to the sky; (4) That the owner
of the lot on which this private alley has been constituted shall construct the said alley and
provide same with concrete canals as per specification of the City Engineer; (5) That the
maintenance and upkeep of the alley shall be at the expense of the registered owner; (6)
That the alley shall remain open at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall be placed
thereon; (7) That the owner of the lot on which the alley has been constructed shall allow the
public to use the same, and allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and drainage purposes, and
shall not act (sic) for any indemnity for the use thereof; and (8) That he shall impose upon
the vendee or new owner of the property the conditions abovementioned; other conditions
set forth .

The petitioner claims that ever since, it had (as well as other residents of neighboring
estates) made use of the above private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep,
until sometime in 1983, when, and over its protests, the private respondent constructed steel
gates that precluded unhampered use.

On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private
respondent, to have the gates removed and to allow full access to the easement.

The court a quo shortly issued ex parte an order directing the private respondent to open the
gates. Subsequently, the latter moved to have the order lifted, on the grounds that: (1) the
easement referred to has been extinguished by merger in the same person of the dominant
and servient estates upon the purchase of the property from its former owner; (2) the
petitioner has another adequate outlet; (3) the petitioner has not paid any indemnity
therefor; and (4) the petitioner has not shown that the right-of-way lies at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an easement exists on the property.

RULING:
Yes, an easement exists on the property.

Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or
passively belong.

In the present case, it is true that the sale did include the alley. On this score, the Court
rejects the petitioner's contention that the deed of sale "excluded" it, because as a mere
right-of-way, it can not be separated from the tenement and maintain an independent
existence. Thus, Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or
passively belong.

Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part. 10 Although they
are possessed of a separate juridical existence, as mere accessories, they can not, however,
be alienated11 from the tenement, or mortgaged separately. the alley in question, as an
easement, is inseparable from the main lot is no argument to defeat the petitioner's claims,
because as an easement precisely, it operates as a limitation on the title of the owner of the
servient estate, specifically, his right to use ( jus utendi).

Case 15

Francisco vs IAC

FACTS:

Ramos' Lot 860-A used to be a part of Lot 860 of the Malinta Estate owned by several co-
owners.
On December 3,1947, the co-owners of Lot 860 (Cornelia and Frisca Dila) executed a deed by
which an undivided 1/3 portion of the land was donated to a niece, Epifania Dila, and another
undivided 1/3 portion to the children of a deceased sister, Anacleta Dila, and the remaining
portion, also an undivided third, was declared to pertain exclusively to and would be retained
by Cornelia Dila. A partition was then executed.

The former co-owners overlooked the fact that, by reason of the subdivision, Epifania Dila’s
lot came to include the entire frontage of what used to be Lot 860 along Parada Road, and
thus effectively isolated from said road the other lots, i.e., of Cornelia Dila, and of the
children of Anacleta Dila.
Despit that, Cornelia sold the lot to some buyers who subsequently sold them to Ramos.
Ramos asked for a right of way through Francisco’s land but negotiations failed. Francisco's
proposal for an exchange of land at the rate of 1 sq.m from him to three 3 sq.m from Ramos,
as was supposedly the custom in the locality, was unacceptable to Ramos.
Later that year, Ramos succeeded was able to obtain a 3m wide passageway through Dila’s
lot. Yet in August, 1973, he inexplicably put up a 10ft high concrete wall on his lot, thereby
closing the very right of way granted to him across Lot 860-B. [It seems that what he wished
was to have a right of passage precisely through Francisco's land, considering this to be more
convenient to him, and he did not bother to keep quiet about his determination to bring suit,
if necessary, to get what he wanted.]
Francisco learned of Ramos' intention and reacted by replacing the barbed-wire fence on his
lot along Parada Road with a stone wall. Shortly thereafter, Francisco filed a case against him
asserting his right to a legal easement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ramos was entitled to an easement of right of way through the land
belonging to Francisco

HELD: NO

The law makes it amply clear that an owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his own act
isolate his property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an
adjacent estate. The third of the cited requisites: that the claimant of a right of way has not
himself procured the isolation of his property had not been met indeed the respondent had
actually brought about the contrary condition and thereby vitiated his claim to such an
easement. It will not do to assert that use of the passageway through Lot 860-B was difficult
or inconvenient, the evidence being to the contrary and that it was wide enough to be
traversable by even a truck, and also because it has been held that mere inconvenience
attending the use of an existing right of way does not justify a claim for a similar easement in
an alternative location.

CASE 24

PURUGGANAN V. PAREDES
69 SCRA 69
Topic: Easement of Drainage

Doctrine: In an easement of receiving rainwater, the distances prescribed in the decree of

registration should not correspond to the width and length of the roof of the house but on
the distance of the rainwater falling inside the land of the servient estate.

FACTS:
Purugganan is the owner of a piece of residential lot adjacent to and bounded on the north
by the lot of Paredes. The lot of Purugganan is subject to an easement of drainage in favor of
Paredes annotated in the Decree of registration, which read in part:

“XXX the applicant agrees to respect an easement or servitude over a portion of the lots No.
1 and 2 which is EIGHT and ONE HALF (8-1/2) meters in length…and the width is ONE (1)
meter, in order that the rainwater coming from the roofing of a house to be constructed by
the oppositor over the ruins of her brick wall…shall fall into the land of the applicant.”

Paredes constructed a new house, the roof was 2-1/2 meters longer than the length allowed
in the Decree of Registration, and has an outer roofing (eaves) of 1.20 meters, protruding
over the lot of Purugganan, which is .20 meters wider than that allowed, and the rainwater
from the GI roofing falls about 3 meters inside lots 1 and 2 of Purugganan.

Purugganan filed a case prohibiting Paredes from proceeding with the construction of the
roof, which exceeds the allowed dimensions. Trial court, in a summary proceeding decided in
favor of Purugganan. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the easement of drainage refers to the measure of the roofing?

HELD:

No.

Paredes have made a mistake in applying the distances prescribed in the decree of
registration to the roofing of their house. They failed to comprehend the meaning of the
phrase “servidumbre de vertiente de los tejados” constituted on the land of Purugganan.
Translated, it means the easement of receiving water falling from the roof which is an
encumbrance imposed on the land of Purugganan because the encumbrance is not the roof
itself but the rain water falling inside the property of Purugganan. The report submitted by
the court-appointed commissioner clearly shows that Paredes exceeded the dimension
allowed in the decree of registration.

Case 7:

Valderama v. North Negros Sugar Central

FACTS:
Several hacienda owners in Manapla, Occidental Negros, entered into a milling
contract with Miguel Osorio wherein the latter would build a sugar central of a minimum
capacity of 300 tons for the milling and grinding of all the sugar cane to be grown by the
hacienda owners who in turn would furnish the central with all the cane they might produce
in their estates for 30 years from the execution of the contract. Later on, Osorio’s rights and
interests were acquired by the North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. 2 years after, the current
petitioners, Catalino Valderrama, Emilio Rodriguez, Santos Urra et. al, made other milling
contracts identical to the first one with the North Negros Sugar, Co., Inc. The hacienda
owners, however, could not furnish the central sufficient cane for milling as required by its
capacity, so the North Negros made other milling contracts with the various hacienda owners
of Cadiz, Occidental Negros. This gave rise to the plaintiffs filing their complaint, alleging that
the easement of way, which each of them has established in his respective hacienda, was
only for the transportation through each hacienda of the sugar cane of the owner thereof,
while the defendant maintains that it had the right to transport to its central upon the railroad
passing through the haciendas of the plaintiffs, not only the sugar cane harvested in said
haciendas, but also that of the hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental Negros.

The CFI entered 1 single judgment for all of them, ruling in Valderrama et. al’s favor
finding that North Negros had no right to pass through the lands of the hacienda owners for
the transportation of sugar cane not grown from their lands. Thus the appeal to the SC.

ISSUE:
WON the easement of way established was restricted to transporting only sugar cane
from the hacienda owners’ lands.

HELD:
NO. The contract entered into by each of the hacienda owners contained a clause
that granted the North Negros an easement of way 7 meters wide for the period of 50 years
upon their properties for the construction of a railroad. The owners allege ambiguity since it
could permit the transportation of sugar cane which they did not produce which is contrary to
their intent but the SC held that it is clear that the easement was established for the benefit
of all producers and of the corporation as it is the intent of the milling contract.

Since the easement is a voluntary, apparent, continuous easement of way in favor of

the corporation, it is contrary to the nature of the contract that it is only limited to canes
produced by the servient estates since it is a well settled rule that things serve their owner by
reason of ownership and not by reason of easement. The owners also cannot limit its use for
there is nothing in the contract prohibiting the central from obtaining other sources.

Transporting cane from Cadiz also does not make it more burdensome since what is
prohibited in Art. 543 of the CC is that in extending the road or in repairing it, it should
occupy a greater area or deposit excavations outside the granted 7 meters. This does not
happen in this case when the North Negros transports sugar cane from Cadiz, crossing the
servient estates (parcel of land that is subject to an easement) , since it continues to
occupy the same area and the encumbrance is still the same regardless of the number of
times it passes through the estates.

Also the period of the easement is longer than the period of the milling contracts, so
even if the owners no longer desire to furnish the central canes for milling, the North Negros
still has the right to the easement for the remaining period so the contention that it should be
limited to the canes produced by the owners has no basis.

Case 5
Ronquillo v. Roco

DOCTRINE: An easement of right of way being discontinuous, cannot be acquired through

prescription but only by virtue of a title.

FACTS:
Petitioners Ronquillo have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a road or passage
way which traversed the land of the Respondents Roco and their predecessors in interest, in
going to Igualdad Street and the market place of Naga City, from their residential land and
back, for more than 20 years.
Respondents Roco and his men started constructing a chapel in the middle of the said right
of way construction actually obstructed the continuous exercise of the rights of the plaintiffs
over said right of way. Respondents also forcibly planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed
wire and closed the road passage way.

ISSUE:
WON an easement of right of way can be acquired thru prescription

HELD:
No. The dismissal was based on the ground that an easement of right of way though it may
be apparent is, nevertheless, discontinuous or intermittent and, therefore, cannot be acquired
through prescription, but only by virtue of a title.
Easements may be Continuous or discontinuous, apparent or non-apparent, discontinuous
being those used at more or less long intervals and which depend upon acts of man.
Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by title or prescription, continuous
non- apparent easements and discontinuous ones whether apparent or not, may be acquired
only by virtue of a title. Both Manresa and Sanchez Roman are of the opinion that the
easement of right of way is a discontinuous one.

Case 8
Javellana v. IAC

DOCTRINE: They closed the entrance of the canal and demolished portions of the main dike
thus impairing the use of the servitude by the dominant estate. And by so doing, plaintiffs
violated not only the law on easement but also Presidential Degree No. 296 which enjoins
any person, natural or juridical, to demolish structures or improvements which tend to
obstruct the flow of water through rivers, creeks, esteros and drainage channels. For this
canal did not serve merely to supply salt water to the school fishpond but also serves as
drainage charged or channel of rainwater from adjacent lands to the Iloilo River.

FACTS:
Marsal & Co., Inc., and Marcelino Florete, Sr. is the present owner of the land adjoining
the Iloilo River up to the adjacent lot where the L. Borres Elem. School is located. There
existed a main canal from the Iloilo River which passes through the Marsal property and
through a canal that traverses the school property going towards Lot 2344. Marsal & Co.
closed the dike entrance and later on demolished the portions of the main dike connecting
the main canal to the canal running through the school grounds. This closure caused flooding
in the premises of the school and its vicinity because the canal serves as outlet of rain or
flood water that empties into the river. This prompted the school and barangay officials to
complain to higher authorities about the closure of the canal. When Florete was about to bury
a pipe in lieu of an open canal, he was prevented from doing so by District Supervisor
Javellana.
Florete instituted a complaint for recovery of damages for allegedly denying his access to
the use of the canal to his property. RTC ruled in favor of Javellana. Florete appealed to the
IAC which reversed the decision. Thus, Javellana instituted herein recourse.

ISSUE:
Whether an easement has been constituted on the subject property. -- YES

HELD:
A positive easement of water-right-of-way was constituted on the property of Florete as
the servient estate in favor of the L. Borres Elementary School and the nearby lands as
dominant estates since it has been in continuous use for no less than 15 years by the school
fishpond as well as by the nearby adjacent lands.
As a positive easement, Florete had no right to terminate the use of the canal without
violating Art. 629 of the CC which provides that “The owner of the servient estate cannot
impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude. Nevertheless if by reason of the
place originally assigned or of the manner established for the use of the easement, the same
should become very inconvenient to the owner of the servient estate, or should prevent him
from making any important works, repairs or improvements thereon, it may be charged at his
expense, provided he offers another place or manner equally convenient and in such a way
that no injury is caused thereby to the owner of the dominant estate or to those who may
have a right to the use of the easement.”
Defendants' closure of the dike's entrance connecting the main canal with the canal
running through the school premises, therefore, caused the flooding of the premises of the L.
Borres Elementary School and its vicinity. This is so because during rainy season, said canal
also serves as outlet of rain or flood waters that empties to the Iloilo River. Witnesses Ignacio
Gencianeo, Francisco Regacho, Severo Maranon and Barangay Captain Antonio Sison
wereunanimous in declaring so.
Case No. 18
Abellana vs. CA

Facts:
The petitioners who live on a parcel of land abutting the northwestern side of the Nonoc
Homes Subdivision, sued to establish an easement of right of way over a subdivision road
which, according to the petitioners, used to be a mere footpath which they and their
ancestors had been using since time immemorial, and that, hence, they had acquired,
through prescription, an easement of right of way therein. The construction of a wall by the
respondents around the subdivision deprived the petitioners of the use of the subdivision
road which gives the subdivision residents access to the public highway. They asked that the
high concrete walls enclosing the subdivision and cutting off their access to the subdivision
road be removed and that the road be opened to them.

The private respondents denied that there was a pre-existing footpath in the place before it
was developed into a subdivision. They alleged furthermore that the Nonoc Subdivision roads
are not the shortest way to a public road for there is a more direct route from the petitioners'
land to the public highway.

In an order dated January 9, 1991, the appellate court denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid decision. Hence, this petition for review in which the
petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred:

1. in not holding that the easement claimed by them is a legal easement established by
law (Art. 619, Civil Code) and acquired by them by virtue of a title under Art. 620, Civil Code
and P. D. No. 957through the National Housing Authority which has exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate subdivision and condominium projects;
2. in not holding that the footpaths and passageways which were converted into
subdivision road lots have acquired the status of public streets in view of Section 4 of
Municipal Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1969 of Talisay, Cebu which provides that subdivision
roads shall be used not only for the exclusive use of the homeowners but also for the general
public, and Section 5, of Ordinance No. 5. Series of 1974 which provides that "those
subdivision road lots whose use by the public are (sic) deemed necessary by the proper
authorities shall be made available for public use" (p. 7, Rollo); and
3. in not determining whether or not the closure of, the dead ends of road lots 1 and 3 of
the Nonoc Homes Subdivision by the private respondents, Estoye and Naya, was legal.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not an easement has arisen by prescription
2. Whether or not the pathway has become a public street

RULING:
1) No. Petitioners' assumption that an easement of right of way is continuous and apparent
and may be acquired by prescription under Article 620 of the Civil Code, is erroneous. The
use of a footpath or road may be apparent but it is not a continuous easement because its
use is at intervals and depends upon the acts of man. It can be exercised only if a man
passes or puts his feet over somebody else's land. Hence, a right of way is not acquirable by
prescription.

2) No. Petitioners cannot invoke Section 29 of P.D. 957 which provides:

Sec. 29. Right of Way to Public Road. — The owner or developer of a subdivision without
access to any existing public road or street must secure a right of way to a public road or
street and such right of way must be developed and maintained according to the requirement
of the government authorities concerned.

a. Because the above provision applies to the owner or developer of a subdivision (which
petitioners are not) without access to a public highway.
b. And the petitioners' allegation that the footpaths which were converted to subdivision
roads have acquired the status of public streets, is not well taken. The municipal ordinances
which declared subdivision roads open to public use "when deemed necessary by the proper
authorities" simply allow persons other than the residents of the Nonoc Homes Subdivision, to
use the roads therein when they are inside the subdivision but those ordinances do not give
outsiders a right to open the subdivision walls so they can enter the subdivision from the
back. The closure of the dead ends of road lots 1 and 3 is a valid exercise of proprietary
rights. It is of judicial notice that most, if not all, subdivisions are enclosed and fenced with
only one or few points that are used as ingress to and egress from the subdivisions.

Case 17

NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION VS. CA

340 SCRA 661

FACTS:

A free patent over three (3) hectares of land, situated in the province of Cagayan was issued
in the name of Vicente Manglapus, and registered under OCT No. P-24814. The land was
granted subject to the following proviso expressly stated in the title:

"... it shall not be subject to any encumbrance whatsoever in favor of any corporation,
association or partnership except with the consent of the grantee and the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and solely for educational, religious or
charitable purposes or for a right of way; and subject finally to all conditions and public
easements and servitudes recognized and prescribed by law especially those mentioned in
sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended..."

Subsequently, respondent Manglapus acquired the lot from Vicente Manglapus by absolute
sale. Sometime in 1982, NIA was to construct canals in Amulung, Cagayan and Alcala,
Cagayan. NIA then entered a portion of Manglapus' land and made diggings and fillings
thereon. Manglapus filed a complaint for damages against NIA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the NIA should pay Manglapus just compensation for the taking of a portion
of his property for use as easement of a right of way.

RULING:

No. The transfer certificate of title contains such a reservation. It states that title to the land
shall be ". . . subject to the provisions of said Land Registration Act and the Public Land Act,
as well as those of Mining Laws, if the land is mineral, and subject, further to such conditions
contained in the original title as may be subsisting."

Under the Original Certificate of Title, there was a reservation and condition that the land is
subject to "to all conditions and public easements and servitudes recognized and prescribed
by law especially those mentioned in Sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended." This reservation, unlike the other provisos
imposed on the grant, was not limited by any time period and thus is a subsisting condition.

Section 112, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provides that lands granted by patent,
"shall further be subject to a right of way sot exceeding twenty meters in width for public
highways, railroads,irrigation ditches, aqueducts, telegraphs and telephone lines, and similar
works..."

We note that the canal NIA constructed was only eleven (11) meters in width. This is well
within the limit provided by law. Manglapus has therefore no cause to complain.

Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that, "Easements are established either by law or by the
will of the owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements." In the
present case, we find and declare that a legal easement of a right-of-way exists in favor of
the government.

The land was originally public land, and awarded to respondent Manglapus by free patent.
The ruling would be otherwise if the land were originally private property, in which case, just
compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an easement of
a right of way.

Case 13

ANASTACIA QUIMEN
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and YOLANDA Q. OLIVEROS

Facts:
Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister
Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the
property equally among themselves, as they did, with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero,
Sulpicio and Rufina abutting the municipal road.

The share of Anastacia, located at the extreme left. It is bounded on the right by the property
of Sotero. Adjoining Sotero's property on the right are two lots originally owned by Rufina
and Sulpicio, respectively, but which were later acquired by a certain Catalina Santos.
Located directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their brother Antonio
which the latter divided into two (2) equal parts, where one of the lot (Lot No. 1448-B-6-A) is
located behind Anastacia’s lot while the other (Lot No. 1448-B-6-B) is behind the property of
Sotero, father of respondent Yolanda.

In February 1982 Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her uncle Antonio through her
aunt Anastacia who was then acting as his administratrix. According to Yolanda, when
petitioner offered her the property for sale she was hesitant to buy as it had no access to a
public road. But Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the assurance that she
would give her a right of way on her adjoining property for P200.00 per square meter.

Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to
the public highway a portion of Anastacia's property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay
for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was
thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her property.

In February 1986 Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen (Lot No. 1448-B-6-B)
located directly behind the property of her parents who provided her a pathway gratis et
amore between their house, extending about nineteen (19) meters from the lot of Yolanda
behind the sari sari store of Sotero, and Anastacia's perimeter fence. The store is made of
strong materials and occupies the entire frontage of the lot measuring four (4) meters wide
and nine meters (9) long. Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not
adequate for ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with facility because
the store itself obstructs the path so that one has to pass through the back entrance and the
facade of the store to reach the road.

On 29 December 1987 Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of
way through Anastacia's property. An ocular inspection upon instruction of the presiding
judge was conducted by the branch clerk of court. The report was that the proposed right of
way was at the extreme right of Anastacia's property facing the public highway, starting from
the back of Sotero's sari-sari store and extending inward by one (1) meter to her property
and turning left for about five (5) meters to avoid the store of Sotero in order to reach the
municipal road and the way was unobstructed except for an avocado tree standing in the
middle.

But the court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action

On appeal by respondent Yolanda, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and held
that she was entitled to a right of way on petitioner's property and that the way proposed by
Yolanda would cause the least damage and detriment to the servient estate.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent (Yolanda) should be granted a right of way

Held:
The Supreme Court sustained the decision of the CA in granting Yolanda the right of way.
We find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of respondent appellate court granting a right
of way to private respondent through petitioner's property. In fact, as between petitioner
Anastacia and respondent Yolanda their agreement has already been rendered moot insofar
as it concerns the determination of the principal issue herein presented. The voluntary
easement in favor of private respondent, which petitioner now denies but which the court is
inclined to believe, has in fact become a legal easement or an easement by necessity
constituted by law.
As defined, an easement is a real right on another's property, corporeal and immovable,
whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or
something to be done on his property, for the benefit of another person or tenement.  It
is jus in re aliena, inseparable, indivisible and perpetual, unless extinguished by causes
provided by law. A right of way in particular is a privilege constituted by covenant or granted
by law to a person or class of persons to pass over another's property when his tenement is
surrounded by realties belonging to others without an adequate outlet to the public highway.
The owner of the dominant estate can demand a right of way through the servient estate
provided he indemnifies the owner thereof for the beneficial use of his property. 

The conditions sine quo non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public
highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was
not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a
point least prejudicial to the servient estate.

The evidence clearly shows that the property of private respondent is hemmed in by the
estates of other persons including that of petitioner; that she offered to pay P200.00 per
square meter for her right of way as agreed between her and petitioner; that she did not
cause the isolation of her property; that the right of way is the least prejudicial to the servient
estate. These facts are confirmed in the ocular inspection report of the clerk of court, more
so that the trial court itself declared that "[t]he said properties of Antonio Quimen which were
purchased by plaintiff Yolanda Quimen Oliveros were totally isolated from the public highway
and there appears an imperative need for an easement of right of way to the public
highway."

In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the
proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long at
the extreme right of petitioner's property, will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as
compared to the suggested passage through the property of Yolanda's father which would
mean destroying the sari sari store made of strong materials. Absent any showing that these
findings and conclusion are devoid of factual support in the records, or are so glaringly
erroneous, this Court accepts and adopts them. As between a right of way that would
demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right
of way which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second
alternative should be preferred. After all, it is not the main function of this Court to analyze or
weigh the evidence presented all over again where the petition would necessarily invite
calibration of the whole evidence considering primarily the credibility of witnesses, existence
and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other, and the
probabilities of the situation. In sum, this Court finds that the decision of respondent
appellate court is thoroughly backed up by law and the evidence.