G.R. No.

L-48050 October 10, 1994 of Olongapo City became final and executory on 30 April 1973 when the then Court of First
Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Br. 3,4 dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
FELICIDAD JAVIER, petitioner, findings and conclusions of the City Court holding that appellant (herein petitioner) failed to
vs. give sufficient evidence to prove that the area in question was within the boundaries of Lot
HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of No. 1641. 5
Zambales and REINO ROSETE, respondents.
Subsequently, on 17 December 1973, petitioner was granted Miscellaneous Sales Patent
Cesar E. Palma for petitioner. No. 5548 and issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-3259 covering Lot No. 1641.
Meanwhile, Ben Babol who was the defendant and appellee in the complaint for forcible
entry had sold the property he was occupying, including the portion of about 200 square
Saturnino V. Bactad for private respondent. meters in question, to a certain Reino Rosete. Thus petitioner demanded the surrender of
the same area in dispute from Reino Rosete who repeatedly refused to comply with the
demand.

BELLOSILLO, J.: On 29 June 1977, or after about four (4) years from the finality of the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 926, petitioner instituted a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with
Petitioner Felicidad Javier questions before us the order of a regional trial court citing the damages against Ben Babol and Reino Rosete before the then Court of First Instance of
final decision of the city court previously dismissing her complaint for forcible entry, and on Zambales and Olongapo City, docketed as Civil Case No. 2203-0, alleging in pars. 2 and 3
the basis thereof, dismissed her petition to quiet title on the ground of res judicata. We therein that —
summon the time-honored remedies accion interdictal, accion publiciana  and accion
reivindicatoria or  accion de reivindicacion to resolve the issues presented in the petition. . . . plaintiff is the absolute owner in fee simple of a parcel of land
identified as Lot No. 1641, Ts-308, Olongapo Townsite Subdivision . . .
It appears that on 25 January 1963, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-3259, issued by the Register
Lot No. 1641, Ts-308 of the Olongapo Townsite Subdivision, Lower Kalaklan, Olongapo of Deeds for the province of Zambales. . . . Sometime in December,
City, with the District Land Officer, Bureau of Lands, Olongapo City. Sometime in December 1970, and until present, defendants, relying on an application filed on
1970, alleging that she was forcibly dispossessed of a portion of the land by a certain Ben December 23, 1969, with the Bureau of Lands, however have squatted,
Babol, she instituted a complaint for forcible entry before the City Court of Olongapo City, illegally occupied and unlawfully possessed the southwestern portion of
docketed as Civil Case No. 926, stating in pars. 2 and 3 therein that — plaintiff's above-described property of about 200 square meters, then by
defendant BEN BABOL and now by defendant REINO ROSETE, the
former having sold the entirety of his property to the latter, including the
. . . plaintiff is the true, lawful and in actual, prior physical possession of a portion in question. . . . 6
certain parcel of land situated at Lower Kalaklan, City of Olongapo, said
lot being designated as Lot No. 1641, Ts-308 of the Olongapo Townsite
Subdivision since 1961 and up to the present time, until the day and Instead of filing a responsive pleading, therein defendant Reino Rosete (private respondent
incidents hereinafter narrated. . . . Sometime on December 12, 1970, the herein) moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. Defendant Ben Babol
defendant, without express consent of plaintiff and without lawful did not file any pleading.
authority, through scheme, strategy and stealth, forcibly entered a portion
on the southwestern part of Lot No. 1641, Ts-308, with the assistance of In its Order dated 27 January 1978,7 the then Court of First Instance of Zambales, Br.
hired helpers, started construction of riprap along the Kalaklan River 1,8 sustained the argument of Rosete and granted his motion to dismiss. Thereafter,
perimeter of said portion of land; said entry was further augmented by petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.9 Hence, this petition for review
removing plaintiff's chain link, fence with galvanized iron posts embedded on certiorari.
in concrete, likewise destroying plants introduced by plaintiff by removing
existing BL (Bureau of Lands) monuments thereon, and by these actions, Petitioner contends that res judicata  cannot apply in the instant case since there is no
defendant started exercising illegal possession of said portion of land identity of parties and causes of action between her complaint for forcible entry, which had
which contains an area of 200 square meters, more or less. 1 long become final and executory, and her subsequent petition for quieting of title. She
argues that private respondent Reino Rosete, who invokes the defense or res judicata, was
On 7 November 1972 the City Court of Olongapo City, Br. 4,2 dismissed Civil Case No. 926 never impleaded in the forcible entry case, which is an action in personam; neither was he a
on the ground that "it appears to the Court that the Bureau of Lands has considered the purchaser  pendente lite who, perhaps, could have validly invoked the defense of res
area in question to be outside Lot 1641 of the plaintiff. . . ."3 The Decision of the City Court judicata. With regard to the cause of action, she maintains that there is no identity of causes
of action since the first case was for forcible entry, which is merely concerned with the terror." 15 And, a judgment rendered in a case for recovery of possession is conclusive only
possession of the property, whereas the subsequent case was for quieting of title, which on the question of possession and not on the ownership. It does not in any way bind the title
looks into the ownership of the disputed land. or affect the ownership of the land or building. 16

Private respondent however submits that there is identity of parties in the two cases since On the other hand, Civil Case No. 2203-0 while inaccurately captioned as an action for
he is a successor in interest by title of the defendant in the first case after the "Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession with Damages" is in reality an action to
commencement of the first action. On the issue of identity of causes of action, he simply recover a parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria under Art. 434 17 of the Civil Code, and
states that neither of the two cases, i.e., the complaint for forcible entry and the subsequent should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 926, which is an accion interdictal. From the
petition for quieting of title, alleges a cause of action. Thus, private respondent continues, averments of the complaint in Civil Case No. 2203-0, plaintiff therein (petitioner herein)
both cases have to be dismissed. clearly sets up title to herself and prays that respondent Rosete be ejected from the
disputed land and that she be declared the owner and given possession thereof. Certainly,
Time and again it has been said that for res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent the allegations partake of the nature of an accion reivindicatoria. 18
action the following requisites must concur: (1) There must be a final judgment or order; (2)
The court rendering the judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; (3) The The doctrine in Emilia v. Bado, 19, decided more than twenty-five years ago, is still good law
former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and, (4) There is between the first and second and has preserved the age-old remedies available under existing laws and jurisprudence to
actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action. 10 The presence of the recover possession of real property, namely accion interdictal, which is the summary action
first three requirements and the identity of subject matter in the fourth requirement are not for forcible entry (detentacion) where the defendant's possession of the property is illegal ab
disputed. Hence, the only issues remaining are whether as between Civil Case No. 926 and initio, or the summary action for unlawful detainer (desahuico) where the defendant's
Civil Case No. 2203-0 there is identity of parties and of causes of action which would bar possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so by the expiration of his right to
the institution of Civil Case No. 2203-0. possess, both of which must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the
land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful
Petitioner's argument that there is no identity of parties between the two actions is without detainer, in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court; 20 accion
merit. We have repeatedly ruled that for res judicata  to apply, what is required is not publiciana  which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to possess and which should be
absolute but only substantial identity of parties. 11 It is fundamental that the application brought in the proper regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted for more than
of res judicata may not be evaded by simply including additional parties in a subsequent one year; and, accion reivindicatoria  or accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery
litigation. In fact we have said that there is still identity of parties although in the second of ownership and includes the  jus utendi  and the  jus fruendi  brought in the proper regional
action there is one party who was not joined in the first action, if it appears that such party is trial court.
not
a necessary party either in the first or second action, 12 or is a mere nominal party. 13 Thus, Accion reivindicatoria  or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action whereby plaintiff alleges
Sec. 49, par. (b), Rule 39, Rules of Court, provides that ". . . the judgment or order is, with ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. 21 It is different
respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised from accion interdictal or accion publiciana  where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better
in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title right to possess without claim of title. 22
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the
same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity." In Civil Case No. 926 petitioner merely claimed a better right or prior possession over the
disputed area without asserting title thereto. It should be distinguished from Civil Case No.
In the case at bench, it is evident that private respondent Reino Rosete is a successor in 2203-0 where she expressly alleged ownership, specifically praying that she be declared
interest of Ben Babol by title subsequent to the commencement and termination of the first the rightful owner and given possession of the disputed portion. Hence, in Civil Case No.
action. Hence, there is actual, if not substantial, identity of the parties between the two 926 petitioner merely alleged that she was "the true, lawful (possessor) and in actual, prior
actions. But, there is merit in petitioner's argument that there is no identity of causes of physical possession" of the subject parcel of land, whereas in Civil Case
action between Civil Case No. 2203-0 she asserted that she was "the absolute owner in fee simple" of the parcel of
No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0. land "covered by Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. P-3259." The complaint in Civil
Case No. 2203-0 definitely raises the question of ownership and clearly gives defendants
Civil Case No. 926 is a complaint for forcible entry, where what is at issue is prior therein notice of plaintiff's claim of exclusive and absolute ownership, including the right to
possession, regardless of who has lawful title over the disputed property. 14 Thus, "[t]he only possess which is an elemental attribute of such ownership. Thus, this Court has ruled that a
issue in an action for forcible entry is the physical or material possession of real property, judgment in forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and
that is, possession de facto  and not possession de jure. The philosophy underlying this declares only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an
remedy is that irrespective of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership. 23
peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or
And, applying the ruling of the Court En Banc  in Quimpo v. De la Victoria, 24 even if we treat includes Lot 284 of the Masantol Cadastre and Lot 284 was subdivided into Lots 284-A and
Civil Case No. 2203-0 as a petition to quiet title, as its caption suggests, still it has a cause 284-B.
of action different from that for ejectment. Consequently, there being no identity of causes of
action between Civil Case No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0, the prior complaint for Trinidad was in physical possession of the land. She refused to surrender the land to her
ejectment cannot bar the subsequent action for recovery, or petition to quiet title. brother-in-law Moses G. Mendoza, despite several demands.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated 27 January 1978 of the then On September 3, 1971, Moses filed with the Court of First Instance, Pampanga a complaint
Court of First Instance of Zambales, Br. I, with station in Olongapo City, dismissing Civil for partition claiming the one fourth (1/4) share of Manuela which was sold to him.8
Case No. 2203-0, and its subsequent Order denying reconsideration of the dismissal are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
During the pendency of the case for partition, Trinidad Fajardo died. On December 15,
1984, the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition of the estate of Trinidad Fajardo. On
The Clerk of Court is directed to remand the records immediately to the court of a quo  and February 16, 1987, Lucio Fajardo Ignacio, son of Trinidad sold Lot 284-B to spouses
the latter to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 2203-0 with deliberate dispatch. This Venancio Viray and Cecilia Nunga-Viray.
decision is immediately executory.
On February 8, 1989, the Regional Trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch 55 rendered
SO ORDERED. a decision in favor of Moses G. Mendoza, the dispositive portion of which provides:

G.R. No. 120784-85        January 24, 2001 "WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants, and hereby orders.1âwphi1.nêt
SPOUSES WARLITO BUSTOS and HERMINIA REYES-BUSTOS, petitioners,
vs. "1. The division and partition of the parcel of land identified and described earlier
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES VENANCIO VIRAY and CECILIA NUNGA- with the aid and assistance of a qualified surveyor, segregating therefrom an area
VIRAY, respondents. equivalent to 1/4 portion to be taken from the vacant right eastern portion which is
toward the national road the same to be determined by one (or the said surveyor)
PARDO, J.: standing on the subject land facing the municipal road, at the expense of the
plaintiffs;
The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari seeking to set aside the Court of
Appeals1 modifying that of the Regional trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch 552 and "2. The said 1/4 portion segregated shall be a fixed portion, described by metes
the resolution denying reconsideration.3 and bounds, and shall be adjudicated and assigned to the plaintiffs;

Paulino Fajardo died intestate on April 2, 1957.4 He had four (4) children, namely: Manuela, "3. In case of disagreement as to where the said right eastern portion should be
Trinidad, Beatriz and Marcial, all surnamed Fajardo. taken, a commission is hereby constituted, and the OIC-Clerk of Court is hereby
appointed chairman, and the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court of Branches 54 and 55 of
On September 30, 1964, the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition5 of the estate of this Court are hereby appointed members, to carry out the orders contained in the
Paulino Fajardo. On the same date, Manuela sold her share to Moses6 G. Mendoza, foregoing first two paragraphs;
husband of Beatriz by deed of absolute sale.7 The description of the property reads as
follows: "4. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees, and
to pay the costs of the proceedings.
"A parcel of an irrigated riceland located in the barrio of San Isidro, Masantol,
Pampanga. Bounded on the North, by Paulino Fajardo; on the East, by Paulino "SO ORDERED."9
Fajardo; on the South, by Paulino Guinto. Containing an area of 5,253 sq. mts.,
more or less. Declared under Tax Declaration No. 3029 in the sum of P710.00." On September 13, 1991, Moses sold the subject land to spouses Warlito Bustos and
Herminia Reyes-Bustos.
At the time of the sale, there was no cadastral survey in Masantol, Pampanga. Later, the
cadastre was conducted and the property involved in the partition case were specified as In the meantime, on November 6, 1989, spouses Venancio Viray and Cecilia Nunga-Viray,
Lots 280, 283, 284, 1000-A and 1000-B. The share of Manuela, which was sold to Moses, buyers of Lucio Ignacio's share of the property, filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Macabebe-Masantol, Pampanga an action for unlawful detainer10 against spouses Bustos, right eastern portion which is toward the national road, the same to be
the buyers of Moses G. Mendoza, who were in actual possession as lessees of the husband determined by one standing on the subject land facing the municipal road,
of Trinidad, Francisco Ignacio, of the subject land. at the expense of the plaintiff-appellees;

The municipal circuit trial court decided the case in favor of spouses Viray. Subsequently, "3. The said 1/4 portion segregated shall be a fixed portion, described by
the trial court issued writs of execution and demolition, but were stayed when spouses metes and bounds, and shall be adjudicated and assigned to the
Bustos filed with the regional Trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch 55,11 a petition for plaintiffs-appellees;
certiorari, prohibition and injunction.
"4. In case of disagreement as to where the said right eastern portion
On December 18, 1992, the regional trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion should be taken, a Commission is hereby constituted, with the
of which reads: OIC/present Clerk of Court as Chairman, and the OIC/present Branch
Clerk of Court of Branches 54 and 55 of the Court (RTC) as members, to
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case, is as it is hereby, dismissed. The carry out and implement the Orders contained in the second and third
preliminary injunction is ordered dissolved and the petitioners and Meridian paragraphs hereof;
Assurance Corporation are hereby ordered jointly and severally, to pay the private
respondents the sum of P20,000.00 by way of litigation expenses and attorney's "5. The defendants are ordered to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P500.00 as
fees, and to pay the cost of the proceedings."12 attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of the proceedings.

In time, the spouses Bustos appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.13 "2. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 92-0421-M is AFFIRMED but the reasons for its
dismissal shall be effective only as to the issue of possession. CA-G.R. SP No.
On February 27, 1989, Lucio Fajardo Ignacio also appealed the decision to the Court of 30369 is DISMISSED.
Appeals.14
"3. No. pronouncement as to costs.
Upon motion for consolidation of the petitioners, on August 9, 1993, the Court of Appeals
resolved to consolidate CA-G.R. SP No. 30369 and CA-G.R. CV No. 37606.15 "SO ORDERED."16

On August 26, 1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in the two cases, the On September 9, 1994, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration;17 however, on June
dispositive portion of which provides: 21, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.18

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, consolidated judgment is hereby Hence, this petition.19
rendered for bot CA-G.R. SP No. 37607 and CA-G.R. SP No. 30369 as follows:
The issue raised is whether petitioners could be ejected from what is now their own land.
"1. The appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 37607 is dismissed; Moses Mendoza
is declared as owner of the 1/4 undivided share previously owned by Manuela The petition is meritorious.
Fajardo; and the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated February 8, 1989 in
Civil Case No. 83-0005-M is affirmed but MODIFIED as follows:
In this case, the issue of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. In the
unlawful detailer case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court as to
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in possession on the ground that the decision has become final and executory. This means
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, and hereby orders. that the petitioners may be evicted. In the accion reinvindicatoria,  the Court of Appeals
affirmed the ownership of petitioners over the subject land. Hence, the court declared
"1. A relocation survey to be conducted (at the expense of the plaintiffs) to petitioners as the lawful owners of the land.
retrace the land subject of the deed of sale dated September 30, 1964
between Manuela Fajardo and Moses Mendoza; Admittedly, the decision in the ejectment case is final and executory. However, the
ministerial duty of the court to order execution of a final and executory judgment admits of
"2. The division and partition of said relocated land by segregating exceptions. In Lipana vs. Development Bank of Rizal,20 the Supreme Court reiterated the
therefrom an area equivalent to 1/4 portion to be taken from the vacant rule "once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to
order its execution, admits of certain exceptions as in cases of special and exceptional The property subject of this case is a parcel of land containing an area of 24,550
nature where it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice to direct the suspension square meters, more or less, located in Lingayen, Pangasinan, and particularly
of its execution (Vecine v. Geronimo, 59 O. G. 579); whenever it is necessary to accomplish described as follows:
the aims of justice (Pascual v. Tan 85 Phil. 164); or when certain facts and circumstances
transpired after the judgment became final which could render the execution of the A parcel of land (Nipa with an area of 8,410 square meters; fishpond with
judgment unjust (Cabrias v. Adil, 135 SCRA 354)." an area of 14,000 square meters; and residential land with an area of
1,740 square meters, more or less. Bounded on the N, by river and
In the present case, the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are now Filemon Anselmo; on the South by Alejandro Soriano and Filemon
legal owners of the land in question and are occupants thereof. To execute the judgment by Anselmo; and on the West by Fortunata Soriano.
ejecting petitioners from the land that they owned would certainly result in grave injustice.
Besides, the issue of possession was rendered moot when the court adjudicated ownership Originally owned by Adriano Soriano until his death in 1947, the above-described
to the spouses Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale. property passed on to his heirs who leased the same to spouses David de Vera
and Consuelo Villasista for a period of fifteen (15) years beginning July 1, 1967
Placing petitioners in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical with Roman Soriano, one of the children of Adriano Soriano, acting as caretaker of
consequence of the decision declaring them as the rightful owners is possession. It follows the property during the period of the lease. After executing an extra judicial
that as owners of the subject property, petitioners are entitled to possession of the same. settlement among themselves, the heirs of Adriano Soriano subsequently
"An owner who cannot exercise the seven (7) "juses" or attributes of ownership-the right to subdivided the property into two (2) lots, Lot No. 60052 and Lot No. 8459. Lot No.
possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate, to 60052 was assigned to Lourdes, Candido and the heirs of Dionisia while Lot No.
recover or vindicate and to the fruits is a crippled owner."22 8459 was assigned to Francisca, Librada, Elocadio and Roman. In 1971, Lot No.
60052 was sold by Lourdes, Candido and the heirs of Dionisia to petitioner
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of spouses Braulio and Aquilina Abalos (hereinafter referred to as petitioners), while,
Appeals I Ca G.R. SP No. 30609 for being moot and academic. We AFFIRM the decision of Elocadio, Francisca and Librada sold their three-fourths shares in Lot No. 8459
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 37606.1âwphi1.nêt also to petitioners.

No costs. On March 14, 1968, the de Vera spouses ousted Roman Soriano as caretaker and
appointed Isidro Verzosa and Vidal Verzosa as his substitutes. Thereafter, Roman
Soriano filedCAR Case No. 1724-P-68 for reinstatement and reliquidation against
SO ORDERED. the de Vera spouses. The agrarian court authorized the ejectment of Roman
Soriano but on appeal, the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which
G.R. No. 128177            August 15, 2001 decision became final and executory. However, prior to the execution of the said
decision, the parties entered into a post-decisional agreement wherein the de Vera
HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO, petitioners, spouses allowed Roman Soriano to sub-lease the property until the termination of
vs. the lease in 1982. In an Order dated December 22, 1972, the post-decisional
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES BRAULIO ABALOS and agreement was approved by the agrarian court.
AQUILINA ABALOS, respondents.
On August 16, 1976, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.: Pangasinan, Branch 38, an application for registration of title over Lot No. 60052
and three-fourths (3/4)pro-indiviso of Lot No. 8459, docketed asLRC Case No. N-
3405. Said application for registration was granted by the trial court, acting as a
May a winning party in a land registration case effectively eject the possessor thereof, land registration court, per Decision dated June 27, 1983. On appeal, the Court of
whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB? Appeals affirmed the decision of the land registration court. The petition for review
filed with the Supreme Court by Roman Soriano docketed asG.R. 70842, was
The instant petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision 1 dated September 20, denied for lack of merit and entry of judgment was entered on December 16, 1985.
1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34930 as well as its Resolution 2 dated
January 15, 1997, denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Meanwhile, it appears that on July 15, 1983, a day after the promulgation of the
land registration court's decision, Roman Soriano, together with Elocadio and
We quote the undisputed facts as narrated by the Court of Appeals, to wit — Librada Soriano, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Branch 37, and
against petitioners, an action for annulment of document and/or redemption,
ownership and damages, docketed asCivil Case No. 159568 (sic; should be Appeals denying the petition of private respondents was set aside, and the motion
15958). Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground ofres judicata, for execution filed by petitioners inCAR Case No. 1724-P-48 was denied.
pendency of another action, laches, misjoinder of parties and lack of jurisdiction,
which was denied by the trial court. On June 22, 1993, the Supreme Court, inG.R. 99843, reversed and set aside the
denial of the Court of Appeals inC.A. GR SP No. 22149, and consequently,Civil
Thereafter, on August 22, 1984, or eleven (11) years after the approval of the post- Case No. 15958 for annulment of document and/or redemption, ownership and
decisional agreement between Roman Soriano and the spouses de Vera inCAR damages, was ordered dismissed.
Case No. 1724-P-68 for reinstatement and reliquidation, petitioners filed with the
agrarian court a motion for execution of said post-decisional agreement which On October 18, 1993, private respondents filed with the Department of Agrarian
allowed Roman Soriano to sub-lease the property. The motion prayed that Adjudication Board (sic), a complaint against petitioners for "Security of Tenure
petitioners be placed in possession of the subject property, jointly with Roman with prayer for Status Quo Order and Preliminary Injunction" docketed asDARAB
Soriano, and to levy so much of Roman's property to answer for the use and Case No. 528-P-93.
occupation by Soriano of 6/7 share of the property. On October 25, 1984, Roman
Soriano filed a motion to suspend hearing on the rental demanded by petitioners,
which, however, was denied by the agrarian court. The agrarian court likewise Meanwhile, it appears that the decision of the land registration court inLRC Case
authorized the substitution of the de Vera spouses by petitioners. Soriano's motion No. N-3405 was partially executed with the creation of a Committee on Partition
for reconsideration was also denied, prompting Soriano to file a petition for per Order dated March 25, 1987. On July 27, 1988, the land registration court
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. approved the partition of Lot No. 8459, with Lot No. 8459-A assigned to private
respondent, and Lot No. 8459-B assigned to petitioners. For Lot No. 60052, O.C.T.
No. 22670 was issued in the name of petitioners; for Lot No. 8459-B, O.C.T. No.
In the meantime, Roman Soriano died on December 11, 1985. Thus, the complaint 22687 was issued, also in the name of petitioner; and for Lot No. 8459-A, O.C.T.
inCivil Case No. 159568 (sic) for annulment of document and/or redemption, No. 22686 was issued in the name of Roman Soriano. Dissatisfied with said
ownership and damages, was amended to substitute Soriano's heirs, herein partition, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed asCA
private respondents, as party-plaintiffs. The complaint was again amended to G.R. SP No. 119497. The appellate court affirmed the partition but reversed the
include Juanito Ulanday as party-defendant for having allegedly purchased part of order of the land registration court directing the issuance of a writ of possession on
the disputed property from petitioners. On motion of petitioners, the re-amended the ground of pendency ofCivil Case No. 15958.
complaint was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that the re-amended
complaint altered the cause of action. Upon reconsideration, the dismissal was set
aside and petitioners were ordered to file their Answer, in view of which petitioners On November 15, 1993, the trial court in compliance with the decision of the
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, docketed Supreme Court inG.R. No. 99843, dismissedCivil Case No. 15958, in view of
asC.A. GR SP No. 22149. which, petitioner, on November 25, 1993, inLRC Case No. N-3405, moved for the
issuance of an alias writ of execution and/or writ of possession to place them in
possession of Lot No. 60052 and Lot No. 8459-B. Per Resolution dated January
On April 25, 1990, the Court of Appeals denied the petition filed by Roman Soriano 21, 1994, said motion was held in abeyance by the land registration court until and
(substituted by private respondents) impugning the denial of their motion to afterDARAB Case No. 528-P-93 for security of tenure with prayer forstatus quo,
suspend hearing on the rental demanded by petitioners, and authorizing the has been resolved.
substitution of the de Vera spouses by petitioners, on the ground that no grave
abuse of discretion was committed by the agrarian court. Thus, private
respondents filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, Their motion for reconsideration having been denied on April 5, 1984, petitioners
docketed asG.R. 93401. interposed an appeal to the Supreme Court, docketed asG.R. 115073. In a
Resolution dated July 27, 1994 issued by the Supreme Court, petitioners' appeal,
which was treated as a petition for certiorari, was referred to this Court [of Appeals]
Meanwhile, on December 7, 1990, the Court of Appeals inC.A. GR SP No. 22149, for determination and disposition.3
also denied the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners, ruling that
the land registration court committed no error when it refused to adhere to the rule
ofres judicata. Petitioners then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on The Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the Resolution of the land registration court
certiorari, docketed asG.R. 99843. and ordered instead the issuance of the corresponding writ of possession in favor of private
respondents. With the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners are now before
us raising the following grounds:
On June 26, 1991, the Supreme Court promulgated its decision inG.R. 93401, and
granted the petition filed by private respondents. Thus, the decision of the Court of
1. THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS ARE CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGRARIAN
 REFORM LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF It is to the credit of respondent Judge that he has shown awareness of the recent
TENANT-CARETAKER. Presidential Decrees which are impressed with an even more solicitous concern
for the rights of the tenants.If, therefore, as he pointed out in his order granting the
2. THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT OF writ of possession, there is a pending case between the parties before the Court of
APPEALS ARE VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISION ON RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. Agrarian Relations, ordinary prudence, let alone the letter of the law, ought to have
cautioned him against granting the plea of private respondents that they be placed
in possession of the land in controversy,x x x. At the time the challenged orders
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS were issued, without any showing of how the tenancy controversy in the Court of
DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION CONSIDERING Agrarian Relations was disposed of, respondent Judge could not by himself and
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD EARLIER PERFECTED AN APPEAL OF with due observance of the restraints that cabin and confine his jurisdiction pass
THE RESOLUTION SUBJECT OF THEIR PETITION.4 upon the question of tenancy. (Emphasis ours)

Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. There is ownership when a thing In its challenged Decision, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on the principle of finality of
pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law judgments. It applied the legal doctrine that once a judgment has become final, the issuance
and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, of a writ of execution becomes ministerial. The appellate court held that petitioner's situation
among which are the right to enjoy the thing owned and the right to exclude other persons does not fall under any of the exceptions to this rule since his occupation of the subject land
from possession thereof. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing did not transpire after the land registration court's adjudication became final.
or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a
thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the
concept of an owner and possession of a holder.5 A person may be declared owner but he In so ruling, however, the Court of Appeals loses sight of the fact that petitioner's claim of
may not be entitled to possession. The possession may be in the hands of another either as possession as a tenant of the litigated property, if proven, entitles him to protection against
a lessee or a tenant. A person may have improvements thereon of which he may not be dispossession.
deprived without due hearing. He may have other valid defenses to resist surrender of
possession. A judgment for ownership, therefore, does not necessarily include possession Private respondents argue that petitioners' tenancy claim is barred byres judicata, having
as a necessary incident.6 been ruled upon in G.R. Nos. 99843 and 93401. However, not being an issue in the case
before us, this question should properly be resolved in DARAB Case No. 528-P-93. To
There is no dispute that private respondents' (petitioners below) title over the land under restate, the only issue before us is whether or not a winning party in a land registration case
litigation has been confirmed with finality. As explained above, however, such declaration can effectively eject the possessor thereof, whose security of tenure rights are still pending
pertains only to ownership and does not automatically include possession, especially so in determination before the DARAB.
the instant case where there is a third party occupying the said parcel of land, allegedly in
the concept of an agricultural tenant. A judgment in a land registration case cannot be effectively used to oust the possessor of
the land, whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB.
While the issue of ownership of the subject land has been laid to rest in the final judgment of Stated differently, the prevailing party in a land registration case cannot be placed in
the land registration court, the right of possession thereof is, as yet, controverted. This is possession of the area while it is being occupied by one claiming to be an agricultural
precisely what is put in issue in the security of tenure case filed by petitioners (private tenant, pending a declaration that the latter's occupancy was unlawful.
respondents below) before the DARAB.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of
It is important to note that although private respondents have been declared titled owners of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34930 dated September 20, 1996, as well
the subject land, the exercise of their rights of ownership are subject to limitations that may as its Resolution dated January 15, 1997 are SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Regional
be imposed by law.7 The Tenancy Act provides one such limitation. Agricultural lessees are Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan in LRC Case No. N-3405 dated January 21, 1994 is
entitled to security of tenure and they have the right to work on their respective landholdings ordered REINSTATED.
once the leasehold relationship is established. Security of tenure is a legal concession to
agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is SO ORDERED.
tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood.8 The exercise of the right of
ownership, then, yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant. G.R. No. 133140           August 10, 1999

However, petitioners' status as tenant has not yet been declared by the DARAB. In keeping JOSE MA. T. GARCIA, petitioner,
with judicial order, we refrain from ruling on whether petitioners may be dispossessed of the vs.
subject property. As ratiocinated inNona v. Plan9 —
COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. LUISITO & MA. LUISA MAGPAYO AND PHILIPPINE BANK Upon service of the writ of possession, Mrs. Magpayo's brother, Jose Ma. T.
OF COMMUNICATIONS, respondents. Garcia (Garcia), who was in possession of the land, refused to honor it and filed a
motion for Intervention in the above-said PBCom petition, which motion was
PUNO, J.: denied.

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the decision Garcia thereupon filed against PBCom, the Magpayos, and the RTC Sheriff the
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 44707 entitled "Jose Ma. T. Garcia, instant suit for recovery of realty and damages wherein he alleged, inter alia, that
Plaintiff-Appellee versus Spouses Luisito and Ma. Luisa Magpayo and Sheriff of Makati, he inherited the land as one of the heirs of his mother Remedios T. Garcia, and
Defendants, Philippine Bank of Communications, Defendant-Appellant".1 that PBCom acquired no right thereover.

The facts are as succinctly summarized by the appellate court, viz.: In its answer, PBCom averred, inter alia, that Garcia's claim over the land is belied
by the fact that it is not among the properties owned by his mother listed in the
Inventory of Real Estate filed at the then CFI of Pasay City, Branch 27, in SP Proc.
Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, in whose name TCT No. S-31269 covering a parcel of land No. 2917-P, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Remedios T. Garcia Petition
identified as Lot 17 situated at Bel Air II Village, Makati, was registered, sold with for Letters of Administration, Pedro V. Garcia Petitioner-Administrator.
the consent of his wife Remedios T. Garcia, the same to their daughter Ma. Luisa
Magpayo and her husband Luisito Magpayo (the Magpayos).
The Magpayos, on the other hand, asserted that title over the land was transferred
to them by Mrs. Magpayo's parents to enable them (Magpayos) to borrow from
On March 5, 1981, the Magpayos mortgaged the land to the Philippine Bank of PBCom.
Communications (PBCom) to secure a loan, Five Hundred Sixty Four Thousand
(P564,000.00) Pesos according to them, One Million Two Hundred Thousand
(P1,200,000.00) Pesos according to PBCom.1âwphi1.nêt Garcia filed a Motion for Summary Judgment praying that judgment be rendered in
his favor to which PBCom counter-motioned that judgment should be rendered in
its favor.
On March 9, 1981, Atty. Garcia's Title was cancelled and in its stead Transfer
Certificate of Title No. S-108412/545 was issued in the name of the Magpayos.
The court a quo denied the motion for summary judgment on the ground that
PBCom raised in its answer both factual and legal issues which could only be
The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was registered at the Makati Register of Deeds ventilated in a full-blown trial.
and annotated on the Magpayos title.
The court a quo, however, later issued a summary judgment.2
The Magpayos failed to pay their loan upon its maturity, hence, the mortgage was
extrajudicially foreclosed and at the public auction sale, PBCom which was the
highest bidder bought the land. In its summary judgment, the lower court held that the mortgage executed by the Magpayo
spouses in favor of PBCom was void. It found that:
The redemption period of the foreclosed mortgage expired without the Magpayos
redeeming the same, hence, title over the land was consolidated in favor of . . . [A]t the time that the defendants Magpayo spouses executed the mortgage in
PBCom which cancelled the Magpayo's title and Transfer Certificate of Title No. favor of the defendant PBCom on March 5, 1981, the said spouses were not yet
138233 was issued in its name. the owners of the property. This finding is evident from the other undisputed fact
that a new Torrens title was issued to the defendants Magpayo spouses only on
March 9, 1981 . . . . The Magpayo spouses could not have acquired the said
On October 4, 1985, the Magpayos filed at the RTC of Makati a complaint seeking property merely by the execution of the Deed of Sale because the property was in
the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, public auction sale, the possession of the plaintiff. The vendor, Pedro V. Garcia, was not in possession
and PBCom's title docketed as Civil Case No. 11891. This complaint was and hence could not deliver the property merely by the execution of the document
dismissed for failure to prosecute. (MANALILI V. CESAR, 39 PHIL. 134). The conclusion is therefore inescapable that
the said mortgage is null and void for lack of one of the essential elements of a
On October 15, 1985, PBCom filed at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a mortgage as required by Art. 2085 of our Civil Code . . . .3
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession over the land, docketed as LRC
Case No. M-731, which Branch 148 thereof granted. Thus, it invalidated the foreclosure sale and nullified TCT No. 138233 issued to PBCom.
Dissatisfied, PBCom appealed. In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals held:
 (P)laintiff-appellee's assertion that ownership over the disputed property was not The Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was not in accord with established
transmitted to his sister and her husband-Magpayo spouses at the time of the jurisprudence and even contradicts itself, as far as the issue of the propriety of the
execution of the Deed of Sale as he was still in actual and adverse possession Summary Judgment is concerned.
thereof does not lie.
The petition has no merit.
For in his complaint, plaintiff-appellee alleged that he entered into possession of
the disputed property only upon the demise of his mother, from whom he alleges to Anent the first assignment of error, petitioner alleged that the Court of Appeals resolved the
have inherited it but who was not the registered owner of the property, that is, on issues "ownership" and "possession" though they were not raised by PBCom in its
October 31, 1980 (Certificate of Death, p. 17, Records), by which admission he is appellant's brief. The allegation is belied by page 17 of PBCom's appellate brief, viz.:
bound. Since the execution of the deed of sale by Atty. Pedro V. Garcia in favor of
the Magpayos took place earlier or on August 1, 1980, then contrary to his claim,
plaintiff-appellee was not in possession of the property at the time of the execution Due to the wrong cited case, the trial court opined erroneously that "Magpayo
of said public instrument. Spouses could not have acquired the property merely by the execution of the deed
of sale because the property was in the possession of the plaintiff" (Order, p. 10).
Furthermore, it appearing that the vendor Atty. Garcia had control of the property
which was registered in his name and that the deed of sale was likewise Again, the trial court could not distinguish ownership from possession. Ownership
registered, then the sale was consummated and the Magpayos were free to and possession are two entirely different legal concepts.
exercise the attributes of ownership including the right to mortgage the land.
Plaintiff-appellee's possession as found by the trial court, started only "at the time
When the land is registered in the vendor's name, and the public instrument of sale of the filing of the complaint in this present case up to the present." (page 2,
is also registered, the sale may be considered consummated and the buyer may Summary Judgment).
exercise the actions of an owner (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on
the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1992 Ed., p. 55). Assuming that to be true, plaintiff-appellee's possession which started only in 1986
could not ripen into ownership. He has no valid title thereto. His possession in fact
That the Magpayos' title, TCT No. S-108412, was issued four (4) days following the was that of an intruder, one done in bad faith (to defeat PBCom's Writ of
execution of the deed of real estate mortgage is of no moment, for registration Possession). His possession is certainly not in the concept of an owner. This is so
under the Torrens system does not vest ownership but is intended merely to because as early as 1981, title thereto was registered in the name of the Magpayo
confirm and register the title which one may already have on the land (Municipality Spouses which title was subsequently cancelled when the property was purchased
of Victorias v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 32, 44-45 [1987]). by PBCom in a public auction sale resulting in the issuance of title in favor of the
latter in 1985.
Petitioner Garcia moved for a reconsideration of above decision which was denied. He now
comes before us raising the following errors committed by the Court Appeals: Anent the second-assignment of error, petitioner contends that the following facts were
admitted by the parties in the trial court:
I
1. The petitioner is a compulsory heir of the late spouses Atty. Pedro V. Garcia and
Remedios Tablan Garcia;
The respondent Court of Appeals has departed from the accepted and usual course of
proceedings when it decided the appeal subject of this case based on issues which were
raised neither in the trial court nor in the appellant's brief. 2. The property subject of this dispute was previously the conjugal property of the
said spouses;
II
3. The petitioner and his family have been and are continuously to the present in
actual physical possession of the property. At the time of the alleged sale to the
The Court of Appeals decided the appeal in a manner not in accord with applicable Magpayo spouses, petitioner was in possession of the property;
jurisprudence when it disregarded the admissions of the private respondents and, despite
ruling that Summary Judgment was proper, made its own findings of facts which were
contrary to the said admissions. 4. When his mother Remedios Tablan (sic) Garcia died, sometime in October,
1980, he became, by operation of law, a co-owner of the property;
III
 5. Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, at the time of the execution of the instrument in favor of Needless to state, there was no error on the part of the appellate court in resorting to
the Magpayo spouses was not in possession of the subject property.4 summary judgment as prayed for by both parties.

We reject the contention of petitioner for a perusal of the records shows that these alleged We stress again that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership
admitted facts are his own paraphrased portions of the findings of fact listed by the trial exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner
court in the summary judgment.5 Indeed petitioner did not cite any page number of the not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others.8 Ownership confers certain
records or refer to any documentary Exhibit to prove how and who admitted the said facts. rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale.9 Atty.
Pedro Garcia and his wife Remedios exercised their right to dispose of what they owned
Petitioner's third assignment of error that he alone as plaintiff in the trial court is entitled to a when they sold the subject property to the Magpayo spouses. On the other hand,
summary judgment merits scant attention. A summary judgment is one granted by the court, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right.10 Literally, to
upon motion by either party, for an expeditious settlement of the case, there appearing from possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession
the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important questions or issues may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a
of fact are involved (except the determination of the amount of damages) and that therefore holder.11 "A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.6 Under Rule 34, either party claims to be so."12 On the other hand, "one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges
may move for a summary judgment — the claimant by virtue of Section 1 and the defending in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or
party by virtue of Section 2, viz.: wrong."13 The records show that petitioner occupied the property not in the concept of an
owner for his stay was merely tolerated by his parents. We held in Caniza v. Court of
Appeals  14 that an owner's act of allowing another to occupy his house, rent-free does not
Sec. 1. Summary judgment for claimant. — A party seeking to recover upon a create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor. Consequently,
claim, counter-claim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any it is of no moment that petitioner was in possession of the property at the time of the sale to
time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting the Magpayo spouses. It was not a hindrance to a valid transfer of ownership. On the other
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof. hand, petitioner's subsequent claim of ownership as successor to his mother's share in the
conjugal asset is belied by the fact that the property was not included in the inventory of the
Sec. 2. Summary judgment for defending party. — A party against whom a claim, estate submitted by his father to the intestate court. This buttresses the ruling that indeed
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at the property was no longer considered owned by petitioner's parents. We also uphold the
any time, move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to Court of Appeals in holding that the mortgage to PBCom by the Magpayo spouses is valid
all or any part thereof. notwithstanding that the transfer certificate of title over the property was issued to them after
the mortgage contract was entered into. Registration does not confer ownership, it is merely
It is true that petitioner made the initial move for summary judgment. Nonetheless, PBCom evidence of such ownership over a particular property.15 The deed of sale operates as a
likewise moved for a summary judgment with supporting affidavit and documentary exhibits, formal or symbolic delivery of the property sold and authorizes the buyer to use the
to wit: document as proof of ownership.16 All said, the Magpayo spouses were already the owners
when they mortgaged the property to PBCom.17

COUNTER-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 44707 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.1âwphi1.nêt
PBCom Is Entitled To A Summary Judgment
SO ORDERED.
The procedure for summary judgment may be availed of also by the defending
parties who may be the object of unfounded claims as clearly shown in Sections 1
and 2 of Rule 34. G.R. No. 129609            November 29, 2001

xxx     xxx     xxx RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CARMEN BONDOC, TERESITA BONDOC-ESTO, DIVISORIA
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to render summary FOOTWEAR and CHUA HUAY SOON, respondents.
judgment in PBCom's favor by DISMISSING plaintiff's Complaint as well as Sps.
Magpayo's Cross-Claim for being sham and frivolous.7
x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 135537 November 29, 2001

RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, directed RODIL to pay its realty tax delinquency and ordered the issuance of a temporary
vs. occupancy permit to the ASSOCIATION.11
IDES O'RACCA BUILDING TENANTS ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.
On 6 October 1987 RODIL filed an action for specific performance, damages and injunction
BELLOSILLO, J.: with prayer for temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against
the REPUBLIC, De Jesus, Banas, Factora and the ASSOCIATION.12 RODIL prayed that a
These twin petitions filed under Rule 45 seek to set aside the Decisions of the Court of restraining order be issued enjoining the ASSOCIATION or any person acting under it from
Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 39919, 36381 and 37243. collecting rentals from the occupants or sub-lessees of O'RACCA. On 26 October 1987 the
trial court granted the writ of preliminary injunction.13 On appeal, the Court of Appeals
upheld the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and ordered the deposit of the
Petitioner Rodil Enterprises Inc. (RODIL) is the lessee of the Ides O'Racca Building monthly rentals with the lower court pendente lite.
(O'RACCA) since 1959.1 It was a "former alien property" over which the Republic of the
Philippines acquired ownership by virtue of RA 477, as amended.2
On 20 November 1987 the REPUBLIC, De Jesus, Banas and Factora filed their Answer
with Counterclaim for damages. On 21 December 1987 the ASSOCIATION also filed its
Sometime in 1980 RODIL entered into a sublease contract with respondents Carmen Answer with Counterclaim for damages.
Bondoc, Teresita Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon,3 members of the
Ides O'Racca Building Tenants Association Inc. (ASSOCIATION).
De Jesus, Banas and Factora were later substituted by Secretary Fulgencio Factoran of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in the action for specific
On 4 September 1972 the lease contract between RODIL and the REPUBLIC was renewed performance. On 31 May 1988 Factoran issued Order No. 1 designating the Land
for another fifteen (15) years.4 At that time the O'RACCA was under the administration of Management Bureau represented by Director Abelardo Palad, Jr. as custodian of all "former
the Building Services and Real Property Management Office (BSRPMO) then headed by alien properties" owned by the REPUBLIC.
Director Jesus R. Factora.5
On 18 May 1992 RODIL signed a renewal contract with Director Palad which was approved
On 12 September 1982 BP 2336 was enacted. It authorized the sale of "former alien by Secretary Factoran.14 The renewal contract would extend the lease for ten (10) years
properties" classified as commercial and industrial, and the O'RACCA building was from 1 September 1987. A supplement to the renewal contract was subsequently entered
classified as commercial property.7 into on 25 May 1992 where rentals on the previous lease contract were increased.15

On 8 January 1987 RODIL offered to purchase the subject property conformably with BP On 14 August 1972 the action for specific performance was dismissed by the trial court
233 and the REPUBLIC responded that its offer to purchase would be acted upon once the upon joint motion to dismiss by RODIL and the Solicitor General. The order of dismissal
Committee on Appraisal shall have determined the market value of the property.8 however was appealed by the ASSOCIATION to the Court of Appeals.16

On 22 July 1997 the ASSOCIATION also offered to lease the same building through On 25 September 1992 the spouses Saturnino Alvarez and Epifania Alvarez, sublessees of
the Department of General Services and Real Estate Property Management (DGSREPM).9 RODIL, filed with the Office of the President a letter-appeal assailing the authority of
Factoran to enter into the renewal contract of 18 May 1992 with RODIL, and claiming the
Pending action on the offer of RODIL to purchase the property, Director Factora of the right to purchase the subject property.17
BSRPMO granted RODIL's request for another renewal of the lease contract on 23
September 1987 for another five (5) years from 1 September 1987.10 The renewal contract While the appeal of the ASSOCIATION from the order of dismissal and the letter-appeal of
was forwarded to then Secretary Jose de Jesus of DGSREPM for approval. the spouses Alvarez were pending, the ASSOCIATION instituted Civil Case No. 92-63833
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila 18 praying for the setting aside of the renewal
On 25 September 1987 Undersecretary of DGSREPM Rufino B. Banas recommended to contract of18 May 1992 as well as the supplementary contract of 25 May 1992, and further
Secretary De Jesus the suspension of the approval of the renewal contract because the praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. On 3 May 1993 the trial court
offer of the ASSOCIATION was more beneficial to the REPUBLIC. denied the prayer for preliminary injunction.

Resultantly, on 30 September 1987 Secretary De Jesus issued another memorandum to On 30 July 1993 RODIL filed an action for unlawful detainer against Divisoria
Director Factora disapproving the renewal contract in favor of RODIL, at the same time Footwear,19 and on 4 August 1993, a similar action against Chua Huay Soon.20
recalling all papers signed by him regarding the subject. Secretary De Jesus likewise
On 10 September 1993 the trial court dismissed the action for declaration of nullity of the WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff [RODIL
lease contract filed by the ASSOCIATION on the ground of litis pendentia.21 The Order ENTERPRISES, INC.], ordering defendant [DIVISORIA FOOTWEAR], its
stated that the action for declaration of nullity and the action for specific performance filed representatives, agents, employees and/or assigns to vacate the leased premises
by RODIL were practically between the same parties and for the same causes of or portion of the Ides O'Racca Building presently occupied by said defendant and
action.22 This Order was appealed by the ASSOCIATION to the Court of Appeals.23 to pay plaintiff the following: a) Rentals in arrears from October 1987 to June 1993
in the amount of P521,000.00; b) Rentals in the amount of P9,000.00 a month from
On 19 January 1994 RODIL filed an action for unlawful detainer against respondent July, 1993 until defendant will have vacated the premises; c) Attorney's fees in the
Teresita Bondoc-Esto,24 and on 1 February 1994 filed another action against respondent amount of P15,000.00; d) Costs of suit.
Carmen Bondoc,25 both with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 142282-CV —
On 8 February 1994 the Office of the President through Executive Secretary Teofisto
Guingona Jr. denied the letter-appeal of the spouses Alvarez, but nullified the renewal IN VIEW THEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered ordering: 1. defendant CHUA
contract of 18 May 1992 and the supplementary contract of 25 May 1992.26 HUAY SOON and all persons claiming rights through him, to vacate the premises
occupied by him at O'RACCA Building, located at the corner of Folgueras and M.
Meanwhile, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila upheld RODIL's right to eject respondents delos Santos Street, Binondo, Manila, and turn over possession thereof to plaintiff
Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon,27 as promulgated in RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC.; 2. defendant to pay rentals in arrears from October
separate decisions the dispositive portions of which read — 1987 up to June 1993 at the rate of P6,175.00 a month, representing the rentals in
arrears; 3. defendant to pay P6,175.00 per month from July 1993 until he vacates
the premises, as reasonable compensation for the use of the premises; 4.
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 143301 — defendant to pay the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees; 5. defendant to pay
interests on the amounts mentioned in Nos. 2 and 3 above at ten (10%) percent
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint until said amounts are fully
favor of the plaintiff [RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC.] and against the defendant paid; and, 6. defendant to pay the costs.
[CARMEN BONDOC], to wit: 1. Ordering the defendant and all those claiming title
under her to vacate the subleased portion of the O'Racca Building, corner The Regional Trial Court affirmed the Metropolitan Trial Court28 in all the four (4) decisions
Folgueras and M. de los Santos Streets, Binondo, Manila; 2. Ordering the above quoted. Thus, respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto and Divisoria Footwear
defendant to pay plaintiff the back rentals from October 1987 to August 1992 at the subsequently filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals,29 followed by respondent
rate of P2,665.00 per month and from September 1992 at the rate of P2,665.00 Chua Huay Soon.30
per month plus a yearly increase of 20% per month up to the time that she vacates
the premises; 3. Ordering the defendant to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees and to pay the cost of suit. While the consolidated appeals from the unlawful detainer cases were pending, the Second
Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision on 12 April 1996 with regard to
CA-G.R. No. 39919 declaring the renewal contract between RODIL and the REPUBLIC null
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 143216 — and void.31 RODIL moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.32 Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.33
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff [RODIL
ENTERPRISES, INC.] as against the defendant [TERESITA BONDOC ESTO] On 29 November 1996 the Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its
ordering the defendant and all persons claiming rights under her to vacate the Decision in CA-G.R. No. 36381 and CA-G.R. No. 37243 setting aside the decisions of the
premises at O'Racca Building located at corner Folgueras and M. de los Santos Regional Trial Court, which sustained the Metropolitan Trial Court, and dismissing the action
Streets, Binondo, Manila, and turn over the possession thereof to plaintiff; ordering for unlawful detainer filed by RODIL against its lessees.34 RODIL moved for reconsideration
the defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P29,700.00 as rental in arrears for the but the motion was denied.35 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.36
period from September 1992 plus legal rate of interest less whatever amount
deposited with the Court; ordering defendant to pay the sum of P3,000.00 as
reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises from January On respondents' motion, G.R. Nos. 129609 and 135537 were consolidated.
1994 until defendant shall have finally vacated the premises minus whatever
amount deposited with the Court as rental; ordering defendant to pay reasonable RODIL now contends that the Court of Appeals erred in annulling its renewal contract with
attorney's fees in the amount of P2,000.00 and the costs of suit. the REPUBLIC and in dismissing its actions for unlawful detainer against respondents
Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua. RODIL claims that the assailed
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 142258 — contracts are neither void nor voidable as the facts show they do not fall within the
enumerations under Arts. 1305 and 1409, and an implied new lease still exists by virtue of 1992 or after the assailed contracts were entered into. As correctly stated by petitioner, one
Art. 1670. As a result, the right to eject respondents properly belongs to it.37 cannot enjoin an act already fait accompli.49

With regard to CA-G.R. No. 39919, RODIL argues that the REPUBLIC, the only defendant Private respondents argue that the "renewal contract" cannot "renew" a void contract.
who is a real party in interest, signified its assent to having the action dismissed. However, they could cite no legal basis for this assertion. It would seem that respondents
Assuming arguendo  that the ASSOCIATION was a real party in interest, its counterclaim consider the renewal contract to be a novation of the earlier lease contract of 23 September
was nonetheless unmeritorious.38 1987. However, novation is never presumed.50 Also, the title of a contract does not
determine its nature. On the contrary, it is the specific provisions of the contract which
On the other hand, respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua dictate its nature.51 Furthermore, where a contract is susceptible of two (2) interpretations,
contend that the lease contract which the lease contract of 18 May 1992 was to renew, one that would make it valid and another that would make it invalid, the latter interpretation
never came into existence. Therefore, since there was no contract to "renew," the renewal is to be adopted.52 The assailed agreement of 18 May 1992, "Renewal of Contract of
contract had no leg to stand on, hence, is also void.39 Respondents then conclude that since Lease," merely states that the term of the contract would be for ten (10) years starting 1
there was no lease contract to speak of, RODIL had no right to relief in its action for September 1987. This is hardly conclusive of the existence of an intention by the parties to
unlawful detainer. The ASSOCIATION, for its part, argues that the counterclaim it filed notate the contract of 23 September 1987. Nor can it be argued that there is an implied
against RODIL cannot be dismissed because the trial court has not passed upon it.40 novation for the requisite incompatibility between the original contract and the subsequent
one is not present.53 Based on this factual milieu, the presumption of validity of contract
cannot be said to have been overturned.
We rule for RODIL. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other
limitations than those established by law.41 Every owner has the freedom of disposition over
his property. It is an attribute of ownership, and this rule has no exception. The REPUBLIC Respondent ASSOCIATION claims that the Decision of the Office of the President declaring
being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the prerogative to enter into a lease null and void the lease contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992 should be counted in its
contract with RODIL in the exercise of its jus disponendi. Hence, as lessor, the REPUBLIC favor.
has the right to eject usurpers of the leased property where the factual elements required for
relief in an action for unlawful detainer are present. We do not agree. The contention does not hold water. It is well-settled that a court's
judgment in a case shall not adversely affect persons who were not parties thereto.
Private respondents claim that the agreements of 23 September 1987, 18 May 1992 and 25
May 1992 did not give rise to valid contracts.42 This is true only of the Contract of Respondent ASSOCIATION finally argues that the 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992 contracts
Lease entered into on 23 September 1987 which the REPUBLIC did not approve. RODIL can be considered rescissible because they concern property under litigation and were
neither alleged nor proved that such approval was made known to it. The so-called approval entered into without the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of competent judicial
of the lease contract was merely stated in an internal memorandum of Secretary De Jesus authority.54 Civil Case No. 87-42323 involved an action for specific performance and
addressed to Director Factora.43 This is evident from the fact that Secretary De Jesus, in his damages filed by RODIL against the REPUBLIC and the ASSOCIATION. The right to file
letter, asked Factora to duly execute a lease contract and forward it to his office for the action for rescission arises in favor of the plaintiff when the defendant enters into a
approval.44 The consequences of this fact are clear. The Civil Code provides that no contract over the thing under litigation without the knowledge and approval of the plaintiff or
contract shall arise unless acceptance of the contract is communicated to the offeror.45 Until the court. The right of action therefore arose in favor of petitioner RODIL and not
that moment, there is no real meeting of the minds, no concurrence of offer and acceptance, respondent ASSOCIATION.
hence, no contract.46
Having preliminarily dealt with the validity of the lease contracts, we now proceed to resolve
However, the same is not true of the contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992. As argued the issue raised by respondent ASSOCIATION with regard to its counterclaim.
by RODIL, these contracts are not proscribed by law; neither is there a law prohibiting the
execution of a contract with provisions that are retroactive. Where there is nothing in a The ASSOCIATION argues that its counterclaim should not have been dismissed. On this
contract that is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order, the point, we agree. The requisites for the application of Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil
validity of the contract must be sustained.47 Procedure are clearly present.55 The counterclaim is necessarily connected with the
transaction that is the subject matter of the claim. In malicious prosecution, there must be
The Court of Appeals invalidated the contracts because they were supposedly executed in proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person,
violation of a temporary restraining order issued by the Regional Trial Court.48 The appellate and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charge was false and
court however failed to note that the order restrains the REPUBLIC from awarding the lease groundless.56 A determination of whether the charge is groundless would necessarily involve
contract only as regards respondent ASSOCIATION but not petitioner RODIL. While a an analysis of whether the action instituted by RODIL is meritorious. The counterclaim did
temporary restraining order was indeed issued against RODIL, it was issued only on 25 May not require the presence of third parties over which the court could not acquire jurisdiction,
and that the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the counterclaim since the
amount of damages claimed by the ASSOCIATION in its counterclaim amounted to ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 39, in Civil Cases Nos.
P3,500,000.00, clearly within the jurisdictional amount for the Regional Trial Court under BP 94-70776, 94-71122 and 94-71123 as well as the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br.
129. 23, in Civil Case No. 94-72209 affirming in toto the Decisions of the MeTC — Br. 28 in Civil
Case No. 143301, MeTC — Br. 15 in Civil Case No. 143216, MeTC — Br. 7 in Civil Case
However, in the interest of making a final adjudication on an issue which has been pending No. 142258, and MeTC — Br. 24 in Civil Case No. 142282-CV, as herein quoted, and the
for fourteen (14) years, we will rule on the issues raised by the ASSOCIATION in its Orders dated 14 August 1992 and 6 November 1992 of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 8 in
counterclaim, and accordingly deny the same, dispensing with any discussion regarding the Civil Case No. 87-42323, recognizing the validity and legality of the Renewal of the Lease
merits of RODIL's cause of action which is clearly neither "false" nor "groundless." Contract dated 18 May 1992 and the Supplemental Contract dated 25 May 1992, are
Therefore, the elements of malicious prosecution are absent. REINSTATED, AFFIRMED and ADOPTED. Costs against private respondents in both
cases.
As regards the action for unlawful detainer, respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria
Footwear and Chua argue that this should not prosper because RODIL is not in actual SO ORDERED.
possession of the property and because they are not its sublessees.57 Their arguments do
not convince. G.R. No. 138053 May 31, 2000

In an action for unlawful detainer the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical
possession. Respondents have admitted that they have not entered into any lease contract CORNELIO M. ISAGUIRRE, petitioner,
with the REPUBLIC and that their continued occupation of the subject property was merely vs.
by virtue of acquiescence.58 The records clearly show this to be the case. The REPUBLIC
merely issued a "temporary occupancy permit" which was not even in the name of the
respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear or Chua but of respondent FELICITAS DE LARA, respondent.
ASSOCIATION. Since the occupation of respondents was merely tolerated by the
REPUBLIC, the right of possession of the latter remained uninterrupted. It could therefore
alienate the same to anyone it chose. Unfortunately for respondents, the REPUBLIC chose
to alienate the subject premises to RODIL by virtue of a contract of lease entered into on 18
May 1992. Resultantly, petitioner had the right to file the action for unlawful detainer against
respondents as one from whom possession of property has been unlawfully withheld. GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Respondents finally argue that petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Rule 45 so that its petition must be dismissed. They allege that petitioner failed to state in its Procedure, petitioner Cornelio M. Isaguirre assails the October 5, 1998 decision1 of the
petition that a motion for reconsideration was filed, the date of filing, when the motion was Court of Appeals2 and its Resolution promulgated on March 5, 1999.
denied, and the date when the resolution denying the motion was received.
The antecedent facts of the present case are as follows:
A cursory review of RODIL's petition belies respondents' assertion. All dates required under
Rule 45, Sec. 4, are properly indicated except when the motion for reconsideration was Alejandro de Lara was the original applicant-claimant for a Miscellaneous Sales Application
filed. Procedural rules are required to be followed as a general rule, but they may be relaxed over a parcel of land identified as portion of Lot 502, Guianga Cadastre, filed with the
to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his noncompliance Bureau of Lands on January 17, 1942 and with an area of 2,324 square meters. Upon his
with the procedure required. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned death, Alejandro de Lara was succeeded by his wife — respondent Felicitas de Lara, as
upon and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for claimant. On November 19, 1954, the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their amended the sales application to cover only 1,600 square meters. Then, on November 3,
very aims. The rules have been drafted with the primary objective of enhancing fair trials 1961, by virtue of a decision rendered by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
and expediting the proper dispensation of justice. As a corollary, if their application and Resources dated November 19, 1954, a subdivision survey was made and the area was
operation tend to subvert and defeat, instead of promote and enhance its objective, further reduced to 1,000 square meters. On this lot stands a two-story residential-
suspension of the rules is justified.59 Petitioner did not repeat its error in its later petition filed commercial apartment declared for taxation purposes under TD 43927 in the name of
under G.R. No. 135537. The oversight must be fashioned with leniency. respondent's sons — Apolonio and Rodolfo, both surnamed de Lara.

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The assailed Decisions of the Sometime in 1953, respondent obtained several loans from the Philippine National Bank.
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 36381, 37243 and 39919 are REVERSED and SET When she encountered financial difficulties, respondent approached petitioner Cornelio M.
Isaguirre, who was married to her niece, for assistance. On February 10, 1960, a document the March 12, 1998 and May 21, 1998 orders of the trial court, including the writ of
denominated as "Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interests" was executed possession dated June 16, 1998 and the sheriff's notice to vacate dated July 7, 1998.6
by respondent and petitioner, whereby the former sold a 250 square meter portion of Lot
No. 502, together with the two-story commercial and residential structure standing thereon, The appellate court summarized the issues involved in the case as follows: (1) whether or
in favor of petitioner, for and in consideration of the sum of P5,000. not the mortgagee in an equitable mortgage has the right to retain possession of the
property pending actual payment to him of the amount of indebtedness by the mortgagor;
Sometime in May, 1968, Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara filed a complaint against petitioner and (b) whether or not petitioner can be considered a builder in good faith with respect to
for recovery of ownership and possession of the two-story building.3 However, the case was the improvements he made on the property before the transaction was declared to be an
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. equitable mortgage.

On August 21, 1969, petitioner filed a sales application over the subject property on the The Court of Appeals held that petitioner was not entitled to retain possession of the subject
basis of the deed of sale. His application was approved on January 17, 1984, resulting in property. It said that —
the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-11566 on February 13, 1984, in the name
of petitioner. Meanwhile, the sales application of respondent over the entire 1,000 square . . . the mortgagee merely has to annotate his claim at the back of the
meters of subject property (including the 250 square meter portion claimed by petitioner) certificate of title in order to protect his rights against third persons and
was also given due course, resulting in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P- thereby secure the debt. There is therefore no necessity for him to
13038 on June 19, 1989, in the name of respondent.4 actually possess the property. Neither should a mortgagee in an equitable
mortgage fear that the contract relied upon is not registered and hence,
Due to the overlapping of titles, petitioner filed an action for quieting of title and damages may not operate as a mortgage to justify its foreclosure. In Feliza Zubiri
with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City against respondent on May 17, 1990. The case v. Lucio Quijano, 74 Phil 47, it was ruled "that when a contract . . . is held
was docketed as Civil Case No. 20124-90. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered as an equitable mortgage, the same shall be given effect as if it had
judgment on October 19, 1992, in favor of petitioner, declaring him to be the lawful owner of complied with the formal requisites of mortgage. . . . by its very nature the
the disputed property. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, lien thereby created ought not to be defeated by requiring compliance
holding that the transaction entered into by the parties, as evidenced by their contract, was with the formalities necessary to the validity of a voluntary real estate
an equitable mortgage, not a sale.5 The appellate court's decision was based on the mortgage, as long as the land remains in the hands of the petitioner
inadequacy of the consideration agreed upon by the parties, on its finding that the payment (mortgagor) and the rights of innocent parties are not affected.
of a large portion of the "purchase price" was made after the execution of the deed of sale in
several installments of minimal amounts; and finally, on the fact that petitioner did not take Proceeding from the foregoing, petitioner's imagined fears that his lien
steps to confirm his rights or to obtain title over the property for several years after the would be lost by surrendering possession are unfounded.
execution of the deed of sale. As a consequence of its decision, the appellate court also
declared Original Certificate of Title No. P-11566 issued in favor of petitioner to be null and
void. On July 8, 1996, in a case docketed as G.R. No. 120832, this Court affirmed the In the same vein, there is nothing to stop the mortgagor de Lara from
decision of the Court of Appeals and on September 11, 1996, we denied petitioner's motion acquiring possession of the property pending actual payment of the
for reconsideration. indebtedness to petitioner. This does not in anyway endanger the
petitioner's right to security since, as pointed out by private respondents,
the petitioner can always have the equitable mortgage annotated in the
On May 5, 1997, respondent filed a motion for execution with the trial court, praying for the Certificate of Title of private respondent and pursue the legal remedies for
immediate delivery of possession of the subject property, which motion was granted on the collection of the alleged debt secured by the mortgage. In this case,
August 18, 1997. On February 3, 1998, respondent moved for a writ of possession, invoking the remedy would be to foreclose the mortgage upon failure to pay the
our ruling in G.R. No. 120832. Petitioner opposed the motion, asserting that he had the right debt within the required period.
of retention over the property until payment of the loan and the value of the improvements
he had introduced on the property. On March 12, 1998, the trial court granted respondent's
motion for writ of possession. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial It is unfortunate however, that the Court of Appeals, in declaring the
court on May 21, 1998. Consequently, a writ of possession dated June 16, 1998, together transaction to be an equitable mortgage failed to specify in its Decision
with the Sheriff's Notice to Vacate dated July 7, 1998, were served upon petitioner. the period of time within which the private respondent could settle her
account, since such period serves as the reckoning point by which
foreclosure could ensue. As it is, petitioner is now in a dilemma as to how
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition he could enforce his rights as a mortgagee. . . .
with prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to annul and set aside
 Hence, this Court, once and for all resolves the matter by requiring the WRIT OF POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF
trial court to determine the amount of total indebtedness and the period RESPONDENT.
within which payment shall be made.
A.1 The RTC patently exceeded the
Petitioner's claims that he was a builder in good faith and entitled to reimbursement for the scope of its authority and acted with
improvements he introduced upon the property were rejected by the Court of Appeals. It grave abuse of discretion in ordering
held that petitioner knew, or at least had an inkling, that there was a defect or flaw in his the immediate delivery of possession
mode of acquisition. Nevertheless, the appellate court declared petitioner to have the of the Property to respondent as said
following rights: order exceeded the parameters of the
final and executory decision and
. . . He is entitled to reimbursement for the necessary expenses which he constituted a variance thereof.
may have incurred over the property, in accordance with Art. 526 and Art.
452 of the Civil Code. Moreover, considering that the transaction was B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
merely an equitable mortgage, then he is entitled to payment of the ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS
amount of indebtedness plus interest, and in the event of non-payment to NOT ENTITLED TO THE POSSESSION OF
foreclose the mortgage. Meanwhile, pending receipt of the total amount of THE PROPERTY PRIOR TO THE PAYMENT
debt, private respondent is entitled to possession over the disputed OF RESPONDENT'S MORTGAGE LOAN.
property.
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
The case was finally disposed of by the appellate court in the following manner: ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER WAS
NOT A BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH.
WHERFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED, and this case is ordered
remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for further D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
proceedings, as follows: ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS
ENTITLED TO INTEREST COMPUTED ONLY
1) The trial court shall determine — FROM THE TIME WHEN THE JUDGMENT
DECLARING THE CONTRACT TO BE AN
EQUITABLE MORTGAGE BECAME FINAL.9
a) The period within which the mortgagor must pay his total amount of
indebtedness.
Basically, petitioner claims that he is entitled to retain possession of the subject property
until payment of the loan and the value of the necessary and useful improvements he made
b) The total amount of indebtedness owing the petitioner-mortgagee plus upon such property. 10 According to petitioner, neither the Court of Appeals' decision in G.R.
interest computed from the time when the judgment declaring the contract CV No. 42065 nor this Court's decision in G.R. No. 120832 ordered immediate delivery of
to be an equitable mortgage became final. possession of the subject property to respondent.

c) The necessary expenses incurred by petitioner over the property.7 The dispositive portion of the March 31, 1995 decision of the Court of Appeals in G.R. CV
No. 42065, which was affirmed by this Court, provides that —
On March 5, 1999, petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate
court.8 Hence, the present appeal wherein petitioner makes the following assignment of IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from
errors: is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered:
(1) dismissing the complaint; (2) declaring the "Document of Sale and
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS Special Cession of Rights and Interests" (Exhibit B) dated February 10,
ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE RTC 1960, to be an equitable mortgage not a sale; (3) upholding the validity of
ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS OCT No. P-13038 in the name of Felicitas de Lara; and (3) declaring null
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF and void OCT No. P-11566 in the name of plaintiff Cornelio Isaguirre. All
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR other counterclaims for damages are likewise dismissed. Costs against
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING A the appellee. 11
Petitioner argues that the abovementioned decision merely settled the following matters: (1) Neither can the creditor's heir who has received his
that the transaction between petitioner and respondent was not a sale but an equitable share of the debt return the pledge or cancel the
mortgage; (2) that OCT No. P-13038 in the name of respondent is valid; and (3) that OCT mortgage, to the prejudice of the other heirs who have
No. P-11566 in the name of petitioner is null and void. Since the aforementioned decision not been paid. (Emphasis supplied.)
did not direct the immediate ouster of petitioner from the subject property and the delivery
thereof to respondent, the issuance of the writ of possession by the trial court on June 16, x x x           x x x          x x x
1998 constituted an unwarranted modification or addition to the final and executory decision
of this Court in G.R. No. 120832. 12
4.14 To require petitioner to deliver possession of the Property to
respondent prior to the full payment of the latter's mortgage loan would be
We do not agree with petitioner's contentions. On the contrary, the March 31, 1995 decision equivalent to the cancellation of the mortgage. Such effective cancellation
of the appellate court, which was affirmed by this Court on July 8, 1996, served as more would render petitioner's rights ineffectual and nugatory and would
than adequate basis for the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of respondent since constitute unwarranted judicial interference.
these decisions affirmed respondent's title over the subject property. As the sole owner,
respondent has the right to enjoy her property, without any other limitations than those
established by x x x           x x x          x x x
law. 1 Corollary to such right, respondent also has the right to exclude from the possession
of her property any other person to whom she has not transmitted such property. 14 4.16 The fact of the present case show that respondent delivered
possession of the Property to petitioner upon the execution of the Deed of
It is true that, in some instances, the actual possessor has some valid rights over the Absolute Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interest dated 10
property enforceable even against the owner thereof, such as in the case of a tenant or February 1960. Hence, transfer of possession of the Property to petitioner
lessee. 15 Petitioner anchors his own claim to possession upon his declared status as a was an essential part of whatever agreement the parties entered into,
mortgagee. In his Memorandum, he argues that — which, in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed to be an equitable
mortgage.
4.8 It was respondent who asserted that her transfer of the Property to
petitioner was by way of an equitable mortgage and not by sale. After her x x x           x x x          x x x
assertion was sustained by the Courts, respondent cannot now ignore or
disregard the legal effects of such judicial declaration regarding the nature 4.19 Petitioner does not have the mistaken notion that the mortgagee
of the transaction. must be in actual possession of the mortgaged property in order to secure
the debt. However, in this particular case, the delivery of possession of
x x x           x x x          x x x the Property was an integral part of the contract between petitioner and
respondent. After all, it was supposed to be a contract of sale. If delivery
was not part of the agreement entered into by the parties in 1960, why did
4.13 Having delivered possession of the Property to petitioner as part of respondent surrender possession thereof to petitioner in the first place?
the constitution of the equitable mortgage thereon, respondent is not
entitled to the return of the Property unless and until the mortgage loan is
discharged by full payment thereof. Petitioner's right as mortgagee to 4.20 Now that the Courts have ruled that the transaction was not a sale
retain possession of the Property so long as the mortgage loan remains but a mortgage, petitioner's entitlement to the possession of the Property
unpaid is further supported by the rule that a mortgage may not be should be deemed as one of the provisions of the mortgage, considering
extinguished even though then mortgagor-debtor may have made partial that at the time the contract was entered into, possession of the Property
payments on the mortgage loan: was likewise delivered to petitioner. Thus, until respondent has fully paid
her mortgage loan, petitioner should be allowed to retain possession of
the subject property. 16
Art. 2089. A pledge or mortgage is indivisible, even
though the debt may be divided among the successors
in interest of the debtor or the creditor. Petitioner's position lacks sufficient legal and factual moorings.

Therefore, the debtor's heir who has paid a part of the A mortgage is a contract entered into in order to secure the fulfillment of a principal
debt cannot ask for the proportionate extinguishment of obligation. 17 It is constituted by recording the document in which it appears with the proper
the pledge or mortgage as long as the debt is not Registry of Property, although, even if it is not recorded, the mortgage is nevertheless
completely satisfied. binding between the parties. 18 Thus, the only right granted by law in favor of the mortgagee
is to demand the execution and the recording of the document in which the mortgage is there was really no sale and that he held respondent's property as mere security for the
formalized. 19 As a general rule, the mortgagor retains possession of the mortgaged property payment of the loan obligation. Therefore, petitioner may claim reimbursement only for
since a mortgage is merely a lien and title to the property does not pass to the necessary expenses; however, he is not entitled to reimbursement for any useful
mortgagee. 20 However, even though a mortgagee does not have possession of the expenses 26 which he may have incurred. 27
property, there is no impairment of his security since the mortgage directly and immediately
subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the Finally, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, this case should be remanded to
fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted. 21 If the debtor is unable to the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for a determination of the total amount of the loan,
pay his debt, the mortgage creditor may institute an action to foreclose the mortgage, the necessary expenses incurred by petitioner, and the period within which respondent must
whether judicially or extrajudicially, whereby the mortgaged property will then be sold at a pay such amount. 28 However, no interest is due on the loan since there has been no
public auction and the proceeds therefrom given to the creditor to the extent necessary to express stipulation in writing. 29
discharge the mortgage loan. Apparently, petitioner's contention that "[t]o require [him] . . .
to deliver possession of the Property to respondent prior to the full payment of the latter's
mortgage loan would be equivalent to the cancellation of the mortgage" is without basis. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 5, 1998 and its
Regardless of its possessor, the mortgaged property may still be sold, with the prescribed Resolution dated March 5, 1999 are hereby AFFIRMED. Respondent is entitled to delivery
formalities, in the event of the debtor's default in the payment of his loan obligation. of possession of the subject property. This case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for
determination of the amount of the loan, the necessary expenses incurred by petitioner and
the period within which the respondent must pay the same.
Moreover, this Court cannot find any justification in the records to uphold petitioner's
contention that respondent delivered possession of the subject property upon the execution
of the "Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interests" on February 10, 1960 and SO ORDERED.
that the transfer of possession to petitioner must therefore be considered an essential part
of the agreement between the parties. This self-serving assertion of petitioner was directly G.R. No. 146082             July 30, 2004
contradicted by respondent in her pleadings. 22 Furthermore, nowhere in the Court of
Appeals' decisions promulgated on March 31, 1995 (G.R. CV No. 42065) and on October 5, MELCHOR CUSTODIO, petitioner, appellee,
1998 (G.R. SP No. 48310), or in our own decision promulgated on July 8, 1996 (G.R. No. vs.
120832) was it ever established that the mortgaged properties were delivered by ROSENDO F. CORRADO, respondent.
respondent to petitioner.

In Alvano v. Batoon, 2 this Court held that "[a] simple mortgage does not give the mortgagee
a right to the possession of the property unless the mortgage should contain some special
provision to that effect." Regrettably for petitioner, he has not presented any evidence, other
than his own gratuitous statements, to prove that the real intention of the parties was to DECISION
allow him to enjoy possession of the mortgaged property until full payment of the loan.

Therefore, we hold that the trial court correctly issued the writ of possession in favor of
respondent. Such writ was but a necessary consequence of this Court's ruling in G.R. No.
120832 affirming the validity of the original certificate of title (OCT No. P-13038) in the name
of respondent Felicitas de Lara, while at the same time nullifying the original certificate of QUISUMBING, J.:
title (OCT No. P-11566) in the name of petitioner Cornelio Isaguirre. Possession is an
essential attribute of ownership; thus, it would be redundant for respondent to go back to For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated July 28, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
court simply to establish her right to possess subject property. Contrary to petitioner's CA-G.R. SP No. 45764, and its Resolution2 dated November 13, 2000 denying the motion
claims, the issuance of the writ of possession by the trial court did not constitute an for reconsideration. The CA affirmed the Decision3 dated September 9, 1997 of the Regional
unwarranted modification of our decision in G.R. No. 120832, but rather, was a necessary Trial Court (RTC) of Balayan, Batangas, Branch 9, in RTC Appeal Case No. 3301, which
complement thereto. 24 It bears stressing that a judgment is not confined to what appears reversed the Decision4 dated August 19, 1996 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
upon the face of the decision, but also those necessarily included therein or necessary Calatagan, Batangas, dismissing respondent Rosendo F. Corrado’s Complaint for Recovery
thereto. 25 of Possession and Ownership with Injunction and Damages, in Civil Case No. 120.

With regard to the improvements made on the mortgaged property, we confirm the Court of The facts and antecedent proceedings, as culled from records, are as follows:
Appeals' characterization of petitioner as a possessor in bad faith. Based on the factual
findings of the appellate court, it is evident that petitioner knew from the very beginning that
On July 12, 1993, respondent Rosendo F. Corrado filed an ejectment5 case against 7. That the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court was appealed before the Regional
petitioner Melchor Custodio with the MTC of Calatagan, Batangas, docketed as Civil Case Trial Court which was docketed as RTC Appealed Case No. 3099.10
No. 116. It was dismissed by the MTC on March 15, 1994 on the grounds that (1) it had no
jurisdiction as the complaint is a possessory suit, (2) there was no barangay conciliation, After trial, the MTC rendered judgment dismissing the Complaint, the dispositive portion of
and (3) the plaintiff failed to prove his case by preponderance of evidence. Upon appeal, the which reads as follows:
RTC of Balayan, Batangas affirmed the appealed decision docketed as RTC Appealed
Case No. 3099.6
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint without
pronouncement as to cost.
On January 2, 1995, respondent filed with the same MTC another complaint for recovery of
possession and damages against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. 120,7 and which is
the core case subject of the present petition. SO ORDERED.11

The Complaint avers that respondent Rosendo F. Corrado (then plaintiff) is the registered The MTC initially resolved several issues and ruled inter alia that: (a) It has jurisdiction over
owner of a residential lot in Barangay Balitoc, Calatagan, Batangas covered by TCT No. T- the complaint which is an accion publiciana case although denominated as recovery of
21342. He claims that more than a year prior to the institution of the complaint, petitioner possession and ownership; (b) Prior compliance with barangay conciliation is not required
Melchor Custodio (then defendant), under a dubious claim of tenancy relationship with because the parties reside in non-adjoining barangays of different municipalities with
respondent’s father, Crisanto Corrado and without his knowledge and consent, demolished respondent residing in Barangay Binubusan, Municipality of Lian, Batangas, and petitioner
his old residential house on the said lot and constructed a two-bedroom bungalow where residing in Barangay Balitoc, Calatagan and the complaint included a prayer for preliminary
petitioner and his family now reside. injunction and TRO; and (c) The filing of the present Civil Case No. 120 does not constitute
forum shopping and the judgment in the previous ejectment case in Civil Case No. 116 will
not amount to res judicata in the present case because there was no judgment on the merits
In his Answer,8 petitioner Melchor Custodio alleged that he is a legitimate leasehold tenant in Civil Case No. 116. The MTC noted that there was no adjudication as to the rights of the
of Crisanto Corrado since 1961 up to the present. He further claimed that respondent’s parties, particularly the determination of their possessory rights in Civil Case No. 116 as its
father consented to the construction of the bungalow thirty (30) years ago when the subject dismissal was anchored on respondent’s non-compliance with the
lot was still owned by respondent’s father and before it was transferred to respondent. As required barangay conciliation under P.D. No. 1508 and on respondent’s failure to allege
affirmative defenses, he alleged inter alia that: (a) the complaint states no cause of action; the particular date of deprivation of possession required for the court to determine whether
(b) the required barangay conciliation under P.D. 15089 was not complied with; and (c) the the case was filed within the one (1) year period.
present complaint is now barred on the ground of res judicata and is violative of the rule on
forum shopping.
However, the MTC finds that the petitioner’s continued stay on respondent’s property has
factual and legal basis since evidence on record, such as milling tickets, convincingly show
The parties agreed on the following stipulation of facts during the pre-trial conference: that petitioner has been a tenant of respondent’s father, Crisanto Corrado, cultivating the
latter’s three (3)-hectare sugarcane land, including the subject lot, since 1961. It did not give
1. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21342 covering the lot in question is in credence to respondent’s claim of ignorance to the tenancy relationship between petitioner
the name of plaintiff Rosendo Corrado; and his father since the latest milling tickets showed that petitioner continued working on the
subject lot even after it was transferred to respondent’s name.
2. That the defendant has never been a tenant of the plaintiff;
Respondent appealed the MTC decision to the RTC, which set aside and reversed the MTC
3. That the construction of the two-bedroom bungalow structure on the subject decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
premises was without the consent of the plaintiff;
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE
4. That the dismissal of Civil Case No. 116 which involved the same parties was by the decision of the lower court dated August 12, 1996 and a new one entered
reason of alleged non-compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508; declaring the plaintiff as the true and absolute owner of the residential lot in
question; ordering the defendant to deliver the possession thereof to the plaintiff
and to vacate the same, with costs against the defendant-appellee.
5. That subject property is located in Barangay Balitoc, Calatagan, and not in
Barangay Gulod, Calatagan;
SO ORDERED.12
6. That no Barangay Certification is attached to the instant complaint pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1508;
In reversing the MTC, the RTC found merit in respondent’s allegation that petitioner cannot CAPTION OF THE COMPLAINT BUT THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS
claim any right to possess respondent’s lot on the premise that he is an alleged tenant of CONTAINED THEREIN.
respondent’s father. The RTC found it unacceptable for the MTC to rule that respondent is
bound by the action of his father in allowing petitioner to construct a house on the subject lot II
and occupy the same. The RTC stressed that the parties had stipulated during the pre-trial
that the subject lot is registered under the name of respondent and that petitioner is not a
tenant of respondent. Further, respondent acquired the said lot in 1970 not from his father WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ALSO ERRED IN
but from the government, which was the registered owner since 1909. Thus, respondent’s NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE FACT THAT FOR RES JUDICATA
father never acquired any right over the said land, hence, he has no right to transmit or TO APPLY, "SUBSTANTIAL" AND NOT ABSOLUTE IDENTITY OF CAUSES OF
alienate the land to anyone. The RTC further stated that petitioner’s alleged possession, if ACTION WILL SUFFICE.
any, would have been only by tolerance by the government and he would have acted
promptly at the time respondent purchased the lot if he truly believed that he had the legal III
right over the lot. Finally, the RTC clarified that contrary to the MTC’s ruling, the case is not
merely an accion publiciana, where only physical possession is involved, but one of accion WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER HAS AMPLY ESTABLISHED BY A
reinvindicatoria because respondent claimed recovery of full possession as an absolute PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE A TENANCY RELATIONSHIP WITH
owner. The RTC concluded that since respondent is the absolute owner of the property, the RESPONDENT AND HIS FATHER, CRISANTO CORRADO.14
MTC cannot bar him from recovering possession based on spurious authority granted by a
third party who is not an owner.
In our view, the relevant issues for our resolution are: (a) whether or not the principle of res
judicata is applicable in this case; and (b) whether the alleged tenancy relationship between
Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC decision. petitioner with respondent and the latter’s father was established by preponderance of
The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows: evidence.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the RTC decision dated September 9, 1997 in RTC On the first issue, petitioner insists that the principle of res judicata is applicable in this case
Appeal Case No. 3301. since the material allegations in the complaints of Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120 would
clearly reveal an identity of cause of action. Citing jurisprudence, it argued that what should
SO ORDERED.13 control in determining the cause of action are the averments in both complaints seeking
recovery of possession of the subject lot with the ultimate goal of dispossessing and
The CA ruled that the principle of res judicata is inapplicable because there is no identity of ejecting petitioner from the property and restoring it to respondent and not the different
causes of action between Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120. It stressed that the former is an captions of the two complaints. He argued further that the application of the principle of res
ejectment suit which was dismissed for failure of respondent to state the date of deprivation judicata only requires substantial and not absolute identity of causes of action. For his part,
of possession while the latter is for recovery of possession, and not ejectment. It also respondent countered that while there may be identity of parties and subject matter, the
brushed aside the alleged tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondent, noting causes of action are not identical in Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120 as the former is one for
that the milling tickets were issued for respondent’s father as the planter and petitioner as ejectment to recover material possession while the latter is one for recovery of possession
the tenant, but without any evidence showing that they referred to the subject lot and and ownership of the subject land.
without any indication that petitioner was getting his share from the subject lot.
We find petitioner’s contentions bereft of merit. The principle of res judicata is inapplicable
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals. because Civil Case No. 116 for ejectment was not decided on the merits and its cause of
action is different from Civil Case No. 120 for recovery of possession and ownership.
Hence, this petition submitting the following issues for our resolution:
For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court
I having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the
merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, (a) identity of parties,
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN (b) identity of subject matter, and (c) identity of cause of action.15
HOLDING THAT CIVIL CASE NO. 116 AND CIVIL CASE NO. 120 HAVE TWO (2)
SEPARATE CAUSES OF ACTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT WHAT In the present case, the judgment in Civil Case No. 116 was not on the merits. A judgment
DETERMINES THE NATURE OR CAUSE OF THE ACTION IS NOT THE on the merits is one rendered after argument and investigation, and when there is
determination which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some
preliminary or formal or merely technical point, or by default and without trial.16 Thus, a reinvindicatoria or a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an element of
judgment on the merits is one wherein there is an unequivocal determination of the rights ownership, because there is no identity of causes of action between the two.
and obligations of the parties with respect to the causes of action and the subject matter of
the case.17 In this case, the MTC’s dismissal of Civil Case No. 116 was anchored on its lack Anent the second issue, petitioner contends that tenancy relationship between him and
of jurisdiction and lack of proof of the date of demand without determining and resolving respondent’s father was amply supported by evidence. It must be stressed that this is a
who has the right of possession between petitioner and respondent. Verily, the case was factual issue requiring re-evaluation and examination of the probative value of evidences
not resolved on the merits but was dismissed on technical points. A judgment dismissing an presented which is not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Besides, this issue had
action for want of jurisdiction cannot operate as res judicata on the merits.18 already been squarely resolved by the Court of Appeals and we find no impelling reason to
set it aside. According to the Court of Appeals, the milling tickets only showed that they
There is also no identity of causes of action between Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120. We were issued to Crisanto Corrado but did not show whether such tickets referred to the same
agree with the findings of the CA which we find no reason to set aside, to wit: lot in question. In petitions for review on certiorari, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing questions of law.
…In Civil Case No. 116, the case as found by the MTC is an ejectment suit and for For a question to be one of law, it must involve no examination of the probative value of the
failure of plaintiff-private respondent to state the date when he was deprived of his evidence presented by the litigants. The findings of fact of the appellate court are generally
possession, the court held that it did not entitle him to file an ejectment suit against conclusive on this Court, which is not a trier of facts.23
herein defendant-petitioner. In Civil Case No. 120, the cause of action is for
recovery of possession and not ejectment. These are two separate causes of At any rate, the issue of tenancy relationship had already been settled during the pre-trial
action and therefore the principle of res judicata does not apply to the present stage where the parties stipulated that the subject lot is registered in the name of
case.19 respondent and that petitioner was never a tenant of respondent. Petitioner and respondent
are bound by such stipulations which are deemed settled and need not be proven during the
Indeed, an ejectment case such as Civil Case No. 116, involves a different cause of action trial. Pre-trial is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues between
from an accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria, such as Civil Case No. 120, and the the parties. It thus paves the way for a less cluttered trial and resolution of the case. Its main
judgment of the former shall not bar the filing of another case for recovery of possession as objective is to simplify, abbreviate and expedite the trial, or totally dispense with it.
an element of ownership. A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no Prescinding therefrom, it is a basic legal precept that the parties are bound to honor the
other issue than possession and establishes only who has the right of possession, but by no stipulations they made during the pre-trial.24
means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of
ownership.20 Incidentally, we agree with the findings of the RTC that Civil Case No. 120 is WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed Decision dated
not an accion publiciana but more of an accion reinvindicatoria as shown by the July 28, 2000 and Resolution dated November 13, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
respondent’s allegation in the complaint that he is the registered owner of the subject lot SP No. 45764 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
and that the petitioner had constructed a bungalow thereon and had been continuously
occupying the same since then. SO ORDERED.

The distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of G.R. No. 84831            June 20, 2001
possession and/or ownership of the land is well-settled in our jurisprudence. What really
distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion publiciana)
and from a reinvindicatory action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the PACENCIO ABEJARON, as represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, ALEJANDRO
question of possession de facto. An unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal) together with ABEJARON, petitioner,
forcible entry are the two forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession vs.
of real property. Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the FELIX NABASA and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
plenary action to recover the right of possession and accion reinvindicatoria or the action to
recover ownership which includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of PUNO, J.:
actions to judicially recover possession.21
With the burgeoning population comes a heightened interest in the limited land resource,
Further, it bears stressing that the issue on the applicability of res judicata to the especially so if, as in the case at bar, one's home of many years stands on the land in
circumstance obtaining in this case is far from novel and not without precedence. In Vda. de dispute. It comes as no surprise therefore that while this case involves a small parcel of
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,22 we held that a judgment in a case for forcible entry which land, a 118-square meter portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953 in Silway, General Santos
involved only the issue of physical possession (possession de facto) and not ownership will City, the parties have tenaciously litigated over it for more than twenty years.
not bar an action between the same parties respecting title or ownership, such as an accion
Petitioner Abejaron filed this petition for review on certiorari to annul the respondent court's On September 24, 1974, Nabasa was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-4140
Decision dated April 26, 1988 and Resolution dated July 12, 1988 reversing the trial court's pursuant to Free Patent No. (XI-4) 2877 covering Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953. As the title
decision and declaring respondent Nabasa the owner of the subject lot. included petitioner Abejaron’s 118-square meter portion of the lot, his son, Alejandro
Abejaron, representing Matilde Abejaron (petitioner Abejaron's wife), filed a protest with the
The following facts spurred the present controversy: Bureau of Lands, Koronadal, South Cotabato against Nabasa's title and application. The
protest was dismissed on November 22, 1979 for failure of Matilde and Alejandro to attend
the hearings.13 Alejandro claims, however, that they did not receive notices of the hearings.
Petitioner Abejaron avers that he is the actual and lawful possessor and claimant of a 118- Alejandro filed a motion for reconsideration dated January 10, 1980. Alejandro also filed a
square meter portion of a 175-square meter residential lot in Silway, General Santos City notice of adverse claim on January 14, 1980. Subsequently, he requested the Bureau of
described as "Block 5, Lot 1, Psu-154953, bounded on the North by Road, on the South by Lands to treat the motion as an appeal considering that it was filed within the 60-day
Lot 2 of the same Psu, on the East by Felix Nabasa, and on the West by Road."1 In 1945, reglementary period. The motion for reconsideration was endorsed and forwarded by the
petitioner Abejaron and his family started occupying the 118-square meter land. At that District Land Office XI-3 of the Bureau of Lands in Koronadal, Cotabato to the Director of
time, the land had not yet been surveyed. They fenced the area and built thereon a family Lands in Manila on November 24, 1981.14 But because the appeal had not been resolved for
home with nipa roofing and a small store. In 1949, petitioner improved their abode to a prolonged period for unknown reasons, petitioner Abejaron filed on March 12, 1982 an
become a two-storey house measuring 16 x 18 feet or 87.78 square meters made of round action for reconveyance with damages against respondent Nabasa before Branch 22,
wood and nipa roofing.2 This house, which stands to this day, occupies a portion of Lot 1, Regional Trial Court of General Santos City.15 On May 10, 1982, petitioner filed a notice
Block 5, Psu-154953 and a portion of the adjoining Lot 2 of the same Psu. Lot 2 belongs to of lis pendens.16
petitioner’s daughter, Conchita Abejaron-Abellon. In 1950, the small store was destroyed
and in its stead, petitioner Abejaron built another store which stands up to the present. In
1951, he planted five coconut trees on the property in controversy. Petitioner's wife, Matilde Abner Lagsub, geodetic engineer, testified for the petitioner. Lagsub stated that on March
Abejaron, harvested coconuts from these trees.3 Petitioner Abejaron also planted banana 30, 1980, Alejandro Abejaron hired him to relocate Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, the land in
and avocado trees. He also put up a pitcher pump.4 All this time that the Abejarons controversy. He surveyed the lot measuring 175 square meters. Fifty-seven (57) square
introduced these improvements on the land in controversy, respondent Nabasa did not meters of Lot 1 and a portion of the adjoining Lot 3 were occupied by Nabasa's house. This
oppose or complain about the improvements. portion was fenced partly by hollow blocks and partly by bamboo. On the remaining 118
square meters stood a portion of petitioner Abejaron’s house and two coconut trees near it,
and his store. Abejaron's 118-square meter portion was separated from Nabasa's 57-square
Knowing that the disputed land was public in character, petitioner declared only his house, meter part by Abejaron's fence made of hollow blocks. Both Nabasa’s and Abejaron’s
and not the disputed land, for taxation purposes in 1950, 1966, 1976, and 1978.5 The last houses appeared more than twenty years old while the coconut trees appeared about 25
two declarations state that petitioner Abejaron’s house stands on Lots 1 and 2, Block 5, Psu years old.
154953.6 Abejaron paid taxes on the house in 1955, 1966, and 1981.7
Back in 1971, Lagsub conducted a subdivision survey on Psu-154953. He was then hired
Petitioner stated that beginning 1955, respondent Nabasa resided on the remaining 57- by the Silway Neighborhood Association to conduct the survey for purposes of allocating
square meter portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953.8 Nabasa built his house about four (4) lots to the members of the association, among whom were respondent Nabasa and
meters away from petitioner Abejaron's house. Beatriz Gusila, a neighbor of the Abejarons petitioner Abejaron. When the 1971 survey was conducted, both the Abejarons and Nabasa
and the Nabasas confirmed that when she arrived in Silway in 1949, Nabasa was not yet were already occupying their respective 118 and 57 square meter portions of Lot 1, Block 5.
residing there while Abejaron was already living in their house which stands to this day. Nabasa and Matilde Abejaron, representative of petitioner, were present during the survey.17

Before 1974, employees of the Bureau of Lands surveyed the area in controversy. Abejaron Respondent Nabasa had a different story to tell. He contends that he had been residing on
merely watched them do the survey9 and did not thereafter apply for title of the land on the a 12 x 15 meter or 180-square meter public land in Silway, General Santos City since 1945.
belief that he could not secure title over it as it was government property.10 Without his He admits that petitioner Abejaron was already residing in Silway when he arrived there.
(Abejaron) knowledge and consent, however, Nabasa "clandestinely, willfully, fraudulently, Nabasa constructed a house which stands to this day and planted five coconut trees on this
and unlawfully applied for and caused the titling in his name" of the entire Lot 1, Block 5, 180-square meter land, but only two of the trees survived. Nabasa never harvested
Psu-154953, including petitioner Abejaron's 118-square meter portion.11 Petitioner imputes coconuts from these trees as petitioner Abejaron claims to own them and harvests the
bad faith and fraud on the part of Nabasa because in applying for and causing the titling in coconuts. In many parts of respondent Nabasa’s testimony, however, he declared that he
his name of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, Nabasa represented himself to be the actual and started occupying the 180-square meter area in 1976.18
lawful possessor of the entire Lot 1, Block 5, including petitioner Abejaron's 118-square
meter portion despite knowledge of Abejaron's actual occupation and possession of said
portion.12 Nabasa avers that previously, he and petitioner Abejaron were in possession of portions of
Lot 2, Psu-154953. This lot was subsequently surveyed and divided into smaller lots with
the area of petitioner Abejaron designated as Lot 2, Block 5, Psu-154953 measuring one
hundred eighty (180) square meters, while his was designated as Lot 1, Block 5, Psu- On rebuttal, petitioner Abejaron presented two neighbors. One of them, Alejandra Doria,
154953 with an area of one hundred seventy five (175) square meters. started living in Silway in 1947. She testified that when she arrived in the neighborhood,
Abejaron's fence as it now stands between the 57-square meter portion occupied by
Instead of applying for free patent over his Lot 2, petitioner Abejaron gave this lot to his Nabasa's house and the 118-square meter area claimed by petitioner Abejaron was already
daughter Conchita Abejaron-Abellon and allowed her to file the application with the District there.23 The other neighbor, Pacencia Artigo, also started living in Silway in 1947. She
Land Office XI-4, Bureau of Lands, Koronadal, South Cotabato. Conchita secured Free declared that the house of the Abejarons stands now where it stood in 1947. She also
Patent No. (XI-4)-3293 over Lot 2. Pursuant to this, she was issued Original Certificate of testified that the Abejarons previously had a store smaller than their present store.24
Title No. P-4420. On April 27, 1981, Conchita's title was transcribed in the Registration Book
of General Santos City. On September 27, 1985, after trial on the merits, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner
Abejaron, viz:
Respondent Nabasa, on the other hand, filed an application for Free Patent over Lot 1,
Block 5, Psu-154953 with the District Land Office No. XI-4, Bureau of Lands, Koronadal, "WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this court hereby renders
South Cotabato. While the application was pending, petitioner Abejaron forcibly encroached judgment as follows:
upon the northern and southwestern portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-159543. Abejaron fenced
the disputed 118-square meter portion of Lot 1 and despite Nabasa's opposition, 1. Declaring the possession and occupancy of Pacencio Abejaron over 118 square
constructed a store near the road. Petitioner Abejaron then transferred his old house meters of Lot No. 1, Block 5, Psu-154953 in good faith and thereby declaring the
constructed on Lot 2, Block 5, Psu-154953 to a portion of the disputed 118-square meter inclusion of 118 square meters of said lot in OCT No. P-4140 erroneous and a
area. Petitioner's daughter, Conchita, patentee and title holder of Lot 2, constructed her own mistake, and for which, defendant Felix Nabasa is hereby ordered to reconvey and
house in Lot 2. execute a registerable document in favor of plaintiff Pacencio Abejaron, Filipino,
married and a resident of Silway, General Santos City, his heirs, successors and
Free Patent No. (XI-4)-2877, covering Lot 1, Block 5, was issued to respondent Nabasa on assigns over an area of one hundred eighteen (118) square meters of Lot No. 1,
September 24, 1974. But before the patent could be transcribed on the Registration Book of Block 5, Psu-154953, situated at Silway, General Santos City, on the Western
the Registrar of Deeds of General Santos City, the District Land Officer of District Land portion of said lot as shown in the sketch plan, Exhibit "R", and the remaining
Office No. XI-4 recalled it for investigation of an administrative protest filed by the portion of 57 square meters of said lot to be retained by defendant Felix Nabasa;
petitioner.19 The protest was given due course, but petitioner Abejaron or his representative
failed to appear in the hearings despite notice. 2) Should Felix Nabasa fails (sic) to do so, upon the finality of this judgment, the
Clerk of Court shall executed (sic) it in the name of Felix Nabasa, widower, and will
On November 22, 1979, the administrative protest was dismissed by the District Land have the same effect as if executed by the latter and the Register of Deeds,
Officer for failure of petitioner Abejaron or his representative to appear in the hearings General Santos City, is hereby directed to issue New Transfer Certificate of Title to
despite notice.20 Respondent Nabasa's Free Patent No. (XI-4)-2877 was then re-transmitted Alejandro Abejaron over 118 square meters of Lot No. 1, Block 5, Psu-154953,
by the District Land Officer of District Land Office XI-4 to the Register of Deeds, General and New Transfer Certificate of Title over 57 square meters of same Lot No. 1,
Santos City, and the same was transcribed in the Registration Book of the Registry of Block 5, Psu-154953, in favor of Felix Nabasa, and ultimately to have OCT No. P-
Property of General Santos City on December 13, 1979. Original Certificate of Title No. P- 4140 of Felix Nabasa cancelled accordingly."
4140, covering Lot 1, Block 2, Psu-154953, was issued to respondent Nabasa.21
Respondent Nabasa's motion for reconsideration having been denied, he appealed to the
On March 12, 1982, petitioner Abejaron filed against respondent Nabasa an action for Court of Appeals. On April 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of
reconveyance with damages seeking reconveyance of his 118-square meter portion of Lot respondent Nabasa, viz:
1, Block 5, Psu-154953.
". . . the only basis for reconveyance is actual fraud. In this case, Abejaron failed to
During the trial, respondent Nabasa presented Abundio Guiral, his neighbor who had been substantiate the existence of actual fraud. . . There was no proof of irregularity in
living since 1945 in Lot 3, Block 5, Psu-154953, adjoining Nabasa's Lot 1. He testified that the issuance of title nor in the proceedings incident thereto nor was there a claim
when he arrived in Silway, petitioner Abejaron was already living there. Four months after, that fraud intervened in the issuance of the title, thus, the title has become
Nabasa started residing in the area. Nabasa constructed a house, planted coconut trees, indefeasible (Frias v. Esquival, 67 SCRA 487). Abejaron was not able to establish
and fenced his 12 x 15 meter area. Abejaron's house in 1945 is still the same house he lives his allegation that Nabasa misrepresented his status of possession in his
in at present, but in 1977, it was jacked up and transferred from Lot 2 to Lot 1, Block 5. application for the title. . . In fact, in Abejaron's answer to Nabasa's counterclaim,
Nabasa tried to prevent the transfer to no avail. The house was then extended towards Lot he said that Nabasa has been occupying the area since 1950.
2.22
 Contrary to the finding of the court a quo, the Bureau of Lands conducted an ocular the party seeking reconveyance to prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to the
inspection before the title was issued. This was confirmed by Abejaron himself property and the fact of fraud.27
(tsn, January 19, 1984).
Petitioner Abejaron does not claim to own Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953. He in fact admits that
xxx he believed the land in dispute was public in character, thus he did not declare it for taxation
purposes despite possession of it for a long time. Neither did he apply for title over it on the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby mistaken belief that he could not apply for title of a public land. In his Complaint, he stated
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered declaring Felix Nabasa as that respondent Nabasa's fraudulent procurement of Free Patent No. (XI-4)-2877 and OCT
the owner of the lot covered by O.C.T. No. P-4140. Costs against plaintif-appellee. No. P-4140 over the disputed land deprived him not of ownership, but of his "right to file the
necessary application thereon with the authorities concerned"28 as long-time possessor of
the land.
SO ORDERED."
Nonetheless, petitioner contends that an action for reconveyance is proper, viz:
Petitioner Abejaron filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. On
July 22, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered a resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari with the ". . . for an action of reconveyance of a parcel of land to prosper, it is not necessary
following assignment of errors: that the proponent be the absolute owner thereof. It is enough that the proponent
has an equitable right thereon. In the case at bar, the plaintiff had been in lawful,
open, continuous and notorious possession, occupation and control in the concept
"I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT of an owner of a greater portion of the subject lot since 1945 and have (sic)
ACTUAL FRAUD WAS COMMITTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND thereby acquired an equitable right thereon protected by law. Possession of public
PROVEN BY THE PETITIONER AND SUSTAINED BY THE TRIAL COURT lands once occupation of the same is proven, as the herein plaintiff did, under
WHEN PRIVATE RESPONDENT PROCURED THE TITLE IN HIS NAME OF THE claim of ownership constitutes a grant from the state (Republic vs. Vera, 120
AREA OF THE LOT IN QUESTION, LOT 1, BLOCK 5, LOCATED AT SILWAY, SCRA 210). A portion of the public land ceased to be public as soon as its claimant
DADIANGAS, GENERAL SANTOS CITY. had performed all the conditions essential to a grant (Republic vs. Villanueva, 114
SCRA 875)."29
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE LOT WHICH BELONGS TO THE PETITIONER IS LOT 2 OF THE SAME Petitioner's contention, buttressed by the Vera case and Chief Justice Teehankee's dissent
BLOCK AND PSU, AND THAT THE PETITIONER FORCIBLY ENTERED INTO in the Villanueva case, is similar to the position taken by the plaintiff in Mesina v. Vda. de
LOT 1 OF THE SAME BLOCK AND PSU, AND FORCIBLY TRANSFERRED HIS Sonza, et al.30 In that case, plaintiff filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija an
OLD HOUSE FROM LOT 2 TO LOT 1 IS BASED ONLY ON THE SELF-SERVING action for cancellation of the original certificate of title procured by the defendant by virtue of
ALLEGATIONS OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND NOT SUPPORTED BY a homestead patent. The title covered a public land which she claimed to own through
ANY COMPETENT AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. public, open, and peaceful possession for more than thirty years. The law applicable in that
case, which petitioner Abejaron apparently relies on in the case at bar, is Sec. 48(b) of
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE Commonwealth Act 141 or the Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942,
FACT THAT PETITIONER HAS A CLEAR RIGHT OVER THE PROPERTY IN which took effect on June 22, 1957, viz:
QUESTION BECAUSE HE HAS BEEN IN ACTUAL AND LAWFUL POSSESSION
FOR SO MANY YEARS AND A CLAIMANT OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION." "Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) of the province where the land is located for
An action for reconveyance of a property is the sole remedy of a landowner whose property confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name after one year from the the Land Registration Act (now Property Registration Decree), to wit:
date of the decree so long as the property has not passed to an innocent purchaser for
value.25 The action does not seek to reopen the registration proceeding and set aside the xxx
decree of registration but only purports to show that the person who secured the registration
of the property in controversy is not the real owner thereof.26 Fraud is a ground for (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been
reconveyance. For an action for reconveyance based on fraud to prosper, it is essential for in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
 ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the The Court pointed out that the Villanueva and Meralco cases are different from the oft-cited
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force Susi case as the latter involved a parcel of land possessed by a Filipino citizen since time
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the immemorial, while the land in dispute in the Villanueva and Meralco cases were sought to
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of be titled by virtue of Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. In explaining the nature
title under the provisions of this Chapter." (emphasis supplied) of land possessed since time immemorial, the Court quoted Oh Cho v. Director of
Lands,39 viz:
Citing Susi v. Razon,31 the Court interpreted this law, viz:
"All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by
". . . where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that
complied with through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-
publicly with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption
Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private
of Commonwealth Act No. 141), the possessor is deemed to have already property even before the Spanish conquest."
acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that In 1986, however, in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,40 this Court en
said grant may be sanctioned by the courts -an application therefor being sufficient banc recognized the strong dissent registered by Chief Justice Teehankee in the Villanueva
under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874 (reproduced as Section 50, case and abandoned the Villanueva and Meralco ruling to revert to the Susi doctrine.
Commonwealth Act No. 141). If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the Reiterating the Susi and Herico cases, the Court ruled:
land in question by grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public
domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin "Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering
Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. (Italics supplied)" possession of public land which is of character and duration prescribed by statute
as the equivalent of express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute
The Mesina and Susi cases were cited in Herico v. Dar,32 another action for cancellation of itself [Sec. 48(b)] that the possessor(s) 'x x x shall be conclusively presumed to
title issued pursuant to a free patent. Again, the Court ruled that under Section 48(b) of the have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, with the plaintiff's proof of occupation entitled to a certificate of title x x x.' No proof being admissible to overcome a
and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessor-in- conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more
interest, title over the land had vested in him as to segregate the land from the mass of than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession
public land. Thenceforth, the land was no longer disposable under the Public Land Act by claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder
free patent.33 The Court held, viz: would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings
would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm
"As interpreted in several cases (Susi v. Razon, et al., 48 Phil. 424; Mesina v. such a conversion already effected by operation of law from the moment the
Pineda Vda. de Sonza, G.R. No. L-14722, May 25, 1960) when the conditions as required period of possession became complete."41 (Emphasis supplied)
specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to
have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without This is the prevailing rule as reiterated in the more recent case of Rural Bank of Compostela
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be v. Court of Appeals, a ponencia of now Chief Justice Davide, Jr.,42 viz:
of public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of.
The application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not "The rule under the latter (Section 48[b] of the Public Land Act, as amended by
affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the R.A. No. 1942), is that when the conditions specified therein are complied with, the
Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent."34 possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a
government grant, without necessity of a certificate of title being issued, and the
In citing Republic v. Villanueva, et al.,35 petitioner Abejaron relied on the dissenting opinion land ceases to be part of the public domain and beyond the authority of the
of Chief Justice Teehankee. However, the en banc majority opinion in that case and Director of Lands."43
in Manila Electric Company v. Bartolome,36 departed from the doctrines enunciated in
the Susi, Mesina, and Herico cases. Citing Uy Un v. Perez,37 the Court ruled that "the right The question brought to the fore, therefore, is whether or not petitioner Abejaron has
of an occupant of public agricultural land to obtain a confirmation of his title under Sec. satisfied the conditions specified in Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A.
48(b) of Com. Act. No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, is 'derecho dominical No. 1942. Sec. 48(b) has been further amended by P.D. No. 1073 which took effect on
incoativo' and that before the issuance of the certificate of title the occupant is not in the January 25, 1977. Sec. 4 of the P.D. reads as follows:
juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State."38
 "Sec. 4. The provision of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the made bigger in 1950. The wooden fence was also changed to a fence made of hollow
Public Land Act, are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall blocks. The two-storey house, bigger store, and hollow-block fence all stand to this day.
apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been In 1951, petitioner planted coconut trees near his house. While the petitioner has shown
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the continued existence of these improvements on the disputed land, they were introduced later
applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of than January 24, 1947. He has failed to establish the portion of the disputed land that his
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945." original nipa house, small store and wooden fence actually occupied as of January 24,
1947. In the absence of this proof, we cannot determine the land he actually possessed and
Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as further amended by P.D. No. 1073, now reads: occupied for thirty years which he may acquire under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
Worthy of notice is the fact that the disputed land was surveyed, subdivided into and
identified by lots only in the 1970's. Therefore, prior to the survey, it would be difficult to
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been determine the metes and bounds of the land petitioner claims to have occupied since 1947
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of in the absence of specific and incontrovertible proof.
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force The neighbors presented by the petitioner, namely Alejandra Doria, Pacencia Artigo, and
majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the Beatriz Gusila, could not also further his cause as both Doria and Artigo stated that they
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of started residing in Silway in 1947, without specifying whether it was on or prior to January
title under the provisions of this chapter." (Italics ours)44 24, 1947, while Gusila arrived in the neighborhood in 1949. While Doria testified that there
was a fence between Abejaron's and Nabasa's houses in 1947, she did not state that
Abejaron's 118-square meter area was enclosed by a fence which stands to this day. This is
However, as petitioner Abejaron's 30-year period of possession and occupation required by confirmed by Geodetic Engineer Lagsub's 1984 survey plan which shows that a fence
the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the effectivity stands only on one side of the 118-square meter area, the side adjacent to Nabasa's 57-
of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the requirement of said P.D. that occupation and possession square meter portion. Again, this poses the problem of determining the area actually
should have started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not apply to him. As the Susi doctrine occupied and possessed by Abejaron at least since January 24, 1947.
holds that the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b) takes place by operation of law, then upon
Abejaron's satisfaction of the requirements of this law, he would have already gained title
over the disputed land in 1975. This follows the doctrine laid down in Director of Lands v. Finally, as admitted by the petitioner, he has never declared the disputed land for taxation
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,45 that the law cannot impair vested rights such as a land purposes. While tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of
grant. More clearly stated, "Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-in- ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when
interest have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property or supported by other effective
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the proof.49 Even the tax declarations and receipts covering his house do not bolster his case as
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or the earliest of these was dated 1950.
at least since January 24, 1947" may apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or
incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.46 Petitioner's evidence does not constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary
to acquire title through possession and occupation of the disputed land at least since
Having laid down the law applicable to the case at bar, i.e., Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land January 24, 1947 as required by Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A.
Act, as amended by R.A. 1942, we now determine whether or not petitioner has acquired 1942. The basic presumption is that lands of whatever classification belong to the State and
title over the disputed land. In doing so, it is necessary for this Court to wade through the evidence of a land grant must be "well-nigh incontrovertible."50 As petitioner Abejaron has
evidence on record to ascertain whether petitioner has been in open, continuous, exclusive not adduced any evidence of title to the land in controversy, whether by judicial confirmation
and notorious possession and occupation of the 118-square meter disputed land for 30 of title, or homestead, sale, or free patent, he cannot maintain an action for reconveyance.
years at least since January 24, 1947. It is axiomatic that findings of fact by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive on the parties and upon this Court, which In De La Peña v. Court of Appeals and Herodito Tan,51 the petitioner filed an action for
will not be reviewed or disturbed on appeal unless these findings are not supported by reconveyance, claiming preferential right to acquire ownership over a 3/4 hectare of land
evidence or unless strong and cogent reasons dictate otherwise.47 One instance when and imputing fraud and misrepresentation to respondent in securing a free patent and
findings of fact of the appellate court may be reviewed by this Court is when, as in the case original certificate of title over the land in controversy. The action for reconveyance was
at bar, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory.48 dismissed by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. This Court affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals, viz:
Petitioner claims that he started occupying the disputed land in 1945. At that time, he built
a nipa house, a small store, and a fence made of wood to delineate his area. "It is well-settled that reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the
This nipa house was improved in 1949 into a two-storey house. The small store was also property alleged to be erroneously titled in another's name. (Tomas v. Court of
 Appeals, G.R. No. 79328, 21 May 1990, 185 SCRA 627, 633; Esconde v. In the present dispute, only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public
Barlongay, G.R. No. 67583, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 603, 611; Nebrada v. Heirs land. Therefore, not being the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales
of Alivio, et al., 104 Phil. 126 [1958]; Director of Lands v. Register of Deeds of patents thereon, respondents have no personality to file the suit. Neither will they
Rizal, 92 Phil. 826 [1953]; Azurin v. Quitoriano, et al., 81 Phil. 261 [1948]). In the be directly affected by the judgment in such suit.
case at bench, petitioner does not claim to be the owner of the disputed portion.
Admittedly, what he has is only a "preferential right" to acquire ownership thereof xxx
by virtue of his actual possession since January 1947. . . Title to alienable public
lands can be established through open, continuous, and exclusive possession for
at least thirty (30) years. . . Not being the owner, petitioner cannot maintain the Clearly, a suit filed by a person who is not a party in interest must be dismissed.
present suit. Thus, in Lucas v. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157, September 23, 1957, the Court affirmed
the dismissal of a Complaint filed by a party who alleged that the patent was
obtained by fraudulent means and consequently, prayed for the annulment of said
Persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not question the titles patent and the cancellation of a certificate of title. The Court declared that the
legally issued by the State. (Reyes v. Rodriguez, 62 Phil. 771, 776 [1936]) In such proper party to bring the action was the government, to which the property would
cases, the real party in interest is the Republic of the Philippines to whom the revert."54
property would revert if it is ever established, after appropriate proceedings, that
the free patent issued to the grantee is indeed vulnerable to annulment on the
ground that the grantee failed to comply with the conditions imposed by the law. Similarly, as petitioner Abejaron has failed to show his title to the disputed land, he is not the
(See Sec. 101 of C.A. 141 [Public Land Act]; Lucas v. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157, 1158 proper party to file an action for reconveyance that would result in the reversion of the land
[1957]; Sumail v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, et al., 96 Phil. to the government. It is the Solicitor General, on behalf of the government, who is by law
946, 953 [1955]). Not being an applicant, much less a grantee, petitioner cannot mandated to institute an action for reversion.55 He has the specific power and function to
ask for reconveyance." (emphasis supplied)52 "represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings" and to "institute
actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain and improvements
thereon as well as lands held in violation of the Constitution."56 Since respondent Nabasa's
In the more recent case of Tankiko, et al. v. Cezar, et al.,53 plaintiffs filed an action for Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title originated from a grant by the government, their
reconveyance claiming that they were the actual occupants and residents of a 126,112- cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.57
square meter land which was titled to another person. The trial court dismissed the action,
but the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal. Despite the appellate court's finding that
plaintiffs had no personality to file the action for reconveyance, the disputed land being part Having resolved that petitioner Abejaron does not have legal standing to sue and is not the
of the public domain, it exercised equity jurisdiction to avoid leaving unresolved the matter real party in interest, we deem it unnecessary to resolve the question of fraud and the other
of possession of the land in dispute. On appeal to this Court, we reinstated the decision of issues raised in the petition. These shall be timely for adjudication if a proper suit is filed by
the trial court and dismissed the action for reconveyance, viz: the Solicitor General in the future.

". . . equity is invoked only when the plaintiff, on the basis of the action filed and WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the impugned decision of the Court of Appeals is
relief sought, has a clear right that he seeks to enforce, or that would obviously be AFFIRMED. The Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 2492 before the Regional Trial Court of
violated if the action filed were to be dismissed for lack of standing. In the present South Cotabato, Branch 1, is DISMISSED. No costs.
case, respondents have no clear enforceable right, since their claim over the land
in question is merely inchoate and uncertain. Admitting that they are only SO ORDERED.
applicants for sales patents on the land, they are not and they do not even claim to
be owners thereof. G.R. No. 203760               December 3, 2014

Second, it is evident that respondents are not the real parties in interest. Because HOMER C. JAVIER, represented by his mother and natural guardian, SUSAN G.
they admit that they are not the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales CANENCIA, Petitioner,
patents thereon, it is daylight clear that the land is public in character and that it vs.
should revert to the State. This being the case, Section 101 of the Public Land Act SUSAN LUMONTAD, Respondent.
categorically declares that only the government may institute an action for
reconveyance of ownership of a public land. . .
DECISION
xxx
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September 29, 2011 Also, the MTC observed that petitioner’s complaint failed to aver the required jurisdictional
and the Resolution3 dated October 1, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. facts as it merely contained a general allegation that respondent’s entry into the disputed
113046 which set aside the Decision4 dated August 20, 2009 and the Order5 dated January portion was made by means of force and intimidation, without specifically stating how,
18, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 74 (RTC) in Sp. Civil Case No. when, and where were such means employed. With such failure, the MTC intimated that
08-744, finding that the action instituted by petitioner was not one for forcible entry, but for petitioner’s remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria
recovery of ownership and possession, hence, within the original jurisdiction of the latter. instituted before the proper forum.22 Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to the RTC.
Consequently, the CA ordered the remand of the case to the R TC for trial on the merits.
The RTC Ruling
The Facts
In a Decision23 dated August 20, 2009, the RTC reversed and set aside the MTC ruling, and
This case originated from a forcible entry Complaint6 dated July 3, 2007 filed by petitioner accordingly ordered respondent to vacate the disputed portion and surrender possession
Homer C. Javier, represented by his mother and natural guardian Susan G. Canencia thereof to petitioner. Likewise, it ordered respondent to pay petitioner the amounts of
(petitioner), against respondent Susan Lumontad (respondent) before the Municipal Trial ₱5,000.00 a month from March 2007, until she vacates said portion, as reasonable
Court of Taytay, Rizal (MTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 1929. compensation for its use and occupation, and ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, including costs
of suit.24
In his complaint, petitioner alleged that he is one of the sons of the late Vicente T. Javier
(Vicente), who was the owner of a 360-square meter (sq. m.) parcel of land located at Preliminarily, the RTC ruled that the facts averred in petitioner’s complaint – namely, that
Corner Malaya and Gonzaga Streets, Barangay Dolores, Taytay Rizal (subject petitioner, through his late father, owned and possessed the subject land, and that by
land),7 covered by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 00-TY-002-11458.8 Since his birth, petitioner’s means of force and intimidation, respondent gainedentry thereto25 – show that his cause of
family has lived in the residential house erected thereon.9 Upon Vicente’s death, petitioner, action is indeed one of forcible entry that falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC.26
together with his mother, continued their possession over the same. On March 26, 2007,
respondent gained entry into the subject land and started to build a two (2)-storey building On the merits, the RTC found that petitioner, being the owner and possessor of the property
(subject building) on a 150 sq. m. portion thereof, despite petitioner’s vigorous objections in question, has the right to be respected in his possession and that respondent forcibly and
and protests.10 The dispute was submitted to barangay conciliation but no amicable unlawfully deprived him of the same.27
settlement was reached between the parties.11 Thus, petitioner was constrained to file
against respondent the instant forcible entry complaint, averring, in addition to the foregoing,
that reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the above-said portion may be Unconvinced, respondent moved for reconsideration,28 which was, however, denied in an
fixed at 5,000.00 per month.12 Order29 dated January 18, 2010, prompting petitioner to file an appeal before the CA.

In her Answer13 dated July 30, 2007, respondent admitted that during Vicente’s lifetime, he The CA Ruling
indeed was the owner and in physical possession of the subject land.14 Nevertheless, she
claimed tobe the owner of the portion where the subject building was being constructed, as In a Decision30 dated September 29, 2011, the CA set aside the RTC ruling and remanded
evidenced by TD No. 00-TY-002-1303115 in her name.16 Hence, she took possession of the the case to the latter court for trial on the merits.31
said portion not as an illegal entrant but as its owner.17
It held that the issue of possession of the subject land is intimately intertwined with the issue
The MTC Ruling of ownership, such that the former issue cannot be determined without ruling on who really
owns such land. Thus, it remanded the case to the RTC for trial on the merits in the
In a Judgment18 dated November 11, 2007, the MTC dismissed the complaint for want of exercise of the latter’s original jurisdiction in an action for recovery of ownership and
cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.19 possession pursuant to Section 8 (2), Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.32

It found that Vicente actually subdivided the subject land into two (2) lots: the first lot, with This notwithstanding, the CA still concluded that respondent had the subject building
an area of 187.20 sq. m., was given to petitioner, while the second lot, with an area of constructed in the concept of being the owner of the 172.80 sq. m. portion of the subject
172.80 sq. m. and where the subject building was erected, was given toone Anthony de la land.33 In this relation, it was observed that petitioner gave a misleading description of TD
Paz Javier (Anthony), son of Vicente by a previous failed marriage, but was eventually No. 00-TY-002-11458, considering that said tax declaration only covered petitioner’s family
acquired by respondent from the latter through sale.20 Based on this finding, the MTC house and not the subject land where said improvement was built, as petitioner alleged in
concluded that petitioner had no cause of action against respondent since she was merely his complaint.34 In truth, the CA found that the subject land is separately covered by TD No.
exercising her rights asthe owner of the 172.80 sq. m. subdivided lot.21 00-TY-002-9660,35 which was cancelled when the land was subdivided into two (2) lots,
namely: (a) the 187.20 sq. m. lot covered by TD No. 00-TY-002-1282536 given by Vicente to
petitioner; and (b) the 172.80 sq. m. lot covered by TD No. 00-TY-002-1282437 given by pleading alleges that petitioner, as the original owner’s, i.e., Vicente’s, successor-in-interest,
Vicente to Anthony, which the latter sold to respondent, resulting in the issuance of TD No. was in prior physical possession of the subject land but was eventually dispossessed of a
00-TY-002-1303138 in her name. 150 sq. m. portion thereof on March 26, 2007 by respondent who, through force and
intimidation, gained entry into the same and, thereafter, erected a building thereon. Clearly,
Further, the CA stated that petitioner was not able to sufficiently establish that respondent with these details, the means by which petitioner’s dispossession was effected cannot be
employed force and intimidation in entering the 172.80 sq. m. portion of the subject landas said to have been insufficiently alleged as mistakenly ruled by the MTC and later affirmed
he failed to demonstrate the factual circumstances that occurred during his dispossession of by the CA. The "how" (through unlawful entry and the construction of the subject building),
said property.39 "when" (March 26, 2007), and "where" (a 150 sq. m. portion of the subject land) of the
dispossession all appear on the face of the complaint. In Arbizo v. Sps. Santillan,45 the Court
held that the acts of unlawfully entering the disputed premises, erecting a structure thereon,
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,40 which was, however, denied in a and excluding therefrom the prior possessor, would necessarily imply the use of force,46 as
Resolution41 dated October 1, 2012, hence, this petition. what had, in fact, been alleged in the instant complaint. Hence, it was erroneous to
conclude that petitioner only made a general allegation that respondent’s entry in the
The Issue Before the Court premises was made by means of force and intimidation47 and, consequently, that a forcible
entry case was not instituted before the MTC. Given that a forcible entry complaint had
The main issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly set aside the been properly filed before the MTC, the CA thus erred in ordering the remand of the case to
RTC Ruling and ordered the remand of the case to the latter court for trial on the merits in the RTC for trial on the merits in an action for recovery of possession and ownership,
anaction for recovery of ownership and possession. otherwise known as an accion reivindicatoria,48 pursuant to Paragraph 2, Section 8, Rule 40
of the Rules of Court which reads:

The Court’s Ruling

SEC. 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction.– x x x.

Although the Court finds that the complaint was indeed one for forcible entry, petitioner’s
case nonetheless fails to impress on the merits. If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original
jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding section,
A. Nature of the Case: Forcible Entry. without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the
interest of justice.
The Court disagrees with the findings of both the MTC and the CA that the allegations in the
petitioner’s complaint do not make a case for forcible entry but another action cognizable by Verily, ejectment cases fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the first level
the RTC.42 courts by express provision of Section 33 (2)49 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,50 in relation to
Section 1,51 Rule 70, of the Rules of Court.52 Even in cases where the issue of possession is
As explicated in the case of Pagadora v. Ilao,43 "[t]he invariable rule is that what determines closely intertwined with the issue of ownership, the first level courts maintain exclusive and
the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the original jurisdiction over ejectment cases,53 as they are given the authority to make an initial
allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession.54 It must be
statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which [Section 1, clarified, however, that such adjudication is merely provisional and would not bar or
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court] provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its prejudice an action between the same parties involving title tothe property. It is, therefore,
face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. Hence, in forcible entry, not conclusive as to the issue of ownership.55
the complaint must necessarily allege that one in physical possession of a land or building
has been deprived of that possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy B. Merits of the Forcible Entry Complaint.
or stealth. It is not essential, however, that the complaint should expressly employ the
language of the law, but it would suffice that facts are set up showing that dispossession
took place under said conditions. In other words, the plaintiff must allege that he, prior to the Notwithstanding petitioner’s proper classification of his action, his forcible entry complaint,
defendant’s act of dispossession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, had been nonetheless, cannot be granted on its merits, considering that he had failed to justify his
in prior physical possession of the property. This requirement is jurisdictional, and as long right to the de facto possession (physical or material possession) of the disputed
as the allegations demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry, the court acquires premises.1âwphi1
jurisdiction over the subject matter."44
As pointed out by the CA, TD No. 00-TY-002-11458, or the supposed document from which
A plain reading of petitioner’s complaint shows that the required jurisdictional averments, so petitioner hinges his right to the de facto possession of the subject land, only covers his
as to demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry, have all been complied with. Said house and not the entire land itself. Nothing appears on record to show that he has the right
to the de facto possession of the 172.80 sq. m. portion which, on the contrary, appears to Philippines, Inc. (UCCPI). This Complaint was docketed thereat as Civil Case No.
be consistent with the claim of ownership of respondent in view of TD No. OOTY-002-13031 4936.5
covering the same property as registered in her name. Thus, with no evidence in support of
petitioner's stance, and the counter-evidence showing respondent's right to the de facto In an Order dated February 9, 2005, the MTCC directed BUCCI to show cause
possession of the 172.80 sq. m. portion as its ostensible owner, the forcible complaint must why its Complaint should not be dismissed for its failure to comply with the
necessarily fail. requirement on the certification against forum-shopping under Rule 7, Section 5
of the Rules of Court.6 According to the MTCC, BUCCI failed to mention in its
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, petitioner's forcible entry complaint in certification against non-forum-shopping a complete statement of the present
Sp. Civil Case No. 08-744 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. status of another case concerning the recovery of ownership of certain parcels
of land earlier filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) by the UCCPI and the
SO ORDERED. MBC against BUCCI. (Civil Case No. MAN-1669, captioned "United Church of
Christ in the Philippines, Inc. and Mandaue Bradford Church, Plaintiff v. Bradford
G.R. No. 195669, May 30, 2016 United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Defendant, for Recovery of Ownership
with Preliminary Injunction".)7
BRADFORD UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, INC., Petitioner, v. DANTE The recovery of ownership case also involved Lot 3-F, the same parcel of land
ANDO, ABENIGO AUGIS, EDGAR CARDONES, ZACARIAS GUTIERREZ, subject of the unlawful detainer case, and yet another parcel of land,
CORNELIO IBARRA, JR., ZENAIDA IBARRA, TEOFILOI LIRASAN, EUNICE denominated simply as Lot 3-C. On October 13, 1997, the RTC of Mandaue City-
LIRASAN, RUTH MISSION, DOLLY ROSALES & EUNICE TAMBANGAN, IN rendered its judgment in the recovery of ownership case against therein
THEIR CAPACITIES AS MANDAUE BRADFORD CHURCH COUNCIL plaintiffs UCCPI and MBC and in favor of therein defendant BUCCI. On
MEMBERS; MANDAUE BRADFORD CHURCH; AND UNITED CHURCH OF November 19, 1997, both the MBC and the UCCPI filed a motion for
CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents. reconsideration of said decision but their motion was denied by Order of March
10, 2005.8
DECISION
Meanwhile, the MTCC Branch 2 of Mandaue City, issued an Order9 dated March
DEL CASTILLO, J.: 31,2005 dismissing the unlawful detainer case with prejudice for BUCCI's failure
to comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping. BUCCI appealed
to the RTC which was docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5126-A.
Well-settled is the rule that the filing of the summary action for unlawful
detainer during the pendency of an action for recovery of ownership of the same
Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court
parcel of Land subject of the summary action of unlawful detainer does not
amount to forum-shopping.
In its Decision10 of March 13, 2006 in the unlawful detainer case, the RTC of
Mandaue City, Branch 56, affirmed the MTCC's dismissal thereof, with prejudice.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the December 10, 2010
The RTC held that BUCCI was guilty of forum-shopping because it failed to
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the Petition in CA-GR. SP
certify under oath that there was another action involving the same parties and
No. 01935 and its January 26, 2011 Resolution3 which denied petitioner's
the same Lot 3-F still pending before another court.
Motion for Reconsideration thereon.4
BUCCI moved for reconsideration but it was denied in the Order11 of June
23,2006.
Proceedings before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
Aggrieved, BUCCI filed a Petition for Review12 before the CA docketed as CA-GR.
Before Branch 2 of the MTCC of Mandaue City, the petitioner Bradford United
SP No. 01935.
Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI) filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer and
damages against herein respondents Dante Ando, Abenigo Augis, Edgar
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
Cardones, Zacarias Gutierrez, Cornelio Ibarra, Jr., Zenaida Ibarra, Teofilo
Lirasan, Eunice Lirasan, Ruth Mission, Dolly Resales and Eunice Tambangan, in
In its Decision13 of December 10, 2010, the CA held that the MTCC and the RTC
their capacities as Members of the Mandaue Bradford Church Council, the
correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case. The CA opined that whatever
Mandaue Bradford Church (MBC), and the United Church of Christ in the
decision mat would be rendered in the action for recovery of ownership of the (1) identity of parties or representation in both cases; (2) identity of rights
parcels of land in question would amount to res judicata in the unlawful detainer asserted and reliefs prayed for; (3) the reliefs are founded on the same facts;
case. The CA ruled that identity of the causes of action does not mean absolute and (4) the identity of the preceding particulars should be such that any
identity, and that the test lies not in the form of action but in whether the same judgment which may be rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which
set of facts or evidence would support both causes of action. Furthermore, the party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
CA found that BUCCI indeed failed to state in the certification against forum-
shopping in the unlawful detainer case a complete statement of the status of the BUCCI likewise maintains that there is only identity of parties between the
land ownership recovery case; and that such failure impinges against Section 5, unlawful detainer case and the case for recovery of ownership; and that the
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the CA dismissed BUCCI's Petition for other three essential elements are absent, to wit: that mere be identity of
Review. The CA likewise denied BUCCI's Motion for Reconsideration in its cause/s of action; that the reliefs sought are founded on the same facts; and
Resolution dated January 26, 2011.14 that the identity of the two preceding particulars be such that any judgment
which may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
Hence, BUCCI is now before this Court through this Petition for Review successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
on Certiorari.15 Specifically, BUCCI maintains that the cause of action in Civil Case No. MAN-
1669 is for recovery of ownership of the parcels of land in dispute, whereas the
Issue cause of action in Civil Case No. 4936, the summary action of unlawful detainer,
is the determination of who has the better or superior right to the
Petitioner presents the following issue for our consideration material/physical possession (or possession de facto), of Lot 3-F; that the
prayer that they be declared the lawful owners of the disputed lots in said Civil
WHETHER XXX THE COURT OF APPEALS IS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT Case No. MAN-1669 is entirely different or dissimilar from the reliefs prayed for
PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF FORUM[-] SHOPPING FOR FILING THE CASE FOR in the summary action of unlawful detainer (Civil Case No. 4936) by BUCCI,
EJECTMENT OR UNLAWFUL DETAINER (CIVIL CASE NO. 4936) DURING THE which is that BUCCI be given or awarded the material or physical possession (or
PENDENCY OF THE [ACTION FOR] RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP XXX (CIVIL CASE possession de facto) of the disputed Lot 3-F.
NO. MAN-1669)[,] AND FOR FAILING TO [DISCLOSE] THE PENDENCY OF THE
[LATTER CIVIL CASE NO. MAN-1669] IN THE CERTIFICATION OF NON[-] Respondents' arguments
FORUM[-]SHOPPING IN THE [FORMER CIVIL CASE NO. 4936].16
Respondents counter that BUCCI's claim that the issues involved in the two
cases are dissimilar or different is of no moment or consequence because the
The fundamental issue to be resolved in this case is whether BUCCI committed latter's deliberate non-disclosure in the certificate against non-forum shopping
forum-shopping when it failed to disclose in the certification on non-forum in the summaiy action of unlawful detainer of the pendency-in-fact of the action
shopping of the unlawful detainer case a complete statement of the status of the for recovery of ownership of the disputed parcels of land, which involved the
action for recovery of ownership of property then pending before the RTC of same parties and the same property, in the action for recovery of ownership, is
Mandaue City. The unlawful detainer suit involved Lot 3-F which was also an irremissibly fatal defect that cannot be cured by mere amendment pursuant
involved in the complaint for recovery of ownership. to Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.

Herein petitioner BUCCI's verification and certification against forum-shopping

Our Ruling
attached to the instant Petition, stated that UCCP had also filed an appeal with
the CA pertaining to the recovery of ownership suit; and this appeal was
The Petition is meritorious.
docketed as CA-GR. No. 00983, then still pending adjudication before the CA. In
the same verification and certification against forum-shopping, BUCCI stressed
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, provides:
that the case for recovery of ownership of the disputed parcels of land was
entirely different from the unlawful detainer case, because the first case does
SEC, 5. Certification against forum[-]shopping. - The plaintiff or principal party
not involve at all the issue of material/ physical possession of Lot 3-F.17
shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a
claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously
Petitioner's arguments
filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed
any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
BUCCI posits that the most decisive factor in determining the existence of
agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
forum-shopping is the presence of all the elements of litis pendentia, namely,
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete must be, between the first and second actions, (a) identity of parties, (b)
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn identity of subject matter, and (c) identity of cause of action."20 It bears notice
that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall that in its certification against non-forum shopping, now attached to this instant
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid Petition, BUCCI mentioned that the decision in the land ownership recovery case
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. was still pending appeal before the CA, a claim that was not controverted at all
by respondents. Simply put, this means that the former judgment is not yet
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere final. Furthermore, the causes of action in the two cases are not identical or
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for similar. To repeat, in the summary action of unlawful detainer, the question to
the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon be resolved is which party has the better or superior right to the
motion and after hearing. The submission, of a false certification or non- physical/material possession (or de facto possession) of the disputed premises. 
compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect Whereas in the action for recovery of ownership, the question to be resolved is
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and which party has the lawful title or dominical right (i.e., owner's right) to the
criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful disputed premises. Thus, in Malabanan v. Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc.21 the
and deliberate forum[-]shopping, the same shall be ground for summary petitioner therein asserted, among others, that the complaint for unlawful
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause detainer against him must be dismissed on grounds of litis pendencia and
for administrative sanctions, (n) forum-shopping in view of the pending case for annulment of an action
for  dacion en pago and for the transfer certificate of title in another case, this
Court reiterated the well-settled rule that a pending action involving ownership
The above-stated rule requires a twofold compliance, and this covers both the
neither suspends nor bars the proceedings in the summary action for ejectment
non-commission of forum-shopping itself, and the submission of the certification
pertaining to the same property, in view of the dissimilarities or differences in
against forum-shopping.18
the reliefs prayed for.
xxx The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the
Petitioner and respondent are the same parties in the annulment and ejectment
same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
cases. The issue of ownership was likewise being contended, with same set of
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists where
evidence being presented in both cases. However, it cannot be inferred that a
the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one
judgment in the ejectment case would amount to res judicata in the annulment
case will amount to res judicata in another. On the other hand, for litis
case, and vice-versa.
pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites
must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the
The issue is hardly a novel one. It has been laid to rest by heaps of cases
same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
iterating the principle that a judgment rendered in an ejectment case shall not
for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect
bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building
to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that
nor shall it be conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case between the
may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful,
same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.
would amount to res judicata in the other case.19
It bears emphasizing that in ejectment suits, the only issue for resolution is the
Here, there is only identity of parties between the summary action of unlawful physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any
detainer and the land ownership recovery case. However, the issues raised are claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. However, the issue of
not identical or similar in the two cases. The issue in the unlawful detainer case ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of determining
is which party is entitled to, or should be awarded, the material or physical who is entitled to possession de facto. Therefore, the provisional determination
possession of the disputed parcel of land, (or possession thereof as a fact); of ownership in the ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality.
whereas the issue in the action for recovery of ownership is which party has the
right to be recognized as lawful owner of the disputed parcels of land. Corollarily, the incidental issue of whether a pending action for annulment would
abate an ejectment suit must be resolved in the negative.
With respect to res judicata, the following requisites must concur to bar the
institution of a subsequent action: "(1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it A pending action involving ownership of the same property does not bar the
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter filing or consideration of an ejectment suit, nor suspend the proceedings. This is
and [over] the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there so because an ejectment case is simply designed to summarily restore physical
possession of a piece of land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly two fonns of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real
deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties' opposing property. Aside from the summary action of ejectment,  action publiciana  or the
claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings.22 plenary action to recover the right of possession and action reinvindicatoria or
the action to recover ownership which includes recovery of possession, make up
the three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession.
The CA thus erred in holding that, "[a]n adjudication in respondents' recovery of
ownership case would constitute an adjudication of petitioner BUCCI's unlawful
Further, it bears stressing that the issue on the applicability of res judicata to
detainer case, such that the court handling the latter case would be bound
the circumstance obtaining in this case is far from novel and not without
thereby and could not render a contrary ruling in the issue of physical or
precedence. In Vda. de Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, we held that a judgment
material possession."23 It bears belaboring that BUCCI alleged in the instant
in a case for forcible entry which involved only the issue of physical possession
Petition that although the RTC dismissed the complaint against it in the
(possession de facto) and not ownership will not bar an action between the
ownership recovery case, it still filed the unlawful detainer case because there
same parties respecting title or ownership, such as an accion reinvindicatoria or
was never a ruling in the former case as to who between the parties had the
a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership,
better right to the material or physical possession (or possession de facto) of
because there is no identity of causes of action between the two.26
the subject property. Of course, no less significant is the assertion by BUCCI
that although it had previously tolerated or put up with the lawful occupation of
the disputed property by respondent MBC, it nonetheless had to put an end to This ruling holds true in the present Petition.chanrobleslaw
such tolerance or forbearance, because all possible avenues for reconciliation or
compromise between the parties in this case had already been closed.24 Thus, a WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The December 10, 2010 Decision of
favorable ruling for BUCCI in the action for recovery of ownership would not at the Court of Appeals and its January 26, 2011 Resolution in CA-GR. SP No.
all compel or constrain the other court (here the MTCC of Mandaue City) to also 01935 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
obligatorily rule in the summary action of ejectment that BUCCI is entitled to Mandaue City, Branch 2 is hereby DIRECTED to give due course to the
the material or physical possession, (or possession de facto) of the disputed Lot complaint for unlawful detainer and damages, docketed thereat as Civil Case
3-F because even if it be proved that it has the lawful title to, or the ownership No. 4936, instituted therein by petitioner Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc.
of, the disputed lots, there is still bom the need and necessity to resolve in the against therein respondents.
summary action of unlawful detainer whether there are valid or unexpired
agreements between the parties that would justify the refusal to vacate by the Without costs.
actual occupants of the disputed property. Indeed, in a summary action of
ejectment, even the lawful owner of a parcel of land can be ousted or evicted SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
therefrom by a lessee or tenant who holds a better or superior right to the
material or physical (or de facto) possession thereof by virtue of a valid lease or G.R. No. 190106               January 15, 2014
leasehold right thereto.
MAGDALENA T. VILLASI, Petitioner,
In Custodio v. Corrado,25 we declared that res judicata did not obtain in the case vs.
because, among others, the summary action of ejectment was different from FILOMENO GARCIA, substituted by his heirs, namely, ERMELINDA H. GARCIA, LIZA
the case for recovery of possession and ownership. There, we expounded that: GARCIA-GONZALEZ, THERESA GARCIA-TIANGSON, MARIVIC H. GARCIA, MARLENE
GARCIA-MOMIN, GERARDO H. GARCIA, GIDEON H. GARCIA and GENEROSO H.
There is also no identity of causes of action between Civil Case Nos. 116 and GARCIA, and ERMELINDA H. GARCIA, Respondents.
120. xxx
DECISION
xxxx
PEREZ, J.:
The distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for
recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land is well-settled in our
jurisprudence. What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
possessory action (action publiciand) and from a reinvindicatory action (action Court, assailing the 19 May 2009 Decision2 rendered by the Sixth Division of the Court of
reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92587. The appellate court affirmed the Order3 of the Regional
An unlawful detainer suit (action interdictal) together with forcible entry are the
Trial Court R TC) of Quezon City, Branch 77, directing the Deputy Sheriff to suspend the No pronouncement as to costs.7
conduct of the execution sale of the buildings levied upon by him.
Unrelenting, FGCI filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, docketed as
The Facts G.R. No. 147960, asseverating that the appellate court erred in rendering the 20 November
2000 Decision. This Court, however, in a Resolution dated 1 October 2001, denied the
Sometime in 1990, petitioner Magdalena T Villasi (Villasi) engaged the services of appeal for being filed out of time. The said resolution became final and executory on 27
respondent Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc. (FGCI) to construct a seven-storey condominium November 2001, as evidenced by the Entry of Judgment8 made herein.
building located at Aurora Boulevard corner N. Domingo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. For
failure of Villasi to fully pay the contract price despite several demands, FGCI initiated a suit To enforce her right as prevailing party, Villasi filed a Motion for Execution of the 20
for collection of sum of money before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 77. In its action November 2000 Court of Appeals Decision, which was favorably acted upon by the RTC.9 A
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91-8187, FGCI prayed, among others, for the payment of the Writ of Execution was issued on 28 April 2004, commanding the Sheriff to execute and
amount of ₱2,865,000.00, representing the unpaid accomplishment billings. Served with make effective the 20 November 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals.
summons, Villasi filed an answer specifically denying the material allegations of the
complaint. Contending that FGCI has no cause of action against her, Villasi averred that she To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied on a building located at No. 140 Kalayaan
delivered the total amount of ₱7,490,325.10 to FGCI but the latter accomplished only 28% Avenue, Quezon City, covered by Tax Declaration No. D-021-01458, and built in the lots
of the project. After the pre-trial conference was terminated without the parties having registered under Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 379193 and 379194. While the
reached an amicable settlement, trial on the merits ensued. building was declared for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI, the lots in which it was
erected were registered in the names of the Spouses Filomeno Garcia and Ermelinda Halili-
Finding that FGCI was able to preponderantly establish by evidence its right to the unpaid Garcia (Spouses Garcia). After the mandatory posting and publication of notice of sale on
accomplishment billings, the RTC rendered a Decision4 dated 26 June 1996 in FGCI’s favor. execution of real property were complied with, a public auction was scheduled on 25
While the trial court brushed aside the allegation of Villasi that an excess payment was January 2006.
made, it upheld the claim of FGCI to the unpaid amount of the contract price and, thus,
disposed: To forestall the sale on execution, the Spouses Garcia filed an Affidavit of Third Party
Claim10 and a Motion to Set Aside Notice of Sale on Execution,11 claiming that they are the
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: lawful owners of the property which was erroneously levied upon by the sheriff. To persuade
the court a quo to grant their motion, the Spouses Garcia argued that the building covered
1. Ordering [Villasi] to pay [FGCI] the sum of ₱2,865,000.00 as actual damages by the levy was mistakenly assessed by the City Assessor in the name of FGCI. The motion
and unpaid accomplishment billings; was opposed by Villasi who insisted that its ownership belongs to FGCI and not to the
Spouses Garcia as shown by the tax declaration.
2. Ordering [Villasi] to pay [FGCI] the amount of ₱500,000.00 representing the
value of unused building materials; After weighing the arguments of the opposing parties, the RTC issued on 24 February 2005
an Order12 directing the Sheriff to hold in abeyance the conduct of the sale on execution, to
wit:
3. Ordering [Villasi] to pay [FGCI] the amount of ₱100,000.00, as moral damages
and ₱100,000.00 as attorney’s fees.5
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby orders Deputy Sheriff Angel Doroni
to suspend or hold in abeyance the conduct of the sale on execution of the buildings levied
Elevated on appeal and docketed as CA-GR CV No. 54750, the Court of Appeals reversed upon by him, until further orders from the Court.13
the disquisition of the RTC in its Decision6 dated 20 November 2000. The appellate court
ruled that an overpayment was made by Villasi and thereby directed FGCI to return the
amount that was paid in excess, viz: The motion for reconsideration of Villasi was denied by the trial court in its 11 October 2005
Order.14
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED and the
appealed decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-8187 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Arguing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in ordering the suspension of the sale on
judgment is hereby rendered ordering the [FGCI] to return to [Villasi] the sum of execution, Villasi timely filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. In a
₱1,244,543.33 as overpayment under their contract, and the further sum of ₱425,004.00 Decision15 dated 19 May 2009, the appellate court dismissed the petition. In a
representing unpaid construction materials obtained by it from [Villasi]. [FGCI] is likewise Resolution16 dated 28 October 2009, the Court of Appeals refused to reconsider its decision.
hereby declared liable for the payment of liquidated damages in the sum equivalent to 1/10
of 1% of the contract price for each day of delay computed from March 6, 1991.
Villasi is now before this Court via this instant Petition for Review on Certiorariassailing the the Revised Rules of Court. To fortify their position, the Spouses Garcia asserted that as the
adverse Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution and raising the following issues: owners of the land, they would be deemed under the law as owners of the building standing
thereon. The Spouses Garcia also asserted that the construction of the building was
The Issues financed thru a loan obtained from Metrobank in their personal capacities, and they merely
contracted FGCI to construct the building. Finally, the Spouses Garcia argued that the tax
declaration, based on an erroneous assessment by the City Assessor, cannot be made as
I. basis of ownership.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN For her part, Villasi insists that the levy effected by the sheriff was proper since the subject
UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT TO SUSPEND AND HOLD IN property belongs to the judgment debtor and not to third persons. To dispute the ownership
ABEYANCE THE SALE ON EXECUTION OF THE BUILDINGS LEVIED UPON ON THE of the Spouses Garcia, Villasi pointed out that the levied property was declared for tax
BASIS OF RESPONDENTS’ AFFIDAVIT OF THIRD-PARTY CLAIM; purposes in the name of FGCI. A Certification issued by the Office of the City Engineering of
Quezon City likewise showed that the building permit of the subject property was likewise
II. issued in the name of FGCI. We grant the petition.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded on his title or right of
WHEN IT HELD THAT THERE IS NO REASON TO PIERCE THE VEIL OF [FGCI’S] possession.1avvphi1 Corollary thereto, before the court can exercise its supervisory power
CORPORATE FICTION IN THE CASE AT BAR; [AND] to direct the release of the property mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its
rightful owner, the claimant must first unmistakably establish his ownership or right of
III. possession thereon. In Spouses Sy v. Hon. Discaya,21 we declared that for a third-party
claim or a terceria to prosper, the claimant must first sufficiently establish his right on the
property:
WHETHER OR NOT THE BRANCH SHERIFF OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 77 SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO FILE THE APPROPRIATE
NOTICE OF LEVY WITH THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY. 17 [A] third person whose property was seized by a sheriff to answer for the obligation of the
judgment debtor may invoke the supervisory power of the court which authorized such
execution. Upon due application by the third person and after summary hearing, the court
The Court’s Ruling may command that the property be released from the mistaken levy and restored to the
rightful owner or possessor. What said court can do in these instances, however, is limited
It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against the property to a determination of whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of
incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if the property belonging to any third his duties in the execution of judgment, more specifically, if he has indeed taken hold of
person is mistakenly levied upon to answer for another man’s indebtedness, such person property not belonging to the judgment debtor. The court does not and cannot pass upon
has all the right to challenge the levy through any of the remedies provided for under the the question of title to the property, with any character of finality. It can treat of the matter
Rules of Court. Section 16,18 Rule 39 specifically provides that a third person may avail only insofar as may be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted correctly or not. It can
himself of the remedies of either terceria, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or require the sheriff to restore the property to the claimant's possession if warranted by the
wrongly taken hold of the property not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, or an evidence. However, if the claimant's proofs do not persuade the court of the validity of his
independent "separate action" to vindicate his claim of ownership and/or possession over title or right of possession thereto, the claim will be denied.22 (Emphasis and underscoring
the foreclosed property. However, the person other than the judgment debtor who claims supplied).
ownership or right over levied properties is not precluded from taking other legal remedies
to prosecute his claim.19 Our perusal of the record shows that, as the party asserting their title, the Spouses Garcia
failed to prove that they have a bona fide title to the building in question. Aside from their
Indeed, the power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties postulation that as title holders of the land, the law presumes them to be owners of the
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued only improvements built thereon, the Spouses Garcia were unable to adduce credible evidence
against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. The duty of the sheriff to prove their ownership of the property. In contrast, Villasi was able to satisfactorily
is to levy the property of the judgment debtor not that of a third person. For, as the saying establish the ownership of FGCI thru the pieces of evidence she appended to her
goes, one man's goods shall not be sold for another man's debts.20 opposition. Worthy to note is the fact that the building in litigation was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of FGCI and not in the Spouses Garcias’. While it is true that tax
receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute
Claiming that the sheriff mistakenly levied the building that lawfully belongs to them, the
credible proof of claim of title over the property.23 In Buduhan v. Pakurao,24 we underscored
Spouses Garcia availed themselves of the remedy of terceria under Section 16, Rule 39 of
the significance of a tax declaration as proof that a holder has claim of title, and, we gave To set the record straight, while petitioner may have proven his ownership of the land, as
weight to the demonstrable interest of the claimant holding a tax receipt: there can be no other piece of evidence more worthy of credence than a Torrens certificate
of title, he failed to present any evidence to substantiate his claim of ownership or right to
Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of the possession of the building. Like the CA, we cannot accept the Deed of Extrajudicial
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no Settlement of Estate (Residential Building) with Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership
one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least executed by the Garcianos as proof that petitioner acquired ownership of the building. There
constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title is no showing that the Garcianos were the owners of the building or that they had any
over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes proprietary right over it. Ranged against respondents’ proof of possession of the building
manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and since 1977, petitioner’s evidence pales in comparison and leaves us totally unconvinced.34
announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one’s In Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v. Felias,35 we ruled that while the building is a conjugal property and
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.25 therefore liable for the debts of the conjugal partnership, the lot on which the building was
constructed is a paraphernal property and could not be the subject of levy and sale:
It likewise failed to escape our attention that FGCI is in actual possession of the building
and as the payment of taxes coupled with actual possession of the land covered by tax x x x. In other words, when the lot was donated to Felisa by her parents, as owners of the
declaration strongly supports a claim of ownership.26 Quite significantly, all the court land on which the building was constructed, the lot became her paraphernal property. The
processes in an earlier collection suit between FGCI and Villasi were served, thru the donation transmitted to her the rights of a landowner over a building constructed on it.
former’s representative Filomeno Garcia, at No. 140 Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, where Therefore, at the time of the levy and sale of the sheriff, Lot No. 107 did not belong to the
the subject property is located. This circumstance is consistent with the tax declaration in conjugal partnership, but it was paraphernal property of Felisa. As such, it was not
the name of FGCI. answerable for the obligations of her husband which resulted in the judgment against him in
favor of Caltex.36
The explanation proffered by the Spouses Garcia, that the City Assessor merely committed
an error when it declared the property for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI, appears The rule on accession is not an iron-clad dictum. On instances where this Court was
to be suspect in the absence of any prompt and serious effort on their part to have it confronted with cases requiring judicial determination of the ownership of the building
rectified before the onset of the instant controversy. The correction of entry belatedly sought separate from the lot, it never hesitated to disregard such rule. The case at bar is of similar
by the Spouses Garcia is indicative of its intention to put the property beyond the reach of import. When there are factual and evidentiary evidence to prove that the building and the
the judgment creditor. Every prevailing party to a suit enjoys the corollary right to the fruits lot on which it stands are owned by different persons, they shall be treated separately. As
of the judgment and, thus, court rules provide a procedure to ensure that every favorable such, the building or the lot, as the case may be, can be made liable to answer for the
judgment is fully satisfied.27 It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the obligation of its respective owner.
suit. Hailing it as the "life of the law,"
Finally, the issue regarding the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction is irrelevant in this
ratio legis est anima,28 this Court has zealously guarded against any attempt to thwart the case. The Spouses Garcia are trying to protect FGCI from liability by asserting that they, not
rigid rule and deny the prevailing litigant his right to savour the fruit of his victory.29 A FGCI, own the levied property. The Spouses Garcia are asserting their separation from
judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty triumph for the prevailing FGCI. FGCI, the judgment debtor, is the proven owner of the building. Piercing FGCI’s
party.30 corporate veil will not protect FGCI from its judgment debt. Piercing will result in the
identification of the Spouses Garcia as FGCI itself and will make them liable for FGCI’s
While it is a hornbook doctrine that the accessory follows the principal,31 that is, the judgment debt.
ownership of the property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced
thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially,32 such WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
rule is not without exception. In cases where there is a clear and convincing evidence to Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92587 are hereby REVERSED and
prove that the principal and the accessory are not owned by one and the same person or SET ASIDE. The Deputy Sheriff is hereby directed to proceed with the conduct of the sale
entity, the presumption shall not be applied and the actual ownership shall be upheld. In a on execution of the levied building.
number of cases, we recognized the separate ownership of the land from the building and
brushed aside the rule that accessory follows the principal. SO ORDERED.

In Carbonilla v. Abiera,33 we denied the claim of petitioner that, as the owner of the land, he G.R. No. 76217 September 14, 1989
is likewise the owner of the building erected thereon, for his failure to present evidence to
buttress his position:
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner, intimidation, in violation of P.D. 1038 and (3) trespassing, coercing and threatening to
vs. harass, remove and eject private respondents from their respective farmholdings in violation
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO VILLEZA, respondents. of P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815, and 1028. 1

G.R. No. L-76216 September 14, 1989 On January 7,1985, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed private respondents' complaint for
forcible entry. 2 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch LXXI
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner, sustained the dismissal by the Municipal Trial Court. 3
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ORLANDO GERNALE, respondents. Private respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On July
24,1986, said court gave due course to their petition and reversed the decisions of the
Alam, Verano & Associates for petitioner. Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court. 4

Francisco D. Lozano for private respondents. The Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in actual possession of the
property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right
to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of
possession. 5 Petitioner moved to reconsider but the same was denied by the Appellate
Court in its resolution dated September 26, 1986. 6
FERNAN, C.J.:
Hence, this recourse.
Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals denied due process to
Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 232,942 square meters and covered by TCT No. 50023 of petitioner when it reversed the decision of the court a quo without giving petitioner the
the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued on September 11, 1980 which opportunity to file its answer and whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a
canceled TCT No. 56762/ T-560. The land was originally registered on August 5, 1948 in forcible entry case against petitioner. 7
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal as OCT No. 19, pursuant to a Homestead
Patent granted by the President of the Philippines on July 27, 1948, under Act No. 141.
We affirm. The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an answer for due
process to exist. The comment filed by petitioner on February 26, 1986 has sufficiently
On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing addressed the issues presented in the petition for review filed by private respondents before
petitioner German Management Services to develop their property covered by TCT No. the Court of Appeals. Having heard both parties, the Appellate Court need not await or
50023 into a residential subdivision. Consequently, petitioner on February 9,1983 obtained require any other additional pleading. Moreover, the fact that petitioner was heard by the
Development Permit No. 00424 from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission for Court of Appeals on its motion for reconsideration negates any violation of due process.
said development. Finding that part of the property was occupied by private respondents
and twenty other persons, petitioner advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the
latter refused. Nevertheless, petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop the
property which included the portions occupied and cultivated by private respondents. subject property, private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry
case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting
process and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved. 8
Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before the Municipal
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan,
San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal and members of the Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association; In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, private
that they have occupied and tilled their farmholdings some twelve to fifteen years prior to respondents were already in possession thereof . There is no evidence that the spouses
the promulgation of P.D. No. 27; that during the first week of August 1983, petitioner, under Jose were ever in possession of the subject property. On the contrary, private respondents'
a permit from the Office of the Provincial Governor of Rizal, was allowed to improve the peaceable possession was manifested by the fact that they even planted rice, corn and fruit
Barangay Road at Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal at its expense, subject to the bearing trees twelve to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act of destroying their crops.
condition that it shag secure the needed right of way from the owners of the lot to be
affected; that on August 15, 1983 and thereafter, petitioner deprived private respondents of Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title
their property without due process of law by: (1) forcibly removing and destroying the it presented, such evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual
barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings without notice; (2) bulldozing the rice, corn possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual
fruit bearing trees and other crops of private respondents by means of force, violence and condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be
turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. 9 Thus, a party who can prove prior The complainant Gloria Cabalag is the wife of Marcelino Guevarra who
possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be cultivated a parcel of land known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico
the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the situated in sitio Bote-bote, barrio Tampisao, Nasugbu, Batangas. The said
security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person parcel of land used to be tenanted by the deceased father of the
having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. 10 complainant. Hacienda Palico is owned by Roxas y Cia. and administered
by Antonio Chuidian. The overseer of the said hacienda is Felix Caisip,
Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized petitioner's one of the accused herein. Even before the occurrence of the incident
drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of private respondents on the basis of presently involved, there had been a series of misunderstandings and
the doctrine of self-help enunciated in Article 429 of the New Civil Code. 11 Such justification litigations involving the complainant and her husband, on one hand, and
is unavailing because the doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or the men of Hacienda Palico on the other.
threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. When possession has already
been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is clear It appears that on December 23, 1957, Marcelino Guevarra filed an action
from Article 536 of the Civil Code which states, "(I)n no case may possession be acquired with the Court of Agrarian Relations seeking recognition as a lawful tenant
through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who of Roxas y Cia. over lot No. 105-A of Hacienda Palico. In a decision dated
believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must February 22, 1958, the Court of Agrarian Relations declared it has no
invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing." jurisdiction over the case, inasmuch as Guevarra is not a tenant on the
said parcel of land. An appeal was taken by Guevarra to the Supreme
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the instant petition. The decision of the Court of Court, but the appeal was dismissed in a resolution dated April 10, 1958.
Appeals dated July 24,1986 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
On May 17, 1958, Roxas y Cia. filed an action against Marcelino
SO ORDERED. Guevarra in the justice of the peace court of Nasugbu, Batangas, for
forcible entry, praying therein that Guevarra be ejected from the premises
of Lot No. 105-A. After due hearing, the said Court in a decision dated
G.R. No. L-28716 November 18, 1970 May 2, 1959 ordered Guevarra to vacate the lot and to pay damages and
accrued rentals. A writ of execution was issued by Justice of the Peace
FELIX CAISIP, IGNACIO ROJALES and FEDERICO VILLADELREY, petitioners, Rodolfo A. Castillo of Nasugbu, which was served on Guevarra on June
vs. 6, 1959, and the return of which was made by Deputy Sheriff Leonardo R.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Aquino of this Court on June 23, 1959 (Exhibit "10"). The writ recites
among other things that the possession of the land was delivered to the
Godofredo F. Trajano and Rafael A. Francisco for petitioners. Roxas y Cia. thru Felix Caisip, the overseer, and Guevarra was given
twenty days from June 6, 1959 within which to leave the premises.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G.
Ibarra and Solicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco for respondents. The record before Us does not explain why said decision was executed. According to the
complainant, her husband's counsel had appealed from said decision. The justice of the
peace who rendered it, Hon. Rodolfo Castillo, said that there really had been an attempt to
appeal, which was not given due course because the reglementary period therefor had
expired; that a motion to reconsider his order to this effect was denied by him; and that a
CONCEPCION, C.J.: second motion for reconsideration was "still pending consideration," and it was October 19,
1959 when such testimony was given.
This case is before Us upon petition of defendants Felix Caisip, Ignacio Rojales and
Federico Villadelrey, for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals which Continuing the narration of the antecedent facts, His Honor, the Trial Judge, added:
affirmed that of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, convicting them of the crime of
Grave Coercion, with which they are charged, and sentencing each to four (4) months and On June 15, 1959, some trouble occurred between the complainant and
one (1) day of arresto mayor  and to pay a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in Caisip regarding the cutting of sugar cane on Lot 105-A. The following
case of insolvency, not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty, as well as one-third of day June 16, 1959, the complainant allegedly again entered the premises
the costs. of Lot 105-A and refused to be driven out by Felix Caisip. Due to the
aforementioned incidents, Gloria Cabalag was charged in the justice of
As set forth in the trial court's decision, the background of the present case is this: the peace court of Nasugbu, Batangas, with grave coercion for the
 incident of June 15, 1959, docketed in the said court as Criminal Case turned her over to the policeman on duty, and then departed. After being interrogated by the
No. 968 (Exhibit "3"); and with the crime of unjust vexation for the incident chief of police, Gloria was, upon representations made by Zoilo Rivera, released and
of June 16, 1959, docketed in the said court as Criminal Case No. 970. allowed to go home.
Both cases, however, were filed only on June 25, 1959.
The foregoing is the prosecution's version. That of the defense is to the effect that, upon
In other words, these criminal cases, Nos. 968 and 970, against Gloria Cabalag, were filed being asked by the policemen to stop weeding and leave the premises, Gloria, not only
eight (8) days after the incident involved in the case at bar. It is, also, noteworthy that both refused to do so, but, also, insulted them, as well as Caisip. According to the defense, she
cases were — on motion of the prosecution, filed after a reinvestigation thereof — was arrested because of the crime of slander then committed by her. Appellants Rojales
provisionally dismissed, on November 8, 1960, by the Court of First Instance of Batangas, and Villadelrey, moreover, testified that, as they were heading towards the barrio of
upon the ground "that the evidence of record ... are insufficient to prove the guilt of the Camachilihan, Gloria proceeded to tear her clothes.
accused beyond reasonable doubt." The decision of said court, in the case at bar, goes on
to say: His Honor, the Trial Judge, accepted, however, the version of the prosecution and found
that of the defense unworthy of credence. The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which
It further appears that due to the tenacious attitude of Gloria Cabalag to fully concurred in this view, are "final," and our authority to review on certiorari  its appealed
remain in the premises, Caisip sought the help of the chief of police of decision is limited to questions purely of law.4 Appellants maintain that the Court of Appeals
Nasugbu who advised him to see Deputy Sheriff Aquino about the matter. has erred: (1) in not finding their acts "justified under Article 429 of the New Civil Code"; (2)
The latter, however, informed Caisip that he could not act on the request in holding that the 20-day period of grace given to Marcelino Guevarra and his wife, Gloria
to eject Gloria Cabalag and to stop her from what she was doing without a Cabalag, by the sheriff, to vacate Lot 105-A, was valid and lawful; (3) in finding that the
proper court order. Caisip then consulted Antonio Chuidian, the hacienda elements of the crime of grave coercion are present in the case at bar; and (4) in finding
administrator, who, in turn, went to the chief of police and requested for appellants guilty as charged. This pretense is clearly untenable.
the detail of policemen in sitio Bote-bote. The chief of police, acting on
said request, assigned the accused Ignacio Rojales and Federico Art. 429 of our Civil Code, reading:
Villadelrey, police sergeant and police corporal, respectively, of the
Nasugbu Police Force, to sitio Bote-bote.1
The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he
On June 17, 1959, at about 5:00 p.m., Gloria Cabalag was seen weeding the portion of Lot may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent
105-A which was a ricefield. Appellant Caisip approached her and bade her to leave, but an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his
she refused to do so, alleging that she and her husband had the right to stay there and that property.
the crops thereon belong to them. She having stuck to this attitude, even when he
threatened to call the police, Caisip went to his co-defendants, Sgt. Rojales and Cpl.
Villadelrey, both of the local police, who were some distance away, and brought them with upon which appellants rely is obviously inapplicable to the case at bar,
him. Rojales told Gloria, who was then in a squatting position, to stop weeding. As Gloria for, having been given 20 days from June 6, 1959, within which to vacate
insisted on her right to stay in said lot, Rojales grabbed her right hand and, twisting the Lot 105-A, complainant did not, on June 17, 1959 — or within said period
same, wrested therefrom the trowel she was holding. Thereupon, Villadelrey held her left — invade  or usurp said lot. She had merely remained  in possession
hand and, together with Rojales, forcibly dragged her northward — towards a forested area, thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have become its co-
where there was a banana plantation — as Caisip stood nearby, with a drawn gun. possessor. Appellants did not "repel  or prevent in actual or threatened  ...
physical invasion or usurpation." They expelled  Gloria from a property of
which she and her husband were in possession even  before the action for
Inasmuch as Gloria shouted "Ina ko po! Ina ko po!"2her neighbors, Librada Dulutan, forcible entry was filed against them on May 17, 1958, despite the fact
followed, soon later, by Francisca Andino, came and asked the policemen why they were that the Sheriff had explicitly authorized them to stay in said property up
dragging her. The policemen having answered that they would take Gloria to town which to June 26, 1959, and had expressed the view that he could not oust
was on the west — Francisca Andino pleaded that Gloria be released, saying that, if their them therefrom on June 17, 1959, without a judicial order therefor.
purpose was as stated by them, she (Gloria) would willingly go with them. By this time,
Gloria had already been dragged about eight meters and her dress, as well as her
blouse3 were torn. She then agreed to proceed westward to the municipal building, and It is urged, that, by weeding and refusing to leave Lot 105-A, Gloria had committed a crime
asked to be allowed to pass by her house, within Lot 105-A, in order to breast-feed her in the presence of the policemen, despite the aforementioned 20-day period, which,
nursing infant, but, the request was turned down. As they passed, soon later, near the appellants claim, the sheriff had no authority to grant. This contention is manifestly
house of Zoilo Rivera, head of the tenant organization to which she was affiliated, in the untenable, because: (1) said period was granted in the presence of the hacienda owner's
barrio of Camachilihan, Gloria called out for him, whereupon, he went down the house and representative, appellant Caisip, who, by not objecting thereto, had impliedly consented to
accompanied them to the municipal building. Upon arrival thereat, Rojales and Villadelrey or ratified the act performed by the sheriff; (2) Gloria and her husband were thereby allowed
to remain, and had, in fact, remained, in possession of the premises, perhaps together with penalty of imprisonment meted out to appellants herein, which is the minimum of the
the owner of the hacienda or his representative, Caisip; (3) the act of removing weeds from maximum prescribed in said Art. 286, 12 and the fine imposed upon them, are in accordance
the ricefield was beneficial  to its owner and to whomsoever the crops belonged, and, even if with law.
they had not authorized it, does not constitute a criminal offense; and (4) although Gloria
and her husband had been sentenced to vacate the land, the judgment against them did not WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
necessarily imply that they, as the parties who had tilled it and planted thereon, had no defendants-appellants. It is so ordered.
rights, of any kind whatsoever, in or to the standing crops, inasmuch as "necessary
expenses shall be refunded to every possessor,"5 and the cost of cultivation, production and
upkeep has been held to partake of the nature of necessary expenses.6 [G.R. NO. 192999 - July 18, 2012]

It is, accordingly, clear that appellants herein had, by means of violence, and without legal DIAMOND FARMS, INC., Petitioner, v. DIAMOND FARM WORKERS MULTI-
authority therefor, prevented the complainant from "doing something not prohibited by law," PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, ELlSEO EMANEL, VOLTAIRE LOPEZ, RUEL
(weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her "to do something against" her will ROMERO, PATRICIO CAPRICIO, ERNESTO FATALLO, ZOSIMO GOMEZ
(stopping the weeding and leaving said lot), "whether it be right or wrong," thereby taking AND 100 JOHN DOES, Respondents.
the law into their hands, in violation of Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code.7
DECISION
Appellant Caisip argues that, not having used violence against the complaining witness, he
should be acquitted of the charge. In this connection, His Honor, the Trial Judge, correctly
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
observed:

Petitioner Diamond Farms, Inc. appeals the Decision1 dated December 17, 2009
... While it is true that the accused Caisip did not lay hands on the
complainant, unlike the accused Rojales and Villadelrey who were the and Resolution 2 dated July 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
ones who used force against Gloria, and while the Court is also inclined to No. 101384.
discredit the claim of the complainant that Felix Caisip drew a gun during
the incident, it sufficiently appears from the record that the motivation and The facts of the case are as follows:ςrαlαω
inducement for the coercion perpetrated on the complainant came from
the accused Caisip. It was his undisguised and particular purpose to
Petitioner is a corporation engaged m commercial farming of bananas.3 It owned
prevent Gloria from entering the land and working on the same. He was
1,023.8574 hectares of land in Carmen, Davao. A big portion of this land
the one who first approached Gloria with this objective in mind, and tried
to prevent her from weeding the land. He had tried to stop Gloria from measuring 958.8574 hectares (958-hectare land) was initially deferred for
doing the same act even the day previous to the present incident. It was acquisition and distribution under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
Caisip who fetched the policemen in order to accomplish his purpose of (CARP).4 On November 3, 1992, Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao of the Department
preventing Gloria from weeding the land and making her leave the of Agrarian Reform (DAR) likewise approved the Production and Profit Sharing
premises. The policemen obeyed his bidding, and even when the said (PPS) Scheme proposed by the Philippine Banana Growers and Exporters
policemen were already over-asserting their authority as peace officers, Association as the mode of compliance with the required production sharing
Caisip simply stood by without attempting to stop their abuses. He could under Section 32 of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as
be hardly said to have disapproved an act which he himself induced and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).5Ï‚rνll
initiated.8
Later, on February 14, 1995, the Deferment Order was lifted and the aforesaid
In other words, there was community of purpose between the policemen and Caisip, so that 958-hectare land was placed under CARP coverage. Thereafter, 698.8897
the latter is guilty of grave coercion, as a co-conspirator, apart from being a principal by hectares of the 958-hectare land were awarded to members of the Diamond
induction.9 Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative (DARBMUPCO).
Petitioner, however, maintained management and control of 277.44 hectares of
In the commission of the offense, the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior land, including a portion measuring 109.625 hectares (109-hectare land).
strength 10 and disregard of the respect due the offended party, by reason of her
sex, 11 were present, insofar as the three appellants herein are concerned. As regards On November 23, 1999, petitioner s certificates of title over the 109-hectare
appellants Rojales and Villadelrey, there was the additional aggravating circumstance of
land were cancelled. In lieu thereof, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-
having taken advantage of their positions as members of the local police force. Hence, the
154155 to T-154160 were issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
On August 5, 2000, the DAR identified 278 CARP beneficiaries of the 109- occupy only the pumping structure. Thereafter, petitioner stopped farm
hectare land, majority of whom are members of respondent Diamond Farm operation on the 74-hectare land and refused their request to resume farm
Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative (DFWMPC). On October 26, 2000, the DAR operation. By way of relief, respondents prayed that their rights as CARP
issued six Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) collectively in favor of beneficiaries of the 109-hectare land be recognized and that their counterclaims
the 278 CARP beneficiaries.6ςrνll for production share, profit share, accrued income and interest be granted.

Subsequently, on July 2, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint7 for unlawful Petitioner filed a reply9 and alleged that respondents initiated the commission of
occupation, damages and attorney s fees against respondents. Petitioner alleged premature and unlawful entry into the 35-hectare land and did nothing to curb
that as of November 1995, it was the holder of TCT Nos. 112068 and 112073 the unlawful entry of other parties. Petitioner also admitted that respondents
covering two parcels of land within the 109-hectare land. It alleged that it had recently allowed it to harvest and perform essential farm operations.
been in possession for a long time of the two lands, which had a total area of
74.3393 hectares (74-hectare land), and grew thereon export-quality banana, In their rejoinder,10 respondents denied that they illegally entered the 35-
producing on average 11,000 boxes per week worth P1.46 million. It alleged hectare land. They averred that petitioner promoted the entry of third parties
that the DAR s August 5, 2000 and cited petitioner s agreements with third parties for the harvest of fruits
thereon.
Order distributing the 109-hectare land to 278 CARP beneficiaries was not yet
final on account of appeals, and therefore petitioner remains the lawful During the proceedings before the Office of the Regional Adjudicator, petitioner
possessor of the subject land (109-hectare land) and owner of the submitted its computation of respondents production and profit share from the
improvements thereon. But while the CARP beneficiaries have not been finally 109-hectare land for the years 1995 to 1999 and accordingly deposited the
designated and installed, respondents its farm workers refused to do their work amount of P2.51 million. Respondents were required to submit a project of
from June 10, 2002, forcibly entered and occupied the 74-hectare land, and distribution, and the parties were ordered to submit position papers. Upon
prevented petitioner from harvesting and introducing agricultural inputs. Thus, compliance by respondents with the order to submit a project of distribution, the
petitioner prayed that respondents be ordered to vacate the subject land; that it Office of the Regional Adjudicator ordered the release of the amount deposited
be allowed to harvest on the 74-hectare land; and that respondents be ordered by petitioner to respondents.11 Respondents thereafter submitted their position
to pay it lost income of P1.46 million per week from June 10, 2002 until farm paper,12 wherein they reiterated that they had to guard the land to protect their
operation normalizes, exemplary damages of P200,000, attorney s fees of rights. They confirmed petitioner s acceptance of their request to resume
P200,000, appearance fees, incidental expenses of P100,000 and costs. normal farm operation, and manifested that a precarious peace and harmony
thereafter reigned on the 109-hectare land. They also repeated their prayers in
In their answer with compulsory counterclaim,8 respondents admitted that their answer. Petitioner, on the other hand, failed to file its position paper
petitioner was the holder of TCT Nos. 112068 and 112073, covering the 74- despite several requests for extension of time to file the same.13ςrνll
hectare land and that the said land produces 11,000 boxes of export-quality
bananas per week. Respondents added that besides the 74-hectare land, In his Decision,14 the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator ruled that petitioner
petitioner owned four other parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 112058, lost its ownership of the subject land when the government acquired it and
112059, 112062 and 112063 having a total area of 35.2857 hectares (35- CLOAs were issued in favor of the 278 CARP beneficiaries. The appeals from the
hectare land). These six parcels, which altogether have a total area of 109.625 Distribution Order will not alter the fact that petitioner is no longer the owner of
hectares (109-hectare land), were acquired by the government upon the the subject land. Also, respondents have been identified as CARP beneficiaries;
issuance of TCTs in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. But even after hence, they are not unlawfully occupying the land. The Adjudicator added that
CLOAs were issued to the 278 CARP beneficiaries, petitioner continued to petitioner is unlawfully occupying the land since it has no contract with the CARP
manage the 109-hectare land, paying wages to respondents as farm workers. beneficiaries. Thus, the Adjudicator denied petitioner s prayers in its complaint
Since 1995 they had been demanding from petitioner payment of their and granted respondents counterclaims.
production share to no avail.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the DARAB, but the DARAB denied petitioner s
Respondents further claimed that petitioner conspired with 67 CARP appeal in a Decision15 dated December 11, 2006. The DARAB ruled that
beneficiaries to occupy and cultivate the 35-hectare land. Petitioner tried to petitioner is unlawfully occupying the subject land; hence, its complaint against
allow alleged beneficiaries to occupy portions of the 74-hectare land, but respondents for unlawful occupation lacks merit. It also ruled that petitioner is
respondents guarded it to protect their own rights, so the intruders were able to no longer entitled to possess the subject land; that petitioner lost its ownership
thereof; that ownership was transferred to the 278 CARP beneficiaries; that the 4. ENCOURAGING the parties to enter into an agribusiness venture over the
appeals from the Distribution Order concern distribution and will not restore subject landholding, if feasible.
petitioner s ownership; that the 278 CARP beneficiaries can now exercise their
rights of ownership and possession; and that petitioner should have delivered chanrobles virtual law library
possession of the 109-hectare land to the CARP beneficiaries on August 5, 2000
instead of remaining in possession and in control of farm operations.
SO ORDERED.16ςrνll

In awarding production and profit share, the DARAB held that Section 32 of the
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner appealed to the CA
CARL requires petitioner to distribute said share to respondents. The DARAB
raising the following arguments: (1) respondents are not the lawful possessors
computed the production and profit share based on the PPS Scheme proposed
of the subject land as well as the valuable improvements thereon, prior to
by the Philippine Banana Growers and
receipt by petitioner of the corresponding payment for the land from the
government, or upon deposit in favor of petitioner of the compensation for the
Exporters Association and approved by DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao. The same in cash or in Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) bonds; (2) not being
dispositive portion of the DARAB s December 11, 2006 Decision reads:Ï‚rαlÎ±Ï lawful possessors of the subject land, respondents are not entitled to production
‰ share in the amount of P25.04 million and interest thereon in the amount of
P6.21 million; and (3) not being lawful possessors of the subject land,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of respondents are not entitled to lease rentals as well as accrued interest
merit. thereon.17ςrνll

The assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:ςηαñrοblεš As afore-stated, the CA in the assailed Decision affirmed the DARAB decision.
νιr†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ The CA, however, deleted the award of lease rentals and interest thereon, to
wit:ςrαlαω
1. DENYING the reliefs prayed for in the complaint;
WHEREFORE, the assailed December 11, 2006 Decision and August 29, 2007
2. ORDERING the [petitioner] to turn over to the respondents the possession of Resolution are MODIFIED to delete the DARAB s award of lease rentals and
the subject landholding and respect the respondents peaceful possession interests thereon in favor of respondents. The rest is AFFIRMED in toto.
thereof;
SO ORDERED.18ςrνll
3. ORDERING the [petitioner] to pay the respondents the following
amount:ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ The CA agreed with the DARAB in rejecting petitioner s bare and belated
allegation that it has not received just compensation. The alleged nonpayment
A. P27,553,703.25 less P2,511,786.00 as Production and Profit Share (PPS) of just compensation is also a collateral attack against the TCTs issued in the
from 15 February 1995 to 31 December 2005; name of the Republic of the Philippines. The CA found that petitioner has never
sought the nullification of the Republic s TCTs. Further, the CA found no credible
evidence relating to proceedings for payment of just compensation. The CA held
b. P17,796,473.43 as lease rental for the use of the land of petitioner from 26
that the issuance of the Republic s TCTs and CLOAs in favor of the 278 CARP
October 2000 up to 31 December 2005;
beneficiaries implies the deposit in cash or LBP bonds of the amount initially
determined as compensation for petitioner s land or the actual payment of just
c. P6,205,011.89 as accrued interest on the unpaid PPS from 01 March 1996 to compensation due to petitioner. Additionally, the appeals over the Distribution
01 March 2006; and d. P2,241,930.90 as accrued interest on the unpaid lease Order cannot justify petitioner s continued possession since the appeals concern
rental from 01 January 2001 to 01 January 2006. only the manner of distribution.

chanrobles virtual law library The CA held that petitioner became liable for respondents production share
when the Deferment Order was lifted. The CA noted that the DARAB computed
the production share based on the approved PPS Scheme. The CA also noted
petitioner s deposit of P2.51 million as petitioner s recognition of respondents of the subject land and the valuable improvements thereon, citing Section 16
right to production share. (e) of the CARL. According to petitioner, "it has yet to receive any compensation
for the lands acquired by the government."21 Petitioner also contends that the
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration contending that CA erred in ruling that the issue of nonpayment of just compensation was raised
the CA erred when it affirmed the DARAB in ordering petitioner to (1) turn over only at the DARAB level, such being an unavoidable issue intertwined with its
possession of the subject land to respondents and respect their possession cause of action. Petitioner further avers that the CA erred in ruling that
thereof and (2) pay respondents production and profit share of P25.04 million petitioner s assertion of its constitutional right to just compensation is a
and interest of P6.21 million.19 The CA, however, denied petitioner s motion for collateral attack on the TCTs of the Republic of the Philippines. Petitioner
partial reconsideration. maintains that the Republic s TCTs which are derived from its TCTs pursuant to
the CARL are neither attacked nor assailed in this case. Petitioner thus prays
that it be declared as the lawful owner and possessor of the subject land until its
Hence, petitioner filed the present appeal. Respondents, on the other hand, no
actual receipt of just compensation.
longer appealed the CA Decision and Resolution.

In their comment, respondents claim that petitioner is just trying to mislead this
In its petition, petitioner argues thatςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω
Court that it has not been paid compensation for its property. Respondents cite
lιbrαrÿ
two Certifications22 of Deposit (CARP Form No. 17) showing that the LBP
deposited P9.92 million in cash and agrarian reform bonds as compensation for
I. 91.3925 hectares of land and another 18.2325 hectares of land, or for 109.625
hectares of land (109-hectare land), owned by petitioner and covered by TCT
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN COMPLETE Nos. T-112058, 112059, 112062, 112063, 112068, and 112073. Respondents
DEROGATION OF THE PETITIONER S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO RECEIVE also cite a DAR Memorandum23 dated November 22, 1999 (CARP Form No. 18)
JUST COMPENSATION FOR THE TAKING OF ITS PROPERTY, COMMITTED A requesting the Register of Deeds to issue TCTs in the name of the Republic of
SERIOUS the Philippines. Respondents then summarized the consequent cancellations of
the TCTs by attaching certified true copies of:
ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE PORTION OF THE DECISION OF THE
DARAB BASED ON ITS REASONING THAT THE ISSUE OF NON-PAYMENT OF JUST x    x    x
COMPENSATION TO THE PETITIONER IS AN ISSUE RAISED ONLY AT THE DARAB
LEVEL; THIS RULING IS SIMPLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND PERTINENT 4. [TCT Nos.] T-112058, T-112059, T-112062, T-112063, T-112073 and T-
JURISPRUDENCE 112068 of petitioner which show that LBP Certificates of Deposit and DAR
Memorandum-Request were duly annotated at the back thereof, and that the
II. same were cancelled on 23 November 1999 upon issuance of TCTs in favor [of]
the Republic of the Philippines;
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CONSIDERING THE PETITIONER S ASSERTION OF 5. [TCT Nos.] T-154159, T-154160, T-154157, T-154156, T-154155 issued in
ITS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO JUST COMPENSATION AS A COLLATERAL favor of the Republic of the Philippines showing that the same were cancelled on
ATTACK ON THE REPUBLIC S TITLE20ςrνll 30 October 2000 upon issuance of TCT[s] in favor of herein respondents;

Essentially, the issues for our resolution are: (1) whether respondents are guilty 6. [TCT Nos.] C-14005, C-14006, C-15311, C-15526, C-15527, C-14007, C-
of unlawful occupation and liable to petitioner for damages and attorney s fees, 14004 issued infavor of herein respondents showing THAT THE FARM/HOMELOT
(2) whether petitioner should turn over possession of the subject land to DESCRIBED IN THIS CERTIFICATE OF LANDOWNERSHIP AWARD IS
respondents and respect their possession thereof, and (3) whether the award of ENCUMBERED IN FAVOR OF THE LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES TO SECURE
production share and interest was proper. FULL PAYMENT OF ITS VALUE UNDER [THE CARL] BY THE FARMER-
BENEFICIARY NAMED HEREIN, and that the same were already cancelled on
Petitioner insists that prior to its receipt of the corresponding payment for the April 30, 2009 upon issuance of TCTs in favor of herein respondent cooperative
land from the government or deposit in its favor of the compensation for the now Davao Farms Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative
land in cash or in LBP bonds, respondents cannot be deemed lawful possessors DFARBEMPCO.24ςrνll
chanrobles virtual law library ART. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use
In its reply, petitioner states that to "set the record straight, the documents such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
presented by respondents refer to the deposit of the initial valuation of the land" threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
as determined by the LBP. This is not the just compensation for the land which
is required to be determined by a court of justice.25 According to petitioner, Being legitimate possessors of the land and having exercised lawful means to
Sections 56 and 57 of the CARL provides that the Regional Trial Court (RTC), protect their possession, respondents were not guilty of unlawful occupation.
acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), has the original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to As to the immediate resumption of farm operations, petitioner admitted that
landowners. Petitioner also states that the issue of just compensation may be respondents have already allowed it to harvest and perform essential activities.
easily gleaned at least from the submissions of the parties in their pleadings and Respondents have confirmed that petitioner accepted their request to resume
one that had therefore been tried under the parties implicit agreement. We find normal farm operations such that a precarious peace and harmony reigned on
petitioner s contentions bereft of merit. On the first issue, we agree that the 109-hectare land. That farm operations resumed is evident from petitioner s
respondents are not guilty of unlawful occupation and that there exists no basis claim of lost income amounting to P1.46 million a week for four weeks, from
to award damages and attorney s fees to petitioner as respondents are agrarian June 10, 2002 to July 7, 2002.26 Due to the parties quick and voluntary
reform beneficiaries who have been identified as such, and in whose favor agreement, farm operation and the parties relationship normalized within five
CLOAs have been issued. We thus uphold the ruling denying petitioner s prayers days from the filing of the complaint on July 2, 2002. We thus agree that
in its complaint for unlawful occupation, damages and attorney s fees. However, petitioner must respect respondents possession.
we note significant facts which dispute some findings of the Adjudicator, DARAB
and CA, and make the necessary clarification or correction as appropriate.
However, we disagree with the finding of the Adjudicator and DARAB that
petitioner is guilty of unlawful occupation. Since respondents themselves have
It is beyond doubt that petitioner is the farm operator and manager while asked petitioner to resume its farm operation, petitioner s possession cannot be
respondents are the farm workers. Both parties enjoyed possession of the land. said to be illegal and unjustified.
Together, they worked thereon. Before CARP, petitioner was the landowner,
farm operator and manager. Respondents are its farm workers. After the
This notwithstanding, we sustain the order for petitioner to turn over possession
deferment period, CARP finally dawned. Petitioner lost its status as landowner,
of the 109-hectare land. The DARAB and the DAR shall ensure that possession
but not as farm operator and manager. Respondents remained as petitioner s
of the land is turned over to qualified CARP beneficiaries.
farm workers and received wages from petitioner.

The procedure for acquisition of private lands under Section 16 (e) of the CARL
Now, the unrebutted claim of respondents in their answer and position paper is
is that upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case
that they guarded the 74-hectare land to protect their rights as farm workers
of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon deposit with an accessible
and CARP beneficiaries. They were compelled to do so when petitioner
bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds, the
attempted to install other workers thereon, after it conspired with 67 CARP
DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and request the proper
beneficiaries to occupy the 35-hectare land. They were fairly successful since
Register of Deeds to issue a TCT in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
the intruders were able to occupy the pumping structure. The government,
Thereafter, the DAR shall proceed with the redistribution of the land to the
including this Court, cannot condone petitioner s act to thwart the CARP s
qualified beneficiaries, to wit:ςrαlαω
implementation. Installing workers on a CARP-covered land when the DAR has
already identified the CARP beneficiaries of the land and has already ordered the
distribution of the land to them serves no other purpose than to create an SEC. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. For purposes of acquisition
impermissible roadblock to installing the legitimate beneficiaries on the land. of private lands, the following procedures shall be followed:ςrαlαω

We also find the action taken by respondents to guard the land as reasonable xxxx
and necessary to protect their legitimate possession and prevent precisely what
petitioner attempted to do. Such course was justified under Article 429 of (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or in case of
the Civil Code which reads:Ï‚rαlαω rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an
accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of We, however, agree that petitioner must now turn over possession of the 109-
the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer hectare land.
Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR
shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified The matter has already been settled in Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated, etc. v.
beneficiaries. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, et al.,29 when we ruled that the
Constitution and the CARL intended the farmers, individually or collectively, to
x    x    x have control over agricultural lands, otherwise all rhetoric about agrarian reform
will be for naught. We stressed that under Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987
Petitioner eventually acknowledged that there was indeed a deposit of the initial Constitution and Section 2 of the CARL, the agrarian reform program is founded
valuation of the land. There were two deposits of cash and agrarian reform on the right of farmers and regular farm workers who are landless to own
bonds as compensation for the 109-hectare land owned by petitioner and directly or collectively the lands they till. The policy on agrarian reform is that
covered by TCT Nos. T-112058, 112059, 112062, 112063, 112068 and 112073. control over the agricultural land must always be in the hands of the farmers.
Notably, petitioner also manifested that the Republic s TCTs which are derived
from its TCTs pursuant to the CARL are neither attacked nor assailed in this Under Section 16 (e) of the CARL, the DAR is mandated to proceed with the
case. Petitioner even argued that the transfer of possession and ownership of redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries after taking possession of
the land to the government is conditioned upon the receipt by the landowner of the land and requesting the proper Register of Deeds to issue a TCT in the name
the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an of the Republic of the Philippines. Section 24 of the CARL is yet another
accessible bank.27 Following petitioner s own reasoning, petitioner has already mandate to complete the award of the land to the beneficiary within 180 days
lost its possession and ownership when the condition was fulfilled. Likewise from the time the DAR takes actual possession of the land.30 And under Section
undisputed is that in 2000, CLOAs had been issued collectively in favor of the 20 of DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1998, also known as the Rules
278 CARP beneficiaries of the 109-hectare land. These CLOAs constitute and Regulations on the Acquisition, Valuation, Compensation and Distribution of
evidence of ownership by the beneficiaries under the then provisions of Section Deferred Commercial Farms, CLOAs shall be registered immediately upon
2428 of the CARL, to wit:Ï‚rαlαω generation, and the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) shall install or
cause the installation of the beneficiaries in the commercial farm within seven
SEC. 24. Award to Beneficiaries. The rights and responsibilities of the days from registration of the CLOA. Section 20 of the Rules provides:Ï‚rαlαÏ
beneficiary shall commence from the time the DAR makes an award of the land ‰
to him, which award shall be completed within one hundred eighty (180) days
from the time the DAR takes actual possession of the land. Ownership of the SEC. 20. Registration of CLOAs and Installation of Beneficiaries CLOAs shall be
beneficiary shall be evidenced by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award, x x x. registered immediately upon generation. The PARO shall install or cause the
(Underscoring ours.) installation of the beneficiaries in the commercial farm within seven (7) days
from registration of the CLOA.
In the light of the foregoing, this Court cannot grant petitioner s plea that it be
declared as the lawful owner of the 109-hectare land. It is also to be noted that We hold that the 109-hectare land must be distributed to qualified CARP
in its complaint, petitioner did not even claim ownership of the 109-hectare beneficiaries. They must be installed on the land and have possession and
land. Petitioner could only state that as of November 1995, it was the holder of control thereof.
the TCTs covering the 74-hectare land and that pending resolution of the
appeals from the distribution orders, it remains in the meantime as the lawful A problem that emerged in this case is the identification of qualified CARP
possessor of the 109-hectare land. Nothing therefore supports petitioner s claim beneficiaries. Respondents own evidence does not definitively show who are the
that it is the lawful owner of the 109-hectare land. legitimate CARP beneficiaries in the 109-hectare land. TCT Nos. 112058,
112059, 112062, 112063, 112068, and 112073, issued in the name of
To reiterate, petitioner had lost its ownership of the 109-hectare land and petitioner, were cancelled by TCT Nos. 154155 to 154160 issued in the name of
ownership thereof had been transferred to the CARP beneficiaries. Respondents the Republic of the Philippines. The Republic s TCTs were cancelled by TCT Nos.
themselves have requested petitioner to resume its farm operations and this C-14002 to C-14007.31 Notably, TCT Nos. C-14004,32 C-14006,33 and C-
fact has given petitioner a temporary right to enjoy possession of the land as 1400734 show that they were respectively cancelled by TCT Nos. C-27342, C-
farm operator and manager. 27344, and C-27345, all in favor of DFARBEMPCO. It must be verified however if
DFARBEMPCO is the legitimate successor of DFWMPC, herein respondent
cooperative. As regards TCT No. C-14005,35 there was a partial cancellation by Sections 56 and 57 of the CARL likewise provides that the RTC, acting as SAC,
TCT No. C-27110 in favor of DARBMUPCO and total cancellation by TCT No. C- has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of
27343 in favor of DFARBEMPCO. Nothing is shown about TCT Nos. C-14002 to just compensation to landowners, to wit:ςrαlαω
C-14003.
SEC. 56. Special Agrarian Court. - The Supreme Court shall designate at least
Neither can TCT Nos. C-15311,36 C-15526,37 and C-1552738 provide clarity. one (1) branch of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) within each province to act as a
These TCTs cited by respondents contain entries of partial or total cancellation Special Agrarian Court.
by TCT Nos. C-27346, C-27115 and C-27114, in favor of DFARBEMPCO or
DARBMUPCO. The areas covered by TCT Nos. C-15311, C-15526, and C-15527 x    x    x
also appear to be different than those covered by the cancelled TCTs in the
name of petitioner and the Republic of the Philippines. Hence, it is imperative
SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and
that the DAR and PARO assist the DARAB so that the 109-hectare land may be
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
properly turned over to qualified CARP beneficiaries, whether individuals or
compensation to landowners, x x x.
cooperatives. Needless to stress, the DAR and PARO have been given the
mandate to distribute the land to qualified beneficiaries and to install them
thereon. We said that the DAR s land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any
means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an
original action with the RTC acting as SAC to determine just compensation. The
To fully address petitioner s allegations, we move on to its claim that the issue
court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of
of just compensation is an issue that may easily be gleaned at least from the
what is admittedly a judicial function.43ςrνll
submissions of the parties in their pleadings and one that had therefore been
tried under the parties implicit agreement.
This case however was not brought before the SAC on determination of just
compensation. No reversible error was therefore committed by the CA when it
Petitioner s claim is unfounded. Even the instant appeal  is silent on the factors
39
did not rule on just compensation.
to be considered40 in determining just compensation. These factors are
enumerated in Section 1741 of the CARL which reads:Ï‚rαlαω
On the third issue, petitioner contends that respondents are not entitled to
production share as well as interest since they are not lawful possessors of the
SECTION 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just
subject land. Petitioner asserts that the 3% production share under Section 32
compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like
of the CARL may only be given if there are sales from the production of the
properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner,
land. Petitioner however claims that it has incurred losses and that respondents
the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall
admitted that farm operations in the subject land have not normalized.
be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and
Petitioner thus submits that there is no factual basis in the production share
the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the
from the sale of agricultural products in the subject land.
nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing
institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine
its valuation. The contention has no merit.

What petitioner stressed before us and before the CA to assail respondents We have already ruled that respondents possession is legitimate. On petitioner s
possession is its less-than-candid claim that it has yet to receive any claim that it incurred losses, Section 32 of the CARL clearly states that the 3%
compensation for the lands acquired by the government.42 Petitioner s cause of production share of the farm workers is based on "gross sales from the
action in its complaint for unlawful occupation with prayer that respondents be production of such lands," to wit:ςrαlαω
ordered to vacate and pay damages and attorney s fees cannot also be
mistaken as one for determination of just compensation. Thus, just SEC. 32. Production-Sharing. Pending final land transfer, individuals or entities
compensation was never an issue in this case. owning, or operating under lease or management contract, agricultural lands
are hereby mandated to execute a production-sharing plan with their
farmworkers or farmworkers organization, if any, whereby three percent (3%)
of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed within sixty
(60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other ABAD, J.:
farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently
receive: Provided, That these individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess This case is about a husband’s sale of conjugal real property, employing a challenged
of five million pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper application, affidavit of consent from an estranged wife. The buyers claim valid consent, loss of right to
determines a lower ceiling. (Underscoring ours.) declare nullity of sale, and prescription.

Petitioner cites its net losses, computed after deductions were made on the The Facts and the Case
amount of its sales. These losses however, have no bearing in computing the
production share which is based on gross sales. And petitioner s own allegation Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar, Zamboanga City. On
of weekly production worth P1.46 million the same amount used by petitioner as October 11, 1982 she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of
basis of its claim for damages debunks its claim that no basis exists that there absolute sale.1 But Tarciano did not for the meantime have the registered title transferred to
were sales from agricultural products of the subject land. Likewise supporting his name.
the existence of sales is petitioner s own computation of respondents production
share and its deposit of the amount of P2.51 million before the Office of the Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia
Regional Adjudicator. It must be noted also that farm operations normalized Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They arranged to meet at the office of Atty. Romulo D.
within five days from the filing of the complaint. Plagata whom they asked to prepare the documents of sale. They later signed an
agreement to sell that Atty. Plagata prepared2 dated April 29, 1988, which agreement
In sum, petitioner failed to show any reversible error committed by the CA in expressly stated that it was to take effect in six months.
affirming the DARAB s computation of respondents production share based on
the approved PPS Scheme. Notably, petitioner has admitted the fact of approval The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down payment of
of the PPS Scheme.44Ï‚rνll ₱60,000.00 for the transfer of the lot’s title to him. And, within six months, Tarciano was to
clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife,
Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale. Upon Tarciano’s compliance with these
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit and AFFIRM the Decision
conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take possession of the lot and pay him an
dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution dated July 15, 2010 of the Court of
additional ₱140,000.00 or ₱160,000.00, depending on whether or not he succeeded in
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101384. demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these
conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the lot without any further
We also DIRECT the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Provincial Agrarian formality and payment.
Reform Officer to assist the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
in the distribution of the I 09-hectare land to the qualified agrarian reform The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on the other
beneficiaries, whether individuals or cooperatives. requirements of the sale. According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one of his trips
to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent.3 As soon as Tarciano met the other
Let a copy of this Decision be served upon the Department of Agrarian Reform. conditions, Atty. Plagata notarized Rosario’s affidavit in Zamboanga City. On January 11,
1989 Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale4 in favor of the Fuentes spouses. They
then paid him the additional ₱140,000.00 mentioned in their agreement. A new title was
With costs against the petitioner. issued in the name of the spouses5 who immediately constructed a building on the lot. On
January 28, 1990 Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died nine
SO ORDERED. months afterwards.

G.R. No. 178902               April 21, 2010 Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents
Conrado G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, and Rose Marie R. Cristobal, together with
MANUEL O. FUENTES and LETICIA L. FUENTES, Petitioners, Tarciano’s sister, Pilar R. Malcampo, represented by her son, John Paul M. Trinidad
vs. (collectively, the Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land
CONRADO G. ROCA, ANNABELLE R. JOSON, ROSE MARIE R. CRISTOBAL and against the Fuentes spouses before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City in
PILAR MALCAMPO, Respondents. Civil Case 4707. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since Tarciano’s
wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had
been forged. They thus prayed that the property be reconveyed to them upon
DECISION reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.6
The spouses denied the Rocas’ allegations. They presented Atty. Plagata who testified that 448 of the Civil Code to payment of the value of the improvements they introduced on the
he personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence in Paco, Manila, on September lot. The CA did not award damages in favor of the Rocas and deleted the award of
15, 1988. He admitted, however, that he notarized the document in Zamboanga City four attorney’s fees to the Fuentes spouses.13
months later on January 11, 1989.7 All the same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the
claim of forgery was personal to Rosario and she alone could invoke it. Besides, the four- Unsatisfied with the CA decision, the Fuentes spouses came to this court by petition for
year prescriptive period for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed. review.14

Both the Rocas and the Fuentes spouses presented handwriting experts at the trial. The Issues Presented
Comparing Rosario’s standard signature on the affidavit with those on various documents
she signed, the Rocas’ expert testified that the signatures were not written by the same
person. Making the same comparison, the spouses’ expert concluded that they were.8 The case presents the following issues:

On February 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, dismissing the case. It ruled that the 1. Whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of consent to her husband
action had already prescribed since the ground cited by the Rocas for annulling the sale, Tarciano’s sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged;
forgery or fraud, already prescribed under Article 1391 of the Civil Code four years after its
discovery. In this case, the Rocas may be deemed to have notice of the fraud from the date 2. Whether or not the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the
the deed of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds and the new title was issued. spouses already prescribed; and
Here, the Rocas filed their action in 1997, almost nine years after the title was issued to the
Fuentes spouses on January 18, 1989.9 3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring
the action to annul that sale.
Moreover, the Rocas failed to present clear and convincing evidence of the fraud. Mere
variance in the signatures of Rosario was not conclusive proof of forgery.10 The RTC ruled The Court’s Rulings
that, although the Rocas presented a handwriting expert, the trial court could not be bound
by his opinion since the opposing expert witness contradicted the same. Atty. Plagata’s
testimony remained technically unrebutted.11 First. The key issue in this case is whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of
consent had been forged. For, if the signature were genuine, the fact that she gave her
consent to her husband’s sale of the conjugal land would render the other issues merely
Finally, the RTC noted that Atty. Plagata’s defective notarization of the affidavit of consent academic.
did not invalidate the sale. The law does not require spousal consent to be on the deed of
sale to be valid. Neither does the irregularity vitiate Rosario’s consent. She personally
signed the affidavit in the presence of Atty. Plagata.12 The CA found that Rosario’s signature had been forged. The CA observed a marked
difference between her signature on the affidavit of consent15 and her specimen
signatures.16 The CA gave no weight to Atty. Plagata’s testimony that he saw Rosario sign
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC decision. The CA found sufficient the document in Manila on September 15, 1988 since this clashed with his declaration in the
evidence of forgery and did not give credence to Atty. Plagata’s testimony that he saw jurat that Rosario signed the affidavit in Zamboanga City on January 11, 1989.
Rosario sign the document in Quezon City. Its jurat said differently. Also, upon comparing
the questioned signature with the specimen signatures, the CA noted significant variance
between them. That Tarciano and Rosario had been living separately for 30 years since The Court agrees with the CA’s observation that Rosario’s signature strokes on the affidavit
1958 also reinforced the conclusion that her signature had been forged. appears heavy, deliberate, and forced. Her specimen signatures, on the other hand, are
consistently of a lighter stroke and more fluid. The way the letters "R" and "s" were written is
also remarkably different. The variance is obvious even to the untrained eye.
Since Tarciano and Rosario were married in 1950, the CA concluded that their property
relations were governed by the Civil Code under which an action for annulment of sale on
the ground of lack of spousal consent may be brought by the wife during the marriage within Significantly, Rosario’s specimen signatures were made at about the time that she signed
10 years from the transaction. Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in the supposed affidavit of consent. They were, therefore, reliable standards for comparison.
1997 fell within 10 years of the January 11, 1989 sale. The Fuentes spouses presented no evidence that Rosario suffered from any illness or
disease that accounted for the variance in her signature when she signed the affidavit of
consent. Notably, Rosario had been living separately from Tarciano for 30 years since 1958.
Considering, however, that the sale between the Fuentes spouses and Tarciano was merely And she resided so far away in Manila. It would have been quite tempting for Tarciano to
voidable, the CA held that its annulment entitled the spouses to reimbursement of what they just forge her signature and avoid the risk that she would not give her consent to the sale or
paid him plus legal interest computed from the filing of the complaint until actual payment. demand a stiff price for it.
Since the Fuentes spouses were also builders in good faith, they were entitled under Article
What is more, Atty. Plagata admittedly falsified the jurat of the affidavit of consent. That jurat real property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a court
declared that Rosario swore to the document and signed it in Zamboanga City on January order allowing the sale, the same would be void. Article 124 thus provides:
11, 1989 when, as Atty. Plagata testified, she supposedly signed it about four months earlier
at her residence in Paco, Manila on September 15, 1988. While a defective notarization will Art. 124. x x x In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
merely strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument, that participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
falsified jurat, taken together with the marks of forgery in the signature, dooms such sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
document as proof of Rosario’s consent to the sale of the land. That the Fuentes spouses encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as proof of Rosario’s consent does not matter. The spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall
sale is still void without an authentic consent. be void. x x x

Second. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has
the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, no force and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are
Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few declared void by positive provision of law,20 as in the case of a sale of conjugal property
months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. without the other spouse’s written consent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is
absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated either by ratification or
When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system of conjugal prescription.21
partnership of gains on their property relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano the sole
administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 16617 prohibited him from selling commonly But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside,
owned real property without his wife’s consent. Still, if he sold the same without his wife’s when any of its terms have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is
consent, the sale is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario the right to have necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it.22 This action, according to
the sale annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of the sale. Failing in Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe. Thus:
that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the value of the
property that Tarciano fraudulently sold. Thus:
Art. 1410. The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe.
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into
without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale
which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. and reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without their mother’s (his wife’s)
Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action.
marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
Besides, even assuming that it is the Civil Code that applies to the transaction as the CA
But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on held, Article 173 provides that the wife may bring an action for annulment of sale on the
Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on ground of lack of spousal consent during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction.
Property Relations Between Husband and Wife.18 Further, the Family Code provisions were Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of
also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested the January 11, 1989 sale. It did not yet prescribe.
rights.19 Thus:
The Fuentes spouses of course argue that the RTC nullified the sale to them based on
Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of fraud and that, therefore, the applicable prescriptive period should be that which applies to
gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without fraudulent transactions, namely, four years from its discovery. Since notice of the sale may
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, be deemed given to the Rocas when it was registered with the Registry of Deeds in 1989,
as provided in Article 256. (n) their right of action already prescribed in 1993.

Consequently, when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, But, if there had been a victim of fraud in this case, it would be the Fuentes spouses in that
1989, the law that governed the disposal of that lot was already the Family Code. they appeared to have agreed to buy the property upon an honest belief that Rosario’s
written consent to the sale was genuine. They had four years then from the time they
learned that her signature had been forged within which to file an action to annul the sale
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide and get back their money plus damages. They never exercised the right.
a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the
If, on the other hand, Rosario had agreed to sign the document of consent upon a false Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
representation that the property would go to their children, not to strangers, and it turned out faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
that this was not the case, then she would have four years from the time she discovered the payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built
fraud within which to file an action to declare the sale void. But that is not the case here. or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However,
Rosario was not a victim of fraud or misrepresentation. Her consent was simply not the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than
obtained at all. She lost nothing since the sale without her written consent was void. that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the
Ultimately, the Rocas ground for annulment is not forgery but the lack of written consent of land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties
their mother to the sale. The forgery is merely evidence of lack of consent. shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the
terms thereof. (361a)
Third. The Fuentes spouses point out that it was to Rosario, whose consent was not
obtained, that the law gave the right to bring an action to declare void her husband’s sale of The Rocas shall of course have the option, pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code,25 of
conjugal land. But here, Rosario died in 1990, the year after the sale. Does this mean that indemnifying the Fuentes spouses for the costs of the improvements or paying the increase
the right to have the sale declared void is forever lost? in value which the property may have acquired by reason of such improvements.

The answer is no. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the
the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 00531 dated February 27, 2007 as follows:
died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas.23 As
lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any 1. The deed of sale dated January 11, 1989 that Tarciano T. Roca executed in
person from its enjoyment and disposal.1avvphi1 favor of Manuel O. Fuentes, married to Leticia L. Fuentes, as well as the Transfer
Certificate of Title T-90,981 that the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City issued
In fairness to the Fuentes spouses, however, they should be entitled, among other things, to in the names of the latter spouses pursuant to that deed of sale are DECLARED
recover from Tarciano’s heirs, the Rocas, the ₱200,000.00 that they paid him, with legal void;
interest until fully paid, chargeable against his estate.
2. The Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City is DIRECTED to reinstate Transfer
Further, the Fuentes spouses appear to have acted in good faith in entering the land and Certificate of Title 3533 in the name of Tarciano T. Roca, married to Rosario
building improvements on it. Atty. Plagata, whom the parties mutually entrusted with closing Gabriel;
and documenting the transaction, represented that he got Rosario’s signature on the
affidavit of consent. The Fuentes spouses had no reason to believe that the lawyer had 3. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R. Cristobal,
violated his commission and his oath. They had no way of knowing that Rosario did not and Pilar Malcampo are ORDERED to pay petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia
come to Zamboanga to give her consent. There is no evidence that they had a premonition Fuentes the ₱200,000.00 that the latter paid Tarciano T. Roca, with legal interest
that the requirement of consent presented some difficulty. Indeed, they willingly made a 30 from January 11, 1989 until fully paid, chargeable against his estate;
percent down payment on the selling price months earlier on the assurance that it was
forthcoming.
4. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R. Cristobal,
and Pilar Malcampo are further ORDERED, at their option, to indemnify petitioner
Further, the notarized document appears to have comforted the Fuentes spouses that spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes with their expenses for introducing useful
everything was already in order when Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale in their improvements on the subject land or pay the increase in value which it may have
favor on January 11, 1989. In fact, they paid the balance due him. And, acting on the acquired by reason of those improvements, with the spouses entitled to the right of
documents submitted to it, the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City issued a new title in retention of the land until the indemnity is made; and
the names of the Fuentes spouses. It was only after all these had passed that the spouses
entered the property and built on it. He is deemed a possessor in good faith, said Article 526
of the Civil Code, who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any 5. The RTC of Zamboanga City from which this case originated is DIRECTED to
flaw which invalidates it. receive evidence and determine the amount of indemnity to which petitioner
spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes are entitled.
As possessor in good faith, the Fuentes spouses were under no obligation to pay for their
stay on the property prior to its legal interruption by a final judgment against them.24 What is SO ORDERED.
more, they are entitled under Article 448 to indemnity for the improvements they introduced
into the property with a right of retention until the reimbursement is made. Thus: G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners, order suspending further hearings in Civil Case No, TG-748 until after judgment in the
vs. related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES
OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents. Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court
issued on August 27, 1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of
Lope E. Adriano for petitioners. jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still
unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules
Padilla Law Office for private respondent. of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may
be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." 2

Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. 3

FERNAN, C.J.:
On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division, promulgated
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a a decision 4 affirming the questioned order of the trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration
corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and filed by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19, 1986. 6
contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land,
can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance
case. with Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that the trial court
and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is predicated on
a quasi-delict. Petitioners have raised a valid point.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land the complaint as constituting the cause of action. 7 The purpose of an action or suit and the
situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, law to govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its
allegations and prayer for relief. 8 The nature of an action is not necessarily determined or
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an controlled by its title or heading but the body of the pleading or complaint itself. To avoid
artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities, pleadings as well as
caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly remedial laws should be liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample opportunity
fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy to prove their respective claims. 9
seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. TG-
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-907- 748:
82, before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against Efren
Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent 4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang,
corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Cavite, adjacent on the right side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs,
Code. defendant constructed waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion
thereof leading to a big hole or opening, also constructed by defendant,
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence situated on the
corporation, this time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with right side of its cemented gate fronting the provincial highway, and
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court. 1 connected by defendant to a man height inter-connected cement culverts
which were also constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise beneath
On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition the tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected
to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular culverts again connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the
inspections on the land. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on respondent lower portion of the same concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of
corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued an the said cemented gate, which hole or opening is likewise connected by
defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal, also constructed by
 defendant, which runs northward towards a big hole or opening which In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the
was also built by defendant thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow- Civil Code and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike,
blocks fence which separates the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing
(and which serves as the exit-point of the floodwater coming from the land loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use
of defendant, and at the same time, the entrance-point of the same and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss
floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after year, during rainy or stormy and damages to the injured party.
seasons.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property
5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint
of plaintiffs, defendant also constructed an artificial lake, the base of sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due
which is soil, which utilizes the water being channeled thereto from its to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of
water system thru inter-connected galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of
complimented by rain water during rainy or stormy seasons, so much so respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal
that the water below it seeps into, and the excess water above it connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation
inundates, portions of the adjoining land of plaintiffs. between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.

6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the
aforementioned water conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as
young man was drowned to death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and will to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.
continue to suffer, as follows: Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each
must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and
a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his
converted to deep, wide and long canals, such that the land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so
same can no longer be planted to any crop or plant. that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and
expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining
landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on suffered.
several occasions, washed away.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs act or omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:
and their laborers are always in danger.
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
the land of plaintiffs are exposed to destruction. ... 10 Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under provisions of this chapter.
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict
are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable
defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or
incurred by the plaintiff. 11 not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award
corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. 13
assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the
damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
 Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first
sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal
and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct
and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin,
having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence.
Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito"
has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ... 14

In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own,
and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime — a distinction
exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or
culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal
case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal
where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in
which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability.

In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is
entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil
Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action
contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution — whether it be
conviction or acquittal — would render meaningless the independent character of the civil
action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch
18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial
court is ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and
Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with
the hearing of the case with dispatch. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against
respondent corporation.

SO ORDERED.