HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A.

RAJASHEKER REDDY

WRIT PETITION No.22499 of 2019

ORDER:

This Writ Petition is filed seeking writ of mandamus

declaring the action of the respondents in dealing with the land

admeasuring Acs.42.35 gts in [Link].239 and 240 of Kokapet

village, Gandipet Mandal, Ranga Reddy District (for short ‘the

subject land’) without establishing title from the competent court

of law, as illegal and arbitrary and consequently to direct the

respondents to restrain from dispossessing the petitioners or

conducting any auction of the subject land.

2. It is the case of the petitioners that they are absolute

owners and possessors of different extents of the subject land,

having purchased through registered sale deeds in the year 1967

in Survey Nos.239 and 240, Arazi Maqtha, Kokapet village,

Gandipet Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. According to the

petitioners, the lands in Kokapet village were subject matter of

long drawn litigation at the instance of one [Link], which had

attained finality in the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil

AppealNo.15590 of 2017 & batch, dated 04.10.2017. In the said

judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that there is a cloud

on the title of the State and private parties, as such, has not

recorded any finding with regard to title of the subject property.

It is further the case of the petitioners that a munthakab was

drawn up by the Hyderabad State Government in the year 1955,

in which it is clearly mentioned that the Kokapet village lands are

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private patta lands and same were classified as non-kalsa lands

as per the Gazette Notification of the year 1950. It is also asserted

that no court has so far decided the subject lands as government

lands and that despite serious litigation of title, the State had not

filed any suit or other proceedings for declaration of its title. It is

also stated that when there is a serious title dispute with respect

to subject land, the respondents cannot take law into its hands

and deprive citizen of his valuable property right, without

following due procedure of law in terms of Article 300A of the

Constitution of India. It is also stated that except filing this writ

petition, they have not filed any other writ or proceedings before

any other court of law or forum for the relief which is sought for in

the present writ petition and by way of an interim order, sought

for a direction to the respondents not to dispossess the petitioners

from the subject land, without following due procedure of law and

also not to conduct public auction in respect of the subject land,

pending disposal of the writ petition.

3. This Court granted interim order on 21.10.2019, which

reads as follows:

“Considering the right claimed by the petitioner

being of the year 1967, and taking into consideration of
the undertaking of the learned Standing Counsel for
HMDA on 15.10.2019, there shall be status quo in all
respects, to be maintained by both the parties.
Matter to be decided, in due course, after filing of
counter affidavit.”

4. Counter and vacate stay petition dated 25.10.2019 is filed by

the 1st respondent-Hyderabad Metropolitan Development

Authority, stating that a dispute arose between [Link] Khan &

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others and some of the legal heirs of Late Nawab Nusrath Jung

Bahadur-I, rep. by their General Power of Attorney holder Sri

[Link] Murthy, defendants in OS No.512 of 1973 on the file

of 4th Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, the property

therein claimed to be that of Nusrath Jung-I and their legal heirs

and they are entitled to the properties of late Nusrath Jung and

also claiming their right through Munthakhab No.57/55, dated

07.05.1955. One of the issues that was framed by the trial Court,

regarding the nature of lands of Nawab Nusrath Jung-I, the Trial

Court after elaborate trial has given findings that the lands under

Munthakhab do not belong to Nawab Nusrath Jung-I and that the

heirs of Nawab were not in possession and enjoyment of the lands

and further held that the Kokapet village was abolished under the

abolition of Jagirs Act and what was released to heirs of Nawab

Jung-I under the Munthakhab was only the commutation sums

which were Atiyat grants within the meaning of Section 2 (1)(b)(i)

of the Hyderabad Atiyat Enquiries Act, 1952. The subject matter

of the sale deeds under which the petitioners are claiming their

rights under the GPA holder [Link] Murthy had been dealt

with in the judgment in OS No.512 of 1973 which has attained

finality, as the appeal against said judgment by the defendants

was dismissed by the Court by this vide judgment dated

11.12.1985 in CCCA No.142 of 1976. It is also stated that this

Court while disposing of the WA No.887 of 2006, dated

25.10.2007 has also considered the judgment in CCCA

No.142/1976 and held that the judgment of the civil court in the
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suit has become final. As per revenue records, right from the

inception of the litigation of the Kokapet lands, the said lands are

declared as State lands by virtue of Jagirs Abolition Regulation,

1358 Fasli and the State has become the owner of the lands. The

name of the Jagirdar is Nusrat Jung-I in which the Jagir was

abolished in the year 1949 under Jagir Abolition Act, 1358 F and

merged with State (Diwani lands), as such, the lands of late Sri

Nusrat Jung-I were taken into custody of the Government by

providing commutation amount to the legal heirs of Jagirdars.

The State of Hyderabad had appointed Atiyat Court as per 1952

Act dated 15.02.1954 in respect of Kokapet Village and others for

paying of commutation amount among the legal heirs of late Sri

Nusrat Jung-I. When, one Mr. [Link], who is alleged to be the

representative of the alleged 203 legal heirs of Nawab Nusrath

Jung Bahadur-I made representation dated 05.08.1999 to the

Government for release of lands of Kokapet as per Munthakab

said to have been issued by Nazim Atiyat and to implement their

names in the revenue records, the same was rejected by the

Government of Andhra Pradesh Revenue (JA) Department in its

Memo No.686888/JA1/99-20, dated 15.04.2002, wherein it is

pointed out illegality of Muntakhab No.57/1955. The Government,

contrary to the aforesaid orders, on the representation of

[Link] dated 06.01.2003 without setting aside the earlier

order and without giving any reasons, directed the Chief

Commissioner of Land Administration of A.P, Hyderabad for

implementation of Muntakab No.57/1955, vide proceedings in

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Memo No.1640/JAI/03-3, dated 06.05.2004. Though the Chief

Commissioner of Land Administration and Special Chief Secretary

in his [Link].NA1/172/2004, dated 16.06.2004 brought to

the notice of the Government about the decision already taken in

rejecting the claim of [Link] in order dated 15.04.2002, the

Government issued Memo No.1640/JA1/2003-4 reiterated for

implementation of Munthakab No.57/1955, however, the

Government Memo No.1640/JA1/2003-4, dated 31.07.2004 has

kept in abeyance of proceedings dated 06.05.2004. Thereafter, the

Government issued proceedings vide Memo No.1640/JAI/2003-9,

dated 21.05.2005, rescinding the orders issued in Memo dated

06.05.2004 and 31.07.2004 and upholding the order passed by

the Government in Memo dated 15.04.2002 as such, the

Muntakab No.57/1955 was not recognized by the Government.

Aggrieved by the proceedings dated 21.05.2005, K.S.B. Ali filed

WP No.10084/2006 for conducting a survey and handing over of

physical possession of the lands admeasuring 719 acres of

Kokapet village. Another WP No.14439 of 2006 was also filed

challenging the tender cum auction of the lands by the HUDA,

which was dismissed on 14.07.2006 granting liberty to the

petitioner for approaching the civil court to obtain appropriate

declaration and injunction. Aggrieved by the orders in WP

No.14439/2006, dated 14.07.2006, the petitioners filed WA

No.887 of 2006, which was also dismissed holding that the legal

heirs of late Nawab Nusrath Jung Bahadur-I were not granted the

property rights in respect of Kokapet lands by the Nazim Atiyat

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and considered the judgment in CCCA No.142/1976 and held that

judgment of civil Court in OS No.512 of 1973 has become final.

Aggrieved by the orders in the Writ Appeal, [Link] had filed

SLP (Civil) No.23392 of 2007 in the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which

was disposed of on 13.12.2007, dismissing the WP No.14439 of

2006 as withdrawn and granted liberty to the petitioners to avail

appropriate remedy. That instead of approaching competent civil

court, petitioners in WPNo.14439 of 2006, pursued WPNo.10084

of 2006, which was filed by [Link] & others, this Court clubbed

all the similar subject matters and passed a common order dated

02.06.2009 in WP Nos.22619 of 2007, 3421, 7747, 8761 and

12928 of 2008 and 3750 & 6425 of 2009 and allowed the same

setting aside the memo dated 21.05.2005 with a direction to issue

fresh orders by issuing notices to the concerned. Aggrieved by the

orders of the learned Single Judge dated 02.06.2009, the

respondent herein filed WA No.1306/2009 & batch. The Hon’ble

Division Bench, vide order dated 18.07.2012 allowed the aforesaid

Writ Appeals, dismissing the writ petitions filed by the legal heirs

of late Nusrat Jung-I. Aggrieved by the orders of the Hon’ble

Division Bench dated 18.07.2012, K.S.B Ali & others filed SLP

Nos.18755 & 18756 of 2013, which were dismissed by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court on 04.10.2017 holding that the remedy for the

said [Link] is only by filing a substantive civil proceedings

before the competent forum but no remedy lies with the

constitutional court to adjudicate the rights over the property of

the subject matter of the writ petition. As such, the petitioners,

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who are claiming same rights on par with KSB Ali have no locus

nor having any right to get their alleged rights, if any, to be

adjudicated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is

also stated that all the contentions raised in this writ petition have

already been dealt with and the findings of the learned Single

Judge were confirmed by the Hon’ble Division Bench, which were

in turn confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The claim of the

petitioners basing on the sale deeds is not tenable, since the

vendor himself has no title, he cannot pass a better title to the

vendee i.e., to the petitioners. Ever since from the date of handing

over possession on 06.01.2000, the 1st respondent is in

possession of the subject land and that the subject land belongs

to the State, as such, this respondent has power and authority to

deal with its own property and sought for dismissal of the writ

petition.

5. Reply affidavit dated 28.11.2019 is filed by the petitioners

to the counter affidavit filed by the 1st respondent denying the

averments therein stating that the finding of the trial Court in OS

No.512 of 1973 relates to the land in [Link].41, 42 & 43, which is

not part and parcel of the land admeasuring Acs.1635.34 gts of

Muntakab No.57 of 1955, through which the said lands are

directed to be released to the holders; that the subject land is not

a Jagir land as contended by the HMDA, but the same was

acquired under purchase through sale deed in the year 1852, as

such, it is self acquired property, therefore, the question of vesting

with the government after abolition of Jagir’s Act does not arise at
8 ARR,J
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all; that the subject land in OS No.512/1973 and CCCA

No.142/1976 are totally different, as such, the same does not take

away the rights of the petitioners; that the writ petitioners are not

parties in WP Nos.10084/2006 and 14439 of 2006 and WA

No.1306 of 2009 and that the orders in WP No.14439 of 2006 and

WA No.887 of 2006 are set aside by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

SLP No.23392 of 2007, dated 13.12.2007, as such, the same

cannot be looked into; that [Link] was never the GPA of the

legal heirs of Nusrat Jung-I and the said contention is also not

accepted by this Court; that the writ petitioners are claiming the

property through registered sale deeds traceable to 1852, as such,

their rights cannot be treated on par with [Link]; that no

court had declared title in favour of the State or the HMDA; that

admittedly the sale deeds through which they acquired the title

are not the subject matter of any suit or related proceedings and

they were never under challenge before any Court; that the HMDA

is not in possession of the subject property since 06.01.2000 and

sought for allowing the writ petition, apart from other contentions

which stood concluded by earlier litigation.

6. Additional counter affidavit dated 15.12.2019 is filed by 1st

respondent stating that the writ petition suffers from “Suppressio

veri and Suggestio falsi” , since the petitioners had failed to

disclose the fact that they were parties to the earlier round of

litigation before this Court and had even challenged the judgment

of Division Bench in WA No.1309 of 2009 & batch before the

Hon’ble Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petitions, which

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were dismissed by the common judgment dated 04.10.2017; that

relevant facts have not been placed before this Court and that

there is a deliberate attempt on the part of the writ petitioners to

suppress material facts and particulars from the notice of this

Court; that earlier proceedings which stand concluded by the

judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in [Link] v. State of A.P

& others1 have been deliberately suppressed; that the contentions

urged by the writ petitioners are barred by res judicata. The

petitioners are claiming title to the subject property basing on the

sale deed allegedly executed by [Link] Murthy (GPA holder

of the legal heirs of Nusrat Jung-I, which is stated to be part of the

larger extent of lands admeasuring 260 acres in [Link].239-240

of Kokapet village and that the said contention is clearly

discernible from the contentions in the affidavit filed in support of

WAMP No.1319 of 2010 in WA No.1309 of 2009 so also in SLP (C )

No.26493 of 2017. The intentional suppression of material facts

by the writ petitioners is nothing but an abuse of process of law

and amounts to contempt of Court.

7. Additional reply affidavit is filed by the petitioners admitting

about filing of implead petitions in WA No.1309 of 2009 so also in

SLP before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, but the same had been

prosecuted by their GPA holder Sri Shahavir Irroni along with

others, and also tendered unconditional apology. As such, there

was no deliberate attempt or intention to suppress the material

facts before this Court. Since the GPA executed earlier in favour

1
(2018) 11 SCC 277
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of Shahavir Irroni seized to operate, they have filed the present

writ petition.

8. Heard Sri [Link], learned counsel for the petitioners

and Sri [Link], learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri [Link]

Rao, learned Standing Counsel for the HMDA-1st respondent.

9. In view of the rival contentions of parties, the points that

emerge for consideration are:

1) Whether the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on

the ground of suppression of material facts as the petitioners have

already admitted in the additional reply affidavit about the non

disclosure of filing of implead petition in WA No.1309 of 2009 &

batch and filing of SLP (C ) No.26493 of 2017?

2) Whether the writ petition can be entertained on

merits in view of earlier litigation between the petitioners and

others and is hit by principles of res judicata?

[Link] 1 & 2:

In this case, it is to be seen that the writ petitioners are

claiming their title through registered sale deeds in document

Nos.872 & 873 of 1967, dated 05.05.1967 and 753 of 1967,

dated15.04.1967. A perusal of the recitals in the said documents

goes to show that the vendors mentioned therein stated to be

constituted attorney of late Nawab Nusrat Jung I by virtue of

registered document No.2 of 1958 on the file of Sub-Registrar,

Hyderabad East, Azampura, Hyderabad and the subject land

belongs to heirs of late Nawab Nusrat Jung-I by virtue of

Muntakhab No.57 of 1955 issued by the Nazim Saheb Atiyat,

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Government of Andhra Pradesh, duly sanctioned by the

Government and the property was also later confirmed by the

Hon’ble High Court in WP No.227 of 19690, which was decided on

01.04.1963. Since the reliance is placed on the sale deeds, it

assumes relevance to refer the same, as in the subsequent

litigation, there is reference to the Muntakab No.57/1955. When

one [Link] requested the then Government of Andhra

Pradesh to implement the Munthakab No.57/1955, which was

referred to in the sale deeds relied on by the petitioners, was

ultimately rejected by the Government vide order dated

21.05.2005. The Government issued Memo dated 06.05.2004

directing implementation of Munthakab No.57/1955 after

rejection order dated 15.04.2002 and ultimately the Government

had rescinded the memo dated 06.05.2004 in Memo dated

21.05.2005 and upheld the rejection orders dated 15.04.2002.

Challenging the aforesaid memo dated 21.05.2005, [Link] &

others filed WP Nos.10084/206 & batch. This Court clubbed all

similar subject matters together and passed a common order

dated 02.06.2009 in WP Nos.22619 of 2007, 3421, 7747, 8761

and 12928 of 2008 and 3750 & 6425 of 2009 and allowed the

same by setting aside the memo dated 21.05.2005 and directed to

issue fresh orders by issuing notices to the concerned. Aggrieved

by the same, Writ Appeal Nos.1309 of 2009 & batch were filed by

the Government and HMDA against the orders of the learned

single Judge dated 02.06.2009. It is pertinent to note that during

the pendency of the Writ Appeal No.1309 of 2009, the petitioners

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herein filed implead petition No.1319 of 2009 and a copy of which

was also filed along with the additional counter affidavit, which

are referred to in additional counter affidavit filed by the 1st

respondent-HMDA. WP No.26093 of 2009 is filed by the 1st

petitioner in WP No.23770 of 2019 (which is connected similar

writ petition) for implementation of MuntakabNo.57/1955 and the

Hon’ble Division Bench allowed the writ appeals setting aside the

orders of the learned Single Judge, vide order dated 18.07.2012 &

dismissed WP No.26093 of 2009.

12. Aggrieved by the orders of the Hon’ble Division Bench dated

18.07.2012, K.S.B Ali & others filed SLP Nos.18755 & 18756 of

2013, which were dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on

04.10.2017 holding:

“13. Firoz Khan and another filed [Link].512 of 1973 (originally [Link].10
of 1967) for a declaration that they are the owners of the plaint schedule
properties in Survey Nos.41, 42 and 43 of Kokapet village. [Link]
Murthy and four others were impleaded as defendants in this suit.
Krishna Murthy was impleaded as the GPA of the heirs of Nusrat Jung-I.
Krishna Murthy through his written statement claimed entitlement to the
lands on the strength of the GPA granted by the heirs of late Nusrat
Jung-I and relied on the Muntakhab in support of the case of the
defendants. The plaintiffs also prayed for a permanent injunction or in
the alternative for recovery of possession of the suit lands.
14. By the judgment dated 30-06-1976, the trial Court considered the
entire evidence and by an elaborately reasoned order decreed the suit.
The Trial Court concluded that, the stand taken by the defendants was
incorrect and observed that the two Firmans clearly established that the
lands in question (Kokapet lands) were Jagir lands; that the legal heirs of
Nusrat Jung-I had also admitted in cross-examination that, some of
them had filed applications for restoration of the Jagir lands to the Nizam
which was rejected; that the first defendant (Krishna Murthy) had not
produced any evidence to establish that the suit lands were acquired by
Nusrat Jung-I under any purchase; and that the legal heirs of Nusrat
Jung-I were entitled only to commutation amounts. This judgment
became final as the appeal there against by the defendants was
dismissed by the Court by the judgment dated 11-12-1985 in CCCA
No.142 of 1976.

38. After considering the respective submissions, we find ourselves in

agreement with the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the
respondent. There are various reasons to dismiss these appeals, which
are discussed hereinbelow.

39. In the first place, it is to be noticed that as far as Mr Ali is concerned,

his Writ Petition No. 10084 of 2006 which was filed in the High Court
after passing of the order dated 13-12-2007 in K.S.B. Ali v. State of
A.P. [K.S.B. Ali v. State of A.P., SLP (C) No. 23392 of 2007, order dated
13 ARR,J
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13-12-2007 (SC), wherein it was directed:“Heard the petitioner's counsel

and learned counsel/ASG for the contesting respondent HUDA, State of
A.P. and other contesting respondents. The petitioner herein has sought
permission to withdraw WP No. 14439 of 2006 filed before the High
Court of A.P. from which Writ Appeal No. 887 of 2006 has arisen. The
contesting respondents have no objection for withdrawal of the writ
petition filed by the petitioner with liberty to take appropriate remedy.
Permission sought is granted. The impugned judgment [K.S.B. Ali v. State
of A.P., 2007 SCC OnLine AP 765] as well as the judgment [K.S.B.
Ali v. State of A.P., WP No. 14439 of 2006, order dated 14-7-2006 (AP)]
passed by the learned Single Judge are set aside. The Writ Petition No.
14439 of 2006 is dismissed as withdrawn. The issues raised are left
open. The special leave petition is disposed of accordingly.”] by this
Court, was not maintainable. This Court, by the said order, had
permitted him to withdraw his Writ Petition No. 14434 of 2006 and “to
take appropriate remedy”. Obviously, the remedy could not be in the
form of another writ petition on the same facts and grounds which were
pleaded earlier. The High Court has rightly held [State of A.P. v. Malik
Sultana, 2012 SCC OnLine AP 858 : (2013) 2 ALD 177] that having given
up his pursuit of public law remedy in earlier abandoned proceedings,
filing of the fresh writ petition or pursuing pending Writ Petition No.
10084 of 2006 would constitute an abuse of the process of the Court.

40. Secondly, the High Court is also right in holding that neither Mr Ali
had established by specific pleadings nor by due authorisation on record
that he was authorised to represent the case of 203 legal heirs of Nusrat
Jung-I. It is clear from the above that insofar as Mr Ali is concerned, his
appeals are not even maintainable.
41. Thirdly, the High Court has specifically remarked, and rightly so,
that even the other appellants did not plead or establish the basis of
their claims that they are the heirs of Nusrat Jung-I.

45. Sixthly, insofar as the decision of the Division Bench on the issue
raised before it is concerned, no arguments were even advanced by the
appellants questioning the validity thereof. Even otherwise, having gone
through the said judgment minutely, we are in complete agreement with
the impugned judgment [State of A.P. v. Malik Sultana, 2012 SCC OnLine
AP 858 : (2013) 2 ALD 177] on those aspects, decided by the High Court.
To recapitulate in brief it is stated that even the writ petition filed by the
petitioners herein (Writ Petition No. 3421 of 2008) which inter alia sought
to challenge memo dated 21-5-2005 issued by the Revenue Department
as illegal and also sought to implement Muntakhab No. 55 of 1955 dated
7-5-1955, by mutating the names of the petitioners in the revenue
records and return the custody of the property was clearly not
maintainable for two reasons. Insofar the memo dated 21-5-2005, was
concerned, the main grievance of the writ petitioners appears to be that
the same had been passed without giving any notice to the writ petitioner
and that the same could not have reviewed/rescinded the memo dated 6-
5-2004. The said arguments are not tenable on account of the fact that
the impugned memo dated 21-5-2005, only sought to reinforce the memo
dated 15-4-2002, issued by the Government in response to the
representation made by Mr Ali. Therefore, when the impugned memo
dated 21-5-2005 was admittedly not issued at the instance of the writ
petitioners there could not have been any question of hearing them prior
to the same. Further, neither the impugned memo nor the memo dated
6-5-2004 (purporting to create rights in favour of the legal heirs of Nawab
Nusrat Jung-I) was communicated to the writ petitioners. Hence, insofar
as the memo dated 21-5-2005 is concerned, no cause of action accrued
in favour of the writ petitioners to have approached the High Court and,
therefore, the only person, if any, who could have challenged the same
was Mr Ali. As far as Mr Ali, is concerned, as already pointed above, he
could not maintain the writ petition as it was not “appropriate remedy”
as granted by this Court.”
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The Hon’ble Supreme Court also observed that when once

Mr. [Link] had withdrawn WP No.14439 of 2006 and also WA

No.887 of 2006, he is disentitled from pursuing WP No.10084 of

2006, which is nothing but abuse of process of Court and held

that the writ petition i.e., WP No.10084 of 2006 is not

maintainable. Though the petitioners herein are parties to

[Link].1306 of 2009 and filed Civil Appeal Nos.15597 & 15598 of

2017, they have suppressed the same. The Hon’ble Supreme

Court clearly narrated the entire history of the earlier litigation in

respect of the subject land, which was not disputed by the

petitioners.

13. Though the petitioners are aware of the same, the same were

deliberately suppressed in the affidavit filed in support of the writ

petition, however, they admitted in the additional reply to the

additional counter affidavit filed by the 1st respondent that one

Mr. Shahavir Irroni, fought the litigation on their behalf in the

capacity of General Power of Attorney Holder, as such, they also

bound by the same. As such, the filing of this writ petition is

nothing but gross abuse of process of law. The petitioners gave an

impression that they are not parties to the litigation. The

petitioners have emphatically asserted in their writ affidavit that

they have not filed any other writ or proceedings before any other

court of law or forum for the relief which is sought for in the

present writ petition. Apart from that in reply affidavit it is

asserted that the sale deeds through which they acquired the title

are not the subject matter of any suit or related proceedings and
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they were never under challenge before any Court, which goes to

show that they have filed false affidavit and basing on the same,

they have obtained interim orders, The litigation in the present

writ petition was long drawn and the petitioners have stated so in

their additional reply affidavit that they are conscious about the

same, as such, there is deliberate, willful, wanton suppression of

facts which is nothing but abuse of process of Court and Law of

Contempt of Court. In view of the above facts and circumstances,

the contention of Sri [Link], learned Senior Counsel that the

petitioners have suppressed the material facts, has force and has

to be accepted. Therefore, the writ petition is solely liable to be

dismissed for Suppressio very and Suggestio falsi.

14. Though it is stated in the reply affidavit that the property in

OS No.512 of 1973 is in different survey numbers, but even in the

additional reply affidavit, the Munthakab No.57 of 1955 on which

reliance is placed, tracing their title, just like in their sale deeds

and the said plea at the instance of legal heirs of Nusrat Jung-I,

was rejected by this Court and also by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, as observed supra and the said fact is known to the

petitioners. Even in the Judgment in OS No.512 of 1973, which is

confirmed in CCCA No.142 of 1976, there is a discussion about

Munthakab No.57 of 1955 on which petitioners placed reliance,

which goes to show that the case of the petitioners had been

rejected on merits. The petitioners themselves stated in the writ

affidavit that the subject property is the subject matter of litigation

in K.S.B Ali v. State of Andhra Pradesh [(2018) 11 Supreme

16 ARR,J
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Court Cases 277], before the Honble Supreme Court, to which the

petitioners are parties, as such, the contention that the subject

land is different from the earlier litigation, cannot be accepted and

that it is one more attempt to mislead this Court. Hence, this

Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed not only on the ground of

suppression of material facts but also on the principles of res

judicata.

15. In Ishwar Dutt v. Collector (LA), (2005) 7 SCC 190 at page

200, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:

25. In Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Bombay [(1965) 2 SCR 547 :

AIR 1965 SC 1153] the Constitution Bench held that the principle of res
judicata is also applicable to subsequent suits where the same issues between
the same parties had been decided in an earlier proceeding under Article 226
of the Constitution.

26. It is trite that the principle of res judicata is also applicable to the writ
proceedings. (See H.P. Road Transport Corpn. v. Balwant Singh [1993 Supp (1)
SCC 552 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 282 : (1993) 23 ATC 673] .)

16. Though the petitioners asserted that they are in possession

of the subject property by virtue of judgment of this Court WP

No.227 of 1960, which is filed for granting relief of restoration of

property on which reliance is placed by the petitioners in the sale

deeds, but the plea of restoration was declined, as held by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in [Link]’s case (supra), wherein it is

held as follows:

“11. The claimants applied to the Assistant Nazim Atiyat for

amendment of the Muntakhab (for inclusion of Sendhi trees). The application
was rejected. The claimants then approached the Atiyat Court which also
rejected their claim. They unsuccessfully approached the Board of Revenue
and thereafter filed [Link].227 of 1960. On 1-4-1963 the Court allowed the
writ petition and declared the claimants entitled to inclusion of income from
sendhi trees in the Muntakhab, directed the respondents to amend the
Munthakhab and awarded Rs.3980-40 as mash. In the Judgment in WP
No.227 of 1960 the High Court however declined to grant the relief of
restoration of the property.”
17 ARR,J
WP_22499_2019

In WA No.1309 of 2009 the Hon’ble Division Bench observed

that the State is in possession of the property, which goes to show

that assertion made by the petitioners is false and contrary to the

said findings of this Court. The assertions made by the petitioners

once again go to show that the petitioners have not come to the

court with clean hands. In view of clear suppression of facts, the

judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners are

not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case.

17. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and

of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is

extraordinary, equitable and discretionary. Prerogative writs

mentioned therein are issued for doing substantial justice. It is,

therefore, of utmost necessity that the petitioner approaching the

writ court must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts

before the court without concealing or suppressing anything and

seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of

relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading

the court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without

considering the merits of the claim. A prerogative remedy is not a

matter of course. While exercising extraordinary power a writ

court would certainly bear in mind the conduct of the party who

invokes the jurisdiction of the court. If the applicant makes a false

statement or suppresses material fact or attempts to mislead the

court, the court may dismiss the action on that ground alone and

may refuse to enter into the merits of the case by stating, “We will

not listen to your application because of what you have done.” The
18 ARR,J
WP_22499_2019

rule has been evolved in the larger pubic interest to deter

unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by

deceiving it. The above principles have been accepted in our legal

system also. As per settled law, the party who invokes the

extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or of a

High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be

truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts

without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be

allowed to play “hide and seek” or to “pick and choose” the facts

he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to disclose

(conceal) other facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests

in disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material facts

are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of writ courts

and exercise would become impossible. The petitioner must

disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought without

any qualification. This is because “the court knows law but not

facts”. An applicant who does not come with candid facts and

“clean breast” cannot hold a writ of the court with “soiled hands”.

Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy.

It is a jugglery, manipulation, manoeuvring or misrepresentation,

which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction. If the

applicant does not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly

but states them in a distorted manner and misleads the court, the

court has inherent power in order to protect itself and to prevent

an abuse of its process to discharge the rule nisi and refuse to

proceed further with the examination of the case on merits. If the

19 ARR,J
WP_22499_2019

court does not reject the petition on that ground, the court would

be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be

dealt with for contempt of court for abusing the process of the

court. (See Kishore Samrite v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra),

kensington Income Tax Commrs. (1917) 1 KB 486: 86 LJKB

257 & K.D. Sharma v. SAIL, (2008) 12 SCC 481).

18. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that earlier

litigation was pursued by their GPA holder, as such, they are not

aware of the same and could not place before this Court that they

are parties to the earlier litigation. But, however, he submits that

in view of the age of the petitioners, they may be pardoned for

filing of this writ petition suppressing material facts. It is

relevant to note here that after filing of the additional reply

affidavit by the learned counsel for the petitioners admitting the

suppression of material facts, this Court cautioned the learned

counsel for the petitioners, inspite of the same, he argued the

matter for considerable length of time. Even after learned Senior

Counsel for the respondent-HMDA brought to the notice of this

Court on 02.12.2019 about suppression of facts, petitioners still

pursued the litigation, as such, petitioners are liable to be

prosecuted. Since, it is stated that the GPA of the petitioners

fought the litigation all through, petitioners being old aged, after

taking into consideration of the above factors, instead of ordering

for prosecution of petitioners for filing false affidavits, inclined to

dismiss the writ petition with exemplary costs.

20 ARR,J
WP_22499_2019

Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed with exemplary

costs of Rs.1,00,000/- each to be paid to the High Court Legal

Services Authority, Hyderabad. In default, it is open for the High

Court Legal Services Authority, Hyderabad, to take steps for

recovery of the said amounts.

As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall

stands dismissed.

___________________________
[Link] REDDY, J

Date: 29.04.2020.
Kvs
21 ARR,J
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HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE [Link] REDDY

WRIT PETITION No.22499 of 2019

Date: 29.04.2020

kvs