TOPIC: QUASI-DELICT ELEMENTS

TITLE:
G.R. No. 180440 : December 5, 2012
DR. GENEVIEVE L. HUANG, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS, INC., DUSIT
THANI PUBLIC CO., LTD. And FIRST LEPANTO TAISHO INSURANCE
CORPORATION, Respondents.

FACTS:11th June 1995, Delia Goldber a Dusit Hotel guest invited her friend.
(Petitioner) Dr. Huang to swin at the hotels pool. They started at 5PM and ended
at 7PM. Afterwhich, They proceeded to shower and dressup at the bathroom. But
upon exiting, The entire pool area was already pitch black and there was no
longer any people around the other than them. They carefully walked to the door
to exit the area but found that the door was locked.

DR. Huang decided to look for a house phone. She found one behind the lifeguard
counter. Unfortunately,When she walked towards the phone, a heavy folding
table fell on her, knocking her almost unconscious
Delia immediately got hold of the house phone and notified the hotel operator of
the incident. Hotel staff arrived to aid Huang by placing an ice pack and ointment
on her head. Huang later demanded services from the hotel physician.
Dr. Dalupines was the hotel physican. How instead of immediate medical
assitancee presented a waiver and demanded it to be signed. But petitioner
refused
Petitioner went home. There she started to feel dizzy and had stomach aches.
She was forced to stay home and miss important appointments with her patients.
She also had on/off headaches causing her 3 days of sleepless nights.
Huang later consulted other doctors to advice on her condition.
Which showed that her head was bruised.. That she could have brain injury and
needed medication

RTC: Found the petitioners testimony as self-serving and devoid of credibility.

The area could not have been totally dark as to render her unable to see when
there were lights open up until 10pm. She would not have met the accident if
only she acted with care and caution.
And, countered the claim that not medical assistance was given. When records
show that hotel staff and nurses gave first aid. And were willing to extend their
assistance but petitioner declined and opted only for Hirudoid cream.
Further, Records revealed no indication of the head injury was a result of the
accident. When petitioner herself has a past medical history which caused her
brain injury. There seemed to be no proof of the connection between the injury
sustained and her affliction.
CA affirmed the RTC decision
ISSUE: WON PHIL. HOTELIERS INC. and DUSIT THANI PUBLIC CO. IS
LIABLE FOR BREACH OF CTONRACT OR ON THE THEORY OF QUASI-
DELICT

RULING/HELD:

Note: NO CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS

She is merely a guest of the guest Delia. Therefore, no contractual relation
between Huang and the Hotel. Theory of Quasi-Delict governs
A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delict or tort,
also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not
otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. Thus, to sustain a claim
liability under quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur:
(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff;
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he
must respond; and
(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
Viewed from the foregoing, the question now is whether respondents PHI and
DTPCI and its employees were negligent?

Based on requisites.
A - Plaintiff suffered head injury
B - Was there negligence from the hotel's side?
1: She was aware that the pool was only up until 7pm
2: She admitted that she lifted the wooden bar counter top which fell on her
head. (contrary to her claim something fell on her head suddenly)
3: The area was not totally dark rendering her blind as she was still able to
search for a phone without bumping, sliding or hitting something thanks to the
residual light available in the area.

The conclusion is that the proximate and immediate cause of her injury is her
own negligence.
It bears stressing that in civil cases, the law requires that the party who alleges a
fact and substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of
proving it. Hence, for petitioner to be entitled to damages, she must show that
she had suffered an actionable injury. Regrettably, petitioner failed in this regard.
SC differentiated Culpa Contractual and Culpa Aquiliana
In that regard, this Court finds it significant to take note of the following
differences between quasi-delict (culpa aquilina) and breach of contract (culpa
contractual). In quasi-delict, negligence is direct, substantive and independent,
while in breach of contract, negligence is merely incidental to the performance of
the contractual obligation; there is a pre-existing contract or [Link] quasi-
delict, the defense of "good father of a family" is a complete and proper defense
insofar as parents, guardians and employers are concerned, while in breach of
contract, such is not a complete and proper defense in the selection and
supervision of employees. In quasi- delict , there is no presumption of negligence
and it is incumbent upon the injured party to prove the negligence of the
defendant, otherwise, the formers complaint will be dismissed, while in breach of
contract, negligence is presumed so long as it can be proved that there was
breach of the contract and the burden is on the defendant to prove that there was
no negligence in the carrying out of the terms of the contract; the rule of
respondeat superior is followed.

In the absence of negligence on the part of respondents PHI and DTPCI, as well
as their management and staff, they cannot be made Iiable to pay for the millions
of damages prayed for by the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision and Resolution or the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87065 dated 9 August 2007 and 5
November 2007, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED
TOPIC: NEGLIGENCE AS PROXIMATE CAUSE
TITLE:
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS: Oct. 23, 1980, Petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield in
Pangasinan (100meters away from Marcelo Javier's Tobacco Field) and found that
his stored palay was flooded with water from the nearby irrigation canal. Urbano
went to investigate and found Marcelo and Emilio cutting grass. When asked who
opened the canal, Javier admitted that it was himself. Urbano got angry and
demanded payment for the soaked palay.
A quarrel ensued and Urbano unsheathed his bolo and hacked Javier hitting him
on the right palm as Javier was parrying. Javier tried to run away but Urbano
caught up and hacked Javier's Left leg with the back of the bolo. Urbano could not
hack further because Javier's daughter intervention.

Erfe and Javier went to the police station to report the incident. And had Javier
brought to the Doctor.
Oct 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences.
1am, Nov. 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Hospital (Nazareth General) due to
a serious condition. Javier had lockjaw and convulsions which was later found to
be caused by tetanus toxin. Which could have been caused by the infected wound
on Javier's palm. Javier died the next day.
Urbano was charged with homicide
RTC found him guilty ruling that Javier's death was the natural and logical
consequence of Urbano's unlawful act
IAC affirmed the conviction on appeal.

Determined, The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate

cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that
Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got
infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and
tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to
harmful elements like tetanus germs.
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by
Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the
wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already
healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment,
somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound was
infected is not clear from the record.
ISSUE: WON THERE WAS EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE FROM THE
TIME JAVIER WAS WOUNDED (HACKED) UNTIL HIS DEATH

RULING/HELD: YES

The court looked into the nature of tetanus and found that tetanous

The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and

the appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days.
However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14
days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when
symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate
approaches 100 percent.
Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability,
and headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest
presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or
back and difficulty swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way
to rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty opening their
mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest manifestation of tetanus
and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As
more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and
sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and
sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small
proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the
region of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are
involved to some degree, and the signs and symptoms encountered
depend upon the major muscle groups affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first
symptom, an interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case of
the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a poor
prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent
stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and causes
simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their
antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the
disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more
intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency.
Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of
respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may
then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14
days and an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually
present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief
 and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter
incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and
generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate
even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short
incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus,
dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive
spasms.
(tetanous incubation period time between the injury and the symptoms ranges
from 2-56 days. But most patients show symptoms within 2weeks. In the case, If
the tentanous toxin was so severe then he should have died within 1-3 days, if
severe or showed signs on the within 14 days.)

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when
he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on
October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the
symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day,
November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected
by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should
have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of
tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14
days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have
been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset
time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted
by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the
hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his
wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days
before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v.
Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof
that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility
that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later
or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection
was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but
the remote  cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take
necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause
of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.
Note: The criminal liability here is limited due to the amicable settlement
previously done
The court's discussion on proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the
criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that
the petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a
person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of
the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
TOPIC: PRESCRIPTION
TITLE:
G.R. No. L-83524 October 13, 1989
ERNESTO KRAMER, JR. and MARIA KRAMER, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES,
INC., respondents.
FACTS: Apr. 8, 1976, F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by petitioners Ernesto
Kramer Jr. and Marta Kramer was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila.
It collided with a inter-island vessel, M/V Asia Philippines owned by Trans-Asia
Shipping Lines(TASL), Inc. Marjolea sank.
Captains of both vessel filed their respective marin protests with the Board of
Marine Inquiry of the Phil. Coast Guard. The Board conducted an investigation to
determine Proximate cause of the marine collision.
Oct. 19, 1981, It concluded that TASL employees were negligent. Thefinding
made by the Board served as a basis to suspend the second mate from pursuing
his profession as a marine officer.
May 30, 1985, The Kramers instituted a complaint for damages against the
private respondent
Respondent TASL moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription.
Citing Art 1146 of the CC, which stated that the prescriptive period for a
complaint for damages is 4years. He claimed that the petitioners should have
filed their claim within 4years from the date when their cause of action accrued.
For their part, the Kramer's contended that maritime collisions have
peculiarities and characteristics which only persons with special skill,
training and experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry
can properly analyze and resolve. The petitioners argued that the
running of the prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the marine
protest and that their cause of action accrued only on April 29, 1982, the
date when the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the
M/V Asia Philippines had become final, and that the four-year
prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be
computed from the said date. The petitioners concluded that inasmuch as
the Complaint was filed on May 30, 1985, the same was seasonably filed
Trial Court: Ruled that the prescriptive period is deemed to have run only from
April 29, 1982, the date when the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia
Philippines had been finally ascertained.
Respondents elevated the case to the CA. Which ordered the RTC to dismiss the
complaint ( prescriptive period started from the occurrence of the mishap)
Petitioners filed for reconsideration

ISSUE: WON PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD RUNS FROM THE OCCURANCE OF

THE MISHAP OR AFTER RENDERING OF THE COURTS DECISION
RULING: PERIOD RUNS FROM OCCURANCE OF THE MISHAP

Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be
instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the
quasi-delict is committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia,this Court ruled that in an action
for damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks, the action being based on
a quasi-delict, the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day
of the collision.
In Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, this Court held as
follows-
The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which
consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an
obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and c) an
act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of
the plaintiff ... It is only when the last element occurs or takes place
that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen ... .
From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted
when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission
of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when
the cause of action arises.
It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of
two (2) vessels the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the
day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an
administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused
by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for
damages.

Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has
prescribed. The collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages
was filed iii court only on May 30, 1 985, was beyond the four (4) year
prescriptive period.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: OWNERS OR MANAGERS OF ENTERPRISES/EMPLOYERS
TITLE:
G.R. No. 173870               April 25, 2012
OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
GERONIMO BACOY, Guardian and representing the children, namely:
MARY MARJORIE B. MONSALUD, ERIC B. MONSALUD, METZIE ANN B.
MONSALUD, KAREEN B. MONSALUD, LEONARDO B. MONSALUD, JR., and
CRISTINA B. MONSALUD, Respondents.

FACTS:
At New Years Dawn, Emilia Bacoy Monsalud, spouse Leonardo Monsalud Sr. and
Daugher Glenda when on their way home form a Christmas party. They were run
over by a Fuso Passenger Jeep which was driven by Allan Maglasang. The jeep
was registered under Oscar del Carmen Jr's Name.
Allan was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide
Emilia's father filed an independent civil action for damages based on culpa
Aquiliana. on behalf of the 6 minor children of the Monsaluds against Allan and
impleaded his employeres, Sps. Carmen. For reimbursement of funeral and burial
expenses. (atty. Fees, Moral, Exemplary damages, loss of net income earnings
from Emilia who was a public school teacher.

Defendants refused the assume civil liability for the victims death. They claim that
there is no cause of action against them because they do not own the jeep nor do
they employ Allan. They claim that Allan and friends stole the jeep as it was
parked beside the house of their driver. They claim that the jeep can be started
by pushing the ignition key albeit no headlights could be turned on this way.

There was no headlights turned on at the time of the accident.

Allan was found to be the Jeepney drivers brother and was actually the
conductor. But was later fired due to the accident.

RTC: found Sps. Carmen not civilly liable for insufficiency of evidence but their
sun Oscar Jr. was held liable in a subsidiary capacity.
It ratiocinated that Oscar Jr., as the registered owner of the jeep, managed and
controlled the same through his driver Rodrigo, in whose house the jeep was
usually parked. Since both Oscar Jr. and Rodrigo were well aware that the jeep
could easily be started by a mere push even without the ignition key, they should
have taken the necessary precaution to prevent the vehicle from being used by
unauthorized persons like Allan. The RTC thus concluded that such lack of proper
precaution, due care and foresight constitute negligence making the registered
owner of the vehicle civilly liable for the damage caused by the same
Oscar moved for reconsideration contending that the provision on vicarious
liability of the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code requires the
existence of employer-employee relationship and that the employee was acting
within the scope of his employment when the tort occurred. He stressed that
even assuming that Allan was his employee, he was hired not as a driver but as a
conductor. Hence, Allan acted beyond the scope of his employment when he
drove the jeep.

RTC set aside its previous decision to make Oscar Jr. civilly liable

Geronimo appealed. CA Granted the appeal.

CA adjudged Oscar Jr. liable to the heirs of the victims based on the
principle that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily
responsible for the injuries or death of third parties caused by the
operation of such vehicle.
Oscar Jr. is deemed to have given Allan the implied permission to use the subject
vehicle. To support its conclusion, the CA cited the following circumstances:
siblings Rodrigo and Allan were both employees assigned to the said jeep, there
was no safely measure or restriction on the vehicle despite the fact that it can be
started without keys

ISSUE: WON OSCAR CAN BE HELD LIABLE FOR DAMAGES WHEN

EMPLOYEE ACTED OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF HIS TASKS

RULING/HELD: YES

Petitioner’s own evidence casts doubt on his claim that his jeep was stolen by
Allan and his alleged cohorts. Negligence is presumed under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur.
Oscar Jr.’s core defense to release him from responsibility for the death of the
Monsaluds is that his jeep was stolen. He highlights that the unauthorized taking
of the jeep from the parking area was indeed carried out by the clandestine and
concerted efforts of Allan and his five companions, notwithstanding the obstacles
surrounding the parking area and the weight of the jeep.

Notably, the carnapping case filed against Allan and his group was already
dismissed by the RTC for insufficiency of evidence. But even in this civil case and
as correctly concluded by the CA, the evidentiary standard of preponderance of
evidence required was likewise not met to support Oscar Jr.’s claim that his jeep
was unlawfully taken
Assuming arguendo that Allan stole the jeep by having the same pushed by a
group, the ignition key should then be with Rodrigo as he was entrusted with the
jeep’s possession. Thus, at the time Rodrigo faced his employer hours after the
incident, it is reasonable to expect that the driver should have also returned the
key to the operator together with the Official Receipt and Certificate of
Registration. Notably, Rodrigo did not do so and instead, the key was allegedly
handed over to the police for reasons unexplained and not available from the
records.

Oscar Jr. alleges that the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur (literally, the thing speaks for itself) should not have been applied
because he was vigilant in securing his vehicle. He claims that the jeep was
parked in a well secured area not remote to the watchful senses of its driver
Rodrigo.
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, "[w]here the thing that caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his
servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if
those who had management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence – in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by
defendant – that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want
of care."Res ipsa loquitur is "merely evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a mere
procedural convenience, since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff
of, the burden of producing a specific proof of negligence."It "recognizes that
parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct proof, thus, it allows
the principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence. It permits the plaintiff
to present along with proof of the accident, enough of the attending
circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create an inference or presumption of
negligence and thereby place on the defendant the burden of proving that there
was no negligence on his part."The doctrine is based partly on "the theory that
the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either
knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it
while the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and is therefore compelled to allege
negligence in general terms."
The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as established by jurisprudence
are as follows:
1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone
is negligent;
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in
charge and
3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.
The above requisites are all present in this case. First, no person just walking
along the road would suddenly be sideswiped and run over by an on-rushing
vehicle unless the one in charge of the said vehicle had been negligent. Second,
the jeep which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of Oscar Jr. as
its owner. When Oscar Jr. entrusted the ignition key to Rodrigo, he had the power
to instruct him with regard to the specific restrictions of the jeep’s use, including
who or who may not drive it. As he is aware that the jeep may run without the
ignition key, he also has the responsibility to park it safely and securely and to
instruct his driver Rodrigo to observe the same precaution. Lastly, there was no
showing that the death of the victims was due to any voluntary action or
contribution on their part.
The aforementioned requisites having been met, there now arises a presumption
of negligence against Oscar Jr. which he could have overcome by evidence that
he exercised due care and diligence in preventing strangers from using his jeep.
Unfortunately, he failed to do so.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED.