PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW

By

ISAGANI A CRUZ
Associate Justice
(1986-1994)
Supreme Court of the Philippines

CARLO L. CRUZ
Professorial Lecturer
College of Law, Lyceum of the Philippines University
College of Law, University of the Philippines

Bar Review Lecturer

Jurists Bar Review Center
College of Law, Lyceum of the Philippines University
UP Law Center

2014 Edition
 FOREWORD

ON FEBRUARY22, 1986, after almost thirteen years of

oppression and repression, the light at the end of the
tunnel glowed fitfully but hopefully to signal the advent
of a new liberation for the Filipino people. That was the
day Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and the Deputy
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
General Fidel V. Ramos, burrowed themselves at Camp
Crame and proclaimed their defiance of President Mar-
cos, whom they accused of rigging the election held on
February 7, 1986. The real winner, they said, was Cora-
zon C. Aquino, the unassuming widow who had
launched a charismatic campaign against the Marcos
regime and received throughout the land a response
that can only be described as phenomenal. Marcos was
asked to respect the mandate of the electorate and step
down in favor of the legitimate choiceof the people.
The announcement stunned, then electrified, the
nation. Before long, a crowd of civilians from all walks of
life-the rich mingling with the slum-dwellers, children
in the care of grandparents, nuns and housewives hold-
ing vigil with doctors and jeepney drivers, students
pitching makeshift tents with their professors, every
single one of them sharing a commonobsession for free-
dom-gathered in front of the military camp to give
support and protection to the men inside. The military
was no less affected and inspired. Generals began de-
fecting with their men to the endangered citadel. The
onlookers were at first alarmed, then thrilled, when
several helicopters landed, not to fight, as it turned out,
but to pledge their support for the outnumbered rebels.
Soon millions had massed at the gates of Camp Crame
and the nearby Camp Aguinaldo, to form a human
shield and buffer against the expected onslaughts of the

iii
 Toward this end, she created a Constitutional Com-
mission which undertook the framing of a new charter
"truly reflective of the ideals and aspirations of the Fili-
pino people." The draft charter, hammered out for more
than four months, was submitted to the electorate in a
plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, and was ratified
with a comfortable margin, due largely to a desire for
stability and normal government rather than to the
intrinsic merits of the document.
It is this Constitution of 1987 that will serve as the
basis of the eighth revision of this book on the political
structure of the Republic of the Philippines. If there
were these many revisions before, it was because the old
Constitution changed with the fickle whims and designs
of the deposed dictator. It is hoped that this time, there
will be more permanence in the new Constitution, and it
w:i.11 remain, as it ought to be, "firm and immovable, like
a mountain amidst the strife of storms or a rock in the
ocean amidst the ranging of the waves."
In a way then, this book is beginning again, not
with a mere revision but with a first edition.

ISAGANI A. CRUZ

May 3, 1987

v
... and

for SALLY
beautiful and beloved

... from the blessed and bountiful beyond.

vii
more assertive of its independence and role as "not only
the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the con-
science of the government."
Important new decisions on executive privilege, as
invoked against the legislative prerogative of investiga-
tion, the President's appointment, control, diplomatic and
military powers, and the Legislature's exercise of its law-
making and non-legislative powers, including its power of
impeachment, are also discussed in this edition.
Principles pertinent to the Constitutional Commis-
sions, as either promulgated or clarified by the Supreme
Court, are likewise presented along with segments on
the greater participation of the people in our democratic
government, as intended in our Constitution.
The undersigned has written these changes in this
book with every intention of remaining consistent with,
if not absolutely faithful to, the views of the author, his
teacher and idol, as expressed and discussed by him
during his final years. It is hoped that the reader would
consider this new edition as a continuation of the au-
thor's legacy of masterful mentorship in the field of Phil-
ippine Political Law, which he started in his first edition
of this book almost forty years ago.
That first edition was dedicated by the author to
his children. He there, and then, expressed his hope that
they will help burnish the nation's future with their in-
violate ideals, their unflappable faith, and their not im-
possible dreams. That dedication is retained in this edi-
tion as his continuing prayer for his offspring, and, in
turn, as their affirmation, made with profound grati-
tude, that, as to the hopes their father held for them
when they were young, all is well.

CARLO L. CRUZ
October 11, 2013

ix
 PRAYER
delivered on July 23, 1986
at the Constitutional Commission
by
J.B. LAUREL, Jr.
Commissioner
Almighty God, even as the eagle flies at will in the in-
finite reaches of the skies, let our vision soar untrammeled as
we seek that radiant future we hope to ensure for our people
in the Constitution we are writing.
Let it be a future where all persons are born free, rel-
ishing their rights but always with deference to the rights of
others and recognizing authority as long as its highest com-
mitment is to the strengthening and defense ofliberty.
Grant that the spirit of freedom shall always reign in
our land, touching one and all like a benediction and igniting
that divine spark in every human being that can make him,
indeed, slightly "lower than angels" in this imperfect world.
Grant us courage, that we may face up to the powerful
and defend those who are weak and oppressed.
Grant us wisdom, that we may distinguish between
what is right and what is just, for they are not always the
same.
Grant us candor, that we may be true to ourselves and
so not be false to others.
Grant us strength when we are assailed by despair, or
self-doubt, or temptation.
And finally, Lord, grant the new Constitution grace and
beauty oflanguage, so that generations from now, when all of
us here are gone, our people will still be moving reverently to
the cadence of its thoughts.
Bless us all, Eternal Spirit, and keep us free, forever and
ever.
Amen.

xi
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Chapter 1

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Scope of the Study............................................................................... 1

Necessity for the Study 1
Basis of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. .. . .. . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. 2
Background of the Study 3

Chapter 2

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PIDLIPPINES

Outstanding Features 13
The Supremacy of the Constitution 16
Prospects of the Constitution 16

Chapter 3

THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

Definition 17
Elements 18
People
(1) , .. : 21
Territory
(2) 22
(3) Government 33
A. Functions 33
B. Doctrine of Parens Patriae 37
C. De Jure and De Facto Governments 40
D. Government of the Philippines 42
E. Administration 42
(4) Sovereignty 43
Act of State 47

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Page

Chapter 7

DELEGATION OF POWERS

Permissible Delegation 162

(1) Tariff Powers 162
(2) Emergency Powers .. . .. . .. 163
(3) Delegation to the People 171
(4) Delegation to Local Governments 172
(5) Delegation to Administrative Bodies 173
Tests ofDelegation 175
(1) The Completeness Test 176
(2) The Sufficient Standard Test 178
The Pelaez Case 182

Chapter 8

THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

The Senate : 186

(1) Composition 186
(2) Qualifications 187
Term 196
The House of Representatives 200
(1) Composition 200
(A) The District Representatives 201
(B) The Party-list Representatives 205
(2) Qualifications 215
(3) Term 222
Election 225
Salaries 226
Parliamentary Immunities 227
(1) Privilege from Arrest 228
(2) Privilege of Speech and Debate 229
Conflict of Interest 233
Incompatible and Forbidden Offices 233
Inhibitions and Disqualifications 236
Sessions 239
Officers 241
Quon1m 241
Discipline of Members 243
Journals 245

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Page

Executive Privilege 366

Presidential Immunity 376

Chapter 11

POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

The Appointing Power 389

(1) The Removal Power 407.
The Control Power 409
The "Take-Care" Clause 419
The Military Power 421
(1) Command of the Armed Forces 424
(2) Habeas Corpus 434
(3) Martial Law 438
(4) Limitations on the Military Powers 439
The Pardoning Power 443
(1) Definitions 444
(2) Limitations 444
(3) Kinds of Pardon 445
(4) Effects of Pardon 448
(5) Distinctions 453
(6) Amnesty 453
The Borrowing Power 455
The Diplomatic Power 457
The Budgetary Power 462
The Informing Power 463
Other Powers 464
Resume 464

Chapter 12

THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Independence of the Judiciary 467

Judicial Power 468
Jurisdiction 474
Appointments 4 74
(1) Qualifications 475
(2) The Judicial and Bar Council................................. 476
Fiscal Autonomy 481
Composition of the Supreme Court 485

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Page

(1) Exceptions 621

Security of Tenure 624
Partisan Political Activity 629
Self-organization 634
Temporary Employees 636
Objectives of the Civil Service 638
Oath 641
Disqualifications 641
Standardization of Compensation 646
Double Compensation 647 .

Chapter 15

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Composition and Qualifications 652

Powers and Functions 654
(I) Enforcement of Election Laws 654
(2) Decision of Election Contests 681
(3) Decision of Administrative Questions 689
(4) Deputization of Law-Enforcement Agencies 690
(5) Registration of Political Parties 691
(6) Improvement of Elections 700
Election Period 701
Party System 702
Funds , 704
Judicial Review 705

Chapter 16

THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Composition and Qualifications 709

Powers and Functions 710
Prohibited Exemptions 725
Report 727

Chapter 17

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Impeachment 730

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Page

Priority Measures 833

Sequestration 834
Salaries 835

APPENDICES

A. The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines 837

B. The 1973 Constitution 917
C. Ordinance Appended to the Constitution Apportioning
the Members of the Batasang Pambansa to the Differ-
ent Provinces with their Component Cities, Highly
Urbanized Cities, and the Districts of Metropolitan
Manila 956
D. The 1935 Constitution 959

--oOo--

xxi
 TABLE OF CASES

Page

Abainza v. Arellano, G.R. No. 181644, December 8, 2008,

573 SCRA 332 662
Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168056,
September 1, 2005, 469 SCRA 1 160, 177, 178, 179
Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715
August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251 275, 290, 729
Abanilla v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 142347, Au-
gust 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 87 721
Abayon v. COMELEC and Raul Daza, G.R. No. 181295,
April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 473 663
Abayon v. HRET, G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010,
612 SCRA 375 214
Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 164 SCRA 651.. 252
ABC Party List v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193256, March
22, 2011, 646 SCRA 93 698
Abella v. Larrazabal, G.R. Nos. 87721-30 & 88004,
December 21, 1989, 180 SCRA 509 658
Abella vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 100710, September 3,
1991, 201 SCRA 253 664
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 133347, October 15, 2008,
569 SCRA 59 : 765
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Phil. Multi-Media
Inc., G.R. Nos. 175769-70, January 19, 2009, 576
SCRA 262 129, 520, 524
Abueva v. Wood, 45 Phil. 612 144
Abundo v. COMELEC G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013,
688 SCRA 149 223
ACCFA v. Federation of Labor Unions, 30 SCRA 649 35
Achacoso v. Macaraig, G.R. No. 93023, March 13, 1991,
195 SCRA 235 621
Adaza v. Pacana, 135 SCRA 431 234
Adolfo v. CFI ofZambales, G.R. No. L-30650, July 31,
1970, 34 SCRA 166 460

xxiii
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Page

Atienza v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188920, February 16,

2010, 612 SCRA 761 699
Atienza v. Villarosa, G.R. No. 161081, May 10, 2005,
458 SCRA 385 503
Atizado v. People, G.R. No. 173822, October 13, 2010, 633
SCRA 105 273
Atizado v. People, G.R. No. 173822, October 13, 2010, 633
SCRA 105 108
Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013, 694 SCRA
477 158, 206, 209, 215, 473, 696
Atty. De Vera v. Judge Layague, 395 Phil. 253 (2000) 780
Austria v. Amante, 79 Phil. 780 390
Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17 150, 242
Aytona v. Castillo, 4 SCRA 1.. 146, 405
Azarcon v. Sandiganhayan, G.R. No. 116033,
February 26, 1997, 268 SCRA 747 752
Aznar v. HRET, G.R. No. 65000, January 9, 1990 254

Bacolod City Water District v. Bayona, G.R. No. 168780,

November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 518 610
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176970, December 8,
2008, 573 SCRA 290 204, 538
Balaba v. People, G.R. No. 169519, July 17, 2009, 593
SCRA 210 754
Balao v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 186050, December
13, 2011, 662 SCRA 312 434
Balbastro v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 171481,
June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 729 778
Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation v. Pacana,
G.R. No. 171673, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 196 75
BANATv. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177508, August 7,
2009, 595 SCRA 477 263, 281, 677, 678
BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009,
586 SCRA 210 214
BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009,
592 SCRA 294 208, 212, 697
Banda v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010,
618 SCRA 488 384

xxvii
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Page

Besa v. PNB, 33 SCRA 330 622

Betoy v. Board of Directors, National Power Corporation,
G.R. Nos. 156556-57, October 4, 2011, 658 SCRA
420 363, 393, 628
Bibas v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 172580, July 23, 2008,
559 SCRA 591 730
Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154 392
Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,
G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78 420
Blanco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180164, June 17, 2008,
554 SCRA 755 605, 680
Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110503, August 4,
1994, 235 SCRA 103 754
Bolinao Electronics Corp. v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 288
Boncalon v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 171812, December 24,
2008, 575 SCRA 449 778
Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 255
Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. The Province of Aldan, G.R.
No. 196870, June 26, 2012, 674 SCRA 555 473
Borja v. People, G.R. No. 164298, April 30, 2008,
553 SCRA 250 610
Borlongan v. Buenaventura, G.R. No. 167234, February
27, 2006, 483 SCRA 405 780
Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 1.. 575
Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 177131, June 7, 2011, 651 SCRA 146 723
Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 80767, April 22, 1991, 196
SCRA 176 615
Brillante v. Puyat-Reyes, House Electoral Tribunal
Case No. 31 (1988) 188, 216
Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358 600
British American Tobacco v. Camacho, G.R. No. 163583,
August 20, 562 SCRA 511 320, 546
British American Tobacco v. Camacho, G.R. No. 163583,
April 15, 2009, 585 SCRA 36 320
Buac v. COMELEC, 465 Phil. 800, 810 (2004) 341
Buehs v. Bacatan, A.C. No. 6674, June 30, 2009,
591 SCRA 217 563
Buencamino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 175895, 12
April 2007, 520 SCRA 79'/ 779
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, G.R. Nos. 142801-
802, July 10, 2001, 360 SCRA 718 385

xxix
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Page

Casco Phil. Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 374 246

Casibang v. Aquino, 92 SCRA 642 140
Casing v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 192334, June 13, 2012,
672 SCRA 500 766
Casino Labor Association v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
141020, June 12, 2008, 554 SCRA 323 610
Castillo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 187231, June 22, 2010,
621 SCRA 499 553, 684
Castriciones v. Chief of Staff Armed Forces of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 65731, September 28, 1989
(Minute Resolution) 437
Castro v. Deloria, G.R. No. 163586, January 27, 2009,
577 SCRA 20 530
Castro, Jr., et al. v. Castaneda and Liceralde, 111 Phil.
765 (1961) 766
Cavite Crusade for Good Government v. Cajigal,
422 Phil. 1, 9 (2001) 795
Cayat v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163776,
April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 23 666, 668
Cayetano v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193846,
April 12, 2011, 648 SCRA 561... 604, 686, 687, 707
Cervantes v. Auditor General, 91 Phil. 359 179
Cesa v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 166658, April 30, 2008,
553 SCRA 357 778
Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008,
545 SCRA 441 517
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242,
July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 579 477, 519, 532
Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Govern-
ment, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998, 299
SCRA 744 370
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250,
July 9, 2002, 433 Phil. 506, 534 (2002), 384
SCRA 152 299, 371
Chevron Philippines, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs, G.R. No. 178759, August 11, 2008, 561
SCRA 710 548
China National Machinery & Equipment Corporation
v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No. 185572, February 7,
2012, fififi RC:RA 189 .. .,..... .. ........ ., . 50, 51, 52, 58, 66, 458
Chua-Qua v. Ciave, G.R. No. 49549, August 30, 1990,
189 SCRA 117 87

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Commission on Elections v. Cruz, G.R. No. 186616,

November 20, 2009, 605 SCRA 167 152, 282, 472
Commission on Elections v. Espanol, G.R. Nos. 149164-
73, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 554, 565 679
Commissioner oflnternal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,
240 SCRA 368 (1995) 639
Commissioner oflnternal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 107135, February 23, 1999, 303 SCRA 508 312
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Eastern Telecom-
munications Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 163835, 7 July
2010, 624 SCRA 340 323
Commissioner oflnternal Revenue v. General Foods
(Phils.), Inc., 401 SCRA 545 547
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine
American Accident Insurance Company, Inc.,
453 SCRA 668 548
Connally v. Scudder, 160 N.E. 655 134
Constantino v. People, G.R. No. 140656, September 13,
2007, 533 SCRA 205 501, 506
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v.
Montano, G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009, 603
SCRA 621 104
Cordillera Broad Coalition v. Commission on Audit,
181 SCRA 495 522
Cornejov. Gabriel, 41 Phil. 188, 193-194 (1920) 729
Corona v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200242,
July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 563 730, 749
Corpus v. Cuaderno, G.R. No. L-23721, March 31, 1965,
13 SCRA 591 629
Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance
Company, G.R. No. 179488, April 23, 2012, 670
SCRA 343 521
CREBA v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No.
183409, June 18, 2010, 621 SCRA 295 537, 538
Crespo v. Mogul, No. L-53373, June 30, 1987, 151
SCRA 462 767
Cruz v, Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234 175, 176
Cua v. COMELEC, 156 SCRA 582 605
Cuenco v. Fernan, A.C. No. 3135, February 17,
1988, 158 SCRA 29 : 738
Culanag v. Director of Prisons, 20 SCRA 1123 446
Cunanan v. Tan, 5 SCRA 1. ,. 265
Custodio v. Senate President, 42 O.G. 1243 14 7, 509

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De la Paz v. Senate, G.R. No. 184849, February 13, 2009,

579 SCRA 521 298, 300
De Leon v. Carpio, 178 SCRA 457 418
Delos Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
223 SCRA 1. 51, 61, 62, 63
Delos Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 622, 624
Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, P.E.T. Case No. 001,
February 13, 1996, 253 SCRA 559 344
Delector v. Ogayan, 123 SCRA 774 636
Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 86899-903,
May 15, 1989, 173 SCRA 409, 419 753
Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 311, 525
Dept. of Education v. San Diego, 180 SCRA 533 107
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon v. Franciso, G.R. No.
172553, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 439 776
Deputy Ombudsman v. Abugan, G.R. No. 168892,
March 24, 2008, 549 SCRA 34 778
Deutsche Gesellschaft Fur Technische Zusammenarbeit
(GTZ) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152318,
April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 150 52, 58
Dimagiba v. Espartero, G.R. No. 154952, July 16, 2012,
676 SCRA 420 650, 777
Dimaporo v. COMELEC, 544 SCRA 381 259
Dimayuga v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 174763,
April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 220 687
Dino v. Olivarez, G.R. No. 170447, December 4, 2009, 607
SCRA 251 679
Dinsay v. Cioco, 264 SCRA 703 (1996) 780
District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 US 203 85
Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc.,
G.R. No. 162272, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 213 170, 383
Domingo v. Zamora, G.R. No. 142283, February 6, 2003,
397 SCRA 56 385
Domino vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 134015,
July 19, 1999, 310 SCRA 546 189, 664
Dra. Baylon v. Fact-Finding Intelligence Bureau,
442 Phil. 217 (2002) 584
Drillon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135 410
Duarte v. Dade, 32 Phil. 36, 49 (1915) 272
Duenas v. HRET, G.R. No. 185401, July 21, 2009,
593 SCRA 316 254
Duenas v. HRET, G.R. No. 191550, May 4, 2010,
620 SCRA 78 254

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Estrada v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, Mar. 2, 2001,

353 SCRA 452 352
Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001,
353 SCRA452 376, 767
Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15, April 3, 2001,
406 Phil. 1 (2001), 356 SCRA 108 152, 472
Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006,
492 SCRA 1 86
Estrella v. COMELEC, _G.R. No. 160465, May 27, 2004,
429 SCRA 789 606, 653
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. v. Court of Appeals,
247 Phil. 387, 394 (1988) 538
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1.. 85
Executive Judge Basilia v. Judge Becamon, 487
Phil. 490 (2004) 780
Executive Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc.,
G.R. No. 164171, March 1, 2006, 482 SCRA 673 175
Ex-Parte Levitt, 303 U.S. 633 506, 508
Ex-Parte Milligan, 4 Wall, 127, [Link]., 297 428, 435

Fabella v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 940 (1997) 771

Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16,
1998, 295 SCRA 470 278, 776
Facura v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166495,
February 16, 2011, 643 SCRA 427 778, 779, 780
Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Court of Appeals,
477 SCRA 49 547
Farinas v. Executive Secretary, 417 SCRA 503 282
Farolan v. Court of Tax Appeals, 217 SCRA 298 72, 75
Federation of Free Farmers v. CA, G.R. No. L-41222,
November 13, 1985 587
Federico v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 199612,
January 22, 2013, 689 SCRA 134 661
Feliciano v. Aranez, G.R. No. 165641, August 25, 2010,
629 SCRA 103 723
Feliciano v. Commission on Audit, 464 Phil. 439 236
Feria v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 122954,
February 15, 2000, 325 SCRA 525........................................ 4::l7
Fermin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 179695
and 182369, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 782 660, 676

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Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 120295

& 123755, June 28, 1996, 257 SCRA 727, G.R. No.
87193, June 23, 1989, 174 SCRA 245 658
Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., G.R. No. L-6060,
September 30, 1950 63
Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, G.R. No.
124295, October 23, 2001, 368 SCRA 36 561
Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013,
691 SCRA 196 363
Funa v. Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010,
612 SCRA 308 362, 505
Funa v. The Chairman, Commission on Audit, G.R.
No. 192791, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 579 501, 598

Gachon v. Devera, Jr., G.R. No. 116695, June 20, 1997,

274 SCRA 540 587
Galang v. Geronimo, G.R. No. 192793, February 22,
2011, 643 SCRA 631 685
Galero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151121, July 21,
2008, 559 SCRA 11 778
Galicto v. Aquino, G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012,
667 SCRA 150 158, 386, 498, 520
Gallardo-Corre v. Gallardo, G.R. No. 136228, January 30,
2001, 350 SCRA 568 583
Gamboa v. Finance Secretary, G.R. No. 176579,
June 28, 2011, 652 SCRA 690 123
Gamogamo v. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corpora-
tion, G.R. No. 141707, May 7, 2002, 431 Phil. 510,
381 SCRA 742 617
Ganaden v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 169359-61, June 1,
2011, 650 SCRA 76 765
Garcea v. Estenzo, 104 SCRA 510 316
Garcia v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
'75025, September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 356 450
Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120 54
Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013 85, 110
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 157584,
April 2, 200!), fi83 SCRA 119 491, G22
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 198554,
July 30, 2012, 677 SCRA 750 119, 237, 425, 429, 543, 544
Garcia v. Mata, 65 SCRA 520 309

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Grego v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 125955, June

19, 1997, 274 SCRA 481 602, 639, 665
Grino v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 91602,
194 SCRA 458 622
GSIS v. Group Management Corporation, G.R. No.
167000, June 8, 2011, 651 SCRA 279 80
GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS, G.R.
No. 170132, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 622 635
GSIS v. Villaviza, G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010,
625 SCRA 669 635
Guazon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623 515
Gudani v. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006,
498 SCRA 671 119, 299, 433
Guerrero v. COMELEC, 391 Phil. 344, 352 (2000) 257
Guevara v. COMELEC, 104 Phil. 269 689
Guevara v. Gimenez, 6 SCRA 813 715
Guevara v. Inocentes, G.R. No. L-25577, March 15, 1966,
18 SCRA 379 268, 400
Guiao v. Figueroa, 94 Phil. 1018 (1954) 766
Guingona v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191846,
May 6, 2010, 620 SCRA 448 519
Gumaru v. Quirino State College, G.R. No. 164196, June
22, 2007, 525 SCRA 412 583
Gunsi v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168792, February 23,
2009, 580 SCRA 70 495, 501, 658
Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives, G.R. No.
193459, February 15, 2011, 643 SCRA 198 .... 653, 743, 744, 747
Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives, G.R. No.
193459, March 8, 2011, 644 SCRA 804 744

Hacienda Luisita Incorporated.v, Luisita Industrial

Park Corporation, G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011,
653 SCRA 154 148, 496, 520, 522
Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, November 22,
2011, 660 SCRA 525 530, 734
Hagad v. Gazo Dadole, 321 Phil. 604 (1995) 626, 775, 776
Halley v. Printwell, Inc., G.R. No. 157549, May 30, 2011,
649 .SCRA 116 574
Hegerty v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 542 (2003) 765

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In Re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 139

In Re Torres, G.R. No. 122338, Dec. 29, 1996 447
In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation
from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees, A.M. No.
05-10-20-SC, March 10, 2010, 615 SCRA 1 76, 555
In Re: Raul M. Gonzales, A.M. No. 88-4-5433, April 15,
1988, 160 SCRA 771 738
In the Matter of Clarification of Exemption from Pay-
ment of All Court and Sheriff's Fees, A.M. No.
12-2-03-0, March 13, 2012, 688 SCRA i.. 483, 555
In the Matter of the Petition for Disqualification of Tess
Dumpit-Michelena, G.R. Nos. 163619-20, November
17, 2005, 475 SCRA 290, 303 189
In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo
and the Writ of Habeas Data in Favor of Francis
Saez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183533,
September 25, 2012, 681 SCRA 678 377, 433
Infante v. Prov. Warden, 92 Phil. 310 446
Ingles v. Mutuc, 135 Phil. 177 (1968) 624
Ingles v. Mutuc, 26 SCRA 171. 409
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza, G.R. No.
175241, February 24, 2010, 613 SCRA 523 505
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,
338 SCRA 81. 430, 471, 515
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil.
618, 634 (2000) 539
Inting v. Tanodbayan, 97 SCRA 494 789

Jacob v. Puno, 131 SCRA 144 418

Jacct v. Dal, G.R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008, 572
SCRA 295 218, 802
Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192474,
June 26, 2012, 674 SCRA 530 257
Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192474,
October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 1 257, 659, 668
Jamero v. Melicor, G.R. No. 140929, May 26, 2005,
459 SCRA 113 554
Japzon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180088,
January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 331 189, 218
Jardiel v. COMELEC, 124 SCRA 650 678, 788

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Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 105111

& 105384, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 297 658, 665
Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989,
176 SCRA 664
Lacson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-16261, Dec. 28, 1951 655
Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 165399 and
165475, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 142 770
Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil. 740 402
Lacson v. Roque, 91 Phil. 456 : 381
Lacson v. Sec. Perez, 410 Phil. 78, 93 (2001),
357 SCRA 756 441
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Pano, 21 SCRA 895 416
Lahm v. Mayor, A.C. No. 7430, February 15, 2012, 666
SCRA 1 563
Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 473 712
Lambino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 174153,
October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160 328, 809, 813
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Arceo, G.R. No. 158270,
July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 85 583
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Rivera, G.R. No. 182431,
November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 285 76
Lanot v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 164858, November 16, 2006,
507 SCRA 114 680
Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 150, 436
Lan taco, Sr. v. Llamas, 195 Phil. 325, 334 (1981) 796
Lapid v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 236 (2000) 770
Lastimosa v. Vasquez, 313 Phil. 358 (1995) 776
Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 382, 522
Laurel v. Misa, 76 Phil. 372, 378 (1946) 554
Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856 43, 45
Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary
of Budget, G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012, 670
SCRA 373 155, 493
Lawyers League v. Aquino, G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986 41
Layos v. Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc., G.R. No.
150470, August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 75 581
Layug v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192984,
February 28, 2012, 667 SCRA 135 264, 682, 687, 698
Lazatin v. Desierto, G.R. No. 147097, 5 June 2009,
588 SCRA 285 582
Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, 168 tlL!M ::!91.. 254
League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 176951, November 18, 2008, 571 SCRA 263 197, 249

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Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 502 348

Loomis v. Jackson, 6W, Va. 613 819
Loong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 93986,
December 22, 1992, 216 SCRA 760 658
Lopez v. Civil Service Commission, 194 SCRA 269 402
Lopez v. Delos Reyes, 55 Phil. 170 301
Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756 428
Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 139396,
August 15, 2000, 338 SCRA 62 764
Lorenzo v. Lopez, A.M. No. 2006-02-SC, October 15,
2007, 536SCRA ll 563
Lozada v. Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012,
670 SCRA 545 376
Lozada v. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337 515
Luciano v. Mariano, 148-B Phil. 178 (1971) 753
Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327 402
Luison v. Garcia, 101 Phil. 1218 705
Lung Center of the Philippines v. Quezon City, 433
SCRA 119 322
Luz Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 192
SCRA 51 (1990) 534
Lyons v. United States of America, 104 Phil. 593 64

Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1 246, 820, 824

Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. 157013, July 10, 2003,
453 Phil. 586 (2003), 405 SCRA 614 221, 290
Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
191618, June 7, 2011, 651 SCRA 239 ..... 132, 256, 343, 4 79, 580
Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal,
G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010,
635 SCRA 783 132, 256, 340, 343, 344, 479
Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77 46
Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464 (1993) 560
Macias v. Commission on Elections, 3 SCRA 1 203
Madarangv. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112314,
March 28, 2001, 355 SCRA 525 752
Madriaga v. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No.
192377. July 25, 2012, 677 8r-R.A sso 495, 501
Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011,
655 SCRA 4 76 24, 37, 81, 99
Magarang v. Jardin, Sr., 386 Phil. 273, 284 (2000) 795

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Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Briones, No. L-77210,

September 19, 1988, 165 SCRA 464 4 73
Marcos v. ChiefofStaff, 89 Phil, 246 (1951) 237, 544
Marcos v. COMELEC, 318 Phil. 329, 397 (1995) 257
Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 382
Mari v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 187728, September 12, 2011,
657 SCRA 414 539
Mariano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995,
242 SCRA 211 203
Maribago Bluewater Beach Resort v. Dual, G.R. No.
180660, July 20, 2010, 625 SCRA 147 112
Marohomsalic v. Cole, G.R. No. 169918, February 27,
2008, 547 SCRA 98 : 778
Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 189034, January 12, 2010,
610 SCRA 53 656
Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002,
429 SCRA 554 401, 520
Matute v. Hernandez, 66 Phil. 68 714
Medina v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 176478,
February 4, 2008, 543 SCRA 684 770
Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16,
2005, 451 SCRA 476 769
Mendoza v. Court of First Instance, 65 SCRA 96 574
Mendoza v. Quisumbing, 186 SCRA 108 628
Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999,
367 Phil. 132 (1999) 801, 803
Mercury Drug Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 75662, September 15, 1989,
177 SCRA 580 112
Merritt v. Gov't. of the Phil. Islands, 34 Phil. 311 61, 78
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Reynado,
G.R. No. 164538, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 88 766
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tobias, G.R.
No. 177780, January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA 165 154
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 104
Miguel v. Honorable Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172035,
July 4, 2012, 675 SCRA 560 753
Mijares v. Ranada, G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005,
455 SCRA 397 96
Mlnlsterio v. City of Cebu, 40 SCH.A 464 61
Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999,
311 SCRA 617 661, 666

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National Electrification Administration v. Morales, G.R.

No. 154200, July 24, 2007, 528 SCRA 79 60, 68, 610, 720
National Housing Authority v. City of Iloilo, G.R. No.
172267, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 237 324
National Housing Corporation v. Juco, 134 SCRA 172 609
National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122 609
Nava v. National Bureau of Investigation, Regional
Office No. XI, Davao City, G.R. No. 134509,
April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 377 767
Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011,
648 SCRA 400 202
Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010,
612 SCRA 131 202
Navia v. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012,
673 SCRA 618 98
Nazareth v. Villar, G.R. No. 188635, January 29,
2013, 689 SCRA 385 304, 311, 312
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers, G.R. No. 180643, March
25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77 154, 198, 298, 369, 375
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers, G.R. No. 180643, September
4, 2008, 564 SCRA 152 197, 298, 304, 372, 457
New Frontier Mines v. NLRC, 129 SCRA 502 587
NHMFC v. Abayari, G.R. No. 166508, October 2,
2009, 602 SCRA 242 720
Nicolas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, February 11,
2009, 578 SCRA 438 458, 557
Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162759,
August 4, 2006, 497 SCRA 649 221
Nicos Industrial Corp. v. Court of Appeals,
206 SCRA 127 571, 572
Nieves v. Blanco, G.R. No. 190422, June 19, 2012,
673 SCRA 638 640
Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
152 SCRA 284 585
Noblejas v. Salas, 67 SCRA 4 7 417
Noblejas v. Teehankee, 23 SCRA 405 151
Noceda v. Arbizo-Directo, G.R. No. 178495, July 26,
2010. 625 SCRA 472 581
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 526

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Office of the Ombudsman v. Galicia, G.R. No.

167711, October 10, 2008, 568 SCRA 327 771
Office of the Ombudsman v. Lucero, G.R. No.
168718, November 24, 2006, 508 SCRA 106 769
Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing, G.R. No.
165416, January 22, 2008, 542 SCRA 253 768, 771
Office of the Ombudsman v. Medrano, G.R. No.
177580, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 747 771
Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez,
G.R. No. 172700, July 23, 2010, 625
SCRA 299 753, 762, 768, 769, 774
Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego, G.R. No.
175573, October 5, 2010, 632 SCRA 140 777, 779
Office of the Ombudsman v. Santiago, G.R. No.
161098, September 13, 2007, 533 SCRA 305 768, 769
Office of the Ombudsman v. Torres, G.R. No.
168309, January 29, 2008, 543 SCRA 46 730
Office of the President v. Cataquiz, G.R. No.
183445, September 14, 2011, 657 SCRA 681 572
Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144 427, 528
Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 172224,
January 26, 2011, 640 SCRA 544 777
Ombudsman v. Pelino, G.R. No. 179261, April 18,
2008, 552 SCRA 203 776
Ombudsman v. Racho, G.R. No. 185685, January
31, 2011, 641 SCRA 148 760, 794
Ondoy v. Ignacio, 97 SCRA 252 111
Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 354
Phil. 948 (1998), 293 SCRA 141.. 271, 383
Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993,
224 SCRA 792 36, 83, 127
Orap v. Sandiganbayan, 139 SCRA 252 754, 769, 790
Orosa v. Roa, 527 Phil. 347, 353-354 (2006) 418
Osmeii.a v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 188818,
May 31, 2011, 649 SCRA 654 724
Osmeiia v. Orbos, G.R. No. 99886, March 31, 1993,
220 SCRA 703 722, 727
Osmena v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 147, 230, 244
Oxales v. United Laboratories, Inc., G.R. No.
152991, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 26 112

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People v. Casido, 336 Phil. 344 (1997) 455

People v. Delgado, 189 SCRA 715 709
People v. Fernandez, CA-G.R. No. L-1128 (1945) 316
People v. Gutierrez, 39 SCRA 173 549
People v. Jacinto, G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011,
645 SCRA 590 108
People v. Lagman, 38 O.G. 1676 93
People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20,
2011, 654 SCRA 188 108, 273
People v. Monticalvo, G.R. No. 193507, January 30,
2013, 689 SCRA 715 108, 273
People v. Munar, 53 SCRA 678 521
People v. Pacificador, 406 Phil. 774, 782 (2001) 791
People v. Patriarca, 395 Phil.690 (2000) 455
People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 837 1, 46
People v. Pilotin, 65 SCRA 635 550
People v. Pomar, 46 Phil. 440 805
People v. Ritter, 194 SCRA 690 105
People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 179
People v. Salle, 250 SCRA 581 445
People v. Sandiganbayan, 451 SCRA 413 751
People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 156394,
January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 205 756
People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164185, July 23,
2008, 559 SCRA 449 645
People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169004, Sep-
tember 15, 2010, 630 SCRA 489 751
People v. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, September 10,
2009, 599 SCRA 20 108, 273
People v. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984,
130 SCRA 465 563
Peoplev. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 171, 173, 176, 180, 507, 521
People v. Zosa, 38 O.G. 1676 93
PEPSICO, Inc. v. Lacanilao, 524 Phil. 147 (2006) 583
Peralta v. Auditor General, 148 Phil. 261 (1971) 648
Peralta v. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30 702
Peralta v. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil. 285 .44, 45
Perez v. Commission on Elections, 375 Phil. 1106,
1115-1116 (1999) 257
Perfecto v. Meer, 85 Phil. 552 585
Perkins vs. Haywood, 31 N. E., 670, 672 585
PERT/CPM Manpower Exponent Co., Inc. v. Vinuya, G.R.
No. 197528, September 5, 2012, 680 SCRA 284 273

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Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R.
No. 113105, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506 155, 311, 312
Philippine Export Processing Zone Authority v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 189767, July
3, 2012, 675 SCRA 513 364
Philippine Fisheries Development Authority v. Central
Board of Assessment Appeals, G.R. No. 178030,
December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 644 323
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190529,
29 April 2010, 619 SCRA 585 582
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. v.
Takenaka Corporation, G.R. No. 180245, July
4, 2012, 675 SCRA 674 503
Philippine International Trading Corporation v.
Commission on Audit, 461 Phil. 737 (2003) 724
Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No.
105371 November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 203 247, 286
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC,
247 Phil. 641 (1988] 113
Philippine National Bank v. Palma, G.R. No.
157279, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 307 520, 522
Philippine Rock Industries, Inc. v. Board of Liquidators,
259 Phil. 650, 655-656 (1989) 72
Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement v. Virgilio
E. Pulgar, G.R. No. 169227, July 5, 2010, 623
SCRA 244 112
Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
169752, September 25, 2007, 534 SCRA 112 273
Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 132561, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 336 520
Phillips Seafood [Philippines] Corporation v. Board
ofinvestments, G.R. No. 175787, February 4,
2009, 578 SCRA 113 412
Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
for Legal Affairs Investigative and Adjudica-
tion Division, G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012,
677 SCRA 408 313, 385, 421, 462
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 262 U.S. 390 104
Pimentel v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19,
2000, 336 SCRA 201 493

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Querubin v. Regional Cluster Director, Legal and

Adjudication Office, COA Regional Office VI,
Pavia, Iloilo City, G.R. No. 159299, July 7,
2004, 433 SCRA 769 724
Quezon City v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation,
G.R. No. 166408, October 6, 2008, 567 SCRA
496 323
Quiao v. Quiao, G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012,
675 SCRA 642 103
Quimzon v. Ozaeta, 98 Phil. 705 644, 651
Quinto v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
189698, February 22, 2010, 613 SCRA 385 632
Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Appointments,
177 SCRA 259 , 398
Quizon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177927, February
15, 2008, 545 SCRA 635 659

Radaza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 177135,

October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 223 495, 501
Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 172476-99,
September 15, 2010, 630 SCRA 505 766
Ramos v. Ramos, 447 Phil. 114 (2003) 583
Rapsing v. Ables, G.R. No. 171855, October 15,
2012, 684 SCRA 195 544
Raro v. Sandiganbayan, 390 Phil. 917 (2000) 765
Rayo v. CFI of Bulacan, 110 SCRA 460 71
Rayo v. Metropolitan Bank, G.R. No. 165142,
December 10, 2007, 539 SCRA 571.. 522
Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, December 3,
2009, 606 SCRA 598 98
Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Ap-
praised Value of the Properties Purchased by
the retired Chief7Associate Justices of the Su-
preme Court, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31,
2012, 678 SCRA 1 158, 483
Re: Complaint against the Honorable Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona dated September 14, 2011
filed by Inter-Petal Recreational Corporation,
A.M. No. 12-6-10-SC, June 13, 2012, 672
SCRA62 732
Re: Request of Jose M. Alejandrino, 672 SCRA 27 796

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Republic v. Investa Corporation, G.R. No. 135466,
May 7, 2008, 554 SCRA 29 755
Republic v. National Labor Relations Commission,
263 SCRA 290 79
Republic v. Purisima, 78 SCRA 470 61
Republic v. Sandiganbayan (First Div.), 525 Phil.
804 (2006) 538
Republic v . Sandiganbayan, 182 SCRA 911 64
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90478,
November 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 212 63
Republic v. Valencia, 141 SCRA 462 553
Republic v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 84 66, 78
Resolution dated May 2, 1989, cited in Re: Request
for Copy of 2008 Statement of Assets, Liabili-
ties and Net Worth (SALN) and Personal
Data Sheet or Curriculum Vitae of the Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court and Officers of the
Judiciary, A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012,
672 SCRA 27 798
Review Center Association of the Philippines v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 180046, April
2, 2009, 583 SCRA 428 270, 383
Reyes v. Commission or. Audit, G.R. No. 125129,
March 29, 1999, 305 SCRA 512, 516 604
Reyes v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
207264, June 25, 2013 193, 257, 260, 682, 800
Reyes v. Lim, G.R. No. 134241, August 11, 2003,
408 SCRA 560 554
Reyna v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 167219,
February 8, 2011, 642 SCRA 210 724
Riel v. Wright, 49 Phil. 195 153, 713
Robles v. HRET, 181 SCRA 780 254
Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil. 603 165, 167
Rodriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805,
November 15, 2011, 660 SCRA 84 377, 378, 433
Romero v. Estrada, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009,
583 SCRA 396 299, 581
Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265, 294 (2004) 791
Romulo v: Yniguez, 141 SCRA 263 149, 743
Roque v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188456, September
10, 2009, 599 SCRA 09 705
Rubrico v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871, February 18,
2010, 613 SCRA 233 378

lxi
 TABLE OF CASES

Page

Sangguniang Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos v.

Martinez, G.R. No. 170626, March 3, 2008,
547 SCRA 416 408
Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 143, 512, 824
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085,
February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656 387
Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, G.R. No. 168662, February
19, 2008, 546 SCRA 303 765
Santiago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March
19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106 328, 813, 825
Santiago v. Republic, 87 SCRA 294 63
Santos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
155618, March 26, 2003, 399 SCRA 611 688
Santos v. Rasalan, G.R. No. 155749, February 8,
2007, 515 SCRA 97 768
Santos v. Santos, 92 Phil. 281 64
Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549 396
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. US, 295 SCRA 495 175
Scott v. Inciong, 68 SCRA 4 73 542
Scoty's Dep't. Store v. Micaller, 99 Phil. 762 428
Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
357 SCRA 441 547
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No.
180906, October 7, 2008, 568 SCRA 1 551
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport
Resources Corporation, G.R. No. 135808,
October 6, 2008, 567 SCRA 354 521
Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 124067, March
27, 1998, 288 SCRA 328 753
Serna v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597, July 16,
2008, 558 SCRA 700 205
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities v. Nixon, 498 F. 2d 725, 162 U.S. App.
D.C. 183 371
Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006,
488 SCRA 1.. 299, 303, 367, 371, 372
491,493,512,514
Seneres v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178678, April 16,
2009, 585 SCRA 557 210, 631
Serrano v . Ambassador Hotel, G-.R No. 197008,
February 11, 2013, 690 SCRA 226 583
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R.
No. 167614, March 24, 2009, 582 SCRA 254 37, 273

lxiii
 TABLE OF CASES

Page

Spouses Serfino v. Far East Bank and Trust Company,

Inc., G.R. No. 171845, October 10, 2012, 683
SCRA 380 : 558
Springer v. Gov't. of the Phil. Islands, 277 U.S. 189 134, 527
SSS Employees Assn. v. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 686 634
Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. v. Municipality of
Cainta, G.R. No. 166838, June 15, 2011, 652 SCRA 44 4 73
Sta. Maria v. Ubay, A.M. No. 595-CFI, December
11, 1978, 87 SCRA 179 4 73
Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on
Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, G.R.
No. 167173, December 27, 2007, 541 SCRA 456 299, 300
Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 56
Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. v. Cuenca,
G.R. No. 173297, March 6, 2013, 692 SCRA 473 507
Suanes v. Disbursing Officer of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 254
Summit Guaranty & Insurance Co. v. CA, 110 SCRA 241 521
Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288, 294-295 (1941) 676
Sumulong v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272 44 7
Sunga v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125629, March 25,
1998, 288 SCRA 76 664
Suplico v. National Economic Development Authority,
G.R. No. 178830, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 329 496
Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 49, 56

Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., 511 Phil. 56 (2005) 563

Taganas v. Emulsan, G.R. No. 146980, September
2, 2003., 410 SCRA 237 581
Tagolino v. HRET and Lucy Torres, G.R. No.
202202, March 19, 2013, 693 SCRA 574 661
Tagum Doctors Enterprises v. Apsay, G.R. No.
81188, August SCRA 4 71, 489 717
Talabon v. Warden, 44 O.G. 4326 571
Talaga v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
196804, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 197 659, 661, 664
Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169888,
November 11, 2008, 570 SCRA 622, 632 753
Tan v. Barrios, G.R. Nos. 85481-82, October 18,
1990, 190 BCRA 086 528, b~~
Tariada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 574 (1997),
272 SCRA 18 81, 144, 471, 493, 539

[Link]
 TABLE OF CASES

Page

Tilendo v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 165975, Septem-

ber 13, 2007, 533 SCRA 331... 760, 762
Tileston v. Ullmann, 318 U.S. 446 507
Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106 204, 280
Tolentino v. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702 511, 822
Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 247, 276, 285, 286, 320
Topacio Nueno v. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12, 21-22 (1946) 234
Topacio v. Ong, G.R. No. 179895, December 18,
2008, 574 SCRA 817 508
Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 (1912) 663
Torio v. Fontanilla, 85 SCRA 599 79
Torres v. People, G.R. No. 175074, August 31, 2011,
656 SCRA 486 754
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 5 428
Trade and Investment Development Corporation of
the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission,
G.R. No. 182249, March 5, 2013, 681 SCRA 27 639
Trade and [Link] Corporation of
the Philippines v. Manalang-Demigilio, G.R. No.
176343, September 18, 2012, 681 SCRA 27 611
Trade and Investment Development Corporation of
the Philippines v. Manalang-Demigillo, G.R.
No. 185571, March 5, 2013, 692 SCRA 359 412
Tria v. Sto. Tomas, 276 Phil. 923 (1991) 624
Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No.
166038, December 4, 2007, 539 SCRA 415 781
Tudor v. Board of Education, 14 NJ 31.. 85
Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank,
511 Phil. 510 (2005) 582

u
Ugdoracion v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179851,
April 18, 2008, 552 SCRA 231.. 658
U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1 177
U.S. v. Dorr, 2 Phil. 332 42
U.S. v, Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 57, 66
U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) 367, 464
U.S. v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566 275
TT$ v, Pons, 34 Phil. 729 215
lJ.S. v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 64
Ugdoracion v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179851,
April 18, 2008, 552 SCRA 231.. 658

lxvii
 TABLE OF CASES

Page

Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on

Elections, 396 Phil. 419, 424-425 (2000) 676
Vilando v. HRET, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149,
August 23, 2011, 656 SCRA 17 192, 505
Vilas v. City of Manila, 229 U.S. 345 46
Villanueva v. People, G.R. No. 188630, February
23, 2011, 644 SCRA 358 753
Villasenor v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180700,
March 4, 2008, 547 SCRA 658 753
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778 91
Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451 379, 411
Vinzons-Chato v. Commission on Elections, 520 SCRA 166 258
Vios v. Pantangco, G.R. No. 163103, February 6, 2009,
578 SCRA 129 582
Virtuoso v. Municipal Judge, 82 SCRA 191.. 108

w
Western Mindanao Power Corporation v. Commissioner
oflnternal Revenue, G.R. No. 181136, June 13,
2012, 672 SCRA 350 324, 548
Wilmerding vs. Corbin Banking Co., 28 South, 640,
641; 126 Ala., 268 584
Wood's Appeal, 79 Pa 59 819

Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation,

474 SCRA 258 548
Yamashita v. Styer, 75 Phil. 563 427
Yap v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 158562,
April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 154 718
Yap v. Thenamaris Ship's Management, G.R. No.
179532, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 369 273
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 92
Ynchausti v. Wright, 47 Phil. 886 712
Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 175, 181, 545
Youngstown Tube and Sheet Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 381

lxix
 Chapter 1

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Scope of the Study

POLITICAL LAW is that branch of public law which

deals with the organization and operations of the gov-
ernmental organs of the State and defines the relations
of the State with the inhabitants of its territory.1
In the present law curriculum prescribed by the Su-
preme Court, Political Law embraces Constitutional
Law I and II, Administrative Law, the Law of Public
Officers, Election Law and the Law on Municipal Corpo-
rations.
Constitutional Law I, which is the particular sub-
ject of this work, is a study of the structure and powers
of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. It
also deals with certain basic concepts of Political Law,
such as the nature of the State, the supremacy of the
Constitution, the separation of powers, and the rule of
the majority.

Necessity for the Study

The inclusion of Political Law as a required subject

in the law course is only one of the reasons for its study.

' People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887.

1
 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 3

preted in the light of their understanding in the country

of origin.

Background of the Study

The inhabitants of the Philippines originally con-

sisted of disparate tribes scattered throughout its more
than seven thousand islands. These tribes were gener-
ally free and were each governed by a system of laws
promulgated by the daiu or a council of elders. Except
when they fell under the. sway of a foreign power, like
the Madjapahit and Sri-Vishayan empires, these tribes
were bound mainly, if not only, by commercial ties.
The discovery of the Philippines by Magellan in
1521 brought the people of the territory under the com-
mon rule of Spain. This rule lasted for more than three
hundred years, during which the abuses of the govern-
ment and the friars gradually developeda sense of unity
among the natives. Rizal and the other propagandists
were later to ignite the spirit of nationalism that was to
fuel the Philippine Revolution.
Started by the fiery Bonifacio and won under the
able generalship of Emilio Aguinaldo, the Philippine
Revolution finally ended Spanish sovereignty in the
Philippines. On June 12, 1898, Philippine independence
was proclaimed; and on January 21, 1899, the First
Philippine Republic was established with Aguinaldo as
its President. The Malolos Constitution, under which
the new government was established, was the first de-
mocratic constitution ever to be promulgated in the
whole of Asia. Significantly, it established a parliamen-
tary system, but with the President and not the Prime
Minister as head of the government.
 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 5

was established in the Philippine Islands, with William

Howard Taft as the first governor.
By virtue of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Philip-
pine Assembly was created in 1907 to sit with the Phil-
ippine Commission in a bicameral legislature. Sergio
Osmefia was initially and successively elected Speaker
of the Philippine Assembly until its dissolution in 1916.
In that year was promulgated the Philippine Autonomy
Act, popularly known as the Jones Law, which estab-
lished inter alia a Philippine Legislature consisting of a
Senate and a House of Representatives. Manuel L. Que-
zon and Sergio Osmefia were elected President and
Speaker, respectively.
The Jones Law continued until 1935, when it was
supplanted by the Tydings-McDuffieAct, which author-
ized the establishment of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. Toward this end, a Constitutional Conven-
tion framed the Constitution of 1935, which was ratified
on May 14 of that year and led to the inauguration of
the Commonwealth Government on November 15, 1935.
Quezon was the first President, with Osmefia as Vice-
President.
The Tydings-McDuffieAct promised independence
to the Filipinos if they could prove their capacity for
democratic government during a ten-year transition
period. As it turned out, they were to demonstrate this
competence not only in the councils of peace but also in
the barricades of World War II, and no less gallantly in
the Second Republic of the Philippines headed by Presi-
dent Jose P. Laurel during the Japanese occupation of
our country.
Accordingly,on July 4, 1946, the United States for-
mally withdrew it sovereignty over the Philippines.
President Manuel A. Roxas thereupon asserted the
 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 7

Subsequently, in the Habeas Corpus Cases,5 the Su-

preme Court unanimously upheld the proclamation of
martial law by the President of the Philippines.
On January 17, 1981, President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 2045 lifting martial law. However, he
retained what he called his "standby legislative powers"
under several decrees he had promulgated earlier, prin-
cipally the National Security Code and the Public Order
Act.
In 1985, to seek a "fresh mandate" from the people,
President Marcos submitted a questionable resignation
that was to be effective on the tenth day following the
proclamation of the winners in the "snap" election to be
called by the legislature on the strength of such resigna-
tion. The election was challenged in the case of Philip-
pine Bar Association v. Commission on Elections" on the
ground inter alia that the vacancy contemplated in Arti-
cle VII, Section 9, of the 1973 Constitution which would
justify the call of a special presidential election before
the expiration of President Marcos's term in 1987 was
supposed to occur before and not after the said election.
Predictably, the then Supreme Court denied the petition
and sustained the resignation and the call.
The election was held on February 7, 1986, as
scheduled, and resulted, amid charges of wholesale ir-
regularities committed by the ruling party, in the proc-
lamation of Marcos and his running-mate, Arturo Tolen-
tino, as President-elect and Vice-President-elect of the
Philippines, respectively. This was followed by a mas-
sive outcry from the people who felt that the real win-
ners were the Opposition candidates.

5
Aquino v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 (1974).
"G.R. No. 72915, Dec. 20, 1985, 140 SCRA 453.
 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 9

Gloria Macapagal Arroyotook the oath the same day as

his constitutional successor.
Estrada lost no time in challenging before the Su-
preme Court Arroyo's right to succeed him, claiming
that he had neither resigned nor abandoned his office,
and that he left Malaca:fiangonly to appease the demon-
strators who clamored for his resignation. The Court
dismissed his petition, ruling that his public statements
made upon and the circumstances leading to his depar-
ture from Malacafiang clearly showed that he had re-
signed. Accordingly, it considered his presidency as
"now in the past tense" and Arroyo's ascendancy to the
Presidency as lawful.
Within months after Arroyo's assumption into of-
fice, Estrada was arrested for plunder amidst the noisy
objections of thousands of his sympathizers who waged
still another people power protest. The attempt of said
protesters to storm Malacafiang and the violencewhich
erupted in the process prompted Arroyo to declare a
state of rebellion. Notwithstanding said protests,
Estrada was eventually tried and convicted by the
Sandiganbayan, only to be later pardoned by Arroyo.
During her first term, Arroyo also faced but quickly
quelled the Oakwood Mutiny mounted by disgruntled
military officerson corruption issues.
She sought another term in 2004, reneging on an
earlier promise that she would not do so. She was pro-
claimed the winner of said election, notwithstanding
allegations of widespread cheating or electoral fraud.
These charges hounded her for most of her second term.
Street protests particularly escalated after the release of
the mfamous Garci 'l'apes, which included her alleged
telephone conversations with a former COMELECCom-
missioner, to whom she had purportedly given explicit
 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 11

as a public functionary but more as a rejection of the

Arroyo regime or, at least, as an affirmation of the con-
tinuing popularity of his mother, who passed away only
months before the 2010 elections.
 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 13

sectors and represented diverse persuasions, which is

probably one reason why they could not meet their
deadline and were able to approve the final draft of
their handiwork only on October 15, 1986. By resolution
of the Commission, it was recommended to the Presi-
dent that the plebiscite on the proposed Constitution be
scheduled, not within sixty days as originally provided,
but within three months, to give the people more oppor-
tunity to study it. Accordingly,the plebiscite was sched-
uled and held on February 2, 1987.
The campaign for the ratification of the proposed
Constitution was led by President Aquino herself, whose
main argument was that it would restrict the powers of
the Presidency as provided for in the Freedom Constitu-
tion. Opposition to the draft, while spirited, was largely
disorganized and consequently ineffective. Many people,
while doubtful about some of its provisions and espe-
cially of its length, which made it seem like a codifica-
tion, nevertheless approved the proposed Constitution
in the end because they felt it would provide the stabil-
ity the country sorely needed at the time. When the
votes were tallied, it appeared that 76.29% of the elec-
torate had voted to ratify, with only 22.74% against.

Outstanding Features

The new Constitution consists of eighteen articles

and is excessively long compared to the Constitutions of
1935 and 1973, on which it was largely based. Many of
the original provisions of the 1935, particularly those
pertaining to the legislative and the executive depart-
merits, have hP.P.n [Link] hP.C'.l'lllRP. of the rnvival of the
bicameral Congress of the Philippines and the strictly
presidential system. The independence of the judiciary
has been strengthened, with new provisions for ap-
 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 15

constitution-making and less personal vainglory, let

alone distrust of the legislature.
What is worse is the inclusion of certain topics that
certainly, by any criterion, have no place in a Constitu-
tion. Among these are sports, love, drugs, and even ad-
vertising; and there is also mention of "the rhythm and
harmony of nature." But what is even worse than all
this is the tortuous language of some of its provisions,
like the followingmasterpiece of circumlocution in Arti-
cle XVI, Section 10:
"The State shall provide the policy environment for the
full development of Filipino capability and the emergence of
communication structures suitable to the needs and aspira-
tions of the nation and the balanced flow of information into,
out of, and across the country, in accordance with a policy that
respects the freedom of speech and of the press."

Excuse me?
One wonders, given the long-windedness of the pre-
sent Constitution, if the people had really read and un-
derstood it when they voted to ratify it.
Even so, it should be remembered that, as its pro-
ponents repeatedly argued during the campaign for its
ratification, its real and main function was to replace
the Freedom Constitution, which was a revolutionary
constitution, and so pave the way for stability and nor-
mality under a regular Constitution duly approved by
the people. Now that that function has been more or less
achieved,we may take a second more critical look at the
Constitution of 1987, this time with a view to its
amendment or revision under its Article XVII, in a less
tense and more amiable atmosphere.

1
Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 16.
 Chapter 3

THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

Definition

",THE STAT~ is a community of persons, more or less

numerous, permanently occupyinga fixed territory, and
possessed of an independent government organized for
political ends to which the great body of inhabitants
render habitual obedience."
The term -,;y;.#p];J,~ is used interchangeably with
State, e.g., the United Nations or the family of nations,
which actually consists of states and not nations. This is
a mistake as the two concepts have different connota-
tions. Hackworth observes that "the term nation,
strictly speaking, as evidenced by its etymology (nasci,
to be born), indicates a relation of birth or origin and
implies a common race, usually characterized by com-
munity of language and customs." The State is a legal
concept, while the nation is only a racial or ethnic con-
cept.2
Thus understood, a nation may comprise several
states; for example, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon,
Jordan, Algeria and Libya, among others, while each a
separate state, all belong to the Arab nation. On the
other hand, it is also possible for a single state to be
made up of more than one nation, as in the case of the

1
Garner, Introduction to Political Science, 41.
2
Digest of International Law (1943), V· 47; Oruz, International
Law, 20.

17
 THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE 19

Domain between the Government of the Republic of the

Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front,
which would have paved the way for the conversion of
the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), sought to be
established under said proposed Agreement purportedly
as an "expanded version" of the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao, into a state."
Thus, said proposed Agreement was to acknowl-
edge the "birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous
peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be ac-
cepted as 'Bangsamoros.' It defined 'Bangsamoro people'
as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and
its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu
archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and
their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, includ-
ing their spouses."
It further specified the "territory of the Bang-
samoro homeland," described therein "as the land mass
as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial
domains, including the aerial domain and the atmos-
pheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-
Palawan geographic region.'' Significantly, it indicated
that "the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural
resources within its 'internal waters,' defined as extend-
ing fifteen (15) kilometers from the coastline of the BJE
area; that the BJE shall also have 'territorial waters,'
which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up
to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP)
south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and
that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the
'Central Government' (used interchangeably with RP)

s See The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the

Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, Ibid.
 THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE 21

BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions bear-

ing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protec-
tion, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water
adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ances-
tral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM
and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. govern-
ment on any foreign affairs matter affecting them."

The Supreme Court went on to state that the BJE

"is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the
status of its relationship with the national government
being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM.
Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the
criteria of a state laid down in the MontevideoConven-
tion, namely, a permanent population, a defined terri-
tory, a government, and a capacity to enter into rela-
tions with other states." The Court further stressed that
the proposed Agreement "cannot be reconciled with the
present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific pro-
visions but the very concept underlying them, namely,
the associative relationship envisioned between the
GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept
presupposes that the associated entity is a state and
implies that the same is on its way to independence."
There are some writers who suggest two additional
elements, to wit, recognition and possession of a suffi-
cient degree of civilization. As these have not been gen-
erally accepted, we shall confine this study to the four
elements first mentioned.

(1) People

People refers simply to the inhabitants of the [Link].A.

While there is no legal requirement as to their
number, it is generally agreed that they must be nu-
merous enough to be self-sufficing and to defend them-
 THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE 23

external waters, which make up the maritime and flu-

uial domain, and the air space above the land and wa-
ters, which is called the aerial domain;
Article I of the Constitution provides as follows:

"NATIONAL TERRITORY

"The national territory comprises the Philippine archi-

pelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and
all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty
or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial
domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil,
the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters
around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipel-
ago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of
the internal waters of the Philippines."

The above provision is a substantial reproduction of

Article I of the 1973 Constitution with only a few minor
changes.
Departing from the method employed in the 1935
Constitution, which described the national territory by
reference to the pertinent treaties concluded by the
United States during its regime in this country, the
present rule now physically lists the components of our
territory and so de-emphasizes recollections of our colo-
nial past. The article has deleted reference to the terri-
tories we claim "by historic right or legal title," but this
does not mean an outright or formal abandonment of
such claim, which was best left to a judicial body capa-
ble of passing judgment over the issue."
At any rate, it has been pointed out that "the defi-
nition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Phil-
ippine Archipelago" as provided for in Section 2 of Re-
public Act No. 5446 "is without prejudice to the delinea-
7
Res. of the Constitutional Commission,July 10, 1986.
 THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE 25

In 1984, the Philippines ratified the United Na-

tions Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),
which, among others, "prescribes the water-land ratio,
length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States
like the Philippines." Consistent with the Philippines'
obligations under said agreement, Congress amended
RA 3046 by enacting Republic Act No. 9522, which, it
was believed, would make RA 3046 "compliant" with the
provisions of UNCLOS III insofar as the determination
of the "water-land ratio, length, and contour of base-
lines" of our archipelago is concerned. Accordingly, "RA
9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of
some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and
classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan
Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as 're-
gimes of islands' whose islands generate their own ap-
plicable maritime zones."
The petitioners in Magallona challenged "the con-
stitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds,
namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime terri-
tory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state's
sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987
Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of
Paris and ancillary treaties, and (2) RA 9522 opens the
country's waters landward of the baselines to maritime
passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Phil-
ippine sovereignty and national security, contravening
the country's nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine
resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provi-
sions.
The petitioners further contended that "RA 9522's
treatment of the KIG as 'regime of islands' not only re-
sults in the loss of a large maritime area but also preju-
dices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. To but-
 THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE 27

Philippine sovereignty and national security, contraven-

ing the country's nuclear-free policy, and damaging ma-
rine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions," and that said law "unconstitutionally 'con-
verts' internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence
subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea
lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight,"
the Supreme Court had this to say -
"As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522,
petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally 'converts'
internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting
these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage un-
der UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate
that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine inter-
nal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in viola-
tion of the Constitution.
''Whether referred to as Philippine 'internal waters' un-
der Article I of the Constitution or as 'archipelagic waters' un-
der UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sov-
ereignty over the body of water lying landward of the base-
lines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas
underneath. [UNCLOS III, Article 49]

''Article 49

"Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space

over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil
"l. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State ex-
tends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines
drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archi-
pelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from
the coast.
"2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over
the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and sub-
soil, and the resources contained therein.
"3. xx x x
"4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage
established in this Part shall not in other respects affect
 THE CONCEPI' OF THE STATE 29

under UNCLOS III. Separate islands generate their own mari-

time zones, placing the waters between islands separated by
more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States' territorial sov-
ereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States
under UNCLOS III."t

The Supreme Court likewise rejected the petition-

ers' arguments on "territorial diminution," i.e., the loss
of our claims to territories under the Treaty of Paris or
Sabah as a result of RA 9522's adherence to the UN-
CLOS Ill's framework on the so-called "regime of is-
lands" with its inclusion of the Scarborough Shoal and
the KIG as parts of our "regime of islands." Thus -

"Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the

Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, ad-
verse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would
have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III.
First, Article 47 (3) ofUNCLOS III requires that '[t]he drawing
of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent
from the general configuration of the archipelago.' Second, Ar-
ticle 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that 'the length of the base-
lines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles,' save for three per
cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up
to 125 nautical miles.
"Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sov-
ereignty over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for several
decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable dis-
tance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago,
such that any straight baseline loped around them from the
nearest basepoint will inevitably 'depart to an appreciable ex-
tent from the general configuration of the archipelago.' xxx.
"Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines' claim over
the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress' decision to clas-
sify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as 'Regime[s] of Is-
lands' under [Link] Republic of [Link] Philippines consistent with
Article 121 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State's res-
ponsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under
UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any 'naturally
formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above wa-
 THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE 31

the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States
to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up
to 200 nautical miles. UNCLOS III, however, preserves the
traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached
to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III."

Finally, the Supreme Court explained in Magallona

that ''baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by
UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific base-
points along their coasts from which baselines are
drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geo-
graphic starting points to measure the breadth of the
maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UN-
CLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be
any clearer:

"'Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territo-

rial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and
the continental shelf.-The breadth of the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continen-
tal shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn
in accordance with article 47.'

"Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory

mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit
with precision the extent of their maritime zones and
continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest
of the international community of the scope of the mari-
time space and submarine areas within which States
parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exer-
cise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the
jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and
sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and
the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in
the exclusive economiczone (Article 56) and continental
shelf (Article 77).
 THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE 33

(3) Government

Government is the agency or instrumentality

through which the wiJl of the State is formulated, ex-
pressed and realized. 12
From the viewpoint of international law, no par-
ticular form of government is prescribed, provided only
that the government is able to represent the State in its
dealings with other States. Our Constitution, however,
requires our government to be democratic and republi- ·
can.
It has been said that "the State is an ideal person,
invisible, intangible, immutable and existing only in
contemplation of law; the government is an agent and,
within the sphere of its agency, it is a perfect represen-
tative, but outside of that it is a lawless usurpation.?"
The mandate of the government from the State is to
promote the welfare of the people. Accordingly, what-
ever good is done by the government is attributed to the
State but every harm inflicted on the people is imputed
not to the State but to the government alone. Such in-
jury may justify the replacement of the government by
revolution, theoretically at the behest of the State, in a
developmentknown as direct State action. 14

A. Functions

The government performs two kinds of functions, to

wit, the constituent and the ministrant.

"Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270.

'" Ibid.
"Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 3rd ed., 6-7, op. cit.
 THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE 35

cerned only with the basic function of maintaining peace

and order.
To our Supreme Court, however, the distinction be-
tween constituent and ministrant functions is not rele-
vant in our jurisdiction. In PVTA v. CIR16 it reiterated
the ruling in ACCFA v. Federation of Labor Unions"
that such distinction has been blurred because of the
repudiation of the laissez faire policy in the Constitu-
tion.

"The irrelevance of such a distinction considering the

heeds of the times was clearly pointed out by the present Chief
Justice, who took note, speaking of the reconstituted Agricul-
tural Credit Administration, that functions of that sort 'may
not be strictly what President Wilson described as 'constituent'
(as distinguished from 'ministrant'), such as those relating to
the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those
regulating property and property rights, those relating to the
administration of justice and the determination of political du-
ties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and for-
eign relations. Under this traditional classification, such con-
stituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of
sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress
and prosperity of the people-these latter functions being min-
istrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the gov-
ernment.' Nonetheless, as he explained so persuasively: The
growing complexities of modern society, however, have ren-
dered this traditional classification of the functions of gov-
ernment quite unrealistic not to say obsolete. The areas which
used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which
the government was called upon to enter optionally and only
because it was better equipped to administer for the public
welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals
continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be ab-
sorbed within activities that the government must undertake
in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social
challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else, the

16
65 SCRA 416.
11
30 SCRA649.
 THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE 37

(on the policy of full public disclosures." and XIII (on

Social Justice and Human Rights)28 of the Constitution,
are not self-executing provisions of the Constitution.29
They have been invariably considered as "not sources of
enforceable rights't" and serve merely as "guides in for-
mulating and interpreting implementing legislation.?"

B. Doctrine of Parens Patriae

One of the important tasks of the government is to

act for the State as parens patriae, or guardian of the
rights of the people. In the case of Government of the
Philippine Islands v. Monte de Piedad, 32 contributions
were collected during the Spanish regime for the relief
of the victims of an earthquake but part of the money
was never distributed and instead deposited with the
defendant bank. In an action for its recovery filed later
by the government, the defendant questioned the com-
petence of the plaintiff, contending that the suit could
be instituted only by the intended beneficiaries them-
selves or by their heirs. The Supreme Court rejected
this view and upheld the right of the government to file
the case for the State as parens patriae in representa-
tion of the legitimate claimants.

27
The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the
Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, GR
No. 183591, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402.
2•
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 167614,
March 24, 2009, 582 SCRA 254.
an Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. COA, G.R.
No. 178160, February 26, 2009, 580 SCRA 295.
·10 Bureau of Fisheries v. Commission on Audit, U.K No.
169815, August 13, 2008, 562 SCRA 134.
" Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, July 16, 2011, 655
SCRA 476.
'12 35 Phil. 728.
 THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE 39

sion program by the Movie and Television Review and

Classification Board. He invoked, among other grounds,
his freedoms of speech and religion, claiming that said
suspension constitute~ censorship. The Supreme Court,
after finding that the petitioner had uttered expletives
in the course of said program, which was regularly aired
during prime time, or at a time when children could
actually view the same, rejected his contentions, stat-
ing--

"As the Court has been impelled to recognize exceptions

to the rule against censorship in the past, this particular case
constitutes yet another exception, another instance of unpro-
tected speech, created by the necessity of protecting the wel-
fare of our children. As unprotected speech, petitioner's utter-
ances can be subjected to restraint or regulation. x x x.
"Petitioner's offensive and obscene language uttered in a
television broadcast, without doubt, was easily accessible to
the children. His statements could have exposed children to a
language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the
welfare of children and the State's mandate to protect and care
for them, as parens patriae, constitute a substantial and com-
pelling government interest in regulating petitioner's utter-
ances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986."

In De la Cruz u. Gracia,35 the Supreme Court al-

lowed the registration of an illegitimate child using the
surname of his deceased father, declaring that it is "the
policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity and filiation of children,
especially of illegitimate children x x x. The State as
parens patriae affords special protection to children
from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial
to their development."

35
G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 648.
 THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE 41

It has been held in a number of cases that the Sec-

ond Republic of the Philippines was a de facto govern-
ment of paramount force, having been established by
the Japanese belligerent during the occupation of the
Philippines in World War II. The characteristics of this
kind of de facto government are:
"(l) Its existence is maintained by active military
power within the territories, and against the rightful
authority of an established and lawful government.
"(2) During its existence, it must necessarily be
obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts
of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do
not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts,
though not warranted by the laws of the rightful gov-
ernment. Actual governments of this sort are estab-
lished over districts differing greatly in extent and con-
ditions. They are usually administered by military au-
thority, supported more or less directly by military
force.?"
By contrast, the Supreme Court unanimously held
in Lawyers League for a Better Philippines u. Corazon C.
Aquino" that "the people have made the judgment; they
have accepted the government of President Corazon C.
Aquinowhich is in effectivecontrol of the entire country
so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact
and law a dejure government. Moreover,the community
of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government."

"'Ibid.
"" G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986.
 THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE 43

The administration runs the government, as a machin-

ist operates his machine. Thus, we speak of the Aquino
administration as directing the affairs of the Govern-
ment of the Philippines for a given time, after which
another administration may be called upon by the peo-
ple to take over. Administration is transitional whereas
the government is permanent.

(4) Sovereignty

Sovereignty is the supreme and uncontrollable

power inherent in a State by which that State is gov-
erned."
There are two kinds of sovereignty, to wit, legal and
political. Legal sovereignty is the authority which has
the power to issue final commands whereas political
sovereignty is the power behind the legal sovereign, or
the sum of the influences that operate upon it. In our
country, the Congress is the legal sovereign, while the
different sectors that mold public opinion make up the
political sovereign.
Sovereignty may also be internal or external. Inter-
nal sovereignty refers to the power of the State to con-
trol its domestic affairs. External sovereignty, which is
the power of the State to direct its relations with other
States, is also known as independence.
Sovereignty is permanent, exclusive, comprehen-
sive, absolute, indivisible, inalienable and imprescripti-
ble.44
By virtue of these characteristics, sovereignty is not
deemed suspended although acts of sovereignty cannot

'" Garner, Political Science and Government, 238, 170.

44
Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856.
 THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE 45

Furthermore, the rule does not apply to the law on

treason although decidedly political in character. As
Justice Felicisimo Feria put it in Laurel v. Misa/"
l
"Since the preservation of the allegiance of the obligation
of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his govern-
ment or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action
but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the
enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has
no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to re-
peal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential
for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants
to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and
give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such ac-
tion is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service
or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the
safety and protection of his army, and because it is tantamount
to practically transferring temporarily to the occupant their al-
legiance to the titular government or sovereignty."

As for judicial decisions, the same are valid during

the occupation and even beyond except those of a politi-
cal complexion, which are automatically annulled upon
the restoration of the legitimate authority. Thus, a per-
son convicted of treason against the Japanese Imperial
Forces was, after the occupation, entitled to be released
on the ground that the sentence imposed on him for his
political offense had ceased to be valid." But if the con-
viction was for a non-political offense like, say, defama-
tion, the sentence would not be affected by the termina-
tion of the occupation.
Where there is a change of sovereignty, the political
laws of the former sovereign are not merely suspended
but abrogated. As they regulate the relations between
the ruler and the ruled, these laws fall to the ground

'° Supra.
50
Peralta v. Director of Prisons, supra.
 THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE 47

which regulates private and domestic rights continues in force

until abrogated or changed by the new ruler."

Act of State

An act of State is an act done by the sovereign

power of a country, or by its delegate, within the limits
of the power vested in him. An act of State cannot be
questioned or made the subject of legal proceedings in a
court of law. 54
With particular reference to Political Law, an act of
State is an act done by the political departments of the
government and not subject to judicial review. An illus-
tration is the decision of the President, in the exercise of
his diplomatic power, to extend recognition to a newly-
established foreign State or government.

54
Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 44.
 THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY 49

The doctrine is also available to foreign States inso-

far as they are sought to be sued in the courts of the
local State.3 The added basis in this case is the principle
of the sovereign equality of States, under which one
State cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation
of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. To do
so would "unduly vex the peace of nations.?'
This does not mean though that the foreign state
would at all times be immune from all suits filed
against it before courts of a host or local state. Accord-
ingly, it has been ruled that such foreign states may be
sued in the host state if engaged regularly therein in a
business or trade or, even if not so engaged, on the basis
of its contracts in the host state which may be consid-
ered as purely commercial,private and proprietary acts,
but not with respect to its contracts entered into by it as
governmental or sovereignacts. Thus -

"The doctrine of state immunity from suit has undergone

further metamorphosis. The view evolved that the existence of
a contract does not, per se, mean that sovereign states may, at
all times, be sued in local courts. The complexity of relation-
ships between sovereign states, brought about by their increas-
ing commercial activities, mothered a more restrictive applica-
tion of the doctrine. xxx As it stands now, the application of the
doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign
or governmental activities (jure imperii). The mantle of state
immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private and pro-
prietary acts (jure gestionis).
"Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it
is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act involved -
whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental,
as opposed to proprietary, functions. As held in United States
of America v. Ruiz (221 Phil. 179 (1985)]-

"Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312.

4
De Haberv. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q.B. 171.
 THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY 51

vate acts or actsjure gestionis. xxx The restrictive theory came

about because of the entry of sovereign states into purely
commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of
governmental functions."
\

As will be discussed later, in the context of the ap-

plicability of the principle of state immunity to a State
in relation to claims filed against it by its citizens or
inhabitants or in connectionwith the actions of its gov-
ernment within its territory, not all acts Jure imperii
may exempt a State from suit, as in the case of its exer-
cise of its power of eminent domain, when done without
payment of just compensation.7
Moreover, it has likewise been ruled that not any
agency of a foreign state may properly invoke the lat-
ter's sovereign immunity to ward off suits against it. In
German Agency for Technical Cooperation v. Court of
Appeals, the petitioner moved to dismiss a complaint for
illegal dismissal filed against it before the National
Labor Relations Commission,contending that the Labor
Arbiter had no jurisdiction over it, as it was "the im-
plementing agency of the Government of the Federal
Republic of Gennany" and "its acts were undertaken in
the discharge of the governmental functions and sover-
eign acts of the Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany." The Supreme Court rejected these conten-
tions stating that the petitioner did not present ade-
quate evidence to establish that it enjoys the immunity
from suit generally accorded to its parent country, the

' Holy See v. Rosario, G.R. No. 101949, 1 December 1994, 238
SCRA 524, 535, cited in China National Machinery & Equipment
Corporation v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012, 665
SCRA 189.
7
See Delos Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 223 SCRA
1, cited in Air Transportation Office v. Ramos, G.R. No. 185685,
February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 36.
 THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY 53

The Court, addressing the factual circumstances

invoked by the petitioner in support of its claim of sov-
ereign immunity, added -
'
"Clearly, it was CNMEG that initiated the undertaking,
and not the Chinese government. The Feasibility Study was
conducted not because of any diplomatic gratuity from or exer-
cise of sovereign functions by the Chinese government, but was
plainly a business strategy employed by CNMEG with a view
to securing this commercial enterprise. xxx. The use of the
term 'state corporation' to refer to CNMEG was only descrip-
tive of its nature as a government-owned and/or -controlled
corporation, and its assignment as the Primary Contractor did
not imply that it was acting on behalf of China in the perform-
ance of the latter's sovereign functions. xxx. Thus, despite peti-
tioner's claim that the EXIM Bank extended financial assistance
to Northrail because the bank was mandated by the Chinese
government, and not because of any motivation to do business in
the Philippines, it is clear from the foregoing provisions that the
Northrail Project was a purely commercial transaction. Admit-
tedly, the Loan Agreement was entered into between EXIM
Bank and the Philippine government, while the Contract
Agreement was between Northrail and CNMEG. Although the
Contract Agreement is silent on the classification of the legal na-
ture of the transaction, the foregoing provisions of the Loan
Agreement, which is an inextricable part of the entire undertak-
ing, nonetheless reveal the intention of the parties to the North-
rail Project to classify the whole venture as commercial or pro-
prietary in character. Thus, piecing together the content and
tenor of the Contract Agreement, the Memorandum of Under-
standing dated 14 September 2002, Amb. Wang's letter dated 1
October 2003, and the Loan Agreement would reveal the desire
of CNMEG to construct the Luzon Railways in pursuit of a
purely commercial activity performed in the ordinary course of
its business. Even assuming arguendo that CNMEG performs
governmental functions, such claim does not automatically vest
it with immunity. This view finds support in Malong v. Philip-
pine National · Railways, in which this Court held that
'(i)mmunity from suit is determined by the character of the ob-
jects for which the entity was organized.' [222 Phil 381, 384
(1985)]"
 THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY 55

"Petitioners were being sued as officers of the United

States Government. As they have acted on behalf of that gov-
ernment, and within the scope of their authority, it is that
government, and not the petitioners personally, that is respon-
sible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it
is proved that claimarits have a right to the payment of dam-
ages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petition-
ers in their personal capacity but by the United States Gov-
ernment as their principal. This will require that government
to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, uiz., the
appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages
awarded, thus making the action a suit against that govern-
ment without its consent."

In University of the Philippines v. Dizon,12 the Su-

preme Court stated that an award against the peti-
tioner for moral and actual damages (including attor-
ney's fees) would require an appropriation by Congress
considering that "such monetary liabilities were not
covered by the 'appropriations earmarked for said pro-
ject,"' which was the subject of the suit and the conse-
quent award.
By contrast, the Supreme Court held as not against
the State an action instituted against the Secretary of
National Defense, also in his official capacity, for pay-
ment of an architect's professional fees for which an
appropriation had already been made by the govern-
ment. 13 The reason was that as far as the State itself
was concerned, it had already discharged its obligation;
clearly, what the complainant wanted only was the
actual payment of the amount already set aside, which
payment was now the sole responsibility of the defen-
dant. The action was therefore properly filed against

12
G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012, 679 SCRA 54.
ta Ruiz v. Cabahug, 54 O.G. 351.
 THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY 57

It is understood, of course, that where a public offi-

cer acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, any injury
caused by him is his own personal liability and cannot
be imputed to the State. Thus, in Festejo v. Fernando, 16
the Director of Public Works took over without authority
property belonging to the plaintiff and constructed
thereon a public irrigation canal. The Supreme Court
held that the action for the recovery of the land or its
value was properly filed against the defendant in his
personal capacity and was therefore not covered by the
doctrine of State immunity.
In U.S.A. v. Guinto, 17 the Supreme Court declared:

"The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they

have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers
or agents of the United States. However, this is a matter of
evidence. The charges against them may not be summarily
dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts are imputable
to the United States of America, which has not given its con-
sent to be sued. In fact, the defendants are sought to be held
answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself
is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must sat-
isfy the judgment.
x x x
"But even as we are certain that the individual petition-
ers in G.R. No. 80018 were acting in the discharge of their offi-
cial functions, we hesitate to make the same conclusion in G.R.
No. 80258. The contradictory factual allegations in this case
deserve in our view a closer study of what actually happened
to the plaintiffs. The record is too meager to indicate if the de-
fendants were really discharging their official duties or had ac-
tually exceeded their authority when the incident in question
occurred. Lacking this information, the Court cannot directly
decide this case. The needed inquiry must first be made by the
lower court oo it may uoeona and rocolvo the conflicting olaims

'"50 O.G. 1556.

" 182 SCRA 644.
 THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY 59

Equipment Corporation v. Sta. Maria, 20 the "executive

endorsements" (of the Certification executed by the Eco-
nomic and CommercialOfficeof the Embassy of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China on the purported sovereign im-
' .
munity of the petitioner) made by the Office of the So-
licitor General and of the Office of the Government Cor-
porate Counsel, clarifying that it is only the Department
of Foreign Affairs which has the authority to make a
determination of immunity from suit, although, in said
case, the Court declared that it would not be "precluded
from making an inquiry into the intrinsic correctness of
such certification."

Waiver of Immunity

Although the doctrine of State immunity is some-

times called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty," it
must be observed in fairness that the State does not
often avail itself of this rule to take undue advantage of
parties that may have legitimate claims against it. The
principle fortunately has a built-in qualification: the
State may, if it so desires, divest itself of its sovereign
immunity and thereby voluntarily open itself to suit. In
fine, the State may be sued if it gives its consent.
It is gratifying that the exception appears now to
be the general policy, with the result that the filing of
suits against the State has become less difficult than
before.

Forms of Consent

The consent of the State to be sued may be given

expressly or impliedly. Express consent may Le uiani-

'0 G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012, 665 SCRA 189.

 THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY 61

ment for injuries he had sustained when his motorcycle

collidedwith a government ambulance."
The express consent of the State to be sued must be
embodied in a duly enacted statute and may not be
given by a mere counsel of the government, as held in
Republic u. Purisima. 24 In this case, the waiver made by
the lawyer for the Rice and Corn Administration, an
agency of the government, was held by the Supreme
Court as not binding upon the State. Incidentally, under
Rule 14, Section 13 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure,
where the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines,
service of summons must be made on the Solicitor Gen-
eral. 25
Worthy of note in this connection is the case of
Amigable u. Cuenca, 26 where the question raised was the
right of the plaintiff to sue the government for recovery
of the value of her property which had been converted
into public streets without payment to her of just com-
pensation. Although it was shown that she had not pre-
viously filed her claim with the Auditor General as
normally required, the Supreme Court decided in her
favor, reiterating the following pronouncement in the
earlier case of Ministerio u. City of Cebu/"

23
Merritt v. Government of the Phil. Is., 34 Phil. 311.
2'
78 SCRA 470.
25
Heirs of Mamerto Manguiat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
150768 and 160176, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 422, cited in Repub-
lic of the .Philippines v. Domingo, G.R. No. 175299, September 14,
2011, 657 SCRA 621.
26
43 SCRA 360, See also Delos Santos v. Intermediate Appel-
late Court, G.R. 71998-99, June 2, 1993, 223 SCRA 1.
27
40 SCRA 464, see also Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 204 SCRA
212, Delos Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 223 SCRA 1.
 THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY 63

area, where private property is to be taken in expropria-

tion without just compensation being paid, the defense
of immunity from suit cannot be set up by the State
against an action for payment by the owners.29
'·
As stressed by the Supreme Court in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan." "the doctrine of sovereign immunity
cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim
for compensation arising from the taking without just
compensation and without the proper expropriation
proceedingsbeing first resorted to of the plaintiffs' prop-
erty."
In Santiago v. Republic, 31 the plaintiff sued the gov-
ernment for revocation of a donation on the ground of
failure of the defendant to comply with the stipulated
conditions. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of
its consent to be sued. The Supreme Court denied the
motion, holding that the suit could prosper because it
did not involve a money claim against the State. As
what the plaintiff was seeking was the return only of
the properties donated, he did not even need to file his
claim first with the Commission on Audit under the
provisionsof [Link]. 327.
Manifestly based on equitable grounds is the rule
that when the State itself files a complaint, the defen-
dant is entitled to file a counterclaim against it. A case
in point is Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co.,32 where
it was held that the government impliedly allowed itself
to be sued when it filed a complaint in intervention for

2"
See Air Transportation Office v. Ramos, G.R. No. 185685,
February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 36, citing Delos Santos v. Intermedi-
ate Appellate Court, supra.
an G.R. No. 90478, Nov. 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 212, 231.
at 8'7 SCRA 294.
'12 G.R. No. L-6060, Sept. 30, 1950.
 THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY 65

ity. Governmental contracts do not result in implied

waiver of the immunity of the State from suit.
The private respondent in this case had claimed
that the United States, through its Engineering Com-
mand in the U.S. Navy, had entered into a contract with
it for the repair of wharves in Subic Bay and should
therefore be required to comply with the agreement or
pay damages. The United States moved to dismiss, in-
voking its non-suability, but the claim was denied by
the lower court on the basis of the Lyons Case. In this
petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court sustained the
immunity of the petitioner from suit, declaring through
Justice VicenteAbad Santos:

"The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State

from being sued in the courts of another State without its con-
sent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. However,
the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are con-
stantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of
States have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish
them between sovereign and governmental acts (Jure imperii)
and private, commercial and proprietary acts (Jure gestionis).
The result is that State immunity now extends only to actsjure
imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now
the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other
States in Western Europe.

***
"The restrictive application of State immunity is proper
only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions
of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have de-
scended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to
have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters
into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract
relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case
the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is de-
voted to the defense of both the United States and the Philip-
 THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY 67

from such a basic concept, is that public funds cannot be the

object of garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be
sued had been previously granted and the state liability ad-
judged. Thus, in the recent case of Commissioner of Public
Highways u. San Diego, such a well-settled doctrine was re-
stated in the opinion of Justice Teehankee: The universal rule
that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private
parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's
action 'only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the
stage of execution' and that the power of courts ends when the
judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties
may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of
public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered
by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The
functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropri-
ated by law."

But the foregoingdoctrine was not applied in Phil-

ippine National Bank v. Pabalan, 41 where a writ of exe-
cution was issued against the Philippine Virginia To-
bacco Administration, pursuant to which its funds on
deposit with the petitioner were garnished. On the con-
tention that such funds were public in character and
therefore could not be garnished, the Supreme Court
declared:

"This is not the first time petitioner raised that issue. It

did so before in Philippine National Bank u. Court of Indus-
trial Relations, decided only last January. It did not meet with
success, this Court ruling in accordance with the two previous
cases of National Shipyard and Steel Corporation and Manila
Hotel Company, that funds of public corporations which can
sue and be sued were not exempt from garnishment. As res-
pondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration is like-

-tt 83 SCRA 595.

 THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY 69

"Like NEA, UP is a juridical personality separate and

distinct from the government and has the capacity to sue and
be sued. Thus, also like NEA, it cannot evade execution, and
its funds may be subject to garnishment or levy. However, be-
fore execution may He had, a claim for payment of the judg-
ment award must first be filed with the COA. Under Com-
monwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of P.D. No.
1445, it is the COAwhich has primary jurisdiction to examine,
audit and settle 'all debts and claims of any sort' due from or
owing the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect to money
claims arising from the implementation of Republic Act No.
6758, their allowance or disallowance is for COA to decide, sub-
ject only to the remedy of appeal by petition for certiorari to
this Court."

In University of the Philippines v. Dizon." the Su-

preme Court, in emphasizing the fundamental rule that
government properties are not subject to levy and exe-
cution, made the followingclarifications -

"However, notwithstanding the rule that government

properties are not subject to levy and execution unless other-
wise provided for by statute (Republic u. Palacio, 23 SCRA 899
1968; Commissioner of Public Highways u. San Diego, supra)
or municipal ordinance (Municipality of Makati u. Court of Ap-
peals, 190 SCRA 206 1990), the Court has, in various in-
stances, distinguished between government funds and proper-
ties for public use and those not held for public use. Thus, in
Viuda de Tan Toco u. Municipal Council of Iloilo (49 Phil 52
1926), the Court ruled that 'where property of a municipal or
other public corporation is sought to be subjected to execution
to satisfy judgments recovered against such corporation, the
question as to whether such property is leviable or not is to be
determined by the usage and purposes for which it is held.' The
following can be culled from Viuda de Tan Toco u. Municipal
Council of lloilo:

"G.R. No. 171182,August 23, 2012, 679 SCRA 54.

 THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY 71

If the agency is incorporated, the test of its suabil-

ity is found in its charter. The simple rule is that it is
suable if its charter says so, and this is true regardless
of the functions it is performing. Municipal corporations,
for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of
the State when they are engaged in governmental func-
tions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity
from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in
the performance of such functions because their charter
provides that they can sue and be sued.
In Bermoy v. Philippine Normal College," suit was
filed by the personnel of the defendant corporation for
recovery of salary differentials and overtime pay. The
defendant moved to dismiss, contending that the action
was against the State inasmuch as the college was a
public agency engaged in a governmental function, to
wit, the education of the youth. The Supreme Court did
not consider this argument decisive. The important
thing was that the charter of the college provided that it
could sue and be sued, which meant that, even assum-
ing that the function involved was public, the State had
thereby waived its immunity. A similar ruling was made
in Arcega v. Court of Appeals, 46 involving the Central
Bank, Rayo v. CFI of Bulacan" involving the National
Power Corporation, and Philippine National Railways v.
Intermediate Appellate Court.48
This test is obviously not available in the case of
the unincorporated agency as there would be no charter
to consult. Since it has no separate juridical personality,
any suit filed against it is necessarily an action against

·"' G.R. No. L-8670, May 18, 1951:i.

'6 66 SCRA 229.
" 110 SCRA 460.
" 217 SCRA 401.
 THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY 73

governmental functions but also, as a sideline, or inci-

dentally, in proprietary enterprises. This doctrine was
first announced in Bureau of Printing u. Bureau of
Printing Employees Association, 52 where the Supreme
Court stated as follows:

"The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government

created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As
such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the
direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the
President, and is 'charged with the execution of all printing
and binding, including work incidental to those processes, re-
quired by the National Government and such other work of the
same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the
(Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to
undertake .. .' (Sec. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code.) It has no corporate
existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the Gen-
eral Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs
of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and, obvi-
ously, not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary
profit.
***
" ... Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to
undertake private binding jobs, it cannot be pretended that it
is thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional
work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its
function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary
in character, there is no showing that the employees perform-
ing said proprietary function are separate and distinct from
those employed in its general governmental functions. * * *
"Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any cor-
porate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot
be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court.) Any suit, action or
proceeding against it, ifit were to produce any effect, would ac-
tually be a suit, action or proceeding against the government
itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be
sued without its consent, much less over its objection. (Soo
Metran vs. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz. 2835; Angat River Irrigation

''' 1 SCRA 340.

 THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY 75

The non-suability of the Bureau of Customs was af-

firmed in the case of Farolan v. Court of Tax Appeals. 54
In Shell Philippines Exploration B. V v. Jalos,55 the
petitioner invoked tha doctrine of state immunity in
asking for the dismissal of a complaint against it, claim-
ing that it should be considered an agent of the Republic
of the Philippines by reason of its appointment by the
latter as the exclusive party to conduct petroleum op-
erations in a certain area, and that said operations were
under the full control and supervision of the State. The
Supreme Court rejected this contention, stating that
these facts do not mean that it had become the State's
'"agent' within the meaning of the law." The Court con-
sidered the petitioner to be but "a service contractor for
the exploration and development of one of the country's
natural gas reserves."

Exemption from Legal Requirements

When the State litigates, either directly or through

its authorized officers, it is not required to put up a
bond for damages, or an appeal bond, since it can be
assumed that it is always solvent.56
In Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation v. Pacana,57
the Supreme Court clarified that this exemption does
not, as a general rule, apply to government-owned or
controlled corporations because they have legal person-
alities distinct from their shareholders. Thus, "while a
GOCC's majority stockholder, the State, will always be
presumed solvent, the presumption does not necessarily

"' 217 SCRA 298.

"'' G.R. No. 179918, September 8, 2010, 630 SCRA 399.
'" Araneta v. Catmaitan, 101 Phil. 323.
57
G.R. No. 171673, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 196.
 THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY 77

also not chargeable against it except when it has ex-

pressly stipulated to pay it or when interest is allowed
by an act of the legislature or in eminent domain cases
where damages sustained by the owner take the form of
interest at the legal rate.62 It has also been held that
statutes of limitation do not run against the State
unless the contrary is expressly provided by law, al-
though this rule is not observed where the State is en-
gaged in private business."
In Republic v. Garcia, 64 it was held that the govern-
ment could not be assessed one-half of the fees paid to
the commissioner who determined the just compensa-
tion for the property under expropriation.

Suability vs. Liability

The mere fact that the State is suable does not mean
that it is liable; or to put it another way, waiver of immu-
nity by the State does not mean concessionof its liability.
As already explained, suability is the result of the express
or implied consent of the State to be sued. Liability, on the
other hand, is determined after hearing on the basis of the
relevant laws and the established facts. When, therefore,
the State allows itself to be sued, all it does in effect is to
give the other party an opportunity to prove, ifit can, that
the State is liable. The State, in many cases, may be su-
able but not liable.
Indeed, in University of the Philippines v. Dizon,65
the Supreme Court, citing Municipality of San Fer-

62
Arasola v. Trinidad, 40 Phil. 252.
~~ Gov't. of the Phil. Islands v. Monte de Piedad, supra.
"76 SCRA 47.
ss G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012, 679 SCRA 54.
 THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY 79

be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to

show that the defendant was not acting in its govern-
mental capacity when the injury was committed or that
the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law:
Failing this, the claim~nt cannot recover.
In one case,68 for example, a claim for recovery of
damages against a provincial government failed when it
was shown that the injury complained of occurredin con-
nection with the repair of streets then being undertaken
by the defendant through its regular agents. This was
clearly a governmental function. By contrast, a municipal-
ity was held liable in another case for forciblyand illegally
ejecting a lessee from certain fishponds belonging to the
former in its proprietary capacity.69 In the case of Torio v.
Fontanilla, 70 the Supreme Court held a municipality liable
for a tort committed in connectionwith the celebration of
a town fiesta, which was considered a proprietary func-
tion.
In University of the Philippines v. Dizon." the Su-
preme Court, citing the earlier case of Republic v. Na-
tional Labor Relations Commission,72 explained that the
"funds of the UP are government funds that are public
in character. They include the income accruing from the
use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent
only for the attainment of its institutional objectives.
Hence, the funds subject of this action could not be
validly made the subject of the RTC's writ of execution
or garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered against
the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was
68
Palafox v. Province of Ilocos Norte, G.R. No. L-10659, Jan.
31, 1958.
69
Mun. of Moncada v. Cajuigan, 21 Phil. 184.
10
85 SCRA 599.
1'
G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012, 679 SCRA 54.
" 263 SCRA 290.
 Chapter 5

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE

POLICIES

ARTICLE II of the Constitution is entitled "Declaration

of Principles and State Policies." This article is intended
to lay down the rules underlying our system of govern-
ment and must therefore be adhered to in the conduct of
public affairs and the resolution of public issues. The
present article is an enlargement and, in some sections,
a modification of the original provisions found also in
Article II of the 1973 Constitution. The purpose is to
emphasize and articulate more unequivocally the objec-
tives and limitations of governmental action in pursuit
of the general goals announced in the Preamble. There
may have been some "overkill" though, as the number of
sections has increased from only ten in the 1973 Consti-
tution to twenty eight in the present charter, many of
which appear to be but meaningless platitudes on sub-
jects considered significant, perhaps, only by those who
insisted on their inclusion.
The foregoing notwithstanding, or despite the per-
ceived or seeming importance of many of the principles
and policies announced in Article II, and as previously
observed, the Supreme Court has made it clear that
most of its provisions are to be considered as "mere leg-
islative guides, which absent enabling legislation, do not
embody enforceable constitutional rights.": Thus, to

I
Magallona v . Ermita, [Link] No. 187107, July 16, 2011, 655
SCRA 476; see also Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18.

81
 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 83

stitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing

importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obli-
gation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would pot be too far when all else would
be lost not only for the present generation, but also for
those to come - generations which stand to inherit
nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.m
Section 28 (on the policy of public disclosure) has
likewise been similarly treated by the Supreme Court,
which has stated that its effectivity "need not await the
passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this
principle, it is merely directed to provide for 'reasonable
safeguards."' According to the Court, the government
cannot "point to the absence of an implementing legisla-
tion as an excuse in not effectingsuch policy."

Preamble

The Preamble to the Constitution reads as follows:

"We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of
Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society and
establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspi-
rations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our
patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the bless-
ings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and
a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality and peace, do
ordain and promulgate this Constitution."

Unlike in the 1935 Constitution, the above Pream-

ble is couched not in the third person but in the first. It

• Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, 224 SCRA

792.
' The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the
Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R.
No. 183591, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402.
 F'uNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 85

Court has described our nation as "Christian," perhaps,

in affirmation of the reality that the vast majority of the
Filipino people believe in an "Almighty God." It has
even "hailed" the Philippines as "the bastion of Christi -
anity in Asia," which "boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos or
93 percent of a total population of 93.3 million - adher-
ing to the teachings of Jesus Christ."
Certain sectors find this change to be inconsistent
with the policy of separation of church and state, which
is characterized as inviolable in Article Il,9 and the es-
tablishment clause, 10 found in the Bill of Rights, which
has been interpreted to restrain the government from
composing prayers for public school children," or from
requiring them to read verses from the Bible,12 or even
from allowing public school teachers to distribute copies
of Bibles during class hours.13 In addition, there are
those who maintain that the presence of the phrase
"Almighty God" in the Preamble somehow lessens the
significance of the provisions of Article VI, Section 29 (2)
of the Constitution, which prohibits appropriations for
sectarian purposes."
On the other hand, the Constitution grants tax ex-
emptions to religious institutions, 15 and allows optional
religious instruction in our public schools" and even full

'People v. Bosi, G.R. No. 193665, June 25, 2012, 674 SCRA
411.
'Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013.
' Constitution, Article II, Section 6.
'0 Ibid., Article III, Section 5.

"Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1.

12
District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 US 203.
"' Tudor v. Board of Education, 14 NJ 31.
"See Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201.
" Constitution, Articles VI, Section 28 (3).
"Ibid., Article XIV, Section 3 (3).
 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 87

"With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of

the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the alleged violation
of the Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no
basis. Private respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner
took advantage of her ~position to court her student. If the two
eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and
academic levels, this only lends substance to the truism that
the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know.
But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is
not to be so casually equated with immorality. The deviation of
the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal
pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary so-
cial mores."19

The new Preamble is rather wordy and suggests at

the outset what one might expect in the text of the Con-
stitution in terms of style and content. Even now we
must prepare against a very "talkative" Constitution.

Republicanism

Section 1 of Article II provides: "The Philippines is

a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides
in the people and all government authority emanates
from them."
It is to be noted that the Constitution now describes
the Philippines as not only a republican but also a de-
mocratic State. Democracy is essentially government by
the people.
In this connection, the Supreme Court has re-
marked that "the 1987 Constitution accords to the citi-
zens a greater participation in the affairs of govern-
ment. Indeed, it provides for people's initiative, the right
to information on matters of public concern (including
the right to know the state of hea lth of [Link] President),

'" Chua-Qua v. Clave, G.R. No. 49549, August 30, 1990, 189
SCRA 117.
 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 89

departments and other government offices, and repre-

sentatives from non-governmental organizations within
the regions for purposes of administrative decentraliza-
tion to strengthen the, autonomy of the units therein
and to accelerate the economic and social growth and
development of the units in the region shall be provided
for by the President.27 The organic act for each autono-
mous region shall be enacted with the assistance and
participation of a regional consultative commission
composed of representatives appointed by the President
from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies.28 The
independent economic and planning agency headed by
the President shall consult with the appropriate public
agencies, various private sectors, and local government
units, for purposes of recommending to Congress, and
implementing continuing integrated and coordinated
programs and policies for national development." The
Congress may create a consultative body to advise the
President on policies affecting indigenous cultural com-
munities, the majority of the members of which shall
come from the communities." Moreover, sectoral repre-
sentation is provided for in the House of Representa-
tives and in local legislative bodies, under paragraphs
(1) and (2) of Section 5 of Article VI and Section 9 of
Article X, respectively, of the Constitution.
This reproduction of the original principle in the
1935 Constitution establishes the democratic and repre-
sentative nature of our government and proclaims our
hostility to autocratic or totalitarian regimes. Thus, the
people are declared supreme. It is affirmed that every

27
Id., Article X, Section 14.
28
Id., Article X, Section 18.
20
Id., Article XII, Section 9.
' ° Id., Article XVI, Section 12.
 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 91

a mere plurality, which may not necessarily be a major-

ity of the total votes cast. It is thus possible at times for
the smaller number to prevail over the majority, as in a
three-cornered election where the winner gets 40,000
votes as against 60,000,. votes cast more or less equally
for the other two candidates. This may also occur in,
say, the suspension or expulsion of a member of the
Congress, which requires the concurrence of two-thirds
of the members of the House to which he belongs." In
the Sandiganbayan, the dissent of one member will pre-
vent a decision of the other two members of the division
as a unanimous vote is required for such decision. The
lone individual is in fact "a majority of one" when pro-
tected by the bill of rights."
All this is justified because the law so provides and
ours is "a government of laws and not of men." The as-
cendancy of the law is axiomatic in a republic and must
be recognized by every public official no matter how
exalted. No person is above the law; all must bow to its
majesty. Every officialact must be based upon and con-
form to the authority of a valid law, lacking which the
act must be rejected.
Indeed, nobility of intention is insufficient to vali-
date an unauthorized act, as illustrated in the cele-
brated case of Villavicencio v. Lukban, 36 where it was
conceded that the mayor of Manila had been motivated
by his desire to protect the morals and health of the
people when he "deported" one hundred seventy prosti-
tutes from Manila to Davao. The Supreme Court had
nevertheless no choice except to condemn his act, there
being no showing that it had been authorized by any

=ta., Art. VI, Sec. 16(2).

"" P.D. No. 1606.
as 39 Phil. 778.
 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 93

may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the
fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under
conditions provided by law, to render personal military
or civil service."
This provision is based upon the inherent right of
every State to existence and self-preservation. By virtue
of this right, a State may take up all necessary action,
including the use of armed force, to repel any threat to
its security.
To this end, it is provided in Article XVI, Section 4,
of the Constitution that the armed forces of the Philip-
pines shall "be composed of a citizen armed force which
shall undergo military training and serve, as may be
provided by law." The pertinent law is C.A. No. 1, oth-
erwise known as the National Defense Act.
In People v. Lagman and People v. Zosa,38 the ac-
cused were charged with and convicted of refusal to
register for military training as required by the above-
mentioned statute. On appeal, Zosa argued that he was
fatherless and had a mother and eight brothers to sup-
port, while Lagman alleged that he had a father to sup-
port, had no military leanings, and did not wish to kill
or be killed; and both claimed that the statute was un-
constitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed their con-
viction, holding that the law in question was based on
the aforecited constitutional principle.

''The National Defense Law, in so far as it established

compulsory military service, does not go against this constitu-
tional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance
therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State
cannot ha performed except through an army. To leave the or-
ganization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to

•• 38 O.G. 1676.
 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 95

Peace and Order

Section 5 provides rather pompously:

"Sec. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the pro-

tection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the peo-
ple of the blessings of democracy."

This was probably inspired by the American Decla-

ration of Independence or some high school commence-
ment address. In any case, it speaks for itself -
needlessly, it would seem - as these are implicit in a
welfare state, which is what we are repeatedly told the
Constitution is establishing.

The Incorporation Clause

Section 2 provides: "The Philippines renounces war

as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equal-
ity, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all na-
tions."
Every State is, by reason of its membership in the
family of nations, bound by the generally accepted prin-
ciples of international law, which are considered to be
automatically part of its own laws. This is known as the
doctrine of incorporation. By virtue thereof, and par-
ticularly since it is expressly affirmed in our Constitu-
tion, our Supreme Court has applied the rules of inter-
national [Link] in the decision of a number of cases not-
withstanding that such rules had not been previously
converted to statutory enactments.
 FvNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 97

mission trying him, contending that the Philippines was

not covered by the Hague Convention under which he
was being prosecuted, since the Philippines was not a
signatory to this agreement. The Supreme Court re-,
jected this argument, holding that we were bound by
that convention because it embodied generally accepted
principles of international law binding upon all States.
Among the grounds invoked by the Supreme Court
in Agustin v. Edu,42 which was a challenge against the
constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction requiring
early warning devices for all motor vehicles, was our
adherence to general accepted principles of interna-
tional law. Thus -

"The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition

must be dismissed is reinforced by this consideration. The peti-
tion itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed
Letter of Instruction: '[Whereas], the hazards posed by such
obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international
bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Conven-
tion on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Or-
ganization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention,
which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D.
No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for
the installation of road safety signs and devices; * * *' It cannot
be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the
Constitution possesses relevance: 'The Philippines * * * adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land * * * .' The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not
for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had
pledged its word. The concept of pacta sunt seruanda stands in
the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with
the principle of international morality."

Indeed, generally accepted principles of interna-

tional law can be relied upon even for purposes of inter-

'" Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 195 (1979).

 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 99

nents of the law of the land, how is the problem re-

solved?
46
This question was raised in Ichong v. Hernandez,
where the petitioner asked for the invalidation of the
Retail Trade Nationalization Act on the ground, among
others, that it contravened several treaties concluded by
us which, under the rule of pacta sunt servanda, a gen-
erally accepted principle of international law should be
observed by us in good faith. The Supreme Court said it
saw no conflict. However,even assuming that there was,
it was the statute that should be upheld because it rep-
resented an exercise of the police power which, being
inherent, could not be bargained away or surrendered
through the medium of a treaty.
Municipal law was also upheld as against interna-
tional law in Gonzales v. Hechanova, 47 on the basis of
the doctrine of separation of powers, and in In re Gar-
cia, 48 under the rule-making powers of the Supreme
Court.
It will be recalled that among the issues raised by
the petitioners in Magallona v. Ermita'" was the neces-
sity for the passage of RA 9522, which provided for new
baselines for our archipelago, considering the permis-
sive text of UNCLOS III, on which said law was based.
The Supreme Court found this contention of the peti-
tioners as "plausible" but just the same ruled in favor of
the law, stressing that it would actually be more benefi-
cial for the Philippines to have "internationally accepted
baselines" or baselines compliant with the provisions of
UNCLOS III. Thus -

46
101 Phil. 1155.
'1 9 SCRA 230 (1963).
•• 2 SCRA 984 (1961).
'" G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011, 655 SCRA 476.
 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 101

It is interesting to note that, in the same case, the

Supreme Court, in distinguishing between treaties and
executive agreements, stated that "a treaty has greater
'dignity' than an executive agreement, because its con-
stitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having
behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and
the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agree-
ment, takes precedence over any prior statutory enact-
ment.?"
The renunciation of war as an instrument of na-
tional policy is itself a generally accepted principle now
categorically expressed in the United Nations Charter.
The view that the war here eschewed is an offensiveand
not a defensive war finds support in the reworded provi-
sion of Article VI, Section 23(1), which empowers the
Congress to declare not war but "the existence of a state
of war" presumably commenced or provoked by the en-
emy State.
The last clause of Section 2 is an addition to the
original provision in the 1935 Constitution and is a
mere stylistic embellishment of our commitment to the
law of nations.
Section 2 must be read with another section in this
Article, which provides as follows:

"Sec. 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign

policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount con-
sideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity,
national interest, and the right to self-determination."

and with Section 8, declaring that:

"Ibid.
 FuNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 103

The first is Section 12, which reads: "The State rec-

ognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social insti-
tution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother, and.
the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and.
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the aid and support of the Gov-
ernment."
Kindred ties are especially close in the Philippines,
making the family a fundamental and important factor
in the enhancement of the nation. The theory is that the
better the home, the better the nation; and also that the
strength of the family lies in the correct upbringing of
its children. Proper recognition is therefore given to the
complementary roles of the parents and the government
in the rearing of the youth for the principal purposes
mentioned, to wit, civic efficiency and the development
of moral character.
Accordingly, it has been observed that the "family
is the basic and the most important institution of soci-
ety. It is in the family where children are born and
molded either to become useful citizens of the country or
troublemakers in the community.?"
Significantly, the new provision declares that the
State "shall equally protect the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception," which seems to sug-
gest a policy against abortion. This, however, must be
equated with the equal protection due the mother. It
should also be observed that in recognizing the sanctity
of the family life, the provision is not closing the door on

"' Quiao v. Quiao, G.R. No 176556, July 4, 2012, 675 SCRA 642.
 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 105

dardize the thinking of the children, who, according to

the court, were not "mere creatures of the State."
On the other hand, there is nothing that inhibits
the government from prescribing or prohibiting certain
courses in the various school curricula intended to im-
prove the education of the students. The legislature now
requires the teaching of the novels of Rizal for the pur-
pose of inculcating in the pupils the virtues and ideals of
our national hero, and may prohibit certain subjects
that are pernicious per se, such as, say, the techniques
of picking pockets.
In People v. Ritter, 59 an alien who had enticed Fili-
pino children with money and then sexually abused
them was expelled from the country, conformably to the
commitment of the State "to defend the right of children
to assistance and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development."
Accordingly, our Supreme Court has consistently
deplored the commission of incestuous rape, declaring
that "our moral fiber must have truly deteriorated with
fathers raping their own children. For a Christian na-
tion like ours, such bestial act should never be tolerated.
Some would argue that for the sake of the family the
child must forgive her father-tormentor. But in the eyes
of the law, a crime is a crime and justice dictates that
fathers who rape their children deserve no place in our
society.t'"
It will be recalled that in the Cabanas Case,61 the
conflicting claims of a mother and an uncle of a child to
59
194 SCRA 690 (1991).
60
People v. Bosi, G.R. No. 193665, June 25, 2012, 674 SCRA
411.
'' 268 U.S. 510.
 F'uNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 107

Even optional religious instruction has been expanded

under the new Constitution as an added measure for the
improvement of the morals of the youth.
In Department of Education u. San Diego,62 the is-
sue was the validity of a rule laid down by the petitioner
prohibiting any student from taking the National Medi-
cal Admission Test (NMAT)if he had earlier failed it
three successive times. In sustaining the rule, the Su-
preme Court observed in part:

"The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke

the right to quality education as a guaranty of the Constitu-
tion: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his
preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed
the NMAT five times. While his persistence is noteworthy, to
say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.
''No depreciation is intended or made against the private
respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify in
the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or
occupation. The only inference is that he is probably better, not
for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not
excited his interest.
"In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster;
in the latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even be out-
standing. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to
quality education for the full harnessing of his potentials and
the sharpening of his latent talents towards what may even be
a brilliant future.
"We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes,
of dentists who should never have left the farm and engineers
who should have studied banking and teachers who could be
better as merchants.
"It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to
regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the
student to the course for which he ls best suited as determined
by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be

62
180 SCRA 533 (1989).
 FuNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 109

as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a

child," declaring that the "appellant may be confined in
an agricultural camp or any other training facility in
accordancewith Sec. 5lofRepublic Act No. 9344."
Moreover, Republic Act No. 9262 has been enacted
to protect women and children from violence and threats
to their personal safety and security.
It is not amiss to remark in this connection that
most of our more prominent leaders in the past were
young men whose youth belied their competence and
responsibility in the discharge of the significant tasks
that history assigned to them during the more crucial
periods of our national existence. Among them were
Rizal, who died at thirty-five; Bonifacio,who was thirty-
three when the Revolution broke out; Aguinaldo, who
became the first President of the Philippines when he
was only thirty; Sergio Osmefia, who was twenty-nine
when he was chosen Speaker of the Philippine Assem-
bly; and Wenceslao Q. Vinzons, whose brilliant if brief
public career began when he was elected to the Consti-
tutional Convention of 1934 at the age of twenty-five.

Women

Article II, Section 14, provides that "the State shall

recognizethe role of women in nation-building and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men." The reverse order follows the polite
phraseology of "ladies and gentlemen" and "ladies first"
and does not suggest a social upheaval, much less an
overturning of the tradition conferring upon the man
the position of head of the family, administrator of the
conjugal funds and other similar capacities. This provi-
sion will need implementation by the legislature, which,
 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 111

The plight of the millions of our impoverished

masses is best told in the story of the ditch-digger, who
was asked why he was digging ditches. His reply: "I dig
the ditch to earn the money to buy the food to give me
strength to dig the ditch."
To him and countless other Filipinos, life is but an
unending cycle of drudgery and toil, a ceaseless struggle
for survival for the elemental right to just exist instead
of truly living. Want is a constant companion. Oppres-
sion is always close by. As for those interests intended
to enhance the joy of living, these are total strangers.
One cannot enjoy the sunset when he must worry about
the oil to light the lamp when the darkness closes in.
To alleviate the plight of these forgotten men, to
give those with less privileges in life more privileges in
law, in the words of President Ramon Magsaysay, our
government has assiduously, if not always successfully,
pursued the policy of social justice enshrined in both the
old and the new Constitutions.
Accordingly,it was held in one case" that:

"As between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and

the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice,
the law has reason to demand from the latter stricter compli-
ance (with the Workmen's Compensation Act). Social justice in
this case is not equality but protection."

The foregoing observations notwithstanding, the

Supreme Court has made it clear that "laws which have
for their object the preservation and maintenance of
social justice are not only meant to favor the poor and
the underprivileged. They apply with equal force to
those who, notwithstanding their more comfortable po-
68
Ondoy v. Ignacio, 97 SCRA 611 (1980).
 F'uNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 113

In one case, the petitioner invoked social justice as

a ground for rejecting the respondent's efforts to relo-
cate her. The Supreme Court said -
I.
"For sure, the NHA's order of relocating petitioner to her
assigned lot and demolishing her property on account of her re-
fusal to vacate was consistent with the law's fundamental ob-
jective of promoting social justice in the manner that will inure
to the common good. xxx It is also worth noting that peti-
tioner's continued refusal to leave the subject property has
hindered the development of the entire area. Indeed, petitioner
cannot invoke the social justice clause at the expense of the
commonwelfare.?"

In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC,73

the Supreme Court likewise emphasized that -

"The policy of social justice is not intended to counte-

nance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the un-
derprivileged. At best it may mitigate the penalty but it cer-
tainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is
an imperative of every humane society but only when the re-
cipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social
justice cannot be permitted to be [the] refuge of scoundrels any
more than can equity be an impediment to the punishment of
the guilty. Those who invoke social justice may do so only if
their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not sim-
ply because they happen to be poor. This great policy of our
Constitution is not meant for the protection of those who have
proved they are not worthy of it, like the workers who have
tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes of their own
character."

72
Maglakas v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 138823,
September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA379.
'" 247 Phil. 641 (1988], cited in Duque v. Veloso, G.R. No.
196201, June 19, 2012, 673 SCRA676.
 F'vNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 115

Apparently not satisfied with the above provisions,

the framers have also provided for a new and separate
Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, with
subtopics on Labor, Agrarian and Natural Resources Re-
form, Urban Land Reform and Housing, Health,
Women, People's Organizations, and Human Rights.
In sustaining the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law, the Supreme Court concluded its opinion in Asso-
ciation of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. u.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform 75 in the followingwords:
"By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles
to the comprehensive agrarian reform program are removed, to
clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. We may now
glimpse the day when he will be released not only from want
but also from the exploitation and disdain of the past and from
his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last, his
servitude will be ended forever. At last, the farm on which he
toils will be his farm. It will be his portion of Mother Earth
that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of
living. And where once it bred for him only deep despair, now
can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling fu-
ture. Now at last can he banish from his small plot of earth his
insecurities and dark resentments and 'rebuild in it the music
and the dream."'

Separation of Church and State

Section 6 reiterates that "the separation of Church

and State shall be inviolable." This is a reproduction of
Article XV, Section 15, of the 1973 Constitution.
The separation of Church and State was originally,
and quite adequately, expressed in the bill of rights pro-
viding that "no law shall be made respecting an estab-
lislunent uf religion or prohibiting the free exercise

"175 SCRA 343 (1989).

 F'uNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 117

ecclesiastical affairs," including a church's disconnection

of its ties with another entity.76
The wall of separation between Church and State is
not a wall of hostility. The State in fact recognizes the
beneficent influence of religion in the enrichment of the
nation's life. "In so far as it instills into the mind the
purest principles of morality," so said Justice Laurel,
"the influence of religion is deeply felt and highly appre-
ciated" by the State. Thus -

''When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Con-

stitution, implored the aid of Divine Providence, in order to es-
tablish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve
and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general
welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the bless-
ings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and de-
mocracy,' they thereby manifested their intense religious na-
ture and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the
destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of relig-
ion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact,
certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to re-
ligious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws
exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to reli-
gious purposes. Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest,
preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as
such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution,
orphanage or leprosarium. Optional religious instruction in the
public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed. Thursday
and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day,
and Sundays are made legal holidays because of the secular
idea that their observance is conducive to beneficial moral re-
sults. The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and big-
amy; and certain crimes against religious worship are consid-
ered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state.?"

'" United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. v. Bradford

United Church of Christ, Inc., G.R. No. 171905, June 20, 2012, 674
SCRA 92, citing Fonacier v. Court of Appeals, 96 Phil. 417 (1955);
Taruc v. Bishop De la Cruz, 493 Phil. 293 (2005).
77
Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201.
 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 119

law at his command, and to employ them in the manner

he may deem most effectual.'?"
This military power of the President has been in-
terpreted to include the power to prevent, as Com-
mander-in-Chief, military personnel from testifying in
legislative inquiries,79 and to confirm, mitigate and re-
mit sentences of erring military personnel."

Local Autonomy

The policy of local autonomy, which was not specifi-

cally mentioned in the 1935 Constitution but was digni-
fied into a constitutional principle by the 1973 charter is
affirmed in Section 25, which provides: "The State shall
ensure the autonomy of local governments."
This principle is fleshed out in Article X, entitled
"Local Government" and the Local Government Code.
The strengthening of local governments is based
upon the Jeffersonian view that "municipal corporations
are the small republics from which the great one derives
its strength." The belief is shared in this country that
vitalization of the local·government unit will enable its
inhabitants to develop their resources and thereby con-
tribute to the progress of the whole nation. More impor-
tantly, they will acquire a deepened sense of involve-
ment that will encourage them to participate more ac-
tively in the direction of public affairs as members of the
body politic.

1"
Kulayan vs. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012, 675 SCRA
482.
79
Gudani v. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006, 498
SCRA671.
"0 Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 198554, July 30,
2012, 677 SCRA 750.
 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 121

sions of Article XII of the Constitution, namely, Section

10, which basically gives to Congress the discretion to
reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments; Sec-
tion 11, which [Link] for public utilities to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associa-
tions organized under the laws of the Philippines, at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is ownedby such
citizens; Section 12, which calls upon the State to pro-
mote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods, and adopt meas-
ures that help them make competitive; and Section 13,
under which the State shall pursue a trade policy that
serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity. All of these provisions are founded on the
need to "conserve and develop our patrimony," as speci-
fied in the Preamble.
In Espina u. Zamora,82 the petitioners challenged
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8762, otherwise
known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000,
which allowed foreigners to engage in retail trade in our
country. The petitioners contended that its basic provi-
sions violated the aforecited constitutional [Link]
Supreme Court rejected the challenge, declaring, as
follows-

"But, as the Court explained in Tafiada v. Angara, the

provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declara-
tions of principles and state policies, are not self-executing.
Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a
cause of action in the courts.
"The Court further explained in Taiiada that Article XII
of Lhe 1987 Cu111;LiLuLiu11 lays duwu Lhe ideals uf economic na-
tionalism: (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified

"2 G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010, 631 SCRA 17.
 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 123

elusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such

policy.
"Here, to the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade Lib-
eralization Act, lessens the restraint on the foreigners' right to
property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, it can-
not be said that the law amounts to a denial of the Filipinos'
right to property and to due process oflaw. Filipinos continue
to have the right to engage in the kinds of retail business to
which the law in question has permitted the entry of foreign
investors.
"Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to
inquire into the wisdom of R.A. 8762 save when it blatantly
violates the Constitution. But as the Court has said, there is no
showing that the law has contravened any constitutional man-
date. The Court is not convinced that the implementation of
R.A. 8762 would eventually lead to alien control of the retail
trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete
and strong argument to support its thesis. The law itself has
provided strict safeguards on foreign participation in that
business. Thus -
"First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business
subject to the categories above-enumerated; Second, only na-
tionals from, or juridical entities formed or incorporated in
countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall be al-
lowed to engage in retail trade business; and Third, qualified
foreign retailers shall not be allowed to engage in certain re-
tailing activities outside their accredited stores through the
use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use of sales repre-
sentatives, door-to-door selling, restaurants and sari-sari
stores and such other similar retailing activities.
"In sum, petitioners have not shown how the retail trade
liberalization has prejudiced and can prejudice the local small
and medium enterprises since its implementation about a dec-
ade ago."

In seeming contrast, the Supreme Court, in Gam-

boa v. Finance Secretary." in interpreting Section 11 of
Article X.11, which reserves franchises for public utilities

.., G.R. No. 1765'79,June 28, 2011, 652 SCRA 690.

 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 125

This patriotic stance of the Supreme Court was fur-

ther emphasized when it later declared -

"Since the constitµtional requirement of at least 60 per-

cent Filipino ownership'applies not only to voting control of the
corporation but also to the beneficial ownership of the corpora-
tion, it is therefore imperative that such requirement apply
uniformly and across the board to all classes of shares, regard-
less of nomenclature and category, comprising the capital of a
corporation. Under the Corporation Code, capital stock consists
of all classes of shares issued to stockholders, that is, common
shares as well as preferred shares, which may have different
rights, privileges or restrictions as stated in the articles of in-
corporation.
"The Constitution expressly declares as State policy the
development of an economy'effectively controlled' by Filipinos.
Consistent with such State policy, the Constitution explicitly
reserves the ownership and operation of public utilities to Phil-
ippine nationals, who are defined in the Foreign Investments
Act of 1991 as Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations
at least 60 percent of whose capital with voting rights belongs
to Filipinos. The FIA's implementing rules explain that '[f]or
stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or
Philippine nationals, mere legal title is not enough to meet the
required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the
stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is essential.' In
effect, the FIA clarifies, reiterates and confirms the interpreta-
tion that the term 'capital' in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution refers to shares with voting rights, as well as with
full beneficial ownership. This is precisely because the right to
vote in the election of directors, coupled with full beneficial
ownership of stocks, translates to effective control of a corpora-
tion.
"Any other construction of the term 'capital' in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution contravenes the letter and
intent of the Constitution. Any other meaning of the term
'capital' openly invites alien domination of economic activities
reserved exclusively to Philippine nationals. Therefore, re-
spondents' interpretation will ultimately result in handing
over effective control of our national economy to foreigners in
 FuNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 127

"Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right
to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them."
"Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecologyin accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature."
"Sec. 17. The State shall give priority to education, sci-
ence and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patri-
otism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote
total human liberation and development."
"Sec. 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights
of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of
national unity and development."
"Sec. 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental,
community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the
welfare of the nation."
"Sec. 24. The State recognizes the vital role of commu-
nication and information in nation-building."
"Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to op-
portunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties
as may be defined by law."
"Sec. 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integ-
rity in the public service and take positive and effective meas-
ures against graft and corruption."
"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."

Sections 15 (on the people's right to health) and 16

(on their right to a balanced and healthful ecology) have,
as earlier noted, been acknowledged by the Supreme
Court as special provisions which "need not even be
written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind.?"

'" Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224
SCRA 792; see also MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay,
G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011, 643 SCRA 90.
 F'uNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 129

ties between the BJE and the national government, the

act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status
which, in international practice, has generally been a
preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive
to national unity." The Court clarified that "indigenous
peoples situated within states do not have a general
right to independence or secession from those states
under international law, but they do have rights
amounting to what was discussed above as the right to
internal self-determination."
It is to be noted that Section 12 of Article XVI of the
Constitution provides that Congress may create a consul-
tative body to advise the President on policies affecting
indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the
members of which shall comefrom such communities.
As previously noted, Section 23 appears to be an af-
firmation of the ever-growing importance of non-
governmental organizations in our democracy.
In ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Phil.
Multi-Media Inc.,88 the Supreme Court remarked that
the "must-carry rule" imposed by the National Tele-
communications Commission and the legislative fran-
chises granted in favor of the parties in said case "are in
consonance with state policies enshrined in the Consti-
tution," including Sections 17 (on the promotion of sci-
ence and technology) and 24 (on the vital role of commu-
nication in nation-building). It would therefore appear
that our Supreme Court has somehow found some use
for these provisions.
Section 17 speaks of promoting "total human lib-
eration and development," whatever this may mean.

RR G.R. Nos. 175769-70, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 262.

 Chapter 6

SEPARATION OF POWERS

THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION of powers was

modified under the 1973 Constitution with the estab-
lishment of a semi-parliamentary government that
made the legislature subordinate in many respects to
the President, who was even vested with the ultimate
power of dissolving it. Under the new Constitution, the
traditional concept of the doctrine has been restored,
but with several significant modifications.
The three major departments of the government
have been maintained, and so have the three constitu-
tional commissions established earlier under the past
charters. Other independent bodies have been created.
By and large, the separation of the principal powers has
been preserved. The judiciary, regarded as the weakest
of the three branches, has been considerably strength-
ened with the conferment on it of additional and impor-
tant powers. In the case of the political departments,
one will observe a lessening of the powers of the execu-
tive and a corresponding increase in the authority of the
legislature, inspired presumably by our experiences
under the Marcos authoritarianism.
Worthy of special interest is the revival of the Com-
mission on Appointments as a check upon the appoint-
ing power in general and the creation of the Judicial
and Bar Council to ensure better selection of the mem-
bers of the judiciary. The Electoral Tribunals have also
been restored (but with a modified membership) to act

131
 SEPARATION OF POWERS 133

Purposes

The doctrine of separation of powers is intended to

prevent a concentratio:[Link] authority in one person or
group of persons that might lead to an irreversible error
or abuse in its exercise to the detriment of our republi-
can institutions. More specifically, according to Justice
Laurel, the doctrine is intended to secure action, to fore-
stall over-action, to prevent despotism and to obtain
efficiency.3
The principle of separation of powers ordains that
each of the three great branches of government has ex-
elusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling
within its own constitutionally allocated sphere."
To achieve these purposes, the legislature is gener-
ally limited to the enactment of laws and may not en-
force or apply them; the executive to the enforcement of
laws and may not enact or apply them; and the judiciary
to the application of laws and may not enact or enforce
them.5
Indeed, it has been ruled that "courts cannot limit
the application or coverage of a law, nor can it impose
conditions not provided therein." "Todo so," according to
the Supreme Court, "constitutes judicial legislation."

"Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. PSC, 40 O.G., 8th Supp. 67.

4
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156 (1936),
cited in Bureau of Customs Employees Association v. Teves, G.R. No.
181704, December 6, 2011, 661 SCRA 589.
'See Bengzon v. Driluu, G.R. Nu. 103524, April 15, 1992, 208
SCRA 133.
e Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation v. Commissioner of

Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 173425, September 4, 2012, 679 SCRA

566.
 SEPARATION OF POWERS 135

powers of government may not at all times be contained

with mathematical precision in water-tight compart-
ments because of their ambiguous nature, e.g., the
power of appointment, which can rightfully be exercised
by each department over its own administrative person-
nel. But more importantly, it is often necessary for cer-
tain powers to be reposed in more than one department,
so that they may better collaborate with and, in the
process, checkeach other for the public good.
An illustration of such coordination is the enact-
ment of the general appropriations law, which begins
with the preparation by the President of the budget,
which becomesthe basis of the bill adopted by the Con-
gress and subsequently submitted by it to the President,
who may then approve it." Another is the grant of am-
nesty by the President which requires the concurrence
of a majority of all the members of the Congress." To
take a third example, the Commission on Elections does
not alone deputize law-enforcement agencies and in-
strumentalities of the government for the purpose of
ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections but does so with the consent of the President.12

Checks and Balances

'What makes the doctrine of separation of powers

especially workable is the corollary system of checks
and balances, by means of which one department is
allowed to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives
or to rectify mistakes or excesses committed by the
other departments. The exercise of this authority is not

in Constitution, Art. VI, Secs. 25, 27.

II
Ibid., Art. VI, Sec. 19.
12
Id., Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(4).
 SEPARATION OF POWERS 137

other departments. The correct view is that when the

Supreme Court mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries or invalidates the acts of a coordinate body,
what it is upholding is not its own supremacy but the
supremacy of the Constitution."
In the determination of whether a given power has
been validly exercised by a particular department, the
test applied is not necessarily or always the nature of
the power. The first criterion-and the safest-is
whether or not the power in question, regardless of its
nature, has been constitutionally conferred upon the
department claiming its exercise. The grant being as-
certained, the exerciseof the power is sustained.
The conferment of power is usually done expressly,
as in the vesture of the legislative power in the Con-
gress, 21 the executive power in the President" and the
judicial power in the Supreme Court and such lower
courts as may be established by law.23 As may be readily
noticed, there is no problem as to the validity of the
discharge of these powers because they naturally per-
tain to the agenciesin which they have been reposed.
But this is not always the case. To illustrate, the
power to impeach, which is essentially executive, and
the power to try and decide impeachment cases, which
is essentially judicial, are expressly lodged in the Con-
gress," as so too is the power of investigation,25 which is
more executive or judicial than legislative. These powers

20
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.
21
Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 1.
22
Ibid., Art. VII, Sec. 1.
"' Id., Art. VIII, Sec. 1.
=ta.. Art. XI, Sec. 3.
'" Id., Art. VI, Sec. 21.
 SEPARATION OF POWERS 139

hardly be effective if the Congress did not possess the

implied authority to punish witnesses for contumacy.
Mention must also be made of those powers which
although not specifically granted by the Constitution
either expressly or by implication may be justified as
inherent or incidental. Thus, the President, as head of
the government, may independently of constitutional or
statutory authority deport undesirable aliens as an "act
of State,"33 even as the Congress can punish any person
who impugns its integrity without proof.34 The courts,
for their part, may claim the contempt power inherent
in the judiciary.35

Justiciable and Political Questions

Assuming then that the proper repository of the

power in question has been ascertained on the basis of a
valid constitutional grant, is the power of the judiciary to
review officialaction terminated? Not necessarily,because
it could be that the act in question had not been per-
formed in accordancewith the rules laid down by the Con-
stitution.
If, say, there is no compliance with a voting re-
quirement prescribed by the fundamental law, as where
a statute granting a tax exemption is enacted by less
than a majority of all the members of the Congress,36 or
when an appointee of the President does not possess the
prescribed qualifications, the courts will have jurisdic-
tion to intervene. The questions involved here are justi-
ciable. The judiciary in such cases would not be en-

"" In re Dick, 38 Phil. 41.

"' In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595.
"" Ibid.
''" Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 28(1).
 SEPARATION OF POWERS 141

cise of the same. In Gonzales v. Office of the President,38

the Supreme Court, in nullifying the removal by the
President of a Deputy Ombudsman, relied on the delib-
erations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the
constitutional grounds for impeachment in defining
"betrayal of public trust" and explained -

"The Constitutional Commission eventually found it rea-

sonably acceptable for the phrase betrayal of public trust to re-
fer to 'acts which are just short of being criminal but constitute
gross faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of
power, inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross
exercise of discretionary powers.' In other words, acts that
should constitute betrayal of public trust as to warrant re-
moval from office may be less than criminal but must be at-
tended by bad faith and of such gravity and seriousness as the
other grounds for impeachment.
"A Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor are not
impeachable officers. However, by providing for their removal
from office on the same grounds as removal by impeachment,
the legislature could not have intended to redefine constitu-
tional standards of culpable violation of the Constitution, trea-
son, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, as well as
betrayal of public trust, and apply them less stringently.
Hence, where betrayal of public trust, for purposes of im-
peachment, was not intended to cover all kinds of official
wrongdoing and plain errors of judgment, this should remain
true even for purposes of removing a Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor from [Link], the fact that the grounds
for impeachment have been made statutory grounds for the
removal by the President of a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor cannot diminish the seriousness of their nature nor
the acuity of their scope. Betrayal of public trust could not
suddenly 'overreach' to cover acts that are not vicious or ma-
levolent on the same level as the other grounds for impeach-
ment."

as G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012, 679 SCRA 614.

 SEPARATION OF POWERS 143

"The term 'political question' connotes what it means in

ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to
'those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be de-
cided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government.' It is con-
cerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of
a particular measure."

In Sanidad v. Commission on Elections." it was

held:

"Political questions are neatly associated with the wis-

dom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of
the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the con-
tested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political.
What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of
the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Con-
stitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act
or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the
amending process confers on the President that power to pro-
pose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question.
Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President
would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides
how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or
the authority assumed was valid or not.
"We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in
pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the question of
the President's authority to propose amendments and the regu-
larity of the procedure adopted for submission of proposals to
the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the latter. A clear
Descartes fallacy or vicious circle. Is it not that the people
themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority
and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the
present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, that consti-
tutional provision has been followed or not is indisputably a
proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of
course-who exercise no power of judicial review, but by the

" 73 SCRA 333 (1976).

 SEPARATION OF POWERS 145

nor-General,45 to call a special election though this duty

was imposed on him by law in mandatory language. The
Court held in both cases that the powers involved were
discretionary in the executive and therefore not subject .·
to judicial compulsion.A similar conclusionwas reached
in In re Dick,46 where the Supreme Court interpreted
also as discretionary the power of the Governor-General
to ascertain the necessity for the expulsion of an alien
for the protection of the national interest.
Indeed, in the earlier case of In Re Patterson,47 the
Court announced that the Governor-General could act
"without interference on the part of the judicial power"
accordingto the doctrine of separation of powers, stating
that "the greater part of modern laws, notwithstanding
these objections, have sanctioned the maxim that the
expulsion of foreigners is a political measure and that
the executive power may expel without appeal any per-
son whose presence tends to disturb the public peace.
The privilege of the foreigners to enter the territory of a
State for the purpose of traveling through or remaining
therein being recognized on principle, we must also rec-
ognize the right of the State under exceptional circum-
stances to limit this privilege upon the ground of public
policy, and in all cases preserve the obligations of the
foreigner to subject himself to the provisions of the local
law concerning his entry into and his presence in the
territory of each State."

"Under these circumstances, the Government exercising

in a sovereign and efficacious manner this attribute of execu-
tive power, has authorized an administrative officer to prevent
the entrance into the country of persons from abroad whom he

"' 16 Phil. 366.

46
Supra.
11
1 Phil. 93.
 SEPARATION OF POWERS 147

President of the Philippines, in the exercise of his politi-

cal prerogatives, that the people had acquiesced in or
accepted the 1973 Constitution. In De la Llana v. Com-
mission on Elections, 51 the Supreme Court refused to
restrain the holding of 'a referendum, ruling that the
calling thereof lay in the exclusive discretion of Presi-
dent Marcos.
In Custodio v. Senate President, 52 where a taxpayer
challenged the validity of a provision in the general
appropriations law that compensated the members of
the Congress for services supposedly rendered by them
during the Japanese Occupation, it was held that the
question submitted was political, affecting as it did the
wisdom or propriety of the law. Hence, the only remedy
available to the petitioner was a resort not to the courts
but to the bar of public opinion. When the Senate in
Alejandrina v. Quezon53 and the House of Representa-
tives in Osmetia v. Pendatun" suspended a member for
disorderly behavior, the Supreme Court refused to inter-
fere even if in the former case it declared that the sus-
pension was illegal "because the seat remains filled but
the occupant is silenced."
In Vera v. Avelino, 55 three senators-elect who had
been prevented from taking their oaths of officeby reso-
1 ution of the Senate went to the Supreme Court and
alleged that only the Electoral Tribunal had jurisdiction
over contests relating to their election, returns and
qualifications. Again, the Supreme Court refused to
intervene, holding that the case was not a "contest," and

OJ 82 SCRA 30 (1978).
"' 42 O.G. 1243.
'"146 Phil. 83.

""109 Phil. 863.

"' 77 Phil. 192.
 SEPARATION OF POWERS 149

Pambansa was held by the Supreme Court to be a poli-

tical question resolubleonly by the sovereignelectorate.
In De Castro u. Committee on Justice, 60 the Su-
preme Court was asked' to reverse a decision of the res-
pondent dismissing impeachment charges against
President Marcos after deliberating thereon for only six
hours and to compel the said committee to give due
course to such charges. The petition for certiorari and
mandamus was dismissed, on the ground inter alia that
the issues raised were political in nature and could be
resolved only by the legislators themselves in the exer-
cise of their discretion. The Court ruled that the dis-
missal of the charges was "within the ambit of the pow-
ers vested exclusively in the Batasan by express provi-
sion of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution and it is
not within the competence of this Court to inquire
whether in the exercise of said powers the Batasan
acted wisely." Later, when in Romulo u. Yniguez." the
petitioners asked for the recall of the impeachment reso-
lution so it could be considered directly by the Batasang
Pambansa, the Court, citing its ruling in the antecedent
case, dismissed the petition on the ground of separation
of powers, in addition to other reasons to be discussed in
detail in Chapter 17.
It must be noted that the Constitution now re-
quires the proper Committee of the House of Represen-
tatives to submit its report on an impeachment com-
plaint, together with its corresponding resolution, to the
House within sixty days from its referral to the same,
and said resolution shall be calendared for considera-
tion by the House within ten session days from its re-

so G.R. No. 71688, Sept. 10, 1985.

"' Infra.
 SEPARATION OF POWERS 151

Garcia, 67 where the Supreme Court asserted the right to

inquire into the factual basis of the suspension and to
annul the same if it appeared from its own investiga-
tions that the grounds invoked by the President were
not actually existing. In a complete about-face, however,
this decision was itself later abandoned in Garcia-
Padilla v. Enrile,68 where the original rule announced in
the Barcelon and Montenegro Cases was reinstated to
make the questioned power once again discretionary in
the President. It is no longer so, however, under Article
VII, Section 18, of the present Constitution, to be dis-
cussed in Chapter 11.
It was also held in Noblejas v. Teehanhee" that the
administrative investigation of an executive official
should be undertaken by the President of the Philip-
pines and not the Supreme Court even if it was provided
by law that such officialhad the rank and privileges of a
judge of the court of first instance. Neither may the
Supreme Court be compelled by law to act as a mere
board of arbitrators, an essentially executive body, par-
ticularly because whatever decisions it might make in
the discharge of its administrative functions would ul-
timately have to be reviewed by the same members in
the exercise of their judicial powers." Section 12 of Arti-
cle VIII of the Constitution provides that the "Members
of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by
law shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions."
Conversely, powers that belong to the judiciary
may not be assumed by other departments, as when, in

61
42 SCRA 448 (1971).
•• 121 SCRA 472 (1983).
sn 23 SCRA 405 (1968).
'0 Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Trans. Co., 57 Phil. 825.
 SEPARATION OF POWERS 153

mentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused

on the 'thou shalt not's' of the Constitution directed against the
exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however,
courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can
do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumen-
tality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just
grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry
with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution
trimming the so called political thicket."

In Article VII, Section 18, it is expressly provided

that "the Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
or the extension thereof." There is no doubt of the au-
thority of the Supreme Court in this specific case. The
question is, in the absence of similar specific authoriza-
tion in other cases, to what extent may the exercise of
discretion by the political departments be reviewed and
if warranted reversed by the courts?
If, say, a notorious criminal is extended an absolute
pardon, or the Congress of the Philippines enacts a law
which is obviouslyimpractical or unwise, may these acts
of the political departments be annulled by the Supreme
Court on the ground that they were committed with
grave abuse of discretion? For example, may the Su-
preme Court now reverse the doctrine in the case of Riel
u. Wright,74 where it inhibited itself from ruling on the
claimed excessive number of employees hired by the
Philippine Legislature after the adjournment of the
session, holding that this was an internal matter under
the exelusive j urisdiction of the legislators?

·., 49 Phil. 194.

 SEPARATION OF POWERS 155

propounded to him in the course of a legislative inquiry.

The Court declared that "there being a legitimate claim
of executive privilege, the issuance of the contempt or-
der suffers from constitutional infirmity."
On the other hand, in Lawyers Against Monopoly
and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management, 77
the Supreme Court rejected a challenge against the
constitutionality of the Priority DevelopmentAssistance
Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act 9206 or
the General Appropriations Act for 2004. Finding that
the proper procedure appeared to have been followedin
the promulgation of said law and noting that the peti-
tioners had not adequately established that said law
constituted an "encroachment on executive power" by
enabling legislators to propose and choose the projects
for which said fund is to be used, the Court held -
"Tojustify the nullification of the law or its implementa-
tion, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful,
breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of
proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain
legislation because 'to invalidate [a law] based on xx x baseless
supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legisla-
ture that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.'
This presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by
the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the
Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by
the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the dis-
charge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act
must be struck down.
"The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. LAMP
would have the Court declare the unconstitutionality of the
PDAF's enforcement based on the absence of express provision
in the GAAallocating PDAF funds to the Members of Congress

G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 373; see also
11

PHILCONSA v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113888, August 19, 1994, 235

SCRA 506.
 SEPARATION OF POWERS 157

ciple and thus unconstitutional." The Court also de-

clared that said PDAF Article, "insofar as it confers
post-enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability
since said legislators are effectively allowed to individu-
ally exercise the power of appropriation which - as
settled in Philconsa - is lodged in Congress.?"
Among the issues raised by the private respondent
in Petitioner Organizations v. Executive Secretary" was
the assumption by the Supreme Court of jurisdiction
over the petitions questioning the constitutionality of
certain Executive Orders issued by the President con-
sidering that there were no "ongoingproceedings"before
any board or tribunal which would have warranted its
exercise its power ofjudicial review under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. The Court upheld its jurisdiction, ex-
plaining as follows-
"UCPB questions the propriety of the present petitions
for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 on the ground that
there are no ongoing proceedings in any tribunal or board or
before a government official exercising judicial, quasi-judicial,
or ministerial functions. UCPB insists that the Court exercises
appellate jurisdiction with respect to issues of constitutionality
or validity oflaws and presidential orders.
"But, as the Court previously held, where there are seri-
ous allegations that a law has infringed the Constitution, it be-
comes not only the right but the duty of the Court to look into
such allegations and, when warranted, uphold the supremacy
of the Constitution. Moreover, where the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public, as in this case, the Court
has the discretion to brush aside technicalities of procedure."

78
Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November
19, 2013.
"'G.R. Nos. 147036-37,April 10, 2012, 669 SCRA49.
 SEPARATION OF POWERS 159

same, on the strength of the principle of separation of

powers, stressing its judicial independence and fiscal
autonomy, and citing its "unique circumstances," declar-
ing that the 'judicial branch, as a whole, should work in
the discharge of its constitutional functions free of re-
straints and influence from the other branches, save
only for those imposed by the Constitution itself.?"

"2 A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012, 678 SCRA 1.

 DELEGATION OF POWERS 161

observation that the delegation of legislative power has

becomethe rule and its non-delegationthe exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task
of government and the 'growing inability of the legisla-
ture to cope directly with the many problems demanding
its attention. The growth of society has ramified its ac-
tivities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems
that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has be-
come necessary. To many of the problems attendant
upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not
have the competence, let alone the interest and the
time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not
to say specific,solutions.
One such problem, to take an example, is the regu-
lation of common carriers. This task requires the deter-
mination of such intricate matters as the routes to be
serviced by such carriers, the number of them to be al-
lowed in each route, the conveniencesthey should offer
the passengers, the fare they may charge, the type of
vehicles they should use, and other myriad details that
the legislature may not have the time, expertise and
interest to prescribe.
Given these shortcomings, the Congress may then
create an administrative body like the Land Transpor-
tation Franchising and Regulatory Board and empower
it to promulgate the needed rules and regulations, sub-
ject only to certain statutory limitations or broad poli-
cies pre-determined by the legislature itself.
Such a device as applied to a hundred other similar
cases can relieve the Congress of many problems that
are better left to be solved by more capable entities and
at the same time enable it to tackle the more serious
 DELEGATION OF POWERS 163

In AKBAYAN u. Aquino,3 the Supreme Court clari-

fied that the subject of this constitutional provision "is
not the power to negotiate treaties and international
agreements, but the power l
to fix tariff rates, import and
export quotas, and other taxes," and, accordingly, should
not be considered as a source of the power of the Presi-
dent to negotiate international trade agreements.

(2) Emergency Powers

"Sec. 23(2). In times of war or other national emer-

gency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may pre-
scribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolu-
tion of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon its next ad-
journment."

In times of war or other national emergency, it is

not likely that a quorum can be convened in the Con-
gress to enable it to do business. Assuming such quo-
rum, there is still the divisiveness and delay inherent in
the lawmaking process that may hamper effective solu-
tion of the problems caused by the emergency. Such
problems, needless to say, must be solved within the
shortest possible time to prevent them from aggravating
the difficultiesof the nation.
To this end, the Congress may authorize the Presi-
dent to exercise emergency powers. This authority may
then be discharged by him with more dispatch and deci-
siveness than can be expected from the Congress itself
dealing with the crisis.

"G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008, 558 SCRA 468.

' Constitution, Article VI.
 DELEGATION OF POWERS 165

worst crisis, the Congress may choose to hold on to its

legislative powers and validly refuse to delegate it; or,
should it decide to do so, limit its duration and termi-
nate it even before the end of the emergency. The emer-
gency does not automatically confer emergency powers
on the President. According to Chief Justice Paras,
"emergency itself cannot and should not create power."
By the same token, the mere continuance of the emer-
gency does not necessarily continue the President's
emergencypowers if they have been granted to him for
a shorter period.
In every case, to prevent the delegation from being
a total surrender of legislative authority, it must be
subject to the restrictions to be prescribed by the Con-
gress. The specific requirement of the Constitution is
that the President may be authorized to exercise powers
"necessary and proper" only for the purpose of carrying
out a national policy declared not by him but by the
[Link] act of the President that is not in keeping
with this national policy can be challenged as beyond
the scopeof his delegated authority.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 6 the petition-
ers questioned the exercise by President Quirino of
emergency powers previously vested in President Que-
zon and successively exercised by Presidents Osmefia
and Roxas. At stake was the validity of certain executive
orders promulgated by President Quirino providing
specificallyfor the appropriation of public funds in the
operation of the national government and the conduct of
the 1949 elections, the control of exports, and the regu-
lation of the rentals of residential lots and buildings. In

"Second Emergency Powers Cases, Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil.

603.
6
Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.
 DELEGATION OF POWERS 167

"It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Com-

monwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress
met in regular session on May 25, 1948, and that Executive
Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without author-
ity of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress in-
stead of the first special session which preceded it as the point
of expiration of the Act, we think we are giving effect to the
purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special
session, the Congress may 'consider general legislation or only
such subjects as he (President) may designate.' (Section 9, Ar-
ticle VI of the Constitution) In a regular session, the power of
the Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the
limitations imposed by the organic law."

Despite this decision, President Quirino continued·

exercising emergency powers, promulgating two execu-
tive orders appropriating public funds for public works
and the relief of typhoon victims. These acts were chal-
lenged in the second Emergency Powers Cases,7 where
the additional circumstance appeared that the Congress
had passed House Bill No. 727 repealing all Emergency
Powers Acts except that this measure had been vetoed
by the President. On this point, the Supreme Court,
through Chief Justice Paras, made the following pro-
nouncement:

"As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitu-

tional provision, it has to be assumed that the National As-
sembly intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be con-
tended that the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such
step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers dele-
gated to the President, the result would be obvious unconstitu-
tionality, since it may never be repealed by the Congress, or if
the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his
veto. This eventuality had in fact taken place when the Presi-
dent disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing all Emergency
Powers Acts. 'l'he situation will make the Congress and the
President or either the principal authority to determine the in-

7
Supra.
 DELEGATION OF POWERS 169

resume its legislative powers. It would also permit

rather than prevent the anomalous situation envisioned
by Justice Tuason thus:

"More anomalous than the exercise of legislative func-

tions by the Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed
exercise of its authority is the fact that there would be two leg-
islative bodies operating over the same field, legislating con-
currently and simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's
actions. Even if the emergency powers of the President, as
suggested, be suspended while Congress was in session and be
renewed after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be
eliminated. Congress by a two-thirds vote could repeal execu-
tive orders promulgated by the President during congressional
recess, and the President in turn could treat in the same man-
ner, between sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the latter.
This is not a fantastic apprehension; in two instances, it mate-
rialized. In entire good faith, and inspired only by the best in-
terests of the country as they saw them, a former President
promulgated an executive order regulating house rentals after
he bad vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and
the present Chief Executive issued an executive order on ex-
port control after Congress had refused to approve the meas-
ure."

Section 17 of Article XII of the Constitution pro-

vides -

"In times of national emergency, when the public interest

so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or di-
rect the operation of any privately owned public utility or busi-
ness affected with public interest."

In David v. Arroyo,8 the Supreme Court declared

that, while the President alone can declare a state of
national emergency, he may uuL invoke this provision Lu
authorize him during the emergency "to temporarily

'G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 161.

 DELEGATION OF POWERS 171

(3) Delegation to the People

Accordingto Cooley,"the prevailing doctrine in the

courts appears to be, that, except in those cases where,
by the Constitution, the·people have expressly reserved
to themselves a power of decision, the function of legis-
lation cannot be exercised by them, even to the extent of
accepting or rejecting a law which has been framed for
their consideration. The people have voluntarily surren-
dered that power when they adopted the Constitution.
The government of the state is democratic, but it is a
representative democracy, and in passing general laws
the people act only through their representatives in the
legislature. Such reference of the law to the people at
large for acceptance or rejection is plain surrender of the
law-making power.'?"
But in People u. Vera, 11 our Supreme Court ob-
served that "courts have also sustained the delegation of
legislative power to the people at large," although it was
quick to add that "some authorities maintain that this
may not be done."
A referendum is traditionally defined as a method
of submitting an important legislative measure to a
direct vote of the whole people.12 It differs from the
plebiscite in that the questions submitted in the latter
are intended to work more permanent changes in the
political structure, like a proposal to amend the Consti-
tution. According to Strong, "the term plebiscite means
literally decree of the people. The plebiscite is a device
to obtain a direct popular vote on a matter of political

° Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed. 238-242.

1

11
65 Phil. 56.
12
Black, 1146.
 DELEGATION OF POWERS 173

scribe local regulations, according to immemorial prac-

tice, subject, of course, to the interposition of the supe-
rior in cases of necessity.'?"
Accordingly,the power of eminent domain and, un-
der the general welfare clause, the police power have
been expressly delegated by the legislature to the local
lawmaking bodies.17 The power of taxation is, however,
derived by them directly from the Constitution, subject
only to limitations that may be imposed by the Con-
gress."

(5) Delegation to Administrative Bodies

The reasons given earlier for the delegation of legis-

lative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of special-
ized activities and their attendant peculiar problems,
the national legislature has found it more and more
necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the
"powerof subordinate legislation,"as it is called. Thus -

"In the case of People vs. Rosenthal and Osmefia, G.R.

Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, and in
Pangasinan Transportation vs. The Public Service Commis-
sion, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court
had occasion to observe that the principle of separation of pow-
ers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern
governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits,
of the principle of 'subordinate legislation,' not only in the
United States and England but in practically all modern gov-
ernments. Accordingly,with the growing complexity of modern

16
People v. Vera, supra.
17
See Francia v. Municipality ofMeycauayan, G.R. No. 170432,
March 24, 2008, 549 SCRA 53; Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R.
No. 156052, February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 92.
1"
Constitution, Art. X, Sec. 5; City of Iriga v. Camarines Sur
III Electric Cooperative, G.R. No. 192945, September 5, 2012.
 DELEGATION OF POWERS 175

operation of a law. Such contingent regulations also

have the force and effect of law.
A case in point is Cruz u. Youngberg.21 The law in-
volved here prohibited the entry into the country of for-
eign cattle, which had been determined by the Philip-
pine Legislature as the cause of a rinderpest epidemic
that had killed many of the local livestock. The same
law, however, authorized the Governor-General to lift
the prohibition, with the consent of the presiding offi-
cers of the lawmaking body, if he should ascertain after
a fact-finding investigation that there was no longer any
threat of contagion from imported cattle.
For an administrative regulation to be valid, its
promulgation must be authorized by the legislature, it
must be within the scope of the authority given by the
legislature, it must be promulgated in accordance with
the prescribed procedure, and it must be reasonable.22

Tests of Delegation
'
Assuming that the delegation of legislative power
comes under any of the permissible exceptions, there is
still the question of whether or not the delegation has
been validly made. To be valid, the delegation itself
must be circumscribed by legislative restrictions, not a
"roving commission" that will give the delegate unlim-
ited legislative authority. It must not be a delegation
"running riot" and "not canalized within banks that
keep it from overflowing.?" Otherwise, the delegation is
21
56 Phil. 234.
22
See Iilxecutive Secretary v, Oouthwing Heavy Industries, G.n.
No. 164171, March 1, 2006, 482 SCRA 673, and Cruz, Philippine
Administrative Law, 2007 edition, pages 50-81.
23
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. US, 295 US 495, Concurring Opin-
ion of Mr. Justice Cardozo; Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 669.
 DELEGATION OF POWERS 177

If there are gaps in the law that will prevent its en-
forcement unless they are first filled, the delegate will
then have been given the opportunity to step into· the
shoes of the legislature and to exercise a discretion es-
sentially legislative in order to repair the omissions.
This is invalid delegation.
Thus, in United States v. Ang Tang Ho, 27 a law au-
thorized the Governor-General "whenever, for any
cause, conditions arise resulting in extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate,
with the consent of the Council of State, temporary
rules and emergency measures for carrying out the pur-
poses of this Act." Pursuant to this authorization, he
issued regulations fixing ceiling prices for the said cere-
als. The appellant, who was being prosecuted for selling
above the said ceiling prices, challenged the law on the
ground that it constituted an invalid delegation of legis-
lative power for failure to conform to the completeness
test. The Supreme Court sustained his contention, de-
claring as follows:

"By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules

and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Gover-
nor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or
define under what conditions or for what reasons the Gover-
nor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may
be issued for any cause and leaves the question of what is any
cause to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Legisla-
ture does not also define what is an extraordinary increase in
the price of palay, rice, or other cereal. That is also left to the
discretion of the Governor-General. The law does not specify or
define what such temporary and emergency measures shall

Collector uf Customs, No. 30783, August 27, 1929, b3 Phil. ::S!:14 et

seq., cited in Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168056,
168207, 168461, 168463 & 168730, September 1, 2005, 469 SCRA 1,
115-116.
21
43 Phil. 1.
 DELEGATION OF POWERS 179

The sufficient standard is usually indicated in the

law delegating legislative power. To illustrate, the Blue
Sky Law required the National Treasurer to cancel cer-
tificates for the sale ,of speculative securities whenever
necessary in the "public interest."?' The Supreme Court
has considered the "optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs" as being
"infused with public interest.':" Under R.A. No. 51, the
President of the Philippines was authorized to reorgan-
ize government-owned or controlled corporations for the
purpose of promoting "simplicity, economy and effi-
ciency" in their operations." C.A. No. 548 empowered
the Director of Public Works to promulgate traffic rules
in the light of the "public welfare.?" Other accepted
standards are "justice and equity," "the sense and ex-
perience of men," and "national security."
But even if the law itself does not expressly pin-
point the standard, the courts will bend over backward
to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare the stat-
ute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity. Thus, in
Hirabayashi v. United States, 35 the petitioner challenged
a regulation establishing curfew hours for Niseis, or
American citizens of Japanese ancestry, during World
War IL One of his claims was that the rule was based on
invalidly delegated legislative power, there being no
sufficient standard mentioned in the pertinent law to
limit the delegate's discretion. The U.S. Supreme Court

115-116, cited in Bureau of Customs Employees Association v. Teves,

G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011, 661 SCRA 589.
"' People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328.
32
Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, Ibid.
,., Cervantes v. Auditor General, 91 Phil. 359.
"' Calalang v. Williams, supra.
"" 320 U.S. 99.
 DELEGATION OF POWERS 181

clause, the law was held to be an invalid delegation of

legislative power for lack of a sufficient standard.

"The Probation Act was not to be effective immediately.

Its effectivity was mdde to depend upon an act to be done by
the provincial boards of the provinces, that of appropriating
funds for the salary of a probation officer. If the provincial
board makes the appropriation, the Probation Act is applicable
in that province; if it does not make the appropriation, the law
is not applicable therein. For purposes of the Probation Act,
the provincial boards may thus be regarded as administrative
bodies endowed with power to determine when the Act shall
take effect in their respective provinces. However, the law does
not lay down any rule or standard to guide the provincial
boards in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is
granted to them is a roving commission which enables the pro-
vincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. The applicability
and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the
hands of the provincial boards with no standard or rule to
guide them. This is a virtual surrender of legislative power to
them."

In Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,38 the Court

noted:

''We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable man-

ner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed
in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that
the seized property shall 'be distributed to charitable institu-
tions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the Na-
tional Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of cara-
baos.' The phrase may see fit is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reason-
able guidelines, ur LeLLe1 still, the liruitatious that the said offi-
cers must observe when they make their distribution. There is

:JR 148 SCRA 659.

 DELEGATION OF POWERS 183

law: (a) be complete in itself-it must set forth therein the pol-
icy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the dele-
gate-and (b) to fix a standard-the limits of which are suffi-
ciently determinate or determinable-to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed,
without a statutory declaration of policy, which is the essence
of every law, and, without the aforementioned standard, there
would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty,
whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of
his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself
the power, not only to make the law, but, also-and this is
worse-to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with
the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nul-
lifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very
foundation of our Republican system.
"Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not
meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of
the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does
not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by
the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently pre-
cise to avoid the evil effects above referred to."

Accordingly,in Bureau of Customs Employees Asso-

ciation v. Teves,41 the Supreme Court similarly ruled
that "two tests determine the validity of delegation of
legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the
sufficient standard test," in finding that both tests "were
fully satisfied by R.A. No. 9335, as evident from the
aforementioned Sections 2, 4 and 7 thereof. Moreover,
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9335 also provides for the incen-
tives due to District Collection Offices. While it is ap-
parent that the last paragraph of Section 5 provides
that '[t]he allocation, distribution and release of the dis-
trict reward shall likewise be prescribed by the rules and
regulations of the Revenue Performance and Evaluation
Board,' Section 7 (a) of R.A. No. 9335 clearly mandates

"G.R. No. 181704,December 6, 2011, 661 SCRA 589.

 Chapter 8

THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

~.·

THE NEW CONSTITUTION has revived the Congress

of the Philippines, which was replaced during the Mar-
cos regime with the Batasang Pambansa. The name of
that legislature is tainted and disgraced, which is
probably one reason why it was not retained to desig-
nate the new legislature. The old Congress under the
Commonwealth Constitution, for all its rather question-
able record, was never a rubber-stamp of the President,
at least not in the servile way the Batasang Pambansa
was to Marcos. The adoption of the former name of the
lawmaking body will resurrect memories of freer days
when the Congress was a peer of the other two depart-
ments and in some respects even more powerful than
either of them.
The new Congress represents a return to bica-
meralism after our recent experiment with unicameral-
ism, which was established by the 1973 Constitution
and, in fact, also initially provided for in the 1935 Con-
stitution before it was amended in 1940. The Malolos
Congress was also unicameral, and so too was the Taft
Commission during the early years of the American
regime. The Philippine Bill of 1902, however, provided
for a legislature consisting of a Philippine Assembly and
the Philippine Commission, which under the Jones Law
were replaced by the House of Representatives and the
Senate, respectively. The Philippine Legislature, as it
was called, was the pattern of the Congress of the Phil-

185
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 187

the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be pro-

vided by law."
By providing for a membership elected at large by
the entire electorate, this rule intends to make the Se-
nate a training ground for national leaders and possibly
a springboard to the Presidency. The feeling is that the
senator, having a national rather than only a district
constituency, will have a broader outlook of the prob-
lems of the country instead of being restricted by paro-
chial viewpoints and narrow interests. With such a per-
spective, the Senate is likely to be more circumspect and
broad-minded than the House of Representatives.

(2) Qualifications

The qualifications for membership in the Senate

are laid down in Section 3 as follows:

"No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at
least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a regis-
tered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less. than
two years immediately preceding the day of the election."

Accordingto Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitu-

tion, "natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birt]i without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens."
The age qualification is fixed at 35 and must be
[Link].n on thP. day of the elections, that is, when the
polls are opened and the votes are cast, and not on the
day of the proclamation of the winners by the board of
canvassers. This nullifies the ruling in the case of
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 189

main (animus manendii.":" Domicile, according to the

Supreme Court, denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some
other reasons, one intends to return. It is a question of
intention and circumstances. In the consideration of
circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind,
namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domi-
cile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains
until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but
one residence or domicile at a time. If one wishes to
successfully effect a change of domicile, he must demon-
strate an actual removal or an actual change of domi-
cile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one, and defi-
nite acts which correspond with the purpose." Without
clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these three
requirements, the domicile of origin continues.12
Applying the foregoing criteria, the Supreme Court
disqualified, on the ground of failure to complywith the
residence requirement, a candidate who sought to es-
tablish his residence with his voter registration records,
a marriage certificate, water bills and a deed of sale
covering property in the place where he sought to be
elected. In rejecting his evidence on his alleged resi-
dence, the Supreme Court noted-

"The above pieces of documentary evidence, however, fail

to convince us that Noble successfully effected a change of

"'Japzon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180088, Janu-

ary 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 331.
" Domino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 134015, July
19, 1999, 310 SCRA 546, 369 Phil. 798, 818 (1999).
'2 In the Matter of the Petition for Disqualification of Tess

Dumpit-Michelena, G.R. Nos. 163619-20, November 17, 2005, 475

SCRA 290, 303.
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 191

"From the foregoing, we find that Noble's alleged change

of domicile was effected solely for the purpose of qualifying as a
candidate in the 2007 elections. This we cannot allow. In To-
rayno, Sr. u. Commission on Elections, we held that the one-
year residency requirement is aimed at excluding outsiders
'from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in
that community for electoral gain.' Establishing residence in a
community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats
the purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of
voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the
community. Thus, we find Noble disqualified from running as
municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007
elections.?"

In Limbona u. COMELEC,14 the Court likewise de-

clared that a candidate is presumed to have changed her
domicileupon her marriage, or by operation oflaw, con-
sistent with the provisions of Articles 68 and 69 of the
Family Code to the effect that spouses shall have a sin-
gle family domicile, unless one of them maintains a
separate residence.
Residence is in any part of the Philippines, like in
the case of the party-list representative member of the
House of Representatives, and unlike in the case of the
district representative member of the House of Repre-
sentatives, who must reside in the district where he is
running.
In Mitra u. COMELEC, 15 the Supreme Court ex-
plained the underlying reasons behind the residence
qualification in this manner -

ta Pundaodaya v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179313, September 17,

2009, 600 SCRA 178.
'' G.R. No. 181097, June 25, 2008, 555 SCRA 391; ooo also
Limbona v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 186006, October 16, 2009, 604
SCRA240.
"'G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 744; October
19, 2010, 633 SCRA 580.
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 193

In Maquiling v. Commission on Elections,17 the Su-

preme Court declared that a candidate who takes his
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executes an Affi-
davit of Renunciation of his American citizenship under
the provisions of the Republic Act No. 9225, but thereaf-
ter continues using his American passport, is to be con-
sidered as having recanted his oath of renunciation of
his foreign citizenship and shall therefore be ineligible
to run for elective office as he thereby reverts to his
status as a dual citizen.
They are also exclusive under the principle of ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius, with the result that it
is not competent for Congress to provide by mere legis-
lation for additional qualifications no matter how rele-
vant they may be. For example, a statutory requirement
of a college degree as an added qualification for mem-
bership in the Congress would be unconstitutional.
Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, which required
all candidates for public office, whether appointed or
elected, both in the national or local government, to
undergo a mandatory drug test, was, upon petition of a
Senator, declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs
Board, 18 as follows-

"Accordingly, Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is

hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or
an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution,
that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitu-
tion is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act
shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the dis-
charge of their defined functions, the three departments of

11
G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013; see also Reyes v. Commis-
sion on Elections, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013.
'" G.R. No. 157870,November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410.
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 195

obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of

candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua
non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-
elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the
proviso that '[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter
upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory
drug test.' Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add an-
other qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the
minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or
not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is
to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as
getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume of-
fice for non-compliancewith the drug-testing requirement.
"It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not expressly
state that non-compliance with the drug test imposition is a
disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of
candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the
drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section of
the law, without exception, made drug-testing on those covered
mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones
shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering
to the statutory command. And since the provision deals with
candidates for public office,it stands to reason that the adverse
consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve around
the election and the assumption of public office of the candi-
dates. Any other construal would reduce the mandatory nature
of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning
and effect whatsoever.
"While it is anti-climactic to state it at this juncture,
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for by
its terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 syn-
chronized elections and the candidates running in that elec-
toral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems
it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its va-
lidity as an implementing issuance.
"It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that tho
unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its
having infringed the constitutional provision defining the
qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run
for and serve as senator."
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 197

It is for this reason that the Senate has been de-

scribed as a "continuing" institution, "as it is not dis-
solved as an entity with each national election or change
in the compositionof its members. However, in the con-
duct of its day-to-day business, the Senate of each Con-
gress acts separately and independently of the Senate of
the Congress before it. Accordingly, all pending matters
and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress
are considered terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the
succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished mat-
ters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the
first time.''"
This is consistent with the general characterization
of Congress as "not a continuing body,"particularly with
respect to the passage of bills. Accordingly, in League of
Cities of the Philippines u. COMELEC,20 it was ruled
that the "unapproved cityhood bills filed during the n1h
Congress became mere scraps of paper upon the ad-
journment of the n'h Congress. All the hearings and
deliberations conducted during the n'h Congress on
unapproved bills also became worthless upon the ad-
journment of the n'h Congress." Said deliberations on
unapproved bills do not even "qualify as extrinsic aids in
construing laws passed by subsequent Congresses."
It should be noted though that it has been ruled
that the Senate's power to punish for contempt in the
exercise of its power to conduct inquiries in aid of legis-

10
Garcillano v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 170338, De-
cember 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 170; Neri v. Senate Committee on Ac-
countability of Public Officers, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008,
564 SCRA 152.
'0 G.R. No. 176951, November 18, 2008, 571 SCRA 263.
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 199

stitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority

of Senators to 'constitute a quorum to do business.' Ap-
plying the same reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the
Senate under the 19&_7 Constitution is not a continuing
body because less than majority of the Senators con-
tinue into the next Congress. The consequence is that
the Rules of Procedure must be republished by the Sen-
ate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators."
The continuity of the life of the Senate is intended
to encourage the maintenance of Senate policies as well
as guarantee that there will be experienced members
who can help and train newcomers in the discharge of
their duties.
It should be noted, however, that as desirable as
experience may be, the Constitution specifically pro-
vides in Article VI, Section 4, that:

"No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive

terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continu-
ity of his service for the full term for which he was elected."

The Constitution seems to be wary of elective offi-

cials who stay too long in office, probably because they
may entrench themselves in power to the exclusion of
other aspirants for their office and perhaps also create
or maintain the political dynasties discouraged and
eschewed in Article II as a matter of state policy. The
senator can serve no more than twelve consecutive
years, after which he must seek greener pastures (per-
haps in the Presidency) or just lie down to pasture.
The term of the members of the Congress of the
Philippines under the old Constitution began on the
thirtieth day of December next following their election
in November. Inasmuch as the election date has been
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 201

"SEC. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be

composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legis-
lative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number .of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, re-
gional and sectoral parties or organizations.
"(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total membership of the House of
Representatives. For three consecutive terms after the ratifica-
tion of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, in-
digenous cultural communities, women, youth and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
"(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand,
or each province, shall have at least one representative.
"(4) Within three years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legisla-
tive districts based on the standards provided in this section."

(A) The District Representatives

Two hundred members were originally provided for

in the House of Representatives to be directly elected
from the various legislative districts created by the Or-
dinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. The terri-
tory was divided into thirteen regions, in turn compris-
ing two hundred districts apportioned among the prov-
inces, cities and Metropolitan Manila in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants and on the
basis of a uniform and progressiveratio.
This initial apportionment shall be subject to ad-
justment by the Congress within three years after the
return of every enumeration to make the representation
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 203

islands need not comply with the 2,000 square meter

contiguous territory requirement under the Local Gov-
ernment Code.
Macias v. Commission on Elections" is the author-
ity for the view that the validity of a legislative appor-
tionment measure is a justiciable question, involving as
it does certain requirements the interpretation of which
does not call for the exercise of legislative discretion.
The Supreme Court in fact annulled the challenged law
in that case when it was shown that the apportionment
was not based on the number of the inhabitants in the
various representative districts. The Supreme Court
noted that some big provinces were given less represen-
tatives than certain relatively smaller ones, e.g., Cebu
got seven while Rizal with a bigger population then got
only four.
In Hererra v. COMELEC, 28 the Supreme Court
clarified that the basis for "districting is the number of
inhabitants" of a province or a city, and not the number
of its registered voters.
It should be noted that the 250,000minimum popu-
lation requirement for the establishment of legislative
districts under Section 5 (3) applies only to cities," and
not to provinces," although the Local Government Code
provides for a minimum population of 250,000 as an
alternative requirement for the establishment of a prov-
ince."

21
3 SCRA 1.
28
G.R. No. 131499, November 17, 1999, 318 SCRA 336.
"M:iri1mo v. C;OMF.T.F.r., CTR No 118577 March 7, 1995, 242
SCRA 211.
30
Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010, 617
SCRA 623.
"' Section 461.
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 205

In Aldaba v. COMELEC,37 a law creating a legisla-

tive district was annulled after a finding that it was
based on mere demographic projections.
It must be pointed out as w·en that a law, the Mus-
lim Mindanao Autonomy Act, authorizing the govern-
ment of the AutonomousRegion of Muslim Mindanao to
create provinces and cities has been considered as un-
constitutional because the power to create them inher-
ently involves the power to create legislative districts,
which only Congress possesses. It may, however, be
authorized by law to create municipalities and baran-
gays."

(B) The Party-list Representatives

The House of Representatives is composednot only

of the regular district representatives but also of the
party-list representatives as provided for in the 1987
Constitution. The party-list representatives shall consti-
tute 20% of the total membership of the body, including
such representatives.
The rules for the selection of the party-list repre-
sentatives are embodied in R.A. No. 7941, which was
enforced for the first time in the elections held in 1998.
Section 2 of this law provides, among others, for the
promotion of "proportional representation in the election
of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, re-
gional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organi-

"G.R No. 188078, January 25, 2010, 611 SCRA 137.

38
Serna v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008, 558
SCRA 700.
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 207

include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cul-

tural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas work-
ers. The sectors that lack 'well-defined political constituencies'
include professionals,the elderly, women, and the youth.
"5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or or-
ganizations that represent the 'marginalized and underrepre-
sented' must belong to the 'marginalized and underrepre-
sented' sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the
members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack 'well-
defined political constituencies' must belong to the sector they
represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the 'marginalized and underrepresented,' or
that represent those who lack 'well-defined political constitu-
encies,' either must belong to their respective sectors, or must
have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors.
The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations
must be bona-fidemembers of such parties or organizations.
"6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organiza-
tions shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified."

In said case, the Court stressed that "the party-list

system is intended to democratize political power by
giving political parties that cannot win in legislative
district elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives." It explained that it is "not synony-
mous with that of the sectoral representation."
The law provides that not later than 90 days before
election day, any political party, organization or coali-
tion may file a verified petition through its president or
secretary for its participation in the party-list system,
attaching a copy of its constitution, by laws, platform,
and list of officers,and such other relevant information
as may be required by the Commission on Elections.
The petition shall be published in at least 2 news-
papers of general circulation and, after due notice and
hearing, be resolved within 15 days and in no case later
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 209

peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural

communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack 'well-defined political
constituencies' include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.''"
Upon registration, the political group shall submit
to the COMELECnot later than 45 days before the elec-
tion at least 5 names from which its representatives
may be chosen in case it obtains the required number of
votes. Under the law, the names of the party-list nomi-
nees shall not be shown on the certified list of partici-
pants in the party-list system to be distributed by the
COMELEC among all the precincts. It has been ruled
though that it is the COMELEC'sconstitutional duty to
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups.43
Only persons who have given their consent in writ-
ing may be named as party-list candidates, and in one
list only. Persons who lost in the immediately preceding
election are ineligible. It should be stressed in this re-
gard that, as previously noted, "a party-list nominee
must be a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sec-
toral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee, one
must either belong to the sector represented, or have a
track record of advocacy for such sector.?" Section 9 of
RA 7941 provides that a nominee of the youth sector

'"Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, Id.

"' Bantay Republic Act v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177271, May 4,
2007, 523 SCRA 1.
14
Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, supra.
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 211

In Lokin u. COMELEC,48 the Supreme Court an-

nulled an additional ground allowed by the COMELEC
for the substitution by a registered party of its nomi-
nees, per Section 13 ,of its Resolution No. 7804, to wit,
when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party." It
stressed that Section 8 of RA 7941 "enumerates only
three instances in which the party-list organization can
substitute another person in place of the nominee whose
name has been submitted to the COMELEC." The Court
considered said additional ground as ultra uires stating
that the implementing rules and regulations of the
COMELEC "should not override, supplant, or modify
the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain consis-
tent with the law they intend to carry out."
At any rate, it is established that the COMELEC
has jurisdiction over cases pertaining to party leader-
ship and the nomination of party-list representatives.49
Every voter shall be entitled to 2 votes: the first for
the candidate for member of the House of Representa-
tives in his legislative district and the second for the
party, organization or coalition he wants represented in
the House of Representatives.
The participants in the party-list system shall be
ranked according to the number of votes they received,
with those getting at least 2% of the total votes cast for
the system being entitled to one seat each. None of them
shall have more than 3 seats each.
The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the par-
ticipants, rank them according to the number of votes
received, and allocate party list representatives propor-

•• G.R. No. 180443, June 22, 2010, 621 SCRA 385.

'"Lokin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193808, June 26,
2012, 674 SCRA 538.
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 213

"3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats af-
ter allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to
the party-list organizations including those that received less
than two percent of the total votes. The continued operation of
the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the
additional seats is now unconstitutional because this threshold
mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the
available party-list seats. The additional seats shall be distrib-
uted to the parties in a second round of seat allocation accord-
ing to the two-step procedure laid down in the Decision of 21
April 2009 as clarified in this Resolution.
"4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat
cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent any party from
dominating the party-list system. There is no violation of the
Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does not require
absolute proportionality for the party-list system. The well-
settled rule is that courts will not question the wisdom of the
Legislature as long as it is not violative of the Constitution."

As explained by the Supreme Court in its first

BANAT ruling, the so-calledtwo step procedure for the
determination of the entitlement of the parties to addi-
tional seats initially entails the computation of the per-
centage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate
by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party
by the total number of votes cast for party-list candi-
dates. There are thereafter two steps in the second
round of seat allocation - First, the percentage is mul-
tiplied by the remaining available seats, which is the
difference between the maximum seats reserved under
the Party-List System and the guaranteed seats of the
two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the
percentage and of the remaining available seats corre-
sponds to a party's share in the remaining available
seats. Second, one party-list seat is assigned to each of
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 215

same rights, privileges and duties as the district representa-

tive. It is the party-list representatives who are 'elected' into
office,not their parties or organizations. Once elected, both the
district representatives and the party-list representatives are
treated in like manner. They have the same deliberative
rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the
making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative dis-
tricts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term limita-
tion of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.
The consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has jurisdic-
tion to pass upon the qualifications of party-list nominees after
their proclamation and assumption of office; they are, for all
intents and purposes, 'elected members' of the House of Repre-
sentatives although the entity directly voted upon was their
party."

(2) Qualifications

Where applicable, the same observations earlier

made regarding the qualifications of the Senators are
repeated for the following qualifications of the members
of the House of Representatives:

"SEC. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of

Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Phil-
ippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five
years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he
shall be elected, resident thereof for a period of not less than
one year immediately preceding the day of the election."

In addition, the party-list representative must be a

bona fide member of the party he seeks to represent at
least ninety days before election day. As previously
noted, to be a bona fide nominee of a sectoral party, one
must either "belong to the sector represented, or have a
track record of advocacy for such sector.?" The youth

"'Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commissionon Elections, supra.

 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 217

Makati residence and a transfer to a new residence in Manila,

with intention to reside in the latter place permanently, par-
ticularly in the light of the fact that she continued to maintain
her house, conduct her business, and perform her religious and
civil obligations in Makati. Granting that she may have moved
to Manila to vote in the plebiscite, such move, at best, was only
temporary, she having retained the animus reuertendi, the de-
sire to return to her Makati residence."

Under the provisions of RepublicAct No. 9225, oth-

erwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003, natural-born Filipino citizens
who have been, or intend to be, naturalized in a foreign
country, shall, upon taking the oath of allegiance pre-
scribed in Section 3 thereof, be deemed to have re-
acquired, or shall retain, their Philippine citizenship.59
They shall thereafter be "deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditionsof this Act.?"
The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or
adopted, below eighteen years of age, of those who re-
acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this
Act shall likewise be deemed citizens of the Philip-
• 61
pmes.
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizen-
ship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippine
and subject to certain conditions. Accordingly, those
intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet
the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Con-
stitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as
The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and other
existing laws. On the other hand, those seeking elective

ns Section 3.
'0 Section 2.
61
Section 4.
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 219

makes a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all

foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath shall be qualified for election, or
appointment, to any Fonstitutional office.
It bears both reiteration and emphasis that Mem-
bers of the House of Representatives must be natural-
born citizens not only at the time of their election but
during their entire tenure. Being a continuing require-
ment, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of
it may still question the same at any time, notwith-
standing the prescriptive period set by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal for the filing of elec-
toral protests, which would not "apply to disqualification
based on citizenship, because qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements and must be pos-
sessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire ten-
ure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his
title may be seasonably challenged. Accordingly, the
1987 Constitution requires that Members of the House
of Representatives must be natural-born citizens not
only at the time of their election but during their entire
tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails
a member's citizenship or lack of it may still question
the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period
notwithstanding.?" The Supreme Court clarified though
that, in assailing one's citizenship, or the source thereof,
proper proceedings should be filed in accordance with
Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473. "Clearly, un-
der law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its
representatives designated by statute, that may ques-
tion the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of

en Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32, July 30,

2009, 594 SCRA 434.
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 221

shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and

sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.68
In Nicolas-Lewis, v. COMELEC, 69 where the afore-
cited constitutional provisions were interpreted, the
Supreme Court, in a 13-0 vote, upheld the right to be
registered as a voter of a dual citizen who was then con-
cededly a non-resident of the Philippines. Citing its
earlier ruling in Macalintal v. COMELEC, 70 where it
upheld the right of non-resident Filipinos to vote under
the provisions of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003, the Court declared that "there is no provision in
the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring
'duals' to actually establish residence and physically
stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise
their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in im-
plicit acknowledgment that 'duals' are most likely non-
residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of
suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A.
9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims,
in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all over-
seas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements
exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions,
are qualified to vote." In arriving at this conclusion, the
Court relied on its earlier statement in Macalintal
where it pronounced that "Section 2 of Article V of the
Constitution is an exception to the residency require-
ment found in Section 1 of the same Article."
It must be noted, however, that said Section 2 pro-
vides for a system of absentee voting only for qualified
Filipinos abroad. It appears clear that only those Filipi-

•• Ibid., Section 5 (2).

en G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006, 497 SCRA 649.
'0 G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003, 453 Phil. 586, 405 SCRA 614.
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 223

only, or a total of nine consecutiveyears. The reason for

the difference is not explained. Considering that the
members of the House of Representatives are generally
younger than the members of the Senate, one would
imagine that the former should be allowed to stay
longer in officeor at least as long as the latter.
The Supreme Court has summarized in Abundo v.
COMELEC12 the rules in connection with the consecu-
tiveness of terms and involuntary interruptions thereof
in connection with the application of the rules on term
limits for elective officers both under the Constitution
and pertinent laws. Thus -

"l. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective po-

sition and the official merely assumed the position pursuant to
the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the
unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be
treated as one full term as contemplated under the subject con-
stitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be
counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco, Jr. [G.R. No.
133495, September 3, 1998, 295 SCRA 157 (1998)]). If the offi-
cial runs again for the same position he held prior to his as-
sumption of the higher office, then his succession to said posi-
tion is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary
severance or interruption (Montebon v. Commission on Elec-
tions [G.R. No. 180444, April 8, 2008, 551 SCRA 50 (2008)).
"2. An elective official, who has served for three con-
secutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for
what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall elec-
tion, had an interruption in the continuity of the official's ser-
vice. For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the
3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen ([Link] v.
Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002,
376 SCRA 90 (2002)] and Socrates v. Commission on Elections
[CTR Nn. lfi4fil?.; November 12, 2002, ~91 8CRA 457]).

72
G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013, 688 SCRA 149.
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 225

Election

As previously remarked, elections for the Congress

of the Philippines were held on the second Monday of
May, 1987. The next elections, conformablyto the Tran-
sitory Provisions, were held in 1992,for all the members
of the Congress, followedby another election three years
later in 1995, for the entire membership of the House of
Representatives and twelve members of the Senate.
Every three years thereafter, all the members of the
House of Representatives and one-half of the Senate
were up for election, or re-election if still allowed.
Under the 1973 Constitution, vacancies in the Ba-
tasang Pambansa were supposed to be filled by special
election called by the Commission on Elections. That
rule has been replaced by the followingprovision, which
is reproduced from the Commonwealth Constitution:

"Sec. 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the

House of Representatives, a special election may be called to
fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus
elected shall serve only for the unexpired term."

Such special election shall however not be neces-

sary if the vacancy pertained to a seat occupied by a
party-list representative, in which case, the same would
be filled by the next representative from the list of
nominees in the order submitted to the Commission on
Elections by the same party, organization, or coalition,
who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is
exhausted, the party, organization or coalition shall
submit additional nominees.73

'" Republic Act No. 7941, Section 16.

 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 227

tures, including allowances, shall be published annually

for the information of the people.
Reduction of the salaries of the members of the
Congress is not prohibited by the Constitution. If any
increase is to be made, the same cannot be effective
during the term of the members of the Congress, includ-
ing the Senators, who have approved such increase.
In Philippine Constitution Association v. Gimenez,15
the petitioner questioned the constitutionality of Repub-
lic Act No. 3836 "insofar as the same allows retirement
gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to
Senators and Representatives, and to the elective offi-
cials of both houses (of Congress)." It is significant that
the law provided that the retirement benefits would be
immediately available upon its approval. It claimed that
its provision on retirement gratuity was "an attempt to
circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of sala-
ries of the members of Congress during their term of
office,contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14
of the (1935) Constitution." The Court sustained the
petition and declared the law unconstitutional. It noted
that the retirement benefits were "immediately avail-
able thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the
full term of all the Members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives approving such increase. Such
provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Arti-
cle VI, Section 14 of the Constitution."

Parliamentary Immunities

"Sec. 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Repre-

sentatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than
six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the

"G.R. No. L-23326, December 18, 1965, 15 SCRA 479.

 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 229

period from its initial convening until its final adjourn-

ment.

(2) Privilege of Speech and Debate

There are two requirements that must concur in or-

der that the privilege of speech and debate can be
availed of by the member of the Congress. The first is
that the remarks must be made while the legislature or
the legislative committee is functioning, that is, in ses-
sion; and the second is that they must be made in con-
nection with the discharge of official duties. These con-
ditions were first laid down in the leading case of Coffin
v. Coffin, 76 where the privilege was denied a legislator
who uttered slanderous remarks in the course of a pri-
vate conversationwith a constituent during a lull in the
session,
Applyingthe rule announced in that case, our own
Supreme Court declared in Jimenez v. Cabangbang"
that the privilege could not be invoked by a legislator
who had allegedly maligned the plaintiff in an open
letter to the President of the Philippines coursed
through and published in the newspapers. The finding
was that he had written the letter at a time when the
Congress was in recess and in his private capacity only.
It is important to note that this privilege is not ab-
solute although it is usually so called. The rule provides
that the legislator may not be questioned "in any other
place," which means that he may be called to account
for his remarks by his own colleagues in the Congress
itself and, when warranted, punished for "disorderly
behavior."

76
4 Mass. 1.
11
17 SCRA 876.
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 231

her, would not be considered for the position of Chief

Justice." The Court boldly chided but nevertheless
meekly exonerated her. It declared that "basic constitu-
tional consideration .dictates this kind of disposition."
Thus-

"The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the

language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her
speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the
Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of
decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent
that her statements in question were intemperate and highly
improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating
that she wanted 'to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court,' and calling
the Court a 'Supreme Court of idiots.' xxx.
"A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily
show that her statements were expressions of personal anger
and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief
Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the
pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamen-
tary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to
ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and
its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust.
Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an
individual privilege accorded the individual members of the
Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a
privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that
represents them.
"To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to
her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric and offensive
personalities. xxx.
"The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disci-
plinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise
would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part
towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal cir-
cumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing
so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitu-
tional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 233

Conflict of Interest

The followingis a new provision intended to ensure

the probity and objectivity of the members of Congress:

"Sec. 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of

Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full
disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall
notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest
that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which
they are authors."

There are some persons who may be tempted to run

for Congress not because of a desire to serve the people
but precisely for the protection or even enhancement of
their own interests. By requiring them to make known
at the outset their financial and business connections or
investments, it is hoped that their potential for self-
aggrandizement will be reduced and they will be pre-
vented from using their official positions for ulterior
purposes. In some countries, businessmen are required
to unload their stockholdings as these might affect their
official acts or at least lead to suspicion of chicanery or
impropriety in the discharge of their duties in the gov-
ernment.

Incompatible and Forbidden Offices

"Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Repre-

sentatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corpora-
tions or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting
his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any officewhich may
have been created or the emolumeuts thereof increased <luring
the term for which he was elected."
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 235

Adaza then qualified as member of the lawmaking body,

whereupon Pacana assumed the governorship as statu-
tory successor. Adaza challenged Pacana's takeover,
contending that under the parliamentary system a legis-
lator could concurrently serve as governor; hence, there
was no vacancy in the governorship that Pacana could
fill. Through Justice Escolin, the Court unanimously
rejected this argument and held that Adaza automati-
cally forfeited the governorship the moment he took his
oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
But not every other office or employment is to be
regarded as incompatible with the legislative position.
For example, membership in the Electoral Tribunals is
permitted by the Constitution itself. Moreover, if it can
be shown that the second office is an extension of the
legislative position or is in aid of legislative duties, the
holding thereof will not result in the loss of the legisla-
tor's seat in the Congress.
Accordingly,the chairmen of the Senate and House
committees on education retain their seats in Congress
while sitting concurrently as ex officio members in the
U.P. Board of Regents. Legislators who serve as treaty
negotiators under the President of the Philippines con-
tinue to sit in the Congress, where they can better work
for the approval of the treaty and the passage of the
needed implementing legislation.
In Liban v. Gordori." the Supreme Court declared
that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine Na-
tional Red Cross [PNRC], despite its having been cre-
ated by a special law, is not to be considered a govern-
ment office or an office in a government-owned or con-
trolled corporation for purposes of the prohibition under

"" G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009, 593 SCRA 68.
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 237

disqualifications have been much simplified with the

followingrewritten provision in the new charter.

"Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Repre-

'
sentatives may personally appear as counsel before any court '

of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial

and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or
indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in
any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government,
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, in-
cluding any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its
subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in
any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuni-
ary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of
his office."

Appearance of the legislator is now barred before

all courts of justice, regardless of rank, composition, or
jurisdiction. The disqualification also applies to the re-
vived Electoral Tribunals and to all administrative bod-
ies, like the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the National Labor Relations Commission. Courts mar-
tial and military tribunals, being administrative agen-
cies, are included.
It must be noted though that the General Court
Martial has been characterized by the Supreme Court
as "a court within the strictest sense of the word and
acts as a criminal court.?" Accordingly, "a court-martial
case is a criminal case and the General Court Martial is·
a 'court' akin to any other courts.'?"
The purpose of the disqualification is to prevent the
legislator from exerting undue influence, deliberately or

05
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 198554, July 30,
2012, 677 SCRA 750.
sn Marcos v. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, 89
Phil, 246 (1951).
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 239

Legislators are prohibited from being financially

interested in any contract with the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, includ-
ing government-owned or controlled corporations, or in
any franchise or special privilege granted by any of
these during their term of office, because of the influ-
ence they can easily exercise in obtaining these conces-
sions. The idea is to prevent abuses from being commit-
ted by the members of the Congress to the prejudice of
the public welfare and particularly of legitimate con-
tractors with the government who otherwise might be
placed at a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the legis-
lator.
It should be noted, though, that not every transac-
tion with the government is barred by this provision.
The contracts referred to here are those involving "fi-
nancial interest," that is, contracts from which the legis-
lator expects to derive some profit at the expense of the
government. An illustration is a contract for public
works or the sale of office equipment or supplies to the
government. By contrast, it cannot be said that the leg-
islator will profit financially from a contract of carriage
with a government airline since it is the carrier that will
benefit from the passenger's fare.
The last sentence restores an inhibition originally
imposed by the 1935 Constitution. Although this provi-
sion has never been judicially interpreted, it may be
surmised that the rule shall apply to the case, say, of a
congressman expediting the collectionof a civil servant's
retirement check for a stipulated fee.

Sessions

The new rule on the legislative sessions is as fol-

lows:
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 241

It is to be recalled that, in Araneta v. Dinglasan,

the Supreme Court distinguished between the regular
and special sessions of Congress. Thus, in a special ses-
sion, the Congress II\ay consider "general legislation or
only such subjects as the President may designate." In a
regular session, "the power of the Congress is not cir-
cumscribed except by limitations imposed by organic
law.?"

Officers
"Sec. 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and
the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of
all its respective Members.
"Each House shall choose such other officers as it may
deem necessary."

The President of the Senate and the Speaker of the

House of Representatives do not have a fixed term and
may be replaced at any time at the pleasure of a major-
ity of all the members of their respective chambers. The
legislative heads in the presidential system are highly
political officers whose continued incumbency will de-
pend upon the partisan alignments of their colleagues.
Other officers usually chosen are the Senate Presi-
dent pro tempore, the Speaker pro tempore, the majority
and minority floor leaders, the chairmen of the various
standing and special committees, and the secretary and
the sergeant-at-arms, the last two being non-members
of the legislature.

Quorum

"A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do

business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day

91
84 Phil. 368.
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 243

what it referred to as a "supermajority vote" of two-

thirds of all the Members of Congress for purposes of
amending or repealing the same, stating that said pro-
vision gave said law "the character of an irrepealable
law by requiring more than what the Constitution de-
mands." Thus -

"Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did

in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting re-
quirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No.
9054 has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the charac-
ter of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the
Constitution demands. Section 16(2), Article VI of the Consti-
tution provides that a 'majority of each House shall constitute
a quorum to do business.' In other words, as long as majority of
the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are
present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct busi-
ness and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is
generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts. Thus, while
a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limi-
tation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the pas-
sage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it sig-
nificantly constricts the future legislators' room for action and
flexibility."

Discipline of Members

Article VI, Section 16(3) states:

"(3) Each House may determine the rules of its pro-
ceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and with
the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or
expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall
not exceed sixty days."

Rules of proceedings are needed for the orderly con-

duct of tho sessions of the Congress. Unless snoh r11 lP.i:;
violate fundamental or individual rights, they are
within the exclusive discretion of each House to formu-
late and interpret and may not be judicially reversed.
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 245

Journals

"(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings,

and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts
as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yetis
and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of
the Members present, be entered in the Journal.
"Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings."

Journals are a record of what is done and past in a

legislative assembly. They are useful not only for au-
thenticating the proceedings but also for the interpreta-
tion of laws through a study of the debates held thereon
and for informing the people of the official conduct of
their respective legislators.
It is for these purposes that the Constitution re-
quires that the journals be published from time to time
excepting such parts as may affect the national security,
which ought not to be divulged to the public in general.
The publication of the journals is in line with the right
to information on matters of public concern as guaran-
teed in Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution.
In U.S. v. Pons, 98 the Supreme Court refused to go
beyond the recitals in the legislative journals, which it
held to be conclusiveon the courts. "To inquire into the
veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature," it
ruled, "when they are, as we have said, clear and ex-
plicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of
the organic laws by which the Philippine Government
was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the
Legislature."

98
34 Phil. 729; Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268.
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 247

Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House,

by members thereof. But, said individual statements do not
necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they
indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song
Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz. 615;
Mayor Motors, Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs.
Games and Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 19, 1960)).
Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill-which
uses the term 'urea formaldehyde' instead of 'urea and formal-
dehyde'-is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of
the measure passed by Congress and approved by the Presi-
dent (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-
18684, Sept. 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the
printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Con-
gress and approved by the Executive-on which we cannot
speculate without jeopardizing the principle of separation of
powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our demo-
cratic system-the remedy is by amendment or curative legis-
lation, not by judicial decree."

102
In the VAT Case, the Supreme Court emphasized
that "our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that
an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its
provisions but also its due enactment. Not even claims
that a proposed constitutional amendment was invalid
because the requisite votes for its approval had not been
obtained or that certain provisions of a statute had been
'smuggled' in the printing of the bill have moved or per-
suaded us to look behind the proceedings of a co-equal
branch of the government."
Earlier, in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado,103
the Supreme Court had-

102
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630.
102
227 SCRA 703.
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 249

It is to be noted that, in League of Cities of the Phil-

ippines v. COMELEC, 105 the Supreme Court observed
that the hearings and deliberations during a previous
Congress cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into
law in the next or subsequent Congresses.
At any rate, at the request of one-fifth of the Mem-
bers present, the yeas and nays on any question shall be
entered in the -Iournal.t" The Constitution likewise re-
quires the recording in the Journal of the votes with
respect to the consideration of bills on third reading, 107
the recording of the objections of the President when he
vetoes a bill as well as the votes cast by the Members of
each House in their reconsideration of a bill vetoed by
the President, 108 and the vote of each Member of the
House of Representatives regarding the Articles of Im-
peachment proposed by its Committee which hears an
impeachment complaint.l"

Adjournment

"(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress

shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than
three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two
Houses shall be sitting."

The above rule appeared in the Commonwealth

Constitution but was deleted from the 1973 charter
because the legislature established thereunder was uni-
cameral. It is now revived with the restoration of bicam-
eralism, which envisions collaboration and coordination
between the two chambers of the Congress.
10'
G.R. No. 176951, November 18, 2008, 671 SCRA 263.
106
Constitution, Article VI, Section 16(4).
'01 Ibid., Article VI, Section 26 (2).
10"
Id., Article VI, Section 27 (1).
IO!l Id., Article XI, Section 3 (3).
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 251

The original provision in the Commonwealth Con-

stitution entitled only the parties having the largest and
second largest number of votes in the chamber to nomi-
nate three members each to the legislative seats. Now
such seats are apportioned among all the parties repre-
sented in each chamber, including the party-list mem-
bers. Thus, if there are three parties represented in the
Senate with thirteen, seven and four members, respec-
tively, the first shall have three of the legislative seats,
the second two and the third one.
The change introduced by the 1987 Constitution fa-
vors the multi-party system as against the two-party
system which the original rule sought to institutional-
ize.
The case of Taiiada u. Cuenco'" held that the right
to nominate to the legislative seats in the Electoral Tri-
bunals belonged to the majority and minority parties in
the chamber, not to the chamber itself or to the majority
party therein if the minority did not make its own
nomination. Presumably, the parties entitled to repre-
sentation in the Electoral Tribunals now are also enti-
tled to nominate their own representatives although the
above provision does not expressly say so. At any rate,
in the event that they should fail or refuse to do so,
would the body itself have the right to fill the vacancies
with representatives from such party? And in case the
representative chosen fails or refuses to assume his
seat, may the chamber then choose a member from an-
other party to fill the vacancy? The records of the Con-
stitutional Commission do not suggest any answer to
these questions.

"' Supra.
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 253

disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the

Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other
court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully dis-
charge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of
Senators. I,

"To our mind, this is the overriding consideration-that

the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it
alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in
the highest interest as evidenced by its being expressly im-
posed by no less than the fundamental law.
"It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolu-
tions that the framers of the Constitution could not have been
unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would in-
volve all 24 Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have
to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility would sur-
face again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more,
but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake.
Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling
such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators des-
ignated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought.
Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and
hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the
Members of the Tribunal, Justices and Senators, singly and
collectively."

Although the Electoral Tribunals are predomi-

nantly legislative in membership and the provision cre-
ating them is found in Article VI on the Legislative De-
partment, it is not correct to say that they are mere
adjuncts of the Congress of the Philippines. In fact, in
the discharge of their constitutional duties, they are
independent of the legislature, and also of the other
departments for that matter.
Thus, in the early case of Angara u. Electoral Com-
mission, 113 it was held that the respondent body (prede-
cessor of U1e Electoral Tribunals) had the exclusive right
to prescribe its own rules of procedure, as against those

"" Supra.
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 255

of Congress was affirmed in Robles u. House of Repre-

sentatives Electoral Tribunal. 119
A different question was raised in Bondoc u.
Pineda, 120 to wit, whether the House of Representatives
could, at the request of the dominant political party
therein, change its representative in the House of Rep-
resentatives Electoral Tribunal, presumably "to thwart
the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the
Tribunal."
While acknowledgingthe independence of the Tri-
bunal as the "sole judge" of election contests involving
the members of the House of Representatives, the Su-
preme Court assumed jurisdiction, precisely to protect
that independence. The decision penned by Justice
Carolina Gri:fio-Aquino declared:

"The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so

zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would,
however, be a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of
Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle
and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judi-
cial) component of the Electoral Tribunal, to serve the interests
of the party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing
Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for
disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the
Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment
of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribu-
nal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda
and Bondoc.
"To sanction such interference by the House of Repre-
sentatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would
reduce the Tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of
the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of the Su-
preme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to

11"
181 SCRA 780.
120
201 SCRA 792.
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 257

Apparently consistent with the provisions of Sec-

tion 17 which states that the Electoral Tribunals shall
be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of their respective "Mem-
bers," the Supreme Court has ruled in several cases that
the jurisdiction of an Electoral Tribunal begins once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office,for it is only after the occurrence of
these events that a candidate can be considered as ei-
ther a Member of the House of Representatives or a
Senator.122 The practical application of these rulings, at
least insofar as the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) is concerned, has been that it com-
mences to exercise such jurisdiction, to the exclusion of
the Commissionon Elections, which has initial jurisdic-
tion over said matters (pursuant to its general authority
to enforce and administer all election laws and decide
all questions affecting elections),123 upon the proclama-
tion of the winning candidate.124

122
Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32, April 1,
2009, 583 SCRA 1; Perez v. Commission on Elections, 375 Phil. 1106,
1115-1116 (1999); Marcos v. COMELEC, 318 Phil. 329, 397 (1995);
Vinzons-Chato v. Commission on Elections, 520 SCRA 166, 179;
Aggabao v. COMELEC, 449 SCRA 400, 404-405; Guerrero v.
COMELEC, 391 Phil. 344, 352 (2000); Gonzales v. COMELEC, 644
SCRA 761, 798-799; Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25,
2013.
12"
Constitution, Article IX-B, Sections 2(1) and 2(3); Jalosjos v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192474, June 26, 2012, 674 SCRA
530.
"'Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, supra, see also Jalosjos
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192474, October 9, 2012, 683
SCRA 1; see also Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, 130 Phil. 663,
672 (1968), where the Supreme Court made a general statement to
the effect that "after proclamation, the usual remedy of any party
aggrieved in an election is to be found in an election protest."
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 259

winner in the congressionalelections, the remedy of the

petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the HRET."
In said case, the winning candidate was proclaimed on
May 14, 2004. While~the COMELEC ordered on July 2,
2004 the suspension of the effects of the proclamation of
the private respondent, it, however, lifted the same on
July 23, 2004 "on the ground that respondent Unico's
proclamation and taking of oath of office had not only
divested the Commission of any jurisdiction to pass
upon his election, returns, and qualifications, but also
automatically conferredjurisdiction to another electoral
tribunal." It is significant that Congress convened that
year on July 26, 2004, or three days after the COME-
LEC declared it had lost jurisdiction over the case in
favor of the HRET, although the term of the proclaimed
winning candidate, or the private respondent, com-
menced at noon of June 30, 2004.
In Perez, the private respondent was proclaimed on
May 16, 1998, and took his oath of office the next day.
The Supreme Court dismissed this petition filed before
it on June 16, 1998, stating that, at the time of the filing
of the same, the private respondent was already a
Member of the House of Representatives. Accordingly,
the Court ruled that it no longer had jurisdiction over
this particular electoral contest. It is significant that the
term of Members of the House of Representatives com-
mences at "noon on the thirtieth day of June next fol-
lowing their election."129 Thus, the oath taken by the
private respondent in this case on May 17, 1998 could
not have served to install him into office, considering
that, at that point, his predecessor's term had not yet

Constitution, Article VI, Section 7; see Dimaporo v. COME-

12"

LEC, 544 SCRA 381.

 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 261

noon of the thirtieth day of June next following their

election, it would seem that said oath and assumption of
office clearly cannot be done prior to said date, as the
terms of the their predecessors would, before said time
and date, have not yet expired. Moreover, another ques-
tion arises - how can the House of Representatives
properly convene and validly hold an "open session"
when it would be only during said "open session" that
they all can validly take their "proper oaths?" Needless
to state, the presence of a quorum would be required for
a valid "open session" to be convened or held.132 Stated
otherwise, how can the newly-elected "Members" of the
House of Representatives constitute themselves into a
quorum when, upon the convening of Congress, they
would yet need to take their oaths of office, and it would
be only after they shall have properly established a quo-
rum can a valid "open session" be called for purposes of
enabling them to properly take their oaths as new
"Members"of the House of Representatives?
Moreover, as stressed by Justice Brion in his Dis-
senting Opinion in said case, the "majority's jurispru-
dential ruling is contrary to the HRET's rules; effec-
tively allows the filing of any election protest or a peti-
tion for quo warranto only after the· assumption to office
by the candidate on June 30 at the earliest" and "would
affect all future proclamations since they cannot be ear-
lier than 15 days counted from the June 30 constitu-
tional cut-off for the assumption to office of newly-
elected officials."He added -

"I submit on this point that the proclamation of the

winning candidate is the operative fact that triggers the ju-
risdiction of the HRET over election contests relating to the
winning candidate's election, returns, and qualifications. In

'"2 Ibid., Article VI, Section 16 (2).

 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 263

It is worth noting that, in BANAT v. COMELEC,135

the Court declared that the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunals can be invoked only after the winning candi-
dates have been proclt3-imed.
At any rate, as previously observed, in Lim-
kaichong v. COMELEC,1~6 the Supreme Court ruled that
the HRET would have jurisdiction over a petition for
disqualification based on citizenship filed against a
Member of the House of Representatives, as said quali-
fication is a continuing requirement and may be taken
cognizanceof by the HRET even if filed beyond the pre-
scribed prescriptive period for the institution of the
same. However, according to the Supreme Court, "it is
the State, through its representatives designated by
statute that may question the illegally or invalidly pro-
cured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate
denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter
that may be raised by private persons in an election
case involving the naturalized citizen's descendant." In
Vilando v. HRET, 137 the Supreme Court remarked that
"such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and
exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve
into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the
pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise
would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of
the father which, as already stated, is not permissible."
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
would obviouslynot have jurisdiction over the qualifica-
tions of candidates who have not been proclaimed as
winners, including nominees of winning parties in
party-list elections who have not qualified to represent

'"" G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009, 595 SCRA 477.

'"" G.R. Nos. 178831-32, April 1, 2009, 583 SCRA 1.
"" 656 SCRA 17 (2011).
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 265

even if the thirty-day period has not yet expired, are

deemed by-passed under Article VII, Section 16.
In Daza v. Singson, 139 the petitioner questioned his
replacement in the .Cornmission on Appointments, in-
sisting that his designation thereto as a representative
of the Liberal Party was permanent and could not be
withdrawn. For his part, the respondent contended that
he could be validly named in the petitioner's place in
view of the political realignment in the House of Repre-
sentatives following the organization of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Filipino (LDP), to which he belonged.
Both invoked the earlier case of Cunanan v. Tan, 140
where the Supreme Court had held that the political
affiliations in the two Houses of Congress should be
reflected in their respective representations in the Com-
mission on Appointments. The petitioner claimed that
the formation of the LDP was a merely temporary de-
velopment whereas the respondent maintained that it
had permanently altered the political compositionof the
House of Representatives.
Ruling in favor of the respondent, the Supreme
Court declared inter alia:
"The petitioner, to repeat, bases his argument heavily on
the non-registration of the LDP which, he claims, has not pro-
vided the permanent political realignment to justify the ques-
tioned reorganization. As he insists:
"(c) Assuming that the so-called new coalesced
majority is actually the LDP itself, then the proposed re-
organization is likewise illegal and ineffectual, because
the LDP, not being a duly registered political party, is
not entitled to the 'rights and privileges granted by law
to political parties' (Sec. 160, BP No. 881), and therefore
cannot legally claim the right to be considered in deter-

'"0 Supra.
5 SCRA 1.
140
 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 267

dergone similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it surely

cannot be considered still temporary because of such discord.
"If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157
members of the LDP in the House of Representatives would
have to be denied representation in the Commission on Ap-
pointments and, for that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal.
By the same token, the KBL, which the petitioner says is now
'history only,' should also be written off. The independents also
cannot be represented because they belong to no political
party. That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only-with
all of its seventeen members-to claim all the twelve seats of
the House of Representatives in the Commission on Appoint-
ments and the six legislative seats in the House Electoral Tri-
bunal."

Organization

The followingprovision is also reproduced from the

Commonwealth Constitution:
"Sec. 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission
on Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after
the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been
organized with the election of the President and the Speaker.
The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the
Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority
of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as
are herein conferred upon it."

This provision is based on the need to enable the

President to exercise his appointing power with dispatch
in coordination with the Commission on Appointments.
The rule that the Commission on Appointments can
meet only during the sessions of the Congress is the rea-
son why ad interim appointments are permitted under
the Constitution. These appointments are made during
the recess, subject to consideration later by the Com-
mission, for confirmation or rejection. Ad interim ap-
pointments shall be effective only until disapproval by
 Chapter 9

POWERS OF THE CONGRESS

THE POWERSof the Congress may be classified gener-

ally into legislative and non-legislative. The legislative
power includes the specific powers of appropriation,
taxation, and expropriation. The non-legislative powers,
as previously mentioned, include the power to canvass
the presidential elections, to declare the existence of a
state of war, to give concurrence to treaties and amnes-
ties, to propose constitutional amendments, and to im-
peach.
These powers are expressly conferred by the Con-
stitution. From such express powers may be derived
some implied powers, such as the power to punish con-
tempt in legislative investigations. The Congress also
possesses inherent powers, such as the determination of
its rules of proceedings and the discipline of its mem-
bers.

Legislative Power in General

Legislative power is the power of lawmaking, the

framing and enactment of laws. This is effected through
the adoption of a bill, or a proposed or projected law,
which, once approved, becomes a statute. A statute is
"the written will of the legislature, solemnly expressed
according to the forms necessary to constitute it the law
of the state."

I
Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 1581.

269
 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 271

In Datu Michael Abas Kida u. Senate of the Philip-

pines.' the Supreme Court clarified that subsequent
laws that do not change or revise any provision in an
earlier law, and whjch merely fill in gaps or supplement
said earlier law, cannot be considered as amendments of
the latter.
In League of Cities of the Philippines u. COMELEC,1
the Supreme Court stressed that "the legislative body
possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil gov-
ernment. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage
and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress,
unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine,
except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly
or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects,
and extends to matters of general concern or common
interest."
Accordingly, it has been ruled that the power to
grant immunity from prosecution has been acknowl-
edged as essentially a legislative prerogative. "The ex-
clusive power of Congress to define crimes and their
nature and to provide for their punishment concomi-
tantly carries the power to immunize certain persons
from prosecution to facilitate the attainment of state
interests, among them, the solution and prosecution of
crimes with high political, social and economic impact.
In the exercise of this power, Congress possesses broad
discretion and can lay down the conditions and the ex-
tent of the immunity to be granted;"

6
G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011, 659 SCRA 270.
'G.R. No. 176951, February 15, 2011, 643 SCRA 150; see also
Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948 (1998); Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192,
212 (1946).
'Tanchanco v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), 512 Phil. 590
(2005), cited in Quarto v. The Honorable Ombudsman Simeon
Marcelo, G.R. No. 169042, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 580, citing
 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 273

Laws in general have no retroactive effect, unless

the contrary is provided. Statutes can be given retroac-
tive effect when the law itself so expressly provides; in
case of remedial statutes; in case of curative statutes; in
case of laws interpreting others; and in case of laws
creating new rights.13 In PERT/CPM Manpower Exponent
Co., Inc. v. Vinuya,14 the Supreme Court explained-

"Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the con-

trary is provided. By its very nature, the amendment intro-
duced by R.A. 10022 - restoring a provision of R.A. 8042 de-
clared unconstitutional - cannot be given retroactive effect,
not only because there is no express declaration of retroactivity
in the law, but because retroactive application will result in an
impairment of a right that had accrued to the respondents by
virtue of the Serrano ruling - entitlement to their salaries for
the unexpired portion of their employment contracts. All sta-
tutes are to be construed as having only a prospective applica-
tion, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give
them a retrospective effect are expressly declared or are neces-
sarily implied from the language used. We thus see no reason
to nullify the application of the Serrano ruling in the present
case."

As previously noted, the Supreme Court affirmed in

· Atizado v. People" the retroactive application of Repub-

13
Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 169752, September 25, 2007, 534
SCRA 112.
"G.R. No. 197528, September 5, 2012, 680 SCRA 284, citing
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 167614, March
24, 2009, 582 SCRA 254 and Yap v . Thenamaris Ship's Management,
G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 369.
"' G.R. No. 173822, October 13, 2010, 633 SCRA 105; see People
v. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, 10 September 2009, 599 SCRA 20; see
also People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011, 654 SCRA
188; People v. Monticalvo, G.R. No. 193507, January 30, 2013, 689
SCRA 715.
 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 275

approved by the two chambers, a conferencecommittee

representing both Houses will draft a compromise
measure that, if ratified by the Senate and the House of
Representatives, will then be submitted to the President
for his consideration.'
The bill is enrolled when printed as finally ap-
proved by the Congress, thereafter authenticated with
the signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker,
and the Secretaries of their respective chambers, and
approvedby the President.16

Origin of Bills

The restoration of bicameralism has also revived

the followingprovision appearing in the 1935 Constitu-
tion:

"Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills

authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local applica-
tion, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments."

An appropriation bill is one the primary and spe-

cificpurpose of which is to authorize the release of funds
from the public treasury.17
A revenue bill is one that levies taxes and raises
funds for the government, 18 while a tariff bill specifies
the rates or duties to be imposed on imported articles.19

16
Cited in Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No.
166715,August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251.
17
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 U.S. 410.
1•
U.S. v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566.
'"Black 4th rev. ed. 1628.
 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 277

jected the challenge, holding that such consolidation

was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose
or concur with amendments to the version originated in
the House of Representatives. What the Constitution
simply means, according to the majority, is that the
initiative must comefrom the House of Representatives.

Prohibited Measures

There are certain measures that may not be passed

by the Congress owing to the nature of our government,
such as those impairing the doctrine of separation of
powers or providing for the appointment of elective offi-
cers. There are also specific prohibitions in the Bill of
Rights against the enactment of ex post facto laws, bills
of attainder, or laws impairing the obligation of con-
tracts. Of this nature is the following provision, also i_n
Article VI, which was contained in the Bill of Rights of
the 1973 Constitution:

"Sec. 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility

shall be enacted."

The purpose of this provision is to preserve the re-

publican and democratic nature of our society by prohib-
iting the creation of privileged classes with special per-
quisites not available to the rest of the citizenry. The
stratification of our society will result in the violation of
Article II, Section 1, proclaiming that sovereignty re-
sides in the people as a whole without distinction as to
birth or lineage, unlike in monarchial regimes.
Another prohibition, this time more appropriate for
inclusion under the Judicial Department, is the follow-
ing section, also in Article VI:
 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 279

The purposes of this rule are:

(1) To prevent hodgepodge or log-rolling legisla-
tion. This is defined as "any act containing several sub-
jects dealing with unrelated matters representing di-
verse interests, the main object of such combination
being to unite the members of the legislature who favor
any one of the subjects in support of the whole act."
(2) To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legisla-
ture.
(3) To fairly apprise the people, through such pub-
lications of its proceedings as are usually made, of the
subjects of legislation that are being considered in order
that they may have the opportunity of being heard there-
on, by petition or otherwise,if they should so desire.24
Thus, in Lidasan v. Commission on Elections, 25 the
challenged law was entitled "An Act Creating the Mu-
nicipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur"
when in fact the said municipality comprised not only
barrios in Lanao del Sur but also two municipalities to
be dismembered in the adjacent province of Cotabato.
Interestingly, even the congressman from Cotabato
voted in favor, only to discover later the prejudice to his
own province. In holding the law unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court, observed:

"The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is

not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the mem-
bers of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not ap-
prise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cota-
bato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their
territory was being taken away from their towns and province
and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept

2'
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 172.
20
21 SCRA 496.
 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 281

In BANAT v. COMELEC,28 the Supreme Court re-

marked that the "requirement is satisfied if the title is
comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the
general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. The
title of a law does not have to be an index of its contents
and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are
relevant to each other and may be inferred from the
title. Moreover, a title which declares a statute to be an
act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the pre-
cise nature of the amendatory act need not be further
stated." Accordingly, the provisions of .the subject law
assailed in said case, RA 9369, which spoke of "poll
automation" but contained "substantial provisions deal-
ing with the manual canvassing of election returns,"
particularly, Sections 34 (on official watchers), 37 (on
Congress and the Commission on Elections acting as
National Boards of Canvassers), 38 (on pre-proclamation
cases) and 43 (on election offenses)thereof, were all con-
sidered by the Court as "germane to the subject matter
of RA 9369 which is to amend RA 7166 and BP 881,
among others."
The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9164 enti-
tled "An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending Republic
Act No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Lo-
cal Government Code of 1991" was challenged on the
ground that, while its title announced that it pertained
to the synchronization of the elections for barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan officials, it likewise provided for
term limits for said officers. The Supreme Court, in re-
jecting the challenge, stated -

""G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009, 595 SCRA 477.

 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 283

the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election

propaganda." Accordingly,the Court held that "the as-
sailed Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Sec-
tion 14 (Repealing Clause) are indeed germane to the
subject expressed in the title of R.A. 9006: An Act to
Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful
and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.
The title was worded broadly enough to include the
measures embodied in the assailed sections."
In any case, a title must not be "so uncertain that
the average person reading it would not be informed of
the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is
really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression
or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.?"

Formalities

Another limitation in Article VI is found in Section

26(2),which provides:

"(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law

unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to
its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment
to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading
of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas
and nays entered in the Journal."

As it was not required in the 1935 Constitution

that the bill should undergo the three readings on sepa-
rate days, the Congress did not consider it unlawful to

"2 82 CJS 365.

 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 285

According to the VAT Case,35 the exception applies

to both the requirements of three readings on separate
days and the distribution of final copies of the bill before
its passage. As for the sufficiency of the ground for the
presidential certification, to wit, the "growing budget
deficit,"which the petitioners claimed did not partake of
a "public calamity or emergency," the Court made the
followingfeeble justification:

"The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of

the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Art.
VII, Sec. 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying
the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under
Art. VI, Sec. 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic
rights of individuals may be of hazard. But the factual basis of
presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away
with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are
duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should
elicit a different standard ofreview."

The third reading itself is limited to the casting of

the members' votes, usually after a brief explanation
thereof, if allowed by the rules, without further debate
on the measure. The yeas and nays are entered in the
journals as a permanent record of how each member
voted on particular issues, for the information especially
of their constituents.
Although not provided for in the Constitution, Con-
gress has established the so-called Conference Commit-
tee, composed of representatives from the Senate and
the House of Representatives, which is a "mechanism
for compromising differences" between their respective
versions of a bill or joint resolution. It has been ruled

"' Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, 235

SCRA 630; Datu Michael Ahas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines,
supra.
 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 287

the provisions of the bill. The allegation that the Conference

Committee usurped the legislative power of Congress is, in our
view,without warrant in fact and in law.?"

Approval of Bills t·

The rules on the approval of bills are found in Arti-

cle VI, Section 27, providing as follows:

"SEC. 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall,

before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it
and return the same with his objections to the House where it
originated, which shall enter the objections at large on its
Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsidera-
tion, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to
pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to
the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered,
and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that
House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of
each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the
names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in
its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any
bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after
the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as
ifhe had signed it."
"(2) The President shall have the power to veto any par-
ticular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill,
but the veto shall not affect the item or items which he does
not object."

The above section provides for three methods by

which a bill may become a law, to wit:
(1) When the President signs it;
(2) When the President vetoes it but theje o is
overridden by two-thirds vote of all the members of ach
House; and

~ ~ \,.
"" Ibid.
~a~ 0
 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 28£

was held that the veto was ineffectual and that the ap-
proval of the item carried with it the approval of the
condition attached to it.
The last method is commonly mistaken to be some
kind of sanction for the indolence of the chief executive
but the fact is that it has a more practical purpose. This
method is employed whenever the President, while not
convinced of the necessity or validity of the measure
under consideration, is nonetheless unwilling to disap-
prove it. His reason may be fear of antagonizing certain
elements interested in its passage or his belief that the
final judgment on its constitutionality rests not with
him but with the judiciary.
An illustration of a bill approved through executive
inaction is the Bar Flunkers Bill, which President Quir-
ino refused to sign although he allowed it to lapse into
law. The Supreme Court subsequently declared it partly
unconstitutional. 40
It should be noted that the thirty-day period during
which the bill is supposed to be considered by the Presi-
dent is now counted from the date of its receipt by him.
This is a definite improvement upon the old rule, which
counted the period from the date of adjournment of the
Congress regardless of the date of the actual submission
of the measure to the President of the Philippines.
It has been ruled that "the requirement that the
implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by
Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the
cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and
the so-called rule on presentment." Thus, "every bill
passed by Congress must be presented to the President
for approval or veto. In the absence of presentment to

'" In re Cunanan, infra.

 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 291

"Concept and bases of congressional oversight

"'Broadly defined, the power of oversight
embraces all activities undertaken by Con-
gress to enhance its understanding of and in-
fluence ov& the implementation of legislation
it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns
post-enactment measures undertaken by Con-
gress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance
with program objectives, (b) to determine
whether agencies are properly administered,
(c) to eliminate executive waste and dishon-
esty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of
legislative authority, and (e) to assess execu-
tive conformity with the congressional per-
ception of public interest.
"'The power of oversight has been held to be
intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and
integral to the checks and balances inherent in a
democratic system of government. x x x x x x
xxx
"'Over the years, Congress has invoked its
oversight power with increased frequency to check
the perceived 'exponential accumulation of power'
by the executive branch. By the beginning of the
20"' century, Congress has delegated an enormous
amount of legislative authority to the executive
branch and the administrative agencies. Congress,
thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that
the administrative agencies perform their functions
within the authority delegated to them. x x x x xx
xxx

"Categories of congressional oversight functions

"'The acts done by Congress purportedly in

the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided
into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investiga-
tion and supervision.
'"a. Scrutiny
"'Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser in-
tensity and continuity of attention to administra-
 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 293

come a law after the expiration of a certain period

of time, only if Congress does not affirmatively dis-
approve of the regulation in the meantime. Less
frequently, the statute provides that a proposed
regulation ~will become law if Congress affirma-
tively approves it. ~ ~
"Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is u.
necessary to maintain the balance of power be-
tween the legislative and the executive branches of ~
government as it. offers lawmakers a way to dele- Pr;~
gate vast power to the executive branch or to inde- 11
pendent agencies while retaining the option to can- 0
eel particular exercise of such power without hav-
ing to pass new legislation or to repeal existing law.
They contend that this arrangement promotes de-
mocratic accountability as it provides legislative
check on the activities of unelected administrative
agencies. One proponent thus explains:
"'It is too late to debate the merits of this
delegation policy: the policy is too deeply embedded
in our law and practice. It suffices to say that the
complexities of modern government have often led
Congress-whether by actual or perceived neces-
sity-to legislate by declaring broad policy goals
and general statutory standards, leaving the choice
of policy options to the discretion of an executive of-
ficer. Congress articulates legislative aims, but
leaves their implementation to the judgment of
parties who may or may not have participated in or
agreed with the development of those aims. Conse-
quently, absent safeguards, in many instances the
reverse of our constitutional scheme could be ef-
fected: Congress proposes, the Executive disposes.
One safeguard, of course, is the legislative power to
enact new legislation or to change existing law. But
without some means of overseeing post enactment
activities of the executive branch, Congress would
be unable to determine whether its policies have
been implemented in accordance with legislative
intent and thus whether legislative intervention is

irrJ..~r4 ·m~·
appropriate.
~ l
(. ~ A..w.,. r. - . ..4- l
z . ~-oi;,,j- ~~
 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 295

gated by the Commission on Elections. The Court held that

these functions infringed on the constitutional independence of
the Commissionon Elections.
"With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional over-
sight is not uncon>stitutionalper se, meaning, it neither neces-
sarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to
implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation
of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances in-
herent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact
even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-
accumulation of power in the executive branch.
"However, to forestall the danger of congressional en-
croachment 'beyond the legislative sphere,' the Constitution
imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may
not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either
executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legisla-
tive power, it must follow the 'single, finely wrought and ex-
haustively considered, procedures' specified under the Consti-
tution, including the procedure for enactment of laws and pre-
sentment.
''Thus, any post-enactment congressionalmeasure such as
this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particu-
lar, congressionaloversight must be confinedto the following:
"(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power
of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments
to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on
any matter pertaining to their departments and its
power of confirmation and
"(2) investigation and monitoring of the imple-
mentation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid oflegislation.
"Any action or step beyond that will undermine the sepa-
ration of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative
vetoes fall in this class.
"Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the
President or an administrative agency to present the proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress
which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a
'right' or 'power' to approve or disapprove such regulations be-
 procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by,
such inquiries shall be respected'."

This "power of inquiry" is granted not only to the

Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to
any of their respective committees.44
It has already been remarked that the power of leg-
islative investigation may be implied from the express
power of legislation and does not itself have to be ex-
pressly granted. If the above rule has been incorporated
in the Constitution, it was not so much to authorize as
in fact to limit the conduct oflegislative inquiries.
The reason is that in the past this power was much
abused by some legislators who used it for illegitimate
ends or to browbeat or intimidate witnesses, usually for
grandstanding purposes only. There were also times
when the subject of the inquiry was purely private in
nature and therefore outside the scope of the powers of
the Congress.
To correct these excesses, it is now provided that
the legislative inquiry must be in aid of legislation,
whether it be under consideration already or still to be
drafted. Moreover,the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries are likewise required to be
respected. Furthermore, the conduct of the investigation
must be strictly in conformity with the rules of proce-
dure that must have been published in advance for the
information and protection of the witnesses.
In Garcillano u. House of Representatiues,45 the Su-
preme Court stressed that the "Senate cannot be al-
lowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned

44
Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504
SCRA 704.
"G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 170.
{Ly~f dtN iJdo-
 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 299

mation of a sensitive character" and which would not

serve to automatically exempt executive officials from
the duty to discloseinformation by the mere fact of their
being executive officials," the "fiscal autonomy and con-
stitutional independence of the -Iudiciary.?" the sub
Judice rule, "which restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging
the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the ad-
ministration of justice.?" the right to privacy,51 which,
however, may not be properly invoked if the subject of
the legislative inquiry pertains to the witness' discharge
of his official functions, and the right to self-
incrimination. 52 In Gudani v. Senga,53 the Court de-
clared that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, may
validly prohibit a general from appearing in a legislative
inquiry, although the legislature would not be "pre-
cluded from seeking judicial relief to compel his atten-
dance."
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 54 the
petitioners sought to restrain the respondent from m-
vestigating their participation in the alleged misuse of

48
Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006, 488 SCRA
1; AKBAYANv. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008, 558 SCRA
468; Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers,
G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, 564 SCRA 152; Chavez v. Pub-
lic Estates Authority, 433 Phil. 506, 534 (2002), 384 SCRA 152.
"Senate v. Ermita, supra.
so Romero v. Estrada, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009, 583
SCRA 396.
"' Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504
SCRA 704.
" Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks,
Financial Institutions and Currencies, G.R. No. 167173, December
27, 2007, 541 SCRA 456.
"G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006, 498 SCRA 671.
"' 203 SCRA 767.
 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS . 301

Failure or refusal to attend a legitimate legislative

investigation or contumacy of the witness may be pun-
ished as legislative contempt. The punishment that may
be meted out includes imprisonment. Thus, in the fa-
mous case of Arna~lt v. Nazareno, 58 the petitioner was
ordered incarcerated by the Senate until such time as he
decided to answer certain relevant questions put to him
in connection with the investigation of a government
transaction.
It was also held in this case that the questions that
may be raised in a legislative investigation do not neces-
sarily have to be relevant to any pending legislation,
provided only that they are relevant to the subject mat-
ter of the investigation being conducted. Such investiga-
tion may result in the submission of proposed legislation
based upon the findings of the investigating committee.
How long may a private individual be imprisoned
by the legislature for contempt? The old rule announced
in Lopez v. De las Reyes59 was that the punishment could
last only for the duration of the session when the con-
tempt was committed. In the Arnault Case, however, the
Supreme Court held that the offender could be impris-
oned indefinitely by the Senate, it being a continuing
body, provided that the punishment did not become so
long as to violate due process. As for the House of Rep-
resentatives, the same decision declared that the im-
prisonment could last not only during the session when
the offense was committed but until the final adjourn-
ment of the body. This rule is presumably still valid and
may be applied, unless changed, to the present Con-
gress.

+tua.
"" 55 Phil. 170.
 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 305

declares that: 'No money shall be paid out of the Treasury ex-
cept in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.' This cons-
titutional edict requires that the GAAbe purposeful, deliber-
ate, and precise in its provisions and stipulations. Assuch, the
requirement unqer Section 20 of R.A. No. 8439 that the
amounts needed to fund the Magna Carta benefits were to be
appropriated by the GAA only meant that such funding must
be purposefully, deliberately, and precisely included in the
GAA. The funding for the Magna Carta benefits would not ma-
terialize as a matter of course simply by fiat of R.A. No. 8439,
but must initially be proposed by the officials of the DOST as
the concerne<lagency for submission to and consideration by
Congress. That process is what complies with the constitu-
tional edict. R.A. No. 8439 alone could not fund the payment of
the benefits because the GAA did not mirror every provision of
law that referred to it as the source of funding. It is worthy to
note that the DOST itself acknowledged the absolute need for
the appropriation in the GAA. Otherwise, Secretary Uriarte,
Jr. would not have needed to request the OP for the express
authority to use the savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits."

While ''law" as here used may refer to constitu-

tional appropriations like the grant of a P300,000.00
salary to the President, it is more often supposed to
denote statutes enacted by the lawmaking body. Funds
are always needed for the support of public projects;
money is the motive force and lubricant of the machin-
ery of government. Hence, the power of the purse is one
of the most important prerogatives of the Congress.

(1) Appropriation Defined

An appropriation measure may be defined as a

statute the primary and specific purpose of which is to
authorize the release of public funds from the treasury,
e.g., the public works act and the general appropriations
act. A law creating an office and providing funds there-
for is not an appropriation law since the main purpose is
not to appropriate funds but to create the office.
 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 30'

from the treasury any amount in excess of one millior

pesos.

(3) Constitµtional Limitations

In addition to these extra-constitutional require·

ments, the Constitution lists down several specific limi-
tations on the power of appropriation of the Congress.
The first is that all appropriation bills should origi-
nate in the House of Representatives, for reasons al-
ready discussed.
The second is the following provision, which was
thought necessary in view of the many abuses commit-
ted in the past in the use of discretionary funds. In
many cases, these funds were spent for personal pur-
poses, or at least unnecessary or excessive public pur-
poses, to the prejudice and often without even the
knowledgeof the public.
"(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular of-
ficials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be sup-
ported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines
as may be prescribed by law.""'

The Congress is called upon to pass the necessary

legislation providing for the proper guidelines to make
this new and salutary limitation effective.
In the case of special appropriations, it is provided
in Article VI, Section 25(4), that:

"A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose

for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actu-
ally available as certified to by the National Treasurer, or to be
raised by a corresponding revenue proposal included therein."

&1 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 25.

 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 309

the measure that authorizes the release of public funds

in accordance with Article VI, Section 29(1). ·

"(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the

general appropriations bill unless it relates specificallyto some
particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enact-
ment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to
which it relates."

This is a verbatim reproduction of Article VI, Sec-

tion 19(2), of the 1935 Constitution. The purpose is to
prevent "riders" or irrelevant provisions that are in-
cluded in the general appropriations bill to ensure their
approval.
In Garcia v. Mata, certain provisions dealing with
66

the activation and retirement of reserve officers of the

Armed Forces were incorporated in the General Appro-
priations Act for 1956. The Supreme Court, in annulling
these provisions, declared:

"A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A. 1600 fails

to disclose its relevance or relation to any appropriation item
therein, or to the Appropriation Act as a whole. From the very
first clause of paragraph 11 itself, which reads:
'After the approval of this Act, and when there is no
emergency, no reserve officer of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty for
more than two years during any period of the consecutive
years.'
the incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. While
R.A. 1600 appropriated money for the operation of the Gov-
ernment for the fiscal year 1956-1967,the said paragraph 11
refers to the fundamental government policy matters of the
calling to active duty and the reversion to inactive status of re-
serve officers in the AFP. The incongruity and irrelevancy con-
tinue throughout the entire paragraph.

"" 65 SCRA 520.

 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 311

Taken from the 1973 Constitution, this provision

was inspired by an expose made by Senator Benigno S.
Aquino, who charged that several millions of pesos had
been transferred from
~ the executive department to. the
House of Representatives, presumably to augment the
allowances of some of its members during an election
campaign.
This provision prohibits one department from
transferring some of its funds to another department
and thereby make it beholden to the former to the det-
riment of the doctrine of separation of powers. Such
transfers are also unsystematic, besides in effect disre-
garding the will of the legislature that enacted the ap-
propriation measure.
Applying the above provision, the Supreme Court
declared in Demetria v. Alba67 through Justice Fernan:

"Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over-

extends the privilege granted under said Section 16(5). It em-
powers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds fron:
one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive De-
partment to any program, project or activity of any depart-
ment, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as tc
whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually saving,
in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether 01
not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item tc
which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely
disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby
amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but
likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitu-
tional infirmities render the provision in question null anc
void."

67
148 SCRA 208; Philippine Constitution Association v
Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994; Sanchez v. COA, G.R
No. 127545, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 471; Nazareth v. Villar, G.R
No. 188635, January 29, 2013, 689 SCRA 385.
 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 313

reprobated by the latter. Thus, in the instant case, the

authority granted to the DOST by the Executive Secre-
tary, being one of the alter egos of the President, was
legal and valid but, in so far as the use of agency's sav-
ings for the year 2000 only. Although 2000 budget was
reenacted in 2001, the authority granted on the use of
savings did not necessarily extend to the succeeding
year."
Insofar as Congress is concerned, "the individual
members of Congress may only determine the necessity
of the realignment of savings in the allotments for their
operating expenses because they are in the best position
to know whether there are savings available in some
items and whether there are deficiencies in other items
of their operating expenses that need augmentation.
However, it is the Senate President and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives who shall approve the
realignment.?"
The issue in Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs Investigative and Adjudica-
tion Division 72 was the legality of the President's trans-
fer of the funds appropriated by Congress for the Presi-
dential Anti-Graft Commission [PAGC]in favor of the
Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Af-
fairs - Investigative and Adjudication Division (IAD-
ODESLA),to which was transferred the functions of the
PAGCafter its abolition. The Supreme Court considered
said allocation of funds as lawful. Thus -

"Indeed, the economical effects of the reorganization is

(sic)shown by the fact that while Congress had initially appro-
priated P22 Million for the PAGC's operation in the 2010 an-
nual budget, no separate or added funding of such a consider-

71
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, supra.
12
G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012, 677 SCRA408.
 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 315

Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the President,

the necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLA may be properly
sourced from the President's own office budget without com-
mitting any illegal appropriation. After all, there is no usurpa-
tion of the legislature's power to appropriate funds when the
President simply allocates the existing funds previously appro-
priated by Congress for his office."

(4) Appropriations for Sectarian Purposes

Whether the appropriation be general or specific, it

must conform to the prohibition against the use of pub-
lic funds or property for sectarian purposes. This is pro-
vided for in Article VI, Section 29(2), which runs in full
as follows:

"No public money or property shall ever be appropriated,

applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, bene-
fit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian in-
stitution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or sup-
port of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher
or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minis-
ter, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any pe-
nal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium."

This provision must be read with Article III, Sec-

tion 5, on religious freedom, and Article II, Section 6, on
the separation of Church and State. Its purpose is to
further bolster this principle and emphasize the neu-
trality of the State in ecclesiasticalmatters.
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the above
prohibition is applicable only where the appropriation is
intended purposely to benefit a religious institution. In
Aglipay u. Ruiz, 73 the Philippine government authorized
a special stamp issue on the occasion of the observance
in Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Con-

"'64 Phil. 201.

 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 317

paid from public funds if they serve the government in a

non-ecclesiastical capacity. Thus, some priests who
served as members of the Constitutional Commission
were paid per diems from public funds for services ren-
dered by them not ;s ecclesiasticsbut as public officers.
Finally, it should be stressed that by specific per-
mission in the Constitution, and as an exception to the
above-stated rule, it is provided in Article XIV, Section
3(3),that:

"At the option expressed in writing by the parents or

guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their chil-
dren or wards in public elementary and high schools within the
regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by
the religious authorities of the religion to which the children or
wards belong, without additional cost to the Government."

(5) Automatic Re-appropriation

"If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have
failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing
fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding
fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in
force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed
by the Congress.'?"

Under the 1935 Constitution, the general appro-

priations act had a duration of only one fiscal year.
Hence, if the Congress failed to enact a new general
appropriations act for the incoming fiscal year, the en-
tire government was theoretically paralyzed since no
money could be paid out of the Treasury "except in pur-
suance of an appropriation made by law." The President
of the Philippines therefore had to call back the Con-
gress in special session and keep it in session until it

1"
Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 25(7).
 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 319

The Power of Taxation

The power of taxation is inherent in the State and

is generally vested in the legislature. Its exercise is,
however,restricted by the followingrules:

"(1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.

The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.?"

In addition to the limitations set forth in this provi-

sion, tax laws must be for a public purpose. Accordingly,
a tax may not be levied for the purpose of paying the
corporate debts of a private corporation on the pretext
that it is intended to ensure the stability of the fertilizer
industry in the country.79
Uniformity in taxation means that persons or
things belonging to the same class shall be taxed at the
same rate. It is distinguished from equality in taxation
in that the latter requires the tax imposed to be deter-
mined on the basis of the value of the property. The
present Constitution adds that the rule of taxation shall
also be equitable, which means that the tax burden
must be imposed according to the taxpayer's capacity to
pay.
According to Delegate Artemio M. Lobrin of the
1971 Constitutional Convention,"progressive taxation is
one which tends to accelerate instead of arrest economic
growth. Furthermore, to be progressive, the tax system
should be suited to the social conditions of the people.''"

=iu«, Art. VI, Sec. 28(1).

79
Planters Products Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, G.R. No.
166006, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 485.
811
Montejo, The New Constitution, 128.
 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 321

ready embraced in the generic term "churches" under

the 1935 Charter. The addition is a token of the recogni-
tion by the Constitution of the Muslim elements in our
nation.
In Angeles University Foundation v. City of Ange-
les,84 the petitioner, invoking the tax exemption in favor
of educational institutions granted under Republic Act
No. 6055, claimed that it should not be made to pay
building permit fees. Said law provided that non-stock,
non-profit educational foundations shall be "exempt
from the payment of all taxes, import duties, assess-
ments, and other charges imposed by the Government
on all income derived from or property, real or personal,
used exclusively for the educational activities of the
Foundation." The Supreme Court rejected said conten-
tion, stressing that "since building permit fees are not
charges on property, they are not impositions from
which petitioner is exempt."
In Lladoc u. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 85 a
donation of Pl0,000.00 was accepted by a parish priest
for the construction of a church. The BIR sought to im-
pose a donee's tax upon his successor, who protested,
invoking the constitutional exemption from taxation of
religious institutions. The Supreme Court sustained the
BIR, holding that the tax imposed was an excise tax, a
tax levied not upon the church itself but upon the parish
priest for the exercise by him of the privilege of receiv-
ing the donation. The taxes covered by the constitu-
tional exemption are real estate taxes or ad valorem
taxes imposed on the property itself.

"G.R. No. 189999, June 27, 2012, 675 SCRA 359.

"'' 14 SCRA 292.
 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 323

voting. The above provision requires an absolute major-

ity of the entire membership of the Congress·because a
tax exemption represents a withholding of the power to
tax and consequent loss of revenue to the government.
~ '
An example of a law providing for a tax exemption
is Section 234(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, the Local
Government Code, which states that properties owned
by the Republic of the Philippines are exempt from real
property tax. BB It should be noted that Congress has the
power to grant tax exemptions over and above the power
of the local government's delegated power to tax." A
claim for a tax refund under a statute partakes of the
nature of a tax exemption." Likewise, under Presiden-
tial Decree No. 1922, P.D. No. 2013 and Republic Act
No. 7279, the National Housing Authority is exempt
from the payment of any and all fees and taxes of any
kind, whether local or general. Accordingly, it is not
subject to the deposit requirement under Section 267 of
R.A. No. 7160 with respect to court actions assailing the
validity of any delinquency sale at public auction of real
property (for non-payment of realty taxes). "NHA cannot
be declared delinquent in the payment of real property

88
See City of Pasig v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No.
185023, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 271; Manila International Air-
port Authority v. City of Pasay, G.R. No. 163072, April 2, 2009, 583
SCRA 234; Philippine Fisheries Development Authority v. CBAA,
G.R. No. 178030, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 644; PAGCOR v.
BIR, G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011, 645 SCRA 338.
89
City Government of Quezon City v. Bayan Telecommunica-
tions, Inc., G.R. No. 162015, March 6, 2006, 484 SCRA 169; Quezon
City v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, G.R. No. 166408, Octo-
ber 6, 2008, 567 SCRA 496.
90
CIR v. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc., G.R. No.
163835, 7 July 2010, 624 SCRA 340.
 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 325

Finally, it is established that "there is no vested

right in a tax exemption, more so when the· latest ex-
pression of legislative intent renders its continuance
doubtful. Being a mere
~ statutory privilege, a tax exemp-
tion may be modified or withdrawn at will by the grant-
ing authority A tax exemption cannot be grounded upon
the continued existence of a statute which precludes its
change or repeal. No law is irrepealable. Congress, in
the legitimate exercise of its lawmaking powers, can
enact a law withdrawing a tax exemption just as effica-
ciously as it may grant the same under Section 28(4) of
Article VI of the Constitution.?"

The Power of Concurrence

The Constitution requires the concurrence of the

Congress to an amnesty and to a treaty.
Article VII, Section 19, authorizes the President to
grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all
the members of the Congress. The basis of the majority
is not the membership of each House, it would appear,
but the membership of the legislature as a whole.
It is also specifically provided in Article VII, Sec-
tion 21, that "no treaty or international agreement shall
be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the members of the Senate."

The War Powers

"Sec. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of

both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall
have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war."

"" Republic v. Caguioa, G.R. No. 168584, October 15, 2007, 536
SCRA 193.
 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 327

Referendum and Initiative

In line with the conferment of legislative power di-

rectly on the people,~·Section 32 provides as follows:

"Sec. 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, pro-

vide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the excep-
tions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and
enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof
passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the regis-
tration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum
of the total number of registered voters, of which every legisla-
tive district must be represented by at least three per centum
of the registered voters thereof."

Initiative is generally defined as the power of the

people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject
them at the polls, independent of the legislative assem-
bly.96 It is the right of a group of citizens to introduce a
matter for legislation either to the legislature or directly
to the voters. 97
Referendum is understood to be the right reserved
to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which
has been passed by a legislative body and which in most
cases would without action on the part of the electors
become a law.98 It is defined as a method of submitting
an important legislative measure to a direct vote of the
whole people, the submission of a law passed by the
legislature for their approval or rejection.99
Independently of the foregoing general definitions
of said concepts, Section 32 of Republic Act No. 6735
now defines initiative as "the power of the people to

as Black, p. 923.
"'Webster, Col. Ed., 752.
"" Black, 1446.
na Sibal, Phil. Legal Encyclopedia, p. 845.
 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 329

The referendum may be of two classes, namely, ref-

erendum on statutes, which refers to a petition to ap-
prove or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by
Congress; and referendum on local law, which refers to a
petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordi-
nance enacted by regional assemblies and local legisla-
tive bodies.l"
To exercise the power of initiative or referendum,
at least ten per centum of the total number of the regis-
tered voters, of which every legislative district is repre-
sented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and
register the same with the Commission on Elections.
Said petition is defined as the written instrument con-
taining the proposition, which is the measure proposed
by the voters, and the required number of signatories. It
shall be in a form to be determined by and submitted to
the Commission.106
A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolu-
tion or ordinance passed by the legislative assembly of
an autonomous region, province or city is deemed val-
idly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least
ten per centum of the registered voters in the province
or city, of which every legislative district must be repre-
sented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein; provided, however, that if the province or
city is composed only of one legislative district, then at
least each municipality in a province or each barangay
in a city should be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein.?" A referendum
of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality

'0" Sections 3 (c.L)and (c.2).

ms Section 5 (a), in relation to Sections 3 (0 and (d).
101
Section 5 (d).
 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 331

Commission, the proposition to reject a national law is

approved by a majority of the votes cast, the said na-
tional law shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall
become effective fift~en days following the completion of
publication of the proposition and the certification by
the Commission in the Official Gazette or in a newspa-
per of general circulation in the Philippines. However, if
the majority vote is not obtained, the national law
sought to be rejected or amended shall remain in full
force and effect.l" A national or local initiative proposi-
tion approved by majority of the votes cast in an election
called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen days
after certification and proclamation by the Commis-
sion.!"
Section 10 of the law prohibits petitions embracing
more than one subject from being submitted to the elec-
torate and provides that statutes involving emergency
measures, the enactment of which is specifically vested
in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to
referendum until ninety days after its effectivity.
Under Section 11, any duly accredited people's or-
ganization, as defined by law, may file a petition for
indirect initiative with the House of Representatives,
and other legislative bodies. The petition shall contain a
summary of the chief purposes and contents of the bill
that the organization proposes to be enacted into law by
the legislature. The procedure to be followed on the ini-
tiative bill shall be the same as the enactment of any
legislative measure before the House of Representatives
except that the said initiative bill shall have precedence
over the pending legislative measures on the commit-
tee.

112
Section 9 (a).
"" Section 9 (c).
 POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 333

thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Com-

mission on Elections.!"
If the proposition is approved by a majority bf the
votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen days after certifica-
tion by the Commissionas if affirmative action thereon
had been made by the local legislative body and local
executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of
votes, the proposition is considered defeated.:"
The power of local initiative shall not be exercised
more than once a year. Initiative shall extend only to
subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of
the local legislative bodies to enact. If at any time before
the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall
adopt in toto the proposition presented, the initiative
shall be cancelled. However, those against such action
may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner
provided under the law.120
Any proposition or ordinance or resolution ap-
proved through the system of initiative and referendum
as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or
amended, by the local legislative body concerned within
six months from the date therefrom, and may be
amended, modified or repealed by the local legislative
body within three years thereafter by a vote of three-
fourths of all its members: provided, however, that in
case of barangays, the period shall be one year after the
expiration of the first six months.121
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 of the
law, which states that the power of initiative and refer-
endum may be exercised by all registered voters of the
118
Section 13 (h).
119
Section 14.
120
Section 15 (a), (b) and (c).
121
Section 16.
 Chapter 10

THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT was debased by

Ferdinand E. Marcos who converted it into a seat of un-
limited power and unbelievable corruption. In 1986,
after almost thirteen years of absolute and tyrannical
rule, he was deposed by an outraged and indignant citi-
zenry. He deserves the scorn of history. Even so, his
oppressive regime has taught us many lessons on liberty
which were useful in the redrafting of the new article on
the Executive Department. Indeed, the main motivation
of the framers in the writing of Article VII was to pre-
vent the recurrence of another despot like the discred-
ited ex-dictator.

Executive Power

Article VII, Section 1, reproduces the original rule

in the 1935 Constitution that:
"The executive power shall be vested in the President of
the Philippines."

Executive power is briefly described as the power to

enforce and administer the laws, but it is actually more
than this. In the exercise of this power, the President of
the Philippines assumes a plenitude of authority, and
the corresponding awesome responsibility, that make

1
The 1935 Constitution vested executive power in "a President
of the Philippines."

335
 THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 337

who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without

having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Phil-
ippine citizenship.2 He is distinguished from the· natu-
ralized citizen, who, acquires his Philippine citizenship
after birth by any of the modes allowed by law.
As previously observed, under the provisions of the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003,3
natural-born Filipino citizens who have been, or intend
to be, naturalized in a foreign country, shall, upon tak-
ing the oath of allegiance prescribed in said law be
deemed to have re-acquired, or shall retain their Philip-
pine citizenship, upon taking said oath. Those seeking
elective or appointive public office in the Philippines
shall meet the qualifications for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws
and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candi-
dacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer au-
thorized to administer an oath. It must be noted that,
upon taking said second oath, the citizen ceases to be a
dual citizen.4
Registration as a voter connotes, of course, posses-
sion of the qualifications for suffrage as enumerated in
Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
The literacy qualification is now expressly required
because it is not deemed embraced in the suffrage quali-
fication. The present Constitution not only does not
require ability to read and write but in fact prohibits its
imposition as a qualification for voting."

2
Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 2.
"Republic Act No. 9225.
4
See discussion in Chapter 8.
"Ibid.
 THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 339

The returns of every election for President and Vice-

President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each
province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed
to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates
of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than
thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certifi-
cates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Represen-
tatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon deter-
mination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the
manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
"The person having the highest number of votes shall be
proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal
and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be
chosen by the vote of a majority of all the members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
"The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the can-
vassing of the certificates.
"The Supreme Court, sitting en bane, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and quali-
fications of the President or Vice-President, and may promul-
gate its rules for the purpose."

As the canvass is regarded merely as a ministerial

function, the Congress shall not have the power to in-
quire into or decide questions of alleged irregularities in
the conduct of the elections. These are matters appro-
priate for an election contest. Normally, as long as the
election returns are duly certified and appear to be au-
thentic, the Congress shall have no duty but to canvass
the same and to proclaim as elected the person receiving
the highest number of votes.
When the Congress meets to canvass the presiden-
tial election returns, it does not need the call to a special
session by the President under Article VI, Section 15, as
the canvass is mandated and called by the Constitution
itself.
 THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 341

the Supreme Court in Buac v. COMELEC,8 "in contra-

vention of Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution,"
which provides that the "Members of the Supreme Court
and of other courts established by law shall not be des-
ignated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or ad-
ministrative functions."
Citing Tecson v. Commission on Elections," the Su-
preme Court explained that this portion of Section 4
designating it as the sole judge of all presidential and
vice-presidential election contests "is an innovation of
the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the
1973 Constitutions to designate any tribunal to be the
sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests,
has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs.
Roxas, as 'not (being) justiciable' controversies or dis-
putes involving contests on the elections, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The
constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June
1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, 'An Act Constitut-
ing an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to
Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of
the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the
Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the
Same.' Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice
and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be
the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent
adoption of the parliamentary form of government un-
der the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected
Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonethe-
less, would now be deemed revived under the present
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution." Ac-
cordingly, "unquestionably, the overarching framework

• 465 Phil. 800.

s 424 SCRA 277 (2004).
 THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 343

power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the pre-

sent Constitution.
"With the explicit provision, the present Constitution
has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with lat-
ter's exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task
of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests,
with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded
by the PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allo-
cated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution.
On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless,
distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court.
"If the logic of petitioner is to be followed, all Members· of
the Court, sitting in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals
would violate the constitutional proscription found in Section
12, Article VIII. Surely, the petitioner will be among the first
to acknowledge that this is not so. The Constitution which, in
Section 17, Article VI, explicitly provides that three Supreme
Court Justices shall sit in the Senate and House Electoral Tri-
bunals, respectively, effectively exempts the Justices-Members
thereof from the prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In the
same vein, it is the Constitution itself, in Section 4, Article VII,
which exempts the Members of the Court, constituting the
PET, from the same prohibition.
''We have previously declared that the PET is not simply
an agency to which Members of the Court were designated.
Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Consti-
tution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate,
from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
McCulloch v. State of Maryland proclaimed that '[a] power
without the means to use it is a nullity.' The vehicle for the ex-
ercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and spe-
cifically mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners dur-
ing the discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is the
PET. Thus, a microscopicview, like the petitioner's, should not
constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial
power.?'"

'0 Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.

191618, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 783; see also Macalintal v.
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, June 7, 2011, 651
SCRA239.
 THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 345

"In so doing, she entered into a political contract with the

electorate that if elected, she would assume the office of Sena-
tor, discharge its functions and serve her constituency as such
for the term for which she was elected. These are givens which
are in full accord with the principle enshrined in the Constitu-
tion that public office is a public trust, and public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people and
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
[Link] x.
"The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May
1995 election is six years, the first three of which coincides
with the last three years of the term of the President elected in
the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. The latter would be
Protestant Santiago's term if she would succeed in proving in
the instant protest that she was the true winner in the 1992
elections. In assuming the office of Senator then, the Protes-
tant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at
the very least, in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her 'de-
termination to protect and pursue the public interest involved
in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.' Such
abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot the in-
stant protest. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would
serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncer-
tainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential election,
thereby enhancing the all-too crucial political stability of the
nation during this period of national recovery."

This ruling was affirmed in a vice-presidential elec-

tion contest where the protestant ran for and won a seat
in the Senate during the pendency of her aforesaid ac-
tion before the PET.13

Term

The term of the President (and the Vice-President)

is fixed by Section 4 as follows:

'" Legarda v. de Castro, P.E.T. Case No. 003, January 18, 2008,
542 SCRA 125.
 THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 347

The term of the President is fixed at only six years,

but it was extended by a few months in the case of
President Aquino. Although her term began on Febru-
ary 25, 1986, it was provided in Article XVIII, Section 5,
that "the six-year ter'm of the incumbent President mid
Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is,
for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby ex-
tended to noon of June 30, 1992." The next regular elec-
tion for the President and Vice-President was held on
the second Monday of that year.
The question of whether or not the President can
run for another term after other persons shall have
served in his former office has yet to be settled by the
Supreme Court. One view is that the President can be
re-elected provided this is not done immediately follow-
ing his first term. Others contend that he is forever dis-
qualified because Section 4 provides that "the President
shall not be eligiblefor any re-election."
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, who succeeded President
Estrada on January 20, 2001, was therefore eligible for
election in her own right because she had not served
more than four years by the end of her predecessor's
term, which expired on June 30, 2004. If her unexpired
term exceeded that period, she would not have been
"qualified for election to the same officeat any time."
Estrada, on the other hand, was elected President
in 1998 and served only for, or resigned from office af-
ter, less than three years. This notwithstanding, he ran
for President again in 2010 and almost won.
In Pormento v. Estrada, 14 the petitioner sought to
disqualify Estrada from participating in the 2010 presi-
dential election, on the basis of this constitutional provi-

,. G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010, 629 SCRA 530.

 THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 349

The Vice-President

The new Constitution retains the office of the Vice-

President who shall, with the President, be elected .di-
rectly by the people, for the same term of six years, and
may be removed also only through the process of im-
peachment. His qualifications are the same as those of
the President. The Vice-President is eligible for the posi-
tion of member of the Cabinet and when appointed as
such does not need confirmation by the Commissionon
Appointments. This is intended to prevent him from
becoming, as mere presidential standby, "a superfluous
Excellency'' with nothing more to do than pray for a
vacancy in the Presidency. Nevertheless, he may not
demand such appointment nor may he, conversely, be
compelledto accept it.
The new provisions on the office of the Vice-
President are as follows:

"Sec. 4. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have

the same qualifications and term of office and be elected with
and in the same manner as the President. He may be removed
from office in the same manner as the President.
"The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of
the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation."
"Sec. 4(2) No Vice-President shall serve for more than
two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was
elected."
"Sec. 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the officeof the
Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the
President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who
shall assume officeupon confirmation by a majority vote of all
the Members of both Houses of Congress voting separately."
 THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 351

"If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice-

President-elect shall act as President until a President shall
have been chosen and qualified.
"If at the beginning of the term of the President, the
President-elect shall have died or shall have become perma-
nently disabled, the Vice-President-elect shall become Presi-
dent.
''Where no President and Vice-President shall have been
chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or
become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or,
in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Represen-
tatives shall act as President until a President or a Vice-
President shall have been chosen and qualified.
"The Congress shall by law provide for the manner in
which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a
President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of
death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials men-
tioned in the next preceding paragraph."
"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal
from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President
shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In
case of death, permanent disability, removal from office,or res-
ignation of both the President and Vice-President, the Presi-
dent of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives shall then act as President until
the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and
qualified.
"The Congress shall by law provide who shall serve as
President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation
of the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or
the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and
be subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifica-
tions as the Acting President."

The cases contemplated in the first section are: (1)

death or permanent disability of the President-elect; (2)
failure to elect the President, as where the canvass of
the presidential elections has not yet been completed, or
where for one reason or another the presidential elec-
 THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 353

dency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace
due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume
the presidency as soon as the disability appears; (3) he ex-
pressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve
them. Without doubt he was referring to the past opportunity
given him to serve the people as their President; (4) he assured
that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come
ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference
is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the presi-
dent which he has given up, and (5) he called on his supporters
to join him in the promotion of a national spirit of reconcilia-
tion and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconcilia-
tion and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up
the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory,
his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past
tense."

Estrada also argued that the respondent could not

have replaced him either in an acting capacity because
the determination of the President's inability to dis-
charge the powers and functions of his office should be
made by the Congress pursuant to the procedure laid
down in Section 11 of Article VII. The Court held that
he had not been replaced on that ground; and anyway,
the Senate and the House of Representatives had, by
resolution, formally recognized Gloria Macapagal Ar-
royo as the constitutional successor of Joseph Estrada
by reason of his resignation as President of the Philip-
pines.
The following additional rules on presidential dis-
ability were originally embodied in a statute" only but
have now been transferred to the Constitution:
"Sec. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Rep-
resentatives his written declaration that he is unable to dis-

"B.P. 231.
 THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 355

"Sec. 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clockin the morn-

ing of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the
President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance
with its rules without need of a call and within seven days en-
act a law calling for i special election to elect a President and.a
Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor
later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling
such special election shall be deemed certified under para-
graph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this Constitution and shall
become law upon its approval on third reading by the Con-
gress. Appropriations for the special election shall be charged
against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from
the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of this
Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be sus-
pended nor the special election postponed. No special election
shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months
before the date of the next presidential election."

Oath of Office

The taking of the oath of office by the President-

elect marks his formal assumption of his duties. The
prescribed oath is provided for as follows:
"Sec. 5. Before they enter on the execution of their of-
fice, the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President
shall take the following oath or affirmation:
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faith-
fully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President
(or Vice-President or Acting President) of the Philippines,
preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do
justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service
of the Nation. So help me God."
"(In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.)"

The oath is not a source of substantive power but is

merely intended to deepen the sense of responsibility of
the President and ensure a more conscientious dis-
charge of his [Link], it has been invoked as
a justification for presidential action, as when President
 THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 357

The "emoluments" which they may not receive dur-

ing their tenure from the government or any other
source (that is, private) refers to any compensation re-
ceived for services rendered or from possession of an
office."Emolument" has been defined as "the profit aris-
ing from officeor employment; that which is received as
compensation for services, or which is annexed to the
possession of office, as salary, fees and perquisites; ad-
vantage, gain, public or private." "The gain, profit or
advantage which is contemplated in the definition or
significance of the word 'emolument,' as applied to pub-
lic officers, clearly comprehends, a gain, profit, or ad-
vantage which is pecuniary in character.?" This means
that the President cannot accept other employment
elsewhere, whether in the government or in the private
sector, and must confine himself to the duties of his
office, although in the case of the Vice-President, he
may be appointed to the Cabinet. It is submitted,
though, that the Vice-President may not receive addi-
tional compensation in the second capacity because of
the absolute prohibition in the above provision.
The followinginhibitions are also provided by Sec-
tion 13:

"The President, Vice-President, the Members of the

Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless oth-
erwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, par-
ticipate in any business, or be financially interested in any con-
tract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality

19
Taxpayers' League of Cargon County v. McPherson, 54 P. 2d.
897, 901; 49 Wy. 26; 106 A.L.R. 767, cited in Philippine Constitution
Association v. Gimenez, G.R. No. L-23326, December 18, 1965, 15
SCRA479.
 THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 359

violative of Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution,

invoked Article IX-B, Section 7, allowing the holding of
multiple positions by the appointive official if "allowed
by law or by the primary functions of his position."
~·
In declaring the executive order unconstitutional,
the Court declared through Chief Justice Fernan:

"In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Arti-

cle VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-Bof the 1987
Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is
unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of posi-
tions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant sec-
retaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not
more than two (2) positions in the government and government
corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to
hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of
the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Con-
stitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise pro-
vided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
"The Court is alerted by respondents to the impractical
consequences that will result from a strict application of the
prohibition mandated under Section 13, Article VII on the op-
erations of the Government, considering that Cabinet members
would be stripped of their offices held in an ex-officio capacity,
by reason of their primary positions or by virtue oflegislation.
"As earlier clarified in this decision, ex-officio posts or
those required by the primary functions of the executive offi-
cial concerned do not fall within the definition of 'any other of-
fice' within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition.
With respect to other offices or employment held by virtue of
legislation, including chairmanships or directorships in gov-
ernment-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidi-
aries, suffice it to say that the feared impractical consequences
are more apparent than real. Being head of an executive de-
partment is no mean job. It is more than a full-time job, re-
quiring full attention, specialized knowledge, skills and exper-
tise. If maximum benefits are to be derived from a department
head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to
his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other
governmental offices or employment. He should be precluded
 THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 361

"The Court had occasion to explain the meaning of an ex-

officio position in Rafael vs. Embroidery and Apparel Control
and Inspection Board, thus: 'An examination of section 2 of the
questioned statute (R.A. 3137) reveals that for the chairman
and members of the-Board to qualify they need only be desig-
nated by the respective department heads. With the exception
of the representative from the private sector, they sit ex-officio.
In order to be designated they must already be holding posi-
tions in the offices mentioned in the law. Thus, for instance,
one who does not hold a previous appointment in the Bureau of
Customs, cannot, under the act, be designated a representative
from that office. The same is true with respect to the represen-
tatives from the other [Link] new appointments are neces-
sary. This is as it should be, because the representatives so
designated merely perform duties in the Board in addition to
those already performed under their original appointments.'
"The term 'primary' used to describe 'functions' refers to
the order of importance and thus means chief or principal
function. The term is not restricted to the singular but may re-
fer to the plural. The additional duties must not only be closely
related to, but must be required by the official's primary func-
tions. Examples of designations to positions by virtue of one's
primary functions are the Secretaries of Finance and Budget
sitting as members of the Monetary Board, and the Secretary
of Transportation and Communications acting as Chairman of
the Maritime Industry Authority and the Civil Aeronautics
Board.
"If the functions required to be performed are merely in-
cidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or oth-
erwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet official, such
additional functions would fall under the purview of 'any other
office' prohibited by the Constitution. An example would be the
Press Undersecretary sitting as a member of the Board of the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation. The same
rule applies to such positions which confer on the cabinet offi-
cial management functions and/or monetary compensation,
such as but not limited to chairmanships or directorships in
government-owned or controlled corporations and their sub-
sidiaries."
 THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 363

multiple offices,as well as incompatibleoffices,refers to the hold-

ing of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or des-
ignation, words which were not even found in Section 13, Article
VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To 'hold' ah office
means to 'possess ortoccupy'the same, or 'to be in possession and
administration,' which implies nothing less than the actual dis-
charge of the functions and duties of the office."

For virtually the same reasons, the Supreme Court

also nullified in Funa v. Agra24 the designation of the
respondent as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently
with his position of Acting Solicitor General, stressing
that it "was of no moment that Agra's designation (as
Acting Secretary of Justice) was in an acting or tempo-
rary capacity." Thus -

"Th