MONZON, JESSA MARIE M.
LAW 3E
Special Proceedings
6TH STUDY GUIDE: ADOPTION
ASSESSMENT AS PART OF FINAL EXAM
I. Trace the procedural history of the ff. jurisprudence (Please refer to the full text)
from the court of origin to the Supreme Court.
II. Identify the initial cause of action or issue in the initial pleading.
1. CANG VS. CA, G.R. No. 105308
2. LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC, G.R. No. 164948, FIRST DIVISION, February 27, 2006,
CALLEJO, SR., J.
3. VDA. DE JACOB VS. CA, G.R. No. 135216
ANSWERS:
1. CANG VS. CA, G.R. No. 105308
I. History of the Jurisprudence
a. Court of Origin
On September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano,
respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB
for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The
petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to his adoption. Anna
Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had "evaded his legal
obligation to support" his children; that her brothers and sisters including Ronald V. Clavano,
had been helping her in taking care of the children; that because she would be going to the
United States to attend to a family business, "leaving the children would be a problem and
would naturally hamper (her) job-seeking venture abroad;" and that her husband had "long
forfeited his parental rights" over the children.
On March 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, issued a decree of
adoption in favor of private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano.
Quoting with approval the evaluation and recommendation of the RTC Social Worker in her
Child Study Report, the lower court concluded as follows:
Simply put, the oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his children. And abandonment of a
child by its (sic) parent is commonly specified by statute as a ground for dispensing with his
consent to its (sic). Indeed, in such case, adoption will be allowed not only without the consent
of the parent, but even against his opposition.
b. Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption stating:
Art. 188 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parents of the child to
be adopted. It has been held however that the consent of the parent who has abandoned the
child is not necessary (Dayrit vs. Piccio, 92 Phil. 729; Santos vs. Ananzanso, 16 SCRA 344). The
question therefore is whether or not oppositor may be considered as having abandoned the
children. In adoption cases, abandonment connotes any conduct on the part of the parent to
forego parental duties and relinquish parental claims to the child, or the neglect or refusal to
perform the natural and legal obligations which parents owe their children (Santos vs.
Ananzanso, supra), or the withholding of the parent's presence, his care and the opportunity to
display voluntary affection. The issue of abandonment is amply covered by the discussion of the
first error.
In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the
petition for adoption. Petitioner's consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the
petition sufficiently alleged the fact of abandonment of the minors for adoption by the natural
father.
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written consent of
petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the child by
his natural parents is one of the circumstances under which our statutes and jurisprudence
dispense with the requirement of written consent to the adoption of their minor children.
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto
was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for
determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue
that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon, failure of the oppositor natural father to
prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the petition for
adoption be considered on its merits.
c. Supreme Court
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate facts
and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion on the issue of whether
petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption
unnecessary.
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose
to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute
abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then
in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children
through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
Petitioner's testimony on the matter is supported by documentary evidence consisting of the
following handwritten letters to him of both his wife and children.
Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of banks in the U.S.A. showing
that even prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, he had deposited amounts for the
benefit of his children.
These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite surprising why the courts
below simply glossed over these, ignoring not only evidence on financial support but also the
emotional exchange of sentiments between petitioner and his family. Instead, the courts below
emphasized the meagerness of the amounts he sent to his children and the fact that, as
regards the bank deposits, these were "withdrawable by him alone." Simply put, the courts
below attached a high premium to the prospective adopters' financial status but totally brushed
aside the possible repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and psychological well-being
of the children.
The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal
separation did not, of necessity; deprive petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of
placing the children up for adoption. Article 213 of the Family Code states: ". . . in case of legal
separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
court." In awarding custody, the court shall take into account "all relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit."
If should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the innocent spouse the "exercise" of
parental authority. Having custody of the child, the innocent spouse shall implement the sum of
parental rights with respect to his rearing and care. The innocent spouse shall have the right to
the child's services and earnings, and the right to direct his activities and make decisions
regarding his care and control, education, health and religion.
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid
reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation case. Deprivation of parental
authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption. But there cannot be a valid decree of
adoption in this case precisely because the findings of the lower courts on the issue of
abandonment of facts on record. The petition for adoption must be denied as it was filed
without the required consent of their father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar,
has not abandoned them.
II. Cause of Action
The initial cause of action or issue in the initial pleading is that whether or not the oppositor
Herbert Cang has abandoned his children which leads to the fact that adoption will be allowed
not only without his consent, but even against his opposition.
2. LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC, G.R. No. 164948, FIRST DIVISION, February 27,
2006, CALLEJO, SR., J.
I. History of the Jurisprudence
a. Court of Origin
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3
minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged
in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother
for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second
marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the
adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by
the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated
that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the
benefits of adoption to her children, and she voluntarily consented.
However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the
voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.
On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition for adoption, rendered a decision
granting said petition
b. Court of Appeals
On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision reversing the ruling of the RTC. It held that
petitioner failed to adduce in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos, the children’s
natural mother. Moreover, the affidavit of consent of the petitioner’s children could not also be
admitted in evidence as the same was executed in Guam, USA and was not authenticated or
acknowledged before a Philippine consular office, and although petitioner has a job, she was
not stable enough to support the children. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated November 25,
2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac City in Spec. Proc. No. 2733
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on May 21, 2004, which the CA denied in its
Resolution dated August 12, 2004.
c. Supreme Court
Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the child,
if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if
the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of
adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be
obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive
parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption.
Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of
love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of
others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the
abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
II. Cause of Action
The initial causes of action or issues in the initial pleading are whether or not the petition for
adoption be granted despite the lack of consent of the proposed adoptees’ biological mother,
lack of the written consent of the petitioner’s children as required by law and the petitioner’s
failure to establish that she is in a position to support the proposed adoptees.
3. VDA. DE JACOB VS. CA, G.R. No. 135216
I. History of the Jurisprudence
a. Court of Origin
Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo
E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by
virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased.
Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In
support of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge
Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo
in favor of Pedro Pilapil.
During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo in Case No. T-46
(entitled "Tomasa vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al) herein defendant-appellee Pedro
sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopted son
and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant
Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with
damages (Civil Case No. T-83) questioning appellee's claim as the legal heir of Alfredo.
The following issues were raised in the court a quo: a) Whether the marriage between the
plaintiff-appellant and deceased Alfredo Jacob was valid; b) Whether the defendant-appellee is
the legally adopted son of deceased Jacob.
On the first issue, appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was solemnized
by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not
however present the original copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the original document
was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of
the original, Tomasa presented as secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued
in 1978.
Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order dated 18 July 1961 in Special
Proceedings No. 192 issued by then Presiding Judge Moya granting the petition for adoption
filed by deceased Alfredo which declared therein Pedro Pilapil as the legally adopted son of
Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the signature of Judge Moya.
In an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of Judge Moya's signature in the
Order granting the petition for adoption, the deposition of Judge Moya was taken at his
residence on 01 October 1990.
In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember the facts in judicial
proceedings taken about twenty-nine (29) years ago when he was then presiding judge since
he was already 79 years old and was suffering from "glaucoma".
The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the authenticity and
genuineness of Judge Moya's signature.
A handwriting examination was conducted by Binevenido C. Albacea, NBI Document Examiner.
Examiner Albacea used thirteen (13) specimen signatures of Judge Moya and compared it with
the questioned signature. He pointed out irregularities and "significant fundamental differences
in handwriting characteristics/habits existing between the questioned and the "standard"
signature" and concluded that the questioned and the standard signatures "JOSE L. MOYA"
were NOT written by one and the same person.
On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moya's signature, appellee presented the
comparative findings of the handwriting examination made by a former NBI Chief Document
Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui who examined thirty-two (32) specimen signatures of Judge
Moya inclusive of the thirteen (13) signatures examined by Examiner Albacea. In his report,
Atty. Pagui noted the existence of significant similarities of unconscious habitual pattern within
allowable variation of writing characteristics between the standard and the questioned
signatures and concluded that the signature of Judge Moya appearing in the Order dated 18
July 1961 granting the petition for adoption was indeed genuine.
Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained the findings of Atty. Pagui
declaring the signature of Judge Moya in the challenged Order as genuine and authentic.
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee sustaining his
claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the
reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent." 4
b. Court of Appeals
In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled in this wise:
Dealing with the issue of validity of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, Article 6, par. 1 of the
Family Code provides that the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other
as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument signed by the parties as well as by
their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage." Accordingly, the primary evidence of
a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract.
As required by the Rules, before the terms of a transaction in reality may be established by
secondary evidence, it is necessary that the due execution of the document and subsequent
loss of the original instrument evidencing the transaction be proved. For it is the due execution
of the document and subsequent loss that would constitute the foundation for the introduction
of secondary evidence to prove the contents of such document.
In the case at bench, proof of due execution besides the loss of the three (3) copies of the
marriage contract has not been shown for the introduction of secondary evidence of the
contents of the reconstructed contract. Also, appellant failed to sufficiently establish the
circumstances of the loss of the original document.
With regard to the trial court's finding that the signature of then Judge Moya in the questioned
Order granting the petition for adoption in favor of Pedro Pilapil was genuine, suffice it to state
that, in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary, the presumption applies that
Judge Moya in issuing the order acted in the performance of his regular duties.
Furthermore, since the signature appearing in the challenged Order was subjected to a rigid
examination of two (2) handwriting experts, this negates the possibility of forgery of Judge
Moya's signature. The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere
statement of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in
pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics, and discrepancies in and between genuine
and false specimens of writing of which would ordinarily escape notice or dete[c]tion from an
unpracticed observer. And in the final analysis, the assessment of the credibility of such expert
witnesses rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and the test of qualification is
necessarily a relative one, depending upon the subject under investigation and the fitness of
the particular witness. Except in extraordinary cases, an appellate court will not reverse on
account of a mistake of judgment on the part of the trial court in determining qualifications of
this case.
Jurisprudence is settled that the trial court's findings of fact when ably supported by substantial
evidence on record are accorded with great weight and respect by the Court. Thus, upon
review, We find that no material facts were overlooked or ignored by the court below which if
considered might vary the outcome of this case nor there exist cogent reasons that would
warrant reversal of the findings below. Factual findings of the trial court are entitled to great
weight and respect on appeal especially when established by unrebutted testimony and
documentary evidence.5 (citations omitted, emphasis in the original)
Disagreeing with the above, petitioner lodged her Petition for Review before this Court.
c. Supreme Court
The Petition is meritorious. Petitioner's marriage is valid, but respondent’s adoption has not
been sufficiently established.
III. Cause of Action
The initial causes of action or issues in the initial pleading are: whether or not the marriage
between the plaintiff-appellant and deceased Alfredo Jacob was valid; and whether the
defendant-appellee is the legally adopted son of deceased Jacob.
