PEOPLE v. GERRICO VALLEJO Y SAMARTINO, GR No.

144656, 2002-05-09
Facts:
for the rape-slaying of a 9-year old child... e Information charging accused-appellant Gerrico
Vallejo with the crime of Rape with Homicide
DAISY DIOLOLA Y DITALO, a nine-year old child
Accused-appellant was arraigned... pleaded not guilty to the crime charged
Ten (10) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola, the victim's
mother... medico-legal officer of the NB
Mayor... of Rosario, Cavite
Public Attorney's Office
NBI Forensic Biologist
NBI Forensic Chemist
SPO1
Cavite police station... neighbors of the victim
The victim's mother, Ma. Nida Diolola, testified... she sent her 9-year old daughter Daisy
Diolola to their neighbor's house... so that Aimee Vallejo, the sister of... accused-appellant,
could help Daisy with her lessons.
the probable suspect since he was with the victim when she was last seen alive.
Jessiemin Mataverd
Daisy relented and watched television instead from the door of Jessiemin's house.  About
five minutes later, accused-appellant came to the house and told Daisy something, as a
result of which she went with him and the two proceeded towards the
"compuerta."... accused-appellant arrived to buy a stick of Marlboro cigarette.  Accused-
appellant had only his basketball shorts on and was... just holding his shirt.  They noticed
both his shorts and his shirt were wet.
Charito Yepes, another neighbo... said they met accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo near the
seashore and... noticed that he was uneasy and looked troubled.
Charito said that accused-appellant did not even greet them, which was unusual.  She also
testified that accused-appellant's shorts and shirt (sando) were wet, but his face and hair
were not.
Renato Abutan, Municipal Mayor of Rosario, Cavite,... mayor said he told accused-appellant
that he could not help him if he did not tell the truth.  At that point, accused-appellant started
crying and... told the mayor that he killed the victim by strangling her.  Accused-appellant
claimed that he was under the influence of drugs.
Atty. Lupo Leyva corroborated Mayor Abutan's testimony.
After accused-appellant assented, Atty. Leyva testified that he "sort of... discouraged" the
former from making statements as anything he said could be used against him.  But, as
accused-appellant was willing to be investigated, Atty. Leyva said he advised him to tell the
truth.
Pet Byron Buan, Forensic Biologist of the NBI, testified that on July 12, 1999, he took blood
samples from accused-appellant in his office for laboratory examination to determine his
blood type.
Pet Byron Buan also testified that before he took the blood samples, he had a conversation
with accused-appellant during which the latter admitted that he had raped and later killed
the victim by strangulation and stated that he was willing to accept the punishment that
would be... meted out on him because of the grievous offense he had committed.
When accused-appellant was brought before Inquest Prosecutor Elpidia J. Itoc at around
noon of July 13, 1999 in Cavite City, accused-appellant had with him a handwritten
confession which he had executed inside his cell at the Municipal Jail of Rosario.   In his
confession,... accused-appellant admitted not only that he killed the victim but that he had
before that raped her.  Accused-appellant said he laid down the victim on a grassy area
near the dike.
Atty. Sikat Agbunag, a lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office, testified that... assist...
accused-appellant about his confession.
accused-appellant said that he had freely and voluntarily executed the document because
he was bothered by his conscience.
At the instance of City Prosecutor Agapito S. Lu of Cavite City, NBI Forensic Biologist Pet
Byron Buan took buccal swabs and hair samples from accused-appellant, as well as buccal
swabs and hair samples from the parents of the victim, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola and
Arnulfo
Diolola.  The samples were submitted to the DNA Laboratory of the NBI for examination.
the vaginal swabs of the victim taken by Dr. Vertido during the autopsy contained the DNA
profiles of accused-appellant and the... victim.
he trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the offense charged
INSUFFICIENCY AND WEAKNESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION
Issues:
the prosecution failed to show that all the samples submitted for DNA testing were not
contaminated, considering that these specimens were... already soaked in smirchy waters
before they were submitted to the laboratory... oral confessions were inadmissible in
evidence for being hearsay, while the extrajudicial confessions were obtained... through
force and intimidation... admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellant is
also attacked on the ground that these were extracted from him by means of torture,
beatings, and threats to his life
Ruling:
There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional
provision:  (1) coerced confessions, the product of third degree methods such as torture,
force, violence, threat, and intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of Section 12,...
and (2) uncounselled statements, given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are
the subject of paragraph 1 of the same section... ccused-appellant cannot now claim that he
was not apprised of the consequences of the statements he was to make as well as the
written confessions he was to execute.
Indeed, accused-appellant admitted that he was first asked whether he wanted the services
of Atty. Leyva before the latter acted as his defense counsel.[44] And counsel who is
provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where the latter... never
raised any objection against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation
but, on the contrary, thereafter subscribed to the veracity of his statement before the
swearing officer.[45] Contrary to the assertions of accused-appellant,... Atty. Leyva was not
the municipal attorney of Rosario, Cavite but only a legal adviser of Mayor Renato Abutan.
[46]... bare assertions of maltreatment by the police... authorities in extracting confessions
from the accused are not sufficient.  The standing rule is that "where the defendants did not
present evidence of compulsion, or duress nor violence on their person;... where there
appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies; and where they did not have
themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress... their claim,"
Principles:
DNA is an organic substance found in a person's cells which contains his or her genetic
code.  Except for identical twins, each person's DNA profile is distinct and unique.
When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the
victim's body for the suspect's DNA.  This is the evidence sample.  The evidence sample is
then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider,
among others things, the following data:  how the samples were collected, how they were
handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in
analyzing the... samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In conclusion, we hold that the totality of the evidence points to no other conclusion than
that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged.  Evidence is weighed not counted. 
When facts or circumstances which are proved are not only consistent with the guilt of... the
accused but also inconsistent with his innocence, such evidence, in its weight and probative
force, may surpass direct evidence in its effect upon the court.
PEOPLE v. JOEL YATAR alias “KAWIT”, GR No. 150224,
2004-05-19
Facts:
Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide
Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for their farm in Nagbitayan
some two kilometers away.
Kathylyn was left alone in the house.
Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house were off. She called out
for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was open. She noticed
that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that... day was still empty. She
went up the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She
found that the door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped
in the dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid.
She found out that it was the naked body of her granddaughter, Kathylyn.
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down
the ladder of the house of Isabel Dawang
When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylyns's
death... appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer Cesar
Abagan accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police
station. They suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (He's...
running away!). Police Officer Orlando Manuel exited through the gate of the Police Station
and saw appellant running away. Appellant was approximately 70 meters away from the
station when Police Officer Abagan recaptured him.[12] He was charged with Rape... with
Homicide. When he was arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded "not guilty."...
appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide... and was accordingly,
sentenced to Death.
Issues:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE DOUBT.
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample
taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain
silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the
Constitution.
Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are
unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-
post facto law.
Ruling:
Appellant's contentions are unmeritorious.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against
appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the
credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of...
weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted.[13] Well-entrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial court on
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent... reasons are
presented necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of the same; the reason
being that the former is in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses
and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude.[14] Absent... any showing that the
trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
which would affect the result of the case, the trial judge's assessment of credibility deserves
the appellate court's highest respect.[15] Where... there is nothing to show that the
witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are
entitled to full faith and credit.[16]
The weight of the prosecution's evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule
which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long
as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond
doubt... that the accused committed the crime.
Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and five
(5) incised, were found on the victim's abdomen and back, causing a portion of her small
intestines to spill out of her body.[18] Rigor mortis of the... vicitm's body was complete when
Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998. According to him, the time of
death may be approximated from between nine (9) to twelve (12) hours prior to the
completion of rigor mortis.[19] In other... words, the estimated time of death was sometime
between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was within the timeframe within
which the lone presence of appellant lurking in the house of Isabel Dawang was testified to
by witnesses.
It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician,
Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma
were noted on the victim,[20] Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the... vaginal
canal of the victim. During his testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that the introduction of semen
into the vaginal canal could only be done through sexual intercourse with the victim.[21] In
addition, it is apparent from the pictures submitted by the... prosecution that the sexual
violation of the victim was manifested by a bruise and some swelling in her right forearm
indicating resistance to the appellant's assault on her virtue.
Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm
specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellant's
gene type.
because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same
DNA, with the notable exception of identical... twins.
DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to
link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological
evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile
source... of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one
from suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used.
If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with
known samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the
following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether...
the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the
prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques.[30] Based on
Dr. de Ungria's testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of...
appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination.
Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample
given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,[33] it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically
valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under
Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would... allow at trial,
including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such
novel procedure.
evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence.[34] Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA
evidence obtained through PCR testing and... utilizing STR analysis, and which was
appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on
scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellant's semen found in the victim's vaginal
canal, the trial court appreciated... circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt
Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken
chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of
others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient
circumstantial... evidence, three requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but
against testimonial compulsion.[37] The right against self- incrimination is simply against the
legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of... guilt. It does not
apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object
evidence.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin,
blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved.
The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his
involvement in an offense of which he is accused.
It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which
was conducted in open court... in the presence of counsel.
This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science
of DNA typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained
under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a... question of
law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence
presented.
Appellant's twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA
evidence and bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence at
Isabel Dawang's house during the time when the crime was committed, undeniably link him
to the... incident. Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence an
impossibility to be in two places at the same time, especially in this case where the two
places are located in the same barangay.[40] He lives within a one hundred (100) meter...
radius from the scene of the crime, and requires a mere five minute walk to reach one
house from the other. This fact severely weakens his alibi.
Appellant's assertion cannot be sustained.
Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never
on mere conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes "something
more than a minimum of probative value," suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must
contain a
"plus value."[41] This may be necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by
matters of slight value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions.
Evidence without "plus value" may be logically relevant but not legally... sufficient to convict.
It is incumbent upon the trial court to balance the probative value of such evidence against
the likely harm that would result from its admission.
The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from
which the court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain
a... conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of certainty that convinces and directs the
understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable doubt.[42] This requires that... the
circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on
the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no one else, committed the
offense charged.[43] In view of the totality of evidence appreciated thus... far, we rule that
the present case passes the test of moral certainty.
However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the
identity of the culprit.
Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that she
last saw the victim alive in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel Dawang.[45]
She witnessed the appellant running down the stairs of Isabel's... house and proceeding to
the back of the same house.[46] She also testified that a few days before the victim was
raped and killed, the latter revealed to her that "Joel Yatar attempted to rape her after she
came from the school."[47]
The victim told Judilyn about the incident or attempt of the appellant to rape her five days
before her naked and violated body was found dead in her grandmother's house on June
25, 1998.[48] In addition, Judilyn also testified that when her auntie Luz
Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant, separated from her husband, "this Joel Yatar threatened to
kill our family.
Thus, appellant's motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant
case. It is a rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is established by the
testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately
after... the commission of the offense, deeds or words that may express it or from which his
motive or reason for committing it may be inferred.
Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
special complex crime of rape with homicide.

Agustin v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 16257,15 June 2005

FACTS:

Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological father,
petitioner Arnel Agustin, for support and support pendent lite before the Quezon City [Link] their
complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they entered into an intimate
relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite Arnel’s insistence on
abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The baby’s birth certificate was
purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but
later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support despite his adequate financial capacity and
even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the
child.

On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country
Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fe’s leg. This incident was
reported to the police. Several months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then,
been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then sued Arnel for support. Fe and Martin moved
for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing,
which Arnel opposed by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and moving to
dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action.
The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity
testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus this
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and was a form
of unreasonable search.

RULING:

No. In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be
difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive
match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing v Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged
the strong weight of DNA testing

In no uncertain terms, the Court also underscored that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions
into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements
that enhance public service and the common good. Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by
proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.

In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness, passion, prejudice or
personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals.
The respondent court acted entirely within its jurisdiction in promulgating its decision and resolution,
and any error made would have only been an error in judgment. As we have discussed, however,
the decision of the respondent court, being firmly anchored in law and jurisprudence, was correct.

RUSTAN ANG Y PASCUA, GR No. 182835, 2010-04-20

Facts:
The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused
Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University
Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to
elope with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected
the proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child.
Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and
sent her text messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages,
namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768.
Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with
spread legs and with Irish's face superimposed on the figure
The sender's cellphone number, stated in the message,... was 0921-8084768, one of the
numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot
he took when they were in Baguio
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted
that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he
threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet.
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under
police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in
sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess
Resort in
Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he
walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested him. They
searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards.
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as an
expert in information technology and computer graphics. He said that it was very much
possible for one to lift the face of a woman from a picture and superimpose it on the body of
another... woman in another picture.
the RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
the Court of Appeals... rendered a decision... affirming the RTC decision.
Issues:
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an
electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature,
as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M.
01-7-01-SC).
Ruling:
Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the
first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the
admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in... evidence. He should
be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on
Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and
administrative proceedings.

PEOPLE VS. QUITOLAY

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before this Court is an appeal of the May 13, 2011 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04237 affirming the October 21, 2009 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Branch 47 in Crim. Case No. U-15476, finding
accused-appellant Rodrigo Quitola y Balmonte (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide as defined and penalized under
Article 294, sub-paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
(People vs. Quitolay G.R. No. 200537 July 13, 2016)

The Facts

In the course of the follow-up investigation, Police Officer 2 Herminigildo Ramos (PO2
Ramos) discovered that accused-appellant, who happened to be the outgoing security
guard of the Nice Place Compound on March 15, 2008, was- seen by one Chat Siquig
Baculad (Baculad). The witness, a coffee vendor, narrated that at around 5:30 in the
morning, the accused-appellant bought a cup of coffee from her. She noticed that the
latter's right arm was covered and when she asked him about it, he merely said he had an
accident. According to the witness, accused-appellant asked for her help in packing his and
his pregnant wife's clothes as they were leaving the city, but she declined. The witness left
the compound and returned after a couple of hours. Upon her return, she chanced upon
accused-appellant and his wife boarding a black car, allegedly owned by Maria Fe Valencia
(Valencia), with all their belongings already loaded.

Upon finding out that accused-appellant, the security guard on duty, was nowhere to be
found during the initial investigations, the police investigators proceeded to his. rented room
in Camanang, Urdaneta City. When they got there, the room was already abandoned.
Convinced that accused-appellant was a possible suspect, the policemen conducted further
investigations. Accused-appellant's relatives from Natividad, Pangasinan averred no
knowledge regarding the whereabouts of accused-appellant. On September 8, 2008,
accused-appellant was eventually arrested in Aklan.

(People vs. Quitolay G.R. No. 200537 July 13, 2016)

On September 10, 2008, accused-appellant was interviewed by Joana Fe Tacason

(Tacason), ABS-CBN field reporter. The interview was conducted inside the detention cell.
During said interview, accused-appellant voluntarily relayed to Tacason that at early dawn
of March 15, 2008, he was in the apartment of the deceased because he tried to borrow
money from her.[11] He narrated that deceased refused to lend him money. In frustration,
he got money from deceased's bag he saw lying on top of the table.[12] When asked what
happened next, accused-appellant responded with "Hindi ko na alam ang sumunod na
nangyari." The interview was taped and was aired the next day. The recorded interview
forms part of the records of the case as Exhibit "U".

The deceased's car, a black Mitsubishi Lancer with Plate No. AEM-184, was later
surrendered by Raffy Quitola (Raffy), accused-appellant's brother. Raffy claimed that the
same was left in his possession by his brother, who paid him a visit on August 17, 2008 and
stayed with him for about a month. Surmising that the car was related to the crime his
brother was arrested for, Raffy turned over the car to the Philippine National Police (PNP) of
Calamba, Laguna.[13]

Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation. According to accused-appellant, at

around 9 o'clock in the morning of March 15, 2008, he and his wife left for Cubao, Quezon
City after he had rendered duty at the Nice Place Compound the night before. Accused-
appellant claimed that they were bound for Aklan for the reason that his wife wanted to give
birth there. He also denied visiting his brother in Laguna. More notable is his claim that his
confession before Tacason was merely prompted by fear

(People vs. Quitolay G.R. No. 200537 July 13, 2016)

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC admitted the extra-judicial confession and held that the denial of accused-
appellant did not overcome the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution. The court
found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. FINDING accused RODRIGO QUITOLA y BALMONTE GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide, he is hereby sentenced
to suffer reclusion perpelua.

2. ORDERING accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of P50,000.00
as indemnity and the additional sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.[14] (Boldface omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved by the RTC decision, accused-appellant elevated the case to the CA. In an
attempt to shatter the prosecution's case, accused-appellant contends that the interview
was impelled by extreme fear because the same was conducted while accused-
appellant was inside the detention cell and while police officers were around. In
addition, the defense argues that the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the RTC
were insufficient to establish accused-appellant's guilt.

The appellate court found no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated October 21,
2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Branch 47, that
convicted accused-appellant Rodrigo B. Quitola for the special complex crime
of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE as defined and penalized under Article 294, sub
paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED."[15]

In a Resolution[16] dated March 19, 2012, this Court required the parties to submit their
respective supplemental briefs. Both the Solicitor General (Sol Gen.) and the accused-
appellant manifested that they are adopting all the arguments contained in their
respective briefs in lieu of filing supplemental briefs. [17]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 13, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Rodrigo Quitolay Balmonte is
hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
the penalty of which is reclusion perpetua in view of the absence of any modifying
circumstance. Accused-appellant is also liable to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00
as temperate damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
and P-75,000.00 as exemplary damages. All monetary awards for damages shall earn
interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until
fully paid.
PEOPLE VS. CAPUNO
THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 185715, January 19, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
APPELLEE, VS. ERLINDA CAPUNO Y TISON, APPELLANT.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before this Court is an appeal of the May 13, 2011 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04237 affirming the October 21, 2009 Decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Branch 47 in Crim. Case No.
U-15476, finding accused-appellant Rodrigo Quitola y Balmonte (accused-appellant)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide
as defined and penalized under Article 294, sub-paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal
Code.

(People vs. Quitolay G.R. No. 200537 July 13, 2016)

FACTS: In the course of the follow-up investigation, Police Officer 2 Herminigildo

Ramos (PO2 Ramos) discovered that accused-appellant, who happened to be the
outgoing security guard of the Nice Place Compound on March 15, 2008, was- seen by
one Chat Siquig Baculad (Baculad). The witness, a coffee vendor, narrated that at
around 5:30 in the morning, the accused-appellant bought a cup of coffee from her. She
noticed that the latter's right arm was covered and when she asked him about it, he
merely said he had an accident. According to the witness, accused-appellant asked for
her help in packing his and his pregnant wife's clothes as they were leaving the city, but
she declined. The witness left the compound and returned after a couple of hours. Upon
her return, she chanced upon accused-appellant and his wife boarding a black car,
allegedly owned by Maria Fe Valencia (Valencia), with all their belongings already
loaded.

Upon finding out that accused-appellant, the security guard on duty, was nowhere to be
found during the initial investigations, the police investigators proceeded to his. rented
room in Camanang, Urdaneta City. When they got there, the room was already
abandoned. Convinced that accused-appellant was a possible suspect, the policemen
conducted further investigations. Accused-appellant's relatives from Natividad,
Pangasinan averred no knowledge regarding the whereabouts of accused-appellant. On
September 8, 2008, accused-appellant was eventually arrested in Aklan.

On September 10, 2008, accused-appellant was interviewed by Joana Fe Tacason

(Tacason), ABS-CBN field reporter. The interview was conducted inside the detention
cell. During said interview, accused-appellant voluntarily relayed to Tacason that at
early dawn of March 15, 2008, he was in the apartment of the deceased because he
tried to borrow money from her.[11] He narrated that deceased refused to lend him
money. In frustration, he got money from deceased's bag he saw lying on top of the
table.[12] When asked what happened next, accused-appellant responded with "Hindi
ko na alam ang sumunod na nangyari." The interview was taped and was aired the next
day. The recorded interview forms part of the records of the case as Exhibit "U".
The deceased's car, a black Mitsubishi Lancer with Plate No. AEM-184, was later
surrendered by Raffy Quitola (Raffy), accused-appellant's brother. Raffy claimed that
the same was left in his possession by his brother, who paid him a visit on August 17,
2008 and stayed with him for about a month. Surmising that the car was related to the
crime his brother was arrested for, Raffy turned over the car to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) of Calamba, Laguna.[13]

Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation. According to accused-appellant,

at around 9 o'clock in the morning of March 15, 2008, he and his wife left for Cubao,
Quezon City after he had rendered duty at the Nice Place Compound the night before.
Accused-appellant claimed that they were bound for Aklan for the reason that his wife
wanted to give birth there. He also denied visiting his brother in Laguna. More notable is
his claim that his confession before Tacason was merely prompted by fear.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC admitted the extra-judicial confession and held that the denial of accused-
appellant did not overcome the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution. The court
found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. FINDING accused RODRIGO QUITOLA y BALMONTE GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide, he is hereby sentenced
to suffer reclusion perpelua.

2. ORDERING accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of P50,000.00
as indemnity and the additional sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.[14] (Boldface omitted)

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved by the RTC decision, accused-appellant elevated the case to the CA. In an
attempt to shatter the prosecution's case, accused-appellant contends that the interview
was impelled by extreme fear because the same was conducted while accused-
appellant was inside the detention cell and while police officers were around. In
addition, the defense argues that the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the RTC
were insufficient to establish accused-appellant's guilt.

The appellate court found no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated October 21,
2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Branch 47, that
convicted accused-appellant Rodrigo B. Quitola for the special complex crime
of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE as defined and penalized under Article 294, sub
paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED."[15]

In a Resolution[16] dated March 19, 2012, this Court required the parties to submit their
respective supplemental briefs. Both the Solicitor General (Sol Gen.) and the accused-
appellant manifested that they are adopting all the arguments contained in their
respective briefs in lieu of filing supplemental briefs. [17]

In his brief, accused-appellant assigned the following errors:

"I.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION.

II.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION

ESTABLISHED THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S GUILT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT."

ATIENZA V BOARD OF MEDICINE

G.R. No. 177407 | February 9, 2011 | J. Nachura
Facts:
1. Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical
Center (RMC) for check-up on February 1995.
2. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to Dr. Pedro
Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. She
underwent kidney operation after the tests revealed that her left kidney is non-
functioning and non-visualizing.

3. Private respondent’s husband Romeo Sioson then filed a complaint for gross
negligence and/or incompetence before the Board of Medicine for the removal of
Editha’s fully functional right kidney, instead of the left, against the doctors who
allegedly participated in the kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr.
Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.

4. After Romeo Sioson presented his evidence, Editha filed her formal offer of
documentary evidence, which consisted of certified photocopies of X-Ray request
forms where interpretation of the ultrasound results were written, for the purpose of
proving that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time
she was operated.

5. Petitioner filed his comments/objections to Editha’s formal offer of exhibits,

alleging that said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are mere photocopies,
not properly identified and authenticated, intended to establish matters which are
hearsay, and incompetent to prove the purpose for which they are offered.

6. The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent was admitted by

the BOM. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Order, which was denied on
the ground that BOM should first admit the evidence being offered so that it can
determine its probative value when it decides the case, and later on determine
whether the evidence is relevant or not.

7. Disagreeing with the BOM, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The
CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition
for review on certiorari.

Issue:
W/N the exhibits are inadmissible in evidence
Held:
No. Petition denied. To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not
strictly applied in proceedings before administrative bodies such as the BOM.
Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of
evidence, in connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful
relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that, “it is the safest policy
to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them
unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection
places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found
relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be
irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or
ignoring them.”
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance
(or evidence) is to be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of
evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue.

Second, petitioner’s insistence that the admission of Editha’s exhibits violated his

substantive rights leading to the loss of his medical license is misplaced in light of
Section 20, Article I of the Professional Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure.
As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice
the substantive rights of petitioner because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved
thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical locations at
the time she was operated on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court on Disputable presumptions.
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms filed in connection
with Editha’s medical case, which contained handwritten entries interpreting the
results of the examination. The fact sought to be established by the admission of
Editha’s exhibits, that her “kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at
the time” of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial
notice. These exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical
locations of Editha’s kidneys because the position and removal may still be
established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.

Contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is also inapplicable.
Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:

1. Best Evidence Rule

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded
in a public office.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for gross
negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning
kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper
anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys at the time of her operation at the RMC may be established
not only through the exhibits offered in evidence.

In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed, especially
as one of the witnesses testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the originals of the
exhibits “because [it] transferred from the previous building, x x x to the new building” and ultimately,
the originals cannot be produced.

ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. V. MALAYAN INSURANCE CO.,

INC., G.R. NO. 171406, [APRIL 4, 2011], 662 PHIL 473-494
FACTS: On November 14, 1995, Shandong Weifang Soda Ash Plant shipped on board the
vessel MV “Jinlian I” 60,000 plastic bags of soda ash dense (each bag weighing 50 kilograms)
from China to Manila. The shipment, with an invoice value of US$456,000.00, was insured with
respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. under Marine Risk Note No. RN-0001-21430,
and covered by a Bill of Lading issued by Tianjin Navigation Company with Philippine Banking
Corporation as the consignee and Chemphil Albright and Wilson Corporation as the notify party.
On November 21, 1995, upon arrival of the vessel at Pier 9, South Harbor, Manila, the
stevedores of petitioner Asian Terminals, Inc., a duly registered domestic corporation engaged
in providing arrastre and stevedoring services, unloaded the 60,000 bags of soda ash dense
from the vessel and brought them to the open storage area of petitioner for temporary storage
and safekeeping, pending clearance from the Bureau of Customs and delivery to the consignee.
When the unloading of the bags was completed on November 28, 1995, 2,702 bags were found
to be in bad order condition.
On November 29, 1995, the stevedores of petitioner began loading the bags in the trucks of
MEC Customs Brokerage for transport and delivery to the consignee. On December 28, 1995,
after all the bags were unloaded in the warehouses of the consignee, a total of 2,881 bags were
in bad order condition due to spillage, caking, and hardening of the contents.
On April 19, 1996, respondent, as insurer, paid the value of the lost/damaged cargoes to the
consignee in the amount of P643,600.25.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On November 20, 1996, respondent, as subrogee of the consignee, filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 35, a Complaint for damages against petitioner, the shipper
Inchcape Shipping Services, and the cargo broker MEC Customs Brokerage.

After the filing of the Answers, trial ensued.

On June 26, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner liable for the
damage/loss sustained by the shipment but absolving the other defendants. The RTC
found that the proximate cause of the damage/loss was the negligence of petitioner’s
stevedores who handled the unloading of the cargoes from the vessel. The RTC
emphasized that despite the admonitions of Marine Cargo Surveyors Edgar Liceralde
and Redentor Antonio not to use steel hooks in retrieving and picking-up the bags,
petitioner’s stevedores continued to use such tools, which pierced the bags and caused
the spillage. The RTC, thus, ruled that petitioner, as employer, is liable for the acts and
omissions of its stevedores under Articles 2176 and 2180 paragraph (4) of the Civil
Code.
ISSUE: WON THE PRESENTATION OF THE INSURANCE CONTRACT IS
INDISPENSABLE.
HELD: YES. Non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is not fatal in the
instant case
Petitioner claims that respondent’s non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy
between the respondent and the consignee is fatal to its cause of action.
We do not agree.
First of all, this was never raised as an issue before the RTC. In fact, it is not among the
issues agreed upon by the parties to be resolved during the pre-trial. As we have said,
“the determination of issues during the pre-trial conference bars the consideration of
other questions, whether during trial or on appeal.” Thus, “[t]he parties must disclose
during pre-trial all issues they intend to raise during the trial, except those involving
privileged or impeaching matters. . . . The basis of the rule is simple. Petitioners are
bound by the delimitation of the issues during the pre-trial because they themselves
agreed to the same.”
Neither was this issue raised on appeal. Basic is the rule that “issues or grounds not
raised below cannot be resolved on review by the Supreme Court, for to allow the
parties to raise new issues is antithetical to the sporting idea of fair play, justice and due
process.”
Non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is not necessarily fatal. In Delsan
Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that:
Anent the second issue, it is our view and so hold that the presentation in evidence of
the marine insurance policy is not indispensable in this case before the insurer may
recover from the common carrier the insured value of the lost cargo in the exercise of its
subrogatory right. The subrogation receipt, by itself, is sufficient to establish not only the
relationship of herein private respondent as insurer and Caltex, as the assured shipper
of the lost cargo of industrial fuel oil, but also the amount paid to settle the insurance
claim. The right of subrogation accrues simply upon payment by the insurance company
of the insurance claim. aSAHCE
The presentation of the insurance policy was necessary in the case of Home Insurance
Corporation v. CA (a case cited by petitioner) because the shipment therein (hydraulic
engines) passed through several stages with different parties involved in each stage.
First, from the shipper to the port of departure; second, from the port of departure to the
M/S Oriental Statesman; third, from the M/S Oriental Statesman to the M/S Pacific
Conveyor; fourth, from the M/S Pacific Conveyor to the port of arrival; fifth, from the port
of arrival to the arrastre operator; sixth, from the arrastre operator to the hauler,
Mabuhay Brokerage Co., Inc. (private respondent therein); and lastly, from the hauler to
the consignee. We emphasized in that case that in the absence of proof of stipulations
to the contrary, the hauler can be liable only for any damage that occurred from the time
it received the cargo until it finally delivered it to the consignee. Ordinarily, it cannot be
held responsible for the handling of the cargo before it actually received it. The
insurance contract, which was not presented in evidence in that case would have
indicated the scope of the insurer’s liability, if any, since no evidence was adduced
indicating at what stage in the handling process the damage to the cargo was
sustained.
In International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. FGU Insurance Corporation, we
used the same line of reasoning in upholding the Decision of the CA finding the arrastre
contractor liable for the lost shipment despite the failure of the insurance company to
offer in evidence the insurance contract or policy. We explained:
Indeed, jurisprudence has it that the marine insurance policy needs to be presented in
evidence before the trial court or even belatedly before the appellate court. InMalayan
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Regis Brokerage Corp., the Court stated that the presentation of
the marine insurance policy was necessary, as the issues raised therein arose from the
very existence of an insurance contract between Malayan Insurance and its consignee,
ABB Koppel, even prior to the loss of the shipment. In Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc.
v. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., the Court ruled that the insurance contract
must be presented in evidence in order to determine the extent of the coverage. This
was also the ruling of the Court in Home Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals.
However, as in every general rule, there are admitted exceptions. In Delsan Transport
Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that the presentation of the insurance
policy was not fatal because the loss of the cargo undoubtedly occurred while on board
the petitioner’s vessel, unlike in Home Insurance in which the cargo passed through
several stages with different parties and it could not be determined when the damage to
the cargo occurred, such that the insurer should be liable for it.
As in Delsan, there is no doubt that the loss of the cargo in the present case occurred
while in petitioner’s custody. Moreover, there is no issue as regards the provisions of
Marine Open Policy No. MOP-12763, such that the presentation of the contract itself is
necessary for perusal, not to mention that its existence was already admitted by
petitioner in open court. And even though it was not offered in evidence, it still can be
considered by the court as long as they have been properly identified by testimony duly
recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the records of the case.
Judicial notice does not apply
Finally, petitioner implores us to take judicial notice of Section 7.01, Article VII of the
Management Contract for cargo handling services it entered with the PPA, which limits
petitioner’s liability to P5,000.00 per package.
Unfortunately for the petitioner, it cannot avail of judicial notice.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provide that:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their
political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and
history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions.
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of
matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration
or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
The Management Contract entered into by petitioner and the PPA is clearly not among
the matters which the courts can take judicial notice of. It cannot be considered an
official act of the executive department. The PPA, which was created by virtue
of Presidential Decree No. 857, as amended, is a government-owned and controlled
corporation in charge of administering the ports in the country. Obviously, the PPA was
only performing a proprietary function when it entered into a Management Contract with
petitioner. As such, judicial notice cannot be applied.

JESSE U. LUCAS V. JESUS S. LUCAS 

G.R. No. 190710, [June 6, 2011]

FACTS:

Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Jesse alleged that he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with
respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted documents which include (a)
petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s
college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City
with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from the same school;
(e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music;
and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a
musical prodigy.

Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that
the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him.
Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC
found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing.  Jesus filed a Motion
for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere
allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.

Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that
Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity
action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima facie case, affirmative
defences, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative
father and the child.

This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new
hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by
Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not
yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC.
He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in
favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant aspects of a
traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should not be
allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.

ISSUE:

Whether aprima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing
order

HELD:

Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack ofa prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for
DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.

RATIO:

Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals. The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural
aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely
misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called
procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective
evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of
the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s
observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case is herefore misplaced. A
prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the
initiatory pleading.

Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to

safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate
court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person, who has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after
due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological
sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not
previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously
subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons; (c)
The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the
scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of
the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as
potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not
preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party,
including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This
does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if,
during the hearing, the said conditions are established.

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a
show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or “good cause” for
the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a
“search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of
probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or
reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of
probable cause. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of
procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found
that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order
compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as
a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing,
the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As
explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action
refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which
the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing The same condition
precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere
harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner
must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.”