Ermita Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v.

City of Manila [GR L-24693,

31 July 1967]
Ermita Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila [GR L-24693,
31 July 1967]
En Banc, Fernando (J): 7 concur, 2 on leave

Facts: On 13 June 1963, Ordinance 4760 was issued by the municipal board of the City
of Manila and approved by Vice Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting
Mayor of the City of Manila. The ordinance (1) imposes a P6,000.00 fee per annum for
first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; (2) requires the owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to
refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other
quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby
open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name
and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality,
the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name,
relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence
certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a
person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the
presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such
registration forms and records kept and bound together; (3) provides that the premises
and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection
either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives.
The ordinance also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of
certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a
dining room or restaurant and laundry; while second class motels are required to have a
dining room. It prohibited a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such
hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents
or a lawful guardian and made it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof
more than twice every 24 hours. It provided a penalty of automatic cancellation of the
license of the offended party in case of conviction. On 5 July 1963, the Ermita-Malate
Hotel and Motel Operators Association (EMHMOA), its member Hotel del Mar, and a
certain Go Chiu filed a petition for prohibition against the mayor of the City of Manila in
his capacity as he is charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of
the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and
enforcement of such ordinances. There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary
injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and
unenforceable. The lower court on 6 July 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction
ordering the Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance 4760 from and after 8 July
1963. After the submission of the memoranda, ruled that the City of Manila lack
authority to regulate motels and rendering Ordinance 4760 unconstitutional and
therefore null and void. It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued by the
Mayor and his agents to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance. The Mayor of Manila
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the regulations imposed on motels and hotels (increasing license fees,
partially restricting the freedom to contract, and restraining the liberty of individuals) is
valid and/or constitutional.

Held: Yes. The ordinance was enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals. It was made as there is observed an alarming increase in the rate of
prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of
motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit
and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers. The ordinance
proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these
establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form,
prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing
several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes
the registration of transients and guests. The increase in the license fees was intended
to discourage establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal
and to increase the income of the city government. Further, the restriction on the
freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging
house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more
than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged,
cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the
immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, are being devoted.
Furthermore, the right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by
general law for the common good. The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the
interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the
proper scope of the police power. State in order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order
to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. 

CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO

FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a
corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging
houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel
although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a
Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein
petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the
members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance,
insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be
declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance
is entitled–
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT,
SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).

On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following
errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling:

(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair,
unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows
operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.

ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.

HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in
declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that
for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an
enactment of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. This delegated police power is
found in Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such
delegated power.

A. The Ordinance contravenes

the Constitution

The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is

unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance of
the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Due process
requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his
life, liberty and property.
Requisites for the valid exercise
of Police Power are not met

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of
the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only
must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable
relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down
as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process clause.

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social
and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the
objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council’s police powers, the
means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly
oppressive.

The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community’s social
ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by
reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and
transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses “allowed” under the
Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes.
Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se
protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself
eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the
spread of sexual disease in Manila.

The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the
moral welfare of the community. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral
sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a
house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption.

If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social
ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the
establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may
exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may
even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to reasonably
accomplish the desired end.

It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of
its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional
guarantees of a person’s fundamental right to liberty and property.

Modality employed is
unlawful taking

It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used
for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking
of the property without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private
property rights of individuals.

There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A “possessory” taking
occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies property. A “regulatory”
taking occurs when the government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically
viable use of the property.

What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government

regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a
manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. When the owner of real
property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of
the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a
taking.

The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the “prohibited” establishments three
(3) months from its approval within which to “wind up business operations or to
transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to
other kinds of business allowable within the area.” The directive to “wind up business
operations” amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of
property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to
accommodate an “allowed” business, the structure which housed the previous business
will be left empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with
reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate
area or to convert into allowed businessesare confiscatory as well. The penalty of
permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance
is also equivalent to a “taking” of private property.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A
zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a “wholesome”
property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such
property without just compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended
for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such
principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we know them. The police
powers of local government units which have always received broad and liberal
interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.

Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to
close down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its
execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the
unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is
to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have established a rule
by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance does not
specify the standards to ascertain which establishments “tend to disturb the
community,” “annoy the inhabitants,” and “adversely affect the social and moral welfare
of the community.”

The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible
standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.

Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without
infringing the due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not
prevented from carrying on their business.

B. The Ordinance violates Equal

Protection Clause

In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are
commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for
the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification in the instant
case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred
and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions
bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.

The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of
motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment
does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.

The standard “where women are used as tools for entertainment” is also discriminatory
as prostitutionone of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banishis not a profession
exclusive to women. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in
prostitution. Thus, the discrimination is invalid.

C. The Ordinance is repugnant

to general laws; it is ultra vires

The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely empowers
local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in
Section 1 thereof.

With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to
legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code
still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the
establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments.

It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare
clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet
applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and
property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not
be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the
community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so
proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance
warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.

Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the
provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted
the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the
establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except
warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service
station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for
an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the
powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to
the general law.

Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and
impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes
statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently
detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to
be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and
is therefore ultra vires, null and void.

Petition Denied.
YRASUEGUI VS. PAL

FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was
dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline
company.
The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds,
the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration
Manual of PAL.

In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an extended
vacation until November 1985. He was allowed to return to work once he lost all the
excess weight. But the problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from
October 17, 1988 to February 1989.

Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner
remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him
to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight
standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks, which he
failed to comply with.

On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for
weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check
dates, which he did not report to.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge
for violation of company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists that he is
being discriminated as those similarly situated were not treated the same.

On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to
attain his ideal weight, “and considering the utmost leniency” extended to him “which
spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years,” his services were considered
terminated “effective immediately.”

LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the
nature of the job of petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be complied
with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the performance of his
duties.

NLRC affirmed.

CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed
because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is obvious that
the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the
result of his dismissal for being overweight.

ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.

HELD: YES
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that
they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. The
dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.

In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims that
obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly
shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination,
and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992,
petitioner himself claimed that “[t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal
weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now.”

Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the
company physician, per the advice of PAL.

In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as
flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code
that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is
nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, “[v]oluntariness basically means that
the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force
influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under
Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and
habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the
element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).”

NOTES:

The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification
defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular
sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or
national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The qualification is
called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of
reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is
valid “provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job
performance.”

The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely
transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its
employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft.
The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline
upon its employees.

The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is
flight safety.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social
justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct.
Neither is it reflective of his moral character.

US v. Toribio
FACTS:

Toribio was found by the trial court of Bohol violating Sections 30 and 33 of Act No.
1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle. The act
prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft purposes for
human consumption.

Appellant Toribio slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered his carabao without a permit

from the municipal treasurer of the municipality.

It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was
slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends
that under such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor
penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure.

Appellant contends that he applied for a permit to slaughter the animal but was not
given one because the carabao was not found to be “unfit for agricultural work” which
resulted to appellant to slaughter said carabao in a place other than the municipal
slaughterhouse.

Appellant then assails the validity of a provision under Act No. 1147 which states that
only carabaos unfit for agricultural work can be slaughtered.

Appellant also contended that the act constitutes a taking of property for public use in
the exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing for the compensation of
owners, and it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for it
deprives them of the enjoyment of their private property.

ISSUE(s):

WON the prohibition and the penalty imposed in Act No. 1147 is limited only to the
slaughter of large cattle at the municipal slaughterhouse.
WON Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle, is
an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.

HELD:

1. NO. The prohibition and penalty imposed in Act No. 1147 applies generally to the
slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly
secured from the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing for food of large
cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit.

Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that
construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent
of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a
construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of
the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its
enactment.

Therefore, sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or
causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without
the permit provided for in section 30.

2. NO. Act no. 1147 is not a taking of the property for public use, within the meaning of
the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to
regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with
the rights of the publics. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it
shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public
rights and interests of the community.

The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the Philippines like an epidemic that
wiped 70-100% of the population of carabaos.. The Supreme Court also said that these
animals are vested with public interest for they are fundamental use for the production
of crops. These reasons satisfy the requisites of a valid exercise of police power

Finally, SC said that article 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of eminent
domain. The said law does not constitute the taking of caraboes for public purpose; it
just serve as a mere regulation for the consumption of these private properties for the
protection of general welfare and public interest.

Atienza v COMELEC
Facts:
Drilon, the former president of the Liberal Party (LP) announced that his party withdrew
support for the administration of former Pres. Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo. However, Atienza,
LPChairman, alleged that Drilon made the announcement without consulting first the party.
            Atienza hosted a party conference which resulted to the election of new officers, with
Atienza as LP president. Drilon immediately filed a petition with the COMELEC to nullify the said
election claiming that it was illegal considering that the party’s electing bodies, NECO and
NAPOLCO, were not properly convened. Moreover, Drilon claimed that under the LP
Constitution, there is a three-year term. Meaning, his term has not yet ended.
However, Atienza contested that the election of new officers could be likened to people power
removing Drilon as president by direct action. Also, Atienza alleged that the amendment to the
LP Constitution providing the three-term had not been properly ratified. The COMELEC held
that the election of Atienza and others was invalid since the electing assembly did not convene
in accordance with the LP Constitution.
The COMELEC ruled that since the said Constitution was not ratified, Drilon was only sitting in a
hold-overcapacity since his term has been ended already. Subsequently, the LP held a NECO
meeting to elect new party leaders before respondent Drilon’s term expired which resulted to
the election of Roxas as the new LP president. Atienza et al. sought to enjoin Roxas from
assuming the presidency of the LP questioning the validity of the quorum. The COMELEC issued
resolution denying petitioners Atienza et al’s petition.
As for the validity of petitioners Atienza, et al’s expulsion as LP members, the COMELEC
observed that this was a membership issue that related to disciplinary action within the political
party. The COMELEC treated it as an internal party matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to
resolve. 

Issue:
WoN the COMELEC has jurisdiction over intra-party dispute.

Held:
The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited.  It does not have blanket
authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. 
Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities without interference from the
state.  The COMELEC may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the
discharge of its constitutional functions. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections
that the COMELEC’s powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
“include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers
responsible for its acts.”  Moreover, the COMELEC’s power to register political parties
necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf.  Thus, the
COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as
an incident of its power to register political parties.
            The COMELEC did not err when it upheld Roxas’s election but refused to rule on the
validity of Atienza’s expulsion.

Manila Memorial Park, et. al., v. Secretary of DSWD

FACTS:

On April 23, 1992, RA 7432 or the Seniors Citizens Act was passed into law granting
20% discounts from all establishments relative to utilization of transportation services,
hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers and
purchase of medicine anywhere in the country, Provided, That private establishments
may claim the cost as tax credit.

On August 23, 1993, Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 02-94 was issued to implement RA
7432. Sections 2(i) of which provides for the definition of a Tax credit which refers to the
amount representing the 20% discount granted to a qualified senior citizen by all
establishments which discount shall be deducted by the said establishments from their
gross income for income tax purposes and from their gross sales for value-added tax or
other percentage tax purposes and Section 4 of RR No. 02-94 which provides for the
recording/bookkeeping requirements for private establishments requiring them to keep
separate and accurate records of sales made to senior citizens.

In CIR v. Central Luzon Drug Corp, 496 Phil 307 (2005), the Court declared Sections
2(i) and 4 of RR No. 02-94 as erroneous because these contravene RA 7432 that
specifically allow private establishments to claim a tax credit the amount of discounts
they grant. In turn the IRR issued pursuant thereto provide for the procedures for its
availment. To deny such credit, despite the plain mandate of the law and the regulations
carrying out that mandate, is indefensible.

In effect, the tax credit benefit under RA 7432 is related to a sales discount. This
contrived definition is improper, considering that the latter has to be deducted from
gross sales in order to compute the gross income in the income statement and cannot be
deducted again, even for purposes of computing the income tax. When the law says that
the cost of the discount may be claimed as a tax credit, it means that the amount when
claimed shall be treated as a reduction from any tax liability, plain and simple. The
option to avail of the tax credit benefit depends upon the existence of a tax liability, but
to limit the benefit to a sales discount which is not even identical to the discount
privilege that is granted by law does not define it at all and serves no useful purpose. The
definition must, therefore, be stricken down.

The law cannot be amended by a mere regulation. In fact, a regulation that "operates to
create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a mere nullity;" it cannot prevail. It is a
cardinal rule that courts "will and should respect the contemporaneous construction
placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it x x x."

In the present case, the tax authorities have given the term tax credit in Sections 2.i and
4 of RR 2-94 a meaning utterly in contrast to what RA 7432 provides. The intent of
Congress in granting a mere discount privilege, not a sales discount.

In case of conflict, the law must prevail. A "regulation adopted pursuant to law is law."
Conversely, a regulation or any portion thereof not adopted pursuant to law is no law
and has neither the force nor the effect of law.

On February 26, 2004, RA 9257 or the Expanded Senior Citizens Actamended certain
provisions of RA 7432, granting 20% discount to qualified senior citizens and the
establishments may claim the discounts granted as tax deduction based on the net cost
of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be
allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is
granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of
value added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax
purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.

The Secretary of Finance issued RR No. 4-2006 and the DSWD issued its own IRR for
their implementation of the tax provision of RA 9257.

Petitioners Manila Memorial Park, Inc. and La Funeraria Paz-Sucat, Inc., domestic
corporations engaged in the business of providing funeral and burial services, feeling
aggrieved by the tax deduction scheme, petitioners prayed that Section 4 of RA 9257 and
the IRR issued by DSWD and the DOF be declared unconstitutional insofar as these
allow business establishments to claim the 20% discount given to senior citizens as a tax
deduction; that the DSWD and the DOF be prohibited from enforcing the same; and
that the tax credit treatment of the 20% discount under the former Section 4 (a) of RA
7432 be reinstated.

ISSUES

Whether the petition presents an actual case or controversy

Whether Section 4 of RA No. 9257 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations,
insofar as they provide that the 20% discount to Senior Citizens may be claimed as tax
deduction by the private establishments are invalid and unconstitutional.

HELD: The Petition lacks merit.

POLITICAL LAW - actual case or controversy.

We shall first resolve the procedural issue. When the constitutionality of a law is put in
issue, judicial review may be availed of only if the following requisites concur: "(1) the
existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial
interest on the part of the party raising the question of constitutionality; (3) recourse to
judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the question of
constitutionality is the lis mota of the case." General v. Urro, G.R. No. 191560, March 29,
2011

In this case, the tax deduction scheme challenged by petitioners has a direct adverse
effect on them. Thus, there exists an actual case or controversy.

POLITICAL LAW tax deduction scheme is an exercise of police power of the

State

Based on the afore-stated DOF Opinion, the tax deduction scheme does not fully
reimburse petitioners for the discount privilege accorded to senior citizens. This is
because the discount is treated as a deduction, a tax-deductible expense that is
subtracted from the gross income and results in a lower taxable income. Being a tax
deduction, the discount does not reduce taxes owed on a peso for peso basis but merely
offers a fractional reduction in taxes owed. Theoretically, the treatment of the discount
as a deduction reduces the net income of the private establishments concerned. The
discounts given would have entered the coffers and formed part of the gross sales of the
private establishments, were it not for R.A. No. 9257. The permanent reduction in their
total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for
public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners would
ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. Just compensation is defined as the
full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The
measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the
meaning of the word compensation, and to convey the idea that the equivalent to be
rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.

A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As
such, it would not meet the definition of just compensation. Having said that, this raises
the question of whether the State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group
of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a
government program. The Court believes so.

The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior
citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their
improvement and well-being as the State considers them an integral part of our society.

The priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the Constitution as set forth in the
law itself.
As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending
the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent
domain, has general welfare for its object.

While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of
business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of
a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process.

Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens program rests largely on the support
imparted by petitioners and the other private establishments concerned. This being the
case, the means employed in invoking the active participation of the private sector, in
order to achieve the purpose or objective of the law, is reasonably and directly related.
Without sufficient proof that Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the
continued implementation of the same would be unconscionably detrimental to
petitioners, the Court will refrain from quashing a legislative act. Carlos Superdrug Corp
v. DSWD, 553 Phil. 120 (2007).

When we ruled that petitioners in Carlos Superdrug case failed to prove that the 20%
discount is arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory. We noted that no evidence, such as a
financial report, to establish the impact of the 20% discount on the overall profitability
of petitioners was presented in order to show that they would be operating at a loss due
to the subject regulation or that the continued implementation of the law would be
unconscionably detrimental to the business operations of petitioners.

In the case at bar, petitioners proceeded with a hypothetical computation of the alleged
loss that they will suffer similar to what the petitioners in Carlos Superdrug
Corporationdid.

We, thus, found that the 20% discount as well as the tax deduction scheme is a valid
exercise of the police power of the State.

Hence, the Law is valid and constitutional.

Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service

Facts:
R.A. No. 9646, otherwise known as the "Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines" was
signed into law on June 29, 2009 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It aims to
professionalize the real estate service sector under a regulatory scheme of licensing,
registration and... supervision of real estate service practitioners (real estate brokers,
appraisers, assessors, consultants and salespersons) in the country. Prior to its
enactment, real estate service practitioners were under the supervision of the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) through... the Bureau of Trade Regulation and
Consumer Protection (BTRCP), in the exercise of its consumer regulation functions.
Such authority is now transferred to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
through the Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service (PRBRES)... created
under the new law.
The implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9646 were promulgated on
July 21, 2010 by the PRC and PRBRES under Resolution No. 02, Series of 2010.
On December 7, 2010, herein petitioners Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REI) and the
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders' Association (CREBA) instituted Civil Case No.
10-124776 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42. Petitioners sought to
declare as void and... unconstitutional the following provisions of R.A. No. 9646
According to petitioners, the new law is constitutionally infirm because (1) it violates
Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which mandates that
"[e]very bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the... title thereof"; (2) it is in direct conflict with Executive Order (E.O.) No.
648 which transferred the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Housing Authority (NHA)
to regulate the real estate trade and business to the Human Settlements Commission,
now the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB), which authority includes the issuance of license to sell of
subdivision owners and developers pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957; (3)
it violates the due process clause as it impinges on the real estate developers' most
basic ownership... rights, the right to use and dispose property, which is enshrined in
Article 428 of the Civil Code; and (4) Section 28(a) of R.A. No. 9646 violates the equal
protection clause as no substantial distinctions exist between real estate developers
and the exempted group mentioned... since both are property owners dealing with their
own property.
Issues:
Whether there is a justiciable controversy for this Honorable Court to adjudicate;
Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is unconstitutional for violating the "one title-one subject" rule
under Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the Philippine Constitution;
Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is in conflict with PD 957, as amended by EO 648, with respect
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate real estate developers;
Whether Sections 28(a), 29, and 32 of [R.A. No. 9646], insofar as they affect the rights
of real estate developers, are unconstitutional for violating substantive due process; and
Whether Section 28(a), which treats real estate developers differently from other natural
or juridical persons who directly perform acts of real estate service with reference to
their own property, is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause.[3]
Ruling:
The petition has no merit.
The Constitution[4] requires as a condition precedent for the exercise of judicial power
the existence of an actual controversy between litigants. An actual case or controversy
involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims... susceptible to
judicial resolution.[5] The controversy must be justiciable definite and concrete touching
on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests, which may be resolved
by a court of law through the application of a law.[6] In other words, the pleadings must
show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial
thereof on the other; that is, it must concern a real and not a merely theoretical question
or issue. There ought to be an actual and... substantial controversy admitting of specific
relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.[7] An actual case is ripe for
adjudication when the act being... challenged has a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it.
No Violation of One-Title One-Subject Rule
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement
that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not
be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a...
reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without
expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishing of that... object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be
an abstract or index of the Act.[10] (Emphasis supplied.)
The primary objective of R.A. No. 9646 is expressed as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes the vital role of real estate service
practitioners in the social, political, economic development and progress of the country
by promoting the real estate market, stimulating economic activity and enhancing...
government income from real property-based transactions. Hence, it shall develop and
nurture through proper and effective regulation and supervision a corps of technically
competent, responsible and respected professional real estate service practitioners
whose standards of... practice and service shall be globally competitive and will promote
the growth of the real estate industry.
We find that the inclusion of real estate developers is germane to the law's primary goal
of developing "a corps of technically competent, responsible and respected professional
real estate service practitioners whose standards of practice and service shall be
globally... competitive and will promote the growth of the real estate industry." Since the
marketing aspect of real estate development projects entails the performance of those
acts and transactions defined as real estate service practices under Section 3(g) of R.A.
No. 9646, it is... logically covered by the regulatory scheme to professionalize the entire
real estate service sector.

Alliance v. Quezon City, GR No. 230651

FACTS:
In 2010, the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Department of
Finance (DOF) issued Joint Memorandum Circular No. 2010-01, directing all local
government units to implement Section 219 of the LGC, which requires assessors to
revise the real property assessments in their respective jurisdictions every three (3)
years.
On December 5, 2016, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of QC enacted the assailed
2016 Ordinance, which: (a) approved the revised schedule of FMVs of all lands and
Basic Unit Construction Cost for buildings and other structures, whether for residential,
commercial, and industrial uses;[9] and (b) set the new assessment levels at five
percent (5%) for residential and fourteen percent (14%) for commercial and industrial
classifications.[10] The revised schedule increased the FMVs indicated in the 1995
Ordinance to supposedly reflect the prevailing market price of real properties in QC.
On April 7, 2017, Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners' Association, Inc.
(Alliance), allegedly a non-stock, non-profit corporation, filed the present petition.
Alliance argued that the 2016 Ordinance should be declared unconstitutional for
violating substantive due process, considering that the increase in FMVs, which resulted
in an increase in the taxpayer's base, and ultimately, the taxes to be paid, was unjust,
excessive, oppressive, arbitrary, and confiscatory as proscribed under Section 130 of
the LGC.
Moreover, it averred that the hike in the FMVs up to 500% of the previous values
was arbitrary and has no factual basis because the 2016 Ordinance contains no
standard or explanation on how the QC Assessor arrived at the new amounts in the
Schedule of FMVs.
ISSUES:
 WoN the petition is infirm for violation of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies
o NO. Although a petitioner's failure to exhaust the required administrative
remedies has been held to bar a petition in court, the Court has relaxed
the application of this rule "in view of the more substantive matters," as in
this case. In particular, a local government unit's authority to increase the
FMVs of properties for purposes of local taxation is a question that
 indisputably affects the public at large. As for QC, the widespread effect of
the 2016 Ordinance to its constituents is glaringly apparent, considering
that QC has a land area of 16,112.8 hectares, which is almost one-fourth
of the entire Metro Manila. Moreover, QC holds 23.3% of Metro Manila's
total population. While taxation is an inherent power of the State, the
exercise of this power should not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or
confiscatory as explicitly prohibited under the LGC.
o As Alliance proffers, the alleged exorbitant increase in real property taxes
to be paid based on the assailed Ordinance triggers a strong public
interest against the imposition of excessive or confiscatory taxes. Courts
must therefore guard the public's interest against such government action.
Accordingly, the Court exempts this case from the rule on administrative
exhaustion.
 WoN the petition is infirm for violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
o NO. In Ferrer, Jr. v. Bautista, the Court allowed the direct resort to it,
noting that the challenged ordinances would "adversely affect the property
interests of all paying constituents of (QC)," and that it would serve as a
test case for the guidance of other local government units in crafting
ordinances. It added that these circumstances allow the Court to set aside
the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition,
stressing that "[t]his is in accordance with the well- entrenched principle
that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay,
but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate,
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed."
o Considering the circumstances of this case and the pronouncement in
Ferrer, Jr., the Court also deems it proper to relax the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts.
 WoN Alliance has legal capacity to sue
o NO. In this case, Alliance admitted that it has no juridical personality,
considering the revocation of its SEC Certificate of Registration and its
failure to register with the HLURB as a homeowner's association.
Nevertheless, Alliance insists that the petition should not be dismissed
because it was filed by the members of the Board of Trustees in their own
personal capacities, as evidenced by a letter dated March 10, 2017
(Authorization Letter) authorizing its ostensible Treasurer, Danilo Liwanag,
to file the petition in their behalf.
o The Court disagrees. A perusal of the petition readily shows that it was
filed by Alliance, and not by the individual members of its Board of
Trustees in their personal capacities.
 o In fact, even assuming that the trustees intended to file the case in their
own behalf, Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that their
names as beneficiaries must be included in the title of the case, which
was, however, not done here.
o For another, Alliance argued that the status of its authorized
representative, Liwanag, as a taxpayer and resident of QC, is sufficient to
correct the procedural lapse.
o This contention is erroneous. In Association of Flood Victims (AFV) v.
Commission on Elections, the Court dismissed the petition for certiorari
and/or mandamus because the petitioner therein – being an
unincorporated association – had no capacity to sue in its own name and
accordingly, its representative who filed the petition in its behalf, had no
personality to bring an action in court. Moreover, in Dueñas v. Santos
Subdivision Homeowners Association, the Court held that the complaint
filed by an unregistered association cannot be treated as a suit by the
persons who signed it.

NOTES: Petition DISMISSED

Cagayan de Oro City v. Cagayan Electric WALA
Philippine Plastics v. Hon. San Pedro WALA
Confederation v. CIR WALA
Aldovino v. Gold WALA
Private Hospitals Association Of The Philippines, Inc (PHAPi) vs. Executive Secretary

● Petitioner seeks to declare as unconstitutional and void the duty imposed upon hospitals,
medical practitioners and employees to prevent actual death or injury under Section 1 :
the penal provisions under Section 4 ; the presumption of liability clause under Section 5;
and the reimbursement and tax deduction clause under Sections 7 and 8, all of Republic
Act No. 10932 “Act Strengthening the Anti-Hospital Deposit Law”. BP 702 prohibits the
demand of deposits or Advance Payments for the confinement or treatment of patients in
Hospitals and Medical Clinics.
● Amended August 25, 1997 that not only it is unlawful to demand, but also to request,
solicit, and accept any deposit or advance payment as pre-requisite for confinement or
medical treatment in emergency or serious cases RA No. 8344 further makes the refusal
to administer medical treatment and support as dictated by good practice of medicine to
prevent death or permanent disability unlawful. In case the hospital or the medical clinic
has no adequate medical capabilities.
 ● RA No. 8344 increased the penalties prescribed under BP 702 to imprisonment of not
less than 6 months and one day but not more than 2 years and 4 months or a fine not less
than P20,000 but not more than P100,000 or both at the discretion of the court.

o If the violation was committed pursuant to an established hospital or clic

policy or upon the instruction of its management, the director or officer
responsible for the formulation and implementation of such policy shall suffer
4 to 6 years or a fine of P100,000 to P500,000 both at the court’s discretion.

o Expanded the definition of “emergency care” to include women in active labor

and at the risk of miscarriage; include reimbursement from the PhilHealth for
the expenses advanced by hospitals and medical facilities in treating poor and
indigent patients and mandate the PCSO to provide assistance to poor and
marginalized patients on emergency treatment in hospitals

● A consolidation of Senate Bill No. 1353 and House Bill No. 5159 gave birth to RA
10932 which was signed into law on August 3, 2017
● RA 10932 expands the service to basic emergency care and expands treatment
administered to a woman in active labor
● Petitioner argues that RA 10932 infringes the constitutional rights to due process, equal
protection of laws and the presumption of innocence is sufficient to invoke the court’s
power of review
● Respondents seek to dismiss the instant petition for being procedurally infirm on the
ground that certiorari and prohibition are proper only against judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial act.
● Also for the lack of justiciable controversy in the absence of an actual governmental act
which directly causes or will imminently cause injury to the alleged right of petitioner.

Issues

· Whether the court, in fact, can discharge its power of judicial review will be
determined by addressing the following issues:

a) Petitions for certiorari and prohibition proper to assail the constitution of RA

10932

b) Is direct resort to the court proper

c) Has petitioner, as an association of privately-owned hospitals, clinics and

other health facilities, the requisites legal standing

d) Is the petition ripe for adjudication.

Ruling of the Court

 ● Petition was dismissed
● Certiorari and prohibition are proper legal vehicles to assail the constitutionality of a law.
But the petition lacks the following requisites:
■ Actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power
■ The person challenging the act must have a standing to challenge.

Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro

FACTS:
The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the
Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty
by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the
reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held
under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the
reservation.
 The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes
in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by
the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in
accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by
the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With

the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which
non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in
the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.

Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.

ISSUE:
Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a department head,
therefore making it unconstitutional?

HELD:
 No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to
be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the distinction is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can
be made. Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or
official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official
thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The
growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely conferred
upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department
Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law. This is necessary since the
provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are
better qualified to judge “when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order”. As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its
inhabitants, they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for
improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state.
Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
Acosta v. Hon. Ochoa WALA
Almora v. PNP DG De la Rosa WALA
Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils
The PPA was created... on July 11, 1974,... by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 505.
On December 23, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued revising the PPA's
charter.
Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and supervision of pilots and the pilotage
profession,... [1] the PPA promulgated PPA-AO-03-85 [2] on March 21, 1985, which
embodied the "Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of
Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports."
These rules mandate, inter alia, that... aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses
[3] and must train as probationary pilots in outports for three months and in the Port of
Manila for four months.
It is only after they have achieved satisfactory performance [4] that... they are given
permanent and regular appointments by the PPA itself [5] to exercise harbor pilotage
until they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental or physical
unfitness by the PPA General Manager.
Subsequently, then PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-
92... whose avowed policy was to "instill effective discipline and thereby afford better
protection to the port users through the improvement of pilotage... services."... and that
"all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all... pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be
only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or
cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance."
On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila
Pilots Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92
before the Department of Transportation and Communication... n March 17, 1993, the
OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona,
dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier.
On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its
implementing memoranda and circulars, Secretary Corona opined that:
"The exercise of one's profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against
wrongful deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due process. In the
limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference
with,... let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby.
As may be noted, the issuance aims no more than to improve pilotage services by
limiting the appointment to harbor pilot positions to one year, subject to renewal or
cancellation after a rigid... evaluation of the appointee's performance.
Issues:
Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in promulgating
PPA Administrative Order 04-92 including all its implementing Memoranda, Circulars
and Orders;
Ruling:
The court a quo pointed out that the Bureau of Customs, the precursor of the PPA,
recognized pilotage as a profession and, therefore, a property right under Callanta v.
Carnation Philippines, Inc.
Consequently, any "withdrawal or alteration" of such property right must be strictly made
in accordance with the constitutional mandate of due process of law.
This was apparently not... followed by the PPA when it did not conduct public hearings
prior to the issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92; respondents allegedly learned about it only
after its publication in the newspapers.
After carefully examining the records and deliberating on the arguments of the parties,
the Court is convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of
respondents' right against deprivation of property without due process of law.
Consequently, the instant petition... must be denied.
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, x x x."
In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely,
that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance
of due process. When one speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be
made between... matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence,
procedural due process "refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced,"
while substantive due process "requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by
which the law would be enforced, is fair,... reasonable, and just." [14] PPA-AO No. 04-
92 must be examined in light of this distinction.
Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No.
04-92 allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby "relevant government
agencies" and the pilots themselves could ventilate their views. They are obviously
referring to the procedural aspect... of the enactment.
Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the
validity of the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the
fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an
administrative body... exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its
executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an
administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing.
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property
right.
A license is a right or permission granted by some competent authority to carry on a
business or do an act which, without such license, would be illegal.

Executive Secretary v. Court of Appeals

Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995, took effect on July 15, 1995. Before the law took effect, ARCO-Phil filed a petition asking
the court to declare some provisions of the law unconstitutional. The law required that only
skilled workers were to be deployed for employed abroad. According to the respondent, the
right of unskilled workers to due process is violated because they are prevented from finding
employment and earning a living abroad. It cannot be argued that skilled workers are immune
from abuses by employers, while unskilled workers are merely prone to such abuses. It was
pointed out that both skilled and unskilled workers are subjected to abuses by foreign
employers. Furthermore, the prohibition of the deployment of unskilled workers abroad would
only encourage fly-by-night illegal recruiters.  The respondent, likewise, alleged that Section 6,
subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional because licensed and authorized recruitment agencies
are placed on equal footing with illegal recruiters. It contended that while the Labor Code
distinguished between recruiters who are holders of licenses and non-holders thereof in the
imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042 does not make any distinction. The penalties in
Section 7(a) and (b) being based on an invalid classification are, therefore, repugnant to the
equal protection clause, besides being excessive; hence, such penalties are violative of Section
19(1), Article III of the Constitution. 9 It was also pointed out that the penalty for
officers/officials/employees of recruitment agencies who are found guilty of economic sabotage
or large-scale illegal recruitment under Rep. Act No. 8042 is life imprisonment. 
 
Issue: Whether or not RA 8042 is valid
 
Held:
 
Section 6 of RA 8042 was previously upheld as valid. It provides that employees of recruitment
agencies may be criminally liable for illegal recruitment.
Penalizing unlicensed and licensed recruitment agencies and their officers and employees and
their relatives employed in government agencies charged with the enforcement of the law for
illegal recruitment and imposing life imprisonment for those who commit large scale illegal
recruitment is not offensive to the Constitution. The accused may be convicted of illegal
recruitment and large scale illegal recruitment only if, after trial, the prosecution is able to
prove all the elements of the crime charged. 
The respondent merely speculated and surmised that licensed and registered recruitment
agencies would close shop and stop business operations because of the assailed penal
provisions of the law. A writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of penal laws
cannot be based on such conjectures or speculations. The respondent even failed to adduce
any evidence to prove irreparable injury because of the enforcement of Section 10(1)(2) of Rep.
Act No. 8042. Its fear or apprehension that, because of time constraints, its members would
have to defend foreign employees in cases before the Labor Arbiter is based on speculations.
Even if true, such inconvenience or difficulty is hardly irreparable injury.
Preliminarily, the proliferation of illegal job recruiters and syndicates preying on innocent
people anxious to obtain employment abroad is one of the primary considerations that led to
the enactment of The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Aimed at affording
greater protection to overseas Filipino workers, it is a significant improvement on existing laws
in the recruitment and placement of workers for overseas employment. 
By issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioners sans any evidence, the trial
court frustrated, albeit temporarily, the prosecution of illegal recruiters and allowed them to
continue victimizing hapless and innocent people desiring to obtain employment abroad as
overseas workers, and blocked the attainment of the salutary policies 52 embedded in Rep. Act
No. 8042. 
The trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction. It is for this reason
that the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.
Dy v. People, G.R. No. G.R. No. 189081 WALA
Ynot v. IAC

FACTS

Here, the constitutionality of former President Marcos’s Executive Order No. 626-A is

assailed. Said order decreed an absolute ban on the inter-provincial transportation of
carabao (regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose) and carabeef. The
carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this shall be confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission (NMIC) may
see fit, in the case of carabeef. In the case of carabaos, these shall be given to deserving
farmers as the Director of Animal Industry (AI) may also see fit. Petitioner had
transported six (6) carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo. These were
confiscated by the police for violation of the above order. He sued for recovery, which
the RTC granted upon his filing of a supersedeas bond worth 12k. After trial on the
merits, the lower court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos, and as they can no
longer be produced, directed the confiscation of the bond. It deferred from ruling on the
constitutionality of the executive order, on the grounds of want of authority and
presumed validity. On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, such ruling was
upheld. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. On the main, petitioner asserts
that EO 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation, and that
its penalty suffers from invalidity because it is imposed without giving the owner a right
to be heard before a competent and impartial court—as guaranteed by due process.

ISSUE

Whether  EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause.

HELD
YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be present: (a) that
the interests of the public, generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require such interference, and; (b) that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose. In US v. Toribio, the Court has ruled that EO 626
complies with the above requirements—that is, the carabao, as a poor man’s tractor so to
speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of the order,
and that the method chosen is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be
achieved and not unduly oppressive. The ban of the slaughter of carabaos except those
seven years old if male and eleven if female upon issuance of a permit adequately works
for the conservation of those still fit for farm work or breeding, and prevention of their
improvident depletion. Here, while EO 626-A has the same lawful subject, it fails to
observe the second requirement. Notably, said EO imposes an absolute ban not on the
slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The object of the prohibition is
unclear. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the disputed measure is missing. It is not clear how the
interprovincial transport of the animals can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, as
they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another.
Obviously, retaining them in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any
more that moving them to another will make it easier to kill them there. Even if
assuming there was a reasonable relation between the means and the end, the penalty is
invalid as it amounts to outright confiscation, denying petitioner a chance to be heard.
Unlike in the Toribio case, here, no trial is prescribed and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared as forfeited for the
government. Concededly, there are certain occasions when notice and hearing can be
validly dispensed with, such as summary abatement of a public nuisance, summary
destruction of pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs.
However, these are justified for reasons of immediacy of the problem sought to be
corrected and urgency of the need to correct it. In the instant case, no such pressure is
present. The manner by which the disposition of the confiscated property also presents a
case of invalid delegation of legislative powers since the officers mentioned (Chairman
and Director of the NMIC and AI respectively) are granted unlimited discretion. The
usual standard and reasonable guidelines that said officers must observe in making the
distribution are nowhere to be found; instead, they are to go about it as they may see fit.
Obviously, this makes the exercise prone to partiality and abuse, and even corruption.

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.
On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received billions of pesos through any or a
combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly
enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and
the Republic of the Philippines.
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:
1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness
2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions
3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code.
Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations against
petitioner.
Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but
was denied.
Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a
probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest
of the accused.
Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on the ground that the
facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was
based was unconstitutional for vagueness and that the Amended Information for Plunder
charged more than one offense. Same was denied.
The questioned provisions of the petitioners are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 of the Plunder Law
which states that:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise
or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof,
acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates
and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or
similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or
raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,
kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position
of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the
National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or
government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity
or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment
in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or
influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by
himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total
value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to
the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of
penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the
court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other
incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the
deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall
not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern
of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
ISSUE:
WON the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?
HELD:
NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who
are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating w/
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have
committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in
his defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his
fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct  to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech.  The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take
chances as in the area of free speech.
Banco Espanol Filipino v. Palanca
FACTS:

Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to
his debt which amounted to 218, 294. 10 Php while his property was worth 75, 000 Php
more than what he owed. Due to his failure to pay, El Banco executed an instrument to
mortgage the former's property. However, Engracio left for Amoy, China and eventually
died there. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is
a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was
also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendant's last known address but it
was not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after
publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by
default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public
auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder and the same was confirmed by the
court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was
made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant,
wherein he requested the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment, and to
vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. On the ground that the order of default
and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject
matter or the action.
HELD:

Where the defendant in a mortgage foreclosure lives outside of the country and refuses
to appear or otherwise submit himself to the authority of the court, the jurisdiction of
the latter is limited to the mortgaged property, with respect to which jurisdiction of the
court is based upon the fact that the property is located within the district and that the
court, under the provisions of law applicable in such cases is vested with the power to
subject property to the obligation created by the mortgage. In such case personal
jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant is non-essential and in fact cannot be
acquired.

FACTS:
          
Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada two (2)
criminal complaints for plunder, among others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents
in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March
2014.

On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-
Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the
“Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to
examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished’
(Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’
(Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).”
The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the subject of the present
certiorari case.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner Estrada was denied due process of law

HELD:

NO. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process.

First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with
copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.

The SC cited in its decision Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as well as Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman, for ready reference.
Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents violates his constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to
specify a law or rule which states that it is a compulsory requirement of due process in a
preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits
of his co-respondents. Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports
Sen. Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is
for the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting
affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the
respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and his witnesses] have
been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the
affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x." At this point, there is still no counter-
affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously, the
counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of the
complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the
issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estrada’s Request.

Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the
determination of probable cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and
should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the
trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as
the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the
rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by procedural
law.

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of

determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in
preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief” as to
the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent’s probable guilt thereof. A
preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’
evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded
belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. We
are in accord with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie
evidence of petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently
supported by the evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein.

Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and
control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary
investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no compelling justification for a strict
application of the evidentiary rules.

Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to those in

administrative proceedings as laid down in the landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of
evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the evidence needed in a
preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to establish the existence of a prima
facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial
evidence,” while the establishment of probable cause needs “only more than ‘bare suspicion,’
or ‘less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction’.” In the United States, from where we
borrowed the concept of probable cause, the prevailing definition of probable cause is this:

In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities.
These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is
accordingly correlative to what must be proved.

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in
a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not
finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However, in administrative cases, where
rights and obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence” which
cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as
substantial evidence because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial
basis can include hearsay evidence. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS, in preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence required in determining
probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to substantial evidence of
guilt.

Actually, the Ombudsman went beyond legal duty and even furnished Sen. Estrada with copies
of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents whom he specifically named, as well as the
counter-affidavits of some of other co-respondents. In the 4 June 2014 Joint Order, the
Ombudsman even held in abeyance the disposition of the motions for reconsideration because
the Ombudsman granted Sen. Estrada five days from receipt of the 7 May 2014 Joint Order to
formally respond to the claims made by his co-respondents. The Ombudsman faithfully
complied with the existing Rules on preliminary investigation and even accommodated Sen.
Estrada beyond what the Rules required. Thus, the Ombudsman could not be faulted with grave
abuse of discretion. Since this is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, the Petition fails in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.

The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are
not applicable to preliminary investigations which are creations of statutory law giving rise to
mere statutory rights. A law can abolish preliminary investigations without running afoul of the
constitutional requirements of due process as prescribed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The
present procedures for preliminary investigations do not comply and were never intended to
comply, with Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. Preliminary investigations do not adjudicate with
finality rights and obligations of parties, while administrative investigations governed by Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate. Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, requires substantial
evidence for a decision against the respondent in the administrative [Link] preliminary
investigations, only likelihood or probability of guilt is required. To apply Ang Tibay, as amplified
in GSIS, to preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence required to establish
probable cause. The respondent in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified
in GSIS, has the right to an actual hearing and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. In
preliminary investigations, the respondent has no such rights.

Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, the hearing officer
must be impartial and cannot be the fact-finder, investigator, and hearing officer at the same
time. In preliminary investigations, the same public officer may be the investigator and hearing
officer at the same time, or the fact-finder, investigator and hearing officer may be under the
control and supervision of the same public officer, like the Ombudsman or Secretary of Justice.
This explains why Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, does not apply to preliminary investigations.
To now declare that the guidelines in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are fundamental and
essential requirements in preliminary investigations will render all past and present preliminary
investigations invalid for violation of constitutional due process. This will mean remanding for
reinvestigation all criminal cases now pending in all courts throughout the country. No
preliminary investigation can proceed until a new law designates a public officer, outside of the
prosecution service, to determine probable cause. Moreover, those serving sentences by final
judgment would have to be released from prison because their conviction violated
constitutional due process.

Thus, petition dismissed for being premature and it constitutes forum shopping.

Ang Tibay v. CIR

FACTS:

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army. Due to an alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his
employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off
as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the
rival labor union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a
company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right to a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence. The Court granted a new trial. Thus, the Solicitor General, arguing
for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Labor Union (respondent) is entitled to a new trial.

HELD:

YES. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU,
which they attached to their petition with the Supreme Court, were evidence so inaccessible to
them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.

Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect
that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered (said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang
Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing).

The Supreme Court also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly
bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply with the requirements of
due process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the
following:

(1)     The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

(2)     Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.

(3)     While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply
a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached.

(4)     Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence
must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

(5)     The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6)     The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.

Therefore, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire
record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that
it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove.

Cuenca v. Atas WALA

UP Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals
FACTS: Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the doctoral
program in Anthropology of the UP CSSP Diliman. She already completed the units of
course work required and finished her dissertation and was ready for oral defense.

After going over her dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Paz that she
committed plagiarism. However, respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation.
Four out of the five panelists gave a passing mark except Dr. Medina.

UP held meeting against her case and some of the panels indicated disapproval. Hence,
she expressed her disappointments over the CSSP administration and warned Dean Paz.
However, Dean Paz request the exclusion of Celine’s name from the list of candidates for
graduation but it did not reach the Board of Regents on time, hence Celine graduated.

Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended
that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn. Dean Paz informed private respondent
of the charges against her.

CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw

private respondent's doctorate degree.

The Board sent her a letter indicating that they resolved to withdraw her Doctorate
Degree recommended by the University Council.

She sought an audience with the Board of Regents and/or the U.P. President, which
request was denied by President
Hence, Celine then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and damages, alleging that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn
her degree without justification and without affording her procedural due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was deprived of her

right to substantive due process.

RULING: No. Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was indeed heard

several times.

Several committees and meetings had been formed to investigate the charge that private
respondent had committed plagiarism and she was heard in her defense.

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to

explain one's side of a controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position
cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process.

In the case at bar, Celine was informed in writing of the charges against her and given
opportunities to answer them. She was asked to submit her written explanation which
she submiited. She, as well, met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the
Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P.
authorities explaining her position.

It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an
audience before the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not
require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. It is noteworthy
that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose cases are included as
items on the agenda of the Board of Regents.

Ligot v. Republic
Facts:
On June 27, 2005, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by the Anti-
Money Laundering Council (AMLC), filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Application for the
issuance of a freeze order with the CA against certain monetary instruments and
properties of... the petitioners
This application was based on the February 1, 2005 letter of the Office of the
Ombudsman to the AMLC,... recommending that the latter conduct an investigation on
Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family for possible violation of RA No. 9160.
Lt. Gen. Ligot declared in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN)
that as of December 31, 2003, he had assets in the total amount of Three Million Eight
Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand and Three Pesos (P3,848,003.00).[11] In... contrast, his
declared assets in his 1982 SALN amounted to only One Hundred Five Thousand
Pesos (P105,000.00).
side from these declared assets, the Ombudsman's investigation revealed that Lt. Gen.
Ligot and his family had other properties and bank accounts, not declared in his
SALN,... Bearing in mind that Lt. Gen. Ligot's main source of income was his salary as
an officer of the AFP,[17] and given his wife and children's lack of any other substantial
sources of income,[18] the Ombudsman declared the assets... registered in Lt. Gen.
Ligot's name, as well as those in his wife's and children's names, to be illegally obtained
and unexplained wealth, pursuant to the provisions of RA No. 1379 (An Act Declaring
Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully
Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings
Therefor).
the AMLC issued Resolution No. 52, Series of 2005, directing the Executive Director of
the AMLC Secretariat to file an application for a freeze order against the properties of
Lt. Gen. Ligot and the members of his family with the CA.
The appellate court granted the application in its July 5, 2005 resolution, ruling that
probable cause existed
Accordingly, the CA issued a freeze order against the Ligots' and Yambao's various
bank accounts, web accounts and vehicles, valid for a period of 20 days from the date
of issuance.
On July 26, 2005, the Republic filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Effectivity of
Freeze Order, arguing that if the bank accounts, web accounts and vehicles were not
continuously frozen, they could be placed beyond the reach of law enforcement
authorities... the CA granted the motion in its September 20, 2005 resolution, extending
the freeze order until after all the appropriate proceedings and/or investigations have
been terminated.
the Ligots filed a motion to lift the extended freeze order, principally arguing that there
was no evidence to support the extension of the freeze order. They further argued that
the extension not only deprived them of their property without due process;... it also
punished them before their guilt could be proven.
The appellate court subsequently denied this motion
Meanwhile, on November 15, 2005,... Republic Act No.
9160, as Amended"[23] (Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases) took effect. Under this rule, a
freeze order could be extended for a maximum period of six months.
Ligots filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA's
When the CA denied this motion i
Ligots filed the present petition.
Lt. Gen. Ligot... maintains that the freeze order issued against them ceased to be
effective in view of the 6-month extension limit of freeze orders provided under the Rule
in Civil Forfeiture Cases.
the Republic claims that the CA can issue a freeze order upon a determination that
probable cause exists, showing that the monetary instruments or properties subject of
the freeze order are related to the unlawful activity
CA's September 20, 2005 resolution, granting the Republic's motion to extend the
effectivity of the freeze order, had already become final and executory, and could no
longer be challenged.
Issues:
conflict between Section 10 of RA No. 9160, as amended, and Section 53(b) of the Rule
in Civil Forfeiture Cases,
Ruling:
We find merit in the petition.
Without challenging the validity of the fixed 6-month extension period, the Republic
nonetheless asserts that the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases does not apply to the present
case because the CA had already resolved the issues regarding the extension of the
freeze order before... the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases came into effect.
This reasoning fails to convince us.
Notably, the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases came into effect on December 15, 2005.
Section 59 provides that it shall "apply to all pending civil forfeiture cases or petitions for
freeze order" at the time of its effectivity.
A review of the record reveals that after the CA issued its September 20, 2005
resolution extending the freeze order, the Ligots filed a motion to lift the extended freeze
order on September 28, 2005. Significantly, the CA only acted upon this motion on
January 4, 2006,... when it issued a resolution denying it.
While denominated as a Motion to Lift Extended Freeze Order, this motion was actually
a motion for reconsideration, as it sought the reversal of the assailed CA resolution.
Since the Ligots' motion for reconsideration was still pending resolution at the time the
Rule in
Civil Forfeiture Cases came into effect on December 15, 2005, the Rule unquestionably
applies to the present case.
Additionally, we would be giving premium to the government's failure to file an
appropriate case until only after six years (despite the clear provision of the Rule in Civil
Forfeiture Cases) were we to dismiss the petition because of the filing of the forfeiture
case... during the pendency of the case before the Court.
Substantive aspect... there are only two requisites for the issuance of a freeze order: (1)
the application ex parte by the AMLC and (2) the determination of probable cause by
the CA.[33] The probable cause required for the issuance... of a freeze order differs
from the probable cause required for the institution of a criminal action, and the latter
was not an issue before the CA nor is it an issue before us in this case.
As defined in the law, the probable cause required for the issuance of a freeze order
refers to "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet,
prudent or cautious man to believe that an unlawful activity and/or a money laundering
offense is about to be, is... being or has been committed and that the account or any
monetary instrument or property subject thereof sought to be frozen is in any way
related to said unlawful activity and/or money laundering offense.
In other words, in resolving the issue of whether probable cause exists, the CA's
statutorily-guided determination's focus is not on the probable commission of an
unlawful activity (or money laundering) that the Office of the Ombudsman has already
determined to exist, but on... whether the bank accounts, assets, or other monetary
instruments sought to be frozen are in any way related to any of the illegal activities... a
freeze order is not dependent on a separate criminal charge, much less does it depend
on a conviction.
As we previously noted in Republic v. Eugenio, Jr.,[36] "[t]o make such freeze... order
anteceded by a judicial proceeding with notice to the account holder would allow for or
lead to the dissipation of such funds even before the order could be issued."
A freeze order, however, cannot be issued for an indefinite period
A freeze order is an extraordinary and interim relief
The primary objective of a freeze order is to temporarily preserve monetary instruments
or property that are in any way related to an unlawful activity or money laundering, by
preventing the owner from utilizing them... during the duration of the freeze order.[39]
The relief is pre-emptive in character, meant to prevent the owner from disposing his
property and thwarting the State's effort in building its case and eventually filing civil
forfeiture proceedings... and/or prosecuting the owner.
Our examination of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, as amended, from the point
of view of the freeze order that it authorizes, shows that the law is silent on the
maximum period of time that the freeze order can be extended by the CA.
As correctly noted by the petitioners, a freeze order is meant to have a temporary effect;
it was never intended to supplant or replace the actual forfeiture cases where the
provisional remedy - which means, the remedy is an adjunct of or an incident to the
main action of asking... for the issuance of an asset preservation order from the court
where the petition is filed is precisely available. For emphasis, a freeze order is both a
preservatory and preemptive remedy.
To stress, the evils caused by the law's silence on the freeze order's period of
effectivity[46] compelled this Court to issue the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases.
Specifically, the Court fixed the maximum allowable extension on the freeze order's...
effectivity at six months. In doing so, the Court sought to balance the State's interest in
going after suspected money launderers with an individual's constitutionally-protected
right not to be deprived of his property without due process of law, as well as to be
presumed... innocent until proven guilty.
We are not unmindful that the State itself is entitled to due process. As a due process
concern, we do not say that the six-month period is an inflexible rule that would result in
the automatic lifting of the freeze order upon its expiration in all instances. An...
inflexible rule may lend itself to abuse - to the prejudice of the State's legitimate
interests - where the property owner would simply file numerous suits, questioning the
freeze order during the six-month extension period, to prevent the timely filing of a
money laundering or... civil forfeiture case within this period. With the limited resources
that our government prosecutors and investigators have at their disposal, the end-result
of an inflexible rule is not difficult to see.
Thus, as a rule, the effectivity of a freeze order may be extended by the CA for a period
not exceeding six months. Before or upon the lapse of this period, ideally, the Republic
should have already filed a case for civil forfeiture against the property owner with the
proper... courts and accordingly secure an asset preservation order or it should have
filed the necessary information.[47] Otherwise, the property owner should already be
able to fully enjoy his property without any legal process affecting it. However, should...
it become completely necessary for the Republic to further extend the duration of the
freeze order, it should file the necessary motion before the expiration of the six-month
period and explain the reason or reasons for its failure to file an appropriate case and
justify the... period of extension sought. The freeze order should remain effective prior to
the resolution by the CA, which is hereby directed to resolve this kind of motion for
extension with reasonable dispatch.
In the present case, we note that the Republic has not offered any explanation why it
took six years (from the time it secured a freeze order) before a civil forfeiture case was
filed in court, despite the clear tenor of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases allowing the
extension... of a freeze order for only a period of six months. All the Republic could
proffer is its temporal argument on the inapplicability of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture
Cases; in effect, it glossed over the squarely-raised issue of due process. Under these
circumstances, we cannot but... conclude that the continued ext... ension of the freeze
order beyond the six-month period violated the Ligots' right to due process; thus, the CA
decision should be reversed.
Principles:
Procedural aspect
Certiorari not proper remedy to assail freeze order; exception
Section 57 of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases explicitly provides the remedy available
in cases involving freeze orders issued by the CA:
Section 57. Appeal. - Any party aggrieved by the decision or ruling of the court may
appeal to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. The appeal shall not stay the enforcement of the subject decision... or
final order unless the Supreme Court directs otherwise.
From this provision, it is apparent that the petitioners should have filed a petition for
review on certiorari, and not a petition for certiorari, to assail the CA resolution which
extended the effectivity period of the freeze order over their properties.
Even assuming that a petition for certiorari is available to the petitioners, a review of
their petition shows that the issues they raise (i.e., existence of probable cause to
support the freeze order; the applicability of the 6-month limit to the extension of
freeze... orders embodied in the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture) pertain
to errors of judgment allegedly committed by the CA, which fall outside the Court's
limited jurisdiction when resolving certiorari petitions.
Clearly, the Ligots should have filed a petition for review on certiorari, and not what is
effectively a second motion for reconsideration
SEC. 28. Precedence of proceedings. - Any criminal case relating to an unlawful activity
shall be given precedence over the prosecution of any offense or violation under
Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, without prejudice to the filing of a separate...
petition for civil forfeiture or the issuance of an asset preservation order or a freeze
order. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. [italics
supplied; emphases ours]
Section 10 of RA No. 9160 (allowing the extension of the freeze order) and Section 28
(allowing a separate petition for the issuance of a freeze order to proceed
independently) of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases are only consistent with the very
purpose of the freeze order,... which specifically is to give the government the
necessary time to prepare its case and to file the appropriate charges without having to
worry about the possible dissipation of the assets that are in any way related to the
suspected illegal activity.

Catacutan v. People
FACTS
Private complainant Georgito Posesano was an Instructor II with Salary Grade 13 while private
complainant Magdalena Divinagracia was an Education Program Specialist II with Salary Grade
16, both at the Surigao del Norte School of Arts and Trades (SNSAT). The Commission on Higher
Education (CHED) Caraga Administrative Region, appointed and promoted private complainants
as Vocational Instruction Supervisor III with Salary Grade 18 at SNSAT. These promotional
appointments were duly approved and attested as permanent by the Civil Service Commission
(CSC).  Being then the Officer-in-Charge of SNSAT, the approved appointments were formally
transmitted to the petitioner copy furnished the concerned appointees. Despite receipt of the
appointment letter, the private complainants were not able to assume their new position since
petitioner made known that he strongly opposed their appointments and that he would not
implement them despite written orders from CHED and the CSC. Thus, private complainants
lodged a formal complaint against petitioner for grave abuse of authority and disrespect of
lawful orders before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao.  For his defense, petitioner
admitted that he did not implement the promotional appointments of the private complainants
because of some procedural lapses or infirmities attending the preparation of the appointment
papers. According to him, the appointment papers were prepared by SNSAT Administrative
Officer, Crispin Noguera, using blank forms bearing the letterhead of SNSAT and not of the
CHED Regional Office who made the appointments. He also averred that the appointment
papers cited the entire plantilla instead of only the particular page on which the vacant item
occurs. He likewise claimed that he received only the duplicate copies of the appointments
contrary to the usual procedure where the original appointment papers and other supporting
documents are returned to his office. Finally, he asserted that the transmittal letter from the
CHED did not specify the date of effectivity of the appointments. Petitioner alleged that his
refusal to implement the appointments of the private complainants was not motivated by bad
faith but he just wanted to protect the interest of the government by following strict
compliance in the preparation of appointment papers. The RTC rendered its Decision holding
that the act of the petitioner in defying the orders of the CHED and the CSC to implement the
subject promotional appointments despite the rejection of his opposition, demonstrates his
palpable and patent fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious
wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.  On appeal, petitioner’s conviction was
affirmed in toto by the Sandiganbayan. The appellate court ruled that the Decision of the trial
court, being supported by evidence and firmly anchored in law and jurisprudence, is correct. It
held that petitioner failed to show that the trial court committed any reversible error in
judgment.
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Invoking the constitutional provision on due process,  petitioner argues that the Decision
rendered by the trial court is flawed and is grossly violative of his right to be heard and to
present evidence. He contends that he was not able to controvert the findings of the trial court
since he was not able to present the Court of Appeals’ (CA’s) Decision which denied the
administrative case filed against him and declared that his intention in refusing to implement
the promotions of the private complainants falls short of malice or wrongful intent.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner’s constitutional rights  to due process and equal protection of the law 
were violated when he was denied the opportunity to present in evidence the Court of Appeals’
Decision dated April 18, 2001
HELD
The petition lacks of merit. Petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process. Petitioner
can hardly claim denial of his fundamental right to due process. Records show that petitioner
was able to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, argue his case vigorously,
and explain the merits of his defense. To reiterate, as long as a party was given the opportunity
to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law
for the opportunity to be heard is the better accepted norm of procedural due process.  There
is also no denial of due process when the trial court did not allow petitioner to introduce as
evidence the CA Decision. It is well within the court’s discretion to reject the presentation of
evidence which it judiciously believes irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding on hand.
This is specially true when the evidence sought to be presented in a criminal proceeding as in
this case, concerns an administrative matter. The findings in administrative cases are not
binding upon the court trying a criminal case, even if the criminal proceedings are based on the
same facts and incidents which gave rise to the administrative matter. The dismissal of a
criminal case does not foreclose administrative action or necessarily gives the accused a clean
bill of health in all respects. In the same way, the dismissal of an administrative case does not
operate to terminate a criminal proceeding with the same subject matter.
At any rate, even assuming that the trial court erroneously rejected the introduction as
evidence of the CA Decision, petitioner is not left without legal recourse. Petitioner could have
availed of the remedy provided in Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court (cite the codal
provision).
As observed by the appellate court, if the petitioner is keen on having the RTC admit the CA’s
Decision for whatever it may be worth, he could have included the same in his offer of exhibits.
If an exhibit sought to be presented in evidence is rejected, the party producing it should ask
the court’s permission to have the exhibit attached to the record.
Rule 133 Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
Romualdez v. Commission on Elections WALA
Kabataan Party list, et. al. v. Commission on Elections

FACTS:

                RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory

biometrics registration system for new voters in order to establish a clean, complete,
permanent, and updated list of voters through the adoption of biometric technology.

                RA 10367 likewise directs that “registered voters whose biometrics have not

been captured shall submit themselves for validation.” “Voters who fail to submit for
validation on or before the last day of filing of application for registration for purposes
of the May 2016 elections shall be deactivated x  x x.”

                COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721 as amended by Resolutions No. 9863
and 10013. Among others, the said Resolution provides that: “the registration records of
voters without biometrics data who failed to submit for validation on or before the last
day of filing of applications for registration for the purpose of the May 9, 2016 National
and Local Elections shall be deactivated.

 
                 Herein petitioners filed the instant petition with application for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI)
assailing the constitutionality of the biometrics validation requirement imposed under
RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related
thereto.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the statutory requirement of biometrics validation is an

unconstitutional requirement of literacy and property.
2. Whether or not biometrics validation passes the strict scrutiny test.
3. Whether or not Resolution No. 9863 which fixed the deadline for validation on
October 31, 2015 violates Section 8 of RA 8189.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

                The Court held that biometrics validation is not a “qualification” to the exercise
of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the
State has the right to reasonably regulate.

                The Court reiterated their ruling in several cases that registration regulates the
exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right. The process
of registration is a procedural limitation on the right to vote.

                Thus, although one is deemed to be a “qualified elector,” he must nonetheless

still comply with the registration procedure in order to vote.

                Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a

literacy, property or other substantive requirement as contemplated by the Framers of
the Constitution -that is, one which propagates a socio-economic standard which is
bereft of any rational basis to a person’s ability to intelligently cast his vote and to
further the public good -the same cannot be struck down as unconstitutional, as in this
case.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

                In applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather
than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for
achieving that interest, and the burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.
Presence of compelling state interest

                Respondents have shown that the biometrics validation requirement under RA
10367 advances a compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to facilitate the
conduct of orderly, honest, and credible elections by containing -if not eliminating, the
perennial problem of having flying voters, as well as dead and multiple registrants. The
foregoing consideration is unquestionably a compelling state interest.

Biometrics validation is the least restrictive means for achieving the above-
said interest

                Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure for biometrics validation,
whereby the registered voter is only required to: (a) personally appear before the Office
of the Election Officer; (b) present a competent evidence of identity; and (c) have his
photo, signature, and fingerprints recorded.

                Moreover, RA 10367 and Resolution No. 9721 did not

mandate registered voters to submit themselves to validation every time there is an
election. In fact, it only required the voter to undergo the validation process one (1)
time, which shall remain effective in succeeding elections, provided that he remains
an active voter.

                Lastly, the failure to validate did not preclude deactivated voters from
exercising their right to vote in the succeeding elections. To rectify such status, they
could still apply for reactivation.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

                Section 8 of RA 8189 provides that:

System of Continuing Registration of Voters. – x x x No registration shall, however, be

conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before
a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.

                The Court held that the 120-and 90-day periods stated therein refer to the
prohibitive period beyond which voter registration may no longer be conducted. The
subject provision does not mandate COMELEC to conduct voter registration up to such
time; rather, it only provides a period which may not be reduced, but may be extended
depending on the administrative necessities and other exigencies.

GIL G. CAWAD v. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, GR No. 207145, 2015-07-28

Facts:
On March 26, 1992, Republic Act (RA) No. 7305, otherwise known as The Magna Carta
of Public Health Workers was signed into law in order to promote the social and
economic well-being of health workers, their living and working conditions and terms of
employment, to develop their skills and capabilities to be better equipped to deliver
health projects and programs, and to encourage those with proper qualifications and
excellent abilities to join and remain in government service.
public health workers (PHWs) were granted the following allowances and benefits,...
Section 20. Additional Compensation.
Section 21. Hazard Allowance
Section 22. Subsistence Allowance
Section 23. Longevity Pay.
Pursuant to Section 35[5] of the Magna Carta, the Secretary of Health promulgated its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) in July 1992. Thereafter, in November 1999,
the DOH, in collaboration with various government agencies and health workers'
organizations, promulgated a Revised IRR consolidating all additional and clarificatory
rules issued by the former Secretaries of Health dating back from the effectivity of the
Magna Carta.
On July 28, 2008, the Fourteenth Congress issued Joint Resolution No. 4, entitled Joint
Resolution Authorizing the President of the Philippines to Modify the Compensation and
Position Classification System of Civilian Personnel and the Base Pay Schedule of
Military and Uniformed Personnel in the Government, and for other Purposes, approved
by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on June 17, 2009, which provided for
certain amendments in the Magna Carta and its [Link] September 3, 2012,
respondents DBM and CSC issued one of the two assailed issuances, DBM-CSC Joint
Circular No. 1, Series of 2012, to prescribe the rules on the grant of Step Increments
due to meritorious performance and Step Increment due to length of service.
hortly thereafter, on November 29, 2012, respondents DBM and DOH then circulated
the other assailed issuance, DBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012
In a letter[9] dated January 23, 2013 addressed to respondents Secretary of Budget and
Management and Secretary of Health, petitioners expressed their opposition to the Joint
Circular cited above on the ground that the same diminishes the benefits granted by the
Magna Carta to PHWs.
Issues:
WHETHER RESPONDENTS' ISSUANCE OF DBM-DOH JOINT CIRCULAR NO. 1, S.
2012 IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING AN UNDUE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER
DBM-DOH Joint Circular is null and void for its failure to comply with Section 35[23] of
RA No. 7305
Ruling:

Perez v. PT&T
FACTS:

Petitioners Felix B. Perez and Amante G. Doria were employed by respondent Philippine
Telegraph and Telephone Company (PT&T) as shipping clerk and supervisor, respectively, in
PT&T’s Shipping Section, Materials Management Group. Acting on an alleged unsigned letter
regarding anomalous transactions at the Shipping Section, respondents formed a special audit
team to investigate the matter. It was discovered that the Shipping Section jacked up the value of
the freight costs for goods shipped and that the duplicates of the shipping documents allegedly
showed traces of tampering, alteration and superimposition.
Petitioners were placed on preventive suspension for 30 days for their alleged involvement in the
anomaly. Their suspension was extended for 15 days twice. Then in a Memorandum, petitioners
were dismissed from the service for having falsified company documents. Petitioners filed a
complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal alleging that they were dismissed on
November 8, 1993, the date they received the above-mentioned memorandum.
LA favored petitioners. NLRC reversed the decision of LA. Petitioners appealed to CA.  CA
affirmed the NLRC decision insofar as petitioners’ illegal suspension for 15 days and dismissal
for just cause were concerned. However, it found that petitioners were dismissed without due
process. Petitioners now seek a reversal of the CA decision before the SC. They contend that
there was no just cause for their dismissal, that they were not accorded due process and that they
were illegally suspended for 30 days.
 

ISSUE:

Whether respondents were dismissed for just cause and with the observance of due process.
 

RULING:

1. Respondents’ evidence is insufficient to clearly and convincingly establish the facts from
which the loss of confidence resulted.  Other than their bare allegations and the fact that such
documents came into petitioners’ hands at some point, respondents should have provided
evidence of petitioners’ functions, the extent of their duties, the procedure in the handling
and approval of shipping requests and the fact that no personnel other than petitioners were
involved. The alterations on the shipping documents could not reasonably be attributed to
petitioners because it was never proven that petitioners alone had control of or access to
these documents.
Willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative is a just cause for termination. However, loss of confidence should not be
simulated. It should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or
unjustified. Loss of confidence may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming
evidence to the contrary. It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify an earlier action
taken in bad faith.
The burden of proof rests on the employer to establish that the dismissal is for cause in view of
the security of tenure that employees enjoy under the Constitution and the Labor Code. The
employer’s evidence must clearly and convincingly show the facts on which the loss of
confidence in the employee may be fairly made to rest. It must be adequately proven by
substantial evidence. Respondents failed to discharge this burden.
Respondents’ illegal act of dismissing petitioners was aggravated by their failure to observe due
process. To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal of an employee, an employer
must furnish the worker with 2 written notices: (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for
termination and giving to said employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2)
another written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds have
been established to justify the employer’s decision to dismiss the employee.
  Petitioners were neither apprised of the charges against them nor given a chance to defend
themselves. They were simply and arbitrarily separated from work and served notices of
termination in total disregard of their rights to due process and security of tenure. Respondents
failed to comply with the two-notice requirement for terminating employees.
We note a marked difference in the standards of due process to be followed as prescribed in the
Labor Code and its implementing rules. The Labor Code provides that an employer must provide
the employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative if he so desires. 
The omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code, on the other hand, require a hearing and
conference during which the employee concerned is given the opportunity to respond to the
charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him. 
In case of conflict, the law prevails over the administrative regulations implementing it. The
authority to promulgate implementing rules proceeds from the law itself.  To be valid, a rule or
regulation must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute. As
such, it cannot amend the law either by abridging or expanding its scope.
Article 277(b) of the Labor Code provides that, in cases of termination for a just cause, an
employee must be given “ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.” Thus, the
opportunity to be heard afforded by law to the employee is qualified by the word “ample” which
ordinarily means “considerably more than adequate or sufficient.” In this regard, the phrase
“ample opportunity to be heard” can be reasonably interpreted as extensive enough to cover
actual hearing or conference. To this extent, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of
Book VI of the Labor Code is in conformity with Article 277(b).
Nonetheless, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code
should not be taken to mean that holding an actual hearing or conference is a condition sine qua
non for compliance with the due process requirement in termination of employment. The test for
the fair procedure guaranteed under Article 277(b) cannot be whether there has been a formal
pretermination confrontation between the employer and the employee. The “ample opportunity
to be heard” standard is neither synonymous nor similar to a formal hearing.
The standard for the hearing requirement, ample opportunity, is couched in general language
revealing the legislative intent to give some degree of flexibility or adaptability to meet the
peculiarities of a given situation. To confine it to a single rigid proceeding such as a formal
hearing will defeat its spirit.
Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code itself provides that
the so-called standards of due process outlined therein shall be observed “substantially,” not
strictly. This is a recognition that while a formal hearing or conference is ideal, it is not an
absolute, mandatory or exclusive avenue of due process.
A hearing means that a party should be given a chance to adduce his evidence to support his side
of the case and that the evidence should be taken into account in the adjudication of the
controversy. “To be heard” does not mean verbal argumentation alone inasmuch as one may be
heard just as effectively through written explanations, submissions or pleadings. Therefore,
while the phrase “ample opportunity to be heard” may in fact include an actual hearing, it is not
limited to a formal hearing only. The existence of an actual, formal “trial-type” hearing, although
preferred, is not absolutely necessary to satisfy the employee’s right to be heard.
  Due process of law simply means giving opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered.
In fact, there is no violation of due process even if no hearing was conducted, where the party
was given a chance to explain his side of the controversy. What is frowned upon is the denial of
the opportunity to be heard. Twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential
elements of due process in the dismissal of employees. It is deemed sufficient for the employer
to follow the natural sequence of notice, hearing and judgment.
In sum, the following are the guiding principles in connection with the hearing requirement in
dismissal cases:
(a) “ample opportunity to be heard” means any meaningful opportunity (verbal or written) given
to the employee to answer the charges against him and submit evidence in support of his defense,
whether in a hearing, conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way.
(b) a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when requested by the employee in
writing or substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company rule or practice requires it, or when
similar circumstances justify it.
(c) the “ample opportunity to be heard” standard in the Labor Code prevails over the “hearing or
conference” requirement in the implementing rules and regulations.
On the other hand, an employee may be validly suspended by the employer for just cause
provided by law. Such suspension shall only be for a period of 30 days, after which the employee
shall either be reinstated or paid his wages during the extended period.
Where the dismissal was without just or authorized cause and there was no due process, Article
279 of the Labor Code mandates that the employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time the compensation was not paid up
to the time of actual reinstatement. In this case, however, reinstatement is no longer possible
because of the length of time that has passed from the date of the incident to final resolution. 14
years have transpired from the time petitioners were wrongfully dismissed. To order
reinstatement at this juncture will no longer serve any prudent or practical purpose. So
petitioners will just be paid their separation pay.
Petition is hereby GRANTED.

Villavicencio v. Lukban

Facts:
The primary... question is Shall the judiciary permit a government of men instead of a
government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban,... Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo
Lukban... best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the... segregated district for
women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of
ikanila, closed.
for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the... segregated district for
women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of
ikanila, closed.
the women were kept... the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by
the police.
omen were kept confined to t... their h... ir houses in the district by the police.
city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the
women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers;... city authorities quietly perfected
arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as
laborers... police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann
and the Mayor... descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol
wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that... awaited their arrival... women
were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the
impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation... had no
knowledge
They had... not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither
directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were
received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a
detachment of Constabulary... soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling
passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.
October 29
The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial
governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Ynigo and Rafael Castillo.
Issues:
The primary... question is Shall the judiciary permit a government of men instead of a
government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?
Ruling:

The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus
100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief
executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen
and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend
his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint
and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the
court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has
inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has
illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why
the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law,
could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily
have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of
process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change
her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her
birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily
evaded.

People v. Nazario
Facts:
was charged with violation of certain municipal ordinances of the municipal council of
Pagbilao, in Quezon... is charged of the crime of Violation of Municipal Ordinance... he
owner and operator of a fishpond... refuse and fail to pay the municipal taxes in the total
amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTY TWO CENTAVOS
(P362.62), required of him as fishpond operator
EUSEBIO NAZARIO
For the defense the accused EUSEBIO NAZARIO
I have lived in Sta. Mesa, Manila,... I never resided at Pagbilao, Quezon. I do not own a
house at
Pagbilao. I am a lessee of a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon, and I have a lease
agreement to that effect with the Philippine Fisheries Commission
I requested an inspection of... my fishpond to determine its condition as it was not then
in operation. The Municipal Treasurer Alvarez went there once in 1967 and he found
that it was destroyed by the typhoon and there were pictures taken
I did not pay because up to now I do not know whether I am covered by the Ordinance
or not.
prosecution would want to show to the court that the accused, as lessee or operator of a
fishpond in the municipality of Pagbilao, refused, and still refuses, to pay the municipal
taxes for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, i
, the accused, by his evidence, tends to show to the court that the taxes sought to be
collected have already lapsed and that there is no law empowering municipalities to
pass ordinances taxing fishpond operators. The defense, by their evidence, tried to
show... further that, as lessee of a forest land to be converted into a fishpond, he is not
covered by said municipal ordinances; and finally that the accused should not be taxed
as fishpond operator because there is no fishpond yet being operated by him,
considering that the supposed... fishpond was under construction during the period
covered by the taxes sought to be collected.
defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ultra vires as it is outside of the power
of the municipal council of Pagbilao, Quezon, to enact; and that the defendant claims
that the ordinance in question is ambiguous and uncertain.
There is no question from the evidences presented that the accused is a lessee of a
parcel of forest land, with an area of 27.1998 hectares, for fishpond purposes, under
Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 1066, entered into by the accused and the government,
through the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources on August 21, 1959.
here is no question from the evidences presented that the 27.1998 hectares of land
leased by the defendant from the government for fishpond purposes was actually
converted into fishpond and used as such, and therefore defendant is an operator of a
fishpond within the purview... of the ordinance in question.[... trial court[2] returned a
verdict of guilty and disposed as follow... the crime of violation of Municipal Ordinance
The ordinances in question are Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, Ordinance No. 12,
series of 1965, and Ordinance No. 15, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of
Pagbilao.
Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao shall
pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare
Issues:
The first objection refers to the ordinances being allegedly "ambiguous and uncertain."[
Ruling:
he petitioner contends that being a mere lessee of the fishpond, he is not covered since
the said ordinances speak of "owner or manager." He likewise maintains that... they are
vague insofar as they reckon the date of payment: Whereas Ordinance No. 4 provides
that parties shall commence payment "after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the
date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries,"[9] Ordinance
No. 12 states that liability for the tax accrues "beginning and taking effect from the year
1964 if the fishpond started operating before the year 196... that
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application."[11] It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1)... it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government...
muscle.
But the act must be utterly vague on its face, t... hus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati,[12]
the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for
"three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a
manner annoying to persons passing by."[13] Clearly, the ordinance imposed no
standard at all "because one may never know in advance what 'annoys some people
but does not... annoy others.'"[14]... construction
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a "perfectly vague"[15] act whose
obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from legislation
couched in imprecise language -- but which nonetheless specifies a standard though...
defectively phrased -- in which case, it may be "saved" by proper construction.
operator
In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. It
is unmistakable from their very provisions that the appellant falls within its coverage. As
the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term "manager". He does not
deny the... fact that he financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish fries
into the fishponds, and had employed laborers to maintain them.[31] While it appears
that it is the National Government which owns them,[32] the Government... never
shared in the profits they had generated. It is therefore only logical that he shoulders the
burden of tax under the said ordinances.
to... is
Suffice it to say that as the actual operator of the fishponds in question, and as the
recipient of profits brought about by the business, the appellant is clearly liable for the
municipal taxes in question. He cannot say that he did not have a fair notice of such a
liability to... make such ordinances vague.
Neither are the said ordinances vague as to dates of payment. There is no merit to the
claim that "the imposition of tax has to depend upon an uncertain date yet to be
determined (three years after the 'approval of the fishpond' by the Bureau of Fisheries,
and upon an uncertain... event (if the fishpond started operating before 1964), also to be
determined by an uncertain individual or individuals."[34] Ordinance No. 15, in making
the tax payable "after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is
approved by... the Bureau of Fisheries,"[35] is unequivocal about the date of payment,
and its amendment by Ordinance No. 12, reckoning liability thereunder "beginning and
taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating before the year
1964,"[36] does not give rise to any ambiguity. In either case, the dates of payment
have been definitely established. The fact that the appellant has been allegedly
uncertain about the reckoning dates -- as far as his liability for the years 1964, 1965,
and 1966 is... concerned -- presents a mere problem in computation, but it does not
make the ordinances vague.
As it stands, then, liability for the tax accrues on January 1, 1964 for fishponds in
operation prior thereto (Ordinance No. 12), and for new fishponds, three years after
their approval by the Bureau of Fisheries (Ordinance No. 15). This is so since the
amendatory act (Ordinance
No. 12) merely granted amnesty unto old, delinquent fishpond operators. It did not
repeal its mother ordinances (Nos. 4 and 15). With respect to new operators, Ordinance
No. 15 should still prevail.
To the Court, the ordinances in question set forth enough standards that clarify
imagined ambiguities.
While such standards are not apparent from the face thereof, they are visible from the
intent of the said ordinances.
The next inquiry is whether or not they can be said to be ex post facto measures. The
appellant argues that they are: "Amendment No. 12 passed on September 19, 1966,
clearly provides that the payment of the imposed tax shall 'beginning and taking effect
from the year
1964, if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964.' In other words, it penalizes
acts or events occurring before its passage, that is to say, 1964 and even prior
thereto."[37]
The Court finds no merit in this contention. As the Solicitor General notes, "Municipal
Ordinance No. 4 was passed on May 14, 1955."[38] Hence, it cannot be said that the
amendment (under Ordinance No. 12) is being made to apply retroactively (to 1964)...
since the reckoning period is 1955 (date of enactment). Essentially, Ordinances Nos. 12
and 15 are in the nature of curative measures intended to facilitate and enhance the
collection of revenues the original act, Ordinance No. 4, had prescribed.[39]
Moreover, the act (of non-payment of the tax), had been, since 1955, made punishable,
and it cannot be said that Ordinance No. 12 imposes a retroactive penalty. As we have
noted, it operates to grant amnesty to operators who had been delinquent between
1955 and 1964. It... does not mete out a penalty, much less, a retrospective one.
The appellant assails, finally, the power of the municipal council of Pagbilao to tax
"public forest lands".[40] In Golden Ribbon Lumber Co., Inc. v. City of Butuan,[41] we
held that local governments' taxing power does not... extend to forest products or
concessions under Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Act then in force.
(Republic Act No. 2264 likewise prohibited municipalities from imposing percentage
taxes on sales.)
First of all, the tax in question is not a tax on property, although the rate thereof is based
on the area of fishponds ("P3.00 per hectare"[42]). Secondly, fishponds are not forest
lands, although we have held them to the agricultural lands.[43] By definition, "forest" is
"a large tract of land covered with a natural growth of trees and underbrush; a large
wood."[44] (Accordingly, even if the challenged taxes were directed on the fishponds,
they would not have been taxes on forest... products.)
They are, more accurately, privilege taxes on the business of fishpond maintenance.
They are not charged against sales, which would have offended the doctrine enshrined
by Golden Ribbon Lumber,[45] but rather on occupation, which is allowed under
Republic Act No. 2264.[46] They are what have been classified as fixed annual taxes
and this is obvious from the ordinances themselves.
There is, then, no merit in the last objection

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion
FACTS:

On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1069
"Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a
Foreign Country".

On 13 November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the

Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty
Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United
States of America.

The Senate, by way of Resolution 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of the said
treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a),
Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition request
upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident
in the Requesting State).

On 18 June 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.
S. Note Verbale 0522 containing a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United
States.

Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by
the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said
extradition.

 Jimenez was charged in the United States for violation of

(a) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States, 2 counts),
(b) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts),
(c) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts),
(d) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries, 6 counts), and
(E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts).
On the same day, the Secretary issued Department Order 249 designating and authorizing a
panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case.

Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez (on 1 July 1999
requested copies of the official extradition request from the US Government, as well as all
documents and papers submitted therewith, and that he be given ample time to comment on
 the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. The Secretary denied
the request.

On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition against the Secretary of
Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation,
for mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez the extradition documents, to
give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the
extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively);
certiorari (to set aside the Justice Secretary’s letter dated 13 July 1999); and prohibition (to
restrain the Justice Secretary from considering the extradition request and from filing an
extradition petition in court;
and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act
directed to the extradition of Jimenez to the United States), with an application for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction.

The trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court.

On 18 January 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered
the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies of the,extradition request and its supporting
papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting
evidence.

IN SUMMARY:
The Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request from the
United States for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States pursuant to PD No. 1609
prescribing the procedure for extradition of persons who have committed a crime in a foreign
country. Jimenez requested for copies of the request and that he be given ample time to
comment on said request. The petitioners denied the request pursuant to the RP-US Extradition
Treaty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the
RP-US Extradition Treaty.

HELD:

NO. The human rights of person and the rights of the accused guaranteed in the Constitution
should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting party, the doctrine of
incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with a situation where
there is a conflict between a rule of the international law and the constitution. Efforts must first
be made in order to harmonize the provisions so as to give effect to both but if the conflict is
irreconcilable, the municipal law must be upheld. The fact that international law has been made
part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over
the municipal law in the municipal sphere. In states where the constitution is the highest law of
the land, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the
constitution.

In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of
property or employment but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible
banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioners favorable action on the
extradition request and the deprivation of private respondents liberty is easily comprehensible.

We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as
"justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory
law or judicial [Link] constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for
"justice outside legality," since private respondents due process rights, although not
guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not
be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against
the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on
which our Constitution is premised.

Thus, Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and
its supporting 
Papers.
Tua v. Mangrobang
Facts:
respondent Rossana Honrado-Tua (respondent) filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Imus, Cavite a Verified Petition[2]  for herself and in behalf of her minor
children, Joshua Raphael, Jesse Ruth Lois, and Jezreel Abigail,... for the issuance of a
protection order, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9262... against her husband, petitioner
Ralph Tua.
the RTC issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO),... In his Comment[6] to
respondent's Petition with Urgent Motion to Lift TPO, petitioner denied respondent's
allegations
Petitioner contended that the issuance of the TPO on May 23, 2005 is unconstitutional
for being violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.
Without awaiting for the resolution of  his Comment on the petition and motion to   lift
TPO,  petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order... and preliminary
injunction and hold departure order assailing the  May 23, 2005 TPO issued by the
RTC.
the CA, in order not to render the petition moot and to avoid grave and irreparable
injury, issued a temporary restraining order
Petitioner later filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
with Manifestation,[8] praying that the enforcement of  all orders, decision to be issued
by the RTC and all the proceedings therein be restrained.
the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit
The CA found that the TPO dated May 23, 2005 was validly issued by the RTC and
found no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance thereof as the same were in
complete accord with the provision of  RA 9262.
Petitioner assails that the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the TPO dated May 23, 2005 as the petition was bereft of any
indication of grounds for the issuance of the same.
Issues:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WITH DUE RESPECT SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN HOLDING AND FINDING IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED RULES
AND JURISPRUDENCE THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED NO GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN THE LATTER ISSUED THE TEMPORARY
PROTECTIVE ORDER (TPO) DATED 23
MAY 2005 WITHOUT OBSERVING DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND
CONSIDERATIONS OF JUSTICE AND BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS.
Ruling:
We are not persuaded.
SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs)
refers to the protection order issued by the court on the date of filing of the application
after ex parte determination that such order should be issued. A court may grant in a
TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty
(30) days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on
the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal
service of the
TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law
enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the
hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.
Clearly, the court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the filing of the application
after ex parte determination that there is basis for the issuance thereof.  Ex parte means
that the respondent need not be notified or be present in the hearing for... the issuance
of the TPO.  Thus, it is within the court's discretion, based on the petition and the
affidavit attached thereto, to determine that the violent acts against women and their
children for the issuance of a TPO have been committed.
In this case, the alleged acts of petitioner among others, i.e., he cocked the gun and
pointed the same to his head in order to convince respondent not to proceed with the
legal separation case; feeding his other children with the food which another child  spat
out;... and threatening the crying child with a belt to stop him from crying which was
repeatedly done; and holding respondent by her nape when he got furious that she was
asking him not to come often to their conjugal home and hold office thereat after their
agreed separation and... threatening her of withholding half of the financial support for
the kids, while not conclusive, are enough bases for the issuance of a TPO.  Petitioner's
actions would fall under the enumeration of Section 5, more particularly, paragraphs a,
d, e (2), f, h, and i.
It is settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion when there is a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal... hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.[18]  We find that the CA did not err when it found no grave...
abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in the issuance of the TPO.
Republic of the Philippines v. Manalo WALA