Republic Flour Mills, Inc.

vs Commissioner of ISSUE: WON such collection of wharfage dues

FACTS: RULING:

From December 1963 to July 1964, Republic As stated on the Section 2802 of the Tariff and
Flour Mills (petitioner) exported Pollard and/or Custom Code, "There shall be levied, collected
bran which was loaded from lighters alongside and paid on all articles imported or brought into
vessels engaged in foreign trade while anchored the Philippines, and on products of the
near the breakwater. The Commissioner of Philippines exported from the Philippines, a
Customs and The Court of Tax Appeals charge of two pesos per gross metric ton as a
(respondent) assessed the petitioner by way of fee for wharfage." appears to be quite precise.
wharfage dues on the said exportations in the Section 2802 refers to what is imported and
sum of P7,948.00, which assessment was paid exported.
by petitioner under protest
The objective of this act must be carried out.
In this case, Republic Flour Mills, Inc. would Even if there is doubt to the meaning of the
want the Court to interpret the words “products language employed, the interpretation should
of the Philippines” found in Section 2802 of the not be at war with the end sought to be
Tariff and Custom Code, as excluding bran (ipa) attained. If the petitioner were to prevail,
and pollard (darak) on the ground that, coming subsequent pleas motivated by the same desire
as they do from wheat grain which is imported to be excluded from the operation of the Tariff
in the Philippines, they are merely waste from and Customs Code would likewise be entitled to
the production of flour. Another main argument sympathetic consideration. It was desirable
of the petitioner is that no government or then that the gates to such efforts at unjustified
private wharves or government facilities were restriction of the coverage of the Act are kept
utilized in exporting such products. In that way, closed. Otherwise, the end result would be not
it would not be liable at all for the wharfage respect for, but defiance of, a clear legislative
dues assessed under such section by mandate
respondent Commission of Customs.
The decision of respondent Court of Tax
On the other hand, the stand of respondent Appeals of November 27, 1967 is affirmed with
Commissioner of Customs was that the costs against petitioner.
petitioner was liable for wharfage dues “upon
receipt or discharge of the exported goods by a
vessel engaged in foreign trade regardless of AGPALO Notes:
the non-use of government-owned or private
wharves.” Respondent Court of Tax Appeals “product of the Philippines” – any product
sustained the action taken by the Commissioner produced in the country, e.g. bran (ipa) &
of Customs under the appropriate provision of pollard (darak) produced from wheat imported
the Tariff and Customs Code. into the country are “products of the
Philippines”
ESCRA SYLLABUS: interpretation should not be at war with the
end sought to be attained. No undue reflection
Statutory construction; First and fundamental is needed to show that if through. an ingenious
duty of courts is to apply the law.—The first and argument, the scope of a statute may be
fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. contracted, the probability that other
Construction and interpretation come only after exceptions may be thought of is not remote. If
it has been demonstrated that application is petitioner were to prevail, subsequent pleas
impossible or inadequate without them. motivated by the same desire to be excluded
Petitioner ought to have been aware that from the operation of the Tariff and Customs
deference to such a doctrine precludes an Code would likewise be entitled to sympathetic
affirmative response to its contention. The law consideration. It is desirable then that the gates
is clear; it must be obeyed. It is as simple as to such efforts at undue restriction of the
that. coverage of the Act be kept closed. Otherwise,
Same; Reasonable interpretation is to be the end result would be not respect for, but
adopted.—There is need of confining familiar defiance of, a clear legislative mandate. That
language of a statute to its usual signification. kind of approach in statutory construction has
While statutory construction involves the never recommended itself. It does not now.
exercise of choice, the temptation to roam at
will and rely on one's predilection as to what
policy should prevail is to be resisted. The
search must be for a reasonable interpretation.
It is best to keep in mind the reminder from
Holmes that "there is no canon against using
common sense in construing laws as saying
what they obviously mean." To paraphrase
Frankfurter, interpolation must be eschewed
but evisceration avoided. Certainly, the utmost
effort should be exerted lest the interpretation
arrived at does violence to the statutory
language in its total context. It would be then to
ignore what has been stressed time and time
again as to the limits of judicial freedom in the
construction of statutes to accept the view
advanced by petitioner.

Same; Legislative intent must be respected.—