Examiners’ reports 2016

Examiners’ reports 2016

LA3019 Family law – Zone A

Introduction
Overall, there were some very good answers in this exam. Strong answers were
able to demonstrate not only knowledge of the law but also to apply it to the specific
question. For essay questions, this means identifying the issue the question is
raising and addressing it directly. For example, many candidates discussed the
concepts of void and voidable marriage for Q3, but did not always relate that
discussion to the issue of non-marriage as discussed in Hudson v Leigh. Essay
questions are directed toward a particular problem or controversy and only rarely
want candidates to describe the general state of the law. It is important to be able to
demonstrate knowledge of the law but we are also interested in your critical
assessment of it and your ability to spot the issue raised. Essay questions usually
raise or identify controversial issues and allow you to demonstrate your
understanding of the controversy.
For problem questions, while most candidates picked up on the issues to be
addressed, many answers lacked detail of analysis. Here is where you have the
chance to demonstrate your skills of legal analysis and good answers apply the law
to the facts of the case, identifying where there might be uncertainties. Problem
questions usually do not have clear answers; that is why they appear on exams!
Further, there were examples of candidates missing or misunderstanding the
significance of crucial factual information. It is good policy to assume that if a fact is
specified in a problem question, it is there for a reason.
For both essays and problem questions, you must use relevant authorities to
support your arguments. Remember, in a common law system, there will be cases
or legislation on most issues covered and knowledge of this authority is important.

Comments on specific questions

Question 1
What is the difference between the Law Commission’s recommendation on
‘qualifying nuptial agreements’ and the courts’ approach to prenuptial
agreements in and since the decision in Radmacher v Granatino (2010)?
Which approach do you prefer and why?
General remarks
The material for this question comes from 6.7.4 of the subject guide.
Here candidates were expected to explain the Radmacher decision and the
principles that emerged from it, including respect for autonomy, no need for legal
advice, although each party should have all material information and intend the

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agreement to be binding. The vitiating elements of contract law apply but also
undue pressure or unconscionable conduct falling short of duress might be enough
to reduce or eliminate the weight of the agreement. The agreement, however, could
never override the court’s overall discretion. Agreements would be given decisive
weight unless they are unfair. Was this decision a dramatic change in the law?
Candidates were then expected to explain the Law Commission’s recommendations
on these agreements. The Law Commission said that certain qualifying agreements
should always be binding and not subject to the court’s assessment of fairness in
regard to property adjustment but that an agreement could not bar an application to
meet needs. It gave time periods for when a qualifying agreement could be made
and disclosure of financial info and independent advice could not be waived.
Candidates were then expected to come to a reasoned conclusion about which
approach they prefer.
Law cases, reports and other references the examiners would expect you to
use
Although the question referred specifically to Radmacher, later cases such as Z v Z,
Kremen and Luckwell v Limata would help to make this answer stronger. Reference
to the Law Commission report was also necessary. This was a question asking you
to compare two approaches and so we needed to see what each approach entailed.
Common errors
Surprisingly, while most candidates showed a good understanding of Radmacher
and the case law, many did not show the same level of understanding of the Law
Commission’s proposals. Many candidates glossed over this part of the question.
A good answer to this question would…
explain clearly how the Radmacher decision was arrived at and, equally, how the
Law Commission arrived at its conclusions. Good answers would then go on to
compare and contrast the two approaches and come to a reasoned judgment about
which may be preferable and why.
Poor answers to this question…
simply set out the facts and reasons in Radmacher and did not address its
strengths and weaknesses. Many also did not discuss sufficiently the Law
Commission’s proposals.
Question 2
How does the court balance human rights and welfare considerations when it
is asked to dispense with a parent’s consent to the placement of a child for
adoption?
General remarks
Material for this question comes from 12.4 of the study guide.
The first thing this question is looking for is knowledge of the law on consent to
adoption placements and the court’s jurisdiction to dispense with that consent.
When can the court dispense with consent? In what circumstances has it done so?
Why are human rights issues raised at all? Which human rights issues are raised?
Why is a balance necessary between welfare and human rights?
Law cases, reports and other references the examiners would expect you to
use
Parental consent to adoption placement is in s.52 ACA 2002. The court can
dispense with it where the welfare of the child demands it. Recent cases have said
that the welfare consideration should, however, be subject to a human rights based
proportionality test. (Re B [2013] UKSC.) Placement against parents’ wishes,

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removing a child from parents permanently, should be made only where nothing
else will do. Students should also discuss Re B-S [2013] EWCA and cases
following it such as Re C [2013] EWCA and CM v Blackburn and Darwen BC [2014]
EWCA and assess how the welfare test works with the human rights-based
proportionality test.
Common errors
Many candidates failed to focus on the question of consent to placement and when
it can be dispensed with and wrote generally about adoption. Many mentioned the
Re B case but displayed lack of detail on how the court exercises its judgment.
A good answer to this question would…
be structured clearly to show knowledge of the law, understanding of why it raises
difficult issues and how the courts have tried to resolve the issues. A clear outline
and structure helps in questions like this where there are two concerns (here,
human rights and child welfare) that must be balanced.
Poor answers to this question…
displayed a lack of focus on the question and took it to mean: ‘tell me everything
you know about adoption’.
Question 3
Why have the courts developed the concept of non-marriage and how have
they defined the boundary between it and a marriage that is either valid or
void?
General remarks
Material for this question comes from 2.1 and 2.2.3 of the study guide. This
question is about the formalities of marriage and non-marriages. What are they?
How are non-marriages different from void or voidable marriages? Why has the
court ‘created’ them? It requires knowledge of the case law on validity of marriage
and an analysis of the differences between non-marriages and void marriages but,
importantly, it also requires some analysis of why the courts have developed the
concept of non-marriage.
Law cases, reports and other references the examiners would expect you to
use
Sections 25 and 49 Marriage Act 1949, s.11 MCA and cases such as Gereis v
Yagoub and Bath. The leading case on non-marriage is Hudson v Leigh and other
cases include MA v JA.
Common errors
Failing to show understanding of non-marriage and how it is different from void
marriage. Many students took this question to review ss.11 and 12 MCA without
discussing adequately the developing idea of non-marriage.
A good answer to this question would…
first discuss the different implications of a finding of non-marriage versus one of
void or voidable: primarily the ability to seek financial relief. It would then discuss
the formalities and intention required to find a marriage void and the confusion
sometimes caused by failing to comply with them; illustrated by cases such as
Gereis v Yagoub and Bath. It would discuss the leading case on non-marriage
Hudson v Leigh and others, such as MA v JA and, given the need for certainty,
question whether a line between void marriage and non-marriage is clear.
Strong answers would discuss why non-marriages might be found, such as in
difficult duress cases where the time limit has passed or in cases of forced
marriage, for example, as in B v I.

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Poor answers to this question…
simply reviewed each of the grounds for nullity. These did not gain many marks.
Question 4
Bob is four-years-old. He attends nursery school each weekday morning. One
of his nursery carers has expressed concern about unexplained serious
bruises on his body. His parents, Colin and Angie, both work full-time outside
the home and so employ a child-minder, Demi, who brings her own three-
year-old, Eldon, to their home each day when she cares for Bob.
The local authority is concerned about both Bob and Eldon. Although Eldon
shows no physical signs of harm, the Local Authority wishes to speak with
him and have him assessed but Demi refuses to make him available for
assessment. Colin and Angie deny harming Bob, refuse to have him seen by
a doctor and say they will sack Demi.
Advise the local authority.
General remarks
This question is about local authorities’ duties to children. It is about investigatory
orders available: child assessment orders and EPOs for both children. It is also
about the possibility of applying for a care or supervision order for each, the
threshold conditions and the welfare test. It requires an understanding of what the
local authority should do to ensure the children in these facts are protected and a
judgement about the likelihood of the LA obtaining any of the orders available to
them.
After outlining the possible investigatory orders, the issue re the care/supervision
order is with identification of the perpetrator of the harm suffered by Bob but the
Lancashire CC case says that if the perpetrator is within a pool that includes a child
minder the threshold has been made out and equally at the welfare stage, the
perpetrator does not have to be identified so long as he or she is within a pool of
possible perpetrators: Re O and N [2003]. The decision then is about what, if any
order is appropriate, considering the welfare stage and Re B UKSC. Re Eldon, the
issue of the unknown perpetrator is more difficult: the court cannot base a finding of
likelihood of future harm to Eldon on a possibility, i.e. that Demi is a possible
perpetrator of harm to Bob: Re S-B [2009] UKSC. But see Re J [2013] UKSC which
says that the fact that a carer is within a pool of possible perpetrators of harm to
one child may be a significant fact that together with other significant facts may be
sufficient for a finding of likelihood of significant harm to another child. What order, if
any, is appropriate for Eldon as we have no other evidence, without assessments,
of harm to him?
Law cases, reports and other references the examiners would expect you to
use
Section 47 CA re duty to investigate; ss.43 and 44 re evidence-seeking,
investigations where parents do not cooperate; s.31 threshold test and cases
mentioned above in interpreting it where the perpetrator of harm is unknown.
Common errors
There seemed to be much confusion about the applicability of Part 3 CA re
voluntary services. The s.17 duty to a child in need is not raised in this question;
here we are interested in Part 4 of the CA and the s.47 duty to a child at risk of
suffering significant harm. Further, many candidates were unsure of the role of s.43
and s.44 orders and said the LA could apply for them after it obtained a care order.
Finally, a surprising number of candidates did not discuss the threshold test at all
and simply said the LA could obtain an order, without explaining how or why they
thought so on these facts.

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A good answer to this question would…

demonstrate an understanding of the process the local authority must go through to
obtain an order, beginning from finding out the facts/assessing the children (s.43 or
s.44) and then analysing whether, on those facts, the threshold test could be made
out. If so, a good answer would form a judgement about what, if any, order is
appropriate.
Poor answers to this question…
did not discuss the threshold test at all and assumed on these facts that the LA
could simply ‘make’ any order it wished. Local authorities do not make orders. Only
the court can make an order.
Student extract
It is the local authority’s duty to investigate the situation at Bob and Eldon’s
house because of the reasonable cause that was seen by the bruising that
caused them to suspect that the child is suffering or is likely to suffer
significant harm according to s.47 CA.
…Since the LA do not have sufficient evidence of the care Bob is exposed to
at home, it is necessary that they conduct a child assessment order under
s.43. …The fact that C and A refuse to have him seen by a doctor may
suggest that they may not comply with the child assessment order. If they do
not, then an emergency protection order may be necessary. …Upon Bob
being assessed, if the LA realises that the harm is as a result of the care
given by the parents or child-minder they may have sufficient grounds to
apply to the courts for a care order. Firstly the threshold criteria should be
assessed (s.31(2)). As seen in the case of Re B. Based on the bruising the
LA can state that the child is suffering significant harm due to the care given.
…The LA would need to establish the link between the harm and the parents
or child minder. In this case, one is unaware of who is the perpetrator,
therefore according to the Lancashire case, a single perpetrator need not be
shown … and also according to Re S-B, all the LA needs to establish is a
pool of possible perpetrators being the child minder and the parents.
Furthermore, once the threshold is crossed one need to consider the welfare
checklist under s.1(3) CA. …
In relation to Eldon’s situation, even though Eldon shows no significant signs
it can be said that because Bob was harmed, Eldon may be likely to suffer
significant harm. However, the LA would need to prove that there is a ‘real
possibility’ that Eldon would suffer significant harm according to Re B. If upon
assessment, Eldon is suffering significant harm or there is a real possibility
that he would suffer harm if a care order is not made, the LA can apply for a
care order.
Comments on extract
This is an extract from a high 2:1 answer. It is clear this candidate understands the
workings of the orders available to the LA and the LA’s duties. He or she then spots
the unknown perpetrator issue for the threshold test for Bob and refers to relevant
case law. It is a bit weaker on Eldon’s case, even though it makes the good point
about likelihood of future harm needing to be a ‘real possibility’ and based on
proven facts before the court will make an order, it does not go further to talk about
how the court can find a real possibility of future harm in unknown perpetrator
cases.

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Question 5
Read the following scenarios and advise Jean and Kelly as to the remedies
available to each of them.
a) Jean is 22-years-old and has been married to Mike for two years.
When they married both Jean and Mike attended University, but
immediately after the marriage Mike insisted that Jean give up her
studies in order to focus upon starting a family. Jean reluctantly
agreed. Since then, Mike has become very jealous, distrustful,
overbearing and controlling in his behaviour towards Jean. He has
prevented her from obtaining employment or from engaging in
social activities outside the matrimonial home unless he
accompanies her. He monitors her telephone calls and computer
use and has installed CCTV cameras outside the house – ‘for
security’ he says. He meanwhile has continued with his course of
study and maintained a social life outside the home.
b) Kelly is 18-years-old. She has a three-month-old baby, Laura, by
Nick, to whom she is not married. Kelly and Nick spent three
months living together in a council flat and Kelly is now living there
with Andy, who is her new boyfriend, and baby Laura. Kelly is
frightened of Nick, who follows her about in the streets and who
says that she only got the flat because of baby Laura and so he is
as much entitled to live in it as she is. Nick has threatened Kelly
saying, ‘The next time I see you in the street I’m going to follow you
home and get into the flat. If you or Andy try and stop me you’ll be
sorry.’
General remarks
This question asked about possible remedies for domestic violence. It required
knowledge of possible criminal and civil remedies across a range of statutes and
case law. The facts did not present straightforward routes to follow, however, and
candidates needed to be clear about why they were advising each of these women
in the way they did.
Law cases, reports and other references the examiners would expect you to
use
Coercive control under the serious crime Act 2015; The Protection from
Harassment Act 1997; The Family Law Act 1996 ss.33, 42, etc.; and perhaps
divorce under the MCA 1973. Relevant cases include B v B; Dolan v Corby; Grubb
v Grubb and Re L [2012].
Common errors
While divorce might be appropriate advice for Jean in part (a), it was not wise to
spend too much time running through the various possible facts she might rely on.
Too often a disproportionate amount of time was taken on divorce for this part, with
too little time being taken on whether an occupation order might serve her better.
A good answer to this question would…
ask if there is a possible criminal charge of coercive control and ask further if Jean
would want this, what would it mean for her? See the possibility of an occupation
order s.33 FLA but, given there is no actual violence, recognise that she might have
to rely on the court’s s.33(6) discretion rather than the s.33(7) balance of harm test.
Dolan v Corby; Re L. Discussion of s.33 factors. Finally, a brief discussion of
divorce would add to this answer.
For part (b), a good answer would note that a non-molestation order is available for
Kelly, she is an associated person. Some discussion of the case law on s.42.

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Further she may wish to apply for an occupation order because she is a former
cohabitant but note that she has a right to occupy. If only her name is on the lease,
Nick has no right to occupy and therefore Kelly does not need an occupation order
against him. But, if his name is still on the lease then she can apply for an
occupation order s.33, probably under s.33(6). She might ask for him to be
excluded also from a defined area around the house and a power of arrest.
Poor answers to this question…
spent far too much time on divorce in part (a) and did not address in sufficient detail
the requirements for occupation orders.
Question 6
Rachel and Jamal have been married for five years and live in London with
Rachel's nine-year-old son, Ernie. Ernie was born when Rachel was living
with Karla after she (Rachel) received donated sperm at the local fertility
clinic. Until they separated when Ernie was three, Rachel and Karla shared
care of Ernie. Karla has maintained Facebook contact with Ernie since the
separation.
Since Rachel and Jamal’s marriage, Jamal has always treated Ernie as part of
the family and they get along well. Jamal’s work often takes him away from
home for days at a time but he spends as much time with Ernie as he can
when he is at home. Rachel works as a primary school teacher and she is
Ernie’s primary carer.
Rachel has informed Jamal that she and Karla have reconciled and are
planning to move, together with Ernie, to Scotland where Rachel has been
offered a job as a head teacher and Karla will stay at home with Ernie. Jamal
feels that Ernie will suffer if he moves away from his home in London and
Ernie has told Jamal that he does not want to move.
Advise Rachel and Jamal.
General remarks
This question is about s.8 orders. Does R require an order of the court to take Ernie
to Scotland? Does J have any way to stop the move? Answering these questions
meant understanding the types of s.8 orders available, who can apply for them and
the grounds on which they may be ordered. We were looking for a good knowledge
of the case law on relocation and the workings of prohibited steps orders and
specific issues order.
Law cases, reports and other references the examiners would expect you to
use
This question was focused on the Children Act 1989, ss.8 and 10. R, as mother has
parental responsibility and even though it does not appear that there is any order in
force, she can choose where in UK to live (but see below). J does not have PR but
can apply for a s.8 order as he is married to R and E has been living with him for 3
years (s.10 CA). To stop R, K and E from moving, he would apply for a prohibited
steps order and the cases on relocation, even within the UK, now include Payne,
Re W [2011], K v K [2011], Re F [2012] and most recently, Re F [2015] EWCA with
its holistic analysis of welfare in these cases. The welfare checklist, in particular E’s
wishes and feelings are important.
Common errors
Many candidates saw this as a question about whether J could obtain PR and
discussed the unmarried father PR cases. Because he is not the father, however,
these cases were not relevant. Further, while many candidates raised the important
issue of E’s wishes and feelings as a part of the welfare checklist, many wrote
about whether or not E was Gillick competent. The importance of a child’s wishes

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and feelings does not depend on Gillick competence. Finally, many answers lacked
sufficient detail about the relocation cases.
A good answer to this question would…
recognise that J could, with the court’s permission (s.10) make an application for a
PSO and that R could simply move with the child without such an order. She may
wish, however, to seek a specific issue order to confirm the move. Strong answers
would also address the issue of a child arrangements order – would contact under
such an order be enough for J? Could he obtain a CAO sharing residence with R?
Poor answers to this question…
saw it as a question about PR and failed to address the relocation issue.
Question 7
Josh, a self-employed IT specialist, and Kevin, a solicitor, entered into a
registered civil partnership in 2010. Josh gave up his housing association flat
to move in with Kevin who was living in a house which had been in his family
for four generations. They agreed that they should make the home ‘theirs’ and
that Josh should organise renovations and decoration of the house. He did
so, spending £100,000 of his savings. After that, because Kevin worked long
hours, and Josh worked from home, Josh took responsibility for most of the
homemaking work.
Kevin has now told Josh that he has fallen in love with Leo and that they have
been in a sexual relationship for about six months. Josh wishes to initiate
dissolution proceedings. He approaches you for advice about the dissolution
and also about any financial claims he may be able to make. He tells you that
Kevin has offered him a lump sum of £50,000 and asked him to move out of
his home, which he says belongs to him and his family. Kevin earns around
£120,000 per year and has a substantial pension from his employment. Josh
earns £20,000 per year. The house is valued at £1,000,000.
Advise Josh.
General remarks
Although this question was about the end of a civil partnership and not a marriage,
the CPA 2004 follows the MCA 1973 on financial relief. The case law on the MCA is
therefore relevant. Problem questions like this on financial relief are sometimes
difficult to answer. It is not always clear whether one should proceed through the
s.25 factors first before then applying the fairness analysis/criteria from White,
Miller/McFarlane and Charman, or whether that overall discretionary judgment
about fairness comes first, with the s.25 factors then looked at afterwards. For this
question and on most exam questions about ‘big money’, either approach is fine
and it might be of some comfort to know that the courts are not in agreement about
the best way to proceed either. In big money cases like this, however, it is important
that candidates discuss both the three strands of fairness in the context of the facts
and also those s.25 factors that may influence the overall determination of fairness.
Some candidates raised the issue of proprietary estoppel and/or constructive trust
but on these facts these were both weak arguments.
For the dissolution of a CP part of the question, we were looking for a discussion of
the ground and facts that might be available to support it.
Law cases, reports and other references the examiners would expect you to
use
CPA s.44 – J can apply for dissolution on the ground of irretrievable breakdown
behaviour fact. Some discussion of how the behaviour fact has been interpreted
and is likely to be interpreted on these facts: Pheasant, Ash, Livingstone-Stallard

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cases. On the finance/property issue, CPA follows MCA on discretion, fairness, etc.,
Lawrence v Gallagher. Here, the main question is whether the family home is a
family asset or what, if any, proportion of it is shareable: see Miller/McFarlane (Hale
and Nicholls) and recent cases such as JL v SL [2015] about family versus non-
family assets. Some discussion of the discretionary exercise, three strands of
fairness, clean break and s.25 factors. White v White, Miller v Miller, McFarlane v
McFarlane, Charman v Charman, Jones v Jones, perhaps also V v V; the MCA
s.25(2); Mesher v Mesher. There are a number of cases that could be cited to
illustrate the courts’ interpretations of the various factors in s.25(2), but White,
Miller/MacFarlane and Charman are required for discussion of the fairness
principle.
Common errors
1. Failing to identify the shareable assets, including the pension and the issue
about the family home.
2. Simply running through each of the s.25 factors. Not all of them were
relevant to the facts of the case. And those that were relevant were not
always applied to the facts to show how/why they were relevant.
A good answer to this question would…
address the following points: all assets go into the pot for distribution (house and
pension); fairness (White); discretion; three strands of fairness (Miller/McFarlane)
needs (e.g. J’s low income) compensation (e.g. J giving up his home and taking
homemaking responsibilities); sharing (equal or departure from equality? if a
departure, on what grounds?); perhaps a fourth strand of fairness (autonomy V v
V); s.25 MCA factors; distinction between marital (family?) and non-marital (non-
family?) property and the effect of the distinction on how the value of asset may be
shared. Reference to Jones v Jones: if all assets are needed to meet needs, then
the nature or source of them is not relevant, if not, then usually equal division
unless a departure from equality is justified usually on the basis of the nature or
source of the asset or special contribution.
Poor answers to this question…
missed entirely the court’s discretionary role and the three strands of fairness;
lacked detail about the nature/source of the assets and why that might affect their
distribution; described or gave an overview of the law but failed to outline the orders
that might be appropriate in this case and explain why.
Question 8
Does legal parenthood always attach to biological parenthood? Should it?
General remarks
This question was about the distinction between legal parenthood and biological
parenthood, not about parental responsibility. It draws on material from 8.1 of the
subject guide. We wanted you to think about how the law allocates legal parenthood
– sometimes by intention and sometimes by biology and then to consider whether
biology should be an important factor in that allocation.
Law cases, reports and other references the examiners would expect you to
use
The HFEA 2008 (e.g. ss.33, 35, 41, 42 and 54) was important here and cases such
as Leeds Teaching Hospital, Evans and on parental orders made in surrogacy
cases (s.54), Re C and Re S (Parental Order) [2010].

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Common errors
Misinterpreting this question to be about parental responsibility; not coming to a
reasoned conclusion about the whether the law treats biological connections with
children fairly or not.
A good answer to this question would…
outline where biological parenthood automatically confers legal parenthood:
biological fathers but not sperm donors in licensed clinics or donated to married or
civilly partnered women, all women who give birth. Where it does not: sperm donors
as above and egg donors. Where legal parenthood is conferred outside biological
parenthood: the husband of a woman treated in a clinic, unless he did not consent,
a man who agrees to treatment of a woman to whom he is not married if the
fatherhood conditions are agreed, lesbian partner ‘other parents’, parental orders
(all HFEA 2008) and adoption orders. The issue here is legal parenthood, not
parental responsibility. A good answer would then discuss whether the biological
connection should be important in conferring legal parenthood and may refer to for
example, the Re G case where Lady Hale talks about social, psychological and
biological parents and says while biology is important, it is only a part of the overall
welfare of the child.
Poor answers to this question…
(See above under ‘common errors’.)
Student extract
No, legal parenthood does not always attach to biological parenthood. With
the advent of fertility clinics and surrogate pregnancy legal parenthood does
not always amount to biological parenthood. In the case of ‘mother’ the issue
of biology still seems to hold that it amounts to legal parenthood even in the
face of assisted reproduction. This is seen in s.33(1) HFEA 2008. In this
situation it holds that ‘mother’ is the woman who carries a child as a result of
the placing in her of an embryo. …The carrier is still considered the legal
mother until the appropriate orders are signed, only then would the woman
who carried the child cease to be the legal mother.
Biology seems to play less of a role when it comes to fathers. A man married
to a woman at the time of her treatment is considered to be the father of the
child. …Also under s.35 HFEA 2008, a man may not be a biological father if
his donor sperm may be used and if the husband agrees to this then he is the
legal father of the child [and not the biologically related donor].
Biology sometimes matters if there is a mistake in the clinic … [then goes on
to discuss the Leeds case]
Even women who did not give birth can now be considered not necessarily
mothers, but second parent. S 42 HFEA. …
Therefore it can be concluded that legal parenthood does not always attach
to biological parenthood and it should not since the world has evolved and
family dynamics are a lot different now. There are homes with two women as
parents and there are homes where fertility is an issue. Hence there is no
need for legal parenthood [always] to reflect biological parenthood.

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Comments on extract
Here are extracts from a first class answer. It runs through the different situations in
which biology either does or does not confer legal parenthood and refers to
statutory and case authority. It comes to a conclusion about whether biology should
automatically confer legal parenthood even though the conclusion is rather
perfunctory. An even stronger conclusion would have addressed the welfare issue
and linked it to the biological/non-biological connections children can have with
adults.

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