Morales, Marc Amiel S.

BALM 4A

GREGORIO TALUSAN v. PEDRO D. OFIANA

FACTS:

Gregorio Talusan (petitioner) filed a complaint for frustrated murder against the private
respondents namely, Ventura Bartolome, Renato Valdecantos, Alfredo Valdecantos, Valentin
Valdecantos, and Pito Valdecantos before the Municipal Court of San Rafael, Bulacan.

On the same day,a warrant of arrest was issued against Ventura Bartolome and Alfredo
Valdecantos.Afterward, a warrant of arrest was also issued against Renato Valdecantos and Pito
Valdecantos.

In a letter-complaint dated 3 March 1969, private respondents Valentin and Alfredo Valdecantos,
as complainants, filed two charges each for attempted murder against petitioner with the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan. The said charges arose out of the same incident of 19
January 1969 which is also the basis of the complaint for frustrated murder filed by the herein
petitioner.
Morales, Marc Amiel S.
BALM 4A

PETER PAUL and VERONICA DIMATULAC vs. HON. SESINANDO VILLON

FACTS:
In the prosecution of the Yabuts for the murder of Dimatulac, the Office of the Public
Prosecutor (particularly the Asst Prosecutor) and two Judges (who handled the case) committed
serious procedural flaws resulting in the impairment of due process (prejudicial to both the
offended party and the accused).
Procedural irregularities in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor:
Warrants of arrest were issued by the MCTC, with no bail recommended, but the Yabuts were
not arrested or were never brought unto the custody of the law. Yet, Asst Fiscal Alfonso-Reyes
conducted a reinvestigation. Though a prosecutor may disagree with the findings of the judge
who conducted the preliminary investigation (and conduct his own), the circumstance that the
accused waived the filing of their counter-affidavits left Alfonso-Reyes no other choice but to
sustain the MCTC findings—which she did not do. And later on, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the
Yabuts to file their counter-affidavits without first demanding that they surrender by virtue of the
standing warrants of arrest.
Alfonso-Reyes recommended a bond of 20k for the Yabuts despite the fact that they were
charged of homicide and that they were fugitives from justice (having avoided service of warrant
of arrest).
Alfonso-Reyes was aware of the private prosecution’s appeal to the DOJ from her resolution.
(The subsequent resolution of the DOJ Secretary exposed her blatant errors.) And despite the
pending appeal, she filed the Information. It would be more prudent to wait for the DOJ
resolution.
Office of the Prosecutor did not even inform the trial court of the pending appeal to the DOJ
Secretary.
Judge Roura’s procedural lapses:
Deferred resolution on the motion for a hold departure order until “such time that all the accused
who are out on bail are arraigned”
Denied the motion to defer proceedings for the reason that “private prosecution has not shown
any indication that the appeal was given due course by DOJ”
Judge Villon’s procedural lapses:
Ordered arraignment despite: a motion to defer proceedings; a ten-day period with which the
complainants can file petition with the CA; resolution of the CA ordering the Yabuts to comment
on the complainants’ action; pending appeal with the DOJ.

ISSUE:
Can the orders of Judge Roura and Judge Villon be sustained despite procedural defects?

RULING:
No. The orders of Judge Roura denying Motion to Defer proceedings are void and set aside. The
order of Judge Villon on the arraignment, and the subsequent arraignment of the Yabuts are void
and set aside. Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is ordered to comply with the DOJ Secretary’s
resolution.
Prosecutors are the representatives not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win every case but that justice be
done. They are servants of the law whose two-fold aim is that guilt shall not escape and
innocence shall not suffer.
The judge “should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the
discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer justice”. The judge’s action must
not impair the substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of the State and offended party.
When the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court, the acquittal of the accused or dismissal of the case is
void.
Morales, Marc Amiel S.
BALM 4A

MARIO CRESPO VS HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, ET.AL.,

FACTS:
April 1977, Asst. Fiscal de Gala with approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for
estafa against Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for
arraignment, Crespo filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending
petition for review filed with the Sec. of Justice for the filing of the information; which was
denied. A motion for reconsideration was denied too in order but the arraignment was referred to
August 18, 1997 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court.
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed
by the accused in the CA, then CA restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with arraignment
until further orders.
On March 22, 1978 undersecretary of justice MAcaraig reversed the resolution of the Provincial
Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against
Crespo. A motion to dismiss was then filed by the Provincial Fiscal with the trial court attaching
Macaraig's letter. On November 1978, judge denied the motion and set arraignment.= stating that
the motion thrust induce the court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before
it but on that adduced before the undersecretary that disregards the requirements of due process
but also erodes court's independence and integrity, motion denied.
Crespo then filed a petition certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of
preliminary writ of prohibition in the CA. Praying that the decision to move on with arraignment
be reversed and set aside declaring the information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect
and to dismiss the case and declare Crespo's obligation as purely civil.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the
provincial fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for
review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.
RULING: Petition denied.
(1) It is a cardinal principle that a criminal action is either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a
criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the
criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or
unfounded prosecution by private persons. It cannot be controlled by the complainant.
(2) However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The
same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the
case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to
affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of
Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an
information be filed in Court.
(3) The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court
thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a
prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of
the information in the proper court.
(4) Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by
the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to
the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require
that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.
(5) It is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to
the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the
accused should be convicted or acquitted.
(6) The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court
any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in
the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before
it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant
or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused
or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the records of the investigation.
CRESPO vs MOGUL
GR No. L-53373 June 30, 1987

FACTS:
Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information
for estaga against Mario Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case
was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to deter arraignment on the ground that there
was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the
office of provincial Fiscal.

CARDINAL PRINCIPLE:
Criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound
discretion of the Fiscal. He may or he may not file the complaint or information, follow or not
follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is
sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for
placing the criminal prosecution under the discretion and control of the fiscal is to prevent
malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons.
It is through the conduct of preliminary investigation, that the fiscal determines the existence of a
Prima Facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with
the fiscal’s discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even
permissible for a Court of compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him
on an information.
In a clash of views between the Judge who did not investigate and the Fiscal who did, or between
the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal’s should normally prevail.
The action of fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to
the approval to the Provincial or City Fiscal or the Chief of State Prosecutor as the case maybe
and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify
or reverse the action or opinion of the Fiscal.