Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981

SAMUEL C. OCCENA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE NATIONAL
TREASURER, THE DIRECTOR OF PRINTING, respondents.

G.R. No. L-56404 April 2, 1981

RAMON A. GONZALES, MANUEL B. IMBONG, JO AUREA MARCOS-IMBONG, RAY ALLAN T.

DRILON, NELSON B. MALANA and GIL M. TABIOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL TREASURER and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions   proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged
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constitutional infirmity. Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the
Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present
Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion
that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana   ruling to the contrary
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notwithstanding. To put it at its mildest, such an approach has the arresting charm of novelty – but
nothing else. It is in fact self defeating, for if such were indeed the case, petitioners have come to the
wrong forum. We sit as a Court duty-bound to uphold and apply that Constitution. To contend
otherwise as was done here would be, quite clearly, an exercise in futility. Nor are the arguments of
petitioners cast in the traditional form of constitutional litigation any more persuasive. For reasons to
be set forth, we dismiss the petitions.

The suits for prohibition were filed respectively on March 6   and March 12, 1981.   On March 10 and
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13 respectively, respondents were required to answer each within ten days from notice.    There was
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a comment on the part of the respondents. Thereafter, both cases were set for hearing and were
duly argued on March 26 by petitioners and Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza for respondents.
With the submission of pertinent data in amplification of the oral argument, the cases were deemed
submitted for decision.

It is the ruling of the Court, as set forth at the outset, that the petitions must be dismissed.

1. It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the
dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary,   dismissing petitions for prohibition and
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mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six    to four.   It
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then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new
Constitution being considered in force and effect."   Such a statement served a useful purpose. It
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could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest
that, as of January 17, 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a
pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what
the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for
instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973
Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is
that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly
demonstrated by Professors Black   and Murphy,   the Supreme Court can check as well as
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legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but
may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot
be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices.
That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably
applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola,   promulgated barely two
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weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases
may be cited. 13

2. We come to the crucial issue, the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose

amendments and how it may be exercised. More specifically as to the latter, the extent of the
changes that may be introduced, the number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, and
the standard required for a proper submission. As was stated earlier, petitioners were unable to
demonstrate that the challenged resolutions are tainted by unconstitutionality.

(1) The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The applicable
provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus:
"The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the
same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National
Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof."   One of such powers is
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precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested
the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the
Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article
on Amendments.   When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President
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and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue Of such
impotence Its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments
embodied in the resolutions now being assailed. It may be observed parenthetically that as far as
petitioner Occena is Concerned, the question of the authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to
propose amendments is not new. In Occena v. Commission on Elections,   filed by the same
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petitioner, decided on January 28, 1980, such a question was involved although not directly passed
upon. To quote from the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Antonio in that case: "Considering
that the proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution extending the retirement of
members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts from sixty-five (65) to seventy (70)
years is but a restoration of the age of retirement provided in the 1935 Constitution and has been
intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through the
mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the advantages and
disadvantages of the proposed amendment."  17

(2) Petitioners would urge upon us the proposition that the amendments proposed are so extensive
in character that they go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang
Pambansa as Successor of the Interim National Assembly. For them, what was done was to revise
and not to amend. It suffices to quote from the opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for the Court,
in Del Rosario v. Commission on Elections   to dispose of this contention. Thus: "3. And whether the
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Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the
present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the
democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for
ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the
new Constitution. 4. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new
one ... is no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or
total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in
part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the
sovereign people."   There is here the adoption of the principle so well-known in American decisions
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as well as legal texts that a constituent body can propose anything but conclude nothing.   We are
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not disposed to deviate from such a principle not only sound in theory but also advantageous in
practice.

(3) That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the
standard for proper submission. Again, petitioners have not made out a case that calls for a
judgment in their favor. The language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above
questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose
amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition
to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it
has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a
requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when,
as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose
amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement of three- fourth votes applies,
such extraordinary majority was obtained. It is not disputed that Resolution No. 1 proposing an
amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own
a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No.
2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a
vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the
Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. Where then is the alleged infirmity?
As to the requisite standard for a proper submission, the question may be viewed not only from the
standpoint of the period that must elapse before the holding of the plebiscite but also from the
standpoint of such amendments having been called to the attention of the people so that it could not
plausibly be maintained that they were properly informed as to the proposed changes. As to the
period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to
the applicable provision: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months
after the approval of such amendment or revision."   The three resolutions were approved by
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the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In

the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the
90-day period provided by the Constitution. Thus any argument to the contrary is unavailing. As for
the people being adequately informed, it cannot be denied that this time, as in the cited 1980
Occena opinion of Justice Antonio, where the amendment restored to seventy the retirement age of
members of the judiciary, the proposed amendments have "been intensively and extensively
discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, [ so that ] it
cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the
proposed amendment [ s ]."  22

WHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.

Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.

Abad Santos, J., is on leave.