J. Theoret.

BioL (I969) 25, 255-275

Dilemma for Social Evolution: The Impact of Darwin~

LILA LEmOWlTZ

Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Northeastern University,

Boston, Massachusetts 02115, U.S.A.

(Received 12 March 1969, and in revised form 15 April 1969)

For 100 years prior to the publication of The Descent of Man social
evolution was accepted as a legitimate, much-discussed field of enquiry.
Darwin's revolutionary approach at first seemed to reinforce its formula-
tions. This paper reviews in detail the intellectual discussions of the decade
immediately preceding the appearance of Darwin's book, and those
occurring in the years which followed, to illustrate how in fact social
evolutionary theory was diverted and ultimately checked by Darwin's
notions.
Darwin's theories stimulated much new research in the life sciences.
This paper undertakes to demonstrate that they had the opposite effect
on social evolutionary theorizing and led to curtailment of social evolu-
tionary investigation. Darwinism not only led to doctrines of racial and
sexual superiority, but introduced into social theorizing an anomalous
philosophic base, which denied or diminished the utility of cultural analyses
of social events.

In the earliest period of anthropology, when anthropology was being

separated from political and social philosophy as a distinct discipline, social
evolution was a central concern of the field and kinship and family appeared
inseparable concepts. Between 1860 and the turn of the century a number of
arguments raged about the origins and evolution of 'family' and kinship
systems, about the course of social evolution in general, and then subsided.
By the 1920's, 'family' had become the provenance of sociologists who
worked primarily in western cultures, and kinship the field of anthropologists;
social evolution was dead. Sociologists simply accepted the 'family' as that
which they found in western settings, parsed and analyzed it, discussed
variations as deviations from the form with which they were familiar, and
avoided, on the whole, generalized definitions and causal explanations.
Anthropologists became involved in much needed descriptive compilations
of data on kinship systems and on the social groupings in which the family
1" An expanded version of a paper presented at the Northeastern Anthropology Associa-
tion meetings, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, March 1968.
255
256 L. L E I B O W I T Z

was imbedded, fulfilling a task identified by Durkheim and Mauss in 1905 in

their Primitive Classification (1963). For the anthropologist, 'family' was a
side issue. Kroeber's monumental Anthropology (1948), first published in
1923, for example, discussed kinship in five separate passages while the word
'family' appears but once, and then in reference to 'family names' in kin
terminological systems. By 1925 Mauss' Essai sur le Don (in English as The
Gift, 1954) in its treatment of marriage focused completely on the trans-
actional exchange nature of marital contracts treating sex, reproduction, and
children as ancillary to exchange. Mauss examined groups and group
exchange systems, illustrating how the study of kinship was no longer even
tied to concepts such as mating, child rearing etc. which had been used to
exemplify "family'. In the 1930's, Mead, following her studies of kinship in
the Admiralty Islands, pioneered studies of child rearing, sex roles and sexual
behavior, in 'total cultural' settings, marking off a new field of anthropo-
logical interest. In this framework 'family' as an entity was extensively
reported on, but again was not particularly central to the discussion by anthro-
pologists. Consequently, the anthropological orientation tended to treat
'family' in its variety as a secondary consideration. 'Family' as a special
object of analysis was not an anthropologists' affair until the 1950's when
discussions on the subject were revived.
The dropping of the term 'family' along with an interest in social evolu-
tion and the current revival of both notions are by no means accidental.
How the great nineteenth century discussions on evolution and the family
grew to the point of stalemate is extremely illuminating.

1. The Beginning of the Argument

The first phase of the discussions began in the year 1861 when Bachhofen
published Das Mutterrecht (in German).t Darwin's Origin of the Species
had appeared in 1859 (Darwin, 1948). At this time, the legacy of the en-
lightenment was such that the scientifically oriented members of the various
national philosophic societies shared rather widely an acceptance of the notion
of social evolution and somewhat sketchily pictured man as progressing from
simple to complex technological and social arrangements. According to
Brace (1967, p. 12), Boucher de Perthes' analysis in 1847 of ancient stone tools
had interested British, if not French scholars, and members of the Royal
Society of Great Britain visited his dig in 1858. Discoveries in 1856 in Ger-
many had also stimulated discussion (Brace, 1967, p. 12).
I" Since I was unable to locate a copy of Bachhofen's work in English or in German in the
Harvard Libraries the referencesto it are derived from secondarysources. All other nine-
teenth centurytexts reviewedwere consulteddirectly.
 IMPACT OF DARWIN ON SOCIAL EVOLUTION 257
Social evolution was neither a new nor a revolutionary concept in 1861
when Bachhofen's book appeared. Bachhofen's effort was new only in that
it was the first essay into an evolutionary treatment of 'family'. [Maine's
Ancient Law (1963) which appeared in the same year as Bachhofen's
Mutterrecht dealt with 'family' only incidentally, as an aspect of legal
institutions.] Bachhofen's work remained unknown in England so that when
McLennan published his Primitive Marriage (1876) in 1865 he was unaware
of it.
The decade that marked the first phase of the debate (1861 to 1871) also
saw the publication of Lubbock's Origin of Civilisation (1882) appearing
in 1870, Morgan's Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity (1882) appearing in
1871, and Tylor's Early History of Mankind in 1865 (Tylor, 1964). In this
first decade the authors of four of these six books in their interpretations of
evolutionary sequences premised a condition of 'primitive promiscuity'.
The books ofBachhofen, McLennan, Lubbock and Morgan will be considered
first; then the works of Tylor and Maine. In the years following Darwin's
Descent of Man (Werner Edition orig. 1871), Tylor and Maine though
disavowing the notion that man could have ever lived 'as a mere struggling
crowd' (Tylor, 1960, p. 246), published books which were evolutionary in
content, but not directed at 'earliest' beginnings.

2. Bachhofen, McLennan, Lubbock and Morgan

Bachhofen, in his analyses was uninfluenced by Darwin's methodological
approach to evolution. Like Maine, he relied heavily on literary and historical
documentary sources for the data on which he built his thesis. His allusions
and illustrations are heavily classical. 'Hetaerism', Bachhofen's name for
'primitive promiscuity' is derived from the Greek for concubinel. Das
Mutterrecht (1861), Bachhofen's book (published as The Mothers in English)
stated that the family evolved from a condition of hetaerism.
According to Bachhofen, because of the uncertainty of paternity under the
formless sexuality of hetaerism, children were necessarily identified as
affiliated with their mothers. Descent was therefore reckoned in the female
line among 'all the peoples of antiquity'. Sexual proscription within the
mother-child unit was thus the first to appear. It followed, to Bachhofen, that
since women were the only parents of the younger generation who were
known with certainty and, as mothers, exercised authority over the young,
they held positions of extreme importance to which respect and honor were
attached. Women ruled in a 'gynaecocracy'. The next development was the
appearance of rules limiting sexual access to women; this violated the
traditional right of all men in a woman. The stimulus for this change seems to
258 L. LEIBOWITZ
have been a moralistic conversion rather than any materialistic accommoda-
tion to changing realities. As a moralistic conversion it had the interesting
effect of incurring a guilt, on the part of the woman, which she had to expiate
by giving herself for a period of her life to all men. Following such a hetaeric
episode she became espoused to one man, and one man only. Paternity was
clarified, and patrilineal descent appeared.
Bachhofen's construction is an attempt to account for some rather exotic
and erotic practices (by European standards) of the much admired Greeks,
Romans and Ancient Hebrews. The Orestes myth with its Furies who pursue
a son who has murdered his mother and refuse to pursue a wife who has
murdered her husband fascinated him. The primacy of mother-son ties over
father-son vengeance is explained as a remnant of an early system; the Furies,
as old goddesses; their defeat before Zeus and Athena, as the triumph of a
religious awakening. Bachhofen's book attempts to account for family as an
institutionalized invention, not as an innate attribute of the species. His
method is that of a classical scholar, his data are indirect, and his notion of
the causality of social process stresses the ideational realm. His definition of
'family' is unclear save that mating and descent are critical features of the
phenomenon. (The sexual relationship is the key to marital arrangements and
family, while knowing one's parents is the key to descent systems.)
McLennan, using a different body of data and a different scientific
rationale, arrives at a completely different reconstruction, but at the same
time shares his fundamental assumptions with Bachhofen. McLennan's
Primitive Marriage (1876) originally published in Britain six years after
Darwin's much discussed Orfgin, was inevitably influenced by the latter
work, which did not draw on historical or 'ancient' material. Darwin's
technique, consisted of developing scalar arrangements of similarities
in living organisms, a standard job for nineteenth century naturalists
who were busy fitting newly found specimens into Linnaean classifications.
Darwin's evolutionary theory derived from the placing of data into temporal
as well as morphological relationships, from which arrangement he drew
conclusions about the nature and processes of biological change. McLennan
(and Lubbock and Morgan) mimicked Darwin's technique by using con-
temporary ethnographic reports of living cultures for historical reconstruc-
tion.
Unlike Bachhofen, McLennan relies on contemporary primitives as
evidence of the most ancient past. He does not ignore historical documentary
sources, however, and uses the rape of the Sabine women as historical
evidence for this theory of the origins of marriage by capture.
McLennan begins his attack on the problem of the evolution of family
with a disc.us~ion, of the differences, between exogamous, and endogamous.
 I M P A C T OF D A R W I N ON S O C I A L E V O L U T I O N 259
'tribes'. The lack of equivalence among the groups he treated as tribal
escaped him, but not his critics. Treating endogamy and exogamy as con-
trasting lines along which total societies were organized, McLennan under-
takes "an inquiry into the origins of the form of capture in marriage
ceremonies", incidentally treating also the origin of family. Beginning with a
promiscuous horde, McLennan, too, arrives at the notion that matrilineal
descent and inheritance systems preceded patriliny and comes to this con-
clusion for reasons which are dissimilar enough from those of Bachhofen to
be mentioned. During the early period of primal promiscuity, men, who were
brave hunters and more useful to the group than women, practiced female
infanticide. This resulted in a shortage of women, and in polyandry, with
consequent uncertainty of paternity. The lack of specificity about who is or
isn't pater led to tracing descent in the female line, McLennan says, but he
fails to take into account that some of his cases showed polyandrous patri-
lineal households (1876, p. 167). Exogamy is forced on the under-womanned
men of the group, since despite the general lack of esteem in which women
were held, each man continued to want one for himself; thus, women had to
be sought and captured from other hostile groups. A taste for marrying out
thus grew out of the necessity for seeking mates elsewhere. "As exogamy and
polyandry are referable to one and the same c a u s e . . . " McLennan goes on,
"we are forced to regard all the exogamous races as having originally been
polyandrous" (quoted in Engels, 1942, p. 12). Despite the notion that
marriage by capture occurred where there was polyandry, which was related
to matriliny, McLennan acknowledges that his ethnographic data showed
that marriage by capture is "now most distinctly marked and impressive
just among those races which have male kinship" (quoted in Engels, 1942,
p. 12). He accounts for the anomaly by borrowing Darwin's notion of sur-
vivals and sees marriage by. capture as something residual. McLennan's
reconstruction, like Bachhofen's, attempts to account for different customs
relating to marriage and family, not as innate attributes of the species, but as
inventions. Despite differences in data, method and conclusions, there is
agreement on base notions.
An element of irony exists in their different perceptions of the causes of
social change. Where Bachhofen sees the sources of change in the ideational
realm, religious conversion, moral growth, etc., McLennan sees causal
agents in such things as the importance of males as hunters, inter-group
competition for scarce goods (females) and group bonding through exogamy.
The irony of the situation lies in the different esteem in which these authors
were held by Engels, who in later years favored Bachhofen. Though Bach-
hofen's causality was acknowledged as being eminently idealistic philo-
sophically, his virtue lies in arrivin~ at a reconstruction closer to that of Mot-
260 L. LEIBOWITZ
gan, which Engels adopted. McLennan, whose materialism was attacked with
a will by people like Wake and Westermarck (see especially Wake, 1967,
chap. IID, was attacked by the Marxist materialists for sloppy formulations
(Engels, 1942, Preface to the Fourth Edition).
Lubbock's Origin of Civilisation (1882) appeared in 1870. Lubbock draws
a good deal of his theory on the origins of family from his predecessors but
draws on additional sources of information such as discussions of archeo-
logical findings, as well as ethnographics and documents, and on new formu-
lations. Where McLennan knew only of monogamy, polygamy and poly-
andry, the notion of 'group marriage' appeared shortly after McLennan
published. Since sexual rights were largely equated with marriage, the dis-
covery that groups of males had access to groups of females and vice versa
was interpreted as shared marital rights or group marriage.
Lubbock's beginning point of human evolutionary change was again an
amoral ancestral group whose group character was crucial. "Children were
not in the earliest times regarded as related equally to their father and their
mother, but that the natural progress of ideas is first, that a child is related
to his tribe generally; second to his mother, and not his father; lastly and
lastly only, that he is related to both" (quoted in Wake, 1967, p. 31). Primitive
promiscuity in Lubbock's terms is 'communal marriage'. Individualized
marriage arose, along with exogamy, from the right of the warrior to main-
tain sole rights over female captives, against his tribe.
Since Lubbock rejected McLennan's reasoning on female infanticide, and
polyandry, it is unclear in his work why men sought mates from outside the
group. But the group did switch from communal to individual marriage
because of marriage by capture. Bachhofen's concept of'expiation for marriage'
appropriately described the hetaeric customs which marked the transfer of
sexual rights in women from the group to the individual. Lubbock's view was
that "the connection of individuals inter se, their duties to one another, their
rights and the descent of their property are all regulated more by the relation
to the tribe than to the family" (Wake, 1967, p. 36), was demonstrated by
the payment of an inmarrying female's sexual service to all the males of her
husband's tribe. Like McLennan, Lubbock rejected kin terms as being con-
ceptions of actual blood relationship, but saw kin terms as expressions of
social relationships, regulating tribal interactions.
Lubbock's work, like that of Bachhofen and McLennan, assumes that it
is necessary to explain the origins of the family. Though his book's most
significant contribution lies in distinguishing and naming the Paleolithic and
Neolithic, Lubbock makes no ties between his technological economic
material and kinship concepts. Morgan's innovative Systems of Consanguinity
and Affinity (1870) does just that, in addition to examining kin terms and
 IMPACT OF DARWIN ON SOCIAL EVOLUTION 261
groups systematically. Following hard on the heels of Lubbock's work
(1870), it immediately overshadowed it.
Morgan's active interest in problems of kinship and marriage systems
antedates by nearly two decades his contribution to the discussion on the
social evolution of kin groups and systems. Morgan's The League of the
Ho-de-no-sau-nee, or Iroquois (1850, with its extensive discussion on kinship
appeared a decade before Bachhofen's work ushered in the discussion of
family and evolution. Morgan's book was essentially ethnographic, focusing
on 'morphology'. In a way, it is like a naturalist's report, a collection of
information on a new specimen of social organization, and represents an
attempt at Linnaean classification of social phenomena. This was just the
kind of information that Darwin's work suggested might be used for studies
of the past, and the book was written just as close examination of the evolu-
tion of 'family' began. What could be more logical than that Morgan should
throw his data into an evolutionary framework? He augmented his field
experience with the Iroquois by his innovative questionnaires and, though his
systematic collection of data may not have resembled a voyage on the
Beagle, it accomplished the same kind of thing. The variety of forms of kinship
organizations recognized by Morgan in no way conflicted with his adoption
of the widespread notion that man's social evolution had been from the simple
to the complex, the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, that technology had
moved from the simpler, less efficient forms to the complex, relatively fruitful
forms. Morgan, emulating Darwin, proceeded to examine his kind of con-
temporaneous data for evidence of such change and in 1877 Ancient Society
(First Indian Edition) appeared.
Morgan suggests that man's ancestors moved from a condition in which no
rules whatever governed mating behavior to one in which there emerged the
consanguine family. This arrangement excluded as mates the parental
generation, and was founded upon the intermarriage, or mating, of brothers
and sisters in a group. There then followed the punaluan family: "Given the
Consanguine family, which involved own brothers and sisters and also
collateral brothers and sisters in the marriage r e l a t i o n . . , and (sic) it was
only necessary to exclude the former from the group, and retain the latter, to
change the Consanguine into the Punaluan family" (Morgan, First Indian
Edition, p. 433). "The system treats all brothers as the husbands of each
other's wives, and all sisters as the wives of each other's husbands, and as
intermarried in a group . . . . Theoretically, the family of the period was
co-extensive with the group united in the marriage relation; but, practically,
it must have subdivided into a number of smaller families for convenience
of habitation and subsistence" (First Indian Edition, p. 454). The syndyasmian
family, or 'pairing family', was founded upon the pairing of a male with a
262 L. L E I B O W I T Z

female under the form of marriage, but without an exclusive cohabitation.

It was the germ of the monogamian family. Divorce or separation was at the
option of both husband and wife.
This new form of family did not modify the 'systems of consanguinity'
which had been invented to support the two older forms of family, but simply
modified the nature of marital ties. The patriarchal family was founded upon
the marriage of one man to several wives, and "was an organization of
servants and slaves under a patriarch" (Morgan, First Indian Edition, p. 511).
Polygamy was incidental to patriarchy. No new systems of consanguinity
appeared with patriarchy. Finally, the monogamian family, the essential
element of civilization, was founded upon the marriage of one man with one
woman with exclusive cohabitation, bringing with it a system of consan-
guinity which was descriptive and expressed 'the actual facts of consan-
guinity'. The evolution of the family, according to Morgan proceeded by
progressive reduction to smaller and smaller mating units which step by step
excluded the closer degrees of blood relatives.
Morgan correlated this evolution of the 'family', a social entity whose
definition was somewhat fluid, with stages in evolution of technology and
economy. The techno-economic stages he accepted were the following:
(1) savagery, which was based on natural subsistence upon fruits and roots
on a restricted habitat, with some fishing. Through changes in the arts of sub-
sistence "one superadded to the other, and brought out at long separated
intervals of time" (Morgan, First Indian Edition, p. 19). (2) Lower barbarism
marked by farinaceous subsistence through cultivation. (3) Middle state of
barbarism distinguished by meat and milk subsistence with domestication of
animals, which Morgan notes were absent in the western hemisphere. (4)
Upper status of barbarism characterized by unlimited subsistence through field
agriculture (brought about by iron manufacturing). This was replaced by
(5) civilization which used phonetic alphabets, and produced literary records.
The correlations Morgan makes associate the consanguine family with
lower savagery; the punaluan family with middle savagery and the syn-
dyasmian family with lower barbarism. The patriarchal family, he sees as a
side development related to pastoralism, the monogamian family arose with
civilization and the individuation of property and person. This correlation
between economic and social milieux which Morgan cites is not always dis-
tinguished as causal, however, by Morgan (nor are his sequences rigidly
applied to all peoples everywhere). For although he stresses the function of
privatized property in the origins of monogamy, he also sees the changes in
kinship systems and marriage rules as deriving their adaptive values from
biological natural selection, matings with close blood relatives producing
poorer and less adaptive stock than out-matings. The evolution of family also
 IMPACT OF D A R W I N ON SOCIAL EVOLUTION 263
involved the expansion of moral and intellectual capacities. The implication
is that, although technico-economic changes played a part in making family
changes possible, the reason for structural innovations lay in an almost
teleological drive for the biologic (and moral) excellence of monogamy.
Like the three other authors of this decade, Bachhofen, McLennan and
Lubbock, Morgan begins from the base of a herd like ancestral organization
and discusses social evolution of the family in terms of an accumulation of
changed rules. Lubbock and McLennan, like Morgan, use techniques and
notions derived from Darwin. They differ from Morgan, however, in con-
cluding that rules governing out-marrying came from the relationship
of a group to its environment and other groups. Morgan, follows Darwinian
models one step further, by utilizing the notion of natural selection,
to suggest that out-marrying rules were derived from the biological
advantages of cross-breeding. 'Survival of the fittest' was interpreted bio-
logically rather than in terms of adaptations to a cultural niche.

3. Maine and Tylor, Pre-1871

The works of Maine and Tylor which appeared in this decade deserve
some special attention, for in the years which followed these two authors
explicitly rejected the notion of 'primitive promiscuity' and the notion of the
origins of family in social invention. If these two authors had adopted their
position before the publication of Darwin's Descent of Man (1871), the
division of the debate on family into two phases made here would belie the
evidence. However, their positions did not take shape before Darwin's, as is
evident from their publications.
Maine's Ancient Law (1963) bears the introductory statement that "The
chief object of the following pages is to indicate some of the earliest ideas
of mankind as they are reflected in ancient law" (from the Preface to the
first edition, reproduced in the 1963 Beacon Paperback Edition). Only
incidentally interested in the family as a social institution, Maine's book is, as
Raymond Firth puts it, of "a mildly evolutionary kind" (Maine, 1963,
Introduction). It takes as its example of the earliest ideas of mankind the
Homeric discussion of the early Greeks' 'Themistes' or Judgments, tracing
from them the development of the Greco-Roman city states, and ultimately
the European state. Appearing as soon after Darwin's Origin as it did, the
book, like Bachhofen's, relied on documentary and literary sources.
In addition to being Regius Professor of Civil Law at Cambridge, Maine
had been a classical scholar at that institution and became its first Reader in
Roman Law and Jurisprudence. His interest extended beyond the classical;
he had an extraordinary knowledge of 'Hindu' legal codes and systems
(before he thought of going to India) and of 'Hindu' non-legal sources.
264 L. LEIBOWITZ
Predictably, he found that "the rudiments of the social s t a t e . . , are known
through testimony of three sorts--accounts by contemporary observers of
civilization less advanced than their own, the records which particular races
have preserved concerning their primitive history and ancient law. The first
kind of evidence is the best we could have expected" (Maine, 1963, p. 116).
Taking Scripture, Homer's description of the Cyclops, and his own dis-
coveries on the Roman Patria Potestas, Maine concluded that kinship unity
preceded territorial unity, and the kinship form from which the European
form of city state ultimately derived was a patriarchal family. But he went on
to say that 'the family' is not simply a group of individuals descended from
some common ancestor, but a fiction, a group into which 'strangers' are
readily incorporated by adoption, specifying obligations, "closely simulating
the reality of kinship" (1963, p. I28). The 'family' is a group which can
readily exclude blood relations if they withdraw from or lack the conditions
of brotherhood. Maine talks about 'family' as a cultural entity whose
antecedents he does not presume to examine. His "ancient society, in which
every man lived during the greater part of his life under the patriarchal
despotism" (1963, p. 8) is not very ancient, since it is evidenced by Homer's
Themistes.
In the preface to the tenth edition of Ancient Law, Maine says explicitly
that the subject of the beginnings of law, in periods of greater antiquity than
the Homeric is 'properly speaking, beyond the scope of the present work'
(from the Preface to the 10th edition reproduced in the 1963 Beacon Paper-
back Edition). Not only does he refrain from discussing the original conditions
of man, but by 1871, when he published Village Communities, East and West,
he has reservations about using contemporary data as evidence of ancient
conditions. He notes that a number of Indian land tenure arrangements
presumed as ancient by British administrators, were introduced by the British
themselves.
In short, Maine was neither interested in pursuing the earliest periods of
human development, nor convinced it was possible with the evidence at hand.
In this first decade of discussion on family he refrained from commenting on
'original' forms of social organization. Although Maine in later years was
supposed to have taken the position that the patriarchal family was original,
there appears to be no direct statement by him in his major publications which
expresses this position. Morgan credits Maine with this point of view
(Morgan, First Indian Edition, p. 514), as does Pollock (Maine, 1963, Appendix
II). At best, it appears that Maine rejected specific theories of origins and
evolution without clarifying his own position.
Tylor's first book, a travel book on Mexico, appeared in the year 1861 and
was followed in 1865 by Researches into the Early History of Mankind (1964).
 IMPACT OF DARWIN ON SOCIAL EVOLUTION 265

Despite beginning Researches with the statement that "The explanation of

the state of things in which we live has often to be sought in the condition of
rude and early t r i b e s . . . (and that) the past is continually needed to explain
the present, and the whole to explain the part" he concludes that " . . . the
time for writing a systematic treatise on the subject does not seem yet to have
come" (Tylor, 1964, p. 1). Fascinated by social evolutionary possibilities, he
uses terms like 'survivals', just as McLennan did. Unlike McLennan, though,
who felt that the time was ripe for a systematic treatise, Tylor confined
himself to writing a series of essays on the evidence of progressive accumula-
tion of cultural innovations in human society, and the diversity of cultural
forms. His first six chapters on Language, Gesture and Word, Writing, Images
and Names indicate his concern with the symbolic, and touch on problems of
the transmission of cultural information. It is only in his tenth chapter,
Some Remarkable Customs, that he examines marriage prohibitions and then
only in the context of a compendium of oddities. Not only does Tylor express
no position whatever on the subject of the original form of human social
organization, he hardly refers to organizational problems at all. Thus Tylor,
like Maine, though unequivocally part of the intellectual community con-
cerned with problems of social evolution, has no identifiable position on
family or its origins.

4. Darwin, the Turning Point

In 1871 Darwin published his Descent of Man and changed the course of
the debate on the family and social evolution. Fortunately Tylor and Maine
found themselves uncommitted to primitive promiscuity, since Darwin, who
was unquestionably responsible for changing evolution from a metaphysical
or theological argument into a 'hard' scientific construct, rejected this
notion.
In his Origin of the Species, Darwin had refrained from tackling Man in
order not to exacerbate the prejudices of his detractors and merelyindicated that
"light would be thrown on the origin of man and his history" (Werner Edition,
p. 1). He undertook Descent of Man because he found that many naturalists
had rallied in support of his position and were not averse to viewing man in
the same evolutionary framework that they had accepted for other species
(Darwin, Werner Edition). For the benefit of the readers of Descent of Man,
Darwin saw as his first task the need for demonstrating man's affinity to
other animals; thus the first chapters of his book examine man structurally,
ontogeneticaUy (using Huxley's material) and even archeologically (Broca's
report on Les Eyzies). Darwin then moves on to the problem of racial varia-
tion, reviewing the arguments that were current. He concludes that those who
accepted evolution saw the human races as members of one species with one
266 L. L E I B O W I T Z

origin (monogenists), while those hostile to evolution and favoring cata-

strophism and supernatural intervention were polygenists who inclined
toward the multi-origin belief. Darwin saw man as one species.
He took Wallace to task (Darwin, Werner Edition, p. 49) for maintaining
that"natural selection could only have endowed the savage with a brain a little
superior to that of an ape". He cites Tylor and Lubbock (Werner Edition,
p. 182) on the close similarity between men of all races in tastes, disposition
and habits, as evidence of the unity of mankind. He remarks that the similarity
of stone arrowheads brought from the most distant parts of the world and
manufactured at the most remote periods are almost identical " . . . and this
fact can only be accounted for by the various races having similar inventive
or mental powers" (Darwin, Werner Edition, p. 182), and, in this last statement,
expressed the equation between specific culture traits and innate capacity that
was to wreak havoc on social evolutionary theory.
For though Darwin noted that all races of man were one species, this did
not exhaust his conceptualization of race. He quoted extensively (Werner
Edition, p. 54) from Dr J. Barnard Davis whose researches had "proved that
there existed in man a close relation between the size of the brain and the
development of the intellectual faculties" (Europeans, 92.3; Americans, 87.5;
Asiatic, 87.1 ; Australians, 81.9 in3). Darwin chides Morgan (Werner Edition,
p. 76) for underrating the power of instinct. Later (Werner Edition, p. 117)
Darwin "reject(s) the belief, lately insisted on by some writers, that the
abhorrence of incest is due to our possessing a special God-implanted
conscience", reasoning that because a rudimentary 'moral sense' and
conscience appears among animals other than man, man's abhorrence of
incest is not God-given but is a highly developed form of animal social
instinct (see chap. IV in Descent of Man).
The fullest development of high moral sense "as judged by our standards"
(Darwin, Werner Edition, p. 121) is dependent on "powers of reasoning
"sufficient" to recognize the bearing of many virtues on the social behavior of
men", and is an expression of the combined effects of instinct and native intell-
igence. Social behavior, the expression of moral sense, is an expression of native
or innate capacity, Darwin reasons, so that for example, women in addition to
being intellectually inferior are also inherently more submissive since they
are neither leaders nor intellectuals. Reproductive behavior, the basis of his
theory of sexual selection, not only has marked effects on the survival chances
of variants within a population but is also evidence of biologically based
emotional and intellectual capabilities. These notions of causal factors in
human behavior led him to conclude (at the end of a passage which sum-
marizes what were then taken to be the social patterns of particular primates
and which recent researches have shown to be misleading): " . . . judging
 IMPACT OF DARWIN ON SOCIAL EVOLUTION 267
from the social habits of man as he now exists, the most probable view is that
he aboriginally lived in small communities, each with a single wife, or if
powerful with several whom he jealously guarded against all other men. Or
he may not have been a social animal (sic) and yet have lived with several wives,
like the gorilla" (Werner Edition, p. 604). Believing that gorilla behavior, like
that of other lower primates, is characterized by sexual jealousy and violent
conflict, which Schaller's (1963) work reveals is untrue, Darwin went on to
say that primeval men " . . . would have been governed more by their instinct
and even less by their reason than are savages at the present day" (Wake,
1967, p. 6 quoted from Darwin, 1871, p. 367).
In defense of a notion that step by step changes in a cumulative manner
resulted in great divergence and evolving species, Darwin's conclusions were
logical. His espousal of the view that a permanent harem herd or patriarchal
family was aboriginally human (not the ephemeral or seasonal variants which
are common, but a permanent form which to my knowledge is not found
elsewhere in nature) was consistent with his belief that man, though a single
species, in his physical variety represented different degrees and kinds of
adaptation. His conclusions were also clearly in line with his view of the
relationship between the sexes, a 'natural' relationship so clearly evidenced
by his contemporaries, bright active men with polygamous inclinations and
proper and dull wives who had not yet followed Mrs Pankhurst into civil
disobedience to obtain female suffrage.
Darwin ended a decade of discussion and argument which had centered
around how various family forms had developed out of herd-like origins with
the conclusions that no such herd had existed. The argument after 1871
entered a new phase as a result of Darwin's work; ultimately his position
was inimical to the development of further discussion along the lines pre-
viously set. It soon became, apparent that information on human cultural
variation was at best spotty, and that much would have to be learned about
human social organization to provide a more substantive base for speculation
and reconstruction. This realization itself slowed discussion.
More important was the shifted philosophical base which Darwin intro-
duced. As White has pointed out, in his introduction to Tylor's Anthro-
pology (1960), Darwin was involved in a basic disagreement with Tylor, and
with those others who like Tylor insisted that a "mental g u l f . . , divides the
lowest savage from the highest ape", and that this gulf was equally great for
all men, a premise implicit in the work of the early social evolutionists.

5. Tylor and Maine, Post-1871

After 1871, however, Tylor disassociated himself from these early social
evolutionists by rejecting 'primitive promiscuity' and 'matriarchy'. Tylor
T.e. 18
268 L. L E I B O W I T Z

also rejected matriarchy or the maternal family because in its various forms
the complex nomenclature indicates an advanced development. Tylor lent
his support to those who claimed primacy for a patriarchal system; "they
have the weight of evidence on their side, providing that they do not insist on
its (patriarchal system) fully developed form having at first appeared, and are
content to argue that in the earliest ages man took his wife to himself, and
that the family was under his power and protection" (Tylor, 1960, p. 410). As
evidence of Tylor's rejection of primitive promiscuity, Leslie White, in his
introduction to the 1960 edition of Tylor's work, quotes the sentence "Man-
kind can never have lived as a mere struggling crowd, each for himself."
But the passage from which White quoted goes on "Society is always made
up of families or households bound together by kindly ties, controlled by
rules of marriage (my italics) and the duties of parent and child, yet the forms
of these rules and duties have been very various" (Tylor, 1960, p. 246). A few
pages later Tylor comments, "Controlling forces of society are at work even
among savages, only in more rudimentary ways than among ourselves.
Public opinion is already a great power, and the way in which it acts is par-
ticularly to be noted" (p. 251). Again, "Thus communities, however ancient
and rude, always have their rules of right and wrong" (p. 252). Tylor precedes
his discussion of society with a discussion of the evolution of language; thus
Tylor's 'earliest' human society presumes symbolling, which suggests that
Tylor may have attached a qualifier to his notion of early man who, lacking
rules, could not be considered man.
A similar ambiguity attaches to Maine's ostensible championing of the
antiquity of the cyclopean or patriarchal family. Maine himself was supremely
cautious about discussing 'earliest' forms. It remained for his students to
report his rejection of originally ruleless mating patterns. Maine's position on
the antiquity of patriarchal forms was well summarized by Andrew Lang.
"Men, whatever their brutal ancestors may have done, when they became men
indeed (my italics) lived originally in small anonymous local groups, and
had . . . the habit of selecting female mates from groups not their own,
because of the jealous despotism of the eldest male" (quoted in Maine, 1963,
p. 422).
Apparently then, Tylor and Maine who had not committed themselves to
the notion of primitive promiscuity before the appearance of Descent of Man,
more or less rejected the notion afterwards with the circular definition that
Mankind as Mankind always had rules, not merely regularities governing his
behavior. Man without rules is not man, so that primitive promiscuity, a
condition of rulelessness, could not characterize a 'human' condition.
Without subscribing to Darwin's position, these authors at the same time
managed to avoid opposing it, while maintaining an emphasis on cultural
 IMPACT OF D A R W I N ON SOCIAL E VOL UT ION 269
adaptation rather than biological causality as a guiding principle in analyzing
human social behavior.

6. Other Post-1871 Views, Spencer, Engels, Marx

Other authors whose works appeared after 1871 were not so equivocal.
Discussions of the origin and evolution of family took on a totally different
character. On the one hand, the theoreticians who favored primitive promis-
cuity and the emergence of family found it necessary to justify their point of
view with philosophic considerations of the overall nature, direction and
causes of social change. Spencer and Engels were labeled metaphysicians
because they devoted significant portions of their arguments on family and
evolution to such questions. On the other hand, there also appeared a new set
of arguments which although evolutionist in orientation, assumed some sort
of sub-societal fixed mating and rearing unit which is biologically determined.
Social change was treated as a direct product of organic mechanisms. The
theoreticians who adopted this position frowned on the holistic schematiza-
tions of the metaphysicians. The advocates of an original primitive promis-
cuity were presumed 'unscientific' and unkind to evidence, if not actually
ignorant of it, in their advocacy of a condition which was not substantiated
by hard ethnographic data. Primitive promiscuity was a mere philosophic
construct.
Certainly Marx, as early as 1857 to 1858, subscribed to the notion of a
kind of primitive promiscuity on theoretical grounds: "Man is only individual-
ized through the process of history. He originally appears as a generic being,
a herd animal--though by no means a political animal in the political sense.
Exchange itself is a major agent of this individualization. It makes the herd
animal superfluous and dissolves it" (Marx, 1965, p. 96). He gives as reason
for accepting this herd animal the impossibility of conceiving man as an
isolate to begin with.
Similarly, Spencer favored the notion of primitive promiscuity on theoret-
ical grounds. Evolution in all realms, physical, biological, social, was to
Spencer a general process involving a movement from indefinite incoherent
homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity and social evolution moved
from the homogeneity of the herd toward greater and greater social com-
plexity and individuation.
But it is hardly true to say that these theoreticians who were conceptualizing
processes on a grand and general scale disregarded evidence. Engels, the heir
apparent of Marx, constantly refers to the work of naturalists in his The
Origin of the Family (1942), first published in 1884, which the author denotes
as the execution of a bequest of Marx. His presentation of a materialist
conception of history in his examination of precultural mating patterns proves
270 L. LEIBOWITZ
tO be a compendium of references to scientific works on animals and men,
written after Darwin's Descent of Man. A work by Alfred Victor Espinas,
from which Engels quotes extensively, afforded him information on herds and
herd organization. Studies on the origin and evolution of family by noted
naturalists provided further animal information. Using Letourneau's data on
mammals Engels catalogs briefly all the various mating assemblages known and
discusses the forms attributed to the quadrumana which he notes includes
every variant save 'polyandry'. He calls attention to the fact that Saussure and
Westermarck claim Letourneau's evidence is at fault by reporting that the quad-
rumana are 'monogamous'. He quotes Letourneau's finding that " A m o n g
mammals there is no strict relation between the degree of intellectual develop-
ment and the form o f sexual life" (Engels, 1942, p. 29) and notes that most
animals follow mating patterns (e.g. are not 'promiscuous') which are
physiologically determined. He then presents Espinas' conclusions, with
which he concurs:
"The herd is the highest social group which we can observe among animals.
It is composed, so it appears, of families, but from the start the family and the
herd are in conflict with one another, and develop in inverse proportion . . . .
When the family bond is close and exclusive, herds form only in exceptional
cases. When on the other hand free sexual intercourse or polygamy prevails,
the herd comes into being almost spontaneously" (quoted in Engels, 1942,
p. 29).
Only then does Engels, in terms of a unified theory of social evolution,
present his conclusion that "Mutual toleration among males . . . was the
first condition for the formation of those larger, permanent groups in which
alone animals could become men" (1942, p. 31).
The charge that the proponents of variously defined 'primitive promis-
cuity' violated or ignored evidence to serve a theoretical construct hardly
seems appropriate, for it is apparent that the testing of theory against evidence
and evidence against theory was continuous.
On the other hand, those who opposed primitive promiscuity as an original
condition were far from being anti-evolutionary, or free of theoretical con-
structs, though it soon became apparent that fragmented explanation of
social phenomena was a consequence of a mechanistic application o f Dar-
winian concepts.

7. The Case of Wake and Maitland

The Development of Marriage and Kinship (1967), an 1889 work by C.
Staniland Wake, is a sophisticated example of the admixture o f Darwinian
concepts and the social empiricist explanations to which they gave rise.
Wake rejects original primitive promiscuity in favor of Darwin's male
 I M P A C T OF D A R W I N ON SOCIAL E V O L U T I O N 271
dominated harem. He suggests a developmental sequence which goes from
this form into group marriage: the groups which intermarry consist of
moieties,, descended from the two wives of the male ancestor who is the
patriarch of old, and the literal father of the tribe. Wake then proposes that
polyandry and polygyny are forms of group marriage. Polyandry arises out
of poverty, whereas polygyny arises out of (1) wealth, (2) the sexual needs of
the wandering male hunter, (3) male scarcity, and (4) the desire for influence
and power (Wake, 1967, p. 202). The reasons for the origin of monandry, a
form which may originate out of any of the forms already cited, are various,
depending on what is already practiced. Monandry may be the result (1) of
the effect of wealth on polyandry, or (2) the effect of poverty on polygyny.
The origin of monandry out of group marriage is not clearly explicable
economically. "Possibly, however, the origin must be sought, not in the
material surrounds of the persons preferring individual marriage, but in ideas
formed consequent on the development of mental culture" (Wake, 1967,
p. 229).
Wake favors no causality above any other, nor does he develop any syn-
thetic theory amalgamating different realms of causality. In fact, despite
proposing an alternative set of evolutionary stages, he is not concerned with
theory building so much as with information. In his second chapter he
devotes himself to demonstrating that instances of so-called primitive promis-
cuity among humans cited in the literature are cases in which clear-cut if
unfamiliar codes of rules apply, thus demonstrating that primitive promis-
cuity did not occur among living human societies--information which was
readily acknowledged by the theoreticians whom he was attacking.
Having thrown doubts on doubtful information, Wake fails to note that
Darwin's postulated early form of human social organization is as inferential
as primitive promiscuity. As Darwin's proposal, though, it is treated as data.
Like many thinkers of his" period Wake found himself justifying Darwin's
conclusions without acknowledging that these conclusions were based on a
theory which precluded treating social phenomena as independent variables.
The conflict or duality in his position is apparent: 'family', on the one hand,
is based on behavioral constants, while on the other hand, it is varied and
subject to change. Are the changes in family the results of changes in rules,
or are they expressions of regularities resulting from changing organisms ?
The anomalous position in which Wake found himself is apparent in his
introductory remarks. "The idea of law implies restraint on free action, but
the restraint may not necessarily have been imposed by man on man; as it
may have been implanted in man's nature, whether he sprang from an inferior
form of animal life, or was derived from a superior source" (1967, pp. lv-lvi).
To avoid the superna2ural source, Wake ultimately adopted Darwin's picture
272 L. LEIBOWITZ
of man as an instinctive creature, a family man by nature with an incurable
roving eye, and a native repugnance toward seducing his sister. Darwin's
'social instinct' becomes 'social restraint' in Wake to account for the sub-
mersion of the individual in the group. Wake, going beyond Darwin, posits a
'natural restraint' towards the commission of incest. Two years after Wake's
book was published, Westermarck formulated this native repugnance as a
necessary outcome of human social rearing, as an aversion to mating with
those with whom one has been raised.
By stressing the biologic basis of sexual behavior and the presumed result-
ant forms of relationship, Darwin's formulations when adopted by social
scientists necessarily limited discussions of the social factors in the origins of
key social institutions, thus generating and perpetuating difficulties in defining
family. Other institutions were similarly tied to biological changes by linking
intellectual capacity and social complexity. This limitation on the develop-
ment of general theories of change moved authors like Wake toward
specificity. (Polyandry has one kind of cause, monandry another, group
marriage a third etc., without any integrating theory of the relationship
between different kinds of causalities.) Where Wake moved toward specificity
with respect to cross-method generalization on particular forms of institu-
tions, Maitland went even further in rejecting the possibility of a general
theory of evolution, treating each culture group as if subject to unique
processes because of a unique history.
"Even had our anthropologists at their command material that would
justify them in prescribing a normal programme for the human r a c e . . , as
Stage A, Stage B, Stage C and so forth, we should still have to face the fact
that rapidly progressive groups have been just those which have not been
independent, which have not worked out their own salvation, but have
appropriated alien ideas and have thus been enabled.., to leap from Stage A
to Stage X without passing through any intermediate stages" (quoted in
Maine, 1963, p. 417.)

In Maitland's formulation (to which Kroeber is indebted) only specific

societies are discussed. Darwin's theory of biological evolution rested on the
demonstration that unique sequences of forms illustrate common processes.
The lack of obvious mechanical sequence in social forms in any one human
group seemed to prevent the development of a parallel theory of social
evolution.
Many factors helped to generate doubt about the value of cultural evolu-
tionary theorizing. The difficulty of accepting and rejecting Darwinism
simultaneously was complicated by the proliferation of information which
apparently contradicted specific evolutionary constructs such as 'savages'
with pottery; North American hunters with privately owned trap lines;
 IMPACT OF DARWIN ON SOCIAL EVOLUTION 273
primitives with 'irrational' economic behavior; complicated kin systems
among simple gatherers (systems which proved more complex to later
analysts than to earlier ones); analphabetic city states etc. Evidence, especially
in the realm of 'family', was unclear at best. Identical forms seemed to
operate differently in different settings, revealing how unclear were some of
the definitions and categories in use. Primitive promiscuity was interpreted as
meaning everything from 'a suppression of individual inclination' to parti-
cipation in saturnalia, or having more than one spouse, or premarital sexual
freedom, or wife lending, etc. The reliability of evidence came under sur-
veillance, and the genuine antiquity of 'ancient' institutions was challenged.
One thing was clear: data about the earliest stages of mankind were
irretrievable.
The irretrievability of data on 'origins' levelled all theories in their
unprovability. Where previously the admission that such data was forever
lost had prompted debate, now, after Darwin had legitimated evolution as a
biological process, such an admission was used to illustrate how fruitless the
whole discussion was for social phenomena. 'Family' was, by virtue of its
kind of impressionistic definition as the mating and rearing social arrange-
ment, a central issue in the argument between defenders of social causality
and the defenders of biological causality. Accepting Darwin's position posed
paradoxes for the analysis of the differences between family forms, and for the
analysis of non-familial institutions. Instead of incorporating the new data
and refining or altering evolutionary theories or proposing new ones, all theory
building relevant to the past (and simultaneously to the future) was reduced
to a trickle, and evolutionary theory was discarded. With evolutionary
theory went family. Darwin, the father of biological evolutionary theory, in
effect acted as a pail bearer of social evolutionary theory, despite the fact that
his notions of selection and adaptation were potentially powerful tools for
conceptualizing social evolution.
Almost by default the last words in the argument fell to Westermarck, (1894)
since no significantly new arguments appeared after his proposal of 1891 that
originally monogamous men practiced incest taboos because of an innate
aversion to mating with individuals with whom they were reared. Rejecting
Darwin's family form he yet used Darwin's notions of instinct. Whatever
his motives, he evidently managed to produce a construct that would have
warmed the heart of Victoria herself, and that seemed like the last remaining
alternative theory possible. By 1910, writers offered only eclectic arguments.
Though Freud's Totem and Taboo (1918) was a later essay into evolution of
family, it essentially was a review of Darwin from a psychological point of
view. (This time the males suffered the guilt.) Classicists, like Jane Harrison,
worried the subject of origins a bit, and were more influenced by Fraser than
274 L. LEIBOWITZ
anthropologists but added little, if anything, to the problem of 'family'.
Anthropologists left family and evolution alone.

8. The Effect of the Argument

What ends did this diminution of discussion achieve? The dilemma of
rejecting and accepting Darwin at one and the same time was avoided. To
accept biological evolution and its mechanisms and to deny those mechanisms
in social evolution was tricky. To do so might lead to the conclusion that man's
differences from other animals was a case of special creation, and Darwin had
been at some pains to slay this dragon. In addition, the whole discussion had
taken on a political cast. The metaphysical "'whole is greater than the sum of
its parts" argument was identified with Marx. To avoid special creation and
yet maintain that different mechanisms obtained in the 'super-organic'
cultural sphere than obtained in the organic sphere, meant subscribing in
one way or another to the Marxian arguments on the transformation of
quantitative differences into qualitative change. But Marxists were revolu-
tionary (and disreputable). Not content with confining their discussions of
social process to past events, they projected them into the future and used
them as a basis for activist attempts to guide the course of change. To
embrace the idea that social evolution is on a different level from organic
evolution is to be open to charges of being either a theologian or an atheistic
revolutionary.
On the other hand, to subscribe to social Darwinism (the idea that social
evolution corresponds to organic evolution) meant subscribing to and endors-
ing colonialist policies. In part, again, this could be taken to be a theological
position, since several variations of scriptural rationales were used to justify
colonialism. (With Darwin's name attached to the notion, this was not likely.)
For humanist social thinkers, social Darwinism had ugly consequences in the
formulation of present and future policy. Thus, subscribing to either social
Darwinism or Marxism meant taking a position on social action. Therefore,
for the survival of the social scientist, it was clearly best for him to have no
position.
The demise of evolutionary discussion accomplished this. Conflicting views
of human nature, as well as conflicting programs of change did not have to be
discussed or resolved, since they were clearly out of the realm of genuine
disinterested analysis. Discussions of evolution became dormant. Family as
an object of analysis ceased to attract attention from the turn of the century
until Murdock's Social Structure (1949) appeared and the universal nuclear
family suddenly assumed importance, reviving the argument by raising
questions about the significance and origins of presumed universals.
 IMPACT OF DARWIN ON SOCIAL EVOLUTION 275

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