LLMAS v.
ORBOS
FACTS:
-Petitioner Rodolfo D. Llamas is the incumbent Vice-Governor of the Province of Tarlac and, on
March 1, 1991 he assumed, by virtue of a decision of the Office of the President, the
governorship (p. 1, Petition). Private respondent Mariano Un Ocampo III is the incumbent
Governor of the Province of Tarlac and was suspended from office for a period of 90 days.
Public respondent Oscar Orbos was the Executive Secretary at the time of the filing of this
petition and is being impleaded herein in that official capacity for having issued, by authority of
the President, the assailed Resolution granting executive clemency to respondent governor.
-Sometime in 1989, petiotioner, together with Tarlac Board Members Marcelino Aganon, Jr. and
Arnaldo P. Dizon, filed on June 13, 1989 a verified complaint dated June 7, 1989 against
respondent governor before the then Department of Local Government (DLG, for short),
charging him with alleged violation of Section 203(2) (f) 203(2) (p), and 208(w), of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, and other
appropriate laws, among them, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices ACt. Prior to that, petitoner
filed with the Office of the Omdusman a verified complainant dated November 10, 1988 against
respondent governor for the latter's alleged viloation of Section 3-G of Republic Act. (R.A.) No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
-Petitioner maintains that sometime in August, 1988, respondent governor, in his official
capacity as Provincial Governor Tarlac, entered into and executed a Loan Agreement with
Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc., a non-stock and non-profit organization headed by the
governor himself as chairman and controlled by his brother-in-law as executive director, trustee,
and secretary; that the said Loan Agreement was never authorized and approved by the
Provincial Board, in direct contravention of the provisions of the Local Government Code; that
the said Agreement is wholly one-sided in favor of the Foundation and grossly inimical to the
interest of the Provincial Government (because it did not provide for interest or for any type
security and it did not provide for suretyship and comptrollership or audit to control the safe
disbursement of said loan); that a total amount of P20,000,000.00 was disbursed to the
aforesaid Foundation; that the transactions constitute a fraudulent scheme to defraud the
Provincial Government; and that the said Agreement is wholly unconstitutional, illegal, a
immoral.
-On the other hand, it is the contention of respondent governor that "the funds were intended to
generate livelihood project among the residents of Tarlac and the use of the Lingkod Tarlac
Foundation, Inc. was authorized by law and considered the best alternative as a matter of
judgment." (pp. 12-13, Appeal Memorandom); that he resigned from the said Foundation in
order to forestall any suspicion that he would influence it; that it is not true that the Loan
Agreement did not provide for continuing audit by the Provincial Government because the
Memorandum of Agreement provides otherwise; and that the Agreement is not manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the Provincial Government and respondent governor did not and
would not profit thereby because it provided sufficient safeguards for repayment.
-After trial, the Secretary of the then Department of Local Government rendered a decision
dated September 21, 1990, dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Governor Mariano Un Ocampo III is, as he hereby found guilty of having
violated Section 3(g) of Republic Act No.3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act
-Parenthetically, be it noted that the Resolution imposed not a preventive suspension but a
penalty of suspension.
Respondent govemor moved for a reconsideration of the abovequoted decision but the same
was denied on October 19, 1990. Aggrieved, he appealed the DLG decision dated September
21, 1990 and the order of denial dated October 19, 1990 to the Office of the President (O.P.
Case No. 4480).
On February 26, 1991, herein public respondent Executive Secretary issued a Resolution
dismissing respondent governor's appeal and affirming the September 21, 1990 DLG decision.
-Subsequently, and pursuant to Sec. 66, Chapter 4 of B.P. Blg. 337, to the effect that the
decision of the Office of the President in administrative suspension of local officials shall be
immediately executory without prejudice to appeal to appropriate courts, petitioner, on March 1,
1991, took his oath of office as acting governor. Under the administrative suspension order,
petitioner had up to May 31, 1991 as acting governor. On the same date (March 1, 1991),
respondent govemor moved for a reconsideration of the Executive Secretary's Resolution, to
which petitioner filed an opposition. From the allegations of the petitioner in his petition,
respondent govemor accepted his suspension and turned over his office to petitioner.
To the surprise of petitioner, however, respondent govemor on March 19, 1991, issued an
"administrative order" dated March 8, 1991, in which the latter signified his intention to
"(continue, as I am bound to exercise my fimctions as govemor and shall hold office at my
residence," in the belief that "the pendency of my Motion for Reconsideration precludes the
coming into finality as executory the DLG decision." (Annex "E", Petition; p. 10, Comment). And,
as categorically stated in the petition, the reassumption ceremony by respondent governor was
held on May 21, 1991 (p. 8, Petition).
Without ruling on respondent governor's Motion for Reconsideration, public respondent issued a
Resolution dated
-Petitioner's act, vis-a-vis the loan to LTFI, may have been promp by an over eagerness to
accelerate the delivery of livelihood services to his provincemates. As the truism goes, however,
the end does not always justify the means. Be that as it may, but without belaboring the
propriety of the loan agreement aforementioned, some measure of leniency may be accorded
petitioner as the purpose of his suspen sion may have made its mark.
WHEREFORE, Governor Mariano Un Ocampo III is hereby granted executive clemency in the
sense that his ninety-day suspension is hereby reduced to the period already served.
-By virtue of the aforequoted Resolution, respondent governor reassumed the governorship of
the province, allegedly withou any notification made to the petitioner.
-Petitioner posits that the issuance by public respondent of the May 15, 1991 Resolution was
"whimsical, capricious and despotic, and constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting lack
of jurisdiction," (p. 6, petition) basically on the ground th executive clemency could be granted
by the President only in criminal cases as there is nothing in the statute books or even in the
Constitution which allows the grant thereof in administrative cases. Petitioner also contends that
since respondent governor refused to recognize his suspension (having reassumed the
governorship in gross defiance of the suspension order), executive clemency cannot apply to
him; that his rights to due process were violated because the grant of executive clemency was
so sudden that he was not even notified thereof; and that despite a finding by public respondent
of impropriety in the loan transaction entered into by respondent governor, the former failed to
justify the reduction of the penalty of suspension on the latter. Petitioner further alleges that the
executive clemency granted by public respondent was "the product of a hocus-pocus strategy"
(p. 1, Manifestation with Motion, etc.) because there was allegedly no real petition for the grant
of executive clemency filed by respondent governor.
ISSUES: 1. WON President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency
in administrative cases.
2. whether or not the grant of executive clemency and the reason therefore, are
political questions beyond judicial review, and
3. whether or not the questioned act was characterized by grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
HELD: 1. YES.
2. NO.
3. NO.
(AS TO NO. 2) Such a rule does not hold true in the case at bar. While it is true that
courts cannot inquire into the manner in which the President's discretionary powers are
exercised or into the wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled rule that when the issue involved
concerns the validity of such discretionary powers or whether said powers are within the limits
prescribed by the Constitution, We will not decline to exercise our power of judicial review. And
such review does not constitute a modification or correction of the act of the President, nor does
it constitute interference with the functions of the President.
-Petitioner's main argument is that the President may grant executive clemency only in
criminal cases, based on Art. VII, Sec. 19 of the Constitution which reads: Sec. 19. Except in
cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
-According to the petitioner, the qualifying phrase "after conviction by final judgment" applies
solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to
anyone who has been "convicted in an administrative case," allegedly because the word
"conviction" refers only to criminal cases (par. 22-b, c, d, Petition). Petitioner, however,
describes in his very own words, respondent governor as one who has been "convicted in an
administrative case" (par. 22-a, petition). Thus, petitioner concedes that the word "conviction"
may be used either in a criminal case or in an administrative case.
-Moreover, applying the doctrine "Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos," We
cannot sustain petitioner's view. In other words, if the law does not distinguish, so We must not
distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency
may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same
token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be
unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII,
Section 19 of the Constitution. Following the petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of
impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve
criminal offenses.
-In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President
cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if the
President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in
criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative
cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
-A number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize or support the exercise of the executive
clemency in administrative cases.
Under Sec. 43 of P.D. 807, "In meritorious cases, ..., the President may commute or remove
administrative penalties or disabilities issued upon officers and employees, in disciplinary cases,
subject to such terms and conditions as he may impose in the interest of the service."
-During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, a subject of deliberations was the
proposed amendment to Art. VII, Sec. 19 which reads as follows: "However, the power to grant
executive clemency for violation of corrupt practices laws may be limited by legislation."The
Constitutional Commission, however, voted to remove the amendment, since it was in
derogation of the powers of the President.
-The proposal was primarily intended to prevent the President from protecting his cronies.
Manifestly, however, the Commission preferred to trust in the discretion of Presidents and
refrained from putting additional limitations on his clemency powers.
-It is evident from the intent of the Constitutional Commission, therefore, that the President's
executive clemency powers may not be limited in terms of coverage, except as already provided
in the Constitution, that is, "no pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation
of election laws, rules and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable
recommendation of the COMELEC" (Article IX, C, Section 5, Constitution). If those already
adjudged guilty criminally in court may be pardoned, those adjudged guilty administratively
should likewise be extended the same benefit.
-In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond
reasonable doubt, but the Constitution grants to the President the power to pardon the act done
by the proved criminal and in the process exempts him from punishment therefor. On the other
hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is mere substantial evidence to
support a decision, not to mention that as to the admissibility of evidence, administrative bodies
are not bound by the technical and rigid rules of admissibility prescribed in criminal cases. It will
therefore be unjust and unfair for those found guilty administratively of some charge if the same
effects of pardon or executive clemency cannot be extended to them, even in the sense of
modifying a decision to subserve the interest of the public.
-Of equal importance are the following provisions of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known
as the Administrative Code of 1987, Section I, Book III of which provides:
SECTION 1. Power of Control. — The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
SECTION 38. Definition of Administrative Relationships. — Unless otherwise expressly stated in
the Code or in other laws defining the special relationships of particular agencies, administrative
relationships shall be categorized and defined as follows:
-(1) Supervision and Control. — Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the
performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts
and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and
programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law governing the
relationship of particular agencies the word "control" shall encompass supervision and control
as defined in this paragraph. ... (emphasis supplied)
The disciplinary authority to investigate, suspend, and remove provincial or city officials
devolves at the first instance on the Department of Interior and Local Government (Secs. 61 and
65, B.P. Blg. 337) and ultimately on the President (Sec. 66). Implicit in this authority, however, is
the "supervision and control" power of the President to reduce, if circumstances so warrant, the
imposable penalty or to modify the suspension or removal order, even "in the sense" of granting
executive clemency. "Control," within the meaning of the Constitution, is the power to substitute
one's own judgment for that of a subordinate. Under the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency,
the different executive departments are mere adjuncts of the President. Their acts are
presumptively the acts of the President until countermanded or reprobated by her (Vinena v.
Secretary, 67 Phil. 451; Free Telephone Workers Union vs. Minister of Labor and Employment,
108 SCRA 767 [1981]). Replying upon this view, it is urged by the Solicitor General that in the
present case, the President, in the exercise of her power of supervision and control over all
executive departments, may substitute her decision for that of her subordinate, most especially
where the basis therefor would be to serve the greater public interest. It is clearly within the
power of the President not only to grant "executive clemency" but also to reverse or modify a
ruling issued by a subordinate against an erring public official, where a reconsideration of the
facts alleged would support the same. It is in this sense that the alleged executive clemency
was granted, after adducing reasons that subserve the public interest. — "the relative success
of . . . livelihood loan program." (pp. 39-40, Comment of public respondent)
-We wish to stress however that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, We refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in
the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.
-Consequently, respondent governor's acceptance of the presidential pardon "serves to put an
end" to the motion for reconsideration and renders the subject decision final, that of the period
already served.
-Finally, petitioner's argument that his constitutional rights to due process were violated is
uruneritorious. Pardon has been defined as "the private, though official, act of the executive
magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended and not communicated
officially to the court. ..." (Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed. 1988, pp.
239-240, citing U.S. v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150 [U.S. 1833]). Thus, assuming that petitioner was not
notified of the subject pardon, it is only because said notice is unnecessary.
--WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) DECLARING that the President did not act
arbitrarily or with abuse, much less grave abuse of discretion in issuing the May 15, 1991
Resolution granting on the grounds mentioned therein, executive clemency to respondent
governor and that, accordingly, the same is not unconstitutional (without prejudice to criminal
proceedings which have been filed or may be filed against respondent governor), and (2)
DENYING the rest of the prayers in the petition for being unmeritorious, moot and academic. No
costs.
