G.R. No.
147406 July 14, 2008
VENANCIO FIGUEROA y CERVANTES,1 Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
When is a litigant estopped by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of a tribunal? This is the
paramount issue raised in this petition for review of the February 28, 2001 Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22697.
Pertinent are the following antecedent facts and proceedings:
On July 8, 1994, an information3 for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed
against the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 18.4 The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.5 Trial on the merits ensued and on
August 19, 1998, the trial court convicted the petitioner as charged.6 In his appeal before the
CA, the petitioner questioned, among others, for the first time, the trial court’s jurisdiction.7
The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision, considered the petitioner to have
actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC;
thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction.
Finding no other ground to reverse the trial court’s decision, the CA affirmed the petitioner’s
conviction but modified the penalty imposed and the damages awarded.8
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the
following issues for our resolution:
a. Does the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the
trial of this case, which was initiated and filed by the public prosecutor before the
wrong court, constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in
petitioner’s appeal to the Honorable Court of Appeals? Conversely, does the active
participation of the petitioner in the trial of his case, which is initiated and filed not by
him but by the public prosecutor, amount to estoppel?
b. Does the admission of the petitioner that it is difficult to immediately stop a bus
while it is running at 40 kilometers per hour for the purpose of avoiding a person who
unexpectedly crossed the road, constitute enough incriminating evidence to warrant
his conviction for the crime charged?
c. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in considering the place of accident as
falling within Item 4 of Section 35 (b) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
and subsequently ruling that the speed limit thereto is only 20 kilometers per hour,
when no evidence whatsoever to that effect was ever presented by the prosecution
during the trial of this case?
d. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in convicting the petitioner for homicide
through reckless imprudence (the legally correct designation is "reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide") with violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code when the prosecution did not prove this during the trial and, more importantly,
the information filed against the petitioner does not contain an allegation to that
effect?
e. Does the uncontroverted testimony of the defense witness Leonardo Hernal that
the victim unexpectedly crossed the road resulting in him getting hit by the bus driven
by the petitioner not enough evidence to acquit him of the crime charged?9
Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a
case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such
statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.10 In this case, at the time the criminal
information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with violation of the Automobile
Law (now Land Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed, Section 32(2) of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 12911 had already been amended by Republic Act No. 7691.12 The said
provision thus reads:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.—Except in cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however,
That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6
years,13 jurisdiction to hear and try the same is conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts
(MTCs). Clearly, therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does not have jurisdiction over Criminal
Case No. 2235-M-94.
While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General acknowledge this fact, they
nevertheless are of the position that the principle of estoppel by laches has already
precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC—the trial went on for 4
years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever raising the
jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a
court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. As
undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable.
To settle once and for all this problem of jurisdiction vis-à-vis estoppel by laches, which
continuously confounds the bench and the bar, we shall analyze the various Court decisions
on the matter.
As early as 1901, this Court has declared that unless jurisdiction has been conferred by
some legislative act, no court or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it.14 We went on to
state in U.S. v. De La Santa15 that:
It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter is fatal, and
subject to objection at any stage of the proceedings, either in the court below or on appeal
(Ency. of Pl. & Pr., vol. 12, p. 189, and large array of cases there cited), and indeed, where
the subject-matter is not within the jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the proceeding ex
mero motu. (4 Ill., 133; 190 Ind., 79; Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.)
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign
authority which organizes the court; it is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by
law and an objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction can not be waived by the parties.
x x x16
Later, in People v. Casiano,17 the Court explained:
4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly
depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction,
but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not
barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of
law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861-863).
However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a
given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it
to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position—
that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that
jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no
bearing thereon. Thus, Corpus Juris Secundum says:
Where accused has secured a decision that the indictment is void, or has been granted an
instruction based on its defective character directing the jury to acquit, he is estopped, when
subsequently indicted, to assert that the former indictment was valid. In such case, there
may be a new prosecution whether the indictment in the former prosecution was good or
bad. Similarly, where, after the jury was impaneled and sworn, the court on accused's motion
quashed the information on the erroneous assumption that the court had no jurisdiction,
accused cannot successfully plead former jeopardy to a new information. x x x (22 C.J.S.,
sec. 252, pp. 388-389; italics ours.)
Where accused procured a prior conviction to be set aside on the ground that the court was
without jurisdiction, he is estopped subsequently to assert, in support of a defense of
previous jeopardy, that such court had jurisdiction." (22 C.J.S. p. 378.)18
But in Pindañgan Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Dans,19 the Court, in not sustaining the plea of lack
of jurisdiction by the plaintiff-appellee therein, made the following observations:
It is surprising why it is only now, after the decision has been rendered, that the plaintiff-
appellee presents the question of this Court’s jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act No.
2613 was enacted on August 1, 1959. This case was argued on January 29, 1960.
Notwithstanding this fact, the jurisdiction of this Court was never impugned until the adverse
decision of this Court was handed down. The conduct of counsel leads us to believe that
they must have always been of the belief that notwithstanding said enactment of Republic
Act 2613 this Court has jurisdiction of the case, such conduct being born out of a conviction
that the actual real value of the properties in question actually exceeds the jurisdictional
amount of this Court (over ₱200,000). Our minute resolution in G.R. No. L-10096, Hyson
Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compaña de Seguros, et al., of March 23, 1956, a parallel case, is
applicable to the conduct of plaintiff-appellee in this case, thus:
x x x that an appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the Court of Appeals for
decision, without questioning the latter’s jurisdiction until decision is rendered therein, should
be considered as having voluntarily waived so much of his claim as would exceed the
jurisdiction of said Appellate Court; for the reason that a contrary rule would encourage the
undesirable practice of appellants submitting their cases for decision to the Court of Appeals
in expectation of favorable judgment, but with intent of attacking its jurisdiction should the
decision be unfavorable: x x x20
Then came our ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy21 that a party may be barred by laches from
invoking lack of jurisdiction at a late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done in the
case with the active participation of said party invoking the plea. We expounded, thus:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of
estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute
of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just
cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court
had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in
such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or
order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a
practice cannot be tolerated—obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering
an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or
power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 [Link].
283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16
Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the
jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny
that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of
the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra)—to the effect that we frown upon the
"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse—as well as
in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano et al. vs.
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court
of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p.
277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31,
1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved
which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a
quo, as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after
an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the
question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be
declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on
July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The
inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.22
For quite a time since we made this pronouncement in Sibonghanoy, courts and tribunals, in
resolving issues that involve the belated invocation of lack of jurisdiction, have applied the
principle of estoppel by laches. Thus, in Calimlim v. Ramirez,23 we pointed out that
Sibonghanoy was developing into a general rule rather than the exception:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so
numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a
matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This
doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the
ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said
case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The
exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the
accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead
a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in
Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned
ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction
having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after
the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being
barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined
to assert it.24
In Calimlim, despite the fact that the one who benefited from the plea of lack of jurisdiction
was the one who invoked the court’s jurisdiction, and who later obtained an adverse
judgment therein, we refused to apply the ruling in Sibonghanoy. The Court accorded
supremacy to the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or
by estoppel.
Yet, in subsequent cases decided after Calimlim, which by sheer volume are too plentiful to
mention, the Sibonghanoy doctrine, as foretold in Calimlim, became the rule rather than the
exception. As such, in Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc.,25 the Court ruled:
While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule presupposes that
estoppel has not supervened." In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all
stages of the proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an
affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial court’s
jurisdiction, especially when an adverse judgment has been rendered. In PNOC Shipping
and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we held:
Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court x x
x in its answers to both the amended complaint and the second amended complaint. It did so
only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the lower court after it had received an
adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 105180, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477, 491), participation in all stages of the case
before the trial court, that included invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief,
effectively barred petitioner by estoppel from challenging the court’s jurisdiction. Notably,
from the time it filed its answer to the second amended complaint on April 16, 1985,
petitioner did not question the lower court’s jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989
when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the lower court’s decision that petitioner raised
the question of the lower court’s lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to
raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction. (italics ours)
Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. vs. Cabrigas,
we ruled:
In the case at bar, it was found by the trial court in its 30 September 1996 decision in LCR
Case No. Q-60161(93) that private respondents (who filed the petition for reconstitution of
titles) failed to comply with both sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and therefore, it had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. However, private respondents never
questioned the trial court’s jurisdiction over its petition for reconstitution throughout the
duration of LCR Case No. Q-60161(93). On the contrary, private respondents actively
participated in the reconstitution proceedings by filing pleadings and presenting its evidence.
They invoked the trial court’s jurisdiction in order to obtain affirmative relief – the
reconstitution of their titles. Private respondents have thus foreclosed their right to raise the
issue of jurisdiction by their own actions.
The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any
stage, a litigant’s participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, including the
invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, bars such party from challenging the
court’s jurisdiction (PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297
SCRA 402 [1998]). A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction (Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 579
[1998]; Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 442 [1998]). The Court frowns
upon the undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting his
case for decision and then accepting judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction, when adverse (Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. NLRC, 298 SCRA 517
[1998], citing Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA 36 [1995]). (italics
ours)26
Noteworthy, however, is that, in the 2005 case of Metromedia Times Corporation v.
Pastorin,27 where the issue of
