[G.R. No. 86819. November 9, 1989.

] and the running of the period within which to appeal therefrom or file a motion for reconsideration
cannot be deemed to commence thereby.
ADAMSON OZANAM EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION INC., ALSO KNOWN AS ADAMSON
UNIVERSITY, Petitioner, v. ADAMSON UNIVERSITY FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES While it is true that said former counsel of petitioner failed to withdraw his appearance, the NLRC can
ASSOCIATION AND CONRADO MAGLAYA, COMMISSIONER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR take judicial notice of the fact that Mr. Justice Narvasa was already elevated to the Supreme Court at
RELATIONS COMMISSION, Respondents. the time the decision in this case was promulgated. Since its decisions are reviewable by the
Supreme Court such matter of public knowledge should be within the judicial notice of the NLRC
Ongkiko, Bucoy & Associates for Petitioner. because of the nature of their functions.
Cresenciano I. Espino, Teotico Quevedo & A. Organista for Private Respondent.
FACTS: The Adamson Ozanam Educational Institution, Inc. also known as the Adamson
RESOLUTION University (AU) was granted by the then Ministry of Education, Culture & Sports (MECS), the
authority to increase their tuition fees by 10% and 5% for the school year 1983-84.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The Adamson University Faculty and Employees Association (AUFEA) believing that under P.D.
SUMMARY: Petitioner Adamson University was granted by the MECS authority to increase their No. 451 60% thereof should be allocated for the increase in salaries and wages of the members
tuition fees by 10% and 5% for AY 1983-1984. The Adamson University Faculty and Employees of the faculty and other members of the school filed a complaint in the Ministry of Labor &
Association demanded remittance of 60% of the increase to the faculty and the staff and filed a Employment (MOLE) against the AU for the recovery of the said 60%.
complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment against the Adamson University for such
remittance. The contention of the AU is that P.D. No. 451 was repealed by the Educational Act of 1982, which
took effect on September 12, 1982, and that assuming that B.P. No. 451 was not repealed,
The Labor Arbiter held in favor of the AU and dismissed the complaint. On appeal to the NLRC, the complainant is not entitled to any benefit considering that there was no actual increment
latter reversed the LA and held in favor of the AUFEA. The NLRC decision was rendered on proceeds in the tuition fee increase for the school year 1983-84 upon which to base the 60%
September 30, 1988. A motion for reconsideration of the said decision filed by the AU was denied in a allocation.
resolution dated January 30, 1989 for having been filed out of time.
In a decision of the labor arbiter dated March 31, 1986 the complaint was dismissed for lack of
AU now contends that its motion for reconsideration should not have been denied for being filed out merit. The AUFEA appealed therefrom to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
of time considering that the NLRC decision was served not upon the AU or its counsel but rather on wherein in due course a decision was rendered on September 30, 1988 setting aside the
the security guard of the building where its former counsel held office, now Justice Narvasa. appealed decision and ordering the AU to remit to the members of AUFEA the amount of
P1,298,160.00 representing the 60% share in the increment proceeds of the tuition fees collected for
The facts reveal that the NLRC decision was served on October 11, 1988upon the security guard of the school year 1983-84. A motion for reconsideration of the said decision filed by the AU was
the building of AU’s former counsel, Atty. Andres Narvasa (Now, Justice Narvasa). denied in a resolution dated January 30, 1989 for having been filed out of time.

In denying the motion for reconsideration the NLRC observed that the former counsel of petitioner did Hence, the herein petition for certiorari filed by the AU. On February 22, 1989, the court
not withdraw nor file a manifestation that his office had been dissolved so he cannot continue to act dismissed the petition for failure to sufficiently show that respondent commission had
as counsel thereof. committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering its questioned judgment. A motion for
reconsideration hereof was filed by petitioner to which respondents were required to file their
Issue: Whether the service of the NLRC decision upon the security guard was effective to start the comment. The desired comments having been submitted and the reply thereto filed by petitioner, the
10-day period for appeal, considering that Justice Narvasa did not file his manifestation for withdrawal court finds a cogent basis to grant the motion for reconsideration. The petition is based on the
as counsel to the NLRC following arguments:

Held: The service was improper. The SC cited Section 4, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court: "SERVICE OF THE DECISION UPON THE SECURITY GUARD OF THE TOEFEMI
BUILDING, WHERE RESPONDENT’S FORMER COUNSEL USED TO HOLD OFFICE, IS
Section 4. Personal Service. — Service of the papers may be made by delivering INEFFECTIVE AND DOES NOT CAUSE THE RUNNING OF THE 10-DAY PERIOD FOR
personally a copy to the party or his attorney, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or AN APPEAL.
with a person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or his office is not
known, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the BASED ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE, THE SUBJECT DECISION PROMULGATED
evening, at the party’s or attorney’s residence, if known, with a person of sufficient ON 30 SEPTEMBER 1988 IS CONTRARY TO THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN CEBU
discretion to receive the same. INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY ET AL. VS. HON. BLAS OPLE, ET AL"

Under the foregoing rule, service of papers should be delivered personally to the party or attorney or ISSUES:
by leaving it at his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. The service of the (1) WON the service of the NLRC’s decision to the guard of the building where Mr. Narvaso
court’s order upon any person other than the party’s counsel is not legally effective. Where the copy used to hold office was sufficient to start the running of the 10-day appeal period (No)
of the decision is served on a person who is neither a clerk or one in charge of the attorney’s office, (2) WON it was proper for the NLRC to order the remittance of the 60% to the AUFEA (No)
such service is invalid and the decision does not therefore become executory.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is granted and the resolution of February 22, 1989 is set aside; the petition
The security guard of the building where the attorney is holding office is neither the office clerk nor a is GRANTED so that the questioned decision of the NLRC dated September 30, 1988 and its resolution dated January 20, 1989 are
hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE while the decision of the labor arbiter dated March 31, 1986 dismissing the complaint for lack of
person in charge thereof as contemplated in the rules. In PLDT v. NLRC, this Court ruled that the merit is hereby AFFIRMED without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
service of the decision at the ground floor of a party’s building when the office is at the 9th floor is not RATIO:
a valid service.
SERVICE OF THE NLRC DECISION ON THE SECURITY GUARD INEFFECTIVE
From the foregoing, it is clear that the service of the decision dated October 11, 1988 on the security
guard of the building where the then counsel for petitioner was holding office was an invalid service
On the first issue, it appears that the decision of the NLRC dated September 30, 1988 was served In the case of Cebu Institute of Technology v. Hon. Blas Ople, 5 this Court ruled that P.D. No. 451
to the office of the counsel for petitioner on October 11, 1988 through the security guard of the was repealed by B.P. 232 effective September 11, 1982. From the said date the governing law on the
building. The office of then counsel for petitioner, Atty. Andres Narvasa (now member of this Court), disposition of the 60% incremental proceeds on the tuition fees are the appropriate provisions of B.P.
was located at the TOEFEMI building. The copy of the decision was addressed to Atty. Roberto I. Blg. 232, which, in pertinent part provides as follows:
Santos of said law office. However, at the time of said service the said law office was already
dissolved as Atty. Narvasa was appointed as a member of this Court. Nevertheless, a copy of "‘Not less than sixty (60) percent of the incremental tuition proceeds shall be used for salaries or
said decision was transmitted by the former office of now Mr. Justice Narvasa to the present counsel wages, allowances and fringe benefits of faculty and support staff, including cost of living allowance,
of record for petitioner on November 5, 1988 who promptly filed a motion for reconsideration on imputed costs of contributed services, thirteenth (13th) month pay, retirement fund contributions,
November 15, 1988. social security, medicare, unpaid school personnel claims, and payment as may be prescribed by
mandated wage orders, collective bargaining agreements and voluntary employer practices . . .’ (Sec.
In denying the motion for reconsideration the NLRC observed that the former counsel of 42; Emphasis supplied)"
petitioner did not withdraw nor file a manifestation that his office had been dissolved so he
cannot continue to act as counsel thereof. Accordingly, as of September 11, 1982, Section 3(a) of PD 451 which limits the disposition of said
60% incremental proceeds increase in tuition fees to those of salaries and wages is deemed
Thus the question that arises is whether the service of the copy of the decision upon the abrogated by way of repeal. 6 Indeed even prior thereto this Court ruled in the University of the East
security guard of the building where the former office of petitioner’s counsel was located was v. UE Faculty Association 7 as follows:l
sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law. Section 4, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court which is suppletory to the rules of the NLRC, provides as follows: "‘We are underscoring such modification because as We see it, it settles the second main issue We
have stated at the outset as to whether or not increase of salaries of wages or allowances or benefits
"Section 4. Personal Service. — Service of the papers may be made by delivering secured by collective bargaining may be charged against the incremental proceeds (60%) under PD
personally a copy to the party or his attorney, or by leaving it in his office with his 451. We read the latest Malacañang decision to mean that increase of salaries even those secured
clerk or with a person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or his by collective bargaining may be charged to the 60% incremental proceeds of MEC authorized tuition
office is not known, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and fee increases . . .’ (Emphasis ours.)"
six in the evening, at the party’s or attorney’s residence, if known, with a person of sufficient
discretion to receive the same." (Emphasis supplied) MECS Order No. 25 finds legal support in B.P. Blg. 232, otherwise known as the Educational Act of
1982 as said MECS Order is an implementing administrative rule interpretative of a pre-existing
Under the foregoing rule, service of papers should be delivered personally to the party or statute and not declarative of certain rights with obligation thereunder. The same should be given
attorney or by leaving it at his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. The retroactive effect and its effectivity should be on September 11, 1982, which is the date of effectivity
service of the court’s order upon any person other than the party’s counsel is not legally of B.P. Blg. 232, not April 1, 1985. Remedial or curative statutes are by nature intended to be
effective. Where the copy of the decision is served on a person who is neither a clerk or one in retroactive. 8
charge of the attorney’s office, such service is invalid and the decision does not therefore
become executory. And this is as it should be as rules and regulations are and should be for the sole purpose of carrying
into effect a general provision of the law. 9 Thus guided by the Cebu Institute of Technology which
The security guard of the building where the attorney is holding office is neither the office declared the automatic repeal of P.D. 451 respondent NLRC committed a grave error in ruling that
clerk nor a person in charge thereof as contemplated in the rules. In PLDT v. NLRC, this Court petitioner cannot charge to the 60% incremental proceeds the items under paragraph 7.4 of the
ruled that the service of the decision at the ground floor of a party’s building when the office is at the MECS Order No. 25 including collective bargaining.
9th floor is not a valid service.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the service of the decision dated October 11, 1988 on the
security guard of the building where the then counsel for petitioner was holding office was an
invalid service and the running of the period within which to appeal therefrom or file a motion
for reconsideration cannot be deemed to commence thereby.

While it is true that said former counsel of petitioner failed to withdraw his appearance, the
NLRC can take judicial notice of the fact that Mr. Justice Narvasa was already elevated to the
Supreme Court at the time the decision in this case was promulgated. Since its decisions are
reviewable by the Supreme Court such matter of public knowledge should be within the judicial notice
of the NLRC because of the nature of their functions.

NLRC DECISION (IRRELEVANT)

On the second issue, the order of respondent NLRC to petitioner to remit to the respondent AUFEA
the sum of P1,298,160.00 representing its 60% share in the increment tuition fees collected for the
school year 1983-1984 is predicated on the argument that: 1) MECS Order No. 25 took effect on April
1, 1985 and prior thereto this Court has ruled that the 60% incremental proceeds should be applied to
the basic salaries and wages; and 2) inasmuch as the CBA was concluded two (2) days after
petitioner was granted the authority to increase its tuition fees, it does not necessarily follow that the
parties intended that the CBA benefits will be taken from the said incremental proceeds.

We disagree.