Lok Prahari v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh & ors.
Introduction
In this case, a writ petition of civil nature in the
year 2004 was filed in the Supreme Court of India. It
was filed by an NGO Lok Prahari which is based in
Lucknow (U.P). It comprised members who were retired
judges, Indian Administrative Officers, journalists,
retired officers of Indian Police Services etc.
This important case was filed by the general secretary
of this NGO, who had a law degree hence himself argued
the matter in the Court. Interesting fact about this
matter was that on the very first day of the hearing,
judgment was reserved by the court but it was
pronounced after 12 years of the filing of the petition
and 20 months after reserving of this particular
judgment by the Supreme Court of India.
Facts
Following are the brief facts of this case:
This petition was filed by an NGO which was registered
under Societies Registration Act. The NGO worked for
the welfare of general public. Its secretary who was
retired IAS officer appeared and argued the matter on
behalf of the NGO.
This matter was related to the conduct of former Chief
Ministers of Uttar Pradesh and their unauthorized use
of government accommodations.
The prayer was made by the petitioner that the former
Chief Ministers of U.P have not vacated the government
accommodations and bungalows even after they have
released from their posts as Chief Ministers. These
persons were in possession of the properties illegally
without any right to use such property.
The contentions were made challenging the validity of
Ex-Chief Ministers Residence Allotment Rules, 1997.
These rules were illegal, and could not be framed in
contradiction of the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh
Ministers (Salaries, Allowances and Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act, 1981.
It was pointed out by the petitioner that a petition was
filed as Public Interest Litigation in the year 1996 in
Allahabad High Court pertaining to the same situation by
Janhit Sangathan. Till that time there were no such rules
allowing former chief ministers to use the government
residential accommodations.
It was contended that during the pendency of above
mentioned petition in Allahabad High Court State of UP/
respondent framed rules for providing government
residential accommodations to former CMs for their life
and after death their family member would vacate the same
within three months.
Petitioner stated that such petition was amended and it
challenged the validity of the same rules but at the
time of disposal no consideration was paid to that
ground
It was argued by that petitioner that the rules made by
State government of UP are arbitrary in nature and non-
statutory as well as violative of Art 14 of the
constitution in respect of the persons like justices of
high court, judges, other ministers, speakers of
assemblies etc. They also hold the constitutional
positions but are given different treatment than CMs.
Petitioner prayed that the petition should be allowed
and 1997 Rules be quashed as they were violative of Art
14 of the Constitution.
The contention was made by the respondent that in India
the federal structure is followed, no expressive bar is
there if provision is made by the state government for
allotment of residential accommodation to ex-Chief
Ministers.
It was contended by respondent that former Presidents
and the Prime Ministers are also allotted residential
accommodation by the government after they cease to be
on such positions according to the provisions of
President’s (Emoluments and Pension) Act, 1951.
The question was made on behalf of respondent about the
right of the petitioner for challenging the validity of
the 1997 Rules. It was argued that the petitioner has
no locus standi to challenge and this was the ground in
petition of 1996 before High Court which was disposed
off without invalidating these rules, hence this
petition was not maintainable on the same ground.
ISSUES
Thus there were two issues before the Court:
• Whether the PIL is maintainable and the petitioner
has a locus standi to challenge the validity of the
1997 rules.
• Whether the provisions of Ex-Chief Ministers
Residence Allotment Rules, 1997 were valid or contrary
to the provisions of UP Ministers (Salaries, Allowances
and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1981.
DECISION
• The Supreme Court of India held that the petitioner
which was an NGO having retired civil servants, police
officers, judges, journalists as members had no bad
intention and no grudges against any respondent were
found. Given how the NGO works for public welfare, it
was entitled to file such a petition. The Court
observed that the petitioner challenged the 1997 Rules
related to former CMs of state permanently residing in
government bungalows when there is shortage of such
accommodations for relevant people. Petitioner had the
locus standi to file such petition.
• Regarding the second issue, the Court held that the
Uttar Pradesh Ministers (Salaries, Allowances and
Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1981 is statutory in
nature. Thus, the Rules of 1997 which were executive
instructions and administrative in nature could not be
made in contraction of a statute.
• The Court rejected the respondent’s argument and
observed that ministers could not be given same
privilege as given to ex-Presidents and Prime
ministers, who are entitled to official residence for
life.
• The Court also observed that the position of CM and
the Cabinet Ministers of the State cannot stand on a
separate footing after they demit the office.
• The Court held that the 1997 Rules are in direct
contravention to the 1981 Act and thus cannot be
upheld. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs
and it was held that the 1997 Rules so far as they are
not in consonance with the provisions of the Act are
bad in law.
• On the basis of above, Apex Court allowed the
petition and directed that respondents shall hand over
the possession of such bungalows within two months and
state government shall recover the rent from concerned
people of the period for which they were in
unauthorized possession of such property.
Bench’s Verdict
The Apex Court in the case while analyzing the cardinal
principles of equality and fraternity enshrined in our
Constitution made the following observations in the
case:
That the allocation of government bungalows to
constitutional functionaries enumerated in Section 4(3)
of the 1981 Act after such functionaries demit public
office(s) would be clearly subject to judicial review
on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India.
That such bungalows constitute public property which by
itself is scarce and meant for use of current holders
of public offices as manifested by the institution of
Section 4-A in the 1981 Act by the Amendment Act of
1997.
That the questions relating to allocation of such
property, therefore, undoubtedly, are questions of
public character and, therefore, the same would be
amenable for being adjudicated on the touchstone of
reasonable classification as well as arbitrariness.
That Natural resources, public lands and the public
goods like government bungalows/official residence are
public property that belongs to the people of the
country. The ‘Doctrine of Equality’ which emerges from
the concepts of justice, fairness must guide the State
in the distribution/allocation of the same. The Chief
Minister, once he/she demits the office, is at par with
the common citizen, though by virtue of the office
held, he/she may be entitled to security and other
protocols. But allotment of government bungalow, to be
occupied during his/her lifetime, would not be guided
by the constitutional principle of equality.
That Section 4(3) of the 1981 Act would have the effect
of creating a separate class of citizens for conferment
of benefits by way of distribution of public property
on the basis of the previous public office held by
them. Once such persons demit the public office earlier
held by them there is nothing to distinguish them from
the common man. The public office held by them becomes
a matter of history and, therefore, cannot form the
basis of a reasonable classification to categorize
previous holders of public office as a special category
of persons entitled to the benefit of special
privileges. The test of reasonable classification,
therefore, has to fail.
That not only that the legislation i.e. Section 4(3) of
the 1981 Act recognizing former holders of public
office as a special class of citizens, viewed in the
aforesaid context, would appear to be arbitrary and
discriminatory thereby violating the equality clause.
It is a legislative exercise based on irrelevant and
legally unacceptable considerations, unsupported by any
constitutional sanctity.
CONCLUSION
The seminal issue taken up by the Two-Judge Bench of
the Supreme Court in the case was that “Whether
retention of official accommodation by the
functionaries mentioned in Section 4(3) of the 1981 Act
after they had demitted office violate the equality
clause guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution of
India?”
In the case, the Petitioner organization alleged that
former Chief Ministers of the State of Uttar Pradesh
continued to occupy their official accommodation even
after demitting office by virtue of Section 4(3) of the
Uttar Pradesh Ministers (Salaries, Allowances and
Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1981 (hereinafter
referred to as the Act of 1981).
Here it would be relevant to mention that Section 4 of
the Act of 1981 was amended in the year 2016. Under
Section 4(3) brought in by the 2016 Amendment, former
Chief Ministers of the State became entitled to
allotment of government accommodation for their life
time. The validity of the aforesaid Section 4(3), as
amended, has been questioned by the writ petitioner,
which claims to be “committed to upholding of the
Constitution and enforcement of the Rule of law”.
In view of the aforesaid, the Supreme Court held that
Section 4(3) of the 1981 Act cannot pass the test of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India and is,
therefore, liable to be struck down. Hence, Section
4(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Ministers (Salaries,
Allowances and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1981 has
been held to be ultra vires the Constitution of India
as it transgresses the equality clause under Article
14.
