SECOND DIVISION the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61.

5 It appeared in
their marriage contract that Eduardo was "single."
[G.R. NO. 165842 November 29, 2005]
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life.
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE Through their joint efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress
PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making
himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was
DECISION jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap
her.6 Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did
CALLEJO, SR., J.: not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming the Decision2 of the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P. had been previously married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of the
Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R. marriage contract.7 She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she
learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, own vows.8
2001, the accusatory portion of which reads:
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, where she worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus
named accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then previously and legally Gaña, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship
married to RUBYLUS [GAÑA] and without the said marriage having been was in order until this one time when he noticed that she had a "love-bite" on
legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared
contract a second marriage with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein he was "single" in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in
complainant, who does not know the existence of the first marriage of said good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to
EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaña]. go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying
Tina.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife
The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was because she threatened to commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was
married to Rubylus Gaña before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail
was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.4 He met the private after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina
complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not
She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend. Tina heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.
was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was
39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty
thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tina's resistance, beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate
Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10)
on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina
his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina's parents, and was assured by them Gandalera the amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs
that their son was still single. of suit.9

Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
1996. They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, reasonable doubt all the elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. It declared that Eduardo's belief, that his first marriage had been Tan15 and Domingo v. Court of Appeals16 to support its ruling. The dispositive
dissolved because of his first wife's 20-year absence, even if true, did not portion of the decision reads:
exculpate him from liability for bigamy. Citing the ruling of this Court
in People v. Bitdu,10 the trial court further ruled that even if the private WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July
complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter 31, 2002 is hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as it hereby reflects, that accused-
would still be criminally liable for bigamy. appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not years of prision mayor as maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other
criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private respects.
complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He
maintained that at the time that he married the private complainant, he was SO ORDERED.17
of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted
that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant Petition for Review
malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by on Certiorari , insisting that:
malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of his
overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial court I
should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To support
his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW
Peñalosa11 and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.12 WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER'S FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE
LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL CODE
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardo's defense of AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE
good faith and reliance on the Court's ruling in United States v. DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
Enriquez13 were misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the Family
Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this II
Court in Republic v. Nolasco,14 the OSG further posited that as provided in
Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW
presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL
marry. Even assuming that the first marriage was void, the parties thereto DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.18
should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover, The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second
the OSG maintained, the private complainant's knowledge of the first element of the felony, i.e., that the marriage has not been legally dissolved
marriage would not afford any relief since bigamy is an offense against the or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
State and not just against the private complainant. presumed dead under the Civil Code. He avers that when he married
Gandalera in 1996, Gaña had been "absent" for 21 years since 1975; under
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of law. He
trial court was erroneous and sought the affirmance of the decision appealed points out that, under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one
from with modification. who has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is still alive,
shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for succession, while the
On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the second paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of death with
RTC with modification as to the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the respect to succession.
prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the
contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse
Before Manuel could lawfully marry the private complainant, there should arises by operation of law upon the satisfaction of two requirements: the
have been a judicial declaration of Gaña's presumptive death as the absent specified period and the present spouse's reasonable belief that the
spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado v. absentee is dead. He insists that he was able to prove that he had not heard
from his first wife since 1975 and that he had no knowledge of her
whereabouts or whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of the impression
Family Code, the presumptive death of Gaña had arisen by operation of that "in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of
law, as the two requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present. The death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of
petitioner concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy. presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for
bigamy."21
The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in
Article 390 of the Civil Code, the rule therein on legal presumptions remains For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to
valid and effective. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code does it prove the felony: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she
require that there must first be a judicial declaration of death before the rule contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been
on presumptive death would apply. He further asserts that contrary to the lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the
rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the requirement of a judicial second marriage or subsequent marriage.22 It is essential in the prosecution
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is only for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
a requirement for the validity of the subsequent or second marriage. requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage.23 Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that the second
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in marriage must be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente)
awarding moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The private which is an essential element of a felony by dolo.24 On the other hand, Cuello
complainant was a "GRO" before he married her, and even knew that he was Calon is of the view that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the
already married. He genuinely loved and took care of her and gave her existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the
financial support. He also pointed out that she had an illicit relationship with a celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter whether the first
lover whom she brought to their house. marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical effects
until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.25 As the Court
In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA ruled in Domingo v. Court of Appeals26 and Mercado v. Tan,27 under the
affirming the petitioner's conviction is in accord with the law, jurisprudence Family Code of the Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
and the evidence on record. To bolster its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of marriage is a defense.
this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.19
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as
The petition is denied for lack of merit. Viada and declared that there are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an
undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, constituting the felony of the act.28 He explained that:
reads:
'This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly
Art. 349. Bigamy. 'The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any incorporated in the principle antedating all codes, and, constituting one of the
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no willfulness there is no
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has crime. There is no willfulness if the subject
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be
proper proceedings. supported by very strong evidence, and if this be produced, the act shall be
deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus, a person who contracts a second
The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit: marriage in the reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead,
because of the many years that have elapsed since he has had any news of
El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legÃtimamente her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her, cannot be deemed
disuelto el anterior, será castigado con la pena de prision mayor.  xxx guilty of the crime of bigamy, because there is no fraudulent intent which is
one of the essential elements of the crime.29
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the
juridical tie of marriage established by law.20 The phrase "or before the As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with
absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings" was incorporated in the Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate
intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is words. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the
classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary.30 Although the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the
words "with malice" do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, pains and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because
such phrase is included in the word "voluntary."31 he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith
based on mere testimony is found incredible.
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act
without legal excuse or justification from which another suffers injury.32 When The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State.
the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the "State shall protect and
or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution." Marriage is a
intentional.33 Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man intends social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and
the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of the interest of society require that the marital relation should be surrounded
proof to the contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and
reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence.34 the causes specified by law.37 The laws regulating civil marriages are
necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the
confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by
mens sit rea.35 encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare
of the community.
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to
Gaña in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing
hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist.36 The prosecution also proved spouses and an approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new
that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the relations to each other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of life
effectivity of the Family Code. and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to
innocent parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence of
married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent
faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; spouse38 after the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such
such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the
law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the present spouse
law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of
the first spouse. Indeed, "men readily believe what they wish to be true," is a
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first
the private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief because one of the parties believed the other to be dead would make the
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts,
than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of easily capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective
a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as condition of individuals.39 Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so
required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of dissolved as to permit second marriages.40 Thus, Article 349 of the Revised
the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon
petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable
when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could of accurate judicial cognizance,41 namely, a judgment of the presumptive
not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to death of the absent spouse.
discharge his burden.
The petitioner's sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his
The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.
dead by means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings" in Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide'
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse,45 without
the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As
for those of succession. explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:46

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following
of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party
his succession may be opened. must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there
is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-
division of the estate among the heirs: founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike
the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in
which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in
the vessel or aeroplane; consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent
marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been Code.
missing for four years;
The Court rejects petitioner's contention that the requirement of instituting a
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
and his existence has not been known for four years. Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract a valid
second marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such
The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven provision was designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised
years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, is created by Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the rulings of this
law and arises without any necessity of judicial declaration.42 However, Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.
Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on
presumptive death, reads: As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela47 that, for
purposes of the marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a judicially declared an absentee before the spouse present may contract a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of absence made in
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose the
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only
death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the requires that the former spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not
know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as of the celebration of the marriage.48 In In Re Szatraw,49 the Court declared
provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he or
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent she had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris
spouse.43 tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or
become final; and that proof of actual death of the person presumed dead
With the effectivity of the Family Code,44 the period of seven years under the being unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another
first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined. The Court ruled
consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a that if a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead because he or
subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the she had not been heard from in seven years cannot become final and
executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage;
appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee
subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless, spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. As explained by
unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court former Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:
stated that it should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a
superfluous and meaningless act.50 The Court also took note that a petition 'Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code
for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse may even be providing that the present spouse must first ask for a declaration of
made in collusion with the other spouse. presumptive death of the absent spouse in order not to be guilty of bigamy in
case he or she marries again.
In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,51 the Court declared that the words
"proper proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code can only refer The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the
to those authorized by law such as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code purpose of the present spouse contracting a second marriage, he or she
which refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased must file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration
person. In Gue v. Republic of the Philippines,52 the Court rejected the of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the latter's
contention of the petitioner therein that, under Article 390 of the Civil Code, reappearance. This provision is intended to protect the present spouse from
the courts are authorized to declare the presumptive death of a person after a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code
an absence of seven years. The Court reiterated its rulings in Szatraw, because with the judicial declaration that the missing spouses presumptively
Lukban  and Jones. dead, the good faith of the present spouse in contracting a second marriage
is already established.58
Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that "the provision of
Article 349 or "before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of
dead by means of a judgment reached in the proper proceedings" is Justice) who wrote that things are now clarified. He says judicial declaration
erroneous and should be considered as not written. He opined that such of presumptive death is now authorized for purposes of
provision presupposes that, if the prior marriage has not been legally remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for
dissolved and the absent first spouse has not been declared presumptively declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, where the ordinary rules of
dead in a proper court proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous. procedure in trial will not be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible
He maintains that the supposition is not true.53 A second marriage is clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full
bigamous only when the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of grasp of the facts. The judgment declaring an absentee as presumptively
the Civil Code are not present.54 Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla was, dead is without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absentee.
likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems to require judicial decree of
dissolution or judicial declaration of absence but even with such decree, a Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the
second marriage in good faith will not constitute bigamy. He posits that a clause "before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead x x
second marriage, if not illegal, even if it be annullable, should not give rise to x" should be disregarded because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil
bigamy.55 Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of the view Code. With the new law, there is a need to institute a summary proceeding
that in the case of an absent spouse who could not yet be presumed dead for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise, there
according to the Civil Code, the spouse present cannot be charged and is bigamy.59
convicted of bigamy in case he/she contracts a second marriage.56
According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an
The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the eminent authority on Criminal Law, in some cases where an absentee
amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform to Article spouse is believed to be dead, there must be a judicial declaration of
349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is absent presumptive death, which could then be made only in the proceedings for the
for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent settlement of his estate.60 Before such declaration, it was held that the
marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even if done in good
the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the faith.61 Justice Regalado opined that there were contrary views because of
present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded the ruling in Jones  and the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code,
belief that the absent spouse was already dead.57 Such judgment is proof of which, however, appears to have been set to rest by Article 41 of the Family
Code, "which requires a summary hearing for the declaration of presumptive award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or
death of the absent spouse before the other spouse can remarry." Article 2220 of the Civil Code.66

Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code criminal cases enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the
may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code.62 Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:

On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
for awarding moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The cases.
petitioner maintains that moral damages may be awarded only in any of the
cases provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
them. The petitioner asserts that the appellate court failed to apply its ruling
in People v. Bondoc,63 where an award of moral damages for bigamy was (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
disallowed. In any case, the petitioner maintains, the private complainant
failed to adduce evidence to prove moral damages. (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on (4) Adultery or concubinage;
its finding that she adduced evidence to prove the same. The appellate court
ruled that while bigamy is not included in those cases enumerated in Article (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
2219 of the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from awarding moral damages
against the petitioner. The appellate court ruled that it is not bound by the (6) Illegal search;
following ruling in People v. Bondoc:
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daños, ello se debió
indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del Código Civil de Filipinas (8) Malicious prosecution;
autoriza la adjudicación de daños morales en los delitos de estupro, rapto,
violación, adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta (9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
enumeración el delito de bigamia. No existe, por consiguiente, base legal
para adjudicar aquà los daños de P5,000.00 arriba mencionados.64 (10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and
35.
The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the
evidence and the law. The OSG, likewise, avers that the CA was not bound The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to
by its ruling in People v. Rodeo. in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The Court rules against the petitioner. The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring
the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article in the order named.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, cases where the aggrieved party has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral
moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
defendant's wrongful act or omission.65 An award for moral damages requires humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or omission of another,
the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be an injury, otherwise, there would not have been any reason for the inclusion of specific
whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the acts in Article 221967 and analogous cases (which refer to those cases
claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission factually bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or resembling,
established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the in other respects, as in form, proportion, relation, etc.)68
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the private complainant had no inkling that he was already married to another
the Civil Code in which the offender may be ordered to pay moral damages before they were married.
to the private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is
liable to the private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner's
relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code. chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act
alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the
According to Article 19, "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who
in the performance of his act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the
honesty and good faith." This provision contains what is commonly referred consortium, attributes and support of a single man she could have married
to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who
be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the it turned out was not her lawful husband.72
performance of one's duties. The standards are the following: act with justice;
give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith. The elements The Court rules that the petitioner's collective acts of fraud and deceit before,
for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad during and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful,
faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.69 deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she did not
sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages.
Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab,73 the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled:
do not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical
provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby injuries, damages for shame, humiliation, and mental anguish are not
committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.70 If the provision recoverable where the actor is simply negligent. See Prosser, supra, at p.
does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all recognize
either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article 20 that where the wrong is willful rather than negligent, recovery may be had for
provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently the ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences though they consist of
causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." On the shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery
other hand, Article 21 provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Kuzma v. Millinery Workers,
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953);
public policy shall compensate the latter for damages." The latter provision is Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the defendant's conduct was not merely
adopted to remedy "the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many negligent, but was willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was bound to result in
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered shame, humiliation, and mental anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result
material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that did ensue the plaintiff became entitled not only to compensatory but also to
untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v.
prove for specifically in the statutes." Whether or not the principle of abuse of Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note, "Exemplary Damages in
rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Law of Torts," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that
the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law depends upon the because of the defendant's bigamous marriage to her and the attendant
circumstances of each case.71 publicity she not only was embarrassed and "ashamed to go out" but
"couldn't sleep" but "couldn't eat," had terrific headaches" and "lost quite a lot
In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and of weight." No just basis appears for judicial interference with the jury's
proposed to marry her. He assured her that he was single. He even brought reasonable allowance of $1,000 punitive damages on the first count. See
his parents to the house of the private complainant where he and his parents Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d 298 (App. Div.74 1955).
made the same assurance - that he was single. Thus, the private
complainant agreed to marry the petitioner, who even stated in the certificate The Court thus declares that the petitioner's acts are against public policy as
of marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and dutifully they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals
performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful and the interest and general welfare of society.
husband. For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her,
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner's Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the
perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Besides, even award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.
considerations of public policy would not prevent her from recovery. As held
in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:75 IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do
an act which, in consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to be SO ORDERED.
neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a
right of action against the person so inducing him for damages sustained by
him in consequence of his having done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899]
1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St.
Rep. 721, the court said that a false representation by the defendant that he
was divorced from his former wife, whereby the plaintiff was induced to marry
him, gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have been assumed
that the fact that she had unintentionally violated the law or innocently
committed a crime by cohabiting with him would be no bar to the action, but
rather that it might be a ground for enhancing her damages. The injury to the
plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the promise to give the fellowship
and assistance of a wife to one who was not her husband and to assume and
act in a relation and condition that proved to be false and ignominious.
Damages for such an injury were held to be recoverable in Sherman v.
Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep.
336.

Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action
upon any transgression of the law by herself but upon the defendant's
misrepresentation. The criminal relations which followed, innocently on her
part, were but one of the incidental results of the defendant's fraud for which
damages may be assessed.

[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the
marriage relation have been maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v.
Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v.
McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97
Am. Dec. 747; Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411.
Considerations of public policy would not prevent recovery where the
circumstances are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no moral turpitude,
that her illegal action was induced solely by the defendant's
misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause of action upon any
transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid
to the enforcement of a contract illegal on its face or to one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the
cause of action is founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154
N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R. 958.76
FIRST DIVISION This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who
satisfactorily complete requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and
G.R. No. 132344           February 17, 2000 as approved of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (Exhibit "B-
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner, 7-A").
vs. The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies at F. dela Cruz Quadrangle,
ROMEO A. JADER, respondent. U.E., Recto Campus, during the program of which he went up the stage
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: when his name was called, escorted by her (sic) mother and his eldest
brother who assisted in placing the Hood, and his Tassel was turned from left
May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a to right, and he was thereafter handed by Dean Celedonio a rolled white
student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma. His relatives took pictures of
graduation when such is not the case? This is the issue in the instant petition the occasion (Exhibits "C" to "C-6", "D-3" to "D-11").
for review premised on the following undisputed facts as summarized by the
trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals (CA),1 to wit: He tendered a blow-out that evening which was attended by neighbors,
friends and relatives who wished him good luck in the forthcoming bar
Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants' College of Law from 1984 up to examination. There were pictures taken too during the blow-out (Exhibits "D"
1988. In the first semester of his last year (School year 1987-1988), he failed to "D-1").
to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he was
given an incomplete grade (Exhibits "2", also Exhibit "H"). He enrolled for the He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of
second semester as fourth year law student (Exhibit "A") and on February 1, absence without pay from his job from April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988
1988 he filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade given (Exhibit "G") and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern
him by Professor Carlos Ortega (Exhibits "H-2", also Exhibit "2") which was University. (Exhibits "F" to "F-2"). Having learned of the deficiency he
approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after payment of the required fee. He dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examination.2
took the examination on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he
Ortega submitted his grade. It was a grade of five (5). (Exhibits "H-4", also suffered moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
Exhibits "2-L", "2-N").1âwphi1.nêt reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights when he was not able to
In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter's negligence. He
met to deliberate on who among the fourth year students should be allowed prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages, unrealized income,
to graduate. The plaintiff's name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
for graduation for the Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of Second In its answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied liability arguing mainly that
Semester (1987-1988) with the following annotation: it never led respondent to believe that he completed the requirements for a
JADER ROMEO A. Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was included in the tentative list of
graduating students. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:
Def. Conflict of Laws — x-1-87-88, Practice Court I Inc., 1-87-88 C-1 to
submit transcript with S.O. (Exhibits "3", "3-C-1", "3-C-2"). WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter to pay plaintiff the
The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of sum of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY PESOS
Bachelor of Laws was scheduled on the 16th of April 1988 at 3:00 o'clock in (P35,470.00) with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint until
the afternoon, and in the invitation for that occasion the name of the plaintiff fully paid, the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as attorney's
appeared as one of the candidates. (Exhibits "B", "B-6", "B-6-A"). At the foot fees and the cost of suit.
of the list of the names of the candidates there appeared however the
following annotation: Defendant's counterclaim is, for lack of merit, hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.3
which on appeal by both parties was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal
with modification. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads: examination, particularly at a time when he had already commenced
preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the lower Court's Decision is Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that defendant-appellee, in prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19
addition to the sum adjudged by the lower court in favor of plaintiff-appellant, of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from
is also ORDERED to pay plaintiff-appellant the amount of FIFTY taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS for moral damages. Costs against of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts,
defendant-appellee. would render the transaction unconscientious.5 It is the school that has
SO ORDERED.4 access to those information and it is only the school that can compel its
professors to act and comply with its rules, regulations and policies with
Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner UE elevated the respect to the computation and the prompt submission of grades. Students
case to this Court on a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of do not exercise control, much less influence, over the way an educational
Court, arguing that it has no liability to respondent Romeo A. Jader, institution should run its affairs, particularly in disciplining its professors and
considering that the proximate and immediate cause of the alleged damages teachers and ensuring their compliance with the school's rules and orders.
incurred by the latter arose out of his own negligence in not verifying from the Being the party that hired them, it is the school that exercises general
professor concerned the result of his removal exam. supervision and exclusive control over the professors with respect to the
submission of reports involving the students' standing. Exclusive control
The petition lacks merit.
means that no other person or entity had any control over the instrumentality
When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a which caused the damage or injury.6
contract of education is entered into between said institution and the student.
The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the operation of an
The professors, teachers or instructors hired by the school are considered
academic program, enforcement of rules and regulations, and the
merely as agents and administrators tasked to perform the school's
supervision of faculty and student services.7 He must see to it that his own
commitment under the contract. Since the contracting parties are the school
professors and teachers, regardless of their status or position outside of the
and the student, the latter is not duty-bound to deal with the former's agents,
university, must comply with the rules set by the latter. The negligent act of a
such as the professors with respect to the status or result of his grades,
professor who fails to observe the rules of the school, for instance by not
although nothing prevents either professors or students from sharing with
promptly submitting a student's grade, is not only imputable to the professor
each other such information. The Court takes judicial notice of the traditional
but is an act of the school, being his employer.
practice in educational institutions wherein the professor directly furnishes
his/her students their grades. It is the contractual obligation of the school to Considering further, that the institution of learning involved herein is a
timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every university which is engaged in legal education, it should have practiced what
student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the it inculcates in its students, more specifically the principle of good dealings
requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they would be enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which states:
included among those who will graduate. Although commencement exercises
are but a formal ceremony, it nonetheless is not an ordinary occasion, since Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
such ceremony is the educational institution's way of announcing to the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
whole world that the students included in the list of those who will be observe honesty and good faith.
conferred a degree during the baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied all the Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent to the ceremony, the damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
school has the obligation to promptly inform the student of any problem
involving the latter's grades and performance and also most importantly, of Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate
the procedures for remedying the same. legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.8 In civilized society,
men must be able to assume that others will do them no intended injury — did not exert any effort to inform plaintiff-appellant of his failing grade in
that others will commit no internal aggressions upon them; that their Practice Court I.12
fellowmen, when they act affirmatively will do so with due care which the
ordinary understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and that Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own
those with whom they deal in the general course of society will act in good negligence that led to the delayed relay of information to respondent. When
faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under one of two innocent parties must suffer, he through whose agency the loss
conditions of civilized society.9 Schools and professors cannot just take occurred must bear it.13 The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for
students for granted and be indifferent to them, for without the latter, the damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even when the act is not
former are useless. illicit.14 If mere fault or negligence in one's acts can make him liable for
damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their faith make him liable. A person should be protected only when he acts in the
academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. The legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in
conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.15
person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a
claim for damages.10 Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to
obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally respondent for the latter's actual damages, we hold that respondent should
calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable.11 Petitioner not have been awarded moral damages. We do not agree with the Court of
ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its Appeals' findings that respondent suffered shock, trauma and pain when he
obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that was informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to take the
respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely bar examinations. At the very least, it behooved on respondent to verify for
the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible
seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its student's grades at any time for the bar examinations. As a senior law student, respondent should have
because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those
Court on the submission of requirements for taking the bar. Petitioner's pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order. Given these
liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an considerations, we fail to see how respondent could have suffered untold
examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied embarrassment in attending the graduation rites, enrolling in the bar review
all requirements for the course. Worth quoting is the following disquisition of classes and not being able to take the bar exams. If respondent was indeed
the respondent court: humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not
verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements including his school records,
It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Tiongson that defendant-appellee before preparing himself for the bar examination. Certainly, taking the bar
University had been informed during the deliberation that the professor in examinations does not only entail a mental preparation on the subjects
Practice Court I gave plaintiff-appellant a failing grade. Yet, defendant- thereof; there are also prerequisites of documentation and submission of
appellee still did not inform plaintiff-appellant of his failure to complete the requirements which the prospective examinee must meet.
requirements for the degree nor did they remove his name from the tentative
list of candidates for graduation. Worse, defendant-appellee university, WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
despite the knowledge that plaintiff-appellant failed in Practice Court with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of
I, again  included plaintiff-appellant's name in the "tentative list of candidates Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal
for graduation which was prepared after the deliberation and which became interest of 6%  per annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint
the basis for the commencement rites program. Dean Tiongson reasons out until fully paid; the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's
that plaintiff-appellant's name was allowed to remain in the tentative list of fees; and the costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is
candidates for graduation in the hope that the latter would still be able to DELEIED.1âwphi1.nêt
remedy the situation in the remaining few days before graduation day. Dean SO ORDERED.
Tiongson, however, did not explain how plaintiff appellant Jader could have
done something to complete his deficiency if defendant-appellee university
THIRD DIVISION October 25. She was diagnosed to be suffering from "CNS Infection: TB
Meningitis vs. Cryptococcal Meningitis". She was later transferred to the
G.R. No. 116384. February 7, 2000 Maria Reyna Hospital, where she was confined from October 25 to
VIOLA CRUZ,  petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS December 5, 1990, and treated for "Cryptococcal Meningitis, Potts Disease,
COMMISSION, NORKIS DISTRIBUTORS, INC., JOSE RAMIRO A. and Diabetes Mellitus Type II".
CARPIO, JR., WESSIE QUISUMBING, and ELIZALDE Starting October 15, 1990, the petitioner stopped reporting for work. On
AMPALAYO, Respondents. October 19, 1990, respondent Norkis was informed by petitioners co-
DECISION employees of her condition, and it was able to recruit a replacement
cashier/bookkeeper in the person of Hernando Juaman, two (2) days after
PURISIMA, J.: petitioners collapse.
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court ascribing On December 28, 1990, petitioner sent a letter to respondent Norkis to verify
grave abuse of discretion to the National Labor Relations Commission the status of her employment. As an answer, she received a termination
(NLRC) in issuing its Resolution, dated November 19, 1993, dismissing for letter, dated November 2, 1990,2 citing health reasons as the cause for her
lack of merit petitioners complaint against the respondents, Norkis dismissal, to wit:
Distributors, Inc., Jose Ramiro A. Carpio, Jr., Wessie Quisumbing, and
Elizalde Ampalayo; and the subsequent Order, dated April 13, 1994, denying "Norkis-VMNG
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Mandaue City
The antecedent facts are as follows: November 2, 1990
Respondent Norkis Distributors, Inc., a domestic corporation with principal To: Viola Cruz
office and business address at A. S. Fortuna Street, Mandaue City, Cebu, is
engaged in the business of selling motorcycles and household appliances, Bookkeeper/Cashier - NDC Valencia
with branches all over the country, one of which branches is in Valencia,
Bukidnon. Respondents Wessie Quisumbing, Jose Ramiro A. Carpio, Jr., Thru: Jojo Cruz
and Elizalde Ampalayo are its President, Vice-President and Manager, From: P.I. R. Department
respectively.
Subject: RELIEVING OF DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS
Petitioner Viola Cruz was hired and employed by respondent Norkis
sometime in March 1997 as cashier/bookkeeper at its branch in Cagayan de Your present ill-health conditions has made you incapable of performing your
Oro City, and was later transferred to its Valencia, Bukidnon branch. For her assigned duties and functions effectively.
loyalty and dedication to the company, petitioner Cruz was given
Because of the above reason, management has decided to relieve you of
compensating salary adjustment of One Hundred (P100.00) Pesos, effective
your present duties and responsibilities as Bookkeeper/Cashier of NDC
July 1, 1990.1cräläwvirtualibräry
Valencia effective immediately.
In October 1990, the Valencia branch of Norkis was scheduled to transfer its
This is done to protect company interest and to avoid disruption of the normal
office to another place. On October 14, 1990, while petitioner and her co-
business operations that may result to delay in the submission of reports
employees were busy packing up and making an inventory of the things to be
affecting the entire organization, and to avoid occurrence of substantial
moved preparatory to such transfer, the petitioner suddenly collapsed. She
losses. Further, this is to protect you from any additional physical and mental
was rushed to the Monsanto General Hospital in Valencia, Bukidnon in the
burden that may result because of your incapable (sic) to work normally. This
evening of the same day but was able to report for work the following day.
will serve as your notice of termination for health reason which will take effect
On October 17, 1990, petitioner was transferred to the Capitol College upon receipt of this letter.
General Hospital in Cagayan de Oro City and was confined thereat until
For your information and compliance. present petition, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the NLRC, and posing
as issues:
(Sgd.) Elenito P. Palang
I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED BY
HRD Manager PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
Noted: II. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER MORAL
(Sgd.) Ramiro A. Carpio AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES FROM PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
Vice-President
The petition is visited by merit.
On March 18, 1991, petitioner lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal against
the private respondents, praying for payment of separation pay in lieu of In its Comment sent in on April 19, 1995, respondent National Labor
reinstatement, service incentive, leave pay, maternity leave pay, 13th month Relations Commission theorized that its factual findings cannot be looked
pay, holiday pay and other money claims, before the Arbitration Branch of into and re-examined by this Court following the well-entrenched doctrine
the NLRC in Cagayan De Oro City. that factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters,
On May 28, 1993, Labor Arbiter Leon P. Murillo rendered a decision for are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, when such findings
complainant/petitioner, disposing as follows: are supported by substantial evidence.
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing judgment is hereby entered The Court agrees with respondent NLRC on the validity of the aforecited
ordering Norkis Distributors, Inc. to pay complainant Viola Cruz the following: doctrine. However, it is well-settled that there are judicially recognized
exceptions to the said doctrine, one of which is when the findings of fact of
1) Separation pay P 25,832.10
the Labor Arbiter and of the National Labor Relations Commission are at
2) Service Incentive leave pay P 1,819.80 variance, such as in the case under scrutiny, where the Court may cull its
own finding of facts on the basis of the evidence on record.
3) Proportionate 13th month pay for 1990 P 2,909.27
In the said letter of termination, dated November 2, 1990, private
and all the above-named respondents are hereby ordered tointly and respondents cited "health reasons" as the cause for petitioners dismissal
severally pay complainant Viola Cruz P100,000.00 in moral damages from work:
and P20,000.00 in exemplary damages.
"xxx This will therefore serve as your notice of termination for health reason
Respondent Norkis Distributors, Inc. is likewise ordered to pay P15,056.11 which will take effect upon receipt of this letter. xxx"5cräläwvirtualibräry
as attorneys fees."3cräläwvirtualibräry
Under Section 8, Rule I, Book VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
From the said decision both parties appealed to the NLRC; and on the Labor Code, for a disease to be a valid ground for the dismissal of the
November 19, 1993, the Fifth Division of the NLRC reversed and set aside employee, the continued employment of such employee is prohibited by law
the appealed decision of the Labor Arbiter, ruling thus: or prejudicial to his health or the health of his co-employees, and there must
be a certification by a competent public health authority that the disease is of
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is Reversed and Set Aside and
such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six
a new one dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. However, respondent
(6) months, even with proper medical treatment. Since the burden of proving
company is ordered to pay complainant her unpaid service incentive leave
the validity of the dismissal of the employee rests on the employer, the latter
pay and proportionate 13th month pay for 1990 in the aggregate sum
should likewise bear the burden of showing that the requisites for a valid
of P4,729.07."4cräläwvirtualibräry
dismissal due to a disease have been complied with. In the absence of the
After her receipt of the Resolution dated April 11, 1994 of NLRC, denying her required certification by a competent public health authority, this Court has
motion for reconsideration, petitioner found her way to this court via the ruled against the validity of the employees dismissal.6cräläwvirtualibräry
Considering that in the present case, the alleged reason for the dismissal of her "present ill-health condition has made you (her) incapable of performing
petitioner was her illness, the private respondents have to prove that their your (her) assigned duties and functions effectively." That she did not file any
decision to terminate the services of petitioner was reached after compliance sick leave was of no moment considering that there was no communication
with the aforestated requisites under Section 8. Private respondents having from the respondent company regarding the status of petitioners
failed to substantiate the same, the dismissal of petitioner on the ground of employment. The said letter of termination, dated November 2, 1990, was
illness cannot be upheld. only received by petitioner in January 1991, after she wrote them (private
respondents) on December 28, 1990, requesting financial assistance.
Respondent Norkis cited as another ground for the dismissal of petitioner,
her alleged unexplained absence for almost three (3) months, which they The additional ground cited by the private respondents for the dismissal of
theorized upon as amounting to abandonment. It is argued that since petitioner was loss of trust and confidence as a result of alleged defalcation
petitioner did not inform the company that she was sick, did not file a sick of company funds committed by petitioner. They theorized that during an
leave and did not also present a medical certificate to support her illness for audit and inventory conducted by Mr. Hernando Juaman, who replaced
a period of three months, she was considered absent without leave, and to petitioner as cashier/bookkeeper, unaccounted company funds in petitioners
have abandoned herb. custody were discovered such that on October 19, 1990, a letter informing
petitioner of such unaccounted funds, together with an attached statement of
On the other hand, petitioner maintains that, contrary to private respondents account, was sent to petitioner and received by her husband Jojo Cruz. A
allegation that she abandoned her work, her serious illness which follow-up letter was sent to petitioner on October 24, 1990, but petitioner
necessitated her confinement in a hospital for almost three (3) months, continued to ignore the same and failed to reply thereto. It is private
caused her inability to report for work. respondents submission that the discovery of the missing funds in petitioners
The petition is meritorious. custody, her unexplained disappearance and prolonged absence militate
against the protestation of innocence of petitioner and are inculpatory facts
For unexplained absence to constitute abandonment, there must be a clear, and circumstances of defalcation against her; private respondents
deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part of the employee to continue his concluded.
employment, without any intention of returning.7 The Court has repeatedly
held that mere absence does not suffice to constitute abandonment. The For her part, petitioner countered that the allegations of private respondents
absence must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly showing that the are baseless. According to her, she was not present when the audit was
employee simply does not want to work anymore. In the case of Artemio allegedly conducted and she was neither informed of the charges against her
Labor, et al. vs. NLRC and Gold City Commercial Complex, Inc. and Rudy nor given an opportunity to refute the same. She denied receiving the letters
Uy,8 it was held that to constitute abandonment, two elements must concur, requiring her to explain the missing funds on the dates they were supposedly
to wit: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable sent. Moreover, Mr. Juaman, who allegedly conducted the audit, did not
reason, and (2) clear intention to sever the employer-employee testify and neither was his affidavit presented before the Labor Arbiter. What
relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and was introduced as evidence of the alleged defalcation was the affidavit of a
being manifested by some overt acts. certain Mr. Elenito Palang, which affidavit could not be given credence
because the latter was not the one who conducted the audit and had no
In the case at bar, petitioners absence was explained by the undeniable fact personal knowledge of the defalcation. References were made to
that she was confined for treatment in several hospitals for around three (3) unaccounted company funds allegedly in the possession of petitioner but
months. The claim of respondent Norkis that it was not informed of the there was no categorical statement as to how such shortages were caused,
sickness of petitioner is belied by the fact that on October 14, 1990, the day the audit procedure observed and it was petitioner who was responsible for
before petitioner stopped going to work, she collapsed within the office the said shortages; petitioner pointed out.
premises and was immediately rushed to a hospital. Such fact should explain
why petitioner deemed it unnecessary to inform respondent Norkis that she Petitioners posture is sustainable. The letter dated October 19, 1990,
was sick. Moreover, private respondents were apparently told that the allegedly sent to petitioner regarding the defalcation charges, reads:
petitioner was ill because in the letter of termination dated November 2, "This is to formally informed (sic) you that due to your indisposition to
1990, they advised petitioner that the company has decided to replace her as discharge your duties and responsibilities as the Cashier/Bookkeeper of NDC
Valencia, we have no other recourse but to have another person to take your xxx we will deduct the corresponding fees including that for compulsory TPL
place. from your separation pay. xxx.

In the turnover and conduct of investigation of Hernando Juaman, We will be preparing the separation pay after the registration has been
Accounting Field Staff sent by the management to take over your place, the renewed and this will be forwarded to you immediately together with the quit
following things were uncovered: claim which will serve as clearance for the branch to release your MC after
you have signed the same.
1. Unaccounted cash from the collections of October 12 and 13, 1990
of P5,374 and P2,712, respectively, totaling to P8,086; These unaccounted xxx xxx xxx"10cräläwvirtualibräry
cash were determined from the official receipts copies of the branch.
And in the following letter sent to petitioner on January 14, 1991, reiterating
2. Unaccounted unclaimed salaries and wages of CSRs Pedro Versales and the companys decision to terminate her for health reasons, the company
Nilo Pamutungan of P896.15 and P700.00 respectively, totaling to P1,596.15 even assured her that she would still be considered for any future vacancy in
the company, to wit:
Since it is indeterminable when you can report back to work and account the
abovementioned unaccounted cash we will be forced to apply your provident "We are glad that you have already recovered although partially, and rest
fund to these accountabilities. Please refer to the attached summary of your assured that once you will become completely healed in the future and
partial accountabilities with the company."9cräläwvirtualibräry certified by your doctor to be physically fit to return to work, we will still
consider you for any vacancy in the company. xxx xxx
The aforesaid letter made mention of the alleged unaccounted funds in xxx"11cräläwvirtualibräry
petitioners custody but no receipts, documents and other proofs were
attached to prove the collection and receipt by petitioner of the amounts If it were true that petitioner was guilty of misappropriation of company funds
therein listed. The attached statement of account is of no probative value and she was terminated for loss of trust and confidence, why did respondent
because it was just a summary of petitioners alleged accountabilities. It does Norkis still promise petitioner a future employment in the company.
not suffice to show that petitioner did receive, retain and convert funds in her Untenable is respondents contention that when they terminated petitioner for
custody. health reasons, they intentionally did not make mention of the alleged
defalcation because they wanted to give petitioner a graceful exit from the
What is more, private respondents failed to prove that a copy of the October company. Defalcation or misappropriation of company funds if true is too
19, 1990 letter was really sent to and received by petitioner. The allegation serious an offense and breach of trust not to be exposed at the first
that said letter as well as the follow-up letter dated October 24, 1990 were opportunity.
received by her husband cannot be relied upon because the private
respondents did not adduce any evidence that petitioners husband did really In the case of Artemio Labor, et al. vs. NLRC, Gold City Commercial
receive subject letters. It is also negated by the fact that in later Complex, Inc. and Rudy Uy,12 this Court held that the right of an employer to
communications of private respondents to the petitioner, no mention was dismiss employees on the ground of loss of trust and confidence must not be
ever made about her alleged defalcation. In a letter dated February 4, 1991, exercised arbitrarily and without just cause. For loss of trust and confidence
or almost four (4) months after the petitioner was reportedly informed of the to be a valid ground for dismissal of an employee, it must be substantial and
defalcation charges against her on October 19, 1990, no mention was ever founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant the employees
made of petitioners alleged accountabilities. As a matter of fact, the letter just separation from employment. Loss of confidence must not be used as a
apprised petitioner of the amount of separation pay due her, and of the subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified; it must be
decision of the company to deduct therefrom the amount owing from the genuine, not a mere afterthought, to justify earlier action taken in bad
vehicle she acquired from the company under a leasing unit plan: faith.13 Because of its subjective nature, this Court has been very scrutinizing
in cases of dismissal based on loss of trust and confidence because the
"xxx the net amount due you at Pesos: Twelve Thousand Two Hundred same can easily be concocted by an abusive employer. Thus, when the
Twenty-Three and twenty centavos (P12, 223.20). breach of trust or loss of confidence theorized upon is not borne by clearly
xxx xxx xxx established facts, such dismissal on the ground of loss and confidence
cannot be allowed. In the case under consideration, evidence is utterly circumstances, the Court is of the sense that the amount of One Hundred
wanting as to the defalcation allegedly perpetrated by the petitioner. Twenty Thousand (P120,000.00) Pesos awarded by the Labor Arbiter for
Consequently, her dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence cannot be moral and exemplary damages is too much. Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
countenanced. Pesos of moral damages and Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos of
exemplary damages should suffice.
What is more, as intimated by petitioner, private respondents were remiss in
their duty to afford her due process. An employee may only be dismissed for WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED; the resolution of National Labor
just or authorized causes and the legality of dismissal of an employee hinges Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. M-001458-93 is SET ASIDE; and
on: (a) the legality of the act of dismissal; that is dismissal on the grounds the resolution of the Labor Arbiter dated May 28, 1993, in NLRC RAB Case
provided for under Article 283 (now 282) of the New Labor Code and (b) the No. 10-03-00211-91 is hereby REINSTATED, with the modification that the
legality in the manner of dismissal.14 The law requires that an employee award of damages is reduced to Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, as
sought to be dismissed must be served two written notices before termination moral damages, and Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, as exemplary
of his employment. The first notice is to apprise the employee of the damages. Costs against Norkis Distributors, Inc.
particular acts or omissions by reason of which his dismissal has been
decided upon; and the second notice is to inform the employee of the SO ORDERED.
employers decision to dismiss him. Failure to comply with the requirement of Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and  Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
two notices makes the dismissal illegal. The procedure is mandatory. Non-
observance thereof renders the dismissal of an employee illegal and Panganiban, J., no part, former partner of a party's counsel.
void.15cräläwvirtualibräry

Records on hand show that prior to the letter of termination aforementioned,

petitioner was never notified, through a memo or letter, of the missing funds
alluded to. Neither was she required to give her side regarding the alleged
misappropriation or defalcation of company funds being imputed to her. As
pointed out by the Solicitor General, petitioner was never served with notices
by the private respondents, verbally or in writing, to inform her of the charges
against her and to require her to answer such charges. It bears stressing that
the respondents failed to establish that subject letter of October 19, 1990
was received by petitioner or her husband. As a matter of fact, from the
evidence it can be gleaned that the said letter was antedated so as to feign
compliance with legal requirements.

There is merit in petitioners submission that the award of moral and

exemplary damages in her favor is warranted by her unjustified dismissal.
Award of moral and exemplary damages for an illegally dismissed employee
is proper where the employee had been harrassed and arbitrarily terminated
by the employer.16 Moral damages may be awarded to compensate one for
diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings and social humiliation occasioned by the employers unreasonable
dismissal of the employee. This Court has consistently accorded the working
class a right to recover damages for unjust dismissals tainted with bad faith;
where the motive of the employer in dismissing the employee is far from
noble. The award of such damages is based not on the Labor Code but on
Article 220 of the Civil Code. However, under the attendant facts and
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-60859. December 27, 1982.] SYLLABUS

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE & RADIO CORPORATION and ERNESTO Q.

TORREJOS, Petitioners, v. GEORGE BARRIOS and OLGA THERESA CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; MAY BE REDUCED IF FOUND EXCESSIVE, AS IN
CRUZ-BARRIOS, Respondents. THE CASE AT BAR. — Where, as in the case at bar, the damages awarded
by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals are found to be
Cesar A. Abigarria, for Petitioners. excessive considering that petitioner is a quasi- public corporation affected
with public interest (Flynn v. Western U. Teleg. Co., 225 NW 242; Western U.
Cruz, Durian, Agabin, Atienza & Alday Law Offices for Private Teleg. Co. v. Cowin, 20 F 2d 103, 74 Am. Jur. 2d, p. 301), that respondents
Respondents. would have had to incur living and sundry expenses, thereby reducing the
net earnings which they would have received (see Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v.
SYNOPSIS Court of Appeals, Et Al., 31 SCRA 551 [1970]), and that respondent-wife
succeeded in securing another better-paying job approximately six months
Petitioner cable company failed to deliver to respondent-spouses, both afterwards, the judgment should be modified by reducing the amounts
physicians, a cablegram from Mercy Hospital of Buffalo, New York, admitting granted.
respondent-wife for a rotating internship in said hospital, as a consequence
of which, she was not able to signify her acceptance and the position was
given to someone else. Such failure caused respondents financial difficulties
in New York, due to loss of earnings for approximately six (6) months,
serious anxiety and sleepless nights. Consequently, they sued petitioner for RESOLUTION
damages. The Trial Court found petitioner guilty of gross negligence’ and
awarded respondents $5,417.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P10,000 as attorney’s
fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, the instant petition. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The issue of negligence involved being basically factual, the Supreme Court
resolved to give partial due course in so far as the award of damages is
concerned.

The Supreme Court held that while the petitioner has been grossly negligent Ordinarily, the Petition for Review in this case would not merit being given
in having failed to deliver the cablegram, and respondent-spouses are due course because a close scrutiny of its allegations, the Comment of
entitled to damages, the damages awarded by the trial court were excessive respondents thereon, and the Reply to said Comment shows that the issue of
considering that petitioner is a quasi-public corporation affected with public negligence involved is basically factual. However, we resolved to give partial
interest; that respondents would have had to incur living and sundry due course in so far as the award of damages is concerned.
expenses thereby reducing the net earnings which they would have received;
and that respondent-wife succeeded in securing another better paying job six We agree that petitioner cable company should be faulted for having failed to
months afterwards. deliver to respondent-spouses, both physicians, a cablegram from Mercy
Hospital, Buffalo, New York, admitting respondent-wife for a rotating
Judgment modified by reducing the award of: (a) actual damages to the internship in said hospital, as a consequence of which, she was unable to
equivalent of $2,703.00 in Philippine currency at the prevailing exchange rate signify her acceptance and the position was given to someone else. We
as of July 31, 1973; (b) moral damages, to P5,000.00; (c) exemplary agree with the finding of both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court that
damages, to P5,000.00; and (d) attorney’s fees, to P8,000.00. petitioner was grossly negligent in having admittedly failed to deliver the
cablegram, particularly considering that respondents had received another
telegram, identically addressed, delivered to them by Eastern Extension, attorney’s fees, to P8,000.00. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
another cable company. We also agree with the finding that such failure
caused respondents financial difficulties in New York, due to loss of earnings No costs.
for approximately six months serious anxiety and sleepless nights, for which
petitioner should be held liable, and which should be corrected for the public SO ORDERED.
good. A telegraph company is a public service corporation owing duties to
the general public and is liable to a member of the public to whom it owes a Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.,
duty for damages proximately flowing from a violation of that duty (Western concur.
U. Tel. Co. v. Ramsey, 88 SW 2d 675; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Caldwell,
102 SW 840, 74 Am. Jur., p. 444).

We find, however the award of damages made by the Trial Court and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals to be excessive. The damages granted
were as follows:jgc:[Link]

"x       x       x

"1. An amount in Philippine currency equivalent to 5,417 dollars computed at

the prevailing exchange rate on July 31, 1973 the date when the complaint in
the instant case was filed, as actual damages;

2. The amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages;

3. The amount of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4. The amount of P10,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees.

x       x       x"

Taking into account the facts and circumstances, that petitioner is a quasi-
public corporation affected with public interest (Flynn v. Western U. Teleg.
Co. 225 NW 242; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Cowin, 20 F 2d 103, 74 Am. Jur.
2d, p. 301), that respondents would have had to incur living and sundry
expenses, thereby reducing the net earnings which they would have received
(see Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 31 SCRA 551 [1970]),
and that respondent wife succeeded in securing another better-paying job
approximately six months afterwards, the judgment should be modified by
reducing the amounts granted.

ACCORDINGLY, the Decision appealed from is hereby modified by reducing

the award of: a) actual damages, to the equivalent of $2,703.00 in Philippine
currency at the prevailing exchange rate as of July 31, 1973; b) moral
damages, to P5,000.00; c) exemplary damages, to P5,000.00; and d)
SECOND DIVISION telegrams being transmitted. The said telegram was detached from the
machine and placed inside a sealed envelope and delivered to plaintiff,
G.R. No. L-44748 August 29, 1986 obviously as is. The additional words in Tagalog were never noticed and
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILS., INC. (RCPI). petitioner, were included in the telegram when delivered.
vs. The trial court in finding for the plaintiff ruled as follows:
COURT OF APPEALS and LORETO DIONELA, respondents.
There is no question that the additional words in Tagalog are libelous. They
O. Pythogoras Oliver for respondents. clearly impute a vice or defect of the plaintiff. Whether or not they were
intended for the plaintiff, the effect on the plaintiff is the same. Any person
reading the additional words in Tagalog will naturally think that they refer to
PARAS, J.: the addressee, the plaintiff. There is no indication from the face of the
telegram that the additional words in Tagalog were sent as a private joke
Before Us, is a Petition for Review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of
between the operators of the defendant.
Appeals, modifying the decision of the trial court in a civil case for recovery of
damages against petitioner corporation by reducing the award to private The defendant is sued directly not as an employer. The business of the
respondent Loreto Dionela of moral damages from P40,000 to Pl5,000, and defendant is to transmit telegrams. It will open the door to frauds and allow
attorney's fees from P3,000 to P2,000. the defendant to act with impunity if it can escape liability by the simple
expedient of showing that its employees acted beyond the scope of their
The basis of the complaint against the defendant corporation is a telegram
assigned tasks.
sent through its Manila Office to the offended party, Loreto Dionela, reading
as follows: The liability of the defendant is predicated not only on Article 33 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines but on the following articles of said Code:
176 AS JR 1215PM 9 PAID MANDALUYONG JUL 22-66 LORETO
DIONELA CABANGAN LEGASPI CITY ART. 19.- Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK FER
observe honesty and good faith.
LORETO DIONELA-CABANGAN-WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK-PER
ART. 20.-Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
115 PM damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN-WALA-KANG There is sufficient publication of the libelous Tagalog words. The office file of
PADALA DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO the defendant containing copies of telegrams received are open and held
together only by a metal fastener. Moreover, they are open to view and
(p. 19, Annex "A") inspection by third parties.
Plaintiff-respondent Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on the It follows that the plaintiff is entitled to damages and attorney's fees. The
telegram sent to him not only wounded his feelings but also caused him plaintiff is a businessman. The libelous Tagalog words must have affected
undue embarrassment and affected adversely his business as well because his business and social standing in the community. The Court fixes the
other people have come to know of said defamatory words. Defendant amount of P40,000.00 as the reasonable amount of moral damages and the
corporation as a defense, alleges that the additional words in Tagalog was a amount of P3,000.00 as attorney's fee which the defendant should pay the
private joke between the sending and receiving operators and that they were plaintiff. (pp. 15-16, Record on Appeal)
not addressed to or intended for plaintiff and therefore did not form part of the
telegram and that the Tagalog words are not defamatory. The telegram sent The respondent appellate court in its assailed decision confirming the
through its facilities was received in its station at Legaspi City. Nobody other aforegoing findings of the lower court stated:
than the operator manned the teletype machine which automatically receives
The proximate cause, therefore, resulting in injury to appellee, was the failure IV
of the appellant to take the necessary or precautionary steps to avoid the
occurrence of the humiliating incident now complained of. The company had The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in awarding Atty's. fees. (p. 4, Record)
not imposed any safeguard against such eventualities and this void in its Petitioner's contentions do not merit our consideration. The action for
operating procedure does not speak well of its concern for their clientele's damages was filed in the lower court directly against respondent corporation
interests. Negligence here is very patent. This negligence is imputable to not as an employer subsidiarily liable under the provisions of Article 1161 of
appellant and not to its employees. the New Civil Code in relation to Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The
The claim that there was no publication of the libelous words in Tagalog is cause of action of the private respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the
also without merit. The fact that a carbon copy of the telegram was filed New Civil Code (supra). As well as on respondent's breach of contract thru
among other telegrams and left to hang for the public to see, open for the negligence of its own employees. 1
inspection by a third party is sufficient publication. It would have been Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving and
otherwise perhaps had the telegram been placed and kept in a secured place transmitting messages. Everytime a person transmits a message through the
where no one may have had a chance to read it without appellee's facilities of the petitioner, a contract is entered into. Upon receipt of the rate
permission. or fee fixed, the petitioner undertakes to transmit the message accurately.
The additional Tagalog words at the bottom of the telegram are, as correctly There is no question that in the case at bar, libelous matters were included in
found by the lower court, libelous per se, and from which malice may be the message transmitted, without the consent or knowledge of the sender.
presumed in the absence of any showing of good intention and justifiable There is a clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in adding
motive on the part of the appellant. The law implies damages in this instance extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent to the private
(Quemel vs. Court of Appeals, L-22794, January 16, 1968; 22 SCRA 44). respondent. As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through its
The award of P40,000.00 as moral damages is hereby reduced to employees. Hence the acts of its employees in receiving and transmitting
P15,000.00 and for attorney's fees the amount of P2,000.00 is awarded. (pp. messages are the acts of the petitioner. To hold that the petitioner is not
22-23, record) liable directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of petitioner's
business is to deprive the general public availing of the services of the
After a motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court, petitioner of an effective and adequate remedy. In most cases, negligence
petitioner came to Us with the following: must be proved in order that plaintiff may recover. However, since
negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases, we may apply the
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by considering
I the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury.

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that Petitioner-employer WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the appellate court is
should answer directly and primarily for the civil liability arising from the hereby AFFIRMED.
criminal act of its employee. SO ORDERED.
II Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that there was sufficient
publication of the alleged libelous telegram in question, as contemplated by
law on libel.

III

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that the liability of

petitioner-company-employer is predicated on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil
Code, Articles on Human Relations.
SECOND DIVISION actual damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorney’s fees.17
G.R. No. 154259             February 28, 2005
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, but not under the ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim
vs. narrated that she was the Hotel’s Executive Secretary for the past twenty
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent. (20) years.18 One of her functions included organizing the birthday party of
DECISION the hotel’s former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.19 The year 1994 was no
different. For Mr. Tsuruoka’s party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: and extended invitations accordingly.20 The guest list was limited to
approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruoka’s closest friends and some hotel
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden
employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited.21 At the party,
(Hotel Nikko)1 and Ruby Lim assail the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink.22 Mindful
dated 26 November 2001 reversing the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
of Mr. Tsuruoka’s wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr.
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, as well as the Resolution4 of the Court of
Boy Miller, the "captain waiter," to inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes
Appeals dated 09 July 2002 which denied petitioners’ motion for
who was not invited.23 Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group
reconsideration.
of Dr. Filart.24 As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with another guest
The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she inquired instead from the sister
under the human relations provisions of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr.
(respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen Reyes.25 Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the
name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening of 13 party as he was not invited.26 Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms.
October 1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,5 he Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to
was spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then leave.27 When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a
approached him.6 Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotel’s Captain Batung whom she later approached.28 Believing that Captain Batung
penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotel’s manager, Mr. and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor
Masakazu Tsuruoka.7 Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for which from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as
she replied: "of course."8 Mr. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart he was not invited.29 Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr.
carrying the basket of fruits which was the latter’s present for the Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as there were
celebrant.9 At the penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the no other guests in the immediate vicinity.30 However, as Mr. Reyes was
celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart.10 After a already helping himself to the food, she decided to wait.31 When Mr. Reyes
couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said: "alam
buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng
stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na
as Executive Secretary thereof.11 In a loud voice and within the presence and kayo."32 She then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough
hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and making a big
Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka scene, and even threatened to dump food on her.33 1awphi1.nét
imbitado, bumaba ka na lang").12 Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court,
invited by Dr. Filart.13 Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however,
also gave her version of the story to the effect that she never invited Mr.
completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation.14 Not long
Reyes to the party.34 According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to
after, while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati
carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going
policeman approached and asked him to step out of the hotel.15 Like a
to take the elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49.35 When they
common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the
reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not
policeman.16 Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos
properly dressed and was not invited.36 All the while, she thought that Mr.
Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at the bar talking to Col. the celebrant only wanted close friends around. It is necessary that Mrs.
Batung.37 Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes Filart be the one to approach appellant because it was she who invited
shouting.38 She ignored Mr. Reyes.39 She was embarrassed and did not want appellant in that occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filart’s invitation, appellant
the celebrant to think that she invited him.40 could not have suffered such humiliation. For that, appellee Filart is equally
liable.
After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,41 giving
more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking ...
Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr.
Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited: The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon
mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only
Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity. Under Article 20 of
Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday celebrant. He assumed the risk of being asked to the Civil Code, every person who violates this duty becomes liable for
leave for attending a party to which he was not invited by the host. Damages damages, especially if said acts were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad
are pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports
duty or the violation of some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because he himself was at fault wrong, a breach of a known duty to some motive or interest or ill-will that
(Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was not the partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA
party of defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to join her and took 603).44
responsibility for his attendance at the party. His action against defendants
Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must therefore fail.42 Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim
and Dr. Violeta Filart the solidary obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2)
found more commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim moral damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000);
ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of several and (3) attorney’s fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
guests: (P10,000).45 On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its
earlier decision as the argument raised in the motion had "been amply
In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he discussed and passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered."46
should not finish his food and to leave the place within the hearing distance
of other guests is an act which is contrary to morals, good customs . . ., for Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that
which appellees should compensate the appellant for the damage suffered the Court of Appeals seriously erred in –
by the latter as a consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The
liability arises from the acts which are in themselves legal or not prohibited, I.
but contrary to morals or good customs. Conversely, even in the exercise of … NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT
a formal right, [one] cannot with impunity intentionally cause damage to INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS OWN FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA
another in a manner contrary to morals or good customs.43 WAS A GATE-CRASHER
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in II.
approaching several people to inquire into the presence of Mr. Reyes
exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as she should have … HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY
approached Dr. Filart first and both of them should have talked to Mr. Reyes LIABLE WITH DR. FILART FOR DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING,
in private: AMAY BISAYA "COULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION,"
"WERE IT NOT FOR DR. FILART’S INVITATION"
Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by
appellee Lim was to approach appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should III.
have told appellant Reyes in private that the latter should leave the party as
… DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The appellate court, on the other
AS REGARDS THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed
HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and to leave the place within
hearing distance of the other guests. Both courts, however, were in
IV. agreement that it was Dr. Filart’s invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the
… IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY party.
BECAUSE OF HIS POVERTY, CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?
AN ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower
V. court’s findings of fact.
… IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE First, let us put things in the proper perspective.
APPELLANT’S BRIEF, THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED
AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel,53 for-invitation-
only, thrown for the hotel’s former Manager, a Japanese national. Then came
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine a person who was clearly uninvited (by the celebrant)54 and who could not
of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as just disappear into the crowd as his face is known by many, being an actor.
respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being While he was already spotted by the organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very
embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-crasher." person who generated the guest list, it did not yet appear that the celebrant
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the celebrant’s instruction to
esteemed in law as injury"47 ) refers to self-inflicted injury48 or to the consent keep the party intimate, would naturally want to get rid of the "gate-crasher"
to injury49 which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has in the most hush-hush manner in order not to call attention to a glitch in an
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not otherwise seamless affair and, in the process, risk the displeasure of the
negligent in doing so.50 As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine celebrant, her former boss. To unnecessarily call attention to the presence of
does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lim’s ability to follow the
Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under instructions of the celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the
Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat hotel’s personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden rests to prove that
him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame. indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered him to leave, could not offer any
satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk ruining a formal
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, had
asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya," to leave the party where he unwittingly sealed his fate by admitting that when Ms. Lim talked to him, she
was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under was very close. Close enough for him to kiss:
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so
liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you
her. were at the buffet table? How close was she when she approached you?

As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.
conclusions concerning the same facts and evidence of the case, this Court Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she
is left without choice but to use its latent power to review such findings of shouted?
facts. Indeed, the general rule is that we are not a trier of facts as our
jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law.51 One of the A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na
exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains herein as the findings of the lang."
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court.52 The lower court
ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?
... one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.61 These standards
are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty
A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.55 and good faith.62 Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or
Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing
would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the or injuring another.63 When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is
hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to
to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary damages arising from a violation of law64 which does not obtain herein as Ms.
does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the
correct in observing that – other hand, states:

Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
the latter to leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have the latter for the damage.
been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements:
plaintiff’s reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good
of what transpired between them. . . custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.66
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,67 and that is, the act
police to take him out.56 complained of must be intentional.68
Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is that it is As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown
unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not
Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to back his story up. All his know each other personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr.
witnesses – Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged abusive
only that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party.57 conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being "single at 44 years old,"
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to had a "very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced
which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen."69 The
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, lameness of this argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say that a
Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.58 complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail
if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights,59 is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was
Article 19 states: likewise acceptable and humane under the circumstances. In this regard, we
cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate court’s declaration that Ms. Lim’s
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs.
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action
observe honesty and good faith.1awphi1.nét "predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person,
which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such
Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which
dignity."70 Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act of by-
does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
she did inquire from Mrs. Filart’s companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did
wrongdoer must be responsible."60 The object of this article, therefore, is to
not invite Mr. Reyes.71 If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if
set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of
done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners
Lim and Hotel Nikko be made answerable for exemplary
damages72 especially for the reason stated by the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals held –

Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the
latter’s lowly station in life.l^[Link] This has to be limited somewhere. In
a democracy, such a limit must be established. Social equality is not sought
by the legal provisions under consideration, but due regard for decency and
propriety (Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of example or
correction for public good and to avert further commission of such acts,
exemplary damages should be imposed upon appellees.73

The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter

with the very facts of the case and the evidence on hand.l^[Link] It is not
disputed that at the time of the incident in question, Mr. Reyes was "an actor
of long standing; a co-host of a radio program over DZRH; a Board Member
of the Music Singer Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda
Papin; a showbiz Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992 official
candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an awardee of a
number of humanitarian organizations of the Philippines."74 During his direct
examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that he had income75 and
nowhere did he say otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of
any information as to the social and economic standing of petitioner Ruby
Lim. Consequently, the conclusion reached by the appellate court cannot
withstand scrutiny as it is without basis.

All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage
which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a
legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be
his to bear alone.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and

Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.