Team Code: TC-027

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF SINDHUSTAN

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION

UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SINDHUSTAN

ALADDIN MOSAI AND ORS.

................................................................................................APPELLANT

V.

MAHASENA PARTY AND ORS.

..............................................................................................RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

1ST ONLINE NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION,2020

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBRIEVIATIONS................................................................................................................3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...................................................................................................................5
CASES.....................................................................................................................................................5
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS...................................................................................................6
BOOKS................................................................................................................................................7
WEB RESOURCES................................................................................................................................7
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.......................................................................................................8
STATEMENT OF FACTS......................................................................................................................8
STATEMENT OF ISSUES...................................................................................................................10
1) WHETHER SECTARIAN APPEALS DURING ELECTION CAMPAIGNS BE BROUGHT
UNDER ‘CORRUPT PRACTICES’ WITHIN S. 123 OF RoPA, 1951?.........................................11
2) WHETHER AN ACT SAID AND DONE IN EXERCISE OF RIGHT TO RELIGION AND
FREEDOM OF SPEECH CAN BE BROUGHT UNDER ‘CORRUPT PRACTICES’?.....................11
3) WHETHER AN APPEAL FROM A PERSON FROM MINORITY COMMUNITY WILL
AMOUNT TO CORRUPT PRACTICE IN THE LIGHT OF PROTECTIVE DISCRIMINATION
PRINCIPLE ENSHRINED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF SINDHUSTAN?...........................11
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS..........................................................................................................12
1) WHETHER SECTARIAN APPEALS DURING ELECTION CAMPAIGNS BE BROUGHT
UNDER ‘CORRUPT PRACTICES’ WITHIN §. 123 OF RoPA, 1951?.............................................12
2) WHETHER THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE APPELLANT WILL BE COVERED UNDER
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION/ FREEDOM OF RELIGION....................................12
3) WHETHER AN APPEAL FROM A PERSON FROM MINORITY COMMUNITY WILL
AMOUNT TO CORRUPT PRACTICE IN THE LIGHT OF PROTECTIVE DISCRIMINATION
PRINCIPLE ENSHRINED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF SINDHUSTAN?...........................13
PLEADINGS.........................................................................................................................................15
1. WHETHER SECTARIAN APPEALS DURING ELECTION CAMPAIGNS BE BROUGHT
UNDER ‘CORRUPT PRACTICES’ WITHIN §. 123 OF RoPA, 1951?.............................................15
1.1 That the appeals made by Aladdin Mosai during the election campaign are not a ground for
appeal on the basis of community under §. 123 (3) of ROPA, 1951.................................................15
1.2 That the appeals made by Bhootnath Jogi during his campaign is not ground for appeal on
the basis of religion under §. 123 (3) of ROPA, 1951.......................................................................18
2. WHETHER THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE APPELLANT WILL BE COVERED
UNDER FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION/ FREEDOM OF RELIGION?...................22
2.1. The statement made by Aladdin Mosai will not amount to hate speech and is not violative of §.
123(3A)..............................................................................................................................................22
 2.2. The said statement made by the appellant is not in violation of §. 123(3a)...............................24
3. WHETHER AN APPEAL FROM A PERSON FROM MINORITY COMMUNITY WILL
AMOUNT TO CORRUPT PRACTICE IN THE LIGHT OF PROTECTIVE
DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE ENSHRINED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF
SINDHUSTAN?.....................................................................................................................................27
PRAYER............................................................................................................................................32
 LIST OF ABBRIEVIATIONS

ABBREVIATION FULL FORM

§ Section

¶ Paragraph

AIR All India Reporter

Art. Article

ASMA All Sindhustan Mislamic Alliance

CILQ Central India Law Quarterly

C.J. Chief Justice

cl Clause

Const. Constitution

DPSPs Directive Principles of State Policy

E.g. Exempli gratia- for example

Etc et cetera

GH Gujarat High Court

HC High Court

Id Ibidium

IPC Indian Penal Code

MANU Manupatra

No. Number

Ors. Others

P.W. Prosecution Witness

RoPA Representation of People Act

SC Supreme Court

SCR Supreme Court Reporter

SMC Sindiabad Municipal Corporation

SSP Sahujan Samajwadi Party

Supra Above

v. versus
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

NAME OF THE CASE CITATION

Abdul Hussain Mir v. Shamsul Huda and Ors. 1975 AIR SC 1612

Abhiram Singh vs C.D. Commachen (Dead) By Lrs. & Ors. 1996 3 SCC 665

Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karmchari Sangh (Railway) v. Union 1981 1 SCC 246
of India,

Ambika Saran Singh v. Mahant Mahadev Nand Giri, 1969 3 SCC 492

Amjad Ali and Ors. v. Nazmut Haque 1959 MANU GH 0135

Arvind Kejriwal v. The State Of U.P and Ors. 2015 MANU UP 1112

Bhupendra Narain Mandal v E.K. Narain Lai Das, 1965 AIR Pat. 332.

Bishwanath Rai v. Sachhidanand Singh 1971 AIR S.C. 1949.

Damodar Tatyaba v. Vamanrao Mahadik, 1991 Bombay AIR 373

Dr. Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo and Ors. v. Prabhakar AIR 1996 SC 1113
Kashinath Kunte and Ors.,

Ebrahim Suleiman Sait v. M.C. Mohammed and Ors. AIR 1980 S.C. 354

Ghayar Ali Khan v. Keshav Gupta AIR 1959 All 264

Indra Sawhney v. Union of India AIR 1993 S.C. 477

Jumuna Prasad Mukhariya and Ors. v. Lachhi Ram and Ors. 1954 AIR 686

Kanti Prasad Jayshanker Yagnik v. Purshottamdas 1969 MANU 0263

Ranchhoddas Patel and Ors.
 Kultar Singh v. Mukhtiar Singh 1965 AIR S.C. 141

Lachhiram v. Jamuna Prasad 9 E.L.R. 149

Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar 1959 SCR 629

M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore 1963 AIR 649

Preeti Srivastava v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1999 SC AIR. 2894

Ramesh Dalal v. Union of India, 1988 SCC 1 668

S.Harcharn Singh v. S. Sajjan Singh and Ors. 1985 AIR 236

State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas 1976 AIR SC 490

Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas 1976 2 SCC 17

Mehra and Ors.

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS:

1. Kerala Education Bill, 1976.

2. Model Code of Conduct, 2019.
3. The Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and Their Rehabilitation Act, 2013.
4. Representation of the People Act, 1951.
5. The Constitution (Seventy Fourth Amendment) Act, 1992.
6. The Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and Their Rehabilitation Act, 2013.
7. The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
8. Law Commission of India Report No. 267.
9. Law Commission of India Report No. 256.
BOOKS:

1. B. Shiva Ramayya, Protective Discrimination and Ethnic mobilization, 22 JIL 480 (1980).
2. Justice S.M.N. Raina, Reservation with justice, 1990 (111) CILQ, P-1
3. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, Volume 1, (5, 2003)
4. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously,227 (1977)

WEB RESOURCES:

1. Heinonline, India available at: https://home.heinonline.org

2. Manupatra Online Resources, India available at: https://www.manupatra.co.in
3. SCC Online, India available at: https://www.scconline.com
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Sindhustan has the inherent jurisdiction to try, entertain and
dispose of the present case by virtue of Article 136 of The Constitution of Sindhustan.

“Article 136- Special Leave to Appeal by the Supreme Court.”

(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant
special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in
any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.

(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order
passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed
Forces
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

Sindhusthan is a constitutional democracy with a parliamentary system of government, and

at the heart of the system is a commitment to hold regular, free and fair elections. There are
four major religions in Sindusthan viz Sindu, Mislam, Kristain, Jarsi. Every five years the

elections are held. The general elections to constitute 17 th Loksabha were held on 15June
2017.

In the aftermath of election, the Sindhusthan Janata Party (SJP) has formed the government
with majority. However, the opposition is led by Rational Nongrace And Alliance (RNAA).
Meanwhile there have been three different instances where the election petitions are filed
for corrupt practices and similar charges. Interestingly the election commission has
cancelled the candidature of the returned candidates.

The instances are as follow,

Aladdin Mosai is a Sindhustan politician, who is the President and chief of the ASMA (All
Sindhusthan Mislamic Alliance). He is elected from sindiabad constituency in 17th Lok sabha.
During his election campaign he promised the Mislam population that out of total budget of Rs
34,000 crore (Sindiabad Municipal Corporation) he will give Rs 5,400 crore for the development
and welfare of the Mislam population. He also made an appeal that Mislamic population is
lagging when it comes to proper representation and they are suppressed by higher communities.

II

Mr. Bhootnath Jogi, a candidate of ruling SJP party contested and won from the constituency of
Luckpur a town. During his election campaign he made certain appeals on the issues like Mow
Animal protection, (Mow is an animal worshiped by Sindhus) Jam Temple (Temple worshiped
by Sindhus), and protecting the dignity of women of Sindusthan against Mislamic aggressors.
 III

Kamlawati the first Malit (Malit is a weaker section of society) Chief Minister of Chhatarpradesh
belonging to SSP (Sahujan Samajwadi Party) had reigned as the Chief Minister of the State for
three continuous terms thriving on support from the Malit community.

During her campaign she said we all know that upper caste do not want Malits to eat well, dress
well or do well. She promised to replace more than 1000 upper caste civil servants with lower
caste ones while neglecting almost equally deprived ones with higher caste population. She even
promised that the manual scavengers in the state most of which are Malits or people of other
lower caste will not be required to do such degrading menial labour job and instead people from
other caste and particularly the people from upper caste are also capable to carry out the same
task and should as and when required. She also assured that once she is in power the she will
reserve 30% of the funds for the welfare of Malits as they were the weaker section of the society
and as the weaker section of the society are always suppressed by the higher section she ensure
that police and prosecutors to rigorously enforce a law that made it easier for Malit victims of
caste based violence to bring charges against their assailants and promised stiff jail terms for
those convicted.
 STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1) WHETHER SECTARIAN APPEALS DURING ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

BE BROUGHT UNDER ‘CORRUPT PRACTICES’ WITHIN S. 123 OF
RoPA, 1951?

2) WHETHER AN ACT SAID AND DONE IN EXERCISE OF RIGHT TO

RELIGION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH CAN BE BROUGHT UNDER
‘CORRUPT PRACTICES’?

3) WHETHER AN APPEAL FROM A PERSON FROM MINORITY COMMUNITY

WILL AMOUNT TO CORRUPT PRACTICE IN THE LIGHT OF PROTECTIVE
DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE ENSHRINED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
OF SINDHUSTAN?
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1) WHETHER SECTARIAN APPEALS DURING ELECTION CAMPAIGNS BE

BROUGHT UNDER ‘CORRUPT PRACTICES’ WITHIN §. 123 OF RoPA, 1951?

The Counsel on behalf of the Appellants most humbly submit that sectarian appeals during
elections by Aladdin Mosai and Bhootnath Jogi cannot be brought under corrupt practices under
§ 123 of RoPA, 1951.

In Mosai’s defense he did not mention any other community in his speeches and only made
promises of providing allocation of Rs.5,500 crore from municipal budget for betterment of
Mislamic community which does not attract any mischief under §. 123 of RoPA, 1951.

Similarly, Bhootnath Jogi’s statements did not express any hatred towards any particular
community, he only promised to work for issues like protection of the sacred animal Mow, Jam
temple and dignity of women, which does not come under grounds of appeal under §. 123 of the
RoPA, 1951. There are also several legislations regarding protection of cattle, enshrined in the
constitution, and states can legislate on the matters of cattle protection.

2) WHETHER THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE APPELLANT WILL BE

COVERED UNDER FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION/ FREEDOM OF
RELIGION.

The Counsel on behalf of Appellants most humbly submits that the Disqualification action
imposed on him is invalid and unjustifiable.
The statements made by Mosai will not amount to hate speech and is not violative of section
123(3A) Of RoPA, 1951 because the statement that were made by the appellant are covered
under right to freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) and right to freedom of religion under
Article 25 of the Indian constitution. And the reliable evidence must have to be proved beyond
the doubt according to the law. And there is no effect of statements that have been made by a
candidate, or, on his behalf and with his consent, during his election, upon the minds and feelings
of the ordinary average voters of this country.

3) WHETHER AN APPEAL FROM A PERSON FROM MINORITY COMMUNITY

WILL AMOUNT TO CORRUPT PRACTICE IN THE LIGHT OF PROTECTIVE
DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE ENSHRINED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF
SINDHUSTAN?

The counsel on behalf of the Appellant in the Hon’ble Court of Sindhustan, submit that an appeal
from a person from a minority community will not amount to ‘corrupt practice’ under §. 123 of
RoPA, 1951 as in the present case the statements made by Kamlawati, (a person from a minority
community ‘Malit’) were in the light of the ‘protective discrimination’ principle enshrined under
the constitution of Sindhustan. The preamble of the constitution assures justice to the citizens of
India; social, economic and political as well as equality of opportunity and status to every citizen
of India. In pursuance of this assurance Article 14, 15 and 16 have been enacted which embody
certain fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution. The various provisions of our
constitution and particularly those of Articles 38, 46, 335, 338 and 340 together with the
preamble show that the right to equality enshrined in our constitution is a positive right, and the
state is under an obligation to undertake measures to make it real and effective. The Indian
constitutional policy of compensatory discrimination was based upon the notion that certain
social groups in India were inherently unequal and were victims of societal discrimination and
thus required satisfaction and compensation. It was believed that the meaning of equality based
upon individual achievement was too hypocritical in a caste-ridden society where group
identification had historically been used for the purposes of discrimination and separateness.
Kamlawati belongs to the Malit class, which
is a weaker §. of the society. She is the first Malit Chief Minister of Chhatar Pradesh belonging to
SSP (Sahujan Samajwadi Party). During her election campaign, she made multiple promises to
her community. She promised that the manual scavengers in the state, most of which are Malits
and people of other lower caste will not be required to do such degrading menial labor.
Under the Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act, 2013
, it is unlawful and an offence for any person, municipality, panchayat or agency to build an
insanitary latrine, or employ a manual scavenger. She assured her community that once she is in
power, she will reserve 30% of the funds for the welfare of Malits.
Article 46 of the Constitution provides that the State shall promote with special care the
educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the society and in particular, of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, which is what was promised by Kamlawati.
She also assured the community that she would ensure that police and prosecutors would
rigorously enforce a law that made it easier for Malit victims of caste-based violence to bring
charges against their assailants and promised stiff jail terms for those convicted. The Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is an Act to prevent the
commission of offences of atrocities against the members of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes and to provide for Special Courts for the trial of such offences and the relief
and rehabilitation of the victims of such offences. Scheduled Castes are a historically oppressed
group who have been the target of some of the grossest offences and indignities of the Indian
society. Kamlawati was merely declaring her promises, which were backed by statutes, to her
community during the campaign. She did not use her caste to get votes in the election. She
merely promised the community what they deserved, under the Indian Constitutional Policy of
Compensatory Discrimination. According to §. 123(3) of the RoPA, 1951, any appeal by a
candidate or his agent to vote or refrain from voting for any person on the ground of his religion,
race, caste, community or language is considered as a corrupt practice and an electoral offence.
However, in this case, Kamlawati did not compel any of the voters by imploring them to vote for
her since they shared the same caste. She only proclaimed her promises to the community, and
what she would do for the betterment of the community.
Hence, it is humbly submitted that statements made by Kamalawati were part of the principle
laid down as ‘protective discrimination’ enshrined in the Constitution of Sindhustan, and
consequently invalidates the §. 123 of RoPA, 1951.
 PLEADINGS

1. WHETHER SECTARIAN APPEALS DURING ELECTION CAMPAIGNS BE

BROUGHT UNDER ‘CORRUPT PRACTICES’ WITHIN §. 123 OF RoPA, 1951?

The counsel humbly submits that ‘sectarian appeals during an election campaign cannot be brought
under ‘corrupt practices’ within §. 123 of the RoPA, 1951.

1.1 That the appeals made by Aladdin Mosai during the election campaign are not a ground for
appeal on the basis of community under §. 123 (3) of ROPA, 1951.

Appeal to vote or refrain from voting on grounds of religion etc. falls under the corrupt practice
specified in clause (3) of §. 123 of the Act. The said provision reads as follows;

“The appeal by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a
candidate or his election agent to vote or refrain from voting for any person on the ground of
his religion, race, caste, community or language or the use of, or appeal to religious symbols
or the use of, or appeal to, national symbols, such as the national flag or the national
emblem, for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of that candidate or for
prejudicially affecting the election of any candidate.”1

1
Representation of the People Act, 1951, No. 4, §. 123 (3), (hereinafter: RoPA).
Thus, §. 123(3) of the Act, positively forbids any appeal to vote or refrain from voting for any
person on the ground of his religion, race, caste, community or language, by making it a corrupt
practice.

In order to see as to whether a particular appeal falls within the mischief of clause (3),
P.B.Gajendragadkar, C.J., speaking for the court in Kultar Singh,2 observed that the document
must be read as a whole and its purpose and effect determined in a fair, objective, and reasonable
manner. "In reading such document", the learned Chief justice further observed,

"it would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that when election meetings are held and appeals are
made by candidates of opposing political parties, the atmosphere is usually surcharged with
partisan feelings and emotions and the use of hyperboles or exaggerated language, or the
adoption of metaphors, and the extravagance of expression in attacking one another, are all a
part of the game; and so, when the question about the effect of speeches delivered or pamphlets
distributed at election meetings is argued in the cold atmosphere of a judicial chamber, some
allowance must be made and the impugned speeches or pamphlets must be construed in that
light".3
§. 123 (2), (3) and (3A) of the RoPA, were enacted to eliminate from the electoral process
appeals to those divisive factors which arouse irrational passions that run counter to the basic
tenets of the Constitution.4 Due respect for the religious beliefs and practices, race, creed, culture
and language of other citizens is one of the basic postulates of our democratic system.
The line has to be drawn by the court between what is permissible and what is prohibited after
taking into account the facts and circumstances of each case interpreted in the context in
which the statements or acts complained of might have been made.5

In the present case of Aladdin Mosai, a Sindhustan politician, who is the President and chief of
the ASMA,6 made a speech during one of his rallies that “Mislams account for around 23 % of
the population in the Metropolis. If the budget of SMC (Sindiabad Municipal Corporation) is
around Rs 34,000 crore, then Rs 5,500 crore should have been allotted for the development of
Mislams”

2
Kultar Singh v. Mukhtiar Singh, AIR 1965 S.C. 141.
3
Id. at 144.
4
S.Harcharn Singh v. S. Sajjan Singh and Ors. 1985 AIR 236.
5
Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehra and Ors. 1975, Suppl. S.C.R. 281.
6
Moot Proposition, ¶ Plot-1.
 He further stated that “Mislamic population has always been suppressed in terms of proper
representation and development by other higher communities who are holding the power for
decades”.7

In his speech, Aladdin just talks about the budgetary allocation of Rs. 5,500 crores for
development of the Mislamic community, for their proper representation and development, so
that this community can have an equal footing in terms of opportunity, and scope for
development in the field of employment and education which would resultantly increase their
representation in the metropolis.

Aladdin in his speech did not mention any other majority community of the metropolis and
hence did not bring any enmity or hate between two or more communities. Budgetary
allocation for welfare and development does not contravene the §.123 of ROPA, 1951 as no
statements have been made against a particular community and no one community has been
favored at the expense of another community.

Even if the returned candidate in his speech mentioned other majority communities as
suppressors in terms of representation and development,8 it is highly doubtful, that enmity and
hatred have been spread between communities.

The allegation of corrupt practice of promotion of feeling of enmity and hatred between
different classes on grounds of community was discussed in the case of Ebrahim Suleiman
Sait v. M.C. Mohammed and Ors.9 In the following case to indicate the effect of the speech
on the minds of the ordinary voters, the election petitioner examined two witnesses. P.W. 2 and
P.W. 4. P.W. 2
P. C. Mohammad said that after listening to the appellant's speech, "the Muslim voters looked
with hatred at those people who stood against them", but when questioned as to which sentence
in the speech attempted to promote the feeling of hatred, the witness referred to the first
sentence and he himself went on to say that "what the sentence really means is that it is not
proper to unite with Jansangh". P. W. 4 Hidre also said in the beginning that the speech was
"intended to destroy communal harmony", but he himself admitted later that the only effect of
the speech was that after the meeting people were saying that "the Opposition League candidate
must be defeated".

7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Ebrahim Suleiman Sait v. M.C. Mohammed and Ors., AIR 1980 S.C. 354.
 It seems to us that the speech sought to criticize the wrong policy of the Muslim League
(Opposition) in aligning with parties that were allegedly responsible for atrocities against the
Muslims and not just to emphasize the atrocities.
Finally, it was held by A.C. Gupta, J.
“In our opinion, it cannot be said that the speech falls within the mischief of §.123(3A) of the
Act; we have reached this conclusion keeping in mind the well-established principle that the
allegation of corrupt practice must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.”10

Hence it is humbly submitted that speeches made by Aladdin Mosai are not appeals on grounds
of community within the meaning of §. 123 of ROPA, and even if the statements are slightly
communal, it cannot be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the speech falls within the
mischief of §. 123 of ROPA, 1951.

1.2 That the appeals made by Bhootnath Jogi during his campaign is not ground for appeal on
the basis of religion under §. 123 (3) of ROPA, 1951.

It is humbly submitted that appeals made by Bhootnath Jogi on the protection of Mow, issue of
Jam temple, and dignity of women do not come under the mischief of §.123 of ROPA.

The Supreme Court in a later judgment in Abdul Hussain Mir v. Shamsul Huda and Ors. 11
reiterated the same principle in Kultar Singh v. Mukhtiar Singh. 12 Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for
the Court observed that "words of wide and vague import like appeal to community, must receive
restricted construction lest law run riot and upset accepted political standards."
"The sharp edge of the appeal, not its elitist possibility or over-nice implication, is the crucial,
commonsense test.”13
In the same context the Bombay High Court in the case Damodar Tatyaba v. Vamanrao
Mahadik and Ors.14 has further elaborated that in cases of speeches, whether or not a corrupt

10
Id.
11
Abdul Hussain Mir v. Shamsul Huda and Ors., AIR 1975 SC 1612.
12
Supra note 2.
13
Supra note 11, at 1618.
14
Damodar Tatyaba v, Vamanrao Mahadik. AIR 1991 Bombay 373 at 379.
practice has been committed, would depend not only on the overall effect and impression but also
on the emphasis on sentences, words, manner of utterance, conjunction of sentences and words,
etc.15

So, in the present case, it is submitted that statements made by Bhootnath Jogi for Animal
protection of sacred animal cow and taking the issue of Jam temple are not a ground for religious
appeal under §. 123(3) of ROPA,1951. It is important to understand the full meaning and context
of the speech and then only come to a conclusion whether the wordings of a speech attract the
provisions of § 123. This principle was mentioned in the case of Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo
and Ors. v. Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte and Ors.16
“The substance of the speech and the manner in which it is meant to be understood by the
audience determines its nature, and not the camouflage by an artistic use of the language. For
understanding the meaning and effect of the speech, the context has to be found in the speech
itself and not outside it with reference to any other background unless the speech itself imports
any earlier fact in the context of that speech.”17

In the case of Kanti Prasad Jayshanker Yagnik v. Purshottamdas Ranchhoddas Patel and
Ors.18,
“The following four passages in Ex. K, a speech delivered by Shambhu Maharaj at Kherwa after
midnight of February 18, 1967, was objected to:

(1) The Congress says that it has brought happiness and will give happiness in future; but even a
father cannot give happiness to his son, nor can a son give happiness to his father. Giving
happiness rests in the hands of God. But God gives happiness where there is religion. He does
not give happiness to the irreligious.

(2) Formerly there were no famines. Possibly once in 100 years there might be one famine. As
against that nowadays every year there is some natural calamity like a famine. Either there is no

15
Id. at 379.
16
Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo and Ors. v. Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte and Ors., AIR 1996 SC 1113.
17
Id. at 1120.
18
Kanti Prasad Jayshanker Yagnik v. Purshottamdas Ranchhoddas Patel and Ors., 1969 MANU 0263.
rain or there is frost or there is visitation of locust or there is some disease in the crops and some
calamity or the other is constantly visiting us. The reason for this is that Congress permits
slaughter of 33,000 bullocks every day. When slaughter of cows is banned, bullocks are allowed
to be slaughtered. In Gujarat 12,000 bullocks are being slaughtered.

(3) Nobody would sit till 12-30 at night to listen to any talks by the Congress-walas. But I have
come to tell the public, which is food of its religion, to elect the Swatantra Party, so that the
slaughter of bullocks might be stopped and all people who are fond of their religion are also
keeping away till 12-30 at night.”19
The SC, not in agreement with the decision of HC on these said passages by the Appellant, said:

“It seems to us that this is not a fair reading of these two passages. Cow slaughter is not
mentioned in these passages except to say that cow slaughter is banned in Gujarat. The causal
relationship, if any, exists between slaughter of 33,000 bullocks every day and natural
calamities. This, in our view, cannot amount to constitute "corrupt practice" within §. 123(2)
proviso (a)(ii). The law does not place any bar on describing a party as irreligious or saying
that because that political party is irreligious natural calamities have resulted because of its
disregard of religion.
We do not find anything objectionable in the third passage because here again it is only an
appeal to elect the Swatantra Party because the people in that party are fond of their religion.”20

Similarly, it is submitted that in the present case of Bhootnath Jogi mere mentioning of animal
‘Mow Protection’21 does not contravene the sub-§. 3 and 3A of 123, of ROPA.

It is also submitted that in Article 48 of the Indian Constitution which is part of Chapter IV
which deals with DPSPs states that:
“Organization of agriculture and animal husbandry: The State shall endeavor to organize
agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and shall, in particular, take

19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Moot Proposition, ¶, Plot-2
steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter, of cows and calves
and other milch and draught cattle”22

The article clearly mentions that State can make laws for prevention of slaughter of cattle animals,

Article 246 (15th Entry in the State List)

Also, according to entry No.15 in the state list, “15. Preservation, protection and improvement
of stock, and prevention of animal diseases; veterinary training and practice.”23
This means the state legislature has exclusive power in the enactment of laws banning cow
slaughter. That is why there are different laws banning cow slaughter to various degrees.

In the case of Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar,24 the petitions challenged the slaughter
of certain cattle in three states – Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Bihar. The laws were
challenged on three grounds:
1) the total ban offended Muslims as the sacrifice of cows was sanctioned on a certain day.
2) Such a ban violated the rights guaranteed to butchers under 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of
India.25
3) That a total ban was not in the interest of the general public.

The Supreme Court held that:

1) the total ban on the slaughter of cattle is valid and in consonance with the DPSPs laid down
under Article 48.26
2) A total ban on she-buffaloes and breeding bull or working bullocks as long as they are capable
of being used as milch or draught cattle was also reasonable and valid.
With respect to the first ground of the petition which mentioned that slaughter of cows is
required on a certain day, the court held that, “No material on the record before us which will
enable us to say, in the face of the foregoing facts, that the sacrifice of a cow on that day is an
obligatory overt

22
India Const. art. 48.
23
India Const. art. 246, (15th Entry in the State List).
24
Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar 1959 SCR 629; AIR 1958 SC 731.
25
M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, Volume 1, (5, 2003).
26
Supra note 22.
act for a Mussalman to exhibit his religious belief and idea. In the premises, it is not possible for
us to uphold this claim of the petitioners.”27
However, it must be noted that the court left the question of whether “total ban” was within the
scope of the restrictions placed by Article 19 (6).28
Hence it is submitted that statements made by Bhootnath Jogi on Mow protection do not attract
mischief of §.123(3) and (3A) of ROPA.

2. WHETHER THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE APPELLANT WILL BE

COVERED UNDER FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION/ FREEDOM OF
RELIGION?

2.1. The statement made by Aladdin Mosai will not amount to hate speech and is not violative of
§. 123(3A).

Under Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution of India it says that- “all citizens shall have the right
to freedom of speech and expression. But this right is subject to reasonable restrictions imposed
on the expression of this right for certain purposes under.”29

Article 25-

Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion.30

The counsel humbly submits before the court that the statements that are made by Mosai are
made in exercise of his Right to Speech and Right to religion, and they are not contrary to §.
123(3A) of ROPA, 1951.

27
Supra note 24.
28
India Const. art. 19 cl. 6
29
India Const. art. No.19, cl.1A.
30
India Const. art. No.25.
Mosai’s statement- “Mislams account for around 23 percent of the population in the Metropolis.
If the budget of SMC (Sindiabad Municipal Corporation) is around Rs 34,000 crore, then Rs
5,500 crore should have been allotted for the development of Mislams”

In the given statement as he said that Mislams is 23 percentage which means that they are a
minority community in the region and under schedule 12 for the benefit of the minority
community he can allocate funds for their welfare and their development which is not
contravening §. 123. ROPA, 1951.

Schedule 12

Schedule 12 was inserted into the Indian constitution by the 74th amendment act of 1992.31
Twelfth Schedule of the Indian Constitution contains the powers, authority and responsibility of
the Municipalities and it contains 18 items.

In the case of Harcharan Singh v. Sajjan Singh32 court observed:

“It would not be an appeal to religion if a candidate is put up by saying 'Vote for him' because
he is a good Sikh or he is a good Muslim, but it would be an appeal to religion if it is publicized
that not to vote for him would be against Sikh religion or against Christian religion or Hindu
religion or to vote for the other candidate would be an act against a particular religion. It is the
total effect of such an appeal that has to be borne in mind in deciding whether there was an
appeal to religion as such or not. In each case, therefore, substance of the matter has to be
judged.”

In Ghayur Ali Khan v. Keshav Gupta.33 It held that even if the appeal is to the members of a
particular community, it does not necessarily fall within the mischief of sub-§. 3 of §. 123 of the
Act, unless the appeal was made on the ground of religion or community. Suppose, the High
Court observed, the action of the political party in power is criticized on the ground that it Has
passed improper legislation interfering with the Hindu usages and customs in the matter of
marriage and divorce and that the persons professing Hindu faith should, therefore, vote against
the candidate set up by such a party. This would be an appeal to the members professing a
particular religion,

31
India Const. art. 243, cl.W, amended by The Constitution (Seventy Fourth Amendment) Act, 1992.
32
S.Harcharn Singh v. S. Sajjan Singh And Ors on 29 November, 1984 1985 AIR 236, 1985 SCR (2) 159.
33
Ghayar Ali Khan v. Keshav Gupta on 31 July, 1958 AIR 1959 All 264.
but it is not an appeal on the ground of religion. It is an appeal to vote against a candidate set
up by a party because the policy of the party is not liked by the maker of the appeal. It is a
criticism of that party.

Court also observed that merely a criticism of the actions of a political party or it is really an
appeal on the ground of religion. The Court gave an example: If a political party is criticized on
the ground that it has a communal outlook and that its policy is to suppress the members of
another community, such as the Jan Sangh or the Muslim League, and it is stated that people
should not vote for any of these communal organizations because the essential policy of these
organizations is to further the ends of the Hindus or the Muslims, at the cost of the members of
the other community, the appeal in such cases also would be to the members of the Hindu or the
Muslim community, but it would not be on the ground of religion or community, but on the
ground of the wrong policy of the particular organization.

The statements made by the appellant that the Mislamic population is not given proper
representation will fall under this purview and it will not amount to a violation of §. 123. of
ROPA,1951.

In Amjad Ali v. Nazmul Hague,34 In that case, it was held “that criticism of the Congress
Government in public meetings for its administrative policy in the matter of its enforcing or
passing legal measures or adopting methods prejudicial to Muslims (e.g. the passing of the
Cattle Preservation Act which prohibits cow slaughter, singing of Ramdhun in schools, banning
the burial of dead bodies, etc.), did not by itself amount to an appeal to Muslims to vote or
refrain from voting on the ground of caste, race, community or religion within the meaning of §.
123(3).”

2.2. The said statement made by the appellant is not in violation of §. 123(3a).

34
Amjad Ali and Ors. v. Nazmut Haque, 1959 MANU GH 0135.
Under Article 19 (1)(a) of the Indian constitution it is says that- “all citizens shall have the right
to freedom of speech and expression. But this right is subject to reasonable restrictions imposed
on the expression of this right for certain purposes under.”

Article 25-

Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion.35

The counsel humbly submits before the court that the statements made by Bhootnath Jogi will be
covered under article 19(1A) and Article 25 of the Indian Constitution and are not violative of §.
123(3A) of ROPA,1951.

Jagdev Singh Sidhanti v. Pratap Singh Daulta:

“It is not easy therefore to see how the Om flag which merely is a pennant on which is printed
the word 'Om' can be called a religious symbol. But assuming that the Om flag may be regarded
as a religious symbol, the evidence on the record is not sufficient to establish that by Sidhanti,
his election agents or any other person with his consent or the consent of his election agent, Om
flag was used or exhibited, or an appeal was made by the use of the Om flag to further the
prospects of Sidhanti at the election. It may be remembered that in the trial of an election
petition, the burden of proving that the election of a successful candidate is liable to be set aside
on the plea that he was responsible directly or through his agents for corrupt practices at the
election, lies heavily upon the applicant to establish his case, and unless it is established in both
its branches i.e. the commission of acts which the law regards as corrupt, and the responsibility
of the successful candidate directly or through his agents or with his consent for its practice not
by mere preponderance of probability, but by cogent and reliable evidence beyond any
reasonable doubt, the petition must fail. The evidence may be examined bearing this approach to
the evidence in mind. Between the months of December 10, 1961, and February 18, 1962,
fourteen.”

35
Supra note 29.
In Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo36 that a ‘mere reference’ to religion in a speech would not
satisfy the standard under sub-§. 3A.37 The Court stated that the words must be considered in
context and not in ‘abstract’ and that other elements, such as the ‘meaning and purport of the
speech and the manner in which it was likely to be understood by the audience had to be
considered’, to reach a conclusion.

In Ramesh v. Union of India38 (Ramesh Dalal) the SC stated that the ‘effect of the words must
be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men, and not
those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of those who scent danger in every hostile point of
view’.

In Ziyauddin Bukhari39, the SC relied on the ‘likely effects test’. In this regard, the Court stated
‘we have to determine the effect of statements proved to have been made by a
candidate, or, on his behalf and with his consent, during his election, upon the minds and feelings
of the ordinary average voters of this country in every case of alleged corrupt practice of undue
influence by making statements.’

In the given case also first the made allegations should be proved beyond reasonable doubt and
that the words that referred had affected the minds and feelings of the ordinary average voters of
the country.

S. Harcharn Singh vs S. Sajjan Singh And Ors.40

It would not be an appeal to religion if a candidate is put up be saying vote for him because he
is a good Sikh or he is a good Christian or he is a good Muslim, but it would be an appeal to
religion if it is publicized that not to vote for him would be against Sikh religion or against
Christian religion or against Hindu religion or to vote for the other candidate would be an act
against a particular religion. It is the total effect of such an appeal that has to be borne in mind
in deciding whether there was all appeal to religion as such or not.

36
Dr. Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo v. Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte, (1996) 1 SCC 130.
37
§. 123 (3A) OF ROPA 1951.
38
Ramesh Dalal v. Union of India, (1988) SCC (1) 668.
39
Ziyauddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Mehra, (1976) 2 SCC 17.
40
S.Harcharn Singh vs S. Sajjan Singh And Ors on 29 November, 1984 1985 AIR 236, 1985 SCR (2) 159.
3. WHETHER AN APPEAL FROM A PERSON FROM MINORITY COMMUNITY
WILL AMOUNT TO CORRUPT PRACTICE IN THE LIGHT OF PROTECTIVE
DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE ENSHRINED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF
SINDHUSTAN?

The counsel on behalf of the Appellant in the Hon’ble Court of Sindhustan, submit that an
appeal from a person from a minority community will not amount to ‘corrupt practice’ under
§. 123 of ROPA, 1951 as in the present case the statements made by Kamlawati, (a person
from a minority community ‘Malit’)41 were in the light of the ‘protective discrimination’
principle enshrined under the constitution of Sindhustan.

Protective Discrimination

The Indian constitution intends to establish a welfare state. The concept of the rule of law is
dynamic in nature. It aims at safeguarding and advancing the civil and political rights of the
citizens of the country. It also has to establish social, economic, educational and cultural
conditions under which the legitimate aspirations and dignity of the citizens may be realized.
Therefore, it is one of the objectives of the Constitution to secure to all citizens equality of
status, equality of opportunity, to promote fraternity amongst the citizens and assure the
dignity of its citizens and the unity and integrity of the nation. Right to equality and
prohibition on the

41
Moot Proposition, ¶ Plot-3.
 basis of sex, religion, caste, race are rights that are granted to all citizens. However, due to
the presence of deeply rooted social inequalities amongst the various communities, the
constitution was framed to include additional provisions like reservations in admissions to
educational institutions and in appointment of various different state services. To make them
truly equal, positive state action was required. Affirmative actions by the state are urgently
needed to assure the people of oppressed classes their dignity as promised to every citizen in
the preamble of the Constitution. It is utterly necessary to also remove the gross injustices
present in our society. The preamble of the constitution assures justice to the citizens of India;
social, economic and political as well as equality of opportunity and status to every citizen of
India. In pursuance of this assurance Article 14, 15 and 16 have been enacted which embody
certain fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution.42

Weaker sections of society have suffered all kinds of indignities and discrimination. Here a
distinction should, however, be recognized between what R. Dworkin calls "the right to equal
treatment" and "the right to treatment as an equal". While the former right comprehends "as
equal distribution of some opportunity burden", the latter means not a right "to receive the
same distribution of some burden or benefit, but to be treated with the same respect and
concern as anyone else". The right to treatment as an equal, "according to Dworkin, "is
fundamental, and the right to equal treatment, derivative". 43 Therefore, so long as the state
guarantees equal concern or respect for all the claim of equality is satisfied.

Equality supposes not merely legal equality but also real equality. The equality of
opportunity has to lie distinguished from the equality of results. The various provisions of
our constitution and particularly those of Articles 38, 46, 335, 338 and 340 together with the
preamble show that the right to equality enshrined in our constitution is a positive right, and
the state is under an obligation to undertake measures to make it real and effective.44 The
Indian constitutional policy of compensatory discrimination was based upon the notion that
certain social groups in India were inherently unequal and were victims of societal
discrimination and thus required satisfaction and compensation. It was believed that the
meaning of equality based upon individual achievement was too hypocritical in a caste-
ridden society where group

42
Justice S.M.N. Raina, Reservation with justice, 1990 (111) CILQ, P-1
43
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 227 (1977), cited in supra note 16.
44
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 S.C. 477 at 637.
 identification had historically been used for the purposes of discrimination and separateness.
The constitution directs and empowers the Government to undertake special measures for the
advancement of backward groups. The Constitution of India recognized as an interim
measure Protective Discrimination in favor of specific groups on grounds of social justice. At
present, the reservations exist for the benefit of three groups namely, (a) Scheduled Caste (b)
Scheduled Tribes and (c) Other backward classes.45

The Hon’ble SC in its advisory opinion in the Kerala Education Bill46 case recognized a
four degree of discrimination in favour of religious minorities. In this respect the court seems
to have acted on the same principle which is applied to socially and educationally backward
classes, that is the principle of protective discrimination. In M.R. Balaji v. State of
Mysore47, while examining the validity of reservation to socially and educationally backward
classes under Art. 15(1), the judge pointed out that the reservation to socially and
educationally backward classes would serve the interests of the society at large by promoting
the advancement of the weaker elements in the society. In the State of Kerala v. N.M.
Thomas48, the CJ. while dealing with the concept of equality guaranteed by Articles 14,
15(1) and 16(1) with reference to the preferential treatment for backward classes observed
that preferential treatment for members of the backward classes with due regard to
administrative efficiency alone can mean equality of opportunity for all citizens. In Akhil
Bharatiya Soshit Karmchari Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India 49, Chinnappa Reddy, the
judge explaining the interrelationship of Articles 16(1) and 16(4) said that Article 16(4) is not
in the nature of an exception to Article 16(1). It is a facet of Article 16(l) which fosters and
furthers the idea of equality of opportunity with special reference to underprivileged and
deprived classes of citizens. The equality means relative equality, namely the principle to
treat equally what is equal and unequally what is unequal. In Indra Sawhney v. Union of
India50, the SC held that there is no doubt that no classification can validly be made only on
the basis of caste just as it cannot be made only on the basis of religion, race, sex, descent,
place of birth or any of them,

45
B. Shiva Ramayya. Protective Discrimination and Ethnic mobilization 22 JIL 480 (1980).
46
Kerala Education Bill, 1976.
47
M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 se. 649.
48
State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, AIR 1976 SC 490.
49
Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karmchari Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India, 1981 1 SCC 246.
50
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 477 at 648.
 the same being prohibited by Article 16(2). What is, however, required to be done for the
purposes of Article 16(9) is not classification but identification of the backward classes. In
Preeti Srivastava v. State of Andhra Pradesh51, the SC held that Article 15(4) which was
added by the constitution, First Amendment of 1951, enables the state to make special
provisions for the advancement, inter-alia, of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes,
notwithstanding Articles 15(1) and 29(2). The wording of Article 15(4) is similar to that of
Article 15(3). Article 15(3) was therefore exception. It enables special provisions being made
for women and children notwithstanding Article 15(l) which imposes the mandate of non-
discrimination on the ground of (among other) sex. This was envisioned as a method of
protective discrimination. The same protective discrimination was extended by Article 15(4)
to (among others) Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Therefore, the programs and
policies of compensatory discrimination under Article 15(4) have to be designed and pursued
to achieve this ultimate national interest. At the same time the programs and policies cannot
be unreasonable or arbitrary, nor can they be executed in a manner that undermines other
vital public interests or the general good of all. All public policies, therefore, in this area have
to be tested on the anvil of reasonableness and the ultimate public good. In the case of Article
16(4), the constitution-makers explicitly spelt out in Article 335 one such public good which
cannot be sacrificed, namely, the necessity of maintaining efficiency in administration.
Article 15(4) also must be used, and policies under it framed, in a reasonable manner
consistent with the ultimate public interests.

Kamlawati belongs to the Malit class, which is a weaker §. of the society. She is the first
Malit Chief Minister of Chhatar Pradesh belonging to SSP (Sahujan Samajwadi Party).
During her election campaign, she made multiple promises to her community. She promised
that the manual scavengers in the state, most of which are Malits and people of other lower
caste will not be required to do such degrading menial labor.52

Under the Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act,
201353, it is unlawful and an offence for any person, municipality, panchayat or agency to
build

51
Preeti Srivastava v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1999 SC. 2894.
52
Moot Proposition, ¶ Plot-3.
53
The Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and Their Rehabilitation Act, 2013.
 an insanitary latrine, or employ a manual scavenger. She assured her community that once
she is in power, she will reserve 30% of the funds for the welfare of Malits.

Article 46 of the Constitution provides that the State shall promote with special care the
educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the society and in particular, of
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, which is what was promised by Kamlawati.

She also assured the community that she would ensure that police and prosecutors would
rigorously enforce a law that made it easier for Malit victims of caste-based violence to bring
charges against their assailants and promised stiff jail terms for those convicted. The
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is an Act to
prevent the commission of offences of atrocities against the members of the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and to provide for Special Courts for the trial of such
offences and the relief and rehabilitation of the victims of such offences. 54 The objective of
this Act is to stop the atrocities against the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and
punish the offenders. The objectives of this Act clearly emphasize the intention of the
government to deliver justice to these communities through proactive efforts to enable them
to live in the society with dignity and self-esteem and without fear or violence or suppression
from the dominant castes. The practice of untouchability, in its overt and covert form was
made a cognizable and non- compoundable offence, and strict punishment is provided for any
such offence. Kamlawati’s promise comes under the purview of this Act.

Scheduled Castes are a historically oppressed group who have been the target of some of the
grossest offences and indignities of the Indian society. Kamlawati was merely declaring her
promises, which were backed by statutes, to her community during the campaign. She did not
use her caste to get votes in the election. She merely promised the community what they
deserved, under the Indian Constitutional Policy of Compensatory Discrimination. According
to §. 123(3) of the Representation of People Act, 1951, any appeal by a candidate or his agent
to vote or refrain from voting for any person on the ground of his religion, race, caste,
community or language is considered as a corrupt practice and an electoral offence.55
However, in this case, Kamlawati did not compel any of the voters by imploring them to
vote for her

54
The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
55
Supra note 1.
since they shared the same caste. She only proclaimed her promises to the community, and
what she would do for the betterment of the community.

Hence, it is humbly submitted that statements made by Kamalawati were part of the principle
laid down as ‘protective discrimination’ enshrined in the Constitution of Sindhustan, and
consequently invalidates the §. 123 of ROPA, 1951.
 PRAYER

IN THE LIGHT OF THE ARGUMENTS ADVANCED AND AUTHORITIES CITED,

THE COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF REPONDENTS HUMBLY PLEADS BEFORE
THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF SINDHUSTAN TO:

1)ACCEPT THE APPEAL OF THE APPELANTS AND REVERSE THE ORDER OF

THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT

2)QUESTION THE VALIDITY OF THE §. 123 OF THE RoPA, 1951.

ANY OTHER ORDER AS IT DEEMS FIT IN THE INTEREST OF EQUITY, JUSTICE

AND GOOD CONSCIENCE.

FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE APPELLANT FACTION SHALL BE DUTY

BOUND FOREVER.

SD/-

(COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT)