UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The European Theater of Operations

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
OF THE ARMIES
In Two Volumes
Volume II: September 1944-May 1945

by
Roland G. Ruppenthal

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

UNITEDSTATES ARMY
WASHINGTON,D.C., 1995
 Library of Congress Catalog Number: 53–60080

FirstPrinted 1959—CMHPub 7–3–1

For sale by the U S . Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, D.C. 20402
 UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
Kent Roberts Greenfield, General Editor

Advisory Committee
(As of 30 May 1958)
Elmer Ellis Brig. Gen. John B. Sullivan
University of Missouri U.S. Continental Army Command
Samuel Flagg Bemis Brig. Gen. Edgar C. Doleman
Yale University Army War College
Gordon A. Craig Brig. Gen. Frederick R. Zierath
Princeton University Command and General Staff College
Oron J. Hale Brig. Gen. Kenneth F. Zitzman
University of Virginia Industrial College of the Armed Forces
W. Stull Holt Col. Vincent J. Esposito
University of Washington United States Military Academy
T. .Harry Williams
Louisiana State University

Office of the Chief of Military History

Maj. Gen. Richard W. Stephens, Chief
Chief Historian Kent Roberts Greenfield
Chief, Histories Division Col. Seneca W. Foote
Chief, Editorial and Publication Division Lt. Col. E. E. Steck
Editor in Chief Joseph R. Friedman
Chief, Cartographic Branch Elliot Dunay
Chief, Photographic Branch Margaret E. Tackley

iii
... to Those Who Served
 Foreword
This volume completes the bridge between combat and services in the
European theater for which the author laid the foundations in Volume I.
It is as important a book for combat commanders as for those who have to
plan and execute logistical operations. It will leave the nonmilitary reader
in no doubt of the enormous weight and complexity of the administrative
burden that the Army had to assume to assure the success of its ground and
air forces, and the resourcefulness with which it managed that burden.
On the other hand, those who have to think about the future can here
study a test of the principle of a single service of supply supporting the
national element of allied forces under a coalition headquarters and a
supreme allied commander.

R. W. STEPHENS
Washington, D.C. Maj. Gen., U.S.A.
15June 1958 Chief of Military History

vii
 Preface
This volume completes the story of the logistic support of U.S. forces
in the European theater, carrying the account forward from mid-September
1944 to the end of hostilities in May 1945. It follows the pattern, established
in Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I , of focusing on the influence
which logistical support or lack of it had on the planning and the conduct
of tactical operations. T h e inclination consequently has been to concen-
trate on the problem areas in logistic support, such as port discharge and
transportation difficulties, and supply and manpower shortages. As explained
in the Preface to Volume I, it was not intended to cover all aspects of
logistics as the term is commonly defined. To avoid duplication, such sub-
jects as hospitalization and evacuation, communications, and construction
are purposely left to the technical service histories, where they can be given
proper coverage. T h e one major exception is the account of the rebuilding
of Cherbourg, which was so important to the development of the logistic
structure in the summer and early fall of 1944 that it is presented as a case
history in planning and execution. A substantial amount of space has been
given to the discussion of theater command and organization because of
the persistent influence which that problem had on logistic support and on
the relations between the service and combat elements. In general, the
topical treatment predominates, but within the boundaries of the two dis-
tinct periods of tactical developments. One major violation of chronology
occurs in the treatment of local procurement (Chapter XVIII), which did
not lend itself to division.
T h e author’s work was again lightened by the use of preliminary studies
prepared by members of the Historical Section, ETO. For Volume II these
were: Robert W. Coakley’s two-volume study of theater command and
organization; John E. Henderson’s study of the replacement problem; and
George H. Elliott’s study of the use of indigenous manpower. Once again
Mr. Royce L. Thompson gave invaluable aid in running down records and
in researching several thorny problems.

It is a pleasure to acknowledge the help of the several persons who con-

tributed so cordially and generously in the final production of the volume:
Mr. Joseph R. Friedman and Miss Ruth Stout for their expert editorial
judgment; Mrs. Loretto Stevens for the laborious work of copy editing the
manuscript; Mr. Wsevolod Aglaimoff for the excellent cartographic work;
ix
and Miss Margaret E. Tackley for the fine selection of photographs. Again
the author wishes to acknowledge the able assistance provided by Mr. Israel
Wice and his staff of the General Reference Branch of the Office, Chief of
Military History, and by the personnel of the Departmental Records Branch,
Adjutant General’s Office, particularly Mrs. Blanche Moore and Mrs. Lois
Aldridge. Key staff officers and commanders associated with the logistic
support of U.S. forces in the ETO provided first-hand knowledge of the
events of 1944–45 as they did for Volume I. Generals John C. H. Lee,
Raymond G. Moses, Ewart G. Plank, Morris W. Gilland, and Frank S. Ross
read varying portions of the manuscript in draft form. Biographical sketches
of the principal commanders and staff officersof the Communications Zone
are included in Volume I.

ROLAND G. RUPPENTHAL
Washington, D. C .
15 June 1958

X
 Contents
T H E TYRANNY OF LOGISTICS,
SEPTEMBER 1944–FEBRUARY 1945
Chapter Page
I. LOGISTIC LIMITATIONS AS T H E ARBITER OF TAC-
TICAL PLANNING . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
(1) The Pursuit's Effect on Logistic Plans . . . . . . . 3
(2) Competing Tactical Plans . . . . . . . .
. . 8
( 3 ) The September Decisions . . . . . . . . . . 11
(4) Prospects at the End of September . . . . . .
. . 17
II. TACTICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS . 22
(1) Tactical Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
(2) Organization and Command . . . . . . . . . 26

III. T H E PORT DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS . . 46

(1) The Port Problem as Affected by the Pursuit . . . . . 46
(2) The Beaches and Minor Ports of Normandy . . . . . 53
(3) The Role of Cherbourg . . . . . . . . . . . 62
(4) The Brittany Area . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
IV. THE PORT DISCHARGE AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS
(CONTINUED) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
96
(1) The Seine Ports—Le Havre and Rouen . . .
. . .
96
(2) Antwerp and the Other Northern Ports . . . .
. . 104
(3) Southern France . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
(4) The Shipping Tie-up . . . . . . . . . . . .
124

V. TRANSPORTATION DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . 134

. .
(1) Motor Transport: T h e Color Routes . . . . . 134
(2) The Railways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
(3) Air Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
(4) Inland Waterways . . . . . . . . . .
. . . 165
VI. FORWARD MOVEMENTS . . . . . . . . . .
. 169
(1) The Tonnage Allocations System . . . . . . . . 169
(2) The Ardennes Counteroffensive and Its Effect on Movements 181

xi
Chapter Page
VII. SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: RATIONS, POL, AND COAL . 188
(1) Rations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
(2) POL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
(3) Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

VIII. SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: EQUIPMENT . . . . . . 215

(1) Class II and IV Shortages in General . . . . . . . 215
(2) T h e Case of the Winter Uniform . . . . . . . . 218
(3) Weapons and Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . 235

IX. SUPPLYING T H E ARMIES: AMMUNITION . , . . . 247

(1) T h e October Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
.
(2) Contention W i t h the W a r Department . . . . . . 257
(3) T h e November Offensive and the Bull Mission . . . . 263
(4) Ammunition Supply in December and January . . . . 269

X. T H E TROOP BUILD-UP, AUGUST 1944–MARCH 1945 . . 276

(1) T h e Flow of Divisions . . . . . . . . . . . 276
(2) Service and Supporting Troops . . . . . . . . . 289
XI. T H E MANPOWER PROBLEM, AUGUST 1944–FEBRUARY
1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
(1) Rumblings of a Replacement Problem . . . . . . 304
(2) The Storm Breaks, November–December 1944 . . . . . 316
(3) T h e TheaterActs,January–February 1945 . . . . . . 326
(4) T h e Replacement System in Operation . . . . . 334
XII. T H E LOGISTIC STRUCTURE UNDER SCRUTINY . . . 348
(1) T h e Communications Zone and the Field Commands . . 348
(2) Expediting Supply Deliveries . . . . . . . . . 351
(3) Supply Planning Procedures . . . . . . . . . . 352
(4) T h e Depot System and Records Keeping . . . . . . 355
(5) Expedients . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . 359

THE LAST OFFENSIVE,

FEBRUARY–MAY 1945

XIII. TACTICAL, LOGISTICAL, AND ORGANIZATIONAL

ASPECTS OF T H E LAST OFFENSIVE . . . . . . 367
(1) Tactical Developments, 8 February–8 May 1945 . . . . 367
(2) Logistic Factors in Planning the Last Offensive . . . . 372
(3) Command and Organization, February–August 1945 . . . 378

xii
Chapter Page
XIV . MOVEMENTS AND DISTRIBUTION: PORT DISCHARGE
AND CLEARANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
(1) Planning and Controlling Movements . . . . . . . 390
(2) Discharge and Clearance . . . . . . . . . . . 393
(3) Shipping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398
(4) BOLERO in Reverse . . . . . . . . . . . . 402
XV . MOVEMENTS AND DISTRIBUTION: TRANSPORTATION
AND FORWARD DELIVERIES . . . . . . . . . 405
(1) T h e Railways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
(2) Motor Transport–XYZ . . . . . . . . . . . 415
(3) Inland Waterways . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
(4) Air Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
(5) Forward Deliveries . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
XVI . SUPPLY IN THE LAST MONTHS . .. . . . . . . 433
(1) Rations. POL. and Coal . . . .. . . . . . . 433
(2) Ammunition . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 441
(3) Equipment . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 452
XVII . END OF THE REPLACEMENT PROBLEM . . . . . . 459
(1) T h e Turning Point . . . . . . . . . . . . 459
(2) Withdrawals Are Stopped . . . . . . . . . . 461
(3) Results of the Retraining Program . . . . . . . . 467
XVIII . LOCAL PROCUREMENT ON THE CONTINENT. JUNE
1944-AUGUST 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . 470
(1) Purpose and Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . 470
(2) The Use of Nonmilitary Labor . . . . . . . . . 475
(3) Local Procurement of Supplies . . . . . . . . . 486
XIX . RETROSPECT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 503
GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513
CODE NAMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 523

xiii
 Tables
No. Page
1. Beach Discharges, 1 July-17 November 1944 . . . . . . . . 57
2. Discharge Performance of Normandy's Minor Ports . . . . . . 62
3. Discharge Performance of the Brittany Ports . . . . . . . . 95
4. Tonnages Discharged at Continental Ports, June 1944-April 1945 . . 124
5. Artillery Ammunition Expenditures, 15-21 October 1944 . . . . 256
6. 12th Army Group Artillery Ammunition Expenditures, 6 June-22 Oc-
tober 1944, Compared With Day of Supply Rates . . . . . . 267
7. OVERLORD Divisional Build-up, D plus go to D plus 210 . . . . . 281
8. Divisional Build-up in the European Theater, 1942-1945 . , . . 282
9. Theater Strength by Major Component, May 1944-April 1945 . . . 288
10. Battle and Nonbattle Casualties, June 1944-May 1945 . . . . * 317
11. Combat Zone Maintenance Factors, June-October 1944 . . . . 430
12. Combat Zone Consumption Experience, 23 March-25 April 1945 . . 432
13. Ammunition Day of Supply by Type: Selected Planned Rates, Sep-
tember 1944-April 1945, and Actual Expenditures, June 1944-Feb-
ruary 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * 446
14. Civilians Employed in the Communications Zone in Selected Weeks,
1944-45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * 477

Maps
1. Tactical Progress, 1 2 September 1944-9 February 1945 . . . .
2. E T 0 Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. COMZ Boundaries, November 1944-January 1945 . . . . . .
4. T h e Port of Cherbourg . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Highway Express Routes, September 1944-February 1945 . . . .
6. Tactical Developments, 8 February-8 May 1945 . . . . . . .
7. COMZ Boundaries, April 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . .
8. Movement Program, March 1945 . . . . . . . . . . .
9. Railways in Use by U.S. Forces East of Paris . . . . . . . .
10. XYZ Truck Routes, 25 March-8 May 1945 . . . . . . . .
11. T h e POL Pipeline Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xiv
 Illustrations
Page
Maj. Gen. Arthur R. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Brig. Gen. John P. Ratay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Maj. Gen. Thomas B. Larkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Troops Debarking Onto a Causeway . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Bulldozer Stuck in the Thick Mud . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
T h e Port of Cherbourg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Destruction at Cherbourg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Marginal Wharf Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Laying Railway Tracks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Seatrain Unloading a Gondola . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
LST’s Discharging Cargo on the Beach . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Crane Lifting a Lock Gate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Dukws Transferring Cargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Quay at Rouen Loaded With Incoming Supplies . . . . . . . . 103
Ships Discharging Cargo for Clearance by Rail . . . . . . . . 112
Remains of Decanting Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Searching for Casualties in Wreckage . . . . . . . . . . . 117
General Destruction at Marseille . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Close-up of Damaged Dock Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Trucks Loaded With Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Red Ball Express Trucks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
Truck-Tractor and Semitrailer Stuck in Thick Mud . . . . . . . 142
Loaded 10-Ton Semitrailers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
Truck Tractors, 5-Ton, Hauling 10-Ton Semitrailers . . . . . . . 145
Four 750-Gallon Skid Tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
American Locomotive Lowered by Crane . . . . . . . . . . 152
Maj. Gen. Frank S. Ross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Convoy of Trucks Carrying Essential Supplies . . . . . . . . . 159
C–47’s Airdropping Supplies by Parachute . . . . . . . . . . 164
Barge Convoy on Albert Canal . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Supply Trucks Passing Through Bastogne . . . . . . . . . . 185
Portion of the Major Pipeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
Camouflaged Pumping Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
POL Storage Tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Thousands of Jerricans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
Sign Appealing for the Return of Jerricans . . . . . . . . . 206
U.S. First Army’s POL Reserves . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
General Dwight D. Eisenhower . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
Serving a Hot Meal to Cold Infantrymen . . . . . . . . . . 224
xv
 Page
Parsons Jacket 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Infantryman Wearing a Field Jacket M1943 . . . . . . . . . 231
Medium Tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
Street Fighting in Aachen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
“And me a Clerk-Typist!” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
Officer Candidate Class, Fontainebleau . . . . . . . . . . . 332
Orientation Lecture for Enlisted Men . . . . . . . . . . . 339
Infantry Replacements Checking Equipment . . . . . . . . . 341
Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
Ludendorff Railway Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369
Stacks of War Matériel in Open Storage . . . . . . . . . . 397
Toot Sweet Express Ready To Leave Cherbourg ........ 406
Bridge Across the Rhine at Wesel . . . . . . . . . . . . 408
Single-Track Railroad Bridge at Mainz . . . . . . . . . . . 409
Truck-Tractor and 40-Ton Tank Transporters . . . . . . . . 417
Highway Bridge Over the Meuse River . . . . . . . . . . 423
C–47 Transport Planes Bringing in POL . . . . . . . . . . 439
Pershing Tanks M26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455
M24 Light Tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457
French Civilians Employed by U.S. Forces . . . . . . . . . . 480
Italian Service Unit Men Loading Cases of Rations . . . . . . . 483
German Prisoners of War Filling 50-Gallon Oil Drums . . . . . . 487
Renault Plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490
Belgian Workers in a Rubber Plant . . . . . . . . . . . . 491
Soldiers Equipping Medium Tank Tracks . . . . . . . . . . 493
First Division Troops Wearing Winter Camouflage Garments . . . . 495

T h e illustrations are from the files of the Department of Defense except

for the cartoon by Sgt. Dick Wingert, page 329, courtesy of The Stars and Stripes.

xvi
 THE TYRANNY OF LOGISTICS,
SEPTEMBER 1944–FEBRUARY 1945
 CHAPTER I

Logistic Limitations as the Arbiter

of Tactical Planning
(1) The Pursuit’s Effect on Logistic Plans T h e shortages which forced this deci-
Three months after the landings in sion were only a foretaste of a prolonged
Normandy, the Allied armies, having supply famine. For a period of almost
three months logistic limitations largely
pursued a disorganized enemy across
northern France and up the Rhône val- dominated tactical planning, and U.S.
forces learned to their dismay how sup-
ley, stood at the Dutch and German bor-
ders in the north, at the Moselle River ply, instead of holding her rightful posi-
in the center, and at the entrance to the tion as the handmaiden of battle, could
Belfort gap in the south. That they were become war’s mistress.
T h e inability to continue the pursuit
stopped there in mid-September was due
in part to the increasing resistance which of the shaken enemy forces was exasperat-
ing to combat commanders, and it was
a reorganized enemy was able to offer
not to be expected that they would react
from the prepared defenses of the West
calmly and objectively to the restrictions
Wall and along the Moselle, and in part
imposed by logistic difficulties. T h e ne-
to supply shortages.
cessity to halt the advance has been
The supply shortages were the more
exasperating because they occurred in variously ascribed to the shortage of
the midst of spectacular advances and gasoline, to shortcomings within the
because they helped frustrate a short- Communications Zone (including the al-
lived hope that the war might quickly leged preoccupation of service troops
be brought to an end. Within a matter with luxurious living and black-market
of days the deteriorating logistic situa- activities), to “high level politics,” to
tion led to one of the most reluctantly undue favoritism toward the British,
made, and most debated, decisions of the and, according to a British view, to the
war. This was the decision which General excessive strain on transport caused by
Dwight D. Eisenhower made late in Sep- Third Army’s advanced position. It is
tember to halt offensive operations on a not within the province of this volume
large part of the front and to concentrate to weigh all these charges. But the acri-
the bulk of the Allied resources on a monious debate which attended the sup-
relatively narrow front in the north. ply difficulties early in September makes
4 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

it appropriate to consider the larger ques- vided only that the ports were captured
tion of the reasons why the Communica- on the dates forecast, and then only by
tions Zone was unable to meet the de- the narrowest margin. In fact, deficits in
mands placed upon it, and to consider port discharge capacity were predicted
the purely logistic aspects of the various beginning in the fifth month (October).
operational plans for which the field They admitted that there were certain
commands now claimed priority. hidden assets, such as supply by air and
The reasons for the so-called “supply other possible expedients. But there was
failure” become apparent enough when also the possibility of additional liabili-
one recalls the invasion plan and com- ties. Any material variation in logistical
pares the expected with the actual course planning factors, such as a higher rate
of the operation. The predicted develop- of demolitions, or tonnage requirements
ment of the OVERLORD operation was larger than estimated, would impinge
based on both tactical and logistical con- directly on the rate of build-up and capa-
siderations. On its operational side the bility of support. By the same token any
plan was predicated on an estimate that unexpected acceleration in the advance
the enemy would make successive stands would have a like effect in creating addi-
on the major water barriers across France tional port discharge and transportation
and Belgium. In accord with this assump- liabilities. 1
tion it was expected that he would make Since the OVERLORD operation devel-
a stand at the Seine and that that line oped quite differently from what had
would not be reached until D plus go. been expected, the assumptions on which
Furthermore, plans had contemplated a the schedules had been based were largely
fairly steady rate of advance rather than voided. For the first seven weeks the
the pursuit of a disorganized enemy. advance was much slower than antici-
While such a forecast of progress was pated, and the Allied forces were con-
admittedly conjectural, it necessarily fined to a shallow Normandy bridgehead.
formed the basis of logistic preparations. From the viewpoint of logistic support,
In the belief, for example, that the Seine the lag in operations was not immediately
ports would not quickly become avail- serious, for it resulted in short lines of
able, great emphasis was placed on the communication and gave the service
development of the Brittany area, and forces added time to develop the port
a pause of at least a month at the Seine facilities at Cherbourg, whose capture
was expected to be necessary to develop had been delayed. But the long restric-
an administrative base capable of sup- tion to this area promised serious con-
porting further offensives. sequences for the future, for the port
Even on these assumptions the margin capacity of Cherbourg and the beaches
of safety of the OVERLORD logistic plan severely limited the force which could
was believed to be nonexistent. In an be maintained during the fall and winter
administrative appreciation prepared months.
early in June, SHAEF planners had con- Whatever temporary advantage ac-
cluded that port capacity would suffice 1 Adm Appreciation, SHAEF G–4 Post-NEPTUNE
to support the planned build-up pro- Opns, 17 Jun 44, SHAEF, 12 A Gp 370.2.
LOGISTIC LIMITATIONS ON TACTICAL PLANNING 5

crued from the short lines of communi- in the period before the breakout, and in
cation and low maintenance scales in the subsequent period could not be de-
Normandy quickly disappeared after the veloped at the speed with which tanks
breakout at the end of July. By D plus 79 and other combat vehicles were able to
(24 August) Allied forces had closed to race to the Seine. T h e result was that the
the Seine eleven days ahead of schedule armies had already used up their opera-
despite a lag of approximately thirty tional reserves by the time they reached
days at the beginning of the breakout. the Seine. Since rail lines and pipelines
Tactically, and to some extent logistically, could not be pushed forward quickly
the spectacular encircling drive of early enough, motor transport facilities were
August brought definite advantages to strained to the breaking point attempt-
the Allied forces. It resulted in the al- ing to meet even the barest maintenance
most complete destruction of the German needs of the armies. T h e Communica-
Seventh Army and thus eliminated a tions Zone consequently found it impos-
large enemy force which later might sible to establish stocks in advance de-
have delayed the Allied advance to the pots. Furthermore, none of the Brittany
Seine; it greatly accelerated the whole ports had as yet been captured, and only
campaign and helped ensure a rapid ad- one major port–Cherbourg–was opera-
vance to the enemy’s border; and it fa- tional. It remained to be seen whether
cilitated the early capture of the Seine compensation could be gained by the
ports and Antwerp, making it possible earlier opening of either Le Havre or
to cancel plans for the capture of Qui- Antwerp.
beron Bay and southern Brittany ports. But the arrival at the Seine marked
From the point of view of logistic sup- only the beginning of supply difficulties.
port the rapid advance to the Seine also Despite the logistic complications which
had its less favorable aspects, and even at the rapid advance had already clearly
this early date (D plus 79) foreshadowed foreshadowed, the decision was now
serious complications. T h e fact that the made to cross the Seine, and a few days
OVERLORD objective was reached on D later to encircle Paris and to continue
plus 79 rather than D plus 90 was in it- the pursuit without pause. On purely
self not serious, for the supply structure tactical grounds such decisions were logi-
was sufficiently flexible to accommodate cally indicated. T h e decisive victory in
itself to a variation of eleven days. T h e the Falaise–Argentan pocket and the dis-
departure from the scheduled advance integration of enemy resistance offered
had actually been more serious. Because opportunities which it would have been
of the initial lag in operations, U.S. folly to ignore. Furthermore, with forty-
forces had been at the D-plus-20 line at six divisions on the Continent, the Allies
D plus 49, and between D plus 49 and D enjoyed a definite superiority in both
plus 79, a period of thirty days, had actu- armor and infantry, as well as in air
ally advanced a distance which by plan power, and could move in almost any
was to have been covered in seventy days. direction against a weakened enemy.
T h e lines of communication obviously T h e situation in northern France,
could not be developed beyond St. Lô coupled with the Seventh Army’s success-
6 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

ful drive from the south, appeared so were now further aggravated. T h e main
favorable, in fact, as to afford an oppor- problem, as before, was the deficiency
tunity to broaden the entire scope of the in transport, which only worsened as the
drive into Germany. Post-OVERLORD lines of communication extended farther
plans (beyond D plus go) had contem- and farther eastward. Despite great ef-
plated only a secondary effort south of forts, rail reconstruction was unable to
the Ardennes along the axis Reims– keep pace with the advance. Air supply
Verdun–Metz by a relatively small force. repeatedly failed to match its predicted
This force was to have the mission of capacity. Motor transport therefore con-
diverting enemy resistance from the tinued to bear the principal burden of
main thrust in the north and preventing forward movement and was unable to
the escape of enemy troops from south- deliver daily maintenance needs, to say
west France by linking up with Seventh nothing of stocking intermediate or ad-
Army forces moving up the valley of vance supply depots.
the Rhône. This plan was now modified T h e unbearable supply task which
to provide for an attack along the sub- the continued advance created can best
sidiary axis in greater strength than be appreciated by comparing planned
originally contemplated, although the with actual developments. At D plus go
main effort was still to be made in the it had been assumed that no more than
north. twelve U.S. divisions would have to be
From the point of view of logistics supported at the Seine. Not until D plus
these decisions to cross the Seine and con- 120 was it thought feasible to support
tinue the pursuit, and to augment the twelve divisions in their first offensive
forces employed south of the Ardennes, action beyond that barrier, and not until
constituted a radical departure from D plus 150 was it contemplated that a
earlier plans. They carried with them “minor advance” might be supported
a supply task out of all proportion to from the Aisne River as a line of depar-
planned capabilities. They were much ture, seventy-five miles beyond the Seine.2
more far-reaching in their effects than At D plus 90 (4 September), however,
the alteration in plans of early August the Communications Zone was already
by which the bulk of the Third Army’s supporting sixteen divisions at a distance
forces had been directed eastward rather of 150 miles beyond the Seine. Within
than into Brittany. With the supply another ten days (mid-September) First
structure already severely strained by Army forces were operating at the Ger-
the speed with which the last 200 miles man border in the vicinity of Aachen,
had been covered, these decisions en- well over 200 miles beyond Paris. Since
tailed the risk of a complete breakdown. plans had not contemplated reaching that
T h e continued advances late in August area until D plus 330 (May 1945), it
and at the beginning of September con- was necessary to support U.S. forces at
sequently brought hectic days and sleep- this distance approximately 230 days
less nights to supply officers. All the diffi- earlier than expected. Moreover, the city
culties which had already begun to
appear during the approach to the Seine 2 lbid., Annexure M.
LOGISTIC LIMITATIONS ON TACTICAL PLANNING 7

of Paris had become an additional sup- decision for which the Communications
ply liability as the result of its liberation Zone bore no responsibility. In fact, it
on D plus 80, 55 days earlier than ex- was only because of the pressure of logis-
pected. U.S. supply lines were now 450 tical planners that a full corps was de-
miles long, leading exclusively from voted to the task. In the view of the
Cherbourg and the beaches, still the chief of the G–4 Logistical Plans Branch
only points of intake. at SHAEF, there was an element of poetic
In addition to overtaxing transport jus