EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015 ]
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD
DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately
an incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of
the Prosecution’s case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s propensity for flight or for
causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to
ensure that the accused appears at trial.[1]
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail
and annul the resolutions dated July 14, 2014[2] and August 8, 2014[3] issued by the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been
charged with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that the resolutions, which
respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For Reconsideration, were
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with
plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion
and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).
[4]
On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus
Motion[5] and Supplemental Opposition,[6] praying, among others, that he be allowed to
post bail should probable cause be found against him. The motions were heard by the
Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition.[7]
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion,
particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile
had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody of the law.
[8]
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.[9]
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered
to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at the Philippine
National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical examination. [10]
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital ,[11] and
his Motion to Fix Bail,[12] both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the
Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014.[13] In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he should
be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the
evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as
to him would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was not a
flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying
Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail, disposing thusly:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court
shall have made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused
Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-
bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile
has not filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It
is thus exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.
xxxx
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he is
charged with plunder, “the maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him
is reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua.” He anchors this claim on Section 2 of
R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy (70) years old
and that he voluntarily surrendered. “Accordingly, it may be said that the crime charged
against Enrile is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable.”
The argument has no merit.
xxxx
x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into
consideration. These circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the
proper penalty after trial should the accused be found guilty of the offense charged. x x x
xxxx
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he is not a
flight risk and his physical condition must also be seriously considered by the Court.
Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are among
the factors that are considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However, as
explained above, it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an
anterior showing that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail
dated July 7, 2014 is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[14]
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its second assailed resolution to deny
Enrile’s motion for reconsideration filed vis-à-vis the July 14, 2014 resolution.[15]
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari, namely:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter
of right. Enrile may be deemed to fall within the exception only upon
concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is
strong.
xxxx
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if
ever he would be convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence,
Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
xxxx
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of
Enrile’s guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a
matter of right.
xxxx
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.[16]
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter
of right; that it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively
that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to
bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is
punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating
circumstances – his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come
forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he
should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already over the age
of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.
In its Comment,[17] the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as
he is charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail
hearing be conducted to determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the
lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the
attendant circumstances.
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.[18] The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail,[19] and further binds the
court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.[20]
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing
additional crimes.[21] The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at
the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high
enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no higher
than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.[22] Thus, bail acts as a reconciling
mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before
or during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial. [23]
2.
Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 114[24] of the Rules of Court,
as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing
at the time of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be punished
with death.[25]
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal
offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is
strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by
the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill
of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or
with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong.[26] Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is
strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.[27]
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court
are bailable as matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital
offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise,
bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or even prior
to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.[28]
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;[29] or (2)
if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of
the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as
follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.
3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is
strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the
Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma,[30] “such discretion may be exercised only
after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of
whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty.” It is axiomatic, therefore, that
bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court
unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution.[31] The indispensability of
the hearing with notice has been aptly explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz.:[32]
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled in People
vs. Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an
accused who is charged with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any
hearing on the motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its
conformity or comment, as it turned out later, over its strong objections. The court
granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint and the affidavits of three policemen, not
one of whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever the court possessed at the time it
issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima facie determining whether or
not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime was
committed and pinpointing the persons who probably committed it. Whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to be established unless
the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already presented. To appreciate the
strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or heard.
It is equally entitled as the accused to due process.
xxxx
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and
reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and
circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the
evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not
the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in
other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial court
can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte determination where the Fiscal is neither
present nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court,
should primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong. For this purpose, a summary hearing means: –
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as
is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the
weight of evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the
merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the
evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on
what further evidence may be therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be
left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as
has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the
examination and cross examination.[33]
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected
to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral,[34] to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for
bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence
to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling
the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.
3.
Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two
mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was
already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and that he
voluntarily surrendered.[35]
Enrile’s averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose Opposition to
the Motion to Fix Bail has only argued that –
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be
imposed upon Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the presence of two
mitigating circumstances, suffice it to state that the presence or absence of
mitigating circumstances is also not consideration that the Constitution
deemed worthy. The relevant clause in Section 13 is “charged with an
offense punishable by.” It is, therefore, the maximum penalty provided
by the offense that has bearing and not the possibility of mitigating
circumstances being appreciated in the accused’s favor.[36]
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enrile’s averment on the
presence of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime
alleged against him being punishable with reclusion perpetua,[37] simply because the
determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the
earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of
the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from the national
commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution
which provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a
court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order
their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under
obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail.[38]
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those
charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing
showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
(2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.[39]
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to
the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape
from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his
indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the
legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years
ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal
processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen
as a flight risk.[40] With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his
long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be
granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for
his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,[41] Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was found
during the medical examinations conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering from the
following conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple drug
therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following:
a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and
vertebral artery disease; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial
calcifications. (Annex 1.6)
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by Holter
monitoring; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome; (Annexes 2.1,
2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the
Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens.
(Annexes 3.1, 3.2)
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
. b High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
c. Alpha thalassemia;
d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate
on recent ultrasound).[42]
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively, could
pose significant risks to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension, because it
could lead to brain or heart complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia,
because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially under stressful
conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with coronary artery disease, because
they could indicate a future risk for heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4)
exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be triggered by certain circumstances (like
excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which could cause a deterioration in
patients with asthma or COPD.[43]
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced age and ill health
required special medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at
his own instance,[44] was not even recommended by the officer-in-charge (OIC) and the
internist doctor of that medical facility because of the limitations in the medical support
at that hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows:
xxxx
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile
at the Philippine National Police Hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator
Enrile at the PNP Hospital?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Why?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the best.
xxxx
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator Enrile, are you
happy or have any fear in your heart of the present condition of the accused vis a
vis the facilities of the hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if the
condition of the patient worsen, we have no facilities to do those things, Your Honor. [45]
xxxx
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is
clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him
bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive
incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has
already held in Dela Rama v. The People’s Court:[46]
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:
x x x [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness
of the prisoner, independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the
humanity of the law makes it a consideration which should, regardless of the charge
and the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to
admit the prisoner to bail;[47] x x x
xxxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect that
the petitioner “is actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary
tuberculosis, and chronic, granular pharyngitis,” and that in said institute they “have seen
similar cases, later progressing into advance stages when the treatment and medicine are
no longer of any avail;” taking into consideration that the petitioner’s previous petition
for bail was denied by the People’s Court on the ground that the petitioner was suffering
from quiescent and not active tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the People’s Court
in sending the petitioner to the Quezon Institute for clinical examination and diagnosis of
the actual condition of his lungs, was evidently to verify whether the petitioner is
suffering from active tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly in deciding his petition for
bail; and considering further that the said People’s Court has adopted and applied the
well-established doctrine cited in our above-quoted resolution, in several cases, among
them, the cases against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527),
in which the said defendants were released on bail on the ground that they were ill and
their continued confinement in New Bilibid Prison would be injurious to their health or
endanger their life; it is evident and we consequently hold that the People’s Court acted
with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to release the petitioner on bail. [48]
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to
have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent
physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate
preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court
for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful
consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail,
which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be
circumstances decisive of the issue of bail – whose existence is either admitted by the
Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice – that the courts can already
consider in resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish.[49] The
Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through
ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the
guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail
to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded
the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion To Fix
Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari,
connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or
lack of jurisdiction.[50] The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all
in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.[51]
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari; ISSUES the writ
of certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and
August 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce
Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond of P1,000,000.00 in
the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile
from custody unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C. J., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.
Velasco, Jr., J., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Perez, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.
Peralta, J., for humanitarian reasons.
Del Castillo, J., I concur in the result based on humanitarian grounds.
Villarama, Jr., J., on official leave.
Reyes, J., on sick leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., I joint the dissent of J. Leonen.
Leonen, J., I dissent, see separate opinion.
Jardeleza, J., no part, prior OSG action.
