THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 195905. July 4, 2018.]

THE C ITY GOVERN MENT OF BAGUIO represented by MAURICIO G.

DOMOGAN, City Mayor, CITY BUILDINGS AND ARCHITECTURE
OFFICE represented by OSCAR FLORES, and PUBLIC ORDER AND
SAFETY DIVISION represented by FERNANDO MOYAEN and CITY
DEMOLITION TEAM represented by NAZITA BAÑEZ , petitioners, vs .
ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG, Regional Hearing O cer-National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples-Cordillera Administrative
Region, MAGDALENA GUMANGAN, MARION T. POOL, LOURDES C.
HERMOGENO, JOSEPH LEGASPI, JOSEPH BASATAN, MARCELINO
BASATAN, JOSEPHINE LEGASPI, LANSIGAN BAWAS, ALEXANDER
AMPAGUEY, JULIO DALUYEN, SR., CONCEPCION PADANG and
CARMEN PANAYO , respondents.

DECISION

MARTIRES , J : p

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the 5 August
2010 Decision 1 and 31 January 2011 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 110598.
The present controversy stemmed from the various orders issued by the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples-Cordillera Administrative Region (NCIP-
CAR) in NCIP Case Nos. 29-CAR-09 and 31-CAR-09.

THE FACTS

The Petitions

Private respondents Magdalena Gumangan, Marion T. Pool, Lourdes C.

Hermogeno, Bernardo Simon, Joseph Legaspi, Joseph Basatan, Marcelino Basatan,
Josephine Legaspi, and Lansigan Bawas (Gumangan petition) are the petitioners in
NCIP Case No. 29-CAR-09. In their petition, 3 led on 23 July 2009, they prayed that
their ancestral lands in the Busol Forest Reserve be identi ed, delineated, and
recognized and that the corresponding Certi cate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT) be
issued. In addition, the Gumangan petition sought to restrain the City Government of
Baguio, et al., (petitioners) from enforcing demolition orders and to prevent the
destruction of their residential houses at the Busol Forest Reserve pending their
application for identi cation of their ancestral lands before the NCIP Ancestral
Domains Office.
On the other hand, private respondents Alexander Ampaguey, Sr., Julio Daluyen,
Sr., Concepcion Padang, and Carmen Panayo (Ampaguey petition) are the petitioners in
NCIP Case No. 31-CAR-09. In their petition, 4 led on 23 July 2009, they prayed that the
petitioners be enjoined from enforcing the demolition orders affecting their properties
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 inside the Busol Forest Reserve. The Ampaguey Petition claimed that they have pending
applications for their ancestral land claims before the NCIP. CAIHTE

Both the Gumangan and Ampaguey petitions assail that petitioners have no right
to enforce the demolition orders and to evict them from their properties. They aver that
their claims over their ancestral lands are protected and recognized under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA).
Proceedings before the NCIP-CAR

In his 27 July 2009 Order, 5 public respondent Atty. Brain Masweng (Atty.
Masweng), NCIP-CAR Hearing O cer, issued a 72-Hour Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) on the Gumangan petition. On the same date, he issued another order 6 for a 72-
Hour TRO on the Ampaguey petition. On 14 August 2009, Atty. Masweng issued a writ
of preliminary injunction in NCIP Case Nos. 29-CAR-09 7 and 31-CAR-09. 8
Aggrieved, petitioners led a petition for certiorari 9 before the CA assailing the
TRO and preliminary injunction issued by Atty. Masweng in the above NCIP case.
The CA Ruling

In its 5 August 2010 decision, the CA dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari
for being procedurally awed because they did not le a motion for reconsideration
before the NCIP. The appellate court elucidated that the present petition constituted
forum shopping because petitioners had a pending motion to dismiss before the NCIP.
Further, the CA ruled that the NCIP had the power to issue the injunctive relief noting
that the NCIP did not act with grave abuse of discretion because the issuances were in
accordance with law. It ruled:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed issuances
STAND. Costs against Petitioners. 1 0
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its
assailed 31 January 2011 resolution.
Hence, this present petition raising the following:

ISSUES

I.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI FOR BEING PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE; AND
II.
WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.

THE COURT'S RULING

The petition is meritorious.

Before proceeding to the merits of the case, a resolution of certain procedural
matters is in order.
Case mooted due to
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 supervening events

At the onset, the present case has been rendered moot and academic. A moot
and academic case is one that ceases to present a justi able controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that declaration thereon would be of no practical value. 1 1 In
City Government of Baguio v. Atty. Masweng (contempt case) , 1 2 the Court set aside
the provisional remedies Atty. Masweng issued in NCIP Case Nos. 29-CAR-09 and 31-
CAR-09 after he was found guilty of indirect contempt, to wit: DETACa

In this case, respondent was charged with indirect contempt for issuing
the subject orders enjoining the implementation of demolition orders against
illegal structures constructed on a portion of the Busol Watershed Reservation
located at Aurora Hill, Baguio City.
xxx xxx xxx
The said orders clearly contravene our ruling in G.R. No. 180206 that
those owners of houses and structures covered by the demolition orders issued
by petitioner are not entitled to the injunctive relief previously granted by
respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
As mentioned earlier, the Court while recognizing that the NCIP is
empowered to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary
injunction, nevertheless ruled that petitioners in the injunction case seeking to
restrain the implementation of the subject demolition order are not entitled to
such relief. Petitioner City Government of Baguio in issuing the demolition
advices are simply enforcing the previous demolition orders against the same
occupants or claimants or their agents and successors-in-interest, only to be
thwarted anew by the injunctive orders and writs issued by respondent. Despite
the Court's pronouncements in G.R. No. 180206 that no such clear legal right
exists in favor of those occupants or claimants to restrain the enforcement of
the demolition orders issued by petitioner, and hence there remains no legal
impediment to bar their implementation, respondent still issued the temporary
restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE , the petition for contempt is GRANTED . The assailed
Temporary Restraining Order dated July 27, 2009, Order dated July 31, 2009,
and Writ of Preliminary Injunction in NCIP Case No. 31-CAR-09, and Temporary
Restraining Order dated July 27, 2009, Order dated July 31, 2009 and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction in NCIP Case No. 29-CAR-09 are hereby all LIFTED and
SET ASIDE . 1 3
As a general rule, the Court no longer entertains petitions which have been
rendered moot. After all, the decision would have no practical value. Nevertheless, there
are exceptions where the Court resolves moot and academic cases, viz.: (a) there was a
grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the case involved a situation of exceptional
character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the issues raised required the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar, and the public; and (4)
the case was capable of repetition yet evading review. 1 4
In the case at bar, there are exceptions warranting an a rmative action from the
Court. The case de nitely involves paramount public interest as it pertains to the Busol
Water Reserve, a source of basic necessity of the people of Baguio and other
neighboring communities. In addition, the present issues are likely to be repeated
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 especially considering the other cases involving land claimants over the Busol Water
Reserve.
Exceptions to the requirement of
a motion for reconsideration in
petitions for certiorari

A petition for certiorari is resorted to whenever a tribunal, board or o cer

exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. 1 5 It is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is no appeal or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 1 6 In other words,
certiorari is a solution of last resort availed of after all possible legal processes have
been exhausted. aDSIHc

Thus, it is axiomatic that a motion for reconsideration is a condition precedent to

the ling of a petition for certiorari. 1 7 This is so considering that the said motion is an
existing remedy under the rules for a party to assail a decision or ruling adverse to it.
Nonetheless, the rule requiring a motion for reconsideration to be led before a petition
f o r certiorari is available admits of exception. In Republic of the Philippines v.
Pantranco North Express, Inc., 1 8 the Court recognized the following exceptions:
1. Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction;
2. Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised
and passed upon in the lower court;
3. Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and
any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or the
petitioner or the subject matter of the petition is perishable;
4. Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless;
5. Where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief;
6. Where, in a criminal case, a relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
7. Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process;
8. Where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and
9. Where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved. 1 9
The Court nds that exceptions exist to warrant petitioners' direct resort to a
petition for certiorari before the CA notwithstanding its lack of a motion for
reconsideration led before the NCIP. First, the issues had been duly raised before the
NCIP especially considering that petitioner had presented similar arguments or
opposition from the TRO initially issued by the NCIP until the grant of the writ of
preliminary injunction. Second, there is urgency in the petition because petitioners seek
to implement its demolition orders with the goal of preserving the Busol Forest
Reserve, Baguio's primary forest and watershed. It cannot be gainsaid that any delay
may greatly prejudice the government as the Busol Forest Reserve may be further
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 compromised. Third, the preservation of the Busol Forest Reserve involves public
interest as it would have a significant impact on the water supply for the City of Baguio.
No forum shopping if different
reliefs are prayed for

The CA also found petitioners' petition for certiorari dismissible for violating the
rule on forum shopping. It opined that a ruling on the said petition for certiorari would
amount to res judicata in view of the petitioners' motion to dismiss led before the
NCIP. ETHIDa

Forum shopping exists when a party, against whom an adverse judgment or

order has been rendered in one forum, seeks a favorable opinion in another forum, other
than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari — it is the institution of two or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition. 2 0 The following are the elements of
forum shopping: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two preceding particulars, such
that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. 2 1
The petition for certiorari led before the CA did not amount to forum shopping
despite the existence of the motion to dismiss before the NCIP. The two actions
involved different reliefs based on different facts. In their petition, petitioners
questioned the issuance of provisional remedies by the NCIP and prayed that these be
dismissed for lack of a clear legal right to be protected. On the other hand, the motion
to dismiss led before the NCIP sought the dismissal of the main complaint of private
respondents for the issuance of a permanent injunction to enjoin the demolition orders
and/or to recognize their purported native title over the land involved.
In addition, judgment rendered in the petition would not amount to res judicata
with respect to the motion to dismiss, and vice versa. To invoke res judicata, the
following elements must concur: (a) the judgment sought to bar the new action must
be nal; (b) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (c) the disposition of the case must be a judgment
on the merits; and (d) there must be, as between the rst and second actions, identity
of parties, subject matter and causes of action. 2 2 As stated, the petition for certiorari
assailed the propriety of the issuance of provisional remedies while the motion to
dismiss attacked the principal action of private respondents. Evidently, the petition for
certiorari and the motion to dismiss had different causes of action especially since the
grant or denial of the provisional remedies does not necessarily mean that the main
action would have the same conclusion.
Having settled the procedural matters, we now address the merits of the case.
Clear legal right and
irreparable injury

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or

proceeding prior to the judgment or nal order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a
person to refrain from a particular act or acts. 2 3 It is an equitable and extraordinary
peremptory remedy to be exercised with caution as it affects the parties' respective
rights. 2 4
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 Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary injunction may be
granted when it is established that: (a) the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded,
and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act
or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; (b) the commission, continuance or
non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably
work injustice to the applicant; or (c) a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening or attempting to do; or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or
acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the
action or proceeding and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
In other words, the following requisites must concur before a preliminary
injunction is issued: (1) the invasion of a right sought to be protected is material and
substantial; (2) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (3) there is
an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. 2 5 cSEDTC

Before the preventive writ may be issued, rst and foremost there must be a
clear showing by the complainant that there is an existing right to be protected, a clear
and unmistakable right at that. 2 6 Thus, it is incumbent upon private respondents to
establish that their rights over the land in the Busol Forest Reserve are unequivocal and
indisputable. They, however, admit that their claims for recognition are still pending
before the NCIP; they are but mere expectations — short of the required present and
unmistakable right for the grant of the issuance of the provisional remedy of injunction.
27

Private respondents also bewail that it would be more prudent that the injunctive
writs be issued to prevent the baseless or unnecessary demolition of their house
should their land claims be ultimately recognized. While the Court understands their
predicament, there is still no basis for the issuance of the injunctive writs because it
can be compensable through the award of damages. A clear and unmistakable right is
not enough to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction as there must be a
showing that the applicant would suffer irreparable injury. Thus, the Court in Power
Sites and Signs, Inc. v. United Neon 2 8 ruled:
It is settled that a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued only to
prevent grave and irreparable injury, that is, injury that is actual, substantial and
demonstrable. Here, there is no irreparable injury as understood in law. Rather,
the damages alleged by the petitioner, namely, immense loss in pro t and
possible damage claims from clients and the cost of the billboard which is a
considerable amount of money is easily quanti able, and certainly does not fall
within the concept of irreparable damage or injury as described in Social
Security Commission v. Bayona:
Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule
relative to the issuance of injunction where there is no standard by
which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy.
An irreparable injury which a court of equity will enjoin includes
that degree of wrong of a repeated and continuing kind which
produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated
only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of
measurement. An irreparable injury to authorize an injunction
consists of a serious charge of, or is destructive to, the property it
affects, either physically or in the character in which it has been
held and enjoined, or when the property has some peculiar quality
or use, so that its pecuniary value will not fairly recompense the
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 owner of the loss thereof. 2 9 (emphasis omitted)
More importantly, their continued occupation absent any clear legal right cannot
be countenanced because of the threat it poses to the Busol Water Reserve. In Province
of Rizal v. Executive Secretary , 3 0 the Court emphasized the importance of preserving
watersheds, to wit:
This brings us to the second self-evident point. Water is life, and must
be saved at all costs . In Collado v. Court of Appeals , we had occasion to
rea rm our previous discussion in Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation
v. Court of Appeals , on the primordial importance of watershed areas, thus: The
most important product of a watershed is water, which is one of the
most important human necessities . The protection of watersheds ensures
an adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of ash
oods that not only damage property but also cause[s] loss of lives. Protection
of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be answered
now. 3 1 (emphasis and underlining supplied) SDAaTC

While the Court does not discount the possible loss private respondents may
suffer should their land claims be recognized with nality, still it bears reiterating that
they failed to show that they are entitled to an injunctive relief. In summary, private
respondents do not have a clear and unmistakable legal right because their land claims
are still pending recognition and any loss or injury they may suffer can be compensable
by damages. To add, their occupation of the Busol Water Reserve poses a continuing
threat of damaging the preservation or viability of the watershed. Any danger to the
sustainability of the Busol Water Reserve affects not only individuals or families inside
the watershed but also the entire community relying on it as a source of a basic human
necessity — water. Furthermore, unlike the injury private respondents may suffer, any
damage to the Busol Water Reserve is irreversible and may not only affect the present
generation but also those to come.
Stare decisis vis-à-vis res
judicata

In its assailed decision, the CA ruled that the NCIP did not act with grave abuse
of discretion because its actions were in accordance with law as it complied with the
IPRA and its implementing rules and regulations. Still, it must be remembered that
judicial decisions form part of the law of the land. 3 2
In The City Government of Baguio v. Atty. Masweng (City Government of Baguio) ,
33 the Court explained that Proclamation No. 15 is not a de nitive recognition of land
claims over portions of the Busol Forest Reserve, to wit:
The foregoing provision indeed states that Baguio City is governed by its
own charter. Its exemption from the IPRA, however, cannot ipso facto be
deduced because the law concedes the validity of prior land rights recognized or
acquired through any process before its effectivity. The IPRA demands that the
city's charter respect the validity of these recognized land rights and titles.
The crucial question to be asked then is whether private respondents'
ancestral land claim was indeed recognized by Proclamation No. 15, in which
case, their right thereto may be protected by an injunctive writ. After all, before a
writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, petitioners must show that there
exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which injunction is
directed are violative of said right.
Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a de nitive
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 recognition of private respondents ancestral land claim. The proclamation
merely identi es the Molintas and Gumangan families, the predecessor-in-
interest of private respondents, as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest
Reservation but does not acknowledge vested rights over the same.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact remains, too, that the Busol Forest Reservation was declared by
the Court as inalienable in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals . The
declaration of the Busol Forest Reservation as such precludes its conversion
into private property. Relatedly, the courts are not endowed with jurisdictional
competence to adjudicate forest lands. 3 4acEHCD

In City Government of Baguio, it was recognized that the NCIP is empowered to

issue TROs and writs of injunction. Nevertheless, the said case ruled that therein
respondents were not entitled to an injunctive relief because they failed to prove their
de nite right over the properties they claimed. The circumstances in City Government
of Baguio and the present case are similar. In both cases, the claimants principally rely
on Proclamation No. 15 as basis for their ancestral land claims in the Busol Forest
Reserve. Unfortunately, it was ruled that the said proclamation is not a de nitive
recognition of their ancestral land claims as it only identi es their predecessors-in-
interest as claimants.
Thus, it is quite unfortunate that the CA found that the actions of the NCIP were in
accordance with law. A cursory reading of the decision indicates that it merely relied on
the applicable statute without regard to the doctrines and principles settled by the
Court. The pronouncements in City Government of Baguio should have put the appellate
court on notice that the actions of the NCIP were baseless because it settled that
claimants of lands in the Busol Water Reserve cannot rely on anticipatory claims for the
issuance of the preventive writ. It befuddles the Court why the CA did not bother to
address the said ruling in its discussions and perfunctorily relied on the statute alone.
On the other hand, respondents argue that petitioners erred in relying on City
Government of Baguio in that res judicata did not arise considering that they were not
parties to the said case and that only parties may be bound by the decision.
Nevertheless, while res judicata may be inapplicable, the ruling in City
Government of Baguio still nds relevance under stare decisis. The said doctrine states
that when the Court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain
state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where facts
are substantially the same, regardless whether the parties and property are the same.
3 5 Stare decisis differs from res judicata in that the former is based upon the legal
principle or rule involved while the latter is based upon the judgment itself. 3 6
Thus, the Court in The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. v. Masweng (Baguio
Regreening) 3 7 held:
Lastly, however, this Court ruled that although the NCIP has the authority
to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction, it was not
convinced that private respondents were entitled to the relief granted by the
Commission. Proclamation No. 15 does not appear to be a definitive recognition
of private respondents' ancestral land claim, as it merely identi es the Molintas
and Gumangan families as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest
Reservation, but does not acknowledge vested rights over the same. Since it is
required before the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction that claimants
show the existence of a right to be protected, this Court, in G.R. No. 180206,
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 ultimately granted the petition of the City Government of Baguio and set aside
the writ of preliminary injunction issued therein.
SDHTEC

In the case at bar, petitioners and private respondents present the very
same arguments and counter-arguments with respect to the writ of injunction
against fencing of the Busol Watershed Reservation. The same legal issues are
thus being litigated in G.R. No. 180206 and in the case at bar, except that
different writs of injunction are being assailed. In both cases, petitioners claim
(1) that Atty. Masweng is prohibited from issuing temporary restraining orders
and writs of preliminary injunction against government infrastructure projects;
(2) that Baguio City is beyond the ambit of the IPRA; and (3) that private
respondents have not shown a clear right to be protected. Private respondents,
on the other hand, presented the same allegations in their Petition for Injunction,
particularly the alleged recognition made under Proclamation No. 15 in favor of
their ancestors. While res judicata does not apply on account of the different
subject matters of the case at bar and G.R. No. 180206 (they assail different
writs of injunction, albeit issued by the same hearing o cer), we are
constrained by the principle of stare decisis to grant the instant petition. 3 8
Like the private respondents in City Government of Baguio and in Baguio
Regreening, herein claimants principally rely on Proclamation No. 15 as basis for their
ancestral land claims in the Busol Forest Reserve. Thus, the Court is constrained to
similarly rule that the injunctive relief issued in the present case are without basis
because the applicants failed to establish a clear and legal right. After all, it has been
settled that Proclamation No. 15 is not a de nite recognition of their ancestral land
claims.
It is noteworthy that in the contempt case, Atty. Masweng was cited for indirect
contempt for issuing TROs and preliminary injunctions in NCIP Case Nos. 29-CAR-09
and 31-CAR-09. He was found in indirect contempt because the Court had already ruled
that the occupants in the Busol Water Reserve had no clear legal right warranting the
issuance of preventive remedies. In the present case, the preventive writs issued in
NCIP Case Nos. 29-CAR-09 and 31-CAR-09 themselves are being questioned. Thus, the
Court had, on more than one occasion, found occupants of the Busol Watershed
Reservation not entitled to the preventive writ for lack of a clear legal right, considering
that their recognition claims were still pending before the NCIP.
Taking into account all the cases involving land claims over the Busol Water
Reserve, it is settled that Proclamation No. 15 and the IPRA, notwithstanding,
provisional remedies such as TROs and writs of preliminary injunction should not ipso
facto be issued to individuals who have ancestral claims over Busol. It is imperative
that there is a showing of a clear and unmistakable legal right for their issuance
because a pending or contingent right is insu cient. Nevertheless, the grant or denial
of these provisional remedies should not affect their ancestral land claim as the
applicants are not barred from proving their rights in an appropriate proceeding.
WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED . The 5 August 2010 Decision and 31
January 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 110598 are
REVERSED . The Temporary Restraining Order and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
issued by the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples-Cordillera Administrative
Region in NCIP Case Nos. 29-CAR-09 and 31-CAR-09 are hereby SET ASIDE . AScHCD

SO ORDERED .
Velasco, Jr., Bersamin, Leonen and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
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 Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 60-80.
2. Id. at 81-82.

3. CA rollo, pp. 517-527.

4. Id. at 76-83.
5. Id. at 430-432.
6. Rollo, pp. 107-108.
7. Id. at 105-106.

8. Id. at 129-130.
9. CA rollo, pp. 3-26.
10. Rollo, pp. 48-49.
11. Gunsi, Sr. v. Commission on Elections, 599 Phil. 223, 229 (2009).

12. 727 Phil. 540 (2014).

13. Id. at 549-555.
14. Timbol v. Commission on Elections, 754 Phil. 578, 585 (2015) citing ARARO Party-List v.
Commission on Elections, 723 Phil. 160, 184 (2013).
15. Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 1.
16. Bergonia v. CA, 680 Phil. 334, 339 (2012).
17. Castro v. Guevarra, 686 Phil. 1125, 1137 (2012).

18. 682 Phil. 186 (2012).

19. Id. at 194.
20. Cruz v. Caraos, 550 Phil. 98, 107 (2007).
21. Heirs of Sotto v. Palicte, 726 Phil. 651, 654 (2014).
22. Republic of the Philippines v. Yu, 519 Phil. 391, 396 (2006).

23. Rules of Court, Rule 58, Section 1.

24. China Banking Corporation v. Ciriaco, 690 Phil. 480, 486 (2012).
25. Lukang v. Pagbilao Development Corporation, 728 Phil. 608, 617-618 (2014).
26. Transfield Philippines, Inc. v. Luzon Hydro Corporation, 485 Phil. 699, 726 (2004).
27. The City Mayor of Baguio v. Masweng, 625 Phil. 179, 183 (2010).

28. 620 Phil. 205 (2009).

29. Id. at 219.

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 30. 513 Phil. 557 (2005).
31. Id. at 582-583.
32. Article 8 of the Civil Code.
33. 597 Phil. 668 (2009).
34. Id. at 678-679.

35. Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, 689 Phil. 603 (2012).
36. Id. at 613.
37. The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. v. Masweng, 705 Phil. 103 (2013).
38. Id. at 117-118.

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