▪ Manila Electric or its employees were negligent by reason of having left

Wright V. Manila Electric (1914)

the rails and a part of the ties uncovered in a street where there is a large
amount of travel
G.R. No. L-7760 October 1, 1914
▪ If the Wright had been prudent on the night in question and had not
Lessons Applicable: Intoxication (Torts and Damages)
attempted to drive his conveyance while in a drunken condition, he
would certainly have avoided the damages which he received
FACTS:
▪ Both parties were negligent and both contributed to the resulting
▪ August 8, 1909 night time: Wright who was intoxicated drove in his damages, although the Wright, in the judgment of the court,
calesa and as his horse leap forward along the rails of the Manila contributed in greater proportion to the damages
Electric company and it fell ▪ no facts are stated therein which warrant the conclusion that the Wright
▪ Wright was thrown and got injured was negligent
▪ that the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one- ▪ It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen
half of their depth out of the ground making the tops of the rails some from the vehicle under the conditions described
5 or 6 inches or more above the level of the street ▪ It having been found that the plaintiff was not negligent, it is
▪ RTC: both parties were negligent, but that the plaintiff's negligence was unnecessary to discuss the question presented by the appellant
not as great as defendant's and under the authority of the case of Rakes company with reference to the applicability of the case of Rakes vs. A.
vs. A. G. & P. Co. apportioned the damages and awarded Wright a G. & P. Co. and we do not find facts in the opinion of the court below
judgment of P1,000 which justify a larger verdict than the one found.
ISSUE: W/N Wright's negligence contributed to the 'principal occurrence' or 'only Dissenting Opinion by Carson:
to his own injury (NOT contributory) thereby he cannot recover ▪ if the case is to be decided on the findings of fact by the trial judge, these
findings sufficiently establish the negligence of Wright
▪ The fact finding of the RTC judge, the fact that there is
HELD:NO. Affirmed negligence though not fully sustained should be assumed that
there were evidentiary facts disclosed which were sufficient to
▪ Mere intoxication is not in itself negligence. It is but a circumstance to sustain that there is negligence
▪ PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. It
▪ G.R. No. L-21291
is the general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober ▪ March 28, 1969
if no want of ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no ▪ FACTS: Ralph Corliss Jr. was an air police of the Clark Air Force Base. The
jeep he was driving while accompanied with a P.C. soldier, collided with a
greater degree of care is required than by a sober one.
locomotive of Manila Railroad Company (MRC) close to midnight at the
TORTS & DAMAGES – Atty. Dy| 1
KMC LPU LAW
 railroad crossing in Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga, in front of the Clark Air ▪ “The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person
Force Base. Corliss Jr. died of serious burns at the hospital the next day, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly
while the soldier sustained serious physical injuries and burns. demand whereby such other person suffers injury.”
▪ In the decision appealed from, the lower court, after summarizing the
evidence, concluded that the deceased “in his eagerness to beat, so to speak,
the oncoming locomotive, took the risk and attempted to reach the other ▪ There was likewise a reliance on Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co. Thus: ”
side, but unfortunately he became the victim of his own miscalculation.
▪ “Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative
▪ The negligence imputed to MRC was thus ruled out by the lower court, or comparative, not an absolute term and its application depends upon the
satisfactory proof to that effect, in its opinion, being lacking. Hence this situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the
appeal direct to us, the amount sought in the concept of damages reaching circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree
the sum of P282,065.40. of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care
under the circumstances.”

▪ ISSUE: WON the lower court’s decision is erroneous

▪ HELD: The decision of the lower court dismissing the complaint, is ▪ To repeat, by such a test, no negligence could be imputed to MRC and the
affirmed. action of Corliss must necessarily fail. The facts being what they are, compel
▪ NO the conclusion that the liability sought to be fastened on MRC had not
arisen.

▪ The lower court judgment has in its favor the presumption of correctness. It
is entitled to great respect. In the absence of compelling reasons, [the ▪ Finally, each and every case on questions of negligence is to be decided in
factual] determination is best left to the trial judge why had the advantage accordance with the peculiar circumstances that present themselves. There
of hearing the parties testify and observing their demeanor on the witness can be no hard and fast rule. There must be that observance of that degree
stand.” of care, precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands.
▪ But more importantly, this action is predicated on negligence, the Civil
Code making clear that whoever by act or omission causes damage to NAPOCOR vs CA
another, there being negligence, is under obligation to pay for the damage GR 103442-45 May 21, 1993
done. Unless it could be satisfactorily shown, therefore, that MRC was
guilty of negligence then it could not be held liable. The crucial question, FACTS:
therefore, is the existence of negligence.
This is a consolidated case comprising of four separate complaints., filed against
NPC and a particular Chavez.
▪ Negligence was defined by us in two 1912 decisions, United States v.
Juanillo and United States v. Barias. Cooley’ formulation was quoted with Plaintiffs filed a complaint against respondent for the lost of lives and destruction
approval in both the Juanillo and Barias decisions. Thus: “Judge Cooley in of properties due to the negligence of the latter in releasing water from Angat dam
his work on Torts (3d ed.), Sec. 1324, defines negligence to be: during the typhoon “Kading”

TORTS & DAMAGES – Atty. Dy| 2

KMC LPU LAW
Benjamin Chavez, being the supervisor at that time of a multi-purpose hydroelectric ISSUE:
plant in the Angat River at Hilltop, Norzagaray, Bulacan, failed to exercise due
Whether or not respondent is negligent?
diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam.
Whether or not the notices of warning were insufficient?
NPC’s allegations were as follows:
Whether or not The damages suffered was not DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA?
1) the NPC exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the operation and
maintenance of the hydroelectric plant; HELD:
2) the NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection of its employees; We declared therein that the proximate cause of the loss and damage sustained by
3) written notices were sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning the the plaintiffs therein — who were similarly situated as the private respondents
residents therein about the impending release of a large volume of water with the herein — was the negligence of the petitioners, and that the 24 October 1978 "early
onset of typhoon "Kading" and advise them to take the necessary precautions; warning notice" supposedly sent to the affected municipalities, the same notice
involved in the case at bar, was insufficient.
4) the water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse of the
dam and avoid greater damage to people and property; The petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of foresight,
imprudence and negligence in the management and operation of Angat Dam," and
5) in spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised, they could still
that "the extent of the opening of the spillways, and the magnitude of the water
not contain or control the flood that resulted and;
released, are all but products of defendants-appellees' headlessness, slovenliness,
6) the damages incurred by the private respondents were caused by a fortuitous and carelessness."
event or force majeure and are in the nature and character of damnum absque
To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a
injuria. By way of special affirmative defense, the defendants averred that the NPC
breach of an obligation due to an "act of God," the following must concur: (a) the
cannot be sued because it performs a purely governmental function.
cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor;
(b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such
as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a moral manner;
The trial court dismissed the complaints as against the NPC on the ground that the
and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the
provision of its charter allowing it to sue and be sued does not contemplate actions
injury to the creditor. (Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553; Estrada v.
based on tort. Its decision on 30 April 1990 dismissing the complaints "for lack of
Consolacion, 71 SCRA 423; Austria v. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 527; Republic of
sufficient and credible evidence."
the Phil. v. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., 21 SCRA 279; Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657).
Court of Appeals reversed the appealed decision and awarded damages in favor of
Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure
the private respondents. Based on the findings that From the mass of evidence
to escape liability for the loss or damage sustained by private respondents since
extant in the record, We are convinced, and so hold that the flash flood on October
they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. The event then was not occasioned
27, 1978, was caused not by rain waters (sic), but by stored waters (sic) suddenly
exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a human factor — negligence or
and simultaneously released from the Angat Dam by defendants-appellees,
imprudence — had intervened. The effect then of the force majeure in question may
particularly from midnight of October 26, 1978 up to the morning hours of October
be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the participation of man. Thus,
27, 1978.
the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the
laws applicable to acts of God.
TORTS & DAMAGES – Atty. Dy| 3
KMC LPU LAW
KEPPEL CEBU SHIPYARD, INC. V. PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY HELD: was resolved by the CIAC against both parties. As this finding of fact by the
CORP., G.R. NOS. 180880-81 & 180896-97, [SEPTEMBER 18, 2012], 695 PHIL 169- CIAC was affirmed by the CA, the Court must have a strong and cogent reason to
226 disturb it.

FACTS: On January 26, 2000, KCSI and WG&A Jebsens Shipmanagement, It is a hornbook doctrine that, save for certain exceptions, the findings of fact of
Inc. (WG&A) entered into, and executed, a Shiprepair Agreement wherein KCSI administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies like the CIAC, which have
agreed to carry out renovation and reconstruction of M/V Superferry 3 (Superferry acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are
3), owned by WG&A, using its (KCSI’s) dry docking facilities. Prior to the execution generally accorded not only respect, but finality when affirmed by the CA. It is well-
of the Shiprepair Agreement, Superferry 3 was already insured by WG&A with settled that “the consequent policy and practice underlying our Administrative Law
Pioneer for US$8,472,581.78. is that courts of justice should respect the findings of fact of said administrative
agencies, unless there is absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such evidence
On February 8, 2000, while undergoing repair, Superferry 3 was gutted by fire.
is clearly, manifestly and patently insubstantial.” Moreover, in petitions for review
WG&A declared the vessel’s damage as a “total constructive loss” and filed an
on certiorari, only questions of law may be put into issue.
insurance claim with Pioneer.
Be that as it may, the Court, after making its own assiduous assessment of the case,
On June 16, 2000, Pioneer paid the insurance claim of WG&A in the amount of
concurs with the conclusions arrived at by the tribunals below that the loss of
US$8,472,581.78. In exchange, WG&A executed a Loss and Subrogation Receipt in
Superferry 3 cannot be attributed to one party alone.
favor of Pioneer.
WG&A was negligent because, although it utilized the welders of KCSI, it used
Believing that KCSI was solely responsible for the loss of Superferry 3, Pioneer tried
them outside the agreed area, the restaurant of the promenade deck. If they did not
to collect the amount of US$8,472,581.78 form KCSI but it was frustrated. Thus,
venture out of the restaurant, the sparks or the hot molten slags produced by the
Pioneer sought arbitration with the Construction Industry Arbitration
welding of the steel plates would not have reached the combustible lifejackets stored
Commission (CIAC) pursuant to the arbitration clause in the Shiprepair Agreement.
at the deck below.
During the arbitration proceedings, an amicable settlement was forged between
On the part of KCSI, it failed to secure a hot work permit pursuant to another work
KCSI and WG&A. Pioneer, thus, stayed on as the remaining claimant.
order. Had this been applied for by the KCSI worker, the hot work area could have
On October 28, 2002, the CIAC rendered its Decision finding that both WG&A and been inspected and safety measures, including the removal of the combustible
KCSI were equally guilty of negligence which resulted in the fire and loss of lifejackets, could have been undertaken. In this regard, KCSI is responsible.
Superferry 3. The CIAC also ruled that the liability of KSCI was limited to the
In short, both WG&A and KCSI were equally negligent for the loss of Superferry 3.
amount of P50,000,000.00 pursuant to Clause 20 of the Shiprepair Agreement.
The parties being mutually at fault, the degree of causation may be impossible of
Accordingly, the CIAC ordered KCSI to pay Pioneer the amount of P25,000,000.00, rational assessment as there is no scale to determine how much of the damage is
with interest at 6% per annum from the time of the filing of the case up to the time attributable to WG&A’s or KCSI’s own fault. Therefore, it is but fair that both
the decision was promulgated, and 12% interest per annum added to the award, or WG&A and KCSI should equally shoulder the burden for their negligence.
any balance thereof, after it would become final and executory. The CIAC further
With respect to the defenses of KCSI that it was a co-assured under Clause 22 (a) of
ordered that the arbitration costs be imposed on both parties on a pro rata basis.
the contract and that its liability is limited to P50,000,000.00 under Clause 20 of the
ISSUE: who should be responsible for the loss of Superferry 3. Shiprepair Agreement, the Court maintains the earlier ruling on the invalidity of
Clause 22 (a) of the Shiprepair Agreement.
TORTS & DAMAGES – Atty. Dy| 4
KMC LPU LAW
It cannot, however, maintain the earlier ruling on the invalidity of Clause 20 of the circumstances, the weaker party is imposed upon in dealing with the dominant
Shiprepair Agreement, which limited KCSI’s liability to P50,000,000.00. In the bargaining party and is reduced to the alternative of taking it or leaving it,
September 25, 2009 Decision, the Third Division found Clause 20 of the Shiprepair completely depriving the former of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.
Agreement invalid, seeing it as an unfair imposition by KCSI, being the dominant This is not the situation in this case.
party, on WG&A. TCASIH
AMADO PICART vs. FRANK SMITH, JR.
Basic is the rule that parties to a contract may establish such stipulations, clauses, (37 Phil 809) G.R. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918
terms, or conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, and public policy. While greater vigilance is required
in determining the validity of clauses arising from contracts of adhesion, the Court
has nevertheless consistently ruled that contracts of adhesion are not invalid per
se and that it has, on numerous occasions, upheld the binding effect thereof. FACTS:
Amado Picart was riding on his pony over Carlatan Bridge in San Fernando, La
In its Decision, the Third Division placed great weight in the testimony of Engr. Union When Smith approached from the opposite direction in an automobile with
Elvin F. Bello, WG&A’s fleet manager, that while he assented to the Shiprepair rate of speed of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the Smith neared the bridge
Agreement, he did not sign the fine-print portion thereof where Clause 20 was he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He
found because he did not want WG&A to be bound by them. This testimony continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive
however, was correctly found by the CIAC as clearly self-serving, because such blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not
intention of WG&A was belied by its actions before, during and after the signing of observing the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile and heard the warning signals. Being perturbed by the
the Shiprepair Agreement.
rapid approach of the vehicle, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on
As pointed out by the CA, WG&A and its related group of companies, which were the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. The bridge is about 75 meters
all extensively engaged in the shipping business, had previously dry-docked and and a width of only 4.80 meters. The vehicle approached without slowing down.
repaired its various ships with KCSI under ship repair agreements incorporating Smith quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse
alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but due to the automobile’s close
the same standard conditions on at least 22 different occasions. Yet, in all these
proximity to the animal, the animal became frightened and turned its body across
instances, WG&A had not been heard to complain of being strong-armed and forced
the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on the hock of
to accept the fine-print provisions imposed by KCSI to limit its liability.
the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken.
Also, as pointed out by the CIAC, if it were true that WG&A did not want to be
bound under such an onerous clause, it could have easily transacted with other ship The horse fell and its rider was thrown off. As a result of its injuries the horse died.
repairers, which may not have included such a provision. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and
required medical attention for several days.
After the signing of the Shiprepair agreement, the record is bereft of any other
evidence to show that WG&A had protested such a provision limiting the liability
of KCSI. Indeed, the parties bound themselves to the terms of their contract which ISSUE:
became the law between them. Whether Smith was guilty of negligence and liable for civil obligations
HELD:
While contracts of adhesion may be struck down as void and unenforceable for Yes. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it
being subversive of public policy, the same can only be done when, under the was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were
TORTS & DAMAGES – Atty. Dy| 5
KMC LPU LAW
no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away through the Orinoco River. He was asked to pilot the said vessel on
from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant February 11, 1988 boarding it that night at 11:00 p.m. The master (captain)
ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. of the Philippine Roxas, Captain Nicandro Colon, was at the bridge together
A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have with the pilot (Vasquez), the vessel’s third mate (then the officer on watch),
recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would and a helmsman when the vessel left the port at 1:40 a.m. on February 12,
therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence 1988. Captain Colon left the bridge when the vessel was under way. The
of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San
duty to guard against the threatened harm. Roque Channel at mile 172. The vessel proceeded on its way, with the pilot
assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a result of the shallowness
of the channel. Between mile 158 and 157, the vessel again experienced
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was some vibrations.These occurred at 4:12 a.m.It was then that the watch
guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. officer called the master to the bridge. The master (captain) checked the
But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case position of the vessel and verified that it was in the centre of the channel.
the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly He then went to confirm, or set down, the position of the vessel on the chart.
responsible. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last He ordered Simplicio A. Monis, Chief Officer of the President Roxas, to
fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the check all the double bottom tanks. At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. ran aground in the Orinoco River,thus obstructing the ingress and egress of
vessels. As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by
Test of Negligence: herein petitioner Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail
out of Puerto Ordaz on that day. Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. III against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company
“last clear chance” rule is applicable. In other words, when a traveler has reached a (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas) for damages in the form of
point where he cannot extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert the unearned profits, and interest thereon amounting to US $400,000.00 plus
injury, his negligence in reaching that position becomes the condition and not the attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses of litigation.
proximate cause of the injury and will not preclude a recovery. (Note especially ▪ Issue: Whether or not the Venezuelan law should be applied.
Aiken vs. Metcalf [1917], 102 Atl., 330.) ▪ Held: No. It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them.
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
▪ Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws were not proven in the
manner provided by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Wild Valley Shipping Co. Ltd vs Court of Appeals
GR No. 119602 October 6, 2000 ▪ The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published in the Gaceta
Oficial of the Republic of Venezuela. A photocopy of the Gaceta Oficial was
presented in evidence as an official publication of the Republic of
▪ Facts: Sometime in February 1988, the Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by
Venezuela.
Philippine President Lines, Inc., private respondent herein, arrived in
▪ The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco is published in a
Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the
book issued by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela. Only a
loading and when the vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle
photocopy of the said rules was likewise presented as evidence.
Solarzano Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the
harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas
TORTS & DAMAGES – Atty. Dy| 6
KMC LPU LAW
 ▪ Both of these documents are considered in Philippine jurisprudence to be them one-fourth undivided share in the remaining property. That very same day,
public documents for they are the written official acts, or records of the Vitallana and Agaton sold to petitioners Pilapil and Penaranda an undivided
official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and portion of the, measuring 18,626 sqm of lot Lot 8734-B-5. The deed of sale, which
public officers of Venezuela. was executed in the presence of Antonio and another witness, specified that the
▪ For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following possession and ownership of the property sold shall be transferred to the buyers
requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the officer having legal from the date of the instrument. The deed of extrajudicial partition was annotated
custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be accompanied by on OCT No. 26026. Because of such partition, OCT No. 26026 was cancelled and
a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, replaced by TCT No. 4026 which, in turn, was superseded by TCT No. 4029,
vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal indicating as owners Agaton, Vitaliana, Maxima, and Antonio. The sale to
of his office. The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended petitioners was inscribed at the back of TCT No. 4029 as Entry No. 10903 on March
to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of a document 29, 1962.
in a foreign country. Later, Antonio sold his one-fourth share to his cousin Bensig, who ceded one-half
▪ It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by the thereof to the spouses Visitacion Otadora and S. Aldrin, by a deed of quitclaim.
Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented as evidence Because of such, TCT No. 4029 was cancelled and supplanted by TCT No. 4484,
with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by Section 24 of Rule which showed Agaton, Vitaliana, Maxima, Bensig, and the spouses Visitacion and
132 of the Rules of Court that a certificate that Captain Monzon, who S. Aldrin as owners of Lot 8734-B-5. Petitioners’ names did not appear among the
attested the documents, is the officer who had legal custody of those records owners, although in the memorandum of encumbrances at the back of TCT No. 4484
made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice regarding the sale to them by Vitaliana was retained.
consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Despite the sale of 18, 626 sqm of their undivided share in said lot earlier made in
Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his favor of petitioners, Agaton AGAIN sold his one-fourth share in the lot to his
office accompanying the copy of the public document. No such certificate daughter Carmen covered by TCT No. 9130. Vitaliana on the other hand, RE-
could be found in the records of the case. With respect to proof of written SOLD her one-fourth share to Maxima. 4 days later, Maxima sold her now one-half
laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written law itself is the best share to her sons Dionisio and Macario who were able to register the said
evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a foreign statute is properties in their names. On Sept, 1971, TCT was issued to spouses Visitacion
involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly and S. Aldrin, and another TCT for Carmen and her husband.
authenticated copy of the statute. Upon discovery of the new titles, petitioners filed a protest with the register of deeds
or Ormoc city, who in a letter informed Carmen, S. ALdrin, Macario and Dionisio
PILAPIL VS. CA of the existence of the deed of sale in favor of petitioner and required them to present
G.R. No. 55134 their original titles for proper annotation. Such request was, however, ignored.
December 4, 1995
FACTS: In the instant petition for review on certiorari, questioning the decision of
On July 1972, Carmen and her husband Masias sold the one-fourth share sold by
the CA affirming the decision of the trial court.
Carmen’s father to her to respondent Serafica and Sons Corp. which was not able
Felix Otadora was the registered owner of a parcel of land (273,796-sqm) in Ormoc
to register the same because of the annotation in TCT No. 9130 earlier made showing
city covered by OCT No. 26026. He died and was survived by his wife Leona and 3
the sale in favor of petitioners. Because of this, the corporation charged the vendors
children (vitaliana, Maxima and Agaton). Subsequently, Leona and the three
with estafa before the City Fiscal’s Office, but the complaint did not prosper.
children sold portions of said lot, leaving a portion with an area of 51, 019 sqm
Petitioners therefore filed, on December 1973, a complaint for quieting of title,
(Lot 8734-B-5) . Then Leona died.
annulment of deeds, cancellation of titles, partition, and recovery of ownership with
On March, 1962, the Otadora siblings, together with their nephew Antonio,
damages, against herein private respondents. The complaint alleged, among other
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition and confirmation of sales, giving each of
things, that petitioners succeeded in possessing only 12,000 square meters of the lot
TORTS & DAMAGES – Atty. Dy| 7
KMC LPU LAW
and needed 6,626 square meters more to complete the total area purchased from HELD: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Vitaliana and Agaton in 1962. Petitioners are declared the lawful owners of 18,626 square meters of said lot and
the unclaimed lot of petitioners be taken in equal portions from the shares thereof
of Agaton and Vitaliana or their successors-in-interest.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the defendants (Serafica & Sons (1) The court below correctly ruled that the annotation of Entry No. 10903 in the
Corporation) and against the plaintiffs (Pilapil) hereby dismissing plaintiffs certificates of title was not made in accordance with law. To affect the land sold, the
complaint, and ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants for attorney’s fee, to
presentation of the deed of sale and its entry in the day book must be done with the
vacate the lot in question and deliver the same to defendant. In its decision dated surrender of the owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title. Production of the
June 1994, the court a quo concluded that the annotation on TCT No. 4484 of the sale owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title is required by Section 55 of Act No. 496
by Vitaliana and Agaton in favor of petitioners was null and void because the
(now Section 53 of PD No. 1529), and only after compliance with this and other
latter failed to surrender the owner’s duplicate copy of the title, in violation of
requirements shall actual registration retroact to the date of entry in the day
Section 55 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496).
book. However, nonproduction of the owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title
The CA said that OCT No. 26026 thereby became inexistent, it having been already
may not invalidate petitioners’ claim of ownership over the lot involved
cancelled by TCT(s) Nos. 4026 and 4029. It would have been against the law to have
considering the factual circumstances of this case.
the deed of sale registered in TCT No. 4029 without an order from the proper court
(2) It is undisputed that after the sale of the lot to petitioners, the same vendors sold
authorizing such registration, specifically because OCT No. 26026 had already
the same property to persons who cannot be considered in law to be unaware of the
undergone two cancellations, first by TCT No. 4026 and then by TCT No. 4029 .It
prior sale to the petitioners.
held that Appellants should have filed the necessary petition with the proper court
asking that the Register of Deeds be authorized to annotate the deed of sale executed
by Agaton Otadora and Vitaliana Otadora in their favor. The said title was, Considering these relationships and contrary to the findings of the courts below, the
therefore, null and void, and the same did not acquire the effect of a constructive vendees, Carmen and Maxima, cannot be considered as third parties who are not
notice to the whole world of the interest over the land in question of the plaintiffs- bound by the prior sale between Agaton and Vitaliana as vendors and petitioners
appellants. At most, the deed of sale is merely a contract between the plaintiffs- as vendees, because there is privity of interest between them and their
appellants and the vendors appearing therein but without any binding effect upon predecessors. The reason for this is that the validity of a title to a piece of property
their persons and upon whom bad faith cannot be imputed. Also, The deed of sale depends on the buyer’s knowledge, actual or constructive, of a prior sale. While
did not specify what part of the 1/4 share of each of the registered owners who there is no direct proof that Carmen and Maxima actually knew of the sale to
executed the sale was sold to the appellants. The CA also agreed with the lower petitioners, they are deemed to have constructive knowledge thereof by virtue of
court that H. Serafica & Sons Corporation was an innocent purchaser for value as their relationship to both Agaton and Vitaliana. Hence, it has become immaterial if
it was not required by law to go beyond TCT No. 9130 which, on its face, appeared the sale to petitioners was properly annotated on the correct certificate of title or not.
to be unencumbered. It is not disputed that of the 25,510 square meters which pertain to Vitaliana and
ISSUE: petitioners argue that the CA erred in holding that: Agaton as their combined undivided share in Lot No. 8734-B-5, an area of 18,626
(1) The annotation of the sale in their favor on TCT No. 4029 is ineffectual; square meters had been sold to petitioners who, in turn, were able to possess only
12,000 square meters thereof. Thus, at most, Vitaliana and Agaton had a remainder
of 6,884 square meters of undivided share which they could have legally disposed
(2) The deeds of sale respectively executed by Agaton and Vitaliana in favor of
of. As it turned out, however, they sold their entire individual one-fourth shares to
Carmen and Maxima are valid and superior to that executed earlier by Agaton and
Carmen and Maxima who, as earlier concluded, were privy to the prior sale to
Vitaliana in their favor;
petitioners.
Thus, when Carmen sold the property to H. Serafica and Sons Corporation, she no
Petitioners contend that the liability of the Otadoras who sold the same property longer had any rights of dominion to transmit, since her own father who sold to
twice should have been determined to avoid multiplicity of suits
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her the property had himself earlier relinquished his ownership rights in favor G.R. No. 112160 February 28, 2000
of the petitioners. Accordingly, Carmen transmitted no right to the corporation.
Under these circumstances, the corporation, having failed to obtain relief through
the criminal complaint filed against the spouses Carmen Otadora and Luis Masias, Lessons Applicable: Last Clear Chance (Torts and Damages)
and having relied on the unencumbered transfer certificate of title shown to it by Laws Applicable: Article 1173
the Masias spouses, is entitled to damages.

As regards the sale made by Vitaliana to her sister Maxima, the former can no
longer transmit any property rights over the subject lot when she sold it to her own FACTS:
sister as she had previously sold the same property to petitioners. Moreover, as
Vitaliana’s sister, Maxima was actually a co-owner of Lot No. 8734-B-5 which, at the ▪ August, 1982: Osmundo S. Canlas executed a Special Power of
time of the sale to petitioners, was not yet partitioned and segregated. Maxima was, Attorney authorizing Vicente Mañosca to mortgage 2 parcels of land
therefore, privy to the contract
On the matter of whether the rights of co-owners had been transgressed by the sale situated in BF Homes Paranaque in the name of his wife Angelina
to the petitioners, the trial court erroneously ruled that there should be proof of Canlas.
compliance with Article 1623 of the Civil Code requiring the vendor of the property ▪ Subsequently, Osmundo Canlas agreed to sell the lands to Mañosca for
to give a written notice of sale to the other co-owners.
P850K, P500K payable within 1 week, and the balance serves as his
investment in the business. Mañosca issued 2 checks P40K and
In view of the foregoing, the sale to the petitioners must be respected by the
successors-in-interest of Agaton and Vitaliana. Inasmuch as petitioners had P460K. The P460K lacked sufficient funds.
managed to possess only 12,000 square meters of the 18,625 square meters they ▪ September 3, 1982: Mañosca mortgage to Atty. Manuel Magno the
bought from Agaton and Vitaliana, the whole area purchased by them should be parcels of lands for P100K with the help of impostors who
taken from the shares of Agaton and Vitaliana upon partition of the property.
misrepresented themselves as the Spouses Canlas.
▪ September 29, 1982: Mañosca was granted a loan by the respondent
NOTES:
1. 1. in Abuyo v. De Suazo: [t]he purpose of the registration is to give notice Asian Savings Bank (ASB) for P500K with the parcels of land as
to third persons. And, privies are not third persons. The vendor’s heirs security and with the help of the same impostors. The loan was left
are his privies. Against them, failure to register will not vitiate or annul unpaid resulting in a extrajudicially foreclosure on the lots.
the vendee’s right of ownership conferred by such unregistered deed
of sale. ▪ January 15, 1983: Canlas wrote a letter informing ASB that the mortgage
2. 2. in Basa v. Aguilar: a third person, within the meaning of Article was without their authority. He also requested the sheriff Contreras to
1620 of the Civil Code (on the right of legal redemption of a co-owner) hold or cancel the auction. Both parties refused.
is anyone who is not a co-owner.
▪ The spouses Canlas filed a case for annulment of deed of real estate
Canlas V. CA (2000) mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction

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 ▪ RTC: restrained the sheriff from issuing a Certificate of Sheriff’s Sale failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising
and annulled the mortgage therefrom
▪ CA: reversed holding Canlas estopped for coming to the bank ▪ the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude
with Mañosca and letting himself be introduced as Leonardo Rey recovery of damages caused by the supervening negligence of
ISSUE: W/N the ASB had was negligent due to the doctrine of last clear chance the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence
▪ Antecedent Negligence: Osmundo Canlas was negligent in giving
HELD: YES. Petition is GRANTED Vicente Mañosca the opportunity to perpetrate the fraud, by entrusting
him the owner's copy of the transfer certificates of title of subject parcels
▪ Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consist in the of land
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the ▪ Supervening Negligence: Failing to perform the simple expedient of
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of faithfully complying with the requirements for banks to ascertain the
the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the identity of the persons transacting with them - ASB bears the loss
provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply ▪ Canlas went to ASB with Mañosca and he was introduced as Leonardo
▪ The degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good Rey. He didn't correct Mañosca. However, he did not know that the
father of a family lots were being used as a security for he was there to make sure
▪ not even a single identification card was exhibited by the said that Mañosca pays his debt so he cannot be estopped from assailing the
impostors to show their true identity validity of the mortgage
▪ acted simply on the basis of the residence certificates bearing ▪ But being negligent in believing the misrepresentation by Mañosca that
signatures which tended to match the signatures affixed on a he had other lots and that the lot were not to be used as a security,
previous deed of mortgage to Atty. Magno Canlas was negligent and undeserving of Attorney's fees.
▪ previous deed of mortgage did not bear the tax ▪ the contract of mortgage sued upon was entered into and signed by
account number of the spouses as well as the impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses Osmundo
Community Tax Certificate of Angelina Canlas Canlas and Angelina Canlas = complete nullity
▪ doctrine of last clear chance ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY,
▪ where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is LTD G..R. No. 156978 May 2, 2006
appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or FACTS:
where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence Societe Francaise Des Colloides loaded a cargo of textiles and auxiliary chemicals
brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had from France on board a vessel owned by Franco-Belgian Services, Inc. The cargo
was consigned to General Textile, Inc., in Manila and insured by respondent New
the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but
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India Assurance Company, Ltd. While in Hong Kong, the cargo was transferred to
M/V P. Aboitiz for transshipment to Manila.

Before departing, the vessel was advised by the Japanese Meteorological Center that
it was safe to travel to its destination. But while at sea, the vessel received a report
of a typhoon moving within its general path. To avoid the typhoon, the vessel
changed its course. However, it was still at the fringe of the typhoon when its hull
leaked. On October 31, 1980, the vessel sank, but the captain and his crew were
saved.

Both the trial and the appellate courts found that the sinking was not due to the
typhoon but to its unseaworthiness.

ISSUE:
Whether the limited liability doctrine, which limits respondent’s award of damages
to its pro-rata share in the insurance proceeds, applies in this case.

HELD:
No. x x x An exception to the limited liability doctrine is when the damage is due to
the fault of the shipowner or to the concurrent negligence of the shipowner and the
captain. In which case, the shipowner shall be liable to the full-extent of the damage.

In the present case, petitioner has the burden of showing that it exercised
extraordinary diligence in the transport of the goods it had on board in order to
invoke the limited liability doctrine. Differently put, to limit its liability to the
amount of the insurance proceeds, petitioner has the burden of proving that the
unseaworthiness of its vessel was not due to its fault or negligence. Considering the
evidence presented and the circumstances obtaining in this case, we find that
petitioner failed to discharge this burden. It initially attributed the sinking to the
typhoon and relied on the BMI findings that it was not at fault. However, both the
trial and the appellate courts, in this case, found that the sinking was not due to the
typhoon but to its unseaworthiness. Evidence on record showed that the weather
was moderate when the vessel sank. These factual findings of the Court of Appeals,
affirming those of the trial court are not to be disturbed on appeal, but must be
accorded great weight. These findings are conclusive not only on the parties but on
this Court as well.
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