BRINAS VS PEOPLE

Facts:
"The evidence of the prosecution tends to show that in the afternoon of January 6, 1957, Juanita Gesmundo bought a train ticket at the
railroad station in Tagkawayan, Quezon for his 55-year old mother Martina Bool and his 3-year old daughter
Emelita Gesmundo, who were bound for Barrio Lusacan, Tiaong, same province. At about 2:00 p.m., Train No. 522 left Tagkawayan
with the old woman and her granddaughter among the passengers. At Hondagua the train's complement were relieved, with Victor
Millan... taking over as engineman, Clemente Brinas as conductor, and Hermogenes Buencamino as assistant conductor. Upon
approaching Barrio Lagalag in Tiaong at about 8:00 p.m. of that same night, the train slowed down and the conductor shouted
'Lusacan', Lusacan'. Thereupon, the... old woman walked towards the left front door facing the direction of Tiaong, carrying the child
with one hand and holding her baggage with the other. When Martina and Emelita were near the door, the train suddenly picked up
speed. As a result the old woman and the child... stumbled and they were seen no more. It took three minutes more before the train
stopped at the next barrio, Lusacan, and the victims were not among the passengers who disembarked thereat.
"Next morning, the Tiaong police received a report that two corpses were found along the railroad tracks at Barrio Lagalag. Repairing to
the scene to investigate, they found the lifeless body of a female child, about 2 feet from the railroad tracks, sprawled to the... ground
with her belly down, the hand resting on the forehead, and with the back portion of the head crushed. The investigators also found the
corpse of an old woman about 2 feet away from the railroad tracks with the head and both legs severed and the left hand missing.
The head was located farther west between the rails. An arm was found midway from the body of the child to the body of the old
woman. Blood, pieces of scattered brain and pieces of clothes were at the scene. Later, the bodies were identified as those of Martina
Bool and Emelita
Gesmundo. Among the personal effects found on Martina was a train ticket
The Court of First Instance of Quezon convicted defendant-appellant Clemente Briñas for double homicide thru reckless imprudence
but acquitted Hermogenes Buencamino and Victor Millan.
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
During the pendency of the criminal prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, the heirs of the deceased victims filed with the
same court a separate civil action for damages against the Manila
Railroad Company
Issues:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNDER THE FACTS AS FOUND BY
SAID COURT; and
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN INCLUDING THE PAYMENT OF DEATH INDEMNITY BY THE PETITIONER?
APPELLANT, WITH SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT IN CASE OF INSOLVENCY, AFTER THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED HAVE
ALREADY COMMENCED A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES AGAINST
THE RAILROAD COMPANY ARISING FROM THE SAME MISHAP.
Ruling:
It is undisputed that the victims were on board the second coach where the petitioner-appellant was assigned as conductor and that
when the train slackened its speed and the conductor shouted "Lusacan, Lusacan", they... stood up and proceeded to the nearest exit.
It is also undisputed that the train unexpectedly resumed its regular speed and as a result "the old woman and the child stumbled and
they were seen no more."
It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common carriers like trains and buses that before reaching a station or
flagstop they slow down and the conductor announces the name of the place. It is also a matter of common experience that as the train
or bus... slackens its speed, some passengers usually stand and proceed to the nearest exit, ready to disembark as the train or bus
comes to a full stop. This is especially true of a train because passengers feel that if the train resumes its run before they are able to
disembark,... there is no way to stop it as a bus may be stopped.
It was negligence on the conductor's part to announce the next flag stop when said stop was still a full three minutes ahead. As the
respondent Court of Appeals correctly observed, "the appellant's announcement was premature and erroneous."
That the announcement was premature and erroneous is shown by the fact that immediately after the train slowed down, it
unexpectedly accelerated to full speed. Petitioner-appellant failed to show any reason why the train suddenly resumed its regular
speed. The... announcement was made while the train was still at Barrio Lagalag.
The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature and erroneous announcement of petitioner-appellant Briñas. This
announcement prompted the two victims to stand and proceed to the nearest exit. Without said announcement, the victims would have
been safely... seated in their respective seats when the train jerked as it picked up speed. The connection between the premature and
erroneous announcement of petitioner-appellant and the deaths of the victims is direct and natural, unbroken by any intervening
efficient causes.
Petitioner-appellant also argues that it was negligence per se for Martina Bool to go to the door of the coach while the train was still in
motion and that it was this negligence that was the proximate cause of their deaths.
We have carefully examined the records and we agree with the respondent court that the negligence of petitioner-appellant in
prematurely and erroneously announcing the next flag stop was the proximate cause of the deaths of Martina Bool and Emelita
Gesmundo. Any negligence... of the victims was at most contributory and does not exculpate the accused from criminal liability.
With respect to the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that after the heirs of Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo had
actually commenced the separate civil action for damages in the same trial court during the pendency of the criminal action, the... said
court had no more power to include any civil liability in its judgment of conviction.
The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. 5978 is culpa contractual, not an act or omission punishable by
law. We also note from the appellant's arguments and from the title of the civil case that the party defendant is the Manila Railroad
Company... and not petitioner-appellant Briñas. Culpa contractual and an act or omission punishable by law are two distinct sources of
obligation.
The petitioner-appellant argues that since the information did not allege the existence of any kind of damages whatsoever coupled by
the fact that no private prosecutors appeared and the prosecution witnesses were not interrogated on the issue of damages, the trial
court... erred in awarding death indemnity in its judgment of conviction.
It is well-settled that when death occurs as a result of the commission of a crime, the following items of damages may be recovered: (1)
an indemnity for the death of the victim; (2) an indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased; (3)... moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, and (6) interest in proper cases.

LRTA VS NAVIDAD
FACTS:
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven o’clock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station
after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito
Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two
apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two,
delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment

that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he
was killed instantaneously.
The widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito
Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. RTC-Pasig: ordered defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin to pay actual, compensatory, and moral damages including
attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
2. CA: exonerated Prudent Security Agency (Prudent) from liability and finding Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and Rodolfo Roman
liable for damages on account of the death of Nicanor Navidad. While the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train, a
contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after
paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was
nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad 

ARGUMENTS
: Escartin’s assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that could not have been
foreseen or prevented. The LRTA would add that the appellate court’s conclusion on the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between Roman and LRTA lacked basis because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not
of the LRTA.

Respondent Navidad and PRudent

: contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the
latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation 

ISSUE:
Whether LRTA is liable

RULING: Yes.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened
with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common
carrier for death of or injury to its passengers, provides:
"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."
The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that
contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to
ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an
independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of
carriage.

Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and related
provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil Code.
The premise, however, for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the
employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris
families in the selection and supervision of its employees.

The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual
matter that has not been shown. Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of the common carrier, on
the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be
breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa
aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply.
In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act
which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed
between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply. 

GV TRANSPORT VS HEIRS OF ROMEO BATTUNG

FACTS: Battung boarded the bus of petitioner in Delfin Albano, Isabela, bound for Manila. He was seated at the first row behind the
driver and slept during the ride. Battung was seated at the first row behind the driver and slept during the ride. When the bus reached
the Philippine Carabao Center in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, the bus driver, Duplio, stopped the bus and alighted to check the tires. At this
point, a man who was seated at the fourth row of the bus stood up, shot Battung at his head, and then left with a companion. The bus
conductor, Daraoay, notified Duplio of the incident and thereafter, brought Romeo to the hospital, but the latter was pronounced dead
on arrival. Hence, respondents filed a complaint on July 15, 2008 for damages in the aggregate amount of P1,826,000.00 based on a
breach of contract of carriage against petitioner, Duplio, and Baraoay (petitioner, et al.) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 22-
1103.   

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is liable for damages arising from culpa contractual  

RULING: No.  
Where, as in the instant case, the injury sustained by the petitioner was in no way due to any defect in the means of transport or in the
method of transporting or to the negligent or wilful acts of [the common carrier'sl employees, and therefore involving no issue of
negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable [care] as well as competent employees, with the injury arising wholly from causes
created by strangers over which the carrier had no control or even knowledge or could not have prevented, the presumption is rebutted
and the carrier is not and ought not to be held liable. To rule otherwise would make the common carrier the insurer of the absolute
safety of its passengers which is not the intention of the lawmakers. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)   

The case involves the death of Battung wholly caused by the surreptitious act of a co-passenger who, after consummating such crime,
hurriedly alighted from the vehicle.   

The law exacts from common carriers (i.e., those persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public) the highest
degree of diligence (i.e., extraordinary diligence) in ensuring the safety of its passengers.   

Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code state:   

Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of
each case.   

Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.   

In this relation, Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed
in Articles 1733 and 1755." This disputable presumption may also be overcome by a showing that the accident was caused by a
fortuitous event.   

The foregoing provisions notwithstanding, it should be pointed out that the law does not make the common carrier an insurer of the
absolute safety of its passengers.   

While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and creates a
presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.   

Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care, vigilance[,] and precaution in the carriage of passengers by
common carriers to only such as human care and foresight can provide. What constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged with
due regard to all the circumstances.   

Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier when its passenger is
injured, merely relieves the latter, for the time being, from introducing evidence to fasten the negligence on the former, because the
presumption stands in the place of evidence. Being a mere presumption, however, the same is rebuttable by proof that the common
carrier had exercised extraordinary diligence as required by law in the performance of its contractual obligation, or that the injury
suffered by the passenger was solely due to a fortuitous event.   

In fine, we can only infer from the law the intention of the Code Commission and Congress to curb the recklessness of drivers and
operators of common carriers in the conduct of their business.   

Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation company makes it an insurer of the passenger's
safety, but that its liability for personal injuries sustained by its passenger rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the degree of
diligence that the law requires.   

Therefore, it is imperative for a party claiming against a common carrier under the above-said provisions to show that the injury or death
to the passenger/s arose from the negligence of the common carrier and/or its employees in providing safe transport to its passengers.

In Pilapil v. CA, the Court clarified that where the injury sustained by the passenger was in no way due   

(1) to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of transporting, or  (2) to the negligent or willful acts of the common carrier's
employees with respect to the foregoing –  

such as when the injury arises wholly from causes created by strangers which the carrier had no control of or prior knowledge to
prevent — there would be no issue regarding the common carrier's negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable care, as well as
competent employees in relation to its transport business; as such, the presumption of fault/negligence foisted under Article 1756 of the
Civil Code should not apply:   

First, as stated earlier, the presumption of fault or negligence against the carrier is only a disputable presumption.[The presumption]
gives in where contrary facts are established proving either that the carrier had exercised the degree of diligence required by law or the
injury suffered by the passenger was due to a fortuitous event.   

Since Battung's death was caused by a co-passenger, the applicable provision is Article 1763 of the Civil Code, which states that:   

"a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or
of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented
or stopped the act or omission."   

Notably, for this obligation, the law provides a lesser degree of diligence, i.e., diligence of a good father of a family, in assessing the
existence of any culpability on the common carrier's part.   

Case law states that the concept of diligence of a good father of a family "connotes reasonable care consistent with that which an
ordinarily prudent person would have observed when confronted with a similar situation.   

The test to determine whether negligence attended the performance of an obligation is:   
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would
have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence."    

At bar, no danger i.e. intelligent reports from law enforcement agents that certain lawless elements were planning to hijack and burn
some of its buses, as to impel petitioner or its employees to implement heightened security measures to ensure the safety of its
passengers. There was also no showing that during the course of the trip, Battung's killer made suspicious actions which would have
forewarned petitioner's employees of the need to conduct thorough checks on him or any of the passengers.    

Relevantly, the Court, in Nocum v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, has held that common carriers should be given sufficient leeway in
assuming that the passengers they take in will not bring anything that would prove dangerous to himself, as well as his co-passengers,
unless there is something that will indicate that a more stringent inspection should be made.  Not to be lightly considered must be the
right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. He cannot be subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the
innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar.   

in compelling the passenger to submit to more rigid inspection, after the passenger had already declared that the box contained mere
clothes and other miscellaneous, could not have justified invasion of a constitutionally protected domain.

BATANGAS TRANSPORT VS CAGUIMBAL

Facts:
There is no dispute at all that the deceased Pedro Caguimbal, Barrio Lieutenant of Barrio Calansayan, San Jose, Batangas, was a
paying passenger of BTCO bus, with plate TPU-507, going south on its regular route from
Calamba, Laguna, to Batangas, Batangas, driven by Tomas Perez, its regular driver, at about 5:30 o'clock on the early morning of April
25, 1954.  The deceased's destination was his residence at Calansayan, San
Jose, Batangas.  The bus of the Biñan Transportation Company, bearing plate TPU-820, driven by Marciano Ilagan, was coming from
the opposite direction (north-bound).  Along the... national highway at Barrio Daraza, Tanauan, Batangas, on the date and hour above
indicated, a horse-driven rig (calesa) managed by Benito Makahiya, which was then ahead of the Biñan bus, was... also coming from
the opposite direction, meaning proceeding towards the north.
As the BTCO bus was nearing a house, a passenger requested the conductor to stop as he was going to alight, and when he heard the
signal of the conductor, the driver Tomas Perez slowed down his bus swerving it farther to... the right in order to stop; at this juncture, a
calesa then driven by Benito Makahiya was at a distance of several meters facing the BTCO bus coming from the opposite direction;
that at the same time, the Biñan bus was about 100... meters away likewise going northward and following the direction of the calesa;
that upon seeing the Biñan bus, the driver of the BTCO bus dimmed his light as established by Magno Ilaw, the very conductor of the
Biñan bus at the time of the accident; that as the calesa and the BTCO bus were passing each other from the opposite directions, the
Biñan bus following the calesa swerved to its left in an attempt to pass between the
BTCO bus and the calesa; that without diminishing its speed of about seventy (70 ) kilometers an hour, the Biñan bus passed through
the space between the BTCO bus and the calesa hitting first the left side of the BTCO bus with... the left front corner of its body and
then bumped and struck the calesa which was completely wrecked; that the driver was seriously injured and the horse was killed; that
the second and all other posts supporting the top of the left side of the BTCO bus were... completely smashed and half of the back wall
to the left was ripped open (Exhibits 1 and 2).  The BTCO bus suffered damages for the repair of its damaged portion
As a consequence of this occurrence, two (2) passengers of BTCO died, namely, Pedro Caguimbal and Guillermo Tolentino, apart from
others who were injured.  The widow and children of Caguimbal instituted the present... action, which was tried jointly with a similar
action of the Tolentinos, to recover damages from the Batangas Transportation Company, hereinafter referred to as BTCO.  The latter,
in turn, filed a third-party complaint against the
Biñan Transportation Company hereinafter referred to as Biñan and its driver, Marciano Ilagan.  Subsequently, the Caguimbals
amended their complaint, to include therein, as defendants, said
Biñan and Ilagan.
After appropriate proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Batangas rendered a decision dismissing the complaint insofar as the
BTCO is concerned, without prejudice to plaintiffs' right to sue Biñan which had stopped participating in the... proceedings herein,
owing, apparently, to a case in the Court of First Instance of Laguna for the insolvency of said enterprise and Ilagan, and without
pronouncement as to costs.
On appeal taken by the Caguimbals, the Court of Appeals reversed said decision and rendered judgment for them, sentencing the
BTCO, Biñan and Ilagan to, jointly and severally, pay to the plaintiffs
Issues:
Hence, this appeal by BTCO, upon the ground that the Court of Appeals erred:  1) in finding said appellant liable for damages; and 2) in
awarding... attorney's fees.
Ruling:
In connection with the first assignment of error, we note that the recklessness of defendant Ilagan was, manifestly, a major factor in the
occurrence of the accident which resulted, inter alia, in the death of Pedro
Caguimbal.  Indeed, as driver of the Biñan bus, he overtook Benito Makahiya's horse-driven rig of calesa and passed between the
same and the BTCO bus despite the fact that the space available was not... big enough therefor, in view of which the Biñan bus hit the
left side of the BTCO bus and then the calesa.  This notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment against the BTCO, upon
the ground that its... driver, Tomas Perez, had failed to exercise the "extraordinary diligence," required in Article 1733 of the new Civil
Code, "in the vigilance for the safety" of his passengers.
The record shows that, in order to permit one of them to disembark, Perez drove his BTCO bus partly to the right shoulder of the road
and partly on the asphalted portion thereof.  Yet, he could have and should have seen to it had he exercised "extraordinary... diligence"
that his bus was completely outside the asphalted portion of the road, and fully within the shoulder thereof, the width of which being
more than sufficient to accommodate the bus.  He could have and should have done this, because, when the... aforementioned
passenger expressed his wish to alight from the bus, Ilagan had seen the aforementioned "calesa", driven by Makahiya, a few meters
away, coming from the opposite direction, with the Biñan bus about 100 meters... behind the rig, cruising at a good speed.[3]   When
Perez slowed down his BTCO bus to permit said passenger to disembark, he must have known, therefore, that the Biñan bus would
overtake the
"calesa", at about the time when the latter and BTCO bus would probably be on the same line, on opposite of the asphalted portions of
the road, and that the space between the BTCO bus and the "calesa" would not be enough to allow the
Biñan bus to go through.  It is true that the driver of the Biñan bus should have slowed down or stopped, and, hence, was reek less in
not doing so; but, he had no especial obligations toward the passengers of the BTCO, unlike Perez... whose duty was to exercise
"utmost" or "extraordinary" diligence for their safety. Perez was thus under obligation to avoid a situation which would hazardous for his
passengers, and make their safety dependent upon the diligence of the Biñan... driver.
In the case at bar, BTCO has not proven the exercise of extraordinary diligence on its part.  For this reason, the case of Isaac vs. A. L.
Ammen Trans. Co., Inc.,[5] relied upon by BTCO, is not in... point, for, in said case, the public utility driver had done "everything he
could to avoid" the accident, and could not have possibly avoided it, for he "swerved the bus to the very extreme right of the road, which
the driver, in the present case, had failed to do.
Principles:
"In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier
in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought for by the passenger.  By the contract of... carriage, the carrier assumes the
express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all
the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the... fault or negligence of the
carrier (Article 1756, new Civil Code).  This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore
incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as... prescribed in Article 1733 and 1755 of the new
Civil Code. "

TIU VS ARRIESGADO

Facts:
At about 10:00 p.m. of March 15, 1987, the cargo truck marked "Condor Hollow Blocks and General Merchandise" bearing plate
number GBP-675 was loaded with firewood in Bogo, Cebu and left for Cebu City. Upon reaching Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela,
Cebu, just as the truck... passed over a bridge, one of its rear tires exploded. The driver, Sergio Pedrano, then parked along the right
side of the national highway and removed the damaged tire to have it vulcanized at a nearby shop, about 700 meters away.[3] Pedrano
left his... helper, Jose Mitante, Jr. to keep watch over the stalled vehicle, and instructed the latter to place a spare tire six fathoms
away[4] behind the stalled truck to serve as a warning for oncoming vehicles. The truck's tail lights were also left on. It was... about
12:00 a.m., March 16, 1987.
At about 4:45 a.m., D' Rough Riders passenger bus with plate number PBP-724 driven by Virgilio Te Laspiñas was cruising along the
national highway of Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu. The passenger bus was also bound for Cebu City, and had come from
Maya, Daanbantayan,... Cebu. Among its passengers were the Spouses Pedro A. Arriesgado and Felisa Pepito Arriesgado, who were
seated at the right side of the bus, about three (3) or four (4) places from the front seat.
As the bus was approaching the bridge, Laspiñas saw the stalled truck, which was then about 25 meters away.[5] He applied the
breaks and tried to swerve to the left to avoid hitting the truck. But it was too late; the bus rammed into the truck's left rear.
The impact damaged the right side of the bus and left several passengers injured.  Pedro Arriesgado lost consciousness and suffered a
fracture in his right colles.[6] His wife, Felisa, was brought to the Danao City Hospital.    She was... later transferred to the Southern
Island Medical Center where she died shortly thereafter.[7]
Respondent Pedro A. Arriesgado then filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage, damages and attorney's fees before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 20, against the petitioners, D' Rough Riders bus operator William Tiu and his driver, Virgilio
Te Laspiñas... on May 27, 1987. The respondent alleged that the passenger bus in question was cruising at a fast and high speed
along the national road, and that petitioner Laspiñas did not take precautionary measures to avoid the accident.
The trial court also ruled that the absence of an early warning device near the place where the truck was parked was not sufficient to
impute negligence on the part of respondent Pedrano, since the tail lights of the truck were fully on, and the vicinity was well lighted
by... street lamps.[16] It also found that the testimony of petitioner Tiu, that he based the selection of his driver Laspiñas on efficiency
and in-service training, and that the latter had been so far an efficient and good driver for the past six years of his... employment, was
insufficient to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees.
After the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said decision was denied, the petitioners elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals
The appellate court rendered judgment affirming the trial court's decision with the modification that the awards for moral and exemplary
damages were reduced to P25,000.
According to the appellate court, the action of respondent Arriesgado was based not on quasi-delict but on breach of contract of
carriage. As a common carrier, it was incumbent upon petitioner Tiu to prove that extraordinary diligence was observed in ensuring the
safety of... passengers during transportation. Since the latter failed to do so, he should be held liable for respondent Arriesgado's claim.
Issues:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONERS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AND HENCE, LIABLE TO
RESPONDENT PEDRO A. ARRIESGADO.
Ruling:
According to the petitioners, the appellate court erred in failing to appreciate the absence of an early warning device and/or built-in
reflectors at the front and back of the cargo truck, in clear violation of Section 34, par. (g) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
They aver that such violation is only a proof of respondent Pedrano's negligence, as provided under Article 2185 of the New Civil Code.
They also question the appellate court's failure to take into account that the truck was parked in an oblique manner, its rear portion
almost... at the center of the road. As such, the proximate cause of the incident was the gross recklessness and imprudence of
respondent Pedrano, creating the presumption of negligence on the part of respondent Condor in supervising his employees, which
presumption was not rebutted. The... petitioners then contend that respondents Condor and Pedrano should be held jointly and
severally liable to respondent Arriesgado for the    payment of the latter's claim.
The petitioners, likewise, aver that expert evidence should have been presented to prove that petitioner Laspiñas was driving at a very
fast speed, and that the CA could not reach such conclusion by merely considering the damages on the cargo truck. It was also pointed
out that... petitioner Tiu presented evidence that he had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his drivers.
Petitioner Laspiñas
Was negligent in driving
The Ill-fated bus
In his testimony before the trial court, petitioner Laspiñas claimed that he was traversing the two-lane road at Compostela, Cebu at a
speed of only forty (40) to fifty (50) kilometers per hour before the incident occurred.[23] He also admitted that he... saw the truck which
was parked in an "oblique position" at about 25 meters before impact,[24] and tried to avoid hitting it by swerving to the left. However,
even in the absence of expert evidence, the damage sustained by the truck[25] itself supports the finding of both the trial court and the
appellate court, that the D' Rough Rider bus driven by petitioner Laspiñas was traveling at a fast pace. Since he saw the stalled truck at
a distance of 25 meters, petitioner Laspiñas had more than... enough time to swerve to his left to avoid hitting it; that is, if the speed of
the bus was only 40 to 50 kilometers per hour as he claimed. As found by the Court of Appeals, it is easier to believe that petitioner
Laspiñas was driving at a very fast speed, since at 4:45 a.m.,... the hour of the accident, there were no oncoming vehicles at the
opposite direction. Petitioner Laspiñas could have swerved to the left lane with proper clearance, and, thus, could have avoided the
truck.[26] Instinct, at the very least, would have prompted... him to apply the breaks to avert the impending disaster which he must have
foreseen when he caught sight of the stalled truck.
Indeed, petitioner Laspiñas' negligence in driving the bus is apparent in the records. By his own admission, he had just passed a bridge
and was traversing the highway of Compostela, Cebu at a speed of 40 to 50 kilometers per hour before the collision occurred. The
maximum speed... allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour.[29] And, as correctly pointed out by the trial court,
petitioner Laspiñas also violated Section 35 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic Act No. 4136,... ec. 35. Restriction
as to speed. (a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor
less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the highway,... and or any other condition then and
there existing; and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of
any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop... within the assured clear distance ahead.
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any
traffic regulation.
Petitioner Tiu failed to
Overcome the presumption
Of negligence against him as
One engaged in the business
Of common carriage
The rules which common carriers should observe as to the safety of their passengers are set forth in the Civil Code, Articles 1733,[32]
1755[33] and 1756.[34] In this case, respondent Arriesgado and... his deceased wife contracted with petitioner Tiu, as owner and
operator of D' Rough Riders bus service, for transportation from Maya, Daanbantayan, Cebu, to Cebu City for the price of P18.00.[35] It
is undisputed that the respondent and his wife were not... safely transported to the destination agreed upon. In actions for breach of
contract, only the existence of such contract, and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his
passenger safely to his destination are the matters that need to be... proved.[36] This is because under the said contract of carriage,
the petitioners assumed the express obligation to transport the respondent and his wife to their destination safely and to observe
extraordinary diligence with due regard for all... circumstances.[37] Any injury suffered by the passengers in the course thereof is
immediately attributable to the negligence of the carrier.[38] Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once
arises, and it... becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.
[39] It must be stressed that in requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and in creating a presumption
of... negligence against them, the law compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers.[40]
While evidence may be submitted to overcome such presumption of negligence, it must be shown that the carrier observed the required
extraordinary diligence, which means that the carrier must show the utmost diligence of very cautious persons as far as human care
and foresight... can provide, or that the accident was caused by fortuitous event.[41] As correctly found by the trial court, petitioner Tiu
failed to conclusively rebut such presumption. The negligence of petitioner Laspiñas as driver of the passenger bus is, thus, binding...
against petitioner Tiu, as the owner of the passenger bus engaged as a common carrier.[42]
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the principle of last clear chance is inapplicable in the instant case, as it only applies in a suit
between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility... from the carrier
to enforce its contractual obligations, for it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and its owner on the ground that the
other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
Principles:
In actions for breach of contract, only the existence of such contract, and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed
to transport his passenger safely to his destination are the matters that need to be... proved.[36] This is because under the said contract
of carriage, the petitioners assumed the express obligation to transport the respondent and his wife to their destination safely and to
observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all... circumstances.[37] Any injury suffered by the passengers in the course thereof
is immediately attributable to the negligence of the carrier.[38] Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at
once arises, and it... becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his
passengers.[39] It must be stressed that in requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and in creating a
presumption of... negligence against them, the law compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers.[40]
The common law notion of last clear chance... permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who has also been negligent provided that
the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so.
MARIANO VS CALLEJAS

Facts:
Petitioner Herminio Mariano, Jr. is the surviving spouse of Dr. Frelinda Mariano who was a passenger of a Celyrosa Express bus bound
for Tagaytay when she met her death. Respondent Ildefonso C. Callejas is the registered owner of Celyrosa Express, while respondent
Edgar de Borja... was the driver of the bus on which the deceased was a passenger.
At around 6:30 p.m. on November 12, 1991, along Aguinaldo Highway, San Agustin, Dasmariñas, Cavite, the Celyrosa Express bus,
carrying Dr. Mariano as its passenger, collided with an Isuzu truck with trailer bearing plate numbers PJH 906 and TRH 531. The
passenger bus was bound... for Tagaytay while the trailer truck came from the opposite direction, bound for Manila. The trailer truck
bumped the passenger bus on its left middle portion. Due to the impact, the passenger bus fell on its right side on the right shoulder of
the highway and caused the death... of Dr. Mariano and physical injuries to four other passengers. Dr. Mariano was 36 years old at the
time of her death. She left behind three minor children, aged four, three and two years.
Petitioner filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage and damages against respondents for their failure to transport his wife and
mother of his three minor children safely to her destination. Respondents denied liability for the death of Dr. Mariano. They claimed
that... the proximate cause of the accident was the recklessness of the driver of the trailer truck which bumped their bus while allegedly
at a halt on the shoulder of the road in its rightful lane. Thus, respondent Callejas filed a third-party complaint against Liong Chio
Chang, doing... business under the name and style of La Perla Sugar Supply, the owner of the trailer truck, for indemnity in the event
that he would be held liable for damages to petitioner.
In the case at bar, the trial court, in its Decision dated September 13, 1999, found respondents Ildefonso Callejas and Edgar de Borja,
together with Liong Chio Chang, jointly and severally liable to pay petitioner damages and costs of suit.
Respondents Callejas and De Borja appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court erred in holding them guilty of
breach of contract of carriage.
Issues:
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL FOURTEENTH DIVISION IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
FACTUAL BASIS OF THE CASE.
Ruling:
In accord with the above provisions, Celyrosa Express, a common carrier, through its driver, respondent De Borja, and its registered
owner, respondent Callejas, has the express obligation "to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the... utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances,"[11] and to observe extraordinary
diligence in the discharge of its duty. The death of the wife of the petitioner in the course of transporting her to her destination... gave
rise to the presumption of negligence of the carrier. To overcome the presumption, respondents have to show that they observed
extraordinary diligence in the discharge of their duty, or that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event.
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and creates a
presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its... passengers.
Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier when its passenger is
injured, merely relieves the latter, for the time being, from introducing evidence to fasten the negligence on the former, because the...
presumption stands in the place of evidence. Being a mere presumption, however, the same is rebuttable by proof that the common
carrier had exercised extraordinary diligence as required by law in the performance of its contractual obligation, or that the injury
suffered by... the passenger was solely due to a fortuitous event.
Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation company makes it an insurer of the passenger's
safety, but that its liability for personal injuries sustained by its passenger rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the... degree
of diligence that the law requires.
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot succeed in his contention that respondents failed to overcome the presumption of negligence
against them. The totality of evidence shows that the death of petitioner's spouse was caused by the reckless negligence of the driver
of the Isuzu... trailer truck which lost its brakes and bumped the Celyrosa Express bus, owned and operated by respondents.
Principles:
The following are the provisions of the Civil Code pertinent to the case at bar:
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances...
of each case.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.

CALALAS VS CA
FACTS:
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in
Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the
jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the
back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the
vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by
Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in
failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against
Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. RTC – Dumaguete – rendered judgment against Salva holding that the driver of the Isuzu truck was responsible
It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch
37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.
2. CA – reversed the RTC, awarding damages instead to Sunga as plaintiff in an action for breach of contract of carriage since the
cause of action was based on such and not quasi delict.
Hence, current petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether (per ruling in Civil Case) negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule
otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers
In relation thereto, does the principle of res judicata apply?

RULING:
No.
The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to
petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. 

Quasi-delict / culpa aquiliana / culpa extra contractual

1. Has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor
2. negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action
3. doctrine of proximate cause is applicable
(device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party, obligation is created by law itself)

Breach of contract / culpa contractual

1. premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation
2. action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor (here, the common carrier)
failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination
3. not available; it is the parties themselves who create the obligation and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus
created

In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the
Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.

Hence, Vicente Calalas (operator) is liable since he did not exercise utmost diligence. 
1. Jeepney was not properly parked;
2. Overloading of passengers. 

SULPICIO LINES VS SESANTE

Facts:
On September 18, 1998, at around 12:55 p.m., the M/V Princess of the Orient, a passenger vessel owned and operated by the
petitioner, sank near Fortune Island in Batangas. Of the 388 recorded passengers, 150 were lost.[3] Napoleon Sesante, then a member
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and a lawyer, was one of the passengers who survived the sinking. He sued the petitioner for
breach of contract and damages.[4]
Sesante alleged in his complaint that the M/V Princess of the Orient left the Port of Manila while Metro Manila was experiencing stormy
weather; that at around 11:00 p.m., he had noticed the vessel listing starboard, so he had gone to the uppermost deck where he
witnessed the strong winds and big waves pounding the vessel; that at the same time, he had seen how the passengers had been
panicking, crying for help and frantically scrambling for life jackets in the absence of the vessel's officers and crew; that sensing danger,
he had called a certain Vency Ceballos through his cellphone to request him to inform the proper authorities of the situation; that
thereafter, big waves had rocked the vessel, tossing him to the floor where he was pinned by a long steel bar; that he had freed himself
only after another wave had hit the vessel;[5] that he had managed to stay afloat after the vessel had sunk, and had been carried by the
waves to the coastline of Cavite and Batangas until he had been rescued; that he had suffered tremendous hunger, thirst, pain, fear,
shock, serious anxiety and mental anguish; that he had sustained injuries,[6] and had lost money, jewelry, important documents, police
uniforms and the .45 caliber pistol issued to him by the PNP; and that because it had committed bad faith in allowing the vessel to sail
despite the storm signal, the petitioner should pay him actual and moral damages
In its defense, the petitioner insisted on the seaworthiness of the M/V Princess of the Orient due to its having been cleared to sail from
the Port of Manila by the proper authorities; that the sinking had been due to force majeure; that it had not been negligent; and that its
officers and crew had also not been negligent because they had made preparations to abandon the vessel because they had launched
life rafts and had provided the passengers assistance in that regard.
On October 12, 2001, the RTC rendered its judgment in favor of the respondent,... The petitioner sought reconsideration, but the RTC
only partly granted its motion by reducing the temperate damages from P500,000.00 to P300,000.00
Dissatisfied, the petitioner appealed.[12] It was pending the appeal in the CA when Sesante passed away. He was substituted by his
heirs.
On June 27, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed decision. It lowered the temperate damages to P120,000.00, which approximated
the cost of Sesante's lost personal belongings; and held that despite the seaworthiness of the vessel, the petitioner remained civilly
liable because its officers and crew had been negligent in performing their duties
Issues:
(1) Is the complaint for breach of contract and damages a personal action that does not survive the death of the plaintiff?; (2) Is the
petitioner liable for damages under Article 1759 of the Civil Code?; and (3) Is there sufficient basis for awarding moral and temperate
damages?
Ruling:
The appeal lacks merit.
An action for breach of contract of carriage survives the death of the plaintiff
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court lays down the proper procedure in the event of the death of a litigant, viz.:Section 16. Death of
party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his
counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary [Link] heirs of the
deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the
court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
A contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty, neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees and gives
ground for an action for damages.[19] Sesante's claim against the petitioner involved his personal injury caused by the breach of the
contract of carriage. Pursuant to the aforecited rules, the complaint survived his death, and could be continued by his heirs following the
rule on substitution.
The petitioner is liable for breach of contract of carriage
The petitioner submits that an action for damages based on breach of contract of carriage under Article 1759 of the Civil Code should
be read in conjunction with Article 2201 of the same code; that although Article 1759 only provides for a presumption of negligence, it
does not envision automatic liability; and that it was not guilty of bad faith considering that the sinking of M/V Princess of the Orient had
been due to a fortuitous event, an exempting circumstance under Article 1174 of the Civil Code.
Article 1759 of the Civil Code does not establish a presumption of negligence because it explicitly makes the common carrier liable in
the event of death or injury to passengers due to the negligence or fault of the common carrier's employees. It reads:Article 1759.
Common carriers are liable for the death or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees,
although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common [Link]
liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their [Link] liability of common carriers under Article 1759 is demanded by the duty of
extraordinary diligence required of common carriers in safely carrying their passengers.[
On the other hand, Article 1756 of the Civil Code lays down the presumption of negligence against the common carrier in the event of
death or injury of its passenger, viz.:Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733
and 1755.
Clearly, the trial court is not required to make an express finding of the common carrier's fault or negligence.[21] Even the mere proof of
injury relieves the passengers from establishing the fault or negligence of the carrier or its employees.[22] The presumption of
negligence applies so long as there is evidence showing that: (a) a contract exists between the passenger and the common carrier; and
(b) the injury or death took place during the existence of such contract.[23] In such event, the burden shifts to the common carrier to
prove its observance of extraordinary diligence, and that an unforeseen event or force majeure had caused the injury.
Sesante sustained injuries due to the buffeting by the waves and consequent sinking of M/V Princess of the Orient where he was a
passenger. To exculpate itself from liability, the common carrier vouched for the seaworthiness of M/V Princess of the Orient, and
referred to the BMI report to the effect that the severe weather condition - a force majeure - had brought about the sinking of the vessel.
A common carrier may be relieved of any liability arising from a fortuitous event pursuant to Article 1174[25] of the Civil Code. But while
it may free a common carrier from liability, the provision still requires exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury or loss.[26]
Else stated, for a common carrier to be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by
a fortuitous event. The common carrier must still prove that it did not contribute to the occurrence of the incident due to its own or its
employees' negligence.
The petitioner has attributed the sinking of the vessel to the storm notwithstanding its position on the seaworthiness of M/V Princess of
the Orient. Yet, the findings of the BMI directly contradicted the petitioner's attribution,... The Captain's erroneous maneuvers of the M/V
Princess of the Orient minutes before she sunk [sic] had caused the accident. It should be noted that during the first two hours when the
ship left North Harbor, she was navigating smoothly towards Limbones Point. During the same period, the ship was only subjected to
the normal weather stress prevailing at the time. She was then inside Manila Bar. The waves were observed to be relatively small to
endanger the safety of the ship. It was only when the MV Princess of the Orient had cleared Limbones Pt. while navigating towards the
direction of the Fortune Island when this agonizing misfortune struck the ship.
Initially, a list of three degrees was observed. The listing of the ship to her portside had continuously increased. It was at this point that
the captain had misjudged the situation. While the ship continuously listed to her portside and was battered by big waves, strong
southwesterly winds, prudent judgement [sic] would dictate that the Captain should have considerably reduced the ship's speed. He
could have immediately ordered the Chief Engineer to slacken down the speed. Meanwhile, the winds and waves continuously hit the
ship on her starboard side. The waves were at least seven to eight meters in height and the wind velocity was a[t] 25 knots. The MV
Princess of the Orient being a close-type ship (seven decks, wide and high superstructure) was vulnerable and exposed to the howling
winds and ravaging seas. Because of the excessive movement, the solid and liquid cargo below the decks must have shifted its weight
to port, which could have contributed to the tilted position of the ship.
Even assuming the seaworthiness of the MA/ Princess of the Orient, the petitioner could not escape liability considering that, as borne
out by the aforequoted findings of the BMI, the immediate and proximate cause of the sinking of the vessel had been the gross
negligence of its captain in maneuvering the vessel
The Court also notes that Metro Manila was experiencing Storm Signal No. 1 during the time of the sinking.[31] The BMI observed that
a vessel like the M/V Princess of the Orient, which had a volume of 13.734 gross tons, should have been capable of withstanding a
Storm Signal No. 1 considering that the responding fishing boats of less than 500 gross tons had been able to weather through the
same waves and winds to go to the succor of the sinking vessel and had actually rescued several of the latter's distressed passengers
We agree with the petitioner that moral damages may be recovered in an action upon breach of contract of carriage only when: (a)
death of a passenger results, or (b) it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud and bad faith, even if death does not result.[33]
However, moral damages may be awarded if the contractual breach is found to be wanton and deliberately injurious, or if the one
responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith.
Principles:
In order to be considered a fortuitous event, however, (1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the
debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of human will; (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitute
the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen it must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in any manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor.
[T]he principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be occasioned solely by the violence of nature.
Human intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the
result of the participation of man, whether due to his active intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then
humanized and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God.[