ISSUE:

CASE DIGESTS FOR P&F Whether or not the civil action for legal separation shall
1. LAPUZ-SY V. EUFEMIO (43 SCRA 177) be suspended on the case of concubinage.
FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation
against Eufemio, married civilly on September 21, 1934 RULING:
and canonically on September 30, 1943. In 1943, her Petition is dismissed. A civil action for legal separation
husband abandoned her. Carmen discovered Eufemio based on concubinage may proceed ahead of or
cohabiting with a Chinese woman, Go Hiok. Carmen simultaneously with a criminal action for concubinage
prayed for the issuance of the decree of legal for the action for legal separation is not to recover civil
separation. Eufemio amended answer to the petition liability arising from the offense. Civil action is not one
and alleged affirmative. Before the trial could be “to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense”
completed, petitioner died in a vehicular accident. With even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or
these respondent moved to dismiss the petition for are related to the same offense. Support pendente lite,
legal separation on two grounds; the petition was filed as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal
beyond 1-year period and the death of petitioner separation and granted at the discretion of the judge.
abated the acted for legal separation.  
3. BUGAYONG V. GINEZ (G.R. No. L-10033 December 28,
ISSUE: 1956)
Whether or not the death of plaintiff in action for legal FACTS:
separation before final decree abated the action. Benjamin Bugayong, serviceman in the US Navy was
married to defendant Leonila Ginez in Pangasinan, while
RULING: on furlough leave. After marriage, the couples live with
An action for legal separation which involves nothing the sisters of the husband, before the latter left to
more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses report back to duty, the couple came to an agreement
is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines that Leonila would stay with Benjamin’s sisters. Leonila
recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the left the dwelling of her sisters-in-law which she
innocent spouse and no one else to claim legal informed her husband by letter that she had gone to
separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the reside with her mother in Pangasinan. Early in July
spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the 1951, Benjamin receive letters from his sister Valeriana
proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal Polangco that her wife informing him of alleged acts of
separation already rendered. Being personal in infidelity.
character, it follows that the death of one party to the Benjamin went to Pangasinan and sought for his wife
action causes the death of the action itself actio whom he met in the house of Leonila’s godmother.
personalis moritur cum persona. They lived again as husband and wife and stayed in the
  house of Pedro Bugayong, cousin of the plaintiff-
2. GANDIONICO V. PEÑARANDA (G.R. No. L-72984 husband. On the second day, he tried to verify from his
November 27, 1987) wife the truth of the information he received but
FACTS: instead of answering, Leonila packed up and left him
Teresita Gandionco, legal wife of the petitioner, Froilan which Benjamin concluded as a confirmation of the acts
Gandionco, filed with the RTC of Misamis Oriental a of infidelity. After he tried to locate her and upon failing
complaint against petitioner for legal separation on the he went to Ilocos Norte. Benjamin filed in CIF of
ground of concubinage with a petition for support and Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation against
payment of damages. Teresita also filed a complaint for Leonila, who timely filed an answer vehemently denying
concubinage against petitioner with MTC of General the averments of the complaint.
Santos City. And again for the application for the
provisional remedy of support pendente lite. The ISSUE:
respondent Judge Peñaranda ordered the payment of Whether or not the acts charged in line with the truth
support pendente lite. Petitioner contends that the civil of allegations of the commission of acts of infidelity
action for legal separation and the incidents thereto amounting to adultery have been condoned by the
should be suspended in view of the criminal case for plaintiff-husband.
concubinage.
RULING: 5. PACETE V. CARRIAGA (231 SCRA 321)
Granting that infidelities amounting to adultery were FACTS:
commited by the wife, the act of the husband in Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979 for
persuading her to come along with him and the fact the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her
that she went with him and together they slept as husband Enrico Pacete and Clarita de la Concepcion, as
husband and wife deprives him as the alleged offended well as for legal separation, accounting and separation
spouse of any action for legal separation against the of property between her and Pacete, She claimed that
offending wife because his said conduct comes within she was married to Pacete on April 1938, and that
the restriction of Article 100 of Civil Code. Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with
Clarita and that she learned of such marriage only on
BROWN V. YAMBAO (G.R. No. L-10699) August 1979.  Reconciliation between her and Pacete
FACTS: was impossible since Pacete preferred to continue living
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed a suit in the with Clarita.
Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain legal The defendants were each served with summons. They
separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He filed an extension within which to file an answer, which
alleged under oath that while interned by the Japanese the court partly granted. Due to misunderstanding, the
invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by
Tomas internment camp, his wife engaged in adulterous the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to
relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a declare the defendants in default, which the court
baby girl that Brown learned of his wife’s misconduct immediately granted. After trial, the court rendered a
only in 1945, upon his release from internment; that decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17, 1980.
thereafter the spouse lived separately and later
executed a document liquidating their conjugal ISSUE:
partnership and assigning certain properties to the Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
erring wife as her share. The complaint prayed for denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file
confirmation of the marriage; that the defendant be their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in
declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed
their remedy s might be just and equitable. the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be
The wife failed to appear and submit any counter null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.
affidavit, thus, found to be in default. During trial, the
Fiscal had induced Mr. Brown to confess that he himself RULING:
had another woman other than his wife and actually Yes. Article 58 of the Family Code, provides that an
begot a children with her. With these, the fiscal raised action for legal separation must “in no case be tried
Art. 100 of FC—Only the offended spouse may file for before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of
legal separation, finding out that Mr. Brown has no right the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a
for action of legal separation. “cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court should
take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. The
significance of the above provisions of the law is
ISSUE: emphasized by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of
Whether or not the prosecutor may raise a finding the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in
other than collusion, during trial of legal separation. actions for annulments of marriage or for legal
separation.  Therefore, “if the defendant in an action for
RULING: annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to
Yes. The Prosecutor has the jurisdiction to find out answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney
collusion between parties who petitioned for legal to investigate whether or not collusion between the
separation, declaration of nullity or annulment of parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene
marriage. In this case, since the husband was found to for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
have a paramour during his wife’s adulterous act with submitted is not fabricated.” Here, the RTC decreed the
another man during marriage. Therefore, the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis 5 months after
prosecutor may raise that the husband has no right for filing of the petition, thus RTC gravely abused its
action of legal separation, being not an offended discretion in its decision on March 17, 1980.
spouse.
6. MACADANDANG V. COURT OF APPEALS (108 SCRA (G.R. No. 139789, 139808 July 19, 2001)
314) FACTS:
FACTS: Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano
Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her Ilusorio. Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age
husband being Crispin Anahaw. She allegedly had possessed of extensive property valued at millions of
intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadandang pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was
sometime in March 1967, She also alleges that due to Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country
the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967. She Club.
gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio
Macadandang in Baptismal rites. Respondent, then contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of
plaintiff, filed a complaint for recognition and support thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated from bed and
against petitioner, the defendant, with the CIF of Davao. board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at
Defendant now petitioner, Macadandang file his Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when
answer, opposing plaintiffs claim and praying for its he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio
dismissal. Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other
The lower court in a pre-trial conference, issued a Pre- hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
Trial Order formalising certain stipulations, admissions Out of their marriage, the spouses got 6 children
and factual issues on which both parties agreed. On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from
Correspondingly, upon agreement of the parties, an the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about five
amended complaint was filed by plaintiff. In its decision (5) months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and
rendered, the lower court dismissed the complaint. The Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother
decision invoked positive provisions of the Civil Code gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100
and Rules of Court and authorities. mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by his
doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a consequence,
ISSUE: Potenciano’s health deteriorated.
Whether or not the wife may institute an action that On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional
would bastardise her child without giving her husband, Trial Court, Antipolo City a petition for guardianship
the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be over the person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due
heard. to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight
and impaired judgment.
RULING: On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting
SC find no merit in petitioner’s submission that the in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to
questioned decision had not become final and Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland
executory since the law explicitly and clearly provides Condominium, Makati.
for the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of
partnership as among the effects of the final decree of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have the
legal separation. custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that
It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a respondents refused petitioner’s demands to see and
disguised attempt to evade the responsibility and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from
consequence of her reckless behavior at the expense of returning to Antipolo City.
her husband, her illicit lover and above all her own son.
For this Court to allow, much less consent to, the ISSUE:
bastardization of respondent's son would give rise to Whether or not petitioner can assert Article 68 and 69
serious and far-reaching consequences on society. This of Family Code to have custody of her husband in
Court will not tolerate scheming married women who consortium.
would indulge in illicit affairs with married men and
then exploit the children born during such immoral RULING:
relations by using them to collect from such moneyed The Supreme Court agrees that as spouses, they are
paramours. This would be the form of wrecking the duty bound to live together and care for each other as
stability of two families. This would be a severe assault provided by Article 68 and 69. However, there was
on morality. absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and
Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since
7. POTENCIANO V. COURT OF APPEALS 1972. Only the moral obligation of the spouses
constitutes the motivating factor for making them 9. TY V. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 127406, 27
observe the said duties and obligations which are highly November 2000)
personal. Therefore, they deny the petitioner’s motion FACTS:
for reconsideration. Edgardo Reyes, private respondent, married to Anna
MariaVillanueva both in a civil and church ceremony
respectively in 1977. However, the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their
marriage null and void ab initio for lack of marriage
8. GOITIA V. CAMPOS-RUEDA (35 PHIL. 252) license. Even before the decree nullifying the marriage
FACTS: was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein petitioner on
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos April 1979, and had their church wedding in Makati on
y Rueda, respondent, got married on January 7, 1915 April 1982.  The decree was only issued in August 1980.
and resided at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They In January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to
stayed together in their conjugal domicile for a month have his marriage with petitioner be declared null and
before the petitioner was compelled to return to her void for lack of marriage license. He stated that at the
parent’s house allegedly because the private time he married Ty the decree of nullity of his marriage
respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and to Anna had not been issued. Ty defended that lack of
lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused marriage license in their marriage is untrue. She
to perform such acts and demanded her husband other submitted the marriage license in court and private
than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept respondent did not question the evidence. However,
on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and RTC and CA affirmed their decision in favor of private
deed, inflicting injuries upon her lips, face and different respondent.
body parts. Goitia filed a complaint against the
respondent for support outside the conjugal home. The ISSUE:
trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Whether or not petitioner may claim damages for
Goitia could not compel her husband to support her failure to comply with marital obligations of the
except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a respondent.
judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from
respondent. Goitia filed motion for review. RULING:
SC ruled that no damages should be awarded to the
ISSUE: wife who sought damages against the husband for filing
Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to a baseless complaint causing her mental anguish,
support her outside the conjugal home. anxiety, corrupted reputation, social humiliation and
alienation from her parents.   Aside from the fact,
RULING: that petitioner wants her marriage to private
The obligation on the part of the husband to support his respondent held valid and subsisting.  She is likewise
wife is created merely in the act of marriage. The law suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife.  To grant
provides that the husband, who is obliged to support her petition for damages would result to a situation
the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a where the husband pays the wife damages from
fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at conjugal or common funds.  To do so, would make the
his option. However, this option given by law is not application of the law absurd.  Moreover, Philippine
absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade laws do not comprehend an action for damages
or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the between husband and wife merely because of breach of
wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of a marital obligation.
his wrongful acts. Had the wife left the conjugal
dwelling without a just cause, the husband would have 10. ILUSORIO V. BILDNER (G.R. No. 139789, 12 May,
been justified in cutting the wife’s support. In the case 2000)
at bar however, the wife was forced to leave the FACTS:
conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted
physical assault of the husband. She can therefore claim matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty
support from the husband for separate maintenance years. Out of their marriage, the spouses had six
even outside the conjugal home. children. In 1972, they separated from bed and board
for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived in Makati
when he was in Manila and in Ilusorio penthouse when Thereafter, deputy sheriff Magsajo caused issuance and
he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff
in Antipolo City. When Potenciano arrived from United sale on three of their conjugal properties. Private
States and lived with Erlinda in Antipolo City for five respondents, spouses Ching, filed a case of injunction
months. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that their against petitioners alleging that petitioners cannot
mother overdosed their father with an antidepressant enforce the judgment against conjugal partnership
drug which the latter’s health deteriorated. Erlinda filed levied on the ground that the subject loan did not
with RTC of Antipolo City a petition for guardianship redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership.
over the person and property of her husband due to the Upon application of private respondents, the lower
latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and court issued a temporary restraining order to prevent
impaired judgment. Potenciano did not return to Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of the
Antipolo City and instead lived in a condominium in writ of execution and with the sale of the said
Makati City after attending a corporate meeting in properties at public auction.
Baguio City. With these, Erlinda filed with CA a petition
for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband and ISSUE:
also for the reason that respondent refused petitioner’s Whether or not loan acquired by PBM from Ayala
demands to see and visit her husband and prohibiting Investments as guaranteed by Alfredo Ching be
Potenciano from living with her in Antipolo City. redounded to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.

ISSUE: RULING:
Whether or not Erlinda Ilusorio may secure a writ of The husband and the wife can engage in any lawful
habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in enterprise or profession. While it is but natural for the
conjugal bliss. husband and the wife to consult each other, the law
does not make it a requirement that a spouse has to get
RULING: the prior consent of the other before entering into any
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity.
corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary The exercise by a spouse of a legitimate profession,
restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such occupation, business or activity is always considered to
restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, redound to the benefit of the family. But an isolated
the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and transaction of a spouse such as being guarantor for a
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal third person’s debt is not per se considered as
restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not redounding to the benefit of the family. Therefore, to
merely nominal or moral. No court is empowered as a hold the absolute community or the conjugal
judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his partnership property liable for any loss resulting from
wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a such isolated activity, proofs showing a direct benefit to
writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any the family must be presented.
other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial
authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free 12. AGAPAY V. PALANG (276 SCRA 341)
choice. Therefore, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is FACTS:
denied. Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage to Carlina
Vallesterol in the church at Pangasinan. A few months
11. AYALA INVESTMENTS V. COURT OF APPEALS after the wedding, he left to work in Hawaii. Out their
(G.R. No. 118305, 12 February 1998) union was born Herminia Palang, respondent. Miguel
FACTS: returned to the Philippines but he stayed in Zambales
Philippine Blooming Mills loan from petitioner Ayala with his brother during the entire duration of his year-
Investment. As an added security for the credit line long sojourn, not with his wife or child. Miguel had also
extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching – Exec. VP, attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he
executed security agreements and making himself returned for good, he refused to live with his wife and
jointly and severally answerable with PBM’s child. When Miguel was then 63 yrs. old, he contracted
indebtedness to Ayala Investments. PBM failed to pay his second marriage with a nineteen year old Erlinda
the loan. Thus, Ayala Investments filed a case for sum of Agapay, petitioner. As evidenced by deed of sale, both
money against PBM and Alfredo Ching. The lower court jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at
issued a writ of execution of pending appeal. Binalonan. A house and lot was likewise purchased
allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. To settle and prayed for was issued by the trial court and not
end a case filed by the first wife, Miguel and Cornelia contented with the order, petitioner filed a motion for
executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise the examination of attachment debtor alleging that the
agreement. The parties agreed to donate their conjugal properties attached by the sheriff were not sufficient to
property consisting of six parcels of land to their only secure the satisfaction of any judgment which was
child, Herminia Palang. Miguel and Erlinda’s likewise granted by the court.
cohabitation produced a son and then two years later
Miguel died. Thereafter, Carlina filed a complaint of ISSUE:
concubinage on the previous party. Respondents sought WON A&L Industries can be held liable for the
to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly obligations contracted by the husband.
purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with
petitioner. Petitioner contended that she had already RULING:
given her half of the riceland property to their son and A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose
that the house and lot is her sole property having registered owner is Lily Yulo.  The said proprietorship
bought with her own money. RTC affirmed in favor of was established during the marriage and assets were
the petitioner while CA reversed the said decision. also acquired during the same.  Hence, it is presumed
that the property forms part of the conjugal partnership
ISSUE: of the spouses and be held liable for the obligations
Whether or not petitioner may own the two parcels of contracted by the husband.  However, for the property
land acquired during the cohabitation of petitioner and to be liable, the obligation contracted by the husband
Miguel Palang. must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.  The obligation was contracted by Augusto
RULING: for his own benefit because at the time he incurred
The Supreme Court ruled that the conveyance of the such obligation, he had already abandoned his family
property was not by way of sale but was a donation and and left their conjugal home.  He likewise made it
therefore void. The transaction was properly a donation appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf
made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly of the company to procure such loan from the
void and inexistent by express provision of law because petitioner.  Clearly, there must be the requisite showing
it was made between persons guilty of adultery or that some advantage accrued to the welfare of the
concubinage at the time of the donation. spouses.
Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce the
20. BA FINANCE CORP. V. COURT OF APPEALS obligation contracted by Augusto against his conjugal
(G.R. No. 61464, 28 May 1988) properties with Lily. Furthermore, the writ of
FACTS: attachment cannot be issued against the said properties
Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the and that the petitioner is ordered to pay Lily actual
amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by a promissory damages amounting to P660,000.00.
note he signed in his own behalf and as a representative
of A&L Industries.  Augusto presented an alleged special
power of attorney executed by his wife, Lily Yulo, who 21. JOHNSON & JOHNSON V. COURT OF APPEALS
managed the business and under whose name the said (GR No. 102692, 23 September 1996)
business was registered, purportedly authorized the FACTS:
husband to procure the loan and sign the promissory Delilah Vinluan purchased products from petitioner for
note.  2months prior the procurement of the loan, her retail business under the name of “Vinluan
Augusto left Lily and their children which in turn Enterprises” incurring an obligation of P235,880.89 for
abandoned their conjugal home.  When the obligation which she issued seven checks of varying amounts and
became due and demandable, Augusto failed to pay the due dates that bounced and were dishonored for having
same. been drawn against insufficient funds.  Partial payments
The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of were made after several demands.  When no further
attachment alleging that said spouses were guilty of payments were made to settle the obligation, J&J filed a
fraud consisting of the execution of Deed of Assignment complaint against the spouses for collection of the
assigning the rights, titles and interests over a principal obligation plus interest with damages.  RTC
construction contract executed by and between the rendered decision in favor of J&J and found that there
spouses and A. Soriano Corporation.  The writ hereby was no “privity of contract between J&J and defendant
husband Alejo Vinluan regarding the obligations with this finding reiterating that its improvements and
incurred by the wife”.  Husband was made a co-owner income are conjugal assets of the Spouses Katigbak.
of the enterprise afer the obligation involved in this When the spouses Katigbak got married, neither of
action has been incurred.  The court then issued a writ them brought properties unto the marriage.  Ramon’s
of execution directing the sheriff to execute judgment occupation rendered him a monthly income of P200.00. 
on the properties of the wife.  However, the 2 notices of The property in question was registered in the name of
levy on execution covered not only her exclusive “Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak married to Ramon Katigbak”. 
paraphernal properties but also the properties of the The latter declared that her mother was the one who
conjugal partnership of the spouses.  This led the bought the property for her and had placed it only in
husband to file a third-party claim seeking the lifting of her name as the practice of her mother in buying
the levy on the conjugal properties.  Trial court denied properties and placing them directly in the names of her
the third-party claim since Alejo’s consent became children.  The husband having no interest with the
evident when he did not seek the intervention of the property only signed the document for the purpose of
Court to air his objections in his wife’s engaging assisting his wife.
business coupled by the fact that he made several In August 1950, the Laperals filed a case and was
representations for the settlement of his wife’s granted by the trial court against the Katigbaks in
account.  Thus, even his own capital may be liable aside recovery of P14,000 and jewelry amounting to P97,500
from the conjugal and paraphernal property. Private or in lieu thereof, to pay such amount.  A month after
respondent elevated the matter to CA, charging the trial the decision was rendered, Evelina filed a complaint
court with grave abuse of discretion for effectively against her husband for judicial separation of property
reversing its own final judgment.  CA upheld private and separate administration which was granted by the
respondent.  Hence this petition by J&J. court and was sought for annulment by the Laperals.

ISSUE: ISSUE:
WON a husband may be held liable for the debts WON the property in question constitutes the
incurred by his wife without his consent and did not paraphernal property of Evelina.
benefit the conjugal partnership?
RULING:
RULING: All properties acquired during the marriage are
SC held that respondent court correctly ruled that the presumed conjugal.  It is however not conclusive but
trial court cannot, in the guise of deciding the third- merely rebuttable, unless it be proved that the property
party claim, reverse its final decision.  Only the wife and belong exclusively to the husband and wife.  In the case
her paraphernal property can be held liable.  And since at bar, the deed of the land is under the name of the
the pwer of the execution of judgment extends only to wife.  At the time it was purchased, the property was of
properties belonging to the judgment debtor alone, the substantial value and as admitted, the husband by
conjugal property and the capital of the husband cannot himself could not have afforded to buy considering the
be levied upon.  In any event that Delilah’s paraphernal singular source of income.
properties are insufficient, in order to bind the conjugal Hence, the property covered by TCT 57626 is
partnership properties, the debts and obligations considered a paraphernal property of the wife.
contracted by either the husband or the wife must be
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and that the 26. AYALA INVESTMENTS V. COURT OF APPEALS
husband must consent to his wife’s engaging in (G.R. No. 118305, 12 February 1998)
business.  The respondent court already found that the FACTS:
husband did not give his consent neither did the Philippine Blooming Mills loan from petitioner Ayala
obligation incurred by the wife redound to the benefit Investment. As an added security for the credit line
of the family. extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching – Exec. VP,
executed security agreements and making himself
22. SPOUSES LAPERAL V. SPOUSES KATIGBAK jointly and severally answerable with PBM’s
(G.R. No. 16991, 31 March 1964) indebtedness to Ayala Investments. PBM failed to pay
FACTS: the loan. Thus, Ayala Investments filed a case for sum of
CFI Manila declared the property covered by TCT money against PBM and Alfredo Ching. The lower court
No.57626 as separate or paraphernal property of issued a writ of execution of pending appeal.
Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak.  The spouses Laperal disagree Thereafter, deputy sheriff Magsajo caused issuance and
service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff Carlos filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money
sale on three of their conjugal properties. Private and damages against Abelardo and his wife before the
respondents, spouses Ching, filed a case of injunction RTC of Valenzuela. As they were separated in fact for
against petitioners alleging that petitioners cannot more than a year prior to the filing of the complaint,
enforce the judgment against conjugal partnership Abelardo and his wife filed separate answers.
levied on the ground that the subject loan did not Abelardo’s wife admitted securing a loan together with
redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. her husband, from Carlos. She claimed, however, that
Upon application of private respondents, the lower said loan was payable on a staggered basis so she was
court issued a temporary restraining order to prevent surprised when Carlos demanded immediate payment
Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of the of the full amount. 
writ of execution and with the sale of the said
properties at public auction. ISSUE: 
Whether or not the amount of US$25,000.00 was a loan
ISSUE: obtained by private respondent and his wife from
Whether or not loan acquired by PBM from Ayala petitioner. 
Investments as guaranteed by Alfredo Ching be
redounded to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. RULING:
Early in time, it must be noted that payment of personal
RULING: debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or
The husband and the wife can engage in any lawful during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
enterprise or profession. While it is but natural for the partnership except insofar as they redounded to the
husband and the wife to consult each other, the law benefit of the family. The defendants never denied that
does not make it a requirement that a spouse has to get the check of US$25,000.00 was used to purchase the
the prior consent of the other before entering into any subject house and lot. They do not deny that the same
legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity. served as their conjugal home, thus benefiting the
The exercise by a spouse of a legitimate profession, family. Hence, defendant-husband and defendant-wife
occupation, business or activity is always considered to are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the
redound to the benefit of the family. But an isolated loan. Defendant-husband cannot allege as a defense
transaction of a spouse such as being guarantor for a that the amount of US $25,000.00 was received as his
third person’s debt is not per se considered as share in the income or profits of the corporation and
redounding to the benefit of the family. Therefore, to not as a loan. Defendant-husband does not appear to
hold the absolute community or the conjugal be a stockholder nor an employee nor an agent of the
partnership property liable for any loss resulting from corporation, H. L. Carlos Construction, Inc. Since he is
such isolated activity, proofs showing a direct benefit to not a stockholder, he has no right to participate in the
the family must be presented. income or profits thereof.

27. CARLOS V. ABELARDO (G.R. No. 146504, 4 April 28. MARIANO V. COURT OF APPEALS
2002) (G.R. No. 51283, June 7, 1989, 173 SCRA 89)
FACTS: FACTS:
Honorio Carlos averred in his complaint that in October The proceedings at bar concerns are, first, an attempt
1989, Abelardo and his wife approached him and by a married man to prevent execution against conjugal
requested him to advance the amount of US$25,000.00 property of a judgment rendered against his wife for
for the purchase of a house and lot. Petitioner issued a obligations incurred by the latter while engaged in a
check in the name of a certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the business that had admittedly redounded to the benefit
property. When Carlos inquired from the spouses in as of the family and second, the interference by a court
to the status of the amount he loaned to them, the with the proceedings on execution of a co-equal or
latter acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that coordinate court. Both acts being prescribed by law,
they were not yet in a position to make a definite correction is called for and will hereby be effected. The
settlement of the same. Thereafter, Abelardo expressed proceedings originated from a suit filed by Esther
violent resistance to Carlos’s inquiries on the amount to Sanchez against Lourdes Mariano in the Court of First
the extent of making various death threats against Instance at Caloocan City, for recovery of the value of
him. Carlos made a formal demand for the payment but ladies’ ready made dresses allegedly purchased by and
the spouses failed to comply with their obligation. Thus, delivered to the latter. Daniel Sanchez, Esther’s
husband, now made his move. He filed a complaint for 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband
annulment of the execution in the Court of First Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on
Instance at Quezon City in his capacity as administrator attachment. She alleged inter alia that the 100,000
of the conjugal partnership. He alleged that the conjugal shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired
assets could not validly be made to answer for by her and her husband during their marriage out of
obligations exclusively contracted by his wife, and that, conjugal funds after the Citycorp Investment Philippines
moreover, some of the personal property levied on, was established in 1974. She, likewise, alleged that
such as household appliances and utensils necessarily being the wife of Alfredo Ching, she was a third-party
used in the conjugal dwelling, were exempt from claimant entitled to file a motion for the release of the
execution. properties. She attached therewith a copy of her
marriage contract with Alfredo Ching.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the claim that property levied on in ISSUES:
execution of a judgment is not property of the Whether or not the conjugal partnership liable for the
judgment debtor, Daniel Sanchez’s wife, but of the payment of the liability?
conjugal partnership of the Sanchez Spouses
RULING:
RULING: NO. For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a
In the case at bar, the husband of the judgment debtor liability that should appertain to the husband alone,
cannot be deemed a “stranger” to the case prosecuted there must be a showing that some advantages accrued
and adjudged against his wife. In any case, whether by to the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal
intervention in the court issuing the writ, or by separate partnership responsible for a liability that should
action, it is unavailing for either Esther Sanchez or her appertain alone to one of the spouses is to frustrate the
husband, Daniel, to seek preclusion of the enforcement objective of the New Civil Code to show the utmost
of the writ of possession against their conjugal assets. concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family
For it being established, as aforestated, that Esther had as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the
engaged in business with her husband’s consent, and power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks
the income derived therefrom had been expended, in to the financial stability of the conjugal partnership. In
part at least, for the support of her family, the liability this case, the private respondent failed to prove that
of the conjugal assets to respond for the wife’s the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was
obligations in the premises cannot be disputed. benefited by the petitioner-husband's act of executing a
continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the
29. CHING V. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 124642, private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The
February 23, 2004) contract of loan was between the private respondent
FACTS: and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No
The Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) presumption can be inferred from the fact that when
obtained a loan of P9,000,000 from the Allied Banking the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation
Corporation (ABC). As an added security for the said agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal
loan, Alfredo Ching, together with Emilio Tañedo and partnership would thereby be benefited. The private
Chung Kiat Hua, executed a continuing guaranty with respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit
the ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally redounded to the conjugal partnership .
guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations
owing to the ABC. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment 30. BUADO V. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 145222,
of all its loans. Hence, the ABC filed a complaint for sum April 24, 2009)
of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary FACTS:
attachment. Citing as one of the grounds for the writ On 30 April 1984, Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado
was the fraud defendants employed in incurring the (petitioners) filed a complaint for damages against
obligations by representing themselves as having the Erlinda Nicol (Erlinda) with Branch 19 of the Regional
financial capacity to pay the loan when in fact they did Trial Court (RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite. Said action
not have such capacity. In the meantime, on July 26, originated from Erlinda Nicol’s civil liability arising from
1983, the deputy sheriff of the trial court levied on the criminal offense of slander filed against her by
attachment the 100,000 common shares of Citycorp petitioners.
stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching. On November 16,
On 6 April 1987, the trial court rendered a decision remanding the case to Branch 21 for further
ordering Erlinda to pay damages. Said decision was proceedings.
affirmed, successively, by the Court of Appeals and this WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The
Court. Finding Erlinda Nicol’s personal properties Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs
insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the Deputy Sheriff against petitioner.
issued a notice of levy on real property on execution
addressed to the Register of Deeds of Cavite.
Respondent averred that there was no proper
publication and posting of the notice of sale.
Furthermore, respondent claimed that his property 31. MALLILIN V. CASTILLO (G.R. No. 136803, June 16,
which was valued at P500,000.00 was only sold at a 2000)
“very low price” of P51,685.00, whereas the judgment FACTS:
obligation of Erlinda Nicol was only P40,000.00. Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo were
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied on alleged to be both married and with children but
23 August 2000. Hence, the instant petition attributing separated from their respective spouses and cohabited
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of in 1979 while respective marriages still subsist.  They
Appeals. established Superfreight Customs Brokerage
Corporation during their union of which petitioner was
ISSUES: the President and Chairman and respondent as Vice
Whether or not the wife's criminal liability is chargeable President and Treasurer.  They likewise acquired real
to the conjugal partnership. and personal properties which were registered solely in
Whether or not the husband of the judgment debtor respondent’s name.  Due to irreconcilable conflict, the
may file an independent action to protect the conjugal couple separated in 1992.  Petitioner then demanded
property subject to execution. his share from respondent in the subject properties but
the latter refused alleging that said properties had been
RULING: registered solely in her name.  Furthermore, respondent
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and
in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly wife because they were still legally married at the time
provides that payment of personal debts contracted by of cohabitation.
the husband or the wife before or during the marriage Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-ownership
shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except shares while respondent filed a motion for summary
insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. judgment.  Trial court dismissed the former and granted
Unlike in the system of absolute community where the latter.
liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime
or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community
of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the
exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same ISSUE: 
advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal Whether or not the petitioner can validly claim his share
partnership of gains. in the acquired properties registered under the name of
The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make the respondent considering they both have subsisting
advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. relationship when they started living together.
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be
concluded that the civil obligation arising from the RULING:
crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the The Court ruled that trial court erred that parties who
benefit of the conjugal partnership. To reiterate, are not capacitated to marry each other and were living
conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal together could not have owned properties in common. 
obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some Under Article 148, if the parties are incapacitated to
advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the marry each other, properties acquired by them through
conjugal partnership. Hence, the filing of a separate their joint contribution, property or industry shall be
action by respondent is proper and jurisdiction is thus owned by them in common in proportion to their
vested on Branch 21. Petitioners failed to show that the contributions which, in the absence of proof to the
Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in contrary, is presumed to be equal.  Hence, there is co-
ownership even though the couples in union are not 33. FRANCISCO V. MASTER IRON WORKS
capacitated to marry each other.     CONSTRUCTION CORP.
Furthermore, when CA dismissed petitioner’s complaint (G.R. No. 151967, 16 February, 2005)
for partition on grounds of due process and equity, his FACTS:
right to prove ownership over the claimed properties Josefina Castillo was 24 years old when she and
was denied.  Such dismissal is unjustified since both Eduardo Francisco got married on January 1983.  The
ends may be served by simply excluding from the action latter was then employed as Vice President in a Private
for partition the properties registered in the name of Corporation.  Josefina acquired two parcels of land
Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo, not parties in the where Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale in
case. The case was remanded to lower court for further favor of Josefina, married to Eduardo.  An affidavit of
proceedings. waiver was executed by Eduardo where he declared
32. VALDES V. RTC (260 SCRA 221) that prior to his marriage with Josefina, the latter
FACTS: purchased the land with her own savings and that he
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were waived whatever claims he had over the property. 
married on January 5, 1971. Begotten during the When Josefina mortgaged the property for a loan,
marriage were five children. In a petition, dated June Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed.  In
22, 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the 1990, Eduardo who was then a General Manager,
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. bought bags of cement from defendant but failed to pay
After hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the same.  The latter filed a complaint for recovery and
the trial court, in its decision of July 29, 1994, granted trial court rendered judgment against Eduardo.  The
the petition. Petitioner avers that the court a quo has court then issued a writ of execution and the sheriff
failed to apply the correct law that should govern the issued a notice of levy on execution over the alleged
disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a property of Josefina for the recovery of the balance of
marriage is declared void ab initio because of the amount due under the decision of the trial court. 
psychological incapacity on the part of either or both of Petitioner filed a third party claim over the 2 parcels of
the parties to the contract. Whereas, the petitioner and land in which she claimed as her paraphernal property.
respondent are directed to start proceedings on the
liquidation of their common properties as defined ISSUE:
by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with Whether or not the subject property is the
the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same conjugal property of Josefina and Eduardo.
code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this
decision. RULING:
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove
portion of the decision directing compliance with that she acquired the property with her personal funds
Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she was
that the Family Code contained no provisions on the the sole owner.  The Deed of Absolute Sale on record
procedure for the liquidation of common property in showed it was issued after her marriage.  Their case fall
"unions without marriage." under Article 148 and since they got married before the
Family Code, the provision, pursuant to Art 256, can be
applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested
ISSUE: rights.  Petitioner likewise failed that she had any vested
Whether or not the regional trial court was right right.
on applying the law to the said case.
34. ABING V. WAEYAN (G.R. No. 137650, 12 April 2000)
RULING: FACTS:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In John Abing and Juliet Waeyan cohabited as husband
a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the and wife in 1986 without the benefit of marriage.
property relations of the parties during the period of Together, they bought a 2 story residential house in
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 1991. Juliet worked in Korea and sent money to John
or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family which the latter deposited in their joint account. In 1992
Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil their house was renovated. In 1994, Juliet returned a
Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases. year after they decided to partition their properties as
their relationship came at an end. Executed a MOA,
both parties did not sign, only the witnesses. Under the husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
agreement john shall leave the dwelling of Juliet paying under a void marriage.  The marriage of Miguel and
him a total of 428,870.00, Juliet paid half and the rest to Erlinda was null and void because the earlier marriage
complete in 12 months installment. However Juliet was of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected
unable to complete the payment. John demanded Juliet by the latter's de facto separation. Under Article 148,
to vacate the annex. only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money,
ISSUE: property or industry shall be owned by them in
Whether or not John exclusively owns the property common in proportion to their respective contributions.
subject of the suit? In the case at bar, Erlinda failed to prove that she
contributed money to the purchase price of the said
RULING: properties, thus, the SC found no basis to justify her co-
No. John bares allegation that he alone thru his own ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently,
funds and money borrowed from his relatives spent for the rice land should, as correctly held by the CA, revert
the construction of the annex structure. Art 147 shall be to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased
governed by co-ownership. Being herself a co-owner Miguel and Carlina Palang.
Juliet may not be ejected from the structure in question
as she is entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership 36. JUANIZA V. JOSE (89 SCRA 306)
as John. FACTS:
Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of
35. AGAPAY V. PALANG (276 SCRA 341) the passenger jeepney involved in an accident of
FACTS: collision with a freight train of the Philippine National
Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Railways that took place on November 23, 1969 which
Pangasinan on 1949.  They have one child named resulted in the death of seven and physical injuries of
Herminia. The 63 year old Miguel contracted a five of its passengers. At the time of the accident,
subsequent marriage with 19-year-old Erlinda Agapay, Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but
herein petitioner. Two months earlier, they jointly had been cohabiting with defendant-appellant, Rosalia
purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Arroyo, for 16 years in a relationship akin to that of
Binalonan Pangasinan.  A house and lot in the same husband and wife. The trial court rendered a decision in
place was likewise purchased.  On the other hand, a civil case for damages arising from the vehicular
Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a accident, ordering Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo to
form of compromise agreement and agreed to donate jointly and severally pay damages to the victims of the
their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to accident. Rosalia claims that it was an error for the trial
their child Herminia. Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation court to consider her a co-owner of the said jeepney,
produced a son named Kristopher.  In 1979, they were just because she had cohabited for many years as wife
convicted of concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint.  of Eugenio Jose, a legally married man.
Two years later, Miguel died.  Carlina and her daughter
instituted this case for recovery of ownership and ISSUE: 
possession with damages against petitioner.  They Whether Eugenio and Rosalia are co-owners of the
sought to get back the land and the house and lot jeepney, and can be held jointly and severally liable for
located at Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel damages.
during his cohabitation with petitioner.  The lower court
dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision. RULING:
No. Article 148 of the Family Code applies in the case of
ISSUE: Eugenio and Rosailia, wherein, a man and a woman who
Whether or not the properties from Miguel's second are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively
marriage should be granted to Erlinda. with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, only the
RULING: properties acquired by both of the parties through
No. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of their actual joint contribution of money, property or
the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation industry shall be owned by them in common in
when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to proportion to their respective contributions. The co-
marry each other live exclusively with each other as ownership provided in Article 147 of the Family Code
requires that the man and the woman living together by the said provision in contrast to Art 147 which states
must not in any way be incapacitated to contract that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family
marriage. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to and household are regarded as contributions to the
Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him to acquisitions of common property by one who has no
contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the salary, income, work or industry.  Such is not included in
aforecited provision of the Family Code, Arroyo cannot Art 148.  If actual contribution is not proven then there
be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to can be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife. shares.
There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for
damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries 38. DOCENA V. LAPESURA (GR No. 140153, 28 March
suffered by, the passengers of the jeepney which 2001)
figured in the collision. FACTS:
Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery of a
37. TUMLOS V. FERNANDEZ (G.R. No. 137650, 12 April parcel of land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses
2000) Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The petitioners claimed
FACTS: ownership of the land based on occupation since time
Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in immemorial. A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in
an action for ejectment filed against Guillerma, Gina the case. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners
and Toto Tumlos.  In the complaint, spouses Fernandez and the intervenor Abuda. The CA reversed the
alleged that they are the absolute owners of an judgment of the trial court and ordered the petitioners
apartment building that through their tolerance they to vacate the land they have leased from Casiano. The
allowed the Tumlos to occupy the apartment for the Complaint in Intervention of Abuda was dismissed. A
last 7 years without payment of any rent.  It was agreed Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the
that Guillerma will pay 1,600 a month while the other petitioners with the Court of Appeals, alleging grave
defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month which was abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge in
not complied with.  Demand was made several times for issuing the Orders and of the sheriff in issuing the Writ
the defendants to vacate the premises as they are in of Demolition.
need of the property for the construction of a new
building. Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and ISSUE:
Guillerma had an amorous relationship and that they Whether or not joint management or administration
acquired the property in question as their love nest.  It does require that the husband and the wife always act
was likewise alleged that they lived together in the said together. 
apartment building with their 2 children for about 10
years and that Gullerma administered the property by RULING:
collecting rentals from the lessees until she discovered Each spouse may validly exercise full power of
that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of their management alone, subject to the intervention of the
marriage. court in proper cases. It is believed that even under the
provisions of the Family Code, the husband alone could
ISSUE: have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to
Whether or not Guillerma is a co-owner of the said contest the writs of demolition issued against the
apartment under Article 148 of the Family Code. conjugal property with the Court of Appeals without
being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached
RULING: certificate of non-forum shopping only by the husband
No. The claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma is not a fatal defect. The signing petitioner here made
since there was no other evidence presented to validate the certification in his behalf and that of his wife. The
it except for the said affidavit.  Even if the allegations of husband may reasonably be presumed to have personal
having cohabited with Mario and that she bore him two knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his wife of any
children were true, the claim of co-ownership still action or claim similar to the petition for certiorari and
cannot be accepted.  Mario is validly married with prohibition given the notices and legal processes
Lourdes, hence, Guillerma and Mario are not involved in a legal proceeding involving real property.
capacitated to marry each other.  The property relation
governing their supposed cohabitation is under Article 39. MARTINEZ V. MARTINEZ (GR No. 162084, 28 June
148 of the Family Code.  Actual contribution is required 2005)
FACTS: of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income
Daniel Martinez Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez from the land as a result of the filing of the land
were the owners of a parcel of land. The former registration case. In the reply, private respondents
executed a last will and testament directing the denied that they were married and alleged that
subdivision of the property into 3 lots bequeathed to Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was single.
each of his sons namely Rodolfo, Manolo (designated as They also denied depriving petitioners of possession of
administrator of the estate), and Daniel Jr. In October and income from the land. On the contrary, according
1997, Daniel Sr. died. Rodolfo then found a deed of sale to the private respondents, the possession of the
purportedly signed by his father on September 1996 property in question had already been transferred to
where it appears that the land was sold to Manolo and petitioners by virtue of the writ of possession. Trial
his wife Lucila and was also issued to them. Rodolfo court denied petitioner’s motion that while in the
filed a complaint against his brother Manolo and sister- amended complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts
in-law Lucila for the annulment of the deed of sale and towards a compromise were made, it was not verified
cancellation of the TCT. Spouses wrote Rodolfo as provided in Article 151.
demanding him to vacate the property which the latter
ignored and refused to do so. This prompted the
spouses to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against ISSUE:
Rodolfo. This matter was referred to the barangay for WON the court can validly dismissed the complaint due
conciliation and settlement but none was reached. It to lack of efforts exerted towards a compromise as
was alleged in the position paper of the spouses that stated in Article 151.
earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made
but the same proved futile. RULING:
Petition was granted. The inclusion of private
ISSUE: respondent Ayson as defendant and petitioner Maria
WON spouses Martinez complied with the requirements Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the cope of
of Art 151 of the Family Code. Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the
phrase "members of the same family" refers to the
RULING: husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and
No suit between members of the same family shall descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or
prosper unless it should appear from the verified half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by
complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise affinity are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction.
have been made, but the same have failed. Lucila Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is
Martinez, the respondent’s sister-in-law was one of the described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent
plaintiffs in the case at bar. The petitioner is not a Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is
member of the same family as that of her deceased admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros,
husband and the respondent. Her relationship with the are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family.
respondent is not one of those enumerated in Article
150. It should also be noted that the petitioners were
able to comply with the requirements of Article 151
because they alleged in their complaint that they had
initiated a proceeding against the respondent for
unlawful detainer in the Katarungan Pambarangay in 41. MANALO V. COURT OF APPEALS
compliance with PD 1508 and that after due (G.R. No. 129242, 16 January 2001)
proceedings, no amicable settlement was arrived at FACTS:
resulting in the barangay chairman’s issuance of a Troadic Manalo died on February 14, 1992. He has a
certificate to file action. wife, Pilar Manalo and 11 children. The deceased left
several real properties in Manila and a business in
40. HONTIVEROS V. RTC (GR No. 125465, 29 June 1999) Tarlac including the business under the name and style
FACTS: Manolos Machine Shop. In November 26, 1992, herein
Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a respondents, 8 of the surviving children, filed a petition
complaint for damages against private respondents with RTC Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate
Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The of their late father and for appointment of their brother
petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel Romeo Manalo as administrator thereof. Hearing was
set on February 11, 1993 and the herein petitioners further added that there was a stipulation in the said
were granted 10 days within which to file their agreement that the spouse would live together in case
opposition to the petition. of reconciliation.

ISSUE:
WON the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where ISSUE:
earnest efforts toward compromise should first be WON Judge Gapusan should be reprimanded because of
made prior the filing of the petition. notarizing the void agreement between the spouses.

RULING:
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the
nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and
the character of the relief were sought in the complaint RULING:
or petition, shall be controlling. The careful scrutiny of A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a
the petition for the issuance of letters of administration, marriage and the family by encouraging the separation
settlement and distribution of the estate belies herein of the spouses and extrajudically dissolving the conjugal
petitioners’ claim that the same is in the nature of an partnership.
ordinary civil action. The provision of Article 151 is There is no question that the stipulation contained in
applicable only to ordinary civil actions. It is clear from the said separation agreement is contrary to law,
the term “suit” that it refers to an action by one person morals and good customs. The family is a basic social
or persons against another or other in a court of justice institution which public policy cherishes and protects.
in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law To preserve the institution of marriage, the law
affords him for the redress of an injury or enforcement considers void any contract for personal separation
of a right. It is also the intention of the Code between husband and wife and every extra-judicial
Commission as revealed in the Report of the Code agreement for the dissolution of the partnership. SC
Commission to make the provision be applicable only to held the action of respondent judge Gapusan as
civil actions. The petition for issuance of letters of contrary to law.
administration, settlement, and distribution of estate is
a special proceeding and as such a remedy whereby the 43. MODEQUILLO V. BREVA (185 SCRA 766)
petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or FACTS:
a particular fact. Hence, it must be emphasized that The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located
herein petitioners are not being sued in such case for at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on July 1988,
any cause of action as in fact no defendant was registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel
pronounced therein. of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan,
Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latter’s
42. ALBANO V. GAPUSAN (A.M. No. 1022-MJ, 7 May name. A motion to quash was filed by the petitioner
1976) alleging that the residential land is where the family
FACTS: home is built since 1969 prior the commencement of
Redentor Albano filed a complaint against Judge this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced
Gapusan seeking disciplinary action involving the latter’s sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for
malpractice in his notarization of a separation liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the
agreement between Valentina Andres and Guillermo judgment sought to be enforced against the family
Maligta and the extrajudicial liquidation of their home is not one of those enumerated. With regard to
conjugal partnership. Likewise, a complaint was filed the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of
alleging that said Judge influenced Judge Crispin of CFI- the public land and the transfer in his favor by the
Ilocos in deciding two criminal cases. In the original possessor and applicant who was a member of
abovementioned separation agreement, it was a cultural minority. The residential house in the present
stipulated that the spouse guilty of adultery or case became a family home by operation of law under
concubinage shall be barred to file an action against the Article 153.
other. Respondent judge denied that he drafted the
said agreement and explained that the spouses had ISSUE:
been separated for a long time when they signed it and WON the subject property is deemed to be a family
the wife had begotten children with her paramour. He home.
 No, Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided
RULING: that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern
The petitioner’s contention that it should be considered existing family residences insofar as said provisions are
a family home from the time it was occupied by applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153
petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all
Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides that existing family residences are deemed to have been
the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing constituted as family homes at the time of their
family residences insofar as said provisions are occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 and are exempt from execution for the payment of
shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family
family residences are deemed to have been constituted Code. On August 3, 1988
as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the
the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from effectivity of the Code and his property is therefore not
the execution for payment of obligations incurred exempt form attachment.
before the effectivity of the Code. The said article The petition was dismissed by SC.
simply means that all existing family residences at the
time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are 45. ARRIOLA V. ARRIOLA (G.R. No. 177703, January 28,
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled 2008)
to the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC. FACTS:
Fidel Arriola died and is survived by his legal heirs: John
The debt and liability which was the basis of the Nabor Arriola (respondent),his son with his first
judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the wife, and Vilma [Link], his second wife and his other son, Anthony
Ronald Arriola (petitioners).On Feb. 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a
Family Code. This does not fall under the exemptions decision ordering the partition of the parcel of land left by the decedent
from execution provided in the FC. Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G.
Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third (1/3)
As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled each. However, the parties failed to agree on how to divide the above
mentioned property and so the respondent proposed to sell it through
that the levy to be made shall be on whatever rights the public auction. The petitioners initially agreed but refused to include in
petitioner may have on the land. Petition was the auction the house standing on the subject land. The respondent then
insist that it should be included since it is an accessory of the subject
dismissed. land, the petitioners still refused, claiming that it was built by Fidel
Arriola (deceased) and that they have been living there for 20 years.

44. MANACOP V. COURT OF APPEALS (277 SCRA 941) ISSUE:

WON the house in the land mentioned should also be part of
FACTS: the public auction.
Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on RULING:
March 1972, a residential lot with a bungalow located in No, the averments of the petitioner claiming that the house
was built by Fidel and they have lived there for 20 years, established this
Quezon City.  The petitioner failed to pay the sub- house as a family home under Article 152 and 153 of the Family code. It
contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed is also provided under Article 159 of the Family code that “ The
family
between petitioner’s corporation and private home shall continue despite the death of one or both
respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co).  The latter filed a spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a
complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor
prayer for preliminary attachment against the former.  beneficiary, and  the heirs cannot partition the same
Consequently, the corresponding writ for the unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This
provisional remedy was issued, which triggered the rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the
attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by property or constituted the family home.
the Manacop Construction President, the petitioner. 
The petitioner insists that the attached property is a 46.  ANGELES V. MAGLAYA (G.R. No. 153798, September
family home having been occupied by him and his 2, 2005)
family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from FACTS:
attachment. Francisco Angeles died intestate on January 21, 1998
in the City of Manila, leaving behind 4 parcels of land
ISSUE:  and a building, among other valuable
WON the subject property is indeed exempted from properties. Respondent Corazon claims that as the sole
attachment since it is deemed to be a family home. legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva
Mercado.
RULING: Petitioner Belen claims, as Francisco’s second wife and
surviving spouse, she should be made administrator of
Francisco’s estate. She claims that respondent could not herein defendant, donated the land by virtue of
be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was donation propter nuptials in favor of Emiliano. The
recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the latter was suffering from tuberculosis in January
corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. 1941. His brother, Felix, then lived with them to work
Further she said that respondent, despite her claim of his house and farm. Emiliano became so weak that he
being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva can hardly move and get up from his bed. Sometime in
Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract September 1942, the wife eloped with Felix and lived
between her supposed parents or produced any at the house of Maria’s father until 1943. Emiliano died
acceptable document to prove such union. in January 1, 1943 where the wife did not attend the
Respondent in turn alleged that the January funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria gave birth to a boy
to December 1938 records of marriages of the Civil who was, herein petitioner.
Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where the alleged 1938
Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were ISSUE:
destroyed. Respondent testified having been in open Whether or not Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of
and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate the deceased.
child. She also offered in evidence her birth certificate
which contained an entry stating that she was born at RULING:
the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943
Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the former is
the handwritten word “Yes” appears on the presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter because
space below the question “Legitimate?” he was born within 300 days following the dissolution of
the marriage. The fact that the husband was seriously
ISSUE: sick is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of
WON respondent is the legitimate child of decedent legitimacy. This presumption can only be rebutted by
Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado? proof that it was physically impossible for the husband
to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days
RULING: of the 300 days next preceding the birth of the child.
NO, A legitimate child is a product of a valid and lawful Impossibility of access by husband to wife includes
marriage (FC Art 146). However, the presumption of absence during the initial period of conception,
legitimacy under Art 164 may be availed only upon impotence which is patent, and incurable; and
convincing proof of the factual basis i.e., that the child’s imprisonment unless it can be shown that cohabitation
parents were legally married and that his/her took place through corrupt violation
conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of of prison regulations. Maria’s illicit intercourse with
that marriage. Respondent failed to present evidence of a man other than the husband during the initial period
Francisco’s marriage to Genoveva, thus she cannot be does not preclude husband and wife. Hence, Mariano
presumed legitimate. Further, the Birth Certificate Andal was considered a legitimate son of the deceased
presented was not signed by Francisco against whom making him the owner of the parcel land.
legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It
was only signed by the attending physician making it 48. BENITEZ-BADUA V. COURT OF APPEALS
only a proof of the fact of the birth of a [Link] (GR No. 105625, 24 January 1994)
legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law FACTS:
itself, it cannot be made dependent on the declaration Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian were
of the attending physician or midwife, or that of the owners of various properties located in Laguna. Isabel
mother of the new-born child. None of the evidence died in 1982 while his husband died in1989. Vicente’s
respondent presented is enough to prove filiation or sister and nephew filed a complaint for the issuance of
recognition. letters of administration of Vicente’s estate in favor of
the nephew, herein private respondent. The petitioner,
47. ANDAL V. MACARAIG (89 PHIL. 165) Marissa Benitez-Badua, was raised and cared by the
FACTS: deceased spouses since childhood, though not related
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria to them by blood, nor legally adopted. The latter to
Duenas, filed a complaint for the recovery of the prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses
ownership and possession of a parcel of land owned by submitted documents such as her certificate of live
Emiliano Andal and Maria Duenas. Eduvigis Macaraig, birth where the spouses name were reflected as her
parents. She even testified that said spouses of Mario. Hence, the child was a legitimate child of
continuously treated her as their legitimate Theresa and Mario.
daughter. On the other hand, the relatives of Vicente
declared that said spouses were unable to physically
procreate hence the petitioner cannot be the biological ISSUE:
child. Trial court decided in favor of the petitioner as Whether or not the child is really Gerardo's.
the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses.
RULING:
ISSUE: Considering that Theresa’s marriage with Gerardo was
Whether or not petitioner’s certificate of live birth will void ab initio, the latter never became the former’s
suffice to establish her legitimacy. husband and never acquired any right to impugn the
legitimacy of the child. Theresa’s contention was to
RULING: have his son be declared as not the legitimate child of
The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit. The mere her and Mario but her illegitimate child with Gerardo. In
registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the this case, the mother has no right to disavow a child
child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption. It because maternity is never uncertain. Hence, she is not
does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted permitted by law to question the son’s
child and her legal rights. Such act amounts to legitimacy. Under Article 167 of the Family Code, “the
simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or child shall be considered legitimate although the
her birth certificate, which is a public document. It is mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the have been sentenced as an adulteress”. Having the best
deceased wife executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial interest of the child in mind, the presumption of his
Settlement of the Estate of the latter. In the notarized legitimacy was upheld by the Court. As a legitimate
document, they stated that they were the sole heirs child, the son shall have the right to bear the surnames
of the deceased because “she died without descendants of Mario and Theresa, in conformity with the provisions
and ascendants”. In executing such deed, Vicente of Civil Code on surnames. Gerardo cannot then impose
effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of his surname to be used by the child, since in the eyes of
the petitioner where it appeared that he was the the law, the child is not related to him in any way.
petitioner.
53. BERNABE V. ALEJO (GR No. 140500, 21 January
49. CONCEPCION V. COURT OF APPEALS 2002)
(GR No. 123450, 31 August 2005) FACTS:
FACTS: The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son
Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa with his secretary Carolina Alejo and was named Adrian
Almonte, private respondent, were married in Bernabe who was born on September 18, 1981.  After
December 1989, and begotten a child named Jose Ernesto Bernabe and Rosalina (legal wife) died, the sole
Gerardo in December 1990. The husband filed on surviving heir left was Ernestina.  Carolina, in behalf of
December 1991, a petition to have his marriage his son Adrian, filed a complaint that Adrian be declared
annulled on the ground of bigamy since the wife an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and
married a certain Mario Gopiao sometime in December be given a share of his father’s estate. Trial court’s
1980, whom according to the husband was still alive ruling: Under the new law, an action for the recognition
and living in Loyola Heights, QC. Trial court ruled that of an illegitimate child must be brought within the
the son was an illegitimate child and the custody was lifetime of the alleged parent to give the latter an
awarded to the wife while Gerardo was granted opportunity to either affirm or deny the child’s filiation.
visitation rights. Theresa argued that there was nothing CA ruling:  The rights of Adrian are governed under
in the law granting “visitation rights in favor of the Article 285 of the Civil Code which allows an action for
putative father of an illegitimate child”. She further recognition to be filed within 4 years after the child has
wanted to have the surname of the son changed from attained the age of majority and that subsequent
“Concepcion to Almonte”, her maiden name, since an enactment of the Family Code did not take away his
illegitimate child should use his mother’s surname. After right.
the requested oral argument, trial court reversed its
ruling and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo but ISSUE:
Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may be declared an relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but
acknowledged illegitimate son. continuously”.
The following facts was established based on the
RULING: testimonial evidences offered by Monina:
The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the 1.     That Francisco was her father and she was
former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the conceived at the time when her mother was employed
putative parent is given by the new code a chance to by the former;
dispute the claim, considering that “illegitimate 2.     That Francisco recognized Monina as his child
children” are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and through his overt acts and conduct.
without the legitimate family being aware of their SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly
existence. Furthermore, the grounds or instances for identifying the putative father is not competence
the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to evidence as to the issue of paternity.  Francisco’s lack of
establish the filiation of spurious children. Hence, the participation in the preparation of baptismal certificates
petition was denied and assailed decision was affirmed. and school records render the documents showed as
incompetent to prove paternity.  With regard to the
54. JISON V. COURT OF APPEALS (GR No. 124853, 24 affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of
February 1998) age attesting that Francisco was not her father, SC was
FACTS: in the position that if Monina were truly not Francisco’s
Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a illegitimate child, it would be unnecessary for him to
complaint against petitioner, Francisco Jison, for have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina
recognition as illegitimate child of the latter.  The case denounce her filiation.  Monina’s evidence hurdles the
was filed 20 years after her mother’s death and when “high standard of proof required for the success of an
she was already 39 years of age.  Petitioner was married action to establish one’s illegitimate filiation in relying
to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he upon the provision on “open and continuous
impregnated Esperanza Amolar, Monina’s mother.  possession”.  Hence, Monina proved her filiation by
Monina alleged that since childhood, she had enjoyed more than mere preponderance of evidence. Since the
the continuous, implied recognition as the illegitimate instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if
child of petitioner by his acts and that of his family.  It illegitimate, Monina filed her action well within the
was likewise alleged that petitioner supported her and period granted her by a positive provision of law. A
spent for her education such that she became a CPA denial then of her action on ground of laches would
and eventually a Central Bank Examiner.  Monina was clearly be inequitable and unjust.  Petition was denied.
able to present total of 11 witnesses.
      55. DE LA CRUZ V. GRACIA
ISSUE: (G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009)
WON Monina should be declared as illegitimate child of FACTS:
Francisco Jison. Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth
because the document attached to the Affidavit to use
RULING: the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate "Autobiography," did not include the signature of the
filiation may be established in the same way and on the deceased father, and “because he was born out of
same evidence as that of legitimate children.  Article wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his
172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by birth and has no more  capacity to acknowledge his
which legitimate filiation is established paternity to the child.”
“To prove open and continuous possession of the status Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for
of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the injunction/registration of name against Gracia. The trial
manifestation of the permanent intention of the court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the
supposed father to consider the child as his, by author of the unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the
continuous and clear manifestations of parental same does not contain any express recognition of
affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure paternity.
charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they
reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the
apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all
ISSUE:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of exclusively to him. Only the child may exercise it at any
the deceased father of minor Christian can be time during his lifetime. As exception, and in three cases
considered as a recognition of paternity. only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child, to
wit: if he or she died during his or her minority, or while
RULING: insane, or after action had already been instituted.
Yes. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to
9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname claim his or her legitimacy lasts during his or her whole
of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized lifetime, he or she may exercise it either against the
him/her as his offspring through an admission made in presumed parents or his or her heirs. The right of action
pubic or private handwritten instrument. Article 176, as which the law concedes to the natural child is not
amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a transmitted to his ascendants or descendants. This is
signature by the putative father in the private extinguished by his death, and cannot be transmitted as
handwritten instrument. a portion of the inheritance of the deceased child.
The following rules respecting the requirement of
affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in 57. MARQUINO V. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT
any private handwritten instrument wherein an (G.R. No. 72078, 27 June 1994)
admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child FACTS:
is made: Bibiana was born on December 2, 1926 at Piapi,
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone Dumaguete City, of Gregoria Romano and allegedly of
piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there Eutiquio Marquino, who is single during that time.
should be strict compliance with the requirement that Bibiana became personally known to the Marquino
the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; family when she was hired as domestic helper in their
and household and she always received financial assistance
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is from them. Thus, she claimed that she enjoyed
accompanied by other relevant and competent continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of her
shown to have been made and handwritten by the father and his family. The Marquinos, on the other
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of hand, strongly denied her allegations. During the
such other evidence. pendency of the case and before respondent Bibiana
could finish presenting her evidence, she died and her
56. CONDE V. ABAYA (13 PHIL. 249) heirs were ordered substituted for her as parties-
FACTS: plaintiffs. On August 20, 1983, Eutiquio Marquino died
Casiano Abaya died in 1899 unmarried however leaving while the case was pending appeal. Petitioners averred
two unaknowledged children by Paula Conde. The two that the action for recognition is in transmissible to the
children died as minors in 1902 and 1903. The mother heirs being a personal act. The trial court dismissed the
sued for the settlement of the intestate estate of case but the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court
Casiano along with the acknowledgment of the two as of Appeals) remand the case to the Court of origin. The
natural children of the deceased. The trial court, with Motion for Reconsideration was denied on May 19,
the opposition of the Roman Abaya, brother of the 1985.
deceased, rendered judgment bestowing the estate of
Casiano to Conde as legitimate heir of the decedent's ISSUE:
natural children. Whether or not after the death of the putative father
the action for recognition of a natural child can be
ISSUE: continued against the heirs of the former
Whether or not the petitioner may enforce an action in
the acknowledgment of the natural child from Casiano RULING:
Abaya. ? The Supreme Court ruled against the continuance of
recognition of a natural child against the heirs of the
former after the death of the putative father. Article
285 provides only two (2) exceptions when an action for
RULING: recognition transcends the death of the putative parent.
The right of action for the acknowledgment of a natural Neither of these exceptions obtains in the case at
child is of a personal character and generally pertains bench. Furthermore, Article 173 of the Family Code
cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply to the Maria Mortera died on July 1955, leaving properties
case at bench because it will prejudice the vested rights worth P600,000.  She executed a will written in Spanish,
of petitioners transmitted to them at the time of the affixed her signature and had it acknowledged before a
death of their father, Eutiquio Marquino. IAC decision Notary Public by her and the witnesses. Among the
was reversed and set aside. Complaint against legacies made in the will was the P20,000 for Rene
Marquinos dismissed. Teotico who was married to the testatrix’s niece,
Josefina Mortera. The usufruct of Maria’s interest in the
58. ABADILLA V. TABILIRAN (249 SCRA 447) Calvo Building were left to the said spouses and the
FACTS: ownership thereof was left in equal parts to her
Respondent Judge Tabiliran was married to Teresita grandchildren, the legitimate children of said spouses.
Banzuela. Sometime in 1965, Banzuela left and Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole and universal
abandoned their family home in Zamboanga del Norte heir to all the remainder of her properties not
and thereafter her whereabouts could not be known. In otherwise disposed by will. Vicente Teotico filed a
1970, Tabiliran began cohabiting with Priscilla petition for the probate of the will but was opposed by
Baybayan, with whom he had three children born in Ana del Val Chan, claiming that she was an adopted
1970, 1971 and 1975, respectively. Tabiliran and child of Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an
Baybayan got married in 1986. In the marriage contract, acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased brother
Tabiliran represented himself as single. Petitioner is a of Maria), that said will was not executed as required by
clerk of court assigned in the sala of respondent, law and that Maria as physically and mentally incapable
charging Tabiliran for gross immorality. to execute the will at the time of its execution and was
executed under duress, threat, or influence of fear.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the 3 children can be considered ISSUE:
legitimate. WON defendant has right to intervene in this
proceeding.
RULING:
As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know
that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, the RULING:
three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may
considered legitimate since at the time they were born, be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding is that
there was an existing valid marriage between he must have an interest in the estate, will or in the
respondent and Banzuela. The applicable provision in property to be affected by either as executor or as a
this case is Article 269 of the Civil Code, which states claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as an
that: Only natural children can be legitimated. Children heir or one who has a claim against it as creditor. Under
born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the terms of the will, defendant has no right to
the conception of the former, were not disqualified by intervene because she has no such interest in the estate
an impediment to marry each other, are natural. either as heir, executor or administrator because it did
Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot not appear therein any provision designating her as
include those born of adulterous relations. The reasons heir/ legatee in any portion of the estate. She could
for this limitation are as follows: (1)rationale of have acquired such right if she was a legal heir of the
legitimation would be destroyed; (2) it would be unfair deceased but she is not under the CIVIL CODE. Even if
to the legitimate children in terms of successional her allegations were true, the law does not give her any
rights; (3) there will be the problem of public scandal, right to succeed the estate of the deceased sister of
unless social mores change; (4) it is too violent to grant both Jose and Francisca because being an illegitimate
the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the
will destroy the sanctity of the marriage; and (5) it will legitimate relatives of her natural father and that
be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry relationship established by adoption is limited solely to
many years after the birth of the child the adopter and adopted and does not extend to the
relatives of the adopting parents except only as
expressly provided by law. As a consequence, she is an
heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the
59. TEOTICO V. DEL VAL (249 SCRA 447) adopter. 
FACTS:
Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaint for
testamentary or as legal heir in the probate proceeding. damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with
whom he was living the time of the tragic incident. In
December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to
60. REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS AND BOBILES (205 adopt Adelberto Bundoc. Such petition was granted on
SCRA 356) November 1982 after the tragic incident.  
FACTS:
Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason
Condat who had been living with her family since he ISSUE:
was four months old. Salvador Condat, father of the WON parental authority concerned may be given
child, and the social worker assigned was served with retroactive effect so as to make adopting parents the
copies of the order finding that the petition was indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the
sufficient in form and substance. The copy was also adopted child where actual custody was lodged with
posted on the bulletin board of the court.  Nobody the biological parents.
appeared to oppose the petition. The judgment
declared that surname of the child be changed to RULING:
“Bobiles”.  Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of
duties and responsibilities of parents, their parental
ISSUE: authority which includes instructing, controlling and
WON the petition to adopt Jason should be granted disciplining the child.  In the case at bar, during the
considering only Zenaida filed the petition. shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto
was still lodged with the natural parents.  It follows that
RULING: they are the indispensable parties to the suit for
The petition for adoption was filed when the law damages.  “Parents and guardians are responsible for
applicable was PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code), the damage caused by the child under their parental
where such petition may be filed either of the spouses authority in accordance with the civil code”. 
or both of them. After the trial court rendered its SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given
favorable decision and while the case was pending on to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability
appeal in CA, Family Code took effect where joint upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when
adoption of both spouses is mandatory.  they had no actual or physical custody over the adopted
Non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an child.  Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual
action or a special proceeding. The Family Code will of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted
have retrospective application if it will not prejudice or child.  Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare
impair vested rights. When Zenaida filed the petition, Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the
she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right adopting parents during the period of trial custody
under said law in force at the time and thus vested and however in this case, trial custody period either had not
must not be prejudiced. A petition must not be yet began nor had been completed at the time of the
dismissed by reason of failure to comply with law not shooting incident.  Hence, actual custody was then with
yet in force and effect at the time. Furthermore, the the natural parents of Adelberto.
affidavit of consent attached by the husband showed Petition for review was hereby granted.
that he actually joined his wife in adopting Jayson. His
declarations and subsequent confirmatory testimony in 62. LANDINGIN V. REPUBLIC (G.R. No. 164948, June 27,
open court was sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. 2006)
Future of an innocent child must not be compromised FACTS:
by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States
rules on the form of the pleadings. Hence, petition was of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of
denied. Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors
Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos and Eugene
61. TAMARGO V. COURT OF APPEALS (209 SCRA 518) Dizon Ramos who was born on. The minors are the
FACTS: natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s brother
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of (deceased), and Amelia Ramos- who went to Italy, re-
age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing married there and now has two children by her second
injuries that resulted in her death. The petitioners,
marriage and no longer communicated with her Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed,
children. petitioner had already remarried. Husband and wife
shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not
ISSUE: present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly
Whether or not the petition for adoption is invalid for adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority.
lack of consent of the biological mother? The use of the word “shall” signifies that joint adoption
of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority since the
RULING: child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
No. The general requirement of consent and notice to legitimate child; it is but natural to require spouses to
the natural parents is intended to protect the natural adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario
parental relationship from unwarranted interference by will not suffice since there are certain requirements that
interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet
the best interests of the child in the manner of the the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The
proposed adoption. When she filed her petition with requirements on residency and certification of the
the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived
Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one
the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and
consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. rearing the children for civic consciousness and
If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother efficiency and development of their moral mental and
of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, physical character and well-being.
thus have adduced the written consent of their legal
guardian. Merely permitting the child to remain for a 64. JAVIER V. LUCERO (94 PHIL. 634)
time undisturbed in the care of others is not such FACTS:
abandonment. To dispense with the requirement of Salud Arca, respondent and Alfredo Javier, defendant
consent, the abandonment must be shown to have had their marriage solemnized at the MTC of Manila. At
existed at the time of adoption the time of their marriage, they had already begotten a
son named Alfredo Javier Jr.
63. IN RE LIM (G.R. No. 168992-93, 21 May 2009) Alfredo Javier left for US on board a ship of US Navy, for
FACTS: he was an enlisted man in the US Navy. Because of
Spouses Monina P. Lim and Primo Lim were childless. defendant’s departure, respondent chose to live with
Subsequently, two minor children, whose parents were defendant’s parents but left due to frictions having
unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD, were occurred between them. She then stayed to her native
entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were place in Tanza, Cavite.
unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD. The With the events transpired, the relationship of the
spouses registered the children making it appears as if spouses become strained and with that Alfredo Javier
they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo filed an action for divorce against Salud Arca at
died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Alabama, USA. Having received the complaint,
Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt respondent averred that defendant was not a resident
the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA of Alabama but a resident of Naic, Cavite. She also
8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In professed that the cause of their separation was not of
2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of desertion on her part but of the defendant. And that
Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle since his departure to US Navy, he had always
was then 25 years old and already married and Michael supported his spouse and his son through allotments by
was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her US Navy Department of US Government. Through these
husband including Michael and Olario gave their she prayed that the complaint be dismissed.
consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.
ISSUE:
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant is still obliged to support
Whether the petitioner, who has remarried, can singly his son even if he reaches the age of majority.
adopt
RULING:
RULING:
Unquestionably, Alfredo Javier, Jr. is the son of violated the prohibition against any compromise of the
petitioner Alfredo Javier, and if financial assistance is to right to support.
be rendered only at the termination of the appeal his
education, or the completion thereof, would be unduly 66. SALIENTES V. ABANILLA (G.R. No. 162734, August
delayed. That is good reason for immediate execution. 29, 2006)
Support also includes the education of the person to be FACTS:
supported "until he complete his education or training Private Respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner
for some profession, trade or vocation even beyond the Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the parents of
age of majority" and on the basis of this article support the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla, 2 years old.
was granted to Alfredo Javier Jr. They lived with Marie’s parents, petitioners Orlando B.
Salientes and Rosario Salientes. Due to in-laws
65. DE ASIS V. DE ASIS (303 SCRA 1760 problems, private respondent suggested to his wife that
FACTS: they transfer to their own house, but Marie Antonette
Private respondent, in her capacity as the legal guardian refused. So, he alone left the house. Thereafter, he was
of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an prevented from seeing his son. Later, Loran, in his
action for maintenance and support against petitioner, personal capacity and as the representative of his son,
alleging that petitioner is the father of subject minor, filed a petition for Habeas Corpus and custody. The
and the former refused and/or failed to provide for the court directed the petitioners to produce and bring the
maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands. body of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel. Marie moved for
Petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor alleged a reconsideration of the order which was denied.
and that he cannot be required to provide support for In this appeal by certiorari, petitioners contend
him. The mother’s child sent in manifestation stating that the order is contrary to Article 213 of the Family
that because of petitioner’s declaration, it was futile Code. And assuming that there are compelling reasons,
and useless exercise to claim support from him. She was the proper remedy of Loran is not habeas corpus but a
withdrawing her complaint against petitioner subject to simple action of custody.
the condition that the latter should not pursue his
counterclaim. The parties mutually agreed to move for ISSUE:
the dismissal of the complaint. The motion was granted Whether or not Habeas Corpus was the
by trial court and dismiss the case with prejudice. appropriate remedy.
Subsequently, another Complaint for maintenance and
support was brought against petitioner, this time in the RULING:
name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by her Yes. Habeas corpus may be resorted to in the
legal guardian, herein private respondent. Petitioner cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family Code,
judicata. respondent Loran and petitioner Marie have joint
parental authority over their son and consequently joint
ISSUE: custody. The couple is separated de facto, the issue of
Whether or not the lower courts acted in grave custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court, and
abuse off discretion after the first complaint was both parents are still entitled to the custody of their
dismissed and adjudged. child. In the present case, private respondent’s cause of
action is the deprivation of his rights to see his child as
RULING: alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas
The right to receive support can neither be corpus is available to him.
renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals
Furthermore, future support cannot be subject of a with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a
compromise. The manifestation sent by private guideline for the proper award of custody by the court.
respondent amounted to renunciations as it severed
the vinculum that gives the subject to minor, the right 67. ESPIRITU V. COURT OF APPEALS (242 SCRA 362)
to claim support from his putative parent, the FACTS:
petitioner. Furthermore, the agreement entered into Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding had a
between the petitioner and private respondent for the common law relationship while in US. They begot a
dismissal of the counterclaim was in the nature of a child in 1986, named Rosalind. After a year, they got
compromised, which cannot be countenanced. It married in the Philippines. Subsequently, they had
another child named Reginald. In 1990, they decided to Whether or not the school should be held liable for the
separate. Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and acts of its students.
she went back to California. Reynaldo brought the
children in the Philippines and left them to his sister.
When Teresita returned in the Philippines sometime in
1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus RULING:
against Reynaldo and his sister to gain custody of the The responsibility of the school authorities over the
children. student continues even if the student should be doing
nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the
ISSUE: company of his classmates and friends. Under the
Whether or not the custody of the children Article 2180 of the Family Code, it is the teacher-in
should be awarded to the mother. charge is the one who is imposed on the liability of
his/her students and not the school. As long as
RULING: defendant can show that he had taken the necessary
In cases of care, custody, education and precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can
property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be the exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Art.
paramount concern and that even a child under 7 years 2180.
of age may be ordered to be separated from the mother
for compelling reasons. The presumption that the 69. YLARDE V. AQUINO (163 SCRA 697)
mother is the best custodian for a child under seven FACTS: 
years of age is strong but not conclusive. At the time the Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal
judgment was rendered, the 2 children were both over of the Gabaldon Primary School in Pangasinan. 
7 years of age. The choice of the child to whom she Defendant Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. 
preferred to stay must be considered. It is evident in the During that time, the school had several concrete blocks
records submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his which were remnants of the old school shop destroyed
father/aunt. She was found of suffering from emotional in World War II.  Defendant decided to help clear the
shock caused by her mother’s infidelity. Furthermore, area so he gathered 18 of his male students and
there was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo ordered them to dig beside a one ton concrete block in
is unfit. In fact he has been trying his best to give the making a hole where the stone can be buried.  It was
children the kind of attention and care which their left unfinished so the following day he called 4 of the 18
mother is not in the position to extend. On the other students including the Novelito Ylarde to complete the
hand, the mother’s conviction for the crime of bigamy excavation.  Defendant left the children to level the
and her illicit relationship had already caused emotional loose soil while he went to see Banez for the key to the
disturbances and personality conflicts at least with the school workroom where he can get some rope.  It was
daughter. Hence, petition was granted. Custody of the alleged that before leaving, he told the children “not to
minors was reinstated to their father. touch the stone”.  After he left, the children playfully
jumped into the pit when suddenly the concrete block
68. AMADORA V. COURT OF APPEALS (160 SCRA 697) slide down.  Unfortunately, Novelito Ylarde was pinned
FACTS: to the wall causing serious physical injuries which as a
17 year old Alfredo Amadora was shot and killed by his consequence led to his death, 3 days thereafter.  The
classmate Pablito Daffon inside the school campus. parents of the victim, herein petitioners, filed a suit for
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless damages against both Aquino and Soriano.
imprudence. The parents filed a civil action for damages
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio ISSUE: 
de San Jose Recoletos, its high school principal, the Whether or not both private respondents can be held
dean of boys, the physics teacher, Daffon and two other liable for the death of Ylarde. 
students, through their respective parents. The
complaints against the students was later dropped. RULING: 
Upon appeal to CA, the decision was reversed and all SC closed this case by categorically stating that a truly
the defendants were completely absolved. careful and cautious person would have acted in all
contrast to the way private respondent Aquino did.
ISSUE: Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his
pupils would have made sure that the children are
protected from all harm in his company. Were it not for parents of Wendell to recover damages.  Trial court
his gross negligence, the unfortunate incident would dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence
not have occurred and the child Ylarde would probably but was set aside by CA.
be alive today, a grown- man of thirty-five. Due to his
failure to take the necessary precautions to avoid the ISSUE:
hazard, Ylarde's parents suffered great anguish all these Whether or not the parents should be held liable for
years. such damages.

70. ST. MARY’S ACADEMY V. CARPITANOS RULING:

(G.R. No. 143363, 6 February 2002) The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused
FACTS:  by their minor children imposed under Art 2180 of the
Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code covered
the school year 1995-1996 They visited schools from obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal
where prospective enrollees were studying.  Sherwin offenses.  The court held that the civil liability of the
Carpitanos joined the campaign.  Along with the other parents for quasi-delict of their minor children is
high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep primary and not subsidiary and that responsibility shall
owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan cease when the persons can prove that they observe all
Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by James the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school.  It damage.  However, Wendell’s mother testified that her
was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner husband owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit
which resulted for it to turned turtle.  Sherwin died due box inside a drawer in their bedroom.  Each of the
to this accident.  spouses had their own key.  She likewise admitted that
during the incident, the gun was no longer in the safety
ISSUE: deposit box.  Wendell could not have gotten hold of the
Whether or not the petitioner St. Mary’s Academy is gun unless the key was left negligently lying around and
liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.  that he has free access of the mother’s bag where the
key was kept.  The spouses failed to observe and
RULING:  exercise the required diligence of a good father to
GRANTED and REMANDED to the RTC for determination prevent such damage.
of any liability of the school. The Court held that for the
school to be liable there must be a finding that the act 72. LAPERAL V. REPUBLIC (G.R. No. L – 18008, 30
or omission considered as negligent was the proximate October 1962)
cause of the injury caused because of negligence, must FACTS:
have causal connection to the accident. There is no The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was
showing of such. Hence, with the overwhelming married with Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria on March
evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent 1939.  However, a decree of legal separation was later
Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of on issued to the spouses.  Aside from that, she ceased
the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, to live with Enrique.  During their marriage, she
it is not the school, but the registered owner of the naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria.  She filed this
vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for petition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden
the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. name Elisea Laperal.  This was opposed by the City
Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art.
71. LIBI V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (209 SCRA 372 of the Civil Code.  She was claiming that continuing
518) to use her married name would give rise to confusion in
FACTS: her finances and the eventual liquidation of the
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart conjugal assets.
until the former broke up with the latter after she found
out the Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic.  ISSUE:
Wendell wanted reconciliation but was not granted by Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in
Julie so it prompted him to resort to threats.  One day, general will prevail over the specific provision of Art.
there were found dead from a single gunshot wound 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman
each coming from the same gun.  The parents of Julie legally separated from his husband.
herein private respondents filed a civil case against the
RULING:
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by
the separation, there being no severance of the
vinculum.  The finding that petitioner’s continued use of
her husband surname may cause undue confusion in
her finances was without basis.  It must be considered
that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in
1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership
between her and Enrique had automatically been
dissolved and liquidated.  Hence, there could be no
more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the
conjugal assets.
Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient
ground to justify a change of the name of Elisea for to
hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy
circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372.
Petition was dismissed.

73. LLANETA V. AGRAVA (G.R. No. L-32054, 15 May

1974)
FACTS:
Atanacia Llaneta was married with Serafin Ferrer whom
she had a child named Victoriano Ferrer.  Serafin died
and about four years later Atanacia had a relationship
with another man out of which Teresita Llaneta, herein
petitioner, was born.  All of them lived with Serafin’s
mother in Manila.  Teresita was raised in the household
of the Ferrer’s using the surname of Ferrer in all her
dealing even her school records.  She then applied for a
copy of her birth certificate in Sorsogon as it is required
to be presented in connection with a scholarship grant. 
Subsequently, she discovered that her registered
surname was Llaneta and that she was the illegitimate
child of Atanacia and an unknown father.  She prayed to
have her name changed from Teresita Llaneta to
Teresita Llaneta Ferrer since not doing so would result
in confusion among persons and entities she dealt with
and would entail endless and vexatious explanations of
the circumstances.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Teresita can have her surname changed
to Ferrer.

RULING:
The Court ruled in favor of Teresita and granted her
petition to change her name to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer. 
In support to her petition, the mother of Serafin Ferrer
and his two remaining brothers have come forward in
earnest support and were proud to share the surname
of Ferrer with her. Furthermore, adequate publication
of the proceeding has not elicited slightest opposition
from the relatives and friends of Serafin Ferrer.