FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 114944. May 29, 2002.]

MANUEL C. ROXAS and AHMED S. NACPIL , petitioners, vs . HON.

CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman and JOSE DE FERRER, Deputy
Special Prosecutor, and the HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ,
respondents.

Villaraza & Angangco for petitioner M. Roxas.

Andin Andin & Balili for Reynaldo Osia.
Solicitor General for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioners herein were chairman and member of the Bids and Awards Committee
(BAC) of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP). The PC-INP
invited bidders for the supply of 65 units of re trucks. After the public bidding, a technical
evaluation committee was formed to conduct ocular inspections of the plant facilities and
equipment of the ve quali ed proponents. Thereafter, the technical committee
recommended Morita-Isuzu and Nikki-Hino re trucks, while the BAC recommended
Ssangyong re trucks. Instead of acting on the recommendation, a review committee was
formed by the Director General of the PC-INP, which declared that there was failure to bid.
BAC was instructed to further evaluate the proponents but this time limiting itself to the
two brands recommended by the technical evaluation committee. BAC subsequently voted
to award the contract to Tahei Co., Ltd., manufacturer of Nikki-Hino. The Commission on
Audit (COA) later on discovered discrepancy between the bid prices indicated on the
disbursement voucher and the unit price shown on the purchase order resulting in an
overpricing of more than 19 million pesos. Twelve PC-INP o cers were then charged with
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 with the Ombudsman, including the two
petitioners. The charges against petitioners were originally dismissed. But, after a motion
for reinvestigation was led by two of their co-accused therein, a turnabout in the
resolution of the Ombudsman resulted in their inclusion in the criminal case. The O ce of
the Ombudsman led an amended information with the Sandiganbayan impleading herein
petitioners. Thus, a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to annul the orders of the
Ombudsman, was led with the Supreme Court. Their petition was dismissed on the
ground that the Ombudsman did not lose jurisdiction over petitioners after the charges
against them were dismissed, considering that the reinvestigation was merely a repeat
investigation. Hence, this motion for reconsideration.
The Supreme Court found merit in the motion for reconsideration, thus, it ordered
the case remanded to the O ce of the Ombudsman for further proceedings for the
determination of probable cause against petitioners. According to the Court, the nding of
probable cause against petitioners in proceedings which they had neither knowledge of
nor participation in violated their right to procedural due process. At the very least, they
should have been noti ed that the complaint against them has not yet been nally
disposed of. CSHEca

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 SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES;

SUPREME COURT SHALL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF
THE OMBUDSMAN AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR AS A RULE; EXCEPTIONS; PRESENT
IN CASE AT BAR. — Ordinarily, we will not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman
to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probable guilty thereof and, thereafter, to le the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts. However, we nd that the case at
bar falls under one of the recognized exceptions to this rule, more speci cally, the
constitutional rights of the accused are impaired and the charges are manifestly false. In
cases where the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor were unable to agree on whether
or not probable cause exists, we may interfere with the ndings and conclusions. Be that
as it may, we recognize that the power to investigate offenses of this nature belongs to the
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor. While the Ombudsman may have erred in
disregarding the recommendations of the Special Prosecution O cers which appear to be
substantiated by the record, he should be allowed an opportunity to review his decision
and, where necessary, correct it. Furthermore, it appears that petitioners were deprived of
due process when the Special Prosecutor reinstated the complaint against them without
their knowledge. Due process of law requires that every litigant must be given an
opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be present and defend himself in person at
every stage of the proceedings.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR REINVESTIGATION OF AN
APPROVED ORDER OR RESOLUTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN OR THE DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN; NOTICE THEREOF SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE AFFECTED PARTIES;
ABSENCE THEREOF IN CASE AT BAR; EFFECT. — Under Rule 11, Section 7 of
Administrative Order No. 07, i.e., the Rules of Procedure of the O ce of the Ombudsman,
motions for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution of the
Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman must be led within fteen (15) days from notice
thereof. It is signi cant to note in this case that no motion for reconsideration was led
from the resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing the charges against petitioners. Hence,
petitioners had a right to consider the complaint against them as closed. Indeed, every
litigation must come to an end; otherwise, it would become even more intolerable than the
wrong and injustice it is designed to correct. For all intents and purposes, therefore,
petitioners were no longer parties in the criminal action. Evidently, the O ce of the Special
Prosecutor thought so too. It did not give petitioners notice of the reinvestigation, which
would have enabled them to participate in the proceedings. But when it later found
probable cause against petitioners, it should have rst given them notice and afforded
them an opportunity to be heard before ordering their inclusion in Criminal Case No.
18956. The nding of probable cause against petitioners in proceedings which they had
neither knowledge of nor participation in violated their right to procedural due process. At
the very least, they should have been noti ed that the complaint against them has not yet
been nally disposed of; or that the ght was not yet over, so to speak. They should have
been apprised of their possible implication in the criminal case to enable them to meet any
new accusations against them head-on, and to prepare for their defense.

RESOLUTION

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 YNARES-SANTIAGO , J : p

Before us is the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner Manuel C. Roxas seeking

to set aside our Decision dated June 19, 2001 which dismissed the instant petition,
anchored on the following arguments: EcAHDT

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE INSTANT CASE DOES NOT ATTEMPT TO
UNNECESSARILY AND EXCESSIVELY ENTANGLE THE HONORABLE COURT WITH
THE TASK OF UNDULY REVIEWING OR INTERFERING WITH THE
PROSECUTORIAL PREROGATIVES OF THE OMBUDSMAN.

II
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THERE EXIST MORE THAN SUFFICIENT REASONS FOR
THE HONORABLE COURT TO FIND VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS AND GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE INSTANT CASE WHEN THE TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES IS TESTED IN THE CRUCIBLE OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS.

III

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE DECISION HAS SERIOUS AND FAR-REACHING
IMPLICATIONS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE CONSIDERING THAT
BECAUSE OF IT, NO DECISION OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN THE DETERMINATION
OF PROBABLE CAUSE WILL EVER ACHIEVE FINALITY. 1

Respondents were required to le their respective comments to the motion. 2 In its

Comment, 3 the O ce of the Special Prosecutor argued that the issues presented in the
Motion for Reconsideration have already been raised, resolved and passed upon by this
Court. On the other hand, the Solicitor General, in his Comment, 4 maintained that petitioner
Roxas was not denied due process since he was no stranger to the proceedings; the
reinvestigation was just a continuation of the investigation of the case where petitioner
was a party-respondent.
In order to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration, it is helpful to restate the salient
antecedent facts.
Manuel C. Roxas was the Chairman, while Ahmed S. Nacpil was a Member, of the
Bids and Awards Committee of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police
(PC-INP). The PC-INP invited bids for the supply of sixty- ve units of re trucks. After the
public bidding, General Cesar P. Nazareno created a Technical Evaluation Committee,
headed by General Mario Tanchanco, which was sent to Korea and Japan to conduct
ocular inspections of the plant facilities and equipment of the ve quali ed proponents.
Thereafter, the Technical Evaluation Committee recommended for procurement the Morita
Isuzu and Nikki-Hino fire trucks.
Meanwhile, the Bids and Awards Committee voted to recommend to Director
General Cesar Nazareno the procurement of Ssangyong re trucks. Instead of acting on
this recommendation, Gen. Nazareno created a Review Committee headed by Gen.
Gerardo N. Flores, which found that there was a failure to bid. Gen. Nazareno thus
instructed the Bids and Awards Committee to reconsider its earlier recommendation and
to conduct further evaluation of the proponents, but this time limiting itself to the two
Japanese brands recommended by the Technical Evaluation Committee, namely, Morita
Isuzu and Nikki-Hino. The Bids and Awards Committee subsequently voted to award the
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 contract to the Tahei Co., Ltd., manufacturer of Nikki-Hino. 5
Accordingly, the contract of sale of sixty- ve units of Nikki-Hino re trucks was
executed between Gen. Nazareno, on behalf of the PC-INP, and Tahei Company, Ltd. The
corresponding Purchase Order was prepared and signed by Col. Nicasio Custodio, Chief of
the PNP Logistics Support Command; Major Obedio Espeña, Acting Chief, PNP
Procurement Center; Gen. Cesar Nazareno; and DILG Secretary Luis Santos.
Thereafter, Custodio, Espeña and Nazareno, together with the PNP Chief
Accountant, Generosa Ramirez, prepared the disbursement vouchers, authorizing the
payment to Tahei Co., Ltd. of the sum of P167,335,177.24, as marginal deposit for the
sixty-five fire trucks.
The COA subsequently discovered that while the disbursement voucher indicated
the bid price of Tahei Co., Ltd. to be only P2,292,784.00 per unit, the purchase order
showed the unit price as P2,585,562.00, resulting in a discrepancy of P292,778.00 per unit
of fire truck or a total of P19,030,570.00.
On February 12, 1993, DILG Secretary Rafael Alunan III led a complaint with the
Ombudsman for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against the following:
1. Dir. Gen. Cesar Nazareno, PNP

2. Dep. Dir. Manuel Roxas, PNP

3. Fire Marshal Mario Tanchanco
4. Fire B/Gen. Diosdado Godoy (Ret.)

5. P/Sr. Supt. Ahmed Nacpil, PNP

6. P/Supt. Juhan Kairan, PNP

7. CInsp. Reynaldo Osea, PNP

8. Dep. Dir. Gen. Gerardo Flores, PNP

9. Dir. Nicasio Custodio, PNP

10. Supt. Obedio Espeña, PNP
11. Former DILG Secretary Luis Santos

12. Ms. Generosa Ramirez

After preliminary investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military

recommended the indictment of all respondents, except Generosa Ramirez. 6 On review,
the O ce of the Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the complaints
against Manuel Roxas, Ahmed Nacpil, Diosdado Godoy, Juhan Kairan and Generosa
Ramirez. 7 This was approved by the Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman in a
Memorandum dated April 15, 1993.
Hence, formal charges were led with the Sandiganbayan against Nazareno, Flores,
Tanchanco, Custodio, Osia, Espeña and Santos, docketed as Criminal Case No. 18956. 8
Roxas, Nacpil, Godoy, Kairan and Ramirez were not included in the criminal information.
Flores and Tanchanco moved for a reinvestigation, which was granted. Thereafter,
on October 19, 1993, the O ce of the Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of
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 the charges against Flores and Tanchanco. In the same resolution, however, the Special
Prosecutor made a sudden turnabout as regards Roxas, Nacpil and Kairan, and ordered
their inclusion as accused in Criminal Case No. 18956. Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose de
Ferrer voted for the approval of the recommendation. Special Prosecutor Aniano A.
Desierto dissented. Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez approved the recommendation.
Roxas, Nacpil and Kairan led a Motion for Reconsideration. The Review Committee
of the O ce of the Special Prosecutor recommended that the Motion for Reconsideration
be granted and that the charge against the movants be dismissed. However, Deputy
Special Prosecutor de Ferrer and Ombudsman Vasquez disapproved the recommendation.
Accordingly, the O ce of the Ombudsman led an amended information with the
Sandiganbayan impleading Roxas, Nacpil and Kairan as co-accused. 9
Thus, Roxas and Nacpil led with this Court the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition, seeking to annul the orders of the Ombudsman directing their inclusion as
accused in Criminal Case No. 18956.
The petition was dismissed in our Decision dated June 19, 2001 on the ground that
the Ombudsman did not lose jurisdiction over petitioners after the charges against them
were dismissed, considering that the reinvestigation was merely a repeat investigation.
Likewise, petitioners were not denied due process when the Ombudsman issued the
assailed orders because they were able to le their counter-a davits during the
preliminary investigation.
After a careful and meticulous review of the case, we nd merit in the Motion for
Reconsideration.
The records show that the participation of petitioner Roxas in the transactions
complained of is limited to the following:
(1) He was the Chairman of the Bids and Awards Committee of the PC-INP.
(2) He wrote a letter to Mrs. Carol de Jesus of Ssangyong Corporation
informing her that her company had been selected as the supplier of
fire trucks.
(3) Upon the directive of Gen. Nazareno, he conducted an immediate review
of the recommendation of the Bids and Awards Committee which
awarded the supply contract to Ssangyong and, instead, adopted the
ndings and recommendation of the Review Committee, again upon
specific orders of Nazareno.
(4) He submitted a memorandum to Gen. Nazareno that Majority of the
members of the Bids and Awards Committee have chosen the Nikki-
Hino brand over Morita Isuzu.
Based on these established facts, the Review Committee of the O ce of the Special
Prosecutor, in a Memorandum dated April 15, 1993, recommended the dismissal of the
charges against petitioner on the following considerations:
The action of [the Bids and Awards] Committee in choosing Ssangyong
over Kanglim does not appear to have caused any damage to the Government or
any party because it did not materialize. This action was nulli ed on order of Gen.
Nazareno and upon recommendation of the Review Committee. Therefore, this
does not merit a lengthy discussion. Su ce it to stay that the procedure followed
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 by the committee which resulted in the choices of Ssangyong does not indicate
any irregularity. Neither does it suggest an unwarranted choice considering that
Ssangyong was the next lower bidder to V.G. Roxas-Kanglim.
What is of signi cance was the action of the INP BAC which chose Nikki-
Hino as the nal winning bidder. It is this action that resulted in the nulli cation
of the previous action by the INP BAC and the purchase of 56 units of re trucks
at a price much higher than the prices for Kanglim or Ssangyong Fire Trucks.
Records show that Gen. Nazareno issued the Order directing this
Committee to reconsider its previous actions. To this Order was attached the
recommendation of Chairman Mario C. Tanchanco of the Technical Evaluation
Committee for the consideration of the Japanese re trucks only namely: Nikki
Hino and Morita Isuzu. In other words, the authority of the INP BAC this time to
conduct the bidding was limited to only Nikki Hino and Morita Isuzu by no less
than the approving authority and the highest ranking commander of the INP. EHaCID

This Committee's action, in the light of General Nazareno's order, appeared

to be regular and proper because it chose the lowest bidder among the Japanese
re trucks supplied to them by General Nazareno. It could not possibly consider
Ssangyong because its previous action choosing Ssangyong was precisely
ordered set aside. Neither could it choose Kanglim because this was not
recommended in the Tanchanco report which was appended by General
Nazareno in the abovestated Order addressed to the INP BAC.

For the foregoing reasons, we nd no reason to hold the members of the

INP BAC liable for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. However, we make exception to
respondent P/Supt. Reynold Osia because he was implicated by Supt. Concordio
Apolonio in his sworn statement (page 73, Records) as the one who acted as
liaison of General Nazareno in discreetly sending his messages to the members
of the INP BAC to vote in favor of Nikki Hino. It can be said that respondent Osia
cooperated with General Nazareno in the manipulative scheme to corner the
award in favor of Tahei Co., Ltd. We therefore hold respondent Osia liable for
violation of the Anti-Graft Law. 1 0

The foregoing recommendation was unanimously approved by Deputy Special

Prosecutor Jose De Ferrer, Special Prosecutor Aniano Desierto and Ombudsman Conrado
M. Vasquez.
During the reinvestigation, however, the O ce of the Special Prosecutor
recommended the indictment of petitioners on the assumption that: "The said persons of
the Bids and Awards Committee who voted for the Nikki-Hino perfected and awarded the
contract to Nikki-Hino. Their cooperation was indispensable for the consummation of the
contract which was irregular." 1 1
Petitioners led a motion for reconsideration. On February 10, 1994, the team of
Special Prosecution O cer III Reynaldo L. Mendoza, Special Prosecution O cer II Luz L.
Quiñones-Marcos and Special Prosecution O cer I Cornelio L. Somido recommended that
petitioners' motion for reconsideration be granted, saying:
It appears that the charge against respondents Roxas, Nacpil and Kairan
was previously dismissed by this Office by virtue of the approved resolution dated
April 15, 1993. For this reason, as far as the said respondents are concerned, there
being no motion or reconsideration led by the complainant (emphasis supplied),
the said respondents ceased to be parties in this case. Consequently, the mere
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 ling of motions for reconsideration by those previously indicted, without
questioning the dismissal of the charge against the said respondents, could not
and should not be made the basis for impleading them as accused in this case
without violating their right to due process. 1 2

At rst blush, it would appear that the ndings of the Special Prosecution O cers
on April 15, 1993 and February 10, 1994 are well supported by the evidence presented
during the preliminary investigation. This notwithstanding, the Deputy Special Prosecutor
and the Ombudsman, in their marginal notes, disapproved the recommendation on
February 10, 1994.
Ordinarily, we will not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine
whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to le the corresponding
information with the appropriate courts. 1 3 However, we nd that the case at bar falls
under one of the recognized exceptions to this rule, more speci cally, the constitutional
rights of the accused are impaired and the charges are manifestly false. 1 4 In cases where
the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor were unable to agree on whether or not
probable cause exists, we may interfere with the findings and conclusions. 1 5
Be that as it may, we recognize that the power to investigate offenses of this nature
belongs to the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor. 1 6 While the Ombudsman may
have erred in disregarding the recommendations of the Special Prosecution O cers which
appear to be substantiated by the record, he should be allowed an opportunity to review
his decision and, where necessary, correct it.
Furthermore, it appears that petitioners were deprived of due process when the
Special Prosecutor reinstated the complaint against them without their knowledge. Due
process of law requires that every litigant must be given an opportunity to be heard. He
has the right to be present and defend himself in person at every stage of the proceedings.
17

Under Rule II, Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 07, i.e., the Rules of Procedure of
the O ce of the Ombudsman, motions for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an
approved order or resolution of the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman must be led
within fteen (15) days from notice thereof. It is signi cant to note in this case that no
motion for reconsideration was led from the resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing
the charges against petitioners. Hence, petitioners had a right to consider the complaint
against them as closed. Indeed, every litigation must come to an end; otherwise, it would
become even more intolerable than the wrong and injustice it is designed to correct. 1 8
For all intents and purposes, therefore, petitioners were no longer parties in the
criminal action. Evidently, the O ce of the Special Prosecutor thought so too. It did not
give petitioners notice of the reinvestigation, which would have enabled them to
participate in the proceedings. But when it later found probable cause against petitioners,
it should have rst given them notice and afforded them an opportunity to be heard before
ordering their inclusion in Criminal Case No. 18956.
The nding of probable cause against petitioners in proceedings which they had
neither knowledge of nor participation in violated their right to procedural due process. At
the very least, they should have been noti ed that the complaint against them has not yet
been nally disposed of; or that the ght was not yet over, so to speak. They should have
been apprised of their possible implication in the criminal case to enable them to meet any
new accusations against them head-on, and to prepare for their defense.
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 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated June 19, 2001 is
RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. This case is ordered REMANDED to the O ce of the
Ombudsman for further proceedings for the determination of probable cause against
petitioners Manuel C. Roxas and Ahmed S. Nacpil in OMB-AFP-CRIM-93-0016. DIEACH

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Rollo, p. 385.

2. Ibid., p. 418.
3. Id., pp. 431-446.
4. Id., pp. 448-460.
5. Id., p. 94.

6. Record, Vol. I, pp. 4-20.

7. Ibid., pp. 21-34.
8. Id., pp. 1-3.
9. Ibid., Vol. I-A, pp. 467-469.
10. Rollo, pp. 129-130.

11. Ibid., p. 65.

12. Id., pp. 71-72.
13. Venus v. Desierto, 298 SCRA 196, 214 [1998].
14. Ibid.
15. Cabahug v. People, et al., G.R. No. 132816, February 5, 2002; Venus v. Desierto, supra.

16. Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 105965-70, March 20, 2001.

17. People v. Hapa, G.R. No. 125698, July 19, 2001.
18. Provincial Government of Quezon v. Comelec, G.R. No. 132885, October 11, 2001.

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