CASE DIGEST (Quimiguing vs Icao)

[Link]
Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin, sought an appeal from
the orders of Zamboanga CFI, which dismissed her complaint for support and damages and request
for amendment of complaint.

Quimiguing averred that the then already married Felix Icao succeeded in having sexual relations
with her through force and intimidation. As a result, she became pregnant despite efforts and drugs
supplied by Icao and had to stop studying. She then claimed for monthly support, damages and
attorney’s fees.

The defendant-appellee, however, moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguing’s failure to allege the fact
that a child had been born in her complaint. The lower court dismissed the case and subsequently
denied further amendment to the complaint, ruling that no amendment was allowed for failure of the
original complaint to state a cause of action.

Issue:
W/N the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and damages from defendant despite failure to
allege fact of birth in complaint

Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the child she was carrying and
an independent cause of action for damages.
This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional personality of the unborn child,
which includes its right to support from its progenitors, even it is only “en ventre de sa mere.” Article
742 of the same Code holds that, just as a conceived child, it may receive donations through persons
that legally represent it. Readings of Articles 40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of the Spanish
Code also further strengthen the case for reversal of order.

Additionally, “for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust xxx constitutes a
clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damage caused”
per Article 21 of the Civil Code, a provision supported by Article 2219, which provides moral damages
for victims of seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.

Judgment reversed, set aside and remanded for proceedings conformable to the
decision; with costs against Icao. 

CASE DIGEST (Geluz v CA)

[Link]
FACTS:
Her present husband impregnated Nita Villanueva before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal
her pregnancy from the parent, she had herself aborted by petitioner Antonio Geluz. After her marriage,
she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to
be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by Geluz. Less than 2 years later, Nita incurred a third
abortion of a two-month old fetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.00. Her husband did not know of,
nor consented to the abortion. Hence Oscar Lazo, private respondent, sued petitioner for damages based
on the third and last abortion.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 as
attorney’s fee and the cost of the suit. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:
Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn child incurs injury, his parents may
recover damages from the ones who caused the damage to the unborn child?

RULING:
Personality begins at conception. This personality is called presumptive personality. It is, of course,
essential that birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be considered as never having possessed
legal personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured,
it is easy to see that if no action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account
of injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even
if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal
death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality.
It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of the Civil
Code because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition
that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the present case, the child was dead when separated
from its mother’s womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such damages must be those
inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or violation of the rights of the deceased child.

Joaquin vs Navarro: Case Digest

FACTS: During the battle of liberation of Manila on February 6, 1945, the following sought refuge on the
ground floor of German Club building: Joaquin Navarro Sr (70); Angela Joaquin (67); daughter Pilar (32-
33); daughter Concepcion (23-25); son Joaquin Natividad Jr (30); and wife of Jr Adela Conde (--). The
building was set on fire and Japanese started shooting the daughters who fell. Sr. decided to leave the
building. His wife didn’t want to leave so he left with his son, Jr., and Jr.’s wife and neighbor Francisco
Lopez. As they came out, Jr. was hit and fell on the ground and rest lay flat on the ground to avoid
bullets. German Club collapsed trapping many people presumably including Angela Joaquin. Sr., Adela,
and Francisco sought refuge in an air aid shelter where they hid for 3 days. On February 10, 1945, on
their way to St. Theresa Academy, they met Japanese patrols. Sr. and Adela were hit and killed. The trial
court ruled that Angela Joaquin outlived her son while CA ruled that son outlived his mother.

ISSUE: W/N the son/mother died first before the other.

[If the son died first, petitioner would reap the benefits of succession. If mother died first, respondent
Antonio, son of Jr. by his first marriage, would inherit]

HELD: Based on the story of Francisco Lopez, Jr. died before his mother did. This presumption was based
on speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence on which civil
cases are to be decided, this inference should prevail. Evidence of survivorship may be direct, indirect,
circumstantial or inferential.
CASE DIGEST: [Link]

Doctrine of non-suability
DEPT OF AGRICULTURE VS NLRC

G.R. No. 104269 November 11, 1993

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, petitioner,

vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., respondents.

Facts:

The case is regarding money claim against Department of Agriculture (DA) as filed and requested by
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security
services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements,
guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter,
several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay,
uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for
damages against the DA and the security agency.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security
agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security
agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter
issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and
the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA.

The petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of
execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the
Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More
importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of
the State.

The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its
immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.

Issues:

Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case.

Discussions:
Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be “sued upon any moneyed claim
involving liability arising from contract, express or implied. However, the money claim should first be
brought to the Commission on Audit. Act 3083 stands as the general law waiving the State’s
immunity from suit, subject to its general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that ‘no execution
shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of the (Philippines),
and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money claims against the
Government must be strictly observed.

Rulings:

No. The rule does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at
times be sued. The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083,
where the Philippine government “consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving
liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between
private parties.”

In this case, The DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a
governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact,
performed any act proprietary in character. But the claims of the complainant security guards clearly
constitute money claims.

REPUBLIC VS SANDOVAL
Case digest
[Link]
[Link]
Facts: Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land
reform program. There was a marchers-police confrontation which resulted in
the death of 12 rallyists and scores were wounded. As a result, then Pres.
Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission for the purpose
of conducting an investigation. The most significant recommendation of the
Commission was for the heirs of the deceased and wounded victims to
be compensated by the government. Based on such recommendation, the
victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action fordamages against the Republic
and the military/police officers involved in the incident. 

Issues: 
(1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity
(2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages

Held: The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as

claimed by the petitioners. The recommendation made by the Commission to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims does not in any way mean
that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of
the creation of the Commission and, therefore, whatever is the finding of the
Commission only serves as the basis for a cause of action in the event any party
decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of the Commission does
not in any way bind the State. 

The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who
allegedly were responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the marchers
acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a settled rule that the State as a
person can commit no wrong. The military and police officers who were
responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable for damages as they
exceeded their authority, hence, the acts cannot be considered official.
PNR VS IAC Case Digest [Link]

Facts:
a collision of a passenger express train of defendant Philippine National Railways, (PNR)...
and a passenger bus of Baliwag Transit, Inc... upon reaching the railroad crossing at Barrio
Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan... g... ot stalled and was hit by defendant's express train
causing damages to plaintiff's bus and its passengers, eighteen (18) of whom died and fifty-
three
(53) others suffered physical injuries.
Plaintiff alleging that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence and
imprudence of defendant PNR and its locomotive engineer, Honorio Cirbado, in operating
its passenger train in a busy intersection without any bars,... semaphores, signal lights,
flagman or switchman to warn the public of approaching train that would pass through the
crossing
The defendants, in their Answer traversed the material allegation of the Complaint and as...
affirmative defense alleged that the collision was caused by the negligence, imprudence
and lack of foresight of plaintiff's bus driver, Romeo Hughes.
At the pre-trial conference... on a partial stipulation of facts and issues
1. That plaintiff is a duly constituted corporation registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission engaged in the business of transportation and operating
public utility buses for the public
2. That defendant Philippine National Railways is a purely government owned and
controlled corporation duly registered and existing by virtue of Presidential Decree
No. 741, with capacity to sue and be sued, and is likewise engaged in transporting
passengers and cargoes by... trains and buses
Issues:
whether the Philippine National Railways enjoys immunity from suit
Ruling:
cited in Manila Hotel Employees Association vs.
Manila Hotel Company, et al., 73 Phil. 374, 388). The Manila Hotel case also relied on the
following rulings:
`By engaging in a particular business through the instrumentality of a corporation, the
government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the
corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations.'
'When the State acts in its proprietary capacity, it is amenable to all the rules of law which
bind private individuals.'
'There is not one law for the sovereign and another for the subject, but when the sovereign
engages in business and the conduct of business enterprises, and contracts with
individuals, whenever the contract in any form comes before the courts, the rights and
obligation of the... contracting parties must be adjusted upon the same principles as if both
contracting parties were private persons. Both stand upon equality before the law, and the
sovereign is merged in the dealer, contractor and suitor'
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4156 as amended by Republic Act No. 6366:
"SEC. 4. General Powers -- The Philippine National Railways shall have the following
general powers:
(a) To do all such other things and to transact all such business directly or indirectly
necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the purpose of the corporation; and
(b) Generally, to exercise all powers of a railroad corporation under the Corporation law."...
in conjunction with Section 2(b) of Presidential Decree No. 741:
"(b) To own or operate railroad transways, bus lines, trucklines, subways, and other kinds of
land transportation, vessels, and pipelines, for the purpose of transporting for consideration,
passengers, mail and property between any points in the Philippines;"
Thus, respondent court utilized the doctrine of implied powers announced in National
Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro, Sr. and Philippine Airlines, Inc. (91 Phil. 203 [1952]), to
the effect that the power to sue and be sued is implicit from the faculty to transact private...
business. At any rate, respondent court characterized the railroad company as a private
entity created not to discharge a governmental function but, among other things, to operate
a transport service which is essentially a business concern, and thus barred from invoking
immunity... from suit.
respondent court agreed with the conclusion reached by the trial court that the absence of a
crossing bar, signal light, flagman or switchman to warn the public of an approaching train
constitutes negligence per the pronouncement of this Court in Lilius vs. Manila
Railroad Company (59 Phil 758 [1934]).
Concerning the exercise of diligence normally expected of an employer in the selection and
supervision of its employees, respondent court expressed the view that PNR was remiss on
this score since it allowed Honorio Cabardo, who finished only primary education and
became an... engineer only through sheer experience, to operate the locomotive, not to
 mention the fact that such plea in avoidance was not asserted in the answer and was thus
belatedly raised on appeal.
"The Manila Railroad Company, the PNR's predecessor, as a common carrier, was not
immune from suit under Act No. 1510, its charter.
The PNR Charter, Republic Act No. 4156, as amended by Republic Act No. 6366 and
Presidential Decree No. 741, provides that the PNR is a government instrumentality under
government ownership during its 50-year term, 1964 to 2014. It is under the Office of the
President of the
Philippines. Republic Act No. 6366 provides:
'SECTION 1-a. Statement of policy. - The Philippine National Railways, being a factor for
socio-economic development and growth, shall be a part of the infrastructure program of the
government and as such shall remain in and under government ownership during its...
corporate existence. The Philippine National Railways must be administered with the view
of serving the interests of the public by providing them the maximum of service and, while
aiming at its greatest utility by the public, the economy of operation must be ensured so
that... service can be rendered at the minimum passenger and freight prices possible.'
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory,
but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends'
The correct rule is that 'not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are
immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for
which the entity was organized
The point is that when the government enters into a commercial business it abandons its
sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other private corporation

[Link]
[Link]
THE PETITION:
The petition is composed of two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of temporary
restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing the
following:

1.     DECEMBER  1, 2015 RESOLUTION OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

SECOND DIVISION (Cancelled petitioner’s certificate of candidacy);

2.     DECEMBER 23, 2015 RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

(Denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration); and

3.     DECEMBER 11, 2015 RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION

(Declared that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year
residency requirement, and that she committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she
declared therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten 10 years and 11
months as of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016)

FACTS OF THE CASE:

September 3, Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares
1968 (petitioner) was found abandoned as a
newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro,
Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar. Custody
over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to
his relatives, Emiliano Militar and his wife.

September 6, Emiliano Militar reported and registered

1968  petitioner as a foundling with the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-
Iloilo).

1973 When petitioner was five (5) years old,

celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
(a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora
Poe (Susan Roces) filed a petition for her
adoption with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of San Juan City.

May 13, 1974   The Poe spouses’ petition for adoption was
granted by the trial court and ordered that
petitioner's name be changed from "Mary
Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe."

December 13, Having reached the age of 18, petitioner

1986 registered as a voter with the local
COMELEC Office in San Juan City.

April 4, 1988 Petitioner applied for and was issued

Philippine Passport No. F9272876 by the
Department of Foreign Affairs

1988-1991 Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued

a degree in Development Studies at the
University of the Philippines but opted to
continue her studies abroad and left for the
U.S. in 1988.

Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston

 College in Chestnuts Hill

July 27, 1991 Petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V.

Llamanzares, a citizen of both the
Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de
San Jose Parish in San Juan City.

July 29, 1991 Desirous of being with her husband who was
then based in the U.S., the couple flew back
to the U.S.

April16, 1992 Petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian

Daniel

April 5, 1993 Renewed her Philippines passport.

May 19, 1998 Renewed her Philippines passport.

July 10, 1998 Petitioner gave birth to daughter Hanna

MacKenzie.

October 18, Petitioner became a naturalized American

2001 citizen

April 8, 2004 – Petitioner came back to the Philippines

July 8, 2004 together with Hanna to support her father's
candidacy for President in the May 2004
elections. It was during this time that she
gave birth to her youngest daughter Anika.

December 13, Petitioner rushed back to the Philippines

2004 – February upon learning of her father's deteriorating
3, 2005 medical condition who died shortly.

2005 Petitioner and husband began preparing for

their resettlement including notification of
their children's schools that they will be
transferring to Philippine schools

May 24, 2005 Petitioner came home to the Philippines and

without delay, secured a Tax Identification
Number from the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.

March 2006 The petitioner's husband officially informed

the U.S. Postal Service of the family's
change and abandonment of their address in
the U.S. petitioner and her husband acquired
 a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian Hills,
Quezon City where they built their family
home.

July 7, 2006 Petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippines pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
Act of 2003.

July 18, 2006 The Bureau of Immigration acted favorably

on petitioner's petitions and declared that she
is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine
citizenship.

August 31, 2006 Again, petitioner registered as a voter

ofBarangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City. She
also secured from the DFA a new Philippine
Passport bearing the No. XX4731999.

October 6, 2010 President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed

petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB).

October 20, Before assuming her post, petitioner

2010 executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of
Allegiance to the United States of America
and Renunciation of American Citizenship"
before a notary public in Pasig City.

October 21, Petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the

2010 Bureau of Immigration and took her oath of
office as Chairperson of the MTRCB. From
then on, petitioner stopped using her
American passport.

July 12, 2011 The petitioner executed before the Vice

Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an
"Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of
Nationality of the United States" and stated
that she in the Philippines, from 3
September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from
May 2005 to present.

December 9, The U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a

2011 "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the
United States" effective 21 October 2010.
 October 2, 2012 The petitioner filed with the COMELEC her
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator
for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered
"6 years and 6 months" to the question
"Period of residence in the Philippines
before May 13, 2013."

October 15, Petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency

2015 for the May 2016 Elections.

In her COC, the petitioner declared that she

is a natural-born citizen and that her
residence in the Philippines up to the day
before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years
and eleven (11) months counted from 24
May 2005.

Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of
several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.

ISSUE:
1.     With regard to: a) being a foundling, and b) her repatriation, is the petitioner a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines? YES TO BOTH.
RATIONALE:
1.    Is petitioner a natural-born citizen of the Philippines?
ON BEING A FOUNDLING:

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.

The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation.  That said,
there is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a
natural-born Filipino.

The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown, but
whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:

Sec. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as
to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be
allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability of
improbability of the fact in issue.

Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a
Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were
 aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status
did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where
there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.

The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)
that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while
the total number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that
any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%.

Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws
do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a
Filipino in the first place to be adopted.

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was
abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino
features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond-shaped eyes and an oval face.

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part
of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 15:

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the
right to change his nationality.

In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"

To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there
may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child
of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just
doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the
Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is
effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no reason to sacrifice the fundamental political
rights of an entire class of human beings.

While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive

language which would definitely exclude foundlings either.

ON PETITIONER’S REPATRIATION

The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of R.A. No.
9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that
since the applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but
only plain "Philippine citizenship."
According to the Supreme Court, the COMELEC's ruling disregarded consistent jurisprudence
on the matter of repatriation.

In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, repatriation was explained as follows:

…Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-bom Filipino.

Also, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was already rejected
in Bengson vs. HRET  where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth:
"A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born
citizen thereof."

LABO JR. VS COMELEC

[Link]

GR No. 86564, August 1, 1989 (Constitutional Law – Loss of Citizenship)

FACTS: Herein petitioner, claiming for recognition as a Philippine citizen is a mayor-elect who, through
his marriage with an Australian national, was naturalized and took an oath of allegiance as an Australian
citizen. Said marriage was found to be bigamous and therefore was annulled. Petitioner claims that his
naturalization made him only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was divested of his Philippine citizenship.

HELD: Yes, because Commonwealth Act No. 63 clearly stated that Philippine citizenship may be lost
through naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation of citizenship; and by oath of allegiance
to a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner.

ROMUALDEZ MARCOS VS COMELEC

CASE DIGEST [Link]

Facts: 
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place
was seven (7) months.

On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and
disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply with the
constitutional requirement for residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency
requirement for candidates for the House of Representative.
In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to
since childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation
showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First
District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that
the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of
votes.

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming
winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.

Issue: 
Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one year
residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.

Held:
Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte.

Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept
of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a
candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required by the
1987 Constitution.

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in
different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of
persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in
favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her
domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand
E. Marcos.

It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run
for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously
referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.

Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat
in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned
resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of
Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First District
of Leyte.