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Personal Details
Principal Investigator Prof. A. Raghuramaraju Department of Philosophy,
University of Hyderabad
Paper Coordinator Prof. Raghunath Ghosh Department of Philosophy,
University of North Bengal
Content Writer Prof. Amit Bhattacharjee Department of Sanskrit,
Burdwan University
Content Reviewer Prof. Pradeep Gokhale Department of Philosophy, Central
University of Tibetan Studies
Language Editor Mr. Raghavendra Rao Harnoor Freelancer, Hyderabad
Description of Module
Subject Name Philosophy
Paper Name Epistemology-II
Module Name/Title Dinnāga and Dharmakirti on Theories of Perception
Module Id 6.7
Pre-requisites General understanding of the Buddhist Theories of Perception
Objectives To generate an awareness among scholars regarding Buddhist Theories of
Perception
Keywords Savikalpaka, nirvikalpaka, kalpanā, svabhāva, paramārthasat,
ātmasamvadana, yogijňānam
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Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti on the Theories of Perception
Indian philosophical systems have formulated their theories of cognition as per their different ontological
or metaphysical presuppositions. Buddhists are not exception to this and hence before discussing theories
of cognition they have presupposed various ontological theories like momentariness (anityatā), causal
efficacy (arthakriyākāritva) as a mark of existence (sat) etc. Being backed by these ideas they have
developed a theory of knowledge. Like other philosophers also the Buddhists believe in the primacy of
perception. Gradually we will see how Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti have developed the theory of perception
being influenced by the admitted presuppositions.
Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti both were pioneers in the development of Buddhist philosophy. In this chapter
we present a brief outline of their theories of perception, which were later criticised and refuted by other
scholars of Indian philosophy. It is well-known that conflict with the Buddhists largely stimulated
philosophic enquiry in most Hindu schools of thought. Knowledge of Buddhism is, therefore, indispensable
for a right understanding of the different systems in their mutual relation and opposition to Buddhism.
Buddhists have taken the Naiyāyikas very seriously for critical examination. Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, in
particular, have played a great role in refuting the position of the Naiyāyikas, in their respective texts, which
we have referred to.
Diṅnāga, His Life and Works
Diṅnāga is one of the most prominent figures in the development of Buddhist philosophy in India (450–
520 A.D.). He is regarded as the father of Medieval Logic. Among his predecessors, Nāgārjuna (c. 300
A.D.), Āryadeva (c.320 A.D.), Maitrey (c. 400 A.D.), Asaṅga (c. 405 A.D.) and Vasubandhu (c. 410A.D.)
are remarkable. Yet, their treatment of methodical discussion was simple, mixed with the problems of the
Yogācāra and Vaibhāṣika schools of philosophy. With the advent of Diṅnāga, a new vista was opened in
the field of Logic. Both in matter and manner, his works marked a distinct departure from those of his
predecessors. The great orientalist, Satis Chandra Vidyabhusan, remarked that the keenness of his insight
and the soundness of his critical acumen combined to mark him with an individuality all his own. No praise
seems too high for him.
Diṅnāga was born in a Brahmin family near Kāñchī. Nāgadatta, a scholar, admitted him to hissect,
Vātsīputrīya, and gradually, Diṅnāga attained erudition in the Tripiṭaka. Having completed the first phase
of his education, he became a disciple of Vasubandhu. Miraculously, he once saw the face of Mañjuśrī, the
Buddhist god of learning. He became inspired and moved to Nālāndā, where a large number of Brāhmana
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scholars and tīrtha dialecticians were defeated in debate. As a result of this achievement, Diṅnāga was
called a “Bull in Discussion” or a “Fighting Bull”. In Sanskrit, he is referred to as “Tarka-pungaba”. His
art of argumentation was circulated all over India, as he travelled on and countered his opponents
spontaneously. Kālidāsa, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Mis´ra, Mallinātha, KumārilBhatta, Pārtha Sārathi Miśra
and many others attempted to oppose him. Most of his life was spent in current Andhra Pradesh.
The following works were written by Dinnāga, although some of his Sanskrit texts are now lost.
a) Pramāņa -samuccaya
b) Nyāyapraveśa
c) Hetucakrahamaru
d) Pramāņasamuccaya-Vŗtti
e) Pramāņs´ astra Nyāyapraves´a
f) Ālambana-Parīksā
g) Ālambana Parīksā-Vŗtti
h) Trikāla-Pariksā
Dharmakīrti, His Life and Works
Ācārya Dharmakīrti was ingenious in the art of argumentation (c. 635–650 A.D.). By birth, he was Brahmin
and was born in Trimalaya, the kingdom of Cuḍāmaṇi. The name of his father was Korunanda. Since
childhood, due to a keen interest in education, he became a scholar in all traditional subjects. Having
acquired profound erudition, he realised that the teachings of Lord Buddha were faultless. Slowly, his strong
inclination towards Buddhism engulfed him. As a result of this, Dharmakīrti was made an outcast by the
Brahmans. He started travelling throughout the country and defeated all his opponents and converted many
of them to Buddhism. Dharmakīrti is sometimes designated by the shorter name, Kīrti. Jayanta, Vācaspati
addressed him as Kīrti. Jayanta said, “Atra Kīrtikarāḥa…” (Nyāyamañjarī, Āhnika 12) and Vācaspati said,
“Tasmād yaduktam Kirtinā…”(Nyāyavārtiak-Tataparyaikā 5.2.5). Dharmakīrti wrote numerous works on
Logic, notably the following:
a) Pramāņa-Vārtika
b) Pramāņa-Vārtik - Vŗtti
c) PramāņaViniścaya
d) Nyāyabindu
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e) Hetubinduvivaraņa
f) Vādanyāya
g) Santānāntarasiddhi
h) Sambandhaparīksā and
i) Sambandhaparīksā-Vŗtti
Diṅnāga’s Views on Perception:
Pratyakṣa (perception)in the Brahmanical system is ordinarily divided into two aspects: a. Nirvikalpa
(indeterminate) and (b) Savikalpa (determinate).However, the Buddhists turn down the second aspect and
hold the first, though with them, it means something entirely different from what it means for the Brahmans.
One with visual cognition can perceive the unique character of a thing (i.e., nīlam vijānāti), but not its
common character (i.e., nīlam iti vijānāti). Here, the former corresponds roughly to an acquaintance with
an object while the latter supplies descriptive knowledge about it. A person in association with visual
consciousness cognises the colour blue as blue, but not that it is blue.
Diṅnāga did not describe any formal definition of perception. However, he described perception as being
freed from preconception and being unconnected with name, genus and so on. In Pramāṇasamuccaya, he
said:
Pratyakṣamanumānaṁca Pramānaṁ hi dvilakṣaṇam.
Prameyaṁ tatra siddhaṁ hi na pramāṇāntaraṁ bhavet.
(ChapterI)
Chapter 1 of the Pramāṇasamuccaya is titled Pratyakṣa (perception). Diṅnāga says that man can perceive
a thing without knowing its name. Actually, the perception of a thing consists of the knowledge of its
individual characteristics alone.
Diṅnāga’s whole theory of perception has severely been criticised by the Nyāyavātikakāra(1.1.4). Through
his criticism, we are able to learn that he says, “Pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍam”, that is, perception is free from
conceptual construction. The adjective kalpanāpoḍa eliminates any inference that is invariably associated
with ideal constructions. It is also competent to exclude errors and illusions from perception.
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Dharmakīrti’s Definition of Perception:
In Nyāyabindu, Dharmakīrti has categorically defined perception. The book is divided into three chapters,
and in the very first chapter, perception is defined: Perception is part of important, valid knowledge or
“dvibidhaṁsamyagjn᷉ānam” (1.2). Perception is direct knowledge. Here, direct knowledge means neither
construction nor illusion. Therefore, perception is cognition that is free from conceptual constructions and
illusions. He says: Tatra Kalpanāpoḍambhrāntam Pratyakṣam(1.4). Perception should be non-constructive
(Kalpanāpoḍam) and non-illusive (Abhrāntam).
Dharmakīrti also defines Kalpanā Abhrānta. Kalpanā denotes construction and construction of nothing,
but a mental reflex. We find the following in Nyāyabindu: Abhilā pasaṅsargajogyaprativāsapratītiḥ
kalpanā tayā rahitam (1.5). This sentence gives an indication of one of its characteristics. The Buddhist
admits both (i) pure sensation (nirvikalpa=Kalpanāpoḍḥ) and (ii) definite perception (savikalpaka). The
latter exists under the name of pramānaphala. Diṅnāga indicates nirvikalpa as pramāhasat (absolute
reality). One may ask why? In answering this question, Buddhists say construction has no ultimate truth.
Again, the question may arise, why?
It is said to pacify questioner every variation in time, space and quality (Svabhāva) is an indication of
something others. That is to say, if something remains in time, space and quality, it remains changing and
hence it does not remain as the same object seen earlier, rather ‘something different’ from the earlier. The
identity of an object in this way is reduced to a single moment, which has neither duration in time nor
extension in space. Men are like a passing series of moments. Dharmakīrti wants to exclude errors from the
category of perception. In our daily life, error is caused by darkness, quick motion in a journey by a shaking
boat, and so on; for instance, to a man journeying by boat, trees on both banks appear to move. Dharmakīrti
says: Timirāṡubhramaņa–Nouẏāna-Saṅkvādyanāhitabivraṁjn᷉ānaṁ Pratyakṣam (1.6). Here, by the word
“timira”, one may understand colourblindness. So, knowledge exempts from such construction, and when
it is not affected by an illusion, what is produced by those is perceptive knowledge.
Dharmakīrti divides perception into four parts (See Nyāyabindu 7–11 sutras). To understand properly
Dharmakīrti’s view regarding the classification of perception, we may follow this diagram below.
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PERCEPTION
(i) Indriyajn᷉ānam (ii) Manovijn᷉ānam (iii) Ātmasaṅvedanam (iv) Yogijn᷉ānam
(Sensation) (Mental Sensation) (Self-conscious)
(Saint’s Direct Perception)
Indriyajn᷉ānam (Sense Knowledge) depends on the activity of the senses alone. The proper object of sense
knowledge is the object in the moment corresponding to the sensation.
Second, Manovijn᷉ānam (Mental Sensation) is to be admitted. To indicate that the proper object and the
following object are not different, manovijn᷉ānam is necessary. Here, difference means interval in time as
well as difference in quality. Therefore, when the difference of two objects (previous and subsequent) is
excluded, the supported moment of the object of sensation also exists in the second moment and is
homogeneous. It does not mean both are same although both are identical. On Buddhist grounds, all reality
is reduced to momentary reality. To simplify this thought, we may say correlation/cooperation exists
between the two. Due to this reason, Dharmakīrti defines mental sensation or manovijňāna as:
Svaviṣayānantara viṣayasahākarinendriyajn᷉ānen Samanantarapratyayenajanitaṁ manovijn᷉ānam (1.9).
Third, every consciousness and every mental phenomenon is self-conscious. It is pertinent to point out the
language of Dharmakīrti: Sarvacittacaittāmātmasaṅvedanam (I.I0).Consciousness apprehends the
presence of an object. On the contrary, mental phenomena apprehend special kinds of consciousness, such
as pleasure and so on.
Lastly, Yogijn᷉ānam is a kind of perception that is entirely mental, and not at all sensuous. Yogi Pratyakṣa
(mystic intuition) is that faculty of the Buddhist Saint (ārya) by which he is capable of completely changing
all ordinary habits of thought. In this case, he acquires the habit of thought. He also acquires the habit of
realising the relativity (Śūnyatā) and unreality of the phenomenal veil (saṅvṛti) concealing absolute reality
(paramātha=Bhūtārtha). It is defined as: Bhūtārthabhāvanā-prakarṣa-paryantajam yogijn᷉ānaṁ ceti (1.11).
Distinction between Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti on the Theory of Perception:
We have already seen the definitions of perception given by Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. Now, we shall
discuss the differentiation of their opinion.
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Diṅnāga omitted putting Pratyakṣa under the rubric “valid knowledge” (samyagjn᷉āna), as Dharmakīrti has
done, and Uddyotakara has made capital out of this apparent omission. There is, however, no room for
honest doubt that Diṅnāga proposed to give a definition of Pratyakṣa as a species of valid knowledge and
could not mean anything else. We see that the definition of Pratyakṣa, as propounded by Diṅnāga, is self-
contained and self-sufficient. In Diṅnāga’s definition, only the single adjective Kalpanāpoḍam has been
deemed sufficient to exclude inferences. As we are aware, inference is invariably associated with ideal
construction (Kalpanā).
However, Dharmakīrti has added another element, namely, abhrānta (non-erroneous) to Diṅnāga’s
definition with a view to excluding errors from the category of perception. Dharmakīrti distinguishes
between imagination and perception. For him, perception of an object is only possible by negating false
perception, that is, imagination. There is a lot of debate among the Buddhists regarding the utility of the
insertion of the term “abhrānta” in Dharmakirti’s definition of perception.
Some argue that this additional qualification is redundant because Diṅnāga’s definition is competent enough
to exclude such contingencies. Actually, this addition has been a source of confusion. Śāntarakṣita gives
his opinion elaborately in this regard.
On the contrary, Vinītadeva, an older commentator of Nyāyabindu, interprets differently. He explains,
‘abhrānta’ as not lacking correspondence with reality” (avisaṁvādaka).
Dharmottara has discussed this question at length in his Pramāņa-viniścayatikā. According to him, illusion
may sometimes be right, “vibhramepi pramāņatā”.
Due to this reason, Diṅnāga has omitted the word “abhrānta” in his definition.
Contributions of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti to the Buddhist epistemology
The branch of philosophy that deals with knowledge is called epistemology. The philosophy of the medieval
schools of Buddhism was conducted into existence by Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. No yardstick is sufficient
enough to measure their contributions to the development of Buddhist epistemology. Both of them
influenced not only Brahmanical thought, but also the non-Brahmanical speculation in Indian philosophy.
At this point, I wish to present a brief outline of the important tenets of Buddhist epistemology, which are
later criticised and refuted by other systems of Indian philosophy.
The Diṅnāga–Dharmakīrti school of Buddhism says that what is sensed or directly grasped by our
perceptual experience cannot be captured by our use of word or language as language is a social affair and
we can transmit through it only what is inter-subjectively accessible. When we say, “This is that book”, we
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perceive the book with our eyes at the present moment. But, “this book “is the same as “that book”, that is,
the book arising in memory cannot be perceived by the senses. The feeling of identity is due to confusion
between an object of memory referring to a past and a different object as perceived at the present moment
by the senses.
One of the important principles of Buddhism is Sarvam Kşaņikam. All is momentary. Therefore,
momentariness is the characteristic feature of the world. Things are subject to change and decay, concepts,
ideas; objects are artificial cuts in an uninterrupted flow of moments. Every variation in time, space and
quality (svabhāva) is an indication of something which is called “other” (yad viruddha-dharma-saṁsṛṣṭain
tan nānā). The identity of an idea or an object thus reduces to a single moment, which has neither duration
in time (Kāla-ananugata), not extension in space (deśa-ananugata). Actually, our intention is to focus on
a no-duration moment, creation–-destruction of the theory of Buddhism (Kṣaṇabhedena Vastuno bhedaḥ,
deśa -kāla-vyatirikta- avayavy-abhāvāt).
From this point of view, every definite cognition, since it corresponds to a subsequent moment, when the
sensation is over, will be cognition of an “other” object. Although some may say it is wrong, it is not.
Buddhist philosophers say empirical cognition refers to a series of moments (Santāna), where infinitesimal
time (sūkșma-kāla-bheda) is not taken into account. Thus, the definition of knowledge is framed so as to
agree with realities having some stability, snātan-apekșayāprāmāņya-lakșaṇam ucyate.
Both Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti see pure sensation (nirvikalpaka) as the only source of knowledge through
which we come in touch with absolute reality (paramārtha sat), that is, with the thing in itself
(svalakșaṇam). In this context, it is pertinent to point out that another principal feature of Buddhist thought
has been revealed here: as it is said, all is like itself alone, itself alone (svalakșaṇam svalakșaṇam). As a
result of this, one may say each object/subject is distinct from another.
Buddhist philosophers categorically established their epistemological thought. They were suspicious of any
sort of theorising about the world that we experience. They believe that all concepts that are produced from
mind are not real in the ultimate sense. But at the same time the conventional reality of these mental
concepts has been admitted by them. They have said that there are two kinds of truth: one is conventional
(sāmvŗtika) and another is ultimate (pāramārthika) and between the two “sat” only the paramārtha, which
has ultimate reality:
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dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṁ dharmadeśanā .
Lokasinvṛti satyaṅca satyaṅc pāramārthikaḥ.
(Madhamaka-śāstra, 24/8)
Dharmakīrti’s own view is entirely different. He does not believe that our perception can be judgemental
or propositional. That is why perception has been defined as non-conceptual and non-constructional. All
construction comes from our mental propensities and dispositions. Each and every person carries with
himself or herself a ‘beginning-less constructional memory-bank’. The “It” in “It is a book” does not refer
to the datum of perception, but to an image of it, which is already a universal or a construct. Dharmakīrti
remarks that although constructs are wrongly identified as objects, and thereby, prompt us to act; our actions
become successful (in most cases) because the constructs are nevertheless indirectly linked up with the
object. Successful activity arises when the individual linkage of the construct (concept) with the object
(percept) is correct (pramāņavārtika, verse 57). He also said that the object of perception is two-fold,
namely, (i) grāhya (apprehensible and (ii) adhyavasaya (determinable). The first is a particular and the
second is a universal.
In conclusion, it may be said that in the development of epistemological thought, both of them (Diṅnāga
and Dharmakīrti) are unique. Ages will roll on, new names will become prominent in the field of discourse,
but both will continue to shine on as before, with ever increasing lustre and brilliance.
Nature of Svalakșaņa:
According to Buddhist thought, all objects free from mental constructions (kalpanā) really are momentary
point-instances, absolutely independent of each other. Perception consists in the apprehension of an object
in its own specific character (svalakşaņa), having nothing in common with other objects, similar or
dissimilar. Therefore, svalakșaņa is completely free of association with names and verbal expressions.
Actually, the object is two-fold: svalakșaņa and sāmanyalakṣaņ. Svam Asādhāraņaṁ lakșaņaṁ tattvam.
The object of cognition is really double, the prima facie apprehended and the definitely realised. The first
is called svalakșaņa as that appears directly in the first moment. The second is the form, which is
constructed as perceptive in a judgement. The directly perceived and the distinctly conceived are two
different things. Depending upon the theory of momentariness, this distinction is expressed. Name, quality,
action and substratum are supplied by imagination.
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Svalakșan has ultimate reality. It is not to be attained through dialectics. Dharmakīrti says: tadeva
paramārthasat (Nyāyabindu14). In Sutra no.13, the definition of Svalakșaņa is found: Yasyārthasy
sannidhānāsannidhānāvyāṁ jn᷉āna pratibhāsavedastat svalakșaņa. It means when an object of cognition
produces a clear flash of consciousness, if it is near, and a dim one, if it is, although remote, but still liable
to the senses, it is a particular.
The essence of reality is just efficiency. Here, efficiency (arthakṛyā) denotes the capacity to produce
something. Now, a question may arise why svalakșaņa is called paramārthasat? Dharmakirti answers:
Arthakṛyāsāmarthya lakṣaņātvād vastunaḥ (Nyāyabindu, 15).
