INSULAR LIFE v.
NLRC and BASIAO -
INSULAR LIFE v. DELOS REYES
In Basiao, the agent was appointed Agency Manager under an Agency Manager
Contract. To implement his end of the agreement, Melecio Basiao organized an agency
office to which he gave the name M. Basiao and Associates. The Agency Manager Contract
practically contained the same terms and conditions as the Agency Contract earlier entered
into, and the Court observed that, "drawn from the terms of the contract they had entered
into, (which) either expressly or by necessary implication, Basiao (was) made the master of
his own time and selling methods, left to his own judgment the time, place and means of
soliciting insurance, set no accomplishment quotas and compensated him on the bases of
results obtained. He was not bound to observe any schedule of working hours or report to
any regular station; he could seek and work on his prospects anywhere and at anytime he
chose to and was free to adopt the selling methods he deemed most effective." Upon these
premises, Basiao was considered as agent — an independent contractor — of petitioner
INSULAR LIFE.
Unlike Basiao, herein respondent De los Reyes was appointed Acting Unit Manager,
not agency manager. There is no evidence that to implement his obligations under the
management contract, De los Reyes had organized an office. Petitioner in fact has admitted
that it provided De los Reyes a place and a table at its office where he reported for and
worked whenever he was not out in the field. Placed under petitioner's Cebu District
Service Office, the unit was given a name by petitioner — De los Reyes and Associates —
and assigned Code No. 11753 and Recruitment No. 109398. Under the managership
contract, De los Reyes was obliged to work exclusively for petitioner in life insurance
solicitation and was imposed premium production quotas. Of course, the acting unit
manager could not underwrite other lines of insurance because his Permanent Certificate
of Authority was for life insurance only and for no other. He was proscribed from accepting
a managerial or supervisory position in any other office including the government without
the written consent of petitioner. De los Reyes could only be promoted to permanent unit
manager if he met certain requirements and his promotion was recommended by the
petitioner's District Manager and Regional Manager and approved by its Division Manager.
As Acting Unit Manager, De los Reyes performed functions beyond mere solicitation of
insurance business for petitioner. As found by the NLRC, he exercised administrative
functions which were necessary and beneficial to the business of INSULAR LIFE.
INSULAR LIFE v. DELOS REYES and TONGKO v. MANULIFE
Insular Life case dealt with the implications of de los Reyes’ appointment as acting
unit manager which was clearly defined under a subsequent contract. In the Insular case, a
determination of the presence of the Labor Code element of control was made on the basis
of the stipulations of the subsequent contracts. In stark contrast with the Insular Life case,
the only contract or document extant and submitted as evidence in the case of Tongko v.
Manulife is the Agreement – a pure agency agreement in the Civil Code context similar to
the original contract in the Insular Life v. Basiao.
Exclusivity of service, control of assignments and removal of agents under private
delos Reyes’ unit, collection of premiums, furnishing of company facilities and materials as
well as capital described as Unit Development Fund are but hallmarks of the management
system in which herein delos Reyes worked, are established proofs that delos Reyes was
indeed an employee of Insular; whereas, all these are absent in Tongko case.
INSULAR LIFE v. BASIAO and TONGKO v. MANULIFE
These cases were of the same factual milieu. Insular Life v. Basiao case, Insular Life
neither controlled nor restricted the choice of methods – or the methods themselves – of
selling insurance by agency manager Melecio Basiao, leaving him free to exercise his own
judgment as to the time, place and means of soliciting insurance.
The same with the Tongko case, where Tongko was the Supreme Court ruled that a
commitment to abide by the rules and regulations of an insurance company does not ipso
facto make the insurance agent an employee. Neither do guidelines somehow restrictive of
the insurance agent’s conduct necessarily indicate "control" as this term is defined in
jurisprudence. Thus, there are management policy decisions in an insurance company that
the labor law element of control cannot reach.
Thus, in the Tongko case, Manulife’s codes of conduct, all of which did not intrude
into the insurance agents’ means and manner of conducting their sales and only control
them as to the desired results and Insurance Code norms, could not be used as basis for a
finding that the labor law concept of control existed between Manulife and Tongko.
