Richard Nat · ~.;...-.

First published in 1985 by Page 1: Occupying German troops march

Bison Books Ltd pasttheArc de Triomphe, Paris, 1940.
176 Old Brompton Road Page 2 -3: Italian troops on the Eastern
London SW5
Front, 1942.
Copyright © 1985 Bison Books Ltd Thispage: US MarinesatlwoJimaplot
the position ofa Japanese. machine gun
All rights reserved. No part of this publication post, February 1945.
may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system or transmitted in any form by any
means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying
or otherwise, without first obtaining written
permission of the copyright owner.

ISBN 0 86124 208 4

Printed in Belgium
Contents
Introduction 6
Blitzkrieg '10
The War in Northern Waters 32
The Desert War and the Mediterranean 42
Soviet Ambitions Betrayed 64
The Course of Global Conflict: 1939-45 78
The Japanese Juggernaut 96
The Italian Campaign 108
Ebb Tide in the Pacific 120
Retaking Burma: The Forgotten War 138
Russia Fin sIts S ength 148
F rtress E ope verthrQwn 166
In ex 190
6

•
n ro UC Ion
It has often been stated that World War II
was part of a European Civil War that
began in 1914 at the start ofWorld War I.
This is partly true. In Europe, at least,
the two world wars were the two hideous
halves of the Anglo-German controversy
that was at the heart of both conflicts.
The question posed was: would Britain be
able, or willing, to maintain her vast
Empire in the face of German hegemony
on the continent of Europe? The answer
to that question never came. Britain, in
seeking to thwart German interests on
the Continent, eventually lost her whole
Empire in the attempt -an empire that
between the wars encompassed a quarter
of the earth's surface and an equal pro-
portion of its population. Put into that
context, both world wars were dangerous
for Britain to fight, jeopardizing the very
existence of the Empire and inevitably
weakening the mother country to the
point that she could not. maintain her
world position at the end of the conflicts.
From Germany's point of view, the
wars were not only dangerous in that
they finally ruined virtually every town
and city, devastated the countryside and
dismembered the nation; they were
irrelevant. In 1890 Germany was in a
position from which, within a generation,
she would economically dominate the
whole of Europe. Inevitably, with that
economic hegemony, political hegemony
would soon follow, ifnot even precede. By
1910 the process was well in train; had no
one done anything to stop her, Germany
would have achieved the Kaiser's dreams
without war by the mid 1920s. The col-
lapse of Imperial Germany in 1918, fol-
lowed by temporary occupation, inflation
and national humiliation, set Germany
back only a few years. Despite the disas-
ters of World War I and its aftermath,
Germany was quickly recovering her old
position - roughly that of 1910 - by the
time Hitler took power in 1933. By 1938
German power in Europe was greater
than ever before, and Britain had to face
the old question once again. Could she
condone German political dominance of
the Continent?
In 1938 some Conservatives, like
Chamberlain and Halifax, recognized the
threat and were tacitly willing to main-
tain the Imperial status quo and condone
Hitler. Other Tories, like Churchill and
the Labour and Liberal Parties, wanted
to challenge Germany again. Had Hitler
been a bit more discreet and less hurried,
perhaps a bit less flamboyant and
 7

Below: Dunkirk, scene ofan ignominious

retreat by Allied forces that signaled the
Fall ofFrance.

virulently anti-Semitic, Chamberlain's

policy might have succeeded. Germany
would have extended her power in
Europe and the Empire would have been
maintained. But that was to ask the im-
possible, to wish that Hitler were some-
one other than Hitler. The result -
humiliation of Britain's policy when
Czechoslovakia was overrun in March
1939 - forced even Chamberlain's hand,
and the stage was set for round two of the
European Civil War.
World War II in Europe was very like a
Greek tragedy, wherein the elements of
disaster are present before the play be-
gins, and the tragedy is writ all the larger
because of the disaster's inevitability.
The story of the war, told through the
maps of Richard Natkiel in this volume,
are signposts for the historian of human
folly. In the end, Germany and Italy were
destroyed, along with much of Europe.
With the devastation came the inevitable
collapse of both the impoverished British
Empire and centuries of European
hegemony in the world. A broader look
from the perspective of the 1980s would
indicate a further irony. Despite Ger-
many's loss of part of its Polish and Rus-
sian territory and its division into two
countries, not to mention the separation
of Austria from the Reich and the semi-
permanent occupation of Berlin, the Ger-
man economic advance was only delayed,
not permanently stopped. The Federal
Republic is clearly the strongest economy
in Western Europe today and the fourth
strongest in the world. The German
Democratic Republic rates twelfth on
this basis. Together their economies are
roughly as strong as that of the Soviet
Union, and their political reunification is
now less of a dream, more of a reality
toward which Germans on both sides of
the Iron Curtain are striving. One day,
probably within the next two decades, a
form of unification may take place, and
when it does, German power on the Con-
tinent will be greater than ever before.
No wonder the Soviets and many West-
ern Europeans view this prospect with
fear and cynicism. What had the world
. wars been for? For what ideals had the
blood of tens of millions been spilt?
The irony of World War II becomes
even clearer when one views briefly its
second half, the struggle between Japan
and the United States for control of the
Pacific. The question facing American
Presidents from Theodore Roosevelt to
Franklin Roosevelt had been: could the
8
 9

Left: The successful Russian defense of

Stalingrad was a major setback to
German war plans.
Below: Japanese tanks pass a wrecked
British ambulance inBurma, 1942.

United States maintain its security and The greatest disaster in the history of Perhaps the balance of the 20th century
trade routes in the Pacific in the face ofan mankind to date was World War II. This and the early years of the 21st will be
increasingly powerful Japanese Navy atlas is a valuable reference work for very like the past 40 years: small con-
and economy? For decades the question those who feel it bears remembering. flicts, limited wars, brinkmanship, arms
was begged, until the Japanese took mat- Clearly, this is the case, but the lessons of races and world tension - yes; general
ters into their own hands at Pearl Har- the war have been less clearly spelled out war, no. If our future takes this course,
bor, the Philippines, Vietnam and - to those who fought in it, who remember the period following World War II may be
Malaya in 1941. The ensuing tragedy, as it, or who suffered from it, as well as to seen by historians of the 21st century as a
inevitable in the Pacific as was its coun- subsequent generations who were shaped time similar to the century following the
terpart in Europe, became obvious by it and fascinated by its horrific drama. Napoleonic Wars - one of growing world
almost from the outset. Millions died in The exceptional maps of Richard Natkiel prosperity, which has indeed been appa-
vain; Japan itself was devastated by fire of The Economist, which punctuate this rent for some nations since 1945, many
and atomic bombs, and eventually con- volume, can give only the outlines of the crises, but no all-out war. If that is our
ceded defeat. tragedy; they do not seek to give, nor can future, as it has been our recent past, the
From a forty-year perspective, what they give, the lessons to be learned. study of World War II will have been
was the point of the Pacific War? Japan It would seem that if anything useful is more than useful. It will have prepared
has the third largest economy in the to be derived from studying World War II, the world psychologically to avoid world
world and by far the largest in Asia. In it is this: avoid such conflicts at all costs. conflict at all cost. In that event, for the
recent years the United States has No nation can profit from them. This is sake of a relatively stable, increasingly
actually encouraged Japan to flex its certainly truer today than if these words prosperous ~cold peace,' the 1939-45 con-
political muscles, increase its armed had been written in 1945. The advances flict will not have been in vain. If war is
forces and help the United States police of science have made a future world COH- the price for a bloodstained peace, those
the Western Pacific. It would seem that . flict even less appetizing to those who are who will benefit are ourselves and future
this conflict was as tragically futile as the still mad enough to contemplate such a generations.
European Civil War. thing. S L Mayer
12

The Swastika
Ascendant

T
he German humiliation at Versail- plemented a military build-up in defiance
les was skillfully exploited by of the Versailles Treaty, which had li- August 1939 rJ
Adolf Hitler and his Nazis, who mited German armed forces to an army of

~b~
rode to power in 1933 on a tide of national 100,000 and a small navy without armor
resentment that they had channeled to or air force support. Groundwork was laid
their purpose. The territorial losses, eco- for a much larger army to be built up by
nomic hardships and affronts to German conscription upon a highly trained pro-
pride embodied in the Treaty of Versail- fessional base organized by General
1es virtually guaranteed the conflict that Hans von Seeckt. The prohibited tanks
escalated into World War II. As Marshal and planes were developed secretly,
Foch had prophesied when the treaty was many in the Soviet Union, and future
forced upon a prostrate Germany: (This is pilots were trained. Meanwhile, the
not Peace. It is an Armistice for twenty Nazis continued to scapegoat the Jews
years.' and other minorities for the nation's
Hitler's stormy career seemed to reach problems; they established the first con-
its zenith when he seized control of the centration camp at Dachau in the same c::::J
German expansion in Europe
German Government in March of 1933. year they came to power.
In fact, it was only beginning. Hitler im- Germany withdrew from the League of

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 13

Previous page: German blitzkrieg

(lightning war) tactics were expertly
executed by their highly trained troops.
Below left: Germany's expansion by
August 1939.
Bottom left: Detail showing the recently
annexed Rhineland and S udetenland.
Below: The Nuremberg Rally in 1934,
withAdolfHitler(center).

Nations, and by 1935 Hitler could step was to bring all Germans living out- of which we know little.' France had to
announce repudiation of the Treaty of side the Reich into the (Greater Ger- stand by its alliance with Britain, and the
Versailles. He told the world that the many.' Austria was annexed in March Czechoslovakian democracy was isolated
German Air Force had been re-created, 1938, with only token protests from Bri- in a rising sea of German expansionism.
and that the army would be strengthened tain and France. Even more ominous was The Sudetenland, with its vital frontier
to 300,000 through compulsory military Hitler's demand that Czechoslovakia defenses, was handed over. Far from
service. The Western democracies, turn over its western border - the Su- securing (peace in our time,' as Neville
France and Britain, failed to make any detenland - on ground that its three mil- Chamberlain had promised after
meaningful protest, a weakness that en- lion German-speaking inhabitants were Munich, this concession opened the door
couraged Hitler's ambition to restore oppressed. The Nazis orchestrated a de- to Nazi occupation of all Czechoslovakia
Germany to her (rightful place' as mand for annexation among the Sudeten in March 1939".
Europe's most powerful nation. Germans, and the Czechoslovakian Gov- Only at this point did the Western
Nazi Germany's first overt move ernment prepared to muster its strong democracies grasp the true scope of Hit-
beyond her borders was into the Rhine- armed forces for resistance. Then British ler's ambitions. Belatedly, they began to
land, which was reoccupied in 1936. This Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain rearm after years of war-weary stasis. By
coup was achieved more through bravado flew to Munich to confer with Hitler. now Hitler's forces were more than equal
than by superior force. Hitler's generals Chamberlain rationalized that the to theirs, and the Fiihrer was looking
had counseled against it on account of the problem was one affecting Central eastward, where Poland's Danzig Corri-
relative size of France's army, but the Europe alone, and expressed reluctance dor stood between him and East Prussia,
reoccupation was uncontested. The next to risk war on behalf of (a far-off country the birthplace of German militarism.
14

The Partition of
Poland

.
SLONIM

F
rance and Britain tried to forestall
the Nazi assault on Poland by
issuing a joint guarantee to the ---~
threatened nation. This was supposed to
provide leverage whereby the democra-
cies could persuade the Poles to make
concessions similar to those made by the
Czechs. But Hitler's aggressiveness grew
more apparent throughout the spring
and summer of 1939. In April he revoked
both the German-Polish Non-Aggression
Pact and the Anglo-German Naval
Agreement of 1935. Then he sent emis-
saries to the Soviet Union, where
Joachim von Ribbentrop concluded both
an 'economic agreement and a Non- .LVOV

Aggression Pact with Josef Stalin. By 1

September 1939, the Germans were
ready to invade Poland on two fronts in
their first demonstration of blitzkrieg -
lightning war - a strategy that combined
surprise, speed and terror. It took Ger-
man forces just 18 days to conquer Po-
.'"
land, which had no chance to complete its HUNGARY
mobilization. The Poles had a bare dozen
cavalry brigades and a few light tanks to
send against nine armored divisions. A
total of five German armies took part in
the assault, and German superiority in BALTIC SEA
artillery and infantry was at least three
to one. The Polish Air Force was almost
entirely destroyed on the ground by the
Luftwaffe offensive supporting Army
Groups North and South.

Above right: The Nazi thrust into Poland,

early September.
Right: Russia counterattacks, mid to late
September.
Below: The partition orPoland as agreed
by Germany and Russia.

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 15

Below: German troops enter Warsaw. The

city finally surrendered on 2 7 September
after 56 hours ofresistance against air
and artillery attack.

Thinly spread Polish troops staggered the invasion of Poland. Australia, New became obvious that Russia and Ger-
back from their border, and German Zealand and South Africa soon joined many had reached a secret agreement on
forces were approaching Warsaw a week them. Since the Western Allies had failed the partition of Poland during the sum-
later. The Poles made a last-ditch effort in their diplomatic efforts to enlist Soviet mer months. On 17 September Soviet
along the Bzura River to halt the German support, they faced a united totalitarian troops crossed the eastern frontier to take
advance against their capital, but they front of Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Vilnyas; a German-Soviet Treaty of
could not withstand the forces pitted Russia (which could be counted upon to Friendship was announced two days
against them. The Polish Government take full advantage of Poland's impo- later. On 28 September, after Warsaw's
fled to Rumania, and on 27 September tence). Stalin had made it clear that he surrender, Russia annexed 77,000 square
Warsaw finally capitulated. wanted a free hand in Eastern Europe miles of eastern Poland. The other 73,000
Meanwhile, Britain and France had when he cast his lot with Germany. Be- square miles, bordering on Germany,
declared war on Germany 48 hours after fore the month of September was out, it were declared a Reich protectorate.
16

GERMAN

Blitzkrieg - North • • SEABORNE LANDINGS AND ATTACKS

PARATROOP LANDINGS
Group I NAVAL GROUPS
ALLIES
1 Div NORWEGIAN DISPOSITIONS
• • LANDINGS AND ATTACKS
E _ WITHDRAWALS
o ,
MILES
I
150
!
I
KILoMETE~S
9April
Gneisenau damaged by Renown

Narvik: 8 April
2 British destroyers sunk by German
troop-ferrying destroyers.
10/1 J April, 10 German destroyers sunk

X 8 June
Glorious sunk, Scharnhorst
damaged in naval action

NORWEGIAN SEA

. e:::J 9 April 1940

German expansion in Europe German forces land simultaneously 16/17 April
at Oslo, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Br 146 Inf Ode
Bergen, Trondheim & Narvik.
itler counted on Allied reluctance

H to assume an active role in the

war, and he was not disappointed.
The six-month hiatus known as the
Phony War lasted from September 1939
until April 1940, when Germany invaded
Norway and Denmark. In the interim, SWEDEN
Britain and France made plans that
could only fail, because they were based
on a negative concept: avoidance ·of the
costly direct attacks that had character-
ized World War I. New Anglo-French
strategy focused on naval blockade and
encirclement - indirect methods that
were no match for the new blitzkrieg tac-
tics of Nazi Germany.
Early in 1940 Hitler turned his atten-
tion to Scandinavia, where he had a
vested interest in Swedish iron ore im-
ports that reached Germany via the
Norwegian port ofNarvik. Norway had a
small Nazi Party, headed by Vidkun
Quisling, that could be counted upon for 9 April
fifth-column support. F~bruary brought Heavy cruiser
evidence that the Allies would resist a Blucher sunk

/r
by shore batteries
German incursion into Norway when the
Altmark, carrying British prisoners, was
boarded in Norwegian waters by a Brit- 10April Group III ~
ish party. Both sides began to make plans Light cruiser C;;S
Konigsberg bombed ~/
for a Northern confrontation. & sunk
On 9 April the Germans launched their
invasion of Norway and Denmark, based
on a bold strategy that called for naval 11 Aprit
--..,....- Heavy cruiser
landings at six points in Norway, sup- Lutzow damaged
ported by waves of paratroops. The naval by torpedo
escort for the Narvik landing suffered
heavy losses, and the defenders of Oslo 16 February 1940 _ - - - - - - - -
Altmark boarded
sank the cruiser Blucher and damaged
the pocket battleship LutZDW. Even so,
the Germans seized vital airfields, which 9April
allowed them to reinforce their assault Cruiser Karlsruhe
torpedoed & sunk Group IV
units and deploy their warplanes against
the Royal Navy ships along the coast.
9 April 1940
German forces occupy Denmark
 17

Denmark had already been overrun and Norway and Denmark would remain Opposite top left: The Reich expands to the
posed no threat to German designs. under German occupation throughout north and east.
Norwegian defense forces were weak, the war, and it seemed that Hitler's Scan- Opposite: German forces forge through
and the Germans captured numerous dinavian triumph was complete. Howev- Denmark and make six simultaneous
arms depots at the outset, leaving hastily er, German naval losses there would landings in Norway.
mobilized reservists without any hamper plans for the invasion of Britain, A bove: A Norwegian port burns as the
weapons. Allied planning proved wholly and the occupation would tie up numer- Germans follow through their surprise
inadequate to German professionalism ous German troops for the duration. The attack.
and air superiority. Kristiansand, Sta- Allies were not much consoled by these
vanger, Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik reflections at the time. The Northern
were all lost to the Germans, along with blitzkrieg had been a heavy blow to their
the country's capital, Oslo. Few Allied morale, and the Germans had gained
troops were trained for landing, and valuable Atlantic bases for subsequent
those who did get ashore were poorly sup- operations.
plied.
In May, British, French and Polish
forces attempted to recapture two impor-
tant cities, but their brief success at Nar-
vik was offset by the bungled effort at
Trondheim to the south. Troops in that
area had to be evacuated within two
weeks, and soon after Narvik was aban-
doned to the Germans when events in
France drew off Allied troops.
18

Military Balance in
the West

n the Western Front, both Allied ance. Experienced French and British

O and German armies scarcely stir-

red for six months after the
declaration of war. The Allies had an ill-
units were designated for this advance,
which left the sector opposite the Arden-
nes as the most vulnerable part of the
founded fai th in their Maginot Line - still Allied line.
incomplete - which stretched only to the On paper, the opposing forces were
Belgian border. The threat of a German almost equally matched. The Allies had a
attack through Belgium, comparable to total of 149 divisions as against 136 Ger-
the Schlieffen Plan of1914, was to be met man divisions, with some 3000 armored
through the Dyle Plan. This strategy vehicles to the Germans' 2700. But the
called for blocking any advance between Germans had several advantages, not the
the Ardennes and Calais by a swift de- least of which was superiority in the air-
ployment of troops into Belgium from the some 6000 fighters and bombers to the FRANCE
vicinity of Sedan. Allies' 3300. Less tangible, but no less CD SCHLIEFFEN PLAN
German General Erich von Manstein important, was their innovative and @ FRENCH DYLE PLAN o MILES 100
I
anticipated this plan, whose weak link flexible approach to modern warfare. The @ MANSTEIN PLAN o KM
was the hilly Ardennes region - widely Allies still clung to outmoded ideas of
believed to be impassable to an advanc- positional warfare, and wasted their
ing army. Manstein prepared for an armor in scattered deployments among by dynamic co-ordination of every detail.
attack on the Low Countries to dr.aw the their infantry divisions. The Germans General Maurice Gamelin, Allied Com-
Allies forward, followed by a swift sur- massed their armor in powerful Panzer mander in Chief, now in his late sixties,
prise breakthrough in the Ardennes that groups that could cut a swath through the was in far from vigorous health. Con-
would aim for Calais. This would cut off most determined resistance. Where siderable friction developed between the
any Allied troops that had moved into necessary, dive-bombing Stukas could British and French commands. The
Belgium to implement the Dyle Plan. support German tanks that had outstrip- Allies also counted too much upon co-
The Allies, discounting the possibility ped their artillery support in the field. It operation from the Belgians and the
of a large-scale German advance through was a lethal combination. Dutch, who were slow to commit them-
the Ardennes, garrisoned the Maginot In organization, too, the Allies lagged selves for fear of provoking a German
Line and deployed their remaining forces far behind the German war machine. attack. German leadership, by contrast,
along the Franco-Belgian border. There Their training, communications and was unified and aggressive - provided
troops stood ready to advance to the Ri ver leadership were not comparable to those Hitler did not take a direct hand in
DyIe should the Belgians need assist- of Hitler's army, which was characterized military affairs.
 19

Below left: Thrust and counterthrust at

the Belgian border.
Bottom left: German soldiers fire at
attacking aircraft from the remains ofa
demolished bridge, Holland, 1940.
Below: The forces ofthe Reich mass at the
Siegfried Line.

Reserves
42 divisions

ffffffffffffff
ffffffffffffff
NORTH SEA ffffffffffffff
GREAT
BRITAIN

THE HAGUE

Army Group B
(Bock)
29~·divisions.inc 3 armored
and 2 motorized

OSTEND
DOVER
ERMANY
DUNKIRK
Supreme Commander,
Armed Forces - Hitler
OKH (Army High Command)
Cin C, Brauchitsch

Army Group A
(Rundstedt)
45~ divisions. inc 7 armored
and 3 motori zed

French 1st Army Group

(Billotte)
22 divisions. inc 2 light mechanized
and 3 motorized

[lGHQ
! Cin C, Gamelin
Northeast Front
Cin C, Georges
\
PARIS VINCENNES Army Group C
(Leeb)
F R A N c E 19 divisions

seine

Reserves
22 divisions. inc 3 armored

"'" ~~
ll'l·ll again~t outflanking attack
for 1st Armv Group

rrrrr on
"nnn,... SWISS border

General reserve

SWITZERLAND
BERNE
MILES 100 •
! f ,I 'i I
KILOMETERS 160
20

Blitzkrieg - West

T
he German assault on the West was were evacuated to England.
launched on 10 May 1940, when The French Seventh Army had tried to
aerial bombardments and para- intervene in Holland, but it was repulsed.
troop landings rained down on the Low In Belgium, the German capture of Eben
Countries at daylight. Dutch airfields Emael, a key fortress, and the accom-
and bridges were captured, and German plishment of Manstein's plan to traverse
troops poured into Holland and Belgium. the Ardennes with his Panzer divisions,
Both countries called for help from gave access to the Meuse. Three bridge-
France and Britain, as the Dutch retre- heads were secured by 14 May, and the
ated from their borders, flooding their Allied line had been breached from Sedan
lands and demolishing strategic objec- to Dinant. The Panzer divisions then
tives in an attempt to halt the invasion. made for the sea, forcing back the British
Their demoralization was completed by a Expeditionary Force and two French
savage air attack on Rotterdam (14 May), armies in Belgium. Allied forces were
after which Dutch forces surrendered. split, and their attempt to link up near
Queen Wilhelmina and her government Arras (21 May) was a failure. German

• • • • •• BELGIAN AND DUTCH FORWARD DEFENSES

1///&#&. FORTRESS HOLLAND

.,
-.
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o
..........
t - _•• GERMAN ATTACKS, 10/13 MAY 1940
GERMAN AIRBORNE LANDINGS, 10 MAY
MOVEMENT OF ALLIED FORCES, 10/13 MAt)
MILES
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80
,
/

14 May
Rotterdam heavily bombed,
~.-..~
Dutch forces capitulate ~
J
·'·_·t ~

NORTH =:0
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DUNKIRK,
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Fr. Seventh Army
(Giraud) ....\ _.'-'
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Fourth Army (Kluge)
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IArmy Group AI
ARRAS·

F RAN C E
IArmy Group C,
 21

Opposite below: German forces pour into

the Low Countries.
Left: Motorized Dutch soldiers are
pictured traversing a dyke.
Below: The Panzer thrust to the Meuse.

~
.
i
Belgian Army···· . \
(King Leopold III) \ ~

BRUSSEL~ :, : L·

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(Gort)
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\
Z ''"\.

<
~

RETHEL

VOUZIERS

~ GERMAN BRIDGEHEADS,AM, 14 MAY Fr Third Army

~ FRENCH DEFENCE \STOP) LINES. PM,14 MAY (Conde)
o MILES 30
Ii! i " i !
o KILOMETERS 40

tanks had already reached the sea at

Noyelles and were turning north toward
the Channel ports.
Only the unwarranted caution of Ger-
man commanders prevented wholesale
destruction of Allied forces in Belgium.
On 23 May orders to halt came down from
Hitler and Field Marshal Gerd von Rund-
stedt. The German advance did not re-
sume until 26 May, and the beleaguered
Allies were able to fall back around
Dunkirk.
22

Dunkirk and the Fall

of France

A
determined defense at Calais, and the Seine, and Mussolini took advantage
German failure to capitalize on of the situation by declaring war on June 1940 (j
the chance of seizing the Channel France. Italian troops moved in and en-
ports, enabled the Royal Navy to begin countered stiff resistance, but overall
evacuating British troops from Dunkirk. French morale and confidence were at a
Between 27 May, when Allied resistance low ebb. The government removed to
at Calais ended, and 4 June, 338,226 men Bordeaux and rejected Prime Minister
of the British Expeditionary Force left Winston Churchill's offer of a union be-
Dunkirk along with 120,000 French sol- tween Britain and France. By 16 June
diers. The Germans tried to prevent the Premier Reynaud was resigning in favor
rescue operation with attacks by the of Marshal Henri Petain, who announced
Luftwaffe, but the Royal Air Force dis- the next day that France was seeking an
tinguished itself in safeguarding the ex- armistice.
0dus. With the loss ofonly 29 planes, RAF The conquered nation was divided into
pilots accounted for 179 German aircraft occupied and unoccupied zones. The
in the four-day period beginning 27 May. Petain Government would rule the un- c:::]
German expansion in Europe
Royal Navy losses totaled six destroyers occupied zone from Vichy and collaborate
sunk and 19 badly damaged, plus many closely with the Germans, to the revul-
smaller craft. The toll in lives and mater- sion of most Frenchmen. The (Free
iel would have· been much higher had French,' led by Charles de Gaulle, a Above: Germany expands westwards to
chance not favored the Allies in the form young army officer and politician, repudi- the Channel coast.
of Germany's inexplicable pause at ated the Vichy regime and departed for Below: The Allied front line contracts as
Noyelles. England, where de Gaulle announced France and Belgium are overrun.
To the south, General Maxime that France would ultimately throw off
Weygand tried to rally remaining French the German oppressors.
forces for defense of the Somme Line. The
Germans began to attack south on 5
June, and the line gave way despite
courageous fighting by many French un-
its. By 10 June the Germans had crossed
J
\ IBelgian Army I ) ! IArmy Group BI
\.. surrendered 28 May) COURTRAI ?<xxxx_
DUNKIRK ' ( 'v4." • l'1Js B E L M
~PRES C,~"
\
'>
\..\.. _ ~ ,'/" ~.
",
i ((
(i
........ _ ..J
ROUBAl ' \
x.-"v
.
MARCHE

\ ARMENTIERES •
L1llE (
'
\.
~
• /~.-'~,
\.:STOMER
'.
I------.
Fr First Army I
~_.~,

" .~
........ ----..~--....~
21 May BETHUNE
British armor
. , attempts breakthrough
~
DOUA
#.-
ST AMAND

:;/ #i
..,-,.-
./
.

.--....-- ~
STPOi lOt :...:A-'.:.R~RA_S. ............~~ __ ...
..,..~~~~~=- ...iJ

VOUZIERS
SENUC
VERDUN
FRONT LINES
(APPROXIMATE)
_ _ _ _ _ 16 MAY, 1940 IFr Second Army I~
_ _ _ _ ._21 MAY
_ _ _ 25MAY GERMAN
~ BRIDGEHEADS . BEAUVAIS
REIMS
•
MILES
!
'i
50
I IFr Sixth Army I
80
 23

. . . BRITISH EMBARKATION POINTS

Far left: The A llies prepare to evacuate as
e, FRENCH EMBARKATION POINTS the Germans advance.
o MILES 10 Left: France divided under Nazi and
I ! i !

o K~ 15 Vichy rule.
Below: The occupying forces move into
Paris inJune.
24

Left: German vacillation and the spirited

NORTH SEA defense ofCalais gave theAllies time to
GREAT
BRITAIN evacuate from Dunkirk.
Below: A British soldier is hit by strafing
J Luftwaffe aircraft on the Dunkirk beach.
DOVER
OSTEND Bottom: The British Expeditionary Force
27 May
Calais pocket a'nd their French allies await departure.
surrenders Right: The aftermath ofevacuation.
\ Below right: The German sweep
southwards through France that resulted
in the 22 June armistice.Note Italian
incursions from the southeast.

MONTREUIL
.
10 pz Div

.
STPOL

F R A N c E CAMBRAI

.
BAPAUME

- - - - FRONTLlNE,25MAY
- - - FRONTLlNE,28MAY
• __ ._ • • • FRONTLlNE,31 MAY
o MILES 30
I I i I I ! i
o KILOMETERS 50
 25

GREAT BRITAIN

ENGLISH CHANNEL

/'.
/,
BAY OF BISCAY ~/ ~ \,'"'\
.
\. ..- ..,,' \.
.
.'~ .-~-'
\
CLERMONT-- .... ' ')
FERRAND ~
\-\ ITALY

STEeNE' '- LANSL~~G

~ /.",

~~
.~ . TURIN

BRIAN~ON
.,,)
)
'\.

\.,
.,.~~
TOULOUSE NICE ·~ENTON
ST JEAN DE LUZ •
'J' 27 June

i
.,......
I I GERMAN CONTROLLED, 4JUNE, 1940 "'• TOULON
•••••••••••• WEYGAND L1NE,4JUNE ' · ' ........ _.1-·- PERPIGNAN
- - - - - FRONTLlNE,11/12JUNE ,.,._.
o MILES 150 ( \ MEDITERRANEAN SEA
b ~'L6METERS ~~O SPA I N L......·· ...\ ...,..."\._ .....
26
Right: The stage is set for the Battle of
Britain, 1940.
The Attack on Below: London's dockland burns after one
ofthe first major bombing raids on the
Britain capital, 7 September 1940.

T
he Battle of Britain was fought in There were only some 25 divisions on mand's decision to concentrate on the
the air to prevent a seaborne British home ground, widely scattered cities rather than airfields.
invasion of the British Isles. The and ill supplied with equipment and All-out Luftwaffe attacks did not begin
German invasion plan, code-named Op- transport. The RAF alone could gain the until 13 August, which gave Britain time
eration Sealion, took shape when Britain time necessary for the army to re-equip to make good some of the losses incurred
failed to sue for peace, as Hitler had ex- after Dunkirk, and hold off the Germans at Dunkirk and to train additional pilots.
pected, after the fall of France. On 16 until stormy fall weather made it im- On 7 September London became the main
July 1940, German Armed Forces were possible to launch Operation Sealion. German target, relieving pressure on
advised that the Luftwaffe must defeat The air arm was well led by Air Chief British airfields which had suffered in
the RAF, so that Royal Navy ships would Marshal Hugh Dowding, who made the earlier bombings. RAF pilots who were
be unprotected if they tried to prevent a most of his relatively small but skillful shot down unwounded could, and often
cross-Channel invasion. It was an ambi- force. The RAF had the advantage of a did, return to combat on the same day,
tious project for the relatively small Ger- good radar system, which the Germans while German pilots were captured. The
man Navy, but success would hinge upon unwisely neglected to destroy, and pro- short-range Messerschmitt Bf 109 could
air power, not sea power. fited also from the German High Com- stay over England only briefly if it were
 27

RAF FIGHT,£R COMMA"I.D

@ COMMAND HEADQUARTERS
® GROUP HEADQUARTERS
_._q_._ SECTOR STATION & BOUNDARY·
• FIGHTER STATION
+ LOW-LEVEL RADAR STATION
... HIGH-LEVEL RADAR STATION
- - - COMMAND BOUNDARY
.. TOWNS BOMBED

LUFTWAFFE BASES
+ ffi-. BOMBER .
U STUKA (DIVE-BOMBER)

•/ . ~ Luftflotte 5 (Stumpff)
•
@
FIGHTER (Bf109)
TWIN-ENGINED FIGHTER (Bf11 0)
• /+ ~~ __ (from Norway _ _ _ COMMAND BOUNDARY

NEWCASrP . . ~ and Denmark) o MILES 100

I
I
Fighter / ®~ .. SUNDERLAND 1~0
·11 Group only
Com~/nd 0~
13 G~uP (Saul) _
~IDDLESBROUGH

() "\ ,
/
/
•
NOR T H s E A

\
\
" ""

-
\ " ......0 •

----- ..".-:..~~
\ Cover of
high-level
radar (15,000 ft)

..
_ MANCHESTER
o
\ SHEFFIELD

\
\ ~NOTTING:AM
... • \ Fighter -f
. \ Command 0 NORWICH .~.
· \ 12 Group ....
BIRMINGHAM
: _ \ (L elg
' h-MaII ory ) .. ~~
: , _ COVENTRY ,,"
: \ ,," .+
:. :
, \ Duxford'
0,' " .",' .,' ", •."
Martlesham

~
••• .......
~ ~
,..,,; IP~SICH.
~
••
... \ 'r----.
\ \
0
Debden
",.",
.'"
.",." ...th..
V
...... \ I ·'.""~NorthWeald
/V8 t &f)1t) <0
.. I Ort!) o"e ~ >-.....
••••• CARDIFF \ olt~ (@j~'.' .-' _.-.-.-
~I' luxbrld ge@O.!.1 \-'~oChford
• ®
••• • \

BRISTOL .~Ml Ball

I._._,_._Croydon..~
'ornchurch
~NHAMES ESTUARY
.... Biggm HIII~'''' " ••- ~Eastchurch
BATH Andover I Fighter KenleyO \. • '.,.. .(Manston ANTWERP
•I \• I • '. West. DetlJ~~.CANTERBURY
Middle Wallop 0 I.
I
!I Redhll~\\Mallmg Lympne.
" • -p>
Hawkmge
GHEN
6/ ~
BEL G I~U M
SOUTHAMPTON
I
\"
\".
i
.
\
A:.\.
.. ~ (f;
l o· v
~ "!:s;angmere ~o±
L1LLE '
VENT',R 0Ul'1y
Luftflotte 2
(Kesselring}
\
\ c
\'
\
\
\ ,
LE~RE •
,_:"

PARIS
•
p
Luftflotte 3
(Sperrle)

RENNES
o @
28

Bottom: Two Luftwaffe Dornier Do 17

bombers over the River Thames,
September 1940.
Right: Aftermath ofheavy night
bombing in the Midlands city ofCoventry
two months later.

to return to its base in France, which

helped cancel out the German superiority
in numbers of planes and pilots.
The Battle of Britain raged in the skies
for almost two months, while a German
fleet of barges and steamers awaited the
signal to depart the Channel ports for the
British coast. By mid September, the in-
vasion date had already been put off
three times, and Hitler had to concede
that the Luftwaffe had failed in its mis-
sion. Sporadic German bombing would
continue until well into 1941, but Opera-
tion Sealion was (postponed' indefinitely.
 29

The Invasio.n of
Yugoslavia

n 6 April 1941, the Germans where it would be joined by the Second

O moved to extend their influence in

the Balkans by an attack on
Yugoslavia, whose Regent, Prince Paul,
Army and other units that included
Italians, Hungarians and Germans.
The plan worked smoothly, and there
had been coerced into signing the Tripar- was little resistance to any of the attacks
tite Pact on 25 March. As a result, he was mounted between 6 and 17 April, when
deposed by a Serbian coalition that an armistice was agreed after King Peter
placed King Peter on the throne in a gov- left the country. Internal dissension
ernment that would last only a matter of among the various Yugoslavian states
days. Hitler ordered 33 divisions into was a help to the Germans, who lost fewer
Yugoslavia, and heavy air raids struck than 200 men in the entire campaign.
Belgrade in a new display of blitzkrieg. Another factor in their favor was the de-
At the same time, the Yugoslav Air Force fenders' use of an ineffectual cordon de-
was knocked out before it could come to ployment that was no match for the
the nation's defense. strength and numbers thrown against
The German plan called for an incur- them. German air superiority completed
sion from Bulgaria by the Twelfth Army, the case against Yugoslavian autonomy.
which would aim south toward Skopje
and Monastir to prevent Greek assist- Below: Yugoslavia falls in the face of
ance to the Yugoslavs. Thence they pressure from Germany, Hungary and
would move into Greece itself, for the in- Italy, April 1941.
vasion that had been planned since the
previous year. Two days later, General
Paul von Kleist would lead his First Pan-
zer Group toward Nis and Belgrade,

:..; c·· ! t·
r"G-e-r-S-ec-o-nd-A-r-m-y.... ;, Danube _ • GERMAN ATTACKS
GERMANY _ - ~ ITALIAN
(Weichs) i
Austria C ~ HUNGARIAN "
• GRAZ 0)
o o MILES 150
XLIX Mtn II Corps ,*o(oJ I iii I "
o KILOMETERS 250

RUMANIA

FLORENCE
•
ITALY

ADRIATIC

SEA

The states of Yugoslavia

30

Below: Italian attacks and Greek

counteroffensives, winter 1940-41.
The Battle for Right: The British evacuate the Greek
Greece mainland as Axis forces thrust
southwards.

r-
T
he overthrow of Yugoslavia's Re- DURRES • TIRANE PRI LEp·
gency Government on 27 March Ital Ninth Army '\ YUGOSLAVIA
1941 changed Hitler's scenario for
SI1I<U06/n"~
ELBASAN 1)\ • L Okhrida
southeastern Europe. Prior to that, he

~
.MONASTIR ;
had planned to assist his Italian allies in
their ill-starred Greek campaign by per- 1 POGRADEC .,..f:\L Prespa ._.'" ~._(
suading Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to
allow his troops free passage into Greece.
£;.. i.tB A ~:~ ~·~-·;.FLO~~~AP
Now he would have to invade both Yugo-
~
~o. . . \\ MESKOPOLI
KORCE.J
• ~M d'
ace onla
slavia and Greece, where the British (J VLORE Ital Eleventh 22 Nov •.1 • KASTORIA
were landing over 50,000 men in an _ (VAL~ONA) Army \ .-.1

attempt to enforce their 1939 guarantee ~ I ~

~ TEPELENE • ERSEKE- 2>0....
of Greek independence. _ filii' \ ,18 Nov ;
MussoJini's forces had crossed the ~Q HI~t~~
----"'"- i
•
Greek frontier into Albania on 28 Octo-
~
ber 1940, but their fortunes had been _.-.-., ., ARGYRO
\'
t
STRON

going downhill since November. The t:? ~ SAR~~~c

Greeks mobilized rapidly and pushed the \
Italians back until half of Albania was ; .METSOVA
i..
recovered, with British assistance, by
March of 1941. The prospect of his ally's TRIKKALA
~.
defeat, coupled with British proximity to PARAM ITHIA·-to
the oil fields of Rumania, motivated Hit-
ler to send three full army corps, with a --~.~ ITALIAN ATIACKS, 28 OCT/8 NOV 1940
\
strong armor component, into Greece. • • GREEK COUNTEROFFENSIVE
GREECE
The attack was launched on 6 April, - - - - STABILISED FRONT, 1 MARCH 1941
simultaneously with the invasion of -to RAF AIRFIELDS

Yugoslavia. ' - -_ _--J

1 LAND OVER 3000 FEET
MILES
Allied forces in Greece included seven 'i i I • ' , i i
80
'
Greek divisions - none of them strong - KILOMETRES 120

less than two divisions from Australia

and New Zealand, and a British armored
brigade, as well as the forces deployed in
Albania. British leaders wanted to base
their defense on the Aliakmon Line,
where topography favored them, with
sufficient forces to close the Monastir
Gap. But the Greek Commander in Chief
held out for a futile attempt to protect
Greek Macedonia, which drew off much-
needed troops to the less-defensible
Metaxas Line. The Germans seized their
chance to destroy this line in direct
attacks and push other troops through
the Monastir Gap to outflank the Allied
defense lines.
By 10 April the German offensive was
in high gear and rolling over the Aliak-
mon Line, which had to be evacuated. A
week later, General Archibald Wavell
declined to send any more British rein-
forcements from Egypt - a sure sign that
the fight for Greece was being aban-
doned. Some 43,000 men were evacuated
to Crete before the Germans closed the
last Peloponnesian port at Kalamata;
11,000 others were left behind.

Right: German mountain infantry march

through the township ofLamia inApril
1941.
 31

tfj.

IONIAN

ZAKINTH~
SEA

_ _ _ _ STABILI ED FRONJINALBANIA,6APRIL 1941

.....~....... METAXAS LINE
• • • • • • • ALlAKMON LINE
_ _ _ _ THE FRONT AT DATES SHOWN
G ERMAN A I RB 0 RN E LA N DIN G, 26 APR I L
HEIGHT IN FEET
~~~~ OVER 6000
3000-6000
F---~~
1200-3000
UNDER1200
MILES 100
I
160
34

Battle of the Atlantic

1939-42

T
he memory of German submarine
success in World War I led the Brit-
Q> ish to introduce a convoy system as
soon as hostilities began. The immediate
0 threat was less than British leaders im-
f5 agined, because submarine construction
/ had not been given high priority in the
~~ German rearmament program, and Hit-
ler was reluctant to antagonize neutral
nations by unrestricted submarine war-
t) fare. This was fortunate for the British in
the early months of the war, because they
lacked sufficient escort vessels. Many
ships sailed independently, and others
were convoyed only partway on their
voyages.
In June 1940 the V-boat threat became
more pressing. The fall ofFrance entailed
the loss of support from the French Fleet
even as British naval responsibility in..
creased with Italian participation in the
war. Germany's position was streng-
thened by the acquisition of bases in
western France and Norway for their
long-range reconnaissance support planes

"....
'A.1111... . .4............
.
",.','c~~"'. . . .
•lIt~l·........
ItI' ~;";............
I
/
/
I
/
/
/
/
/
I
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
I
/
I
I
/
I
I
/
/
I
I
I
/
I
/
I BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC, SEPT.1939-MAY 1940
/
I
ALLIED AND NEUTRAL MERCHANT SHIPS SUNK
(j!? / • U-BOATS SUNK
I
I .iff!!Jj~~ CONVOY ROUTES, ESCORTED
/ ~
I " , UNESCORTED

Ed GERMANY, 3 SEPT. 1939

GERMANY AND GERMAN OCCUPIED
TERRITORY, 31 MAY 1940

MERCATOR PROJECTION
 35

Previous pages: A surfaced German U-

boat immediately prior to its sinking by
US Navy bombers southwest ofAscension
Island, November 1943.
Opposite and below right: Early
developments in theBattle.oftheAtlantic.
Below: USS Spencer closes on aU-boat
offthe east coast ofAmerica.

and U-boats. And German submarines,

if relatively few in number, had several
technical advantages. Their intelli-
gence was superior to that of the British
due to effective code-breaking by the
German signals service. British Asdic
equipment could detect only submerged /'

submarines; those on the surface were

easily overlooked at night or until they
approached within striking distance of a
convoy. Radar was not sophisticated, and
British patrol aircraft were in very short
supply.
As a result, the Battle of the Atlantic
was not one of ships alone. It involved
technology, tactics, intelligence, air pow-
er and industrial competition. The Ger-
mans made full use oftheir advantages in
the second half of 1940 (known to Ger-
man submariners as (the happy time').
U -boat (wolf-packs' made concerted
attacks on convoys to swamp their
escorts, and numerous commanders won
renown for the speed and success of their
missions. I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
'- ........
p......
ilII..4...........
",e,.,.............
CilII Ii-;.. . . .
'IIt,.ill";- ....
Ity~,O~...........
I
I
/
I
I
I
I
/
/
I
/
I
/
I
I
/
/
I
/
I
/
/
/
I
/
/
/
/
I
/
I
/
I
/
I
/
/
I
I BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC.JUNE 1940-MARCH 1941
I
1-
(jf? / ALLIED AND NEUTRAL MERCHANT SHIPS SUNK

.!111._-•
/ U-BOATS SUNK
I
" •
CONVOY ROUTES, ESCORTED
,UN ESCORTED

L..--_ _--I
1 ~~I~:~~ ~~IS OCCUPIED TERRITORY,

MERCATOR PROJECTION
36

By March 1941 this picture was chang-

ing. Many V-boats had been destroyed,
and replacement construction was not
keeping pace. The British provided stron-
ger escorts and made use of rapidly de-
veloping radar capabilities to frustrate
German plans. Three of the best German
V-boat commanders were killed that
March, and Churchill formed the effec-
tive Battle of the Atlantic Committee to
co-ordinate British efforts in every
sphere of the struggle. The remainder of
1941 proved that a balance had been
struck: German V-boats tripled in num-
ber between March and November, but
shipping losses in November were the
lowest of the war to that date. VS assist-
ance in both convoy duty and supplies
helped improve the British position, as
did intelligence breakthroughs.
When the Vnited States formally en-

p ........
., 1)11'4'",.............
e,.,cii';,i:.. .
Q ell,;I)/l; ......
J'lo;
e
• .1.:
I
/
/
I
I
I •
•
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I •
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC, APRIL 1941-0EC.1941
I
I
I ALLIED AND NEUTRAL MERCHANT SHIPS SUNK
I
I • U-BOATS SUNK
I
• U BOAT SUPPLY SHIPS SUNK

I " "i ~1f.1fA~$fI;$.!f/!;%*1f,0~~14 CON V 0 Y R0 UTE S

--------.... ALLIED AIR COVER ZONES

'"-_ _--II ~1XI~E~~~9~~IS OCCUPIED TERRITORY,

MERCATOR PROJECTION
 37

Opposite and below right: The Battle of

the A tlantic continues, with A llied air
cover now apparent.
Below: US troops disembark in Iceland.
Air cover from Reykjavik drastically
reduced U-boat strikes in the area from
1941 onwards.

tered the war at the end of 1941, the

situation changed again. The US Navy
was preoccupied with the Japanese
threat in the Pacific, and the East Coast
was left vulnerable to German sub- •
marine operations. For the first half of
1942, the US ships sailed without escorts,
showed lights at night and 'communi-
cated without codes - afflicted by the
same peacetime mentality that had
proved so disastrous at Pearl Harbor.
Sparse anti-submarine patrols along the
East Coast were easily evaded by the ex-
perienced Germans. It was months before
an effective convoy system was estab-
lished and extended as far south as the
Caribbean. But by late summer of 1942
the US coastline was no longer a happy
hunting ground, and the U-boats turned
their attention back to the main North
Atlantic routes.

...: .. ....

BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC,JAN.1942-JULY1942

ALLIED AND NEUTRAL MERCHANT SHIPS SUNK

• U-BOATS SUNK
IIiIf!IJ!i!!!A~ifIfJ CONVOY ROUTES
~ ALLIED AIR COVER ZONES

'---_----'I ~:jSu~~~ t4~IS OCCUPIED TERRITORY,

MERCATOR PROJECTION
38

Stalking. the
Bismarck

to intercept the raiders. Prince of Wales shells into the German warship. A torpe-

T
he formidable German battleship
Bismarck was ready for action in still had workmen aboard and was by no do from the cruiser Dorsetshire completed
the spring of 1941. Armed with 15- means fully prepared to fight. Hood was a the Bismarck's destruction. She sank
inch guns and protected by massive veteran, but she took a German shell in with all but 110 men of her crew, which
armor plate, she was an ocean raider to one of her aft magazines just as she closed numbered 2300.
reckon with, accompanied on her first with Bismarck and blew up. Only three
foray by the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, crew members of 1500 survived. Bis-
which had finished her trials at the same marck then scored several direct hits on
time. On 18 May the two warships left Prince of Wales, ending the engagement.
Gdynia for Bergen, where RAF recon- Leaking fuel from a ruptured tank, Bis-
naissance planes spotted them two days marck left the scene, shadowed by Prince
later. Their presence in Norwegian wa- of Wales and two cruisers. Prinz Eugen
ters could only mean a foray into the broke away and returned to Brest, and
Atlantic, and Royal Navy vessels in and the Royal Navy lost contact with the
around Britain were warned of the com- damaged German battleship. On 26 May
ing confrontation. Meanwhile, the Ger- she was spotted by an RAF Catalina
man ships put to sea in foggy weather, north of Gibraltar.
bound for the Denmark Strait under com- Force H, heading northeast from Gib- Below: Charting the Bismarck's course to
mand of Vice-Admiral Gunther Lutjens. raltar, included the carrier Ark Royal, destruction, May 1941.
Not until late on 23 May were they spot- which launched her Swordfish against Right: The loss ofAllied convoy PQ-17 in
ted in the Strait by the cruisers Suffolk the disabled Bismarck. A torpedo strike July 1942 proved agrievous blow to
and Norfolk. jammed Bismarck's rudder and left her morale. Almost two-thirds ofthe ships
British Vice-Admiral Lancelot Hol- an easy prey to the battleships Rodney involved failed to reach their destination,
land, commanding the Hood and the new and King George V, which arrived that Archangel, and thousands oftons of
battleship Prince ofWales, altered course night (26-27 May) to pour heavy-caliber urgently needed materiel were lost.

\"'
1)
~i
~
"'~.
'?
~~
':(:
~t~

~,-1
~
Approximate 1\
limit of ice edge :"\.
~
'~-
~k
\J+, ~j
, ..7 Night, 24/25 May [~
Torpedo strike
from Victorious

0306, 25 May - - - -
Contact lost

CANADA
1047,25 May
King George Vturns __
N-East in error ••••
~~e~~\se

~~F~UND-
1030,26 May
Bismarck sighted ---~--------­
by RAF Catalina
. ..
2047/2125,26 May _ _~~---------~-:~:!t§j
LAND
~,t> '- Torpedo strike
from Ark Royal
cri,PPles Bismarck /
Night. 26/27 May 26 May
Destroyers attack Force H-
Ale = Aircraft carrier Renown (B)
Prinz Eugen to Brest.
B = Battleship Ark Royal (Ale)
arrives there 1 June
Sheffield (C)
C = Cruiser
T/s = Troopship
c==J AXIS AND AXIS-OCCUPIED
 39

The Arctic Convoys

2{;
~ ~~~CB~A~JESRH~PS SUNK BY U-BOATS Ayrshire e3C.,rts Silver Sword, Troubadour
SPITZ~ERGEN . .. ~ __ - - _. __ - _ _ and Ironclad through ice barrier to Novaya Zemlya
-' • ~ _ .,.". -...., and Archangel
~ MERCHANT SHIP RUN AGROUND
. ~J.:fi} "-
.. . , n_I~_': ·.. __ ~I LWashington '-
-t" GERMAN AIR BASES < '(oJ! Bolton Castle :11!!!. '-
~I ~Paulus Potter
NAUTICAL MILES 200
I

""
!

I ~Pankraft
HOPEI I , LEarlston

2215 ~ Empire Byron ~ ~ River Afton

PO-17 scatters ~

;2 Carlton /
" ,
.I' "\
,
2215 4 July Aldersdale
PO-17 scatters L J ~ Daniel Morgan
Cruiser and destroyer ....IE:.. Honomu ~ Zaafaran
escort head South
~ Fairfield City \
\
.il!!!!!!.Peter Kerr \

s
Sunk 5 Ju\'4

s
fI
,I
B A R E N T E A
Hartlebury H!'!
Pan Atlantic JiIII'"
~ Winston Salem
•
Sunk 6/8 July
OIopana /
I\
John Witherspoon
Afternoon, 5 July
Tirpitz. Scheer, Hipper
2130,5 July
Operation abandoned due
Alcoa Ranger ..;,
, ~
and 6 destroyers sail to success of attacks by
German bombers and
submarines on PO-17 , \

TROMSO') C>
~ 6 ~LfZ ,,-"
I
,./)C -,r-BANAK • ,.-------~
/
~)
"1'"BARDUFOSS
.",,·oJ·,...·'. NORWAY i
I·
r .-.~)".
KIRKENES ~ :-
~Hoosier} Sunk 10 July C/lGUEVI
NARVIK
I"'. .J
,'.
\
\.
\.
i
j
)
. .,/.1
.J.......
J..
I ~ EI Capitan

j '...... t. ", \......._.,.,.., ...1' it} PETSAMO . / I"

./'.-.,/
. '-./ \ ..... ""'.\./r ... ~ iI I Cape Kanin

(~
./ "
\ FINLAND 1
• MURMANSK I
. i ! \
I
..,../ SWEDEN i
.
,'/
.
RUSSIA IOKANGA '..... To White Sea
l'- & Archangel
/ ~ !

azardous duty fell to the men who ships were heavily escorted by Allied des-

H
vous with the close cover, leaving PQ-17
convoyed supplies to Russia after troyers, battleships, submarines, a car- scattered and defenseless. German
the German invasion of June rier and various smaller craft. Near Bear U-boats and aircraft began to pick off the
1941. The forces of nature on the arctic Island in the Barents Sea, the convoy lost hapless ships, and the surface-ship mis-
run posed a threat equal to that of the its shadowing aircraft in heavy fog. At sion that set sail from Altenfjord on 5
Germans. Savage storms and shifting ice the same time, word came that German July was canceled as unnecessary late
packs were a constant menace. In the surface ships Tirpitz, Scheer and Hipper that day.
summer months, the pack ice retreated had left their southern bases. Between 5 and 8 July, almost two-
north, and convoys could give a wider Early on 4 July, German planes torpe- thirds of the convoy was sunk in icy
berth to enemy airfields on the Norwe- doed a merchantman and sank two ships waters hundreds of miles from its des-
gian and Finnish coasts, but the long of the convoy. The German ships arrived tination ofArchangel. The armed trawler
summer daylight made them vulnerable at Altenfjord, Norway, and operations Ayrshire succeeded in leading three mer-
to V-boats. When the ice edge moved control in London expected an imminent chantmen up into the ice, where they
south again, the V -boat threat lessened sailing to intercept the convoy, whose dis- camouflaged themselves with white
with the hours of daylight, but it was tant cover had been withdrawn per pre- paint and rode out the crisis. These three
more difficult to stand clear of the vious plans. Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea were among the eleven merchant ships
airfields. Lord, saw a chance for the convoy's ships that finally reached Russia with desper-
Many Allied seamen lost their lives on to evade the German raiders by scatter- ately needed supplies. The other 25 went
the arctic run, including most of the ing; orders to this effect were issued on 4 down with their crews and thousands of
members of PQ-17, which sailed for Rus- July. The long-range escort, except for tons of materiel destined for the Soviet
sia on 27 June 1942. Thirty-six merchant the submarines, left the convoy to rendez- war effort.
40

The Sea Roads

Secured, 1943-45

y mid 1942 the Battle of the Atlan-

•
.: • B tic had shifted away from the VS
East Coast to more distant areas,
where German V-boats continued to
make successful raids on Allied shipping.
Many oil tankers and other vessels were
lost south of the Caribbean, off the Brazi-
lian coast and around the Cape of Good
Hope. Before the year was out, the Allies
had augmented the convoy system by
specially trained Support Groups - escort
vessels that would help endangered con-
voys or seek out V-boats in areas where
they had been detected. These groups
usually incIuded a small aircraft carrier
and an escort carrier~ along with surface
forces. They were free of normal escort
duties and could therefore hunt the
U-boats to destruction.
A cryptographic breakthrough at the
end of 1942 increased Allied intelligence
on German deployments, and changes in
the code system (June 1943) made it more
difficult for the Germans to anticipate
Allied movements. Even so, late 1942
and early 1943 brought great difficulties.
Allied commitments were increased by
the invasion of North Africa, which drew
~""".
•..
:~
:o~
off North Atlantic escort ferces, with

NI

.. ~i
.
·tc ·
...
:, .\'
:.·x· ........
.. :: ..

BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC,AUG.1942-MAY1943

ALLIED AND NEUTRAL MERCHANT SHIPS SUNK

• U-BOATS SUNK
W!~~if!lf!Ii$j CONVOY ROUTES
......-----.... ALLIED AIR COVER ZONES

L - - -_ _ ~I ~~I~:~~9:~'S OCCUPIED TERRITORY,

MERCATOR PROJECTION
 41

Opposite: Continuation and (below right)

conclusion ofthe Battle ofthe Atlantic.
Below: AU-boat victim burns in mid-
Atlantic. By thesummerof1943 the worst
Allied shipping losses were over.

corresponding shipping losses. In March

1943, the climax of the Battle of the
Atlantic, 120 Allied ships were sunk.
Then the support groups returned from
North African waters, and the US indust-
rial effort paid dividends in accelerated
production of escort carriers and other
needed equipment. Improvements in
radar and long-range scout planes, years
in the making, came to the fore, and
Allied crews began to capitalize on their
hard-won experience. In April 1943, ship-
ping losses declined, and the following
month 41 U-boats were destroyed. On 22
May the German submarines were
ordered to withdraw from the North
Atlantic.
After the summer of 1943, the U-boats
were never again the threat that they
had been. The (wolf-pack' tactic was
abandoned in 1944, and the remaining
submarines prowled singly in an area in-
creasingly focused around the British
Isles. At the war's end, fewer than 200
were still operational. Allied victory in
the Atlantic was. largely a function of
superior co-ordination of effort, which
ultimately offset the initial German
advantage in submarine technology.

..
.. ... .
_ ...
... .

BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC, JUNE 1943-MAY1945

ALLIED AND NEUTRAL MERCHANT SHIPS SUNK

rjf?
U-BOATS SUNK
!J1~f!!J!&~Wc~f!i~'!f!lf!!/!/!;~Zf.fI,i CO NV0 Y ROUT ES
~ ALLIED AIR COVER ZONES

1.-.(z.'<tT'1
_-it·· '.
I AXIS AND AXIS OCCUPIED TERRITORY,
31 MAY 1944
"' 7 MAY 1945

MERCATOR PROJECTION
 e eser ar
an e
•
e I
44

Previous pages: The German retreat from

EIAlamein, November 1942.
Rommel's First Right: The Germans press eastwards
through Libya into Egypt.
Offensive Below: Rommel enters Egypt.
Bottom left: Rommel and his officers
inspect a captured British tank.
Bottom: The Allies isolated at Tobruk.
Below right: Rommel directs operations.

he first German troops began land- sion penetrated the Tobruk perimeter a broke through the Halfaya Pass into

T ing in North Africa on February

1941, under command of General
Erwin Rommel, who would earn the nick-
short distance, but was driven back. Ita-
lian troops were now coming up to replace
the German units making ready to cross
Egypt. Rommel was dissatisfied with the
failure to capture Tobruk, and another
full-scale attack struck the British there
name (Desert Fox.' His leadership abili- the Egyptian frontier. The British garri- on 30 April. Axis troops pushed a salient
ties were acknowledged by comrades and son at Tobruk was isolated in the midst of into the western sector, but it was con-
enemies alike. Rommel soon saw that Axis forces, and on 25 April the Germans tained after four days of fighting.
British forces in Africa were weak, and
that no reinforcements would be forth-
coming. On 24 March German forces took . . . .~•.•••. ~R~:~~~~~;~
EI Agheila easily, and the 5 Light Divi- - -....- ~~~::RATTACt<
sion went on to attack the British 2 o MILES 10
Armored Division at Mersa Brega. There ! . t i I·t<M·' i' 1t
they encountered stiff resistance, but the
British failed to counterattack and lost
their advantage.
Instead of choosing among three
alternative courses of attack, Rommel
moved boldly on all three fronts: north to
Benghazi, northeast to Msus and Mechili
and east to Tengeder, to threaten British
supply lines. Field Marshal Archibald
Wavell, in overall command of British Gulf, of Sollum
forces, lacked the men to counter this
multiple attack, launched on 5 April. His
single armored division fell back and was
reduced to a remnant by mechanical fail-
ure. The defense at Mechili, 3 Indian Bri-
gade, was soon overwhelmed, with what
remained of the 2 Armored Division. The
8 Australian Division retreated from
Benghazi to Derna, thence toward Tob-
ruk, which was being reinforced with the
7 Australian Division.
On 14 April the German 5 Light Divi- ~-
:~

G y -~
~ ' '%:
22 G~ards
I

"
BIR EL KHIREIGA"i~
\
\
Bde Gr..oup/.
\ ............_ - ... 1 7Armd""

\\ \
Bde Group

.............. STABfUSED fRONT, MAY 1941

o MILES 10
I ! I I' i I( I! j
o KILOM ETERS 16
 45

o MILES 100
-----1....1'
1 - 1- - - -. . . . . . . . .

o KILoMETEr{S 150 MEDITERRANEAN SEA

SlRTE
G'ulf of Sirte
MERSA
MATRUH

~ NOFILIA • .
/~ AGEDABIA
~. 2Apr
CyrenaIca
Tripolitania ~ MERSA BREGA L
EL AGHEILA 24 Mar 1941
I B Y A E G Y P T
46

MEDITERRANEAN SEA
The German Drive
on Gazala
GAZALA

'toe

ommel's German units, the Deut- .

R sches Afrika Korps (DAK), and
their allies suffered a setback in
the Crusader Battles with the British y r e n a c a
SIR HACf

Eighth Army late in 1941. Tobruk was

relieved, and Rommel had to pull back to
El Agheila, having suffered 38,000 Axis
casualties as against 18,000 for the Brit- "'''';';';'''~:::;::=::::::::::::-::'::::~':..'-'
ish. His men were exhausted, supplies
were running out and 300 German tanks
had been destroyed in the Libyan desert. I B ''''''''''Y''''''''''",,"~,"A
',\.
British forces pursued Rommel to El
Agheila, believing that his shattered un-
its would be unable to react. However,
successful air raids on Malta had restored
the German supply line across the
Mediterranean, and Rommel's forces
were quickly rebuilt to fighting strength. MILES

On 21 January 1942 they made an unex- To Jalo Oasis, 10 miles + KILOMETERS

pected advance that pushed Eighth Army

Eighth Army (Ritchie) HQ at Gambl

Group Cruewell, (5 Ind Oiv and 10 Ind Bde in reserve)
early afternoon,
.................
26 May
-- -
....

\ BIR TEM;;D~::::=
\
\

\SIDI BREGHISC

\".... .

",
-ROTONDA SEGNALI
'------

~xxx Corps

INITIALATTACKS EIGHTH ARMY'S - POSITIONS ON 26 MAY

ROMMEL WITHDRAWS COR PS HEADQUARTERS
ARMOUR INTO BRIDGEHEAD
DIViSiONAL HEADQUARTERS
( THE CAULDRON) 30 MAY/1 JUNE
BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS
MILES 15
i i I I MINEFIELDS
KILOMETERS AIRFIELDS AND LANDING FIEU
 47

back toward Agedabia. In a matter of

days the British faced encirclement at
Benghazi and were forced to retreat to
the defensive position at Gazala. The line
there consisted of minefields running
south to Bir Hacheim and a series of for-
tified keeps that were manned by XIII
Corps brigades.
) Div
DAK forces under Cruewell swung
around Bir Hacheim on· 26 May to out-
flank the Gazala Line, but they were
( Corps
attacked from both sides on Sidra Ridge
and stopped short with loss of a third of
.......... their armor. Their water and fuel were
running out, and Rommel tried to push a
supply line through the British
minefields without success. He then
lune moved all his remaining armor into (the
s forces break out r---~_~ I_ ,,
,
Cauldron' to await the impending British
n 'The Cauldron' \ counterattack.
\

10/11 June
\
Cruewell's isolated forces were finally
~ French Bde withdraws
\
supplied on 4 June, and Eighth Army
"
failed to counterattack until 5/6 June,
",,,
\

\
when it was beaten off with heavy losses.
I
THARMV'S-
,
I The defense at Bir Hacheim crumbled
rlONS ON 11 JUNE
_ MAIN COUNTERATTACKS
I
I
I
and DAK broke out of the Cauldron to
DURING 1/10JUNE
....
, ...
\
I force the British back from the Gazala
::::J MOVEMENTS. PM 11 JUNE _~

Line even beyond Tobruk. Axis forces

- MINEFIELDS 7 Mot Bde \"
MILES 10 4 S Afr Armd had surrounded the British garrison
SIR EL GUBI'~
iii
KILOMETRES
i I
15 ---,
Car Regt
I
I ,'--
\
there by 18 June.

Opposite above: Rommel advances Opposite: The Allied stand on26 May, Above left: Breakout from the Cauldron.
eastwards, pushing the Eighth A rmy with fortified keeps (shaded) scattered Below: AnAfrikaKorps Panzer III
back toward Gazala and Tobruk. along the minefield (bold line). advances.
48

The Fall ofTobruk

E
ighth Army was severely'demoral-
~.... DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTEF
ized by the German triumph at \ BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS
Gazala, which contributed to the f> REGIMENT HEADQUARTER~
distrust between infantry and tank units ~ MINEFIELD
A. (Perimeter minefield not show
that had surfaced during the Crusader U LANDING FIELD
Battles. British leadership had failed to FIELD-GUN BATTERIES
~ 6 S Afr Bde
capitalize on several advantages, includ- 1 S Afr P
ing a numerical superiority in armor, the ... ----- ..... ......
DAK containment in the Cauldron and
the well-prepared defense line at Gazala.
Rommel launched his drive on Tobruk
from the southeastern sector on 20 June
1942. Heavy dive-bomber attacks dis-
played German air superiority to devas-
tating effect, after which DAK pushed
through the perimeter defenses. By mid-
morning German troops had reached the
minefields, and the airfields were over-
run soon after. At 1900 hours 21 Panzer
Division moved into Tobruk.
There was sporadic fighting within the
perimeter through the night, but the Ger-
mans had overcome almost all resistance
by the morning of21 June. General Klop-
per, the South African in command of the
garrison, surrendered, and the road to
Egypt was open.
21 pz Diy
Right: The perimeter defenses are J ~ 0800 hrs, 20 June, (OAK)
breached, and the fall ofTobruk is less
than 12 hours away. •• •• 15 pz Diy

Trieste Diy Ariete Diy

Below: British troops surrender to their MILES
i I
I "
Axis adversaries. Rommel's victory, KI~OMETER~
completed on21 June, cleared the way for
an advance into Egypt.
 49

The Naval War in the 2300,11 Nov 1940

Main direction of Swordfish M.,
torpedo attacks Piccolo

Mediterranean

T
he Royal Navy faced a difficult task
in the Mediterranean, where the
well-equipped and modern Italian First
Navy enjoyed a position from which it waves
could strike at will. British forces were
split between Gibraltar (Force H) and
Alexandria, with Malta at the center - a
•
•

--
key position, but highly vulnerable. Only
light and submarine naval forces were
based on Malta, and Mediterranean Fleet
commander Sir Andrew Cunningham Oil storage
depot
was constantly seeking ways to enhance ee
the British position in the Mediterranean
~ SHIPS CRIPPLED
through flexible use of his surface ships,
including a limited number of carriers. o.... 1 MILE
' _ _10....-_....'

Cunningham's forces scored several

successes against the Italian Navy in
chance encounters during July 1940, and March, RAF scouts reported three Italian back to help; all three were destroyed.
plans were laid to attack the Italian fleet cruisers heading east, and Admiral Cun- The remainder of the Italian force fled
in harbor at Taranto. On the night of 11 ningham put to sea from Alexandria. back to its bases, including the Vittorio
N ovem her, 21 Swordfish torpedo- Three battleships, an aircraft carrier and Veneto, which found safe harbor at
bombers were launched from the carrier destroyer escorts comprised his force, Taranto to the disappointment of
Illustrious: all but two returned, having which was to rendezvous south of Crete Admiral Cunningham and his men.
sunk the new battleship Littorio and two with Vice-Admiral H D Pridham-Wippell
modernized battleships and inflicted commanding a force of four cruisers and A bove: The successful night attack on the
heavy damage on other craft. It was a four destroyers. Italian fleet in Taranto on 11 November
major coup for the British, and soon fol- The principal target among the Italian 1940 mounted by 21 Swordfish torpedo-
lowed by another successful strike at force converging south of Crete was the bombers from HMS IIIustrious.
Cape Matapan, Greece. battleship Vittorio Veneto, the pride of Below: A second blow was dealt to Italian
Italian naval forces moved toward Mussolini's fleet. Air strikes were laun- naval might at Cape Matapan on28
Greece in late March 1941, to interdict ched against her, but only one torpedo March 1941.
convoys carrying British troops to assist found its mark. Then the Italian cruiser Following pages: HMS Barham, a
the Greeks during the Axis invasion of Pola was heavily damaged, and the battleship ofthe A llied Mediterranean
the Balkans, then imminent. On 27 heavy cruisers Zara and Fiume were sent fleet, at Gibraltar.

GREECE
~ ~~~~T~~E~~~ ~~E~~~~~~DO
BOMBERS FROM FORMIDABLE
TIMES SHOWN ARE THOSE
ON 28 MARCH 1941
CMatapan 0
NAUTICAL MILES
, "
50
, Crete

Garibaldi and ,
Abruzzi to Light forces "l GAVDHOS
G cruisers:

"
Brindisi ,)to 2359 (Pridham-Wippell) " lara, Pola, Fiume, Garibaldi, Abruzzi
~,,
cruisers: , and 4 destroyers
On on, Ajax, Gloucester.
Perth and 4 destroyers
------f--.--______
2359 ~

1515 -------------_-I~-------
1200 __ ------

.::;:......, 2100............... ----~-.. ---~--------, 1200

~ ~ ~ ~
-------;.t' '-- ,---- 1200 ,
.:
~ ~~\
1830 ••••\......
1700~ •••• ..;..
1510 1450 1420

·····················~··················1i~~
····..1520
1205~
~••
.: r. . ,
::::.:.~
,.- - ........ --.".~l.

--......
,~\~
" ','
. .\
0855 cease fire Battle Squadron
(Cunningham)
Warspite, Barham.
Valiant, carrier
Formidable and
\ 1200 9 destroyers
2100 2230 1930 1058-1127 0812-0855
Zara, Fiume and Battlegroup sinks Torpedo bombers Light forces in action Light forces in action
4 destroyers turn lara, Fiume, Pola and from Formidable with Vittorio Veneto with Trieste division
back to assist Pola 2 destroyers score hit on Pola

MEDITERRANEAN SEA
52

ATTACKS BY
Majorca
The Malta Convoys ~PALMA
C GERMAN AIRCRAFT}

@ ITALIAN AIRCRAFT :

......- E-BOATS
~ U-BOATS

Night, 10/11 August 1942

'Pedestal' convoy (Syfret)
14 merchant ships,
20 warships, enters

T
he British island fortress of Malta planes off to Malta and turned back, and Mediterranean

was in serious straits by mid 1942. the Axis made its first overt move in the
Its location astride Axis supply form of a V-boat attack on the carrier
M E
lines made it the target of incessant air Eagle, which was sunk.
attack, and its own supply lines were in- The next day brought heavy Allied los-
creasingly tenuous. Convoys to Malta ses to Axis planes and submarines. The
had to be suspended in July due to their freighter Deucalion went down, the des-
heavy losses. It was clear that Malta troyer Foresight was so badly damaged
could not hold out against both the Luft- that she had to be sunk and the Indomit-
BOUGIE
waffe and the Italian Regia Aeronautica able's flight deck was bombed out of op-
ALGIERS A L G
without food or fuel, and Operation eration. At this point Syfret turned back
Pedestal was mounted as a desperate according to plan, leaving Rear Admiral ,
Noon, 11 August 2045, 11 August
effort to convoy supplies from England. H M Burrough to escort the convoy the Carrier Eagle sunk First air attack
Twenty warships under command of rest of the way with four cruisers and four
Vice-Admiral E N Syfret left the Clyde on destroyers. Two of the cruisers were dis-
3 August with 14 merchantmen, 32 des- abled in the next few hours, Cairo so bad- NAUTICAL MILES
, , I
120
I

troyers and various smaller craft. The ly that she had to be sunk. At dusk, two of
aircraft carrier Furious accompanied the the merchantmen were destroyed and
group with a cargo of fighter planes for one damaged. The American tanker Ohio sunk, along with one aircraft carrier, two
Malta's RAF squadron. On 10 Septem- was hit but stayed with the convoy, as did cruisers and a destroyer. But the fuel and
ber, when the convoy passed through the the damaged cruiser Kenya. other supplies that got through enabled
Strait of Gibraltar in fog, a dummy con- Early on the morning of 13 September, Malta to hold on.
voy was dispatched from Port Said -to- five more merchantmen and the cruiser
ward Malta as a diversion. Next day it Manchester were lost to torpedoes, and Above: The hazardous passage to Malta.
returned to port, having failed to distract renewed air attacks sank Wairanama Below: The damaged tanker HMS Ohio
Axis leaders from the main operation, and did additional damage to Ohio, with limps toward port with destroyer escort.
which was shadowed by reconnaissance its irreplaceable fuel cargo. By the time Right: General Eisenhower (left) on
aircraft from the morning of 11 Septem- light forces from Malta met the convoy, Malta with Viscount Gort, the island's
ber. That afternoon Furious flew her all but five of the merchantmen had been governor.
 53

. CAGLIARI

C Passero

13/15 August
Port Chalmers, Rochester
Castle, Melbourne Star,
Brisbane Star, Ohio &
escorts arrive at Malta

i, 12 August 1215, 12 August 1600, 12 August 1840, 12 August 2000, 12 August Night, 12/13 August 0800, 13 August 1125, 13 August 1900, 13 August
Ind air attack Deucalion damaged, U-boat sunk Foresight sunk, Cairo, Clan Ferguson Santa Eliza, Wairangi, Waimarama Rochester Castle Merchant ship
sunk later carrier Indomitable & Empire Hope sunk. Almeria, Lykes & sunk, Ohio & Ohio damaged. straggler sunk by
damaged. Main Nigeria, Brisbane Glenorchy sunk. damaged Dorset damaged, German aircraft
covering force ('X') Star, Kenya It Ohio Manchester damaged. sunk later
withdraws as planned damaged sunk later. Rochester
Castle damaged
54

Below: The German tanks advance, with

Italian support.
EI Alamein: The Right: The first Battle ofEIAlamein.
Below right: General Grant tanks ofthe
First Battle Allied 22 nd Armored Brigade advance
south ofEIAlamein.

A
fter the fall of Tobruk, Rommel
f'/777;;'>. EIGHTH ARMY POSITIONS
was promoted to Field Marshal, a ~ AFTERNOON 26 JUNE 1942
status that strengthened his argu- lill1IlliTIn MINEFIELD
~
ment for advancing to Egypt at once. (The SMALL BRITISH COLUMNS
~ CORPS HEADQUARTERS
original Axis plan called for a halt while ~ DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS Italian
naval and air forces massed to invade
Malta.) Using the supplies newly cap-
tured at Tobruk, Rommel crossed the
o
I
o
~ BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS
MILES
I

KILOMET~ES
10
,
i
20
--,
XXI Corps

Egyptian frontier and attacked the Brit-

ish at Mersa Matruh (26-27 June), where
Eighth Army was now under tactical
command of General Claude Auchinleck,
Commander in Chief, Middle East. The
British could not contain the German
late evening
advance and retreated to the next de-
fensible position - a line south from the
small rail station of El Alamein.
Auchinleck had few reserve units with
which to prepare his position from El
Alamein, near the coast, to the Qattara
Depression, an area of wilderness that
was considered almost impassable. His
depleted forces took their positions along
this line to bar the way to the Nile. Mean-
while, Rommel's forces had also been
much reduced in recent battles - to some
2000 German infantry and 65 tanks - Afternoon
while fuel and other supplies were dwind- 27 June
ling (these had consisted largely of booty
captured at Tobruk and Mersa Matruh).
Eighth Army's artillery units were in-
strumental in repelling the first German
and Italian attacks on 2-4 July; their co-
ordination was much better than it had
been under General N M Ritchie from
whom Auchinleck had assumed com-
mand. The British Commander in Chief The Sabratha unit fell to the 9 Australian and Auchinleck's refusal to continue the
was now in a position to essay some Division on 10-11 July, and the British attacks known collectively as the First
limited counterattacks, whose targets recovered Tell el Eisa as a result. Battle of El Alamein was to cost him his
were Italian rather than German divi- Larger Allied efforts were mounted in command.
sions. This choice was deliberate, as it the Ruweisat Ridge area, where opposing
compelled Rommel to waste fuel in wide- forces grappled to an exhausted stand- Below: The A llied retreat along the
spread efforts to assist his Italian cohorts. still. Both sides were simply worn out, Mediterranean coast to E IA lamein.

......(f)
We
oro
MEDITERRANEAN
SEA' ~~

Italian XX Corps-.

.......... -.................... ................. . ,--~~-----.:

15 d 21 -- .... _--~
pz Oivsa("OAK) .,.,,~ _ _. . . . ...~
_---.j.~ EIGHTH ARMY

-_----.--- AXIS
I ! MILES ! i ,
30
 55

EIGHTH ARMY
10/11 July,
~ CORPS HEADQUARTERS
Auchinleck's newly arrived
~ DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS
9 Australian Div recovers
~ BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS
Tell el Eisa
(POSITIONS ARE THOSE ON MORNING OF 1 JULY)
o MILES 10
I 'I " I II ,'I
o KILOMETERS 16

TELL EL AQQAQIR •
Italian XX Corps

Italian X Corps

XXX Corps~

@f!J7 Motor Bde

56

The Battle of Alam

HaIfa

based loosely upon Auchinleck's: to hold forced him to turn north earlier than he

I
n August 1942 Churchill arrived in
the Middle East to make changes. the Alam HaIfa Ridge and counter a Ger- had intended, with the result that DAK
General Harold Alexander replaced man threat in the South with 7 Armored failed to break through the Alam HaIfa
Auchinleck as Commander in Chief, and Division. Rommel used the tactic this position. Harassing air attacks and a
General Bernard Montgomery took plan had anticipated when, on 30 August, shortage of fuel compounded Rommel's
charge of Eighth Army. Less than three his main attacks swung south of the Brit- difficulties. His 15 Panzer Division tried
weeks later, he would face Rommel's last ish positions with the object of turning to outflank 22 Armored Brigade on 1
attempt to break through the position at north again beyond Alam HaIfa to sur- September, but this effort was stymied by
EI Alamein. round Eighth Army. The presence of 7 an improved British antitank system.
Montgomery's defensive plan was Armored Division on the right flank Axis forces pulled back to prepare a deep
 57
Below: A Vickers gun noses over the
barricades. GERMAN ITALIAN
--"'"""'"I.~ --~ ROMMEL'S INTENDED ADVANCE
Right: TheAxisattack on AlamHalfa ••
_ -...- -- - - ROMMEL'S ACTUAL ADVANCF.
failed to achieve its objectives. EASTERN EDGE OF AXIS MINEFIELDS
Below right: Rommel's staffconfer as the 164 Div -<=~>---,- ~~~NT~Ll~~~,~N~'~~FIELDS
Allied defense turns into counterattack. o MILES 10
I ! I
'i ! ,
I
16

Trento
defensive position between the Qattara Oiv
Depression and the sea.
Rommel had to hold the new line of , I I IIII~
defense or be overwhelmed - he lacked
both the vehicles and the fuel for a mobile
battle. By the same token he could not
retreat. On 6 September, Axis forces were
back where they had started, committed
to an immediate counterattack for every
foot of disputed ground.
Bologna
Div

8A~
~

Folgore
Div

~/-l
'/' ,f ,. i

/j ....I
58

EI Alamein: The
Second Battle

I
n his new command, General Mont-
gomery lived up to his reputation as a
careful planner who emphasized both
training and morale. Eighth Army had
suffered many changes of fortune and
command in the North African Theater,
and morale had eroded to a serious de-
gree. Failures of co-operation and con-
fidence had resulted in faulty operations,
and Montgomery addressed himselfto re-
building Eighth Army into an optimum
fighting unit. At the same time, he was
amassing a force superior to the Ger-
mans' in every respect: troops, tanks,
guns and aircraft.
The Germans were well dug in along a
line between the sea and the Qattara De-
pression, and Montgomery's plan was to
attack north of the Miteirya Ridge. The I:·:-:-:·:-:-::-·:-:::-::J AXIS MINEFIELDS
infantry of XXX Corps was to push for- "OPERATION LIGHTFOOT"
ward to the Oxalic Line and open corri- ._._._ 'OXALIC'; XXX CORPS' FINAL OBJECTIVE (0310 HRS. 24 OCT)
•••••••••••• 'PIERSON'; X CORPS' FIRST OBJECTIVE (DAWN, 24 OCT)
dors through the minefields for passage of _____ 'SKINFLINT'; X CORPS' FINAL OBJECTIVE
the X Corps' Sherman tanks, which were o MILES 10
finally proving a match for the German I 'i i ' I i i i ' I
o 'KILOMETERS 16
Mark IV. Axis forward defenses were
manned largely by Italian troops, and
Rommel was hospitalized in Germany; he
did not arrive until 25 October, when the
battle was underway. General Stumme
commanded in his absence.
The British infan~y made a good start
toward its objectives on 24 October, but it
proved impossible to move the tanks for-
ward as planned. The German 21st Pan-
zer Division was kept out of the main
battle for several days by diversionary
efforts from XIII Corps, and the German
defense suffered as a result of General
Stumme's death from a heart attack dur-
ing the first day offighting. The Axis fuel
shortage had become critical with the
sinking oftwo tankers in Tobruk Harbor.
When Rommel returned to North Afri-
ca, he launched a series of unsuccessful
counterattacks that ended on 3 Novem-
ber, when the British armor began to
break through into open ground. Hitler
at first forbade a withdrawal, but by 4
November Axis losses had made it inevit-
able. Rommel and his remaining forces
made good their retreat.

A bove right: The attack plan for corridors

to be driven through Axis minefields to
provide safe passage for Allied tanks.
Right: General Montgomery directs
operations atElAlamein. On his right is
General Sir Brian Horrocks.
 59

Above: Italian infantrymen in the field at

EIAlamein.
Right: The second battle saw the Eighth
Army repel Axis attacks.

20
I

KILO~ETERS
i
30

2130 hrs, 23 October,

Eighth Army launches attack

~XIII Corps
(Horrocks)
44 Div

~~"'--_.J 7 Armd Div

 60

Operation Torch

n 8 November 1942, four days af- Field Marshal Kesselring. Allied forces Below: US troops march 011 A 19iers'

O ter Rommel began to retreat from

EI Alamein, American and Brit-
ish forces made a series of landings in
under General Dwight D Eisenhower,
American Commander in Chief of the
Torch operation, were stopped short in
Maison Blanche airfield.
Bottom: The Operation Torch landings.
Right: The A llied push into Tunisia.
French North Africa. This operation, Tunisia by early December. Below right: The Germans reinforce.
code-named Torch, was the first real
Allied effort of the war. It was hoped that
the numerous Vichy French forces in
North Africa would not resist the land-
ings, and the US had undertaken diplo-
matic missions to local French leaders ,
with this object in view. (Anglo-French
relations were still embittered by the .
.,> • ; .'.

events of 1940.) Despite these efforts,

sporadic French opposition delayed plan-
•.
ned Allied attacks on Casablanca and
Mehdia, and two destroyers were lost off
Algiers. However, the weakest point of
the Allied plan was its failure to occupy
Tunisia in the first landings. German
troops began to arrive there on 9 Novem-
ber to cover Rommel's retreat and formed
a defensive perimeter.
The Allied capture of Vichy leader
Admiral Darlan at Algiers helped dimin-
ish resistance from French forces; fewer
than 2000 casualties were incurred in the
three main landing areas. The largest
difficulty was pushing the considerable
Allied force the 400 miles to Tunis before
the Germans could pour in troops and
aircraft from Sicily. This they did with
great speed, on instructions from Hitler
and Commander in Chief Mediterranean

ALLIED LANDINGS ('OPERATION TORCH')

• 8 NOVEMBER 1942

,
AND SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS
SPA I N 9 November,
ALLIED AIRBORNE LANDINGS
Kesselring begins to
AIRFIELDS pour in troops by air PALERMO
MILES 300 MEDITERRANEAN
' i i I
I ~
KILOMETERS SEA Sicily

HEIGHT IN FEET

§
OVER 7000
. . 5000-7000
1000-5000
UNDER 1000
 61

• • ALLIES
, ALLIED AIRBORNE LANDINGS
I( • GERMAN
- - - - BRITISH V CORPS FRONT, 1 JANUARY 1943

MILES C Serrat
o KILOMETRE~
HEIGHT IN FEET
OVER 7000
foo------...'; 5000- 7000
1000-5000
.....-------....1
' - - -_ _---..J UNDER 1000
62

200 pz ......... /'"

Gr Regt /~ " 15 pz Div
From Tripoli to l/l
Q)

°E
Tunis o
c.o

E
ighth Army's pursuit of Rommel's
forces was hampered by weather
and supply problems. It took l\1ont-
Midnight 5/6 Apr
gomery almost three weeks to reach Age-
dabia (23 November 1942), and he had to
halt there until he was resupplied. Soon
after, the short-lived German position at
El Agheila was outflanked and the race
\ To Gabes, 10 miles
toward Tunisia resumed.
The port of Tripoli offered the British .. • EIGHTH ARMY ATTACKS 5/6 APRil 1943
hope of alleviating their supply prob- - - - - - AXIS POSITIONS 4 APRIL
•••••••••••••• AXIS ANTI-TANK DITCHES
lems, but the Germans got there first and
- " ' " ' - - - AXIS MINEFIELDS
did as much damage as they could to port • • GERMAN COUNTERATTACKS
installations before pushing on to Tuni- o MILES
sia. The British reached Tripoli on 23
oI .' I
KILOMETRES
'I
January 1943, and it was not until mid-
March that the port began to function
effectively as a pipeline for British sup- Axis divisions sought to defend Tunisia victory. Allied troops broke through in
plies. Meanwhile, Axis forces had con- against 19 Allied divisions that had reco- early May. Tunis fell on the 7th, and five
solidated behind the Mareth Line after vered from their earlier reverses to take days later Italy's Marshal Messe and
inflicting 10,000 casualties on Allied on an overwhelming superiority in air Germany's General von Arnim surren-
troops from the Torch landings at the power and armor. The Allies had 1200 dered with some quarter of a million
Battle of Kasserine. Rommel now faced tanks to the Axis' 130, 1500 guns to the troops. These forces would be sorely mis-
Montgomery's Eighth Army in his last Axis' 500. sed by Hitler when the Allies launched
battle in Africa - a bitter fight that raged Hill 609 was hotly conte'sted by Amer- their invasion of Italy.
from 6 to 27 March. Axis forces were out- ican forces seeking access to the so-called
flanked, and by mid-April had retreated Mousetrap Valley leading to the coastal Above: The Eighth A rmy's attempt to
up the coast to form a tight perimeter plain. British troops made some progress progress up Tunisia's east coast was
on the hills around Bizerta and Tunis. at Longstop Hill and Peter's Corner, delayed at Wadi Akarit.
Rommel urged evacuation of German which commanded the Medjerda Valley. Right: The A llied conquest ofTunisia.
and Italian forces from Africa when he Then General Alexander switched ex- Bizerta and Tunis fell on 7 May.
returned to Germany, but his counsel perienced units from Eighth Army to V Below: The EighthArmy'sprogress in the
was ignored. Thirteen understrength Corps, which made possible a decisive wake ofElAlamein.

900 800 700 600 500

0500 hrs, 23 January 1943

Eighth Army enters Tripoli

TUNISIA J"

j
..,..,;'
/.0';
/
/J'
,. ..i
i
,
,-
\
i Free French Force
(Leclerc)
i
i from Chad via Murzuk
i
,i
~'

r'-''''
.",'

'r r pol

1300 1200 1100 1000 900 800

 63

Cape Bon

Gulf of Tunis

- - - - - FRONT LINE, 22 APRil 1943

_ )I ALLIED ATTACKS 22/30 APRIL
Ia t~ 1/7 MAY
C 4~ 8/11 MAY
• • GERMAN COUNTERATTACKS

HEIGHT IN FEET

OVER 1800
1200-1800
600-1200
UNDER 600
0 ,
MILES 25
I i I
0 KILOMETRES 40

400 300 200 100 MILES o , •• , . , . , ,. ROMMEL'S DEFENSE POSITIONS

II( • EIGHTH ARMY'S ADVANCE

M E D .r E R R A N E A N s E A

~ MECHLI
StDt .8ARRANI S Nov
/
Ha/faya Pass
11 Nov \
i

y r e n a c a "'\.I
i
i
i
i
\
"~ \ p T
\
600 500 400 \. 300
66

The Winter War:

Finland, 1939-40

n 30 November 1939, the Soviet and considerable territory in the north.

O Union invaded Finland, after fail-

ing to obtain territorial conces-
sions demanded in early October. Five
They would seek to make good these los-
ses the following year in an alliance with
Nazi Germany.
different Soviet armies crossed the The Finnish fight was solitary and ulti-
Russo-Finnish frontier on four major mately hopeless, because the British and
fronts, but the conquest of this small French Governments feared to arouse
neighboring nation proved much more Soviet hostility by involving themselves.
difficult than had been foreseen. Deep Nevertheless, the Russo-Finnish War
snow and heavy forest forced Russian had far-reaching consequences in the in-
tanks and transports to stay on the roads, ternational community. As a result of it,
where they were easy targets for the the French Government fell due to dis-
mobile, well-trained Finnish ski troops. sension about helping the Finns, and the
Russian convoys were shot up and sepa- League of Nations was thoroughly dis-
rated, and formations were isolated and credited. Hitler formed a false impression
defeated in detail. The Finns never had of Soviet inefficiency that probably influ-
more than nine divisions in the field, with enced his decision to turn on his Russian
few guns and almost no tanks. But their ally. And the Red Army was awakened to
confidence was high, and they had the deep-seated internal problems that be-
advantage of fighting on familiar ground came subject to reform in the months that
with tactics suited to the terrain. followed.
By 31 January 1940, the Russians had
made deep penetrations in the north by
dint of superior numbers, but the Man-
nerheim Line, on the Karelian Isthmus,
was holding on. The Seventh and Thir-
teenth Soviet Armies assaulted this line
from 1 through 13 February with forces Previous pages: The Wehrmacht advance
that included six tank brigades and 21 with difficulty along a muddy Russian
infantry divisions. A massive bombard- road, 1941.
ment preceded these attacks, which Below: The Russians breach Finland's
achieved a breakthrough in mid- MannerheimLine in February.
February. The Finns were forced to sur- Right: Soviet soldiers dismantle Finnish
render, and to cede the Karelian Isthmus anti-tank obstacles.

R Vuoksi

LAPPEENRANTA F I N LAN D
LAKE
(I)

°E LADOGA
o
N

Gulf of Finland

"""-_---_ Seventh Army

.. • RUSSIAN ATTACKS 12 infantry divisions
5 tank brigades
® ~~~l~~E1~:6~~~~~ARY + other units
®
J~
BREAKTHROUGH, 13 FEBRUARY
MANNERHEIM LINE
• • • • • • MAIN POSITION R U S S I A
" " " " " " " , SUMMA SECTOR
VVV VV V INTERMEDIATE POSITION
: : : , , , REAR POSITION ~RONSTADT
o MILES 30 ~LENINGRAD
I 'i" i " " I o
o KILOMETRES 40 Estonia
 67

• • RUSSIAN ATTACKS: 30 NOV, 1939/31 JAN, 1940

_ ~ FINNISH COUNTERATTACKS 27 DEC/5 JAN
BARENTS SEA
NORWAY
IJY] FINNISH ARMY CORPS
CEDEDTO RUSSIAAT
DATES SHOWN
MILES 150
!
iii i
KILOMETERS 200

\
\ .......... "

KIRUNA.

GALLIVARE
•

SWEDEN

LULEA

,'ALAND
IS.

Estonia

Above: Earlier Soviet penetration in the

north and east from November 1939 had
met effective Finnish resistance.
68

Military Balance on
the Eastern Front

T
he German High Command spent attack that they ignored all the warning Finnish War were far from complete, and
almost a year planning the inva- signs. In fact, the Red Army was still on a there was almost no Russian reserve to
sion of Russia, code-named Opera- peacetime footing when the invasion be- deal with deep incursions. The Germans
tion Barbarossa. Three different plans gan on 22 June. Most units were widely had good reason to be optimistic about
were devised, of which the one giving scattered for summer training; others the invasion of Russia.
priority to the capture of Leningrad was were too close to the western frontier. The
chosen. German leaders estimated Red reforms that followed upon the Russo-
Army strength along the frontier at some
155 divisions (in fact, there were 170 MILES 300
within operational distance.) The front iii" 'I
KILOMETRES 500
was divided in half by the Pripet Mar-
shes. In the north, von Leeb's Army
Group North was to aim itself against
Leningrad, where it faced an almost
equal number of Russian divisions.
However, these were deployed so far for-
ward that they were vulnerable to being
pushed back against the coast. Von
Bock's Army Group Centre, with two
Panzer armies, was the strongest Ger-
man force in the field; facing it was the
comparatively weak Red Army West
Front. Most Soviet troops were south of
the Pripet Marshes, positioned to defend
the agricultural and industrial wealth of
the Ukraine. Von Rundstedt's Army
Group South was to thrust southeast
against these forces.
The German plan called for swift
penetration deep into Russia in June, to
destroy the Red Army long before winter.
A massive German buildup began, but
Stalin and his advisors were so deter-
mined not to give Hitler any excuse to

MILES
I ,
300
I ,
MILES ,,
300
iii iii "
KILOMETRES 500 KILOMETRES 500

'- '-
j j
·.. \~i RUMANIA '""~i RUMANIA
li
.. - _.
....... li
. .. - _.
.......
 B A L T J C SEA
LatvIa
RIGA.

····t·fff·················:
~~~~~~~~~~-E~A-S-T~P-R-U-S-S-I~A~M-E-M-~~l f~i Bg~hAr:;~"~

(leeb)
~~~ttGroup -Jl11
~
t.~~i_1_(;:;~nia .*~~t:::.
rr r "111)_ - - then Sobennikov)
Below: Soviet cavalrymen on the march, 26 divisions 24 divisions
(inc 3 panzer divs) (inc 4 tank divs)
1941.Horse-mounted troops were more
',./' ..l_u_ft_fl_ot_te_'_ _--'
mobile than tanks in the severe Russian
winter conditions, and were thus more , reserve
effective than appearances suggested. ,,i added later
+ff r
for sec.urity
operations

West Front
(Pavlov,
Army Group then Timoshenko)
". Centre 38 divisions
, (Bock) (inc 8 tank divs)
/\ 51 divisions
__ MINSK

\
.~
(inc 9panzer divs)
luftflotte II
-- Thirt~enth

reserve

._."\
\ First Panzergruppe
i (Kleist)
\.

fi;JItI' ......
South-West
0_0

.r/
,
Front
(Kirponos,
then Budenny)
, 56 divisi{)ns
(inc 16 tank divs)
Above left: The initial German thrusts to HUNGARY
ffreserve
Moscow and Kiev.
Far left: A northern attack was later Army Group
South U k r a i n e
added to the original two-pronged assault (Rundstedt)
plan. 59 divisions
Left: Hitler finally identified Leningrad (inc 5panzerdivs,
as the prime target, and it was this plan of 14 Rumanian divs &
attack that was selected. 2 Hungarian divs)
luftflotte IV
Right: The Eastern Front from the Baltic
to the Black Sea, showing the relative
strengths and dispositions ofthe two "'rese,:;;"".,
protagonists.
"'\ \
.,.,- ...... ,
, .--------,
I' South Front I
I (Tyulenev) I
.'.
'., " .
I 16 divisions
I (inc 4 tank divs)
L
I
...I

RUMANI .
ODESSA
(1

~ ARMOURED DIVISIONS

OTHER DIVISIONS, including motorised

~
infantry (in Panzergruppen) and cavalry
SEA

~
o MILES 150
t-I--...,jr----I.
n
I
---r,----.,.•...L'--_,_---oJ'
1111 nI'tJl~TQ~c:. '){'\11
70

Below: The crew ofa German Panzer

attempt to free their tank from frozen mud
Operation by lighting a fire.
Right: The front line moves progressively
Barbarossa: 1941 eastwards as German pressure forces
Russia to yield.

G
erman forces achieved almost July to prevent an assault on Kiev. heavy losses every time it gave battle.
total surprise in their 22 June in- This development incited Hitler to di- Many divisions were trapped in pockets
vasion of Soviet territory, which vert Army Group Centre from its attack and destroyed piecemeal, while at Kiev
was preceded by a devastating air attack on Moscow via Smolensk into the alone, half a million Red soldiers were
that all but wiped out the Red Air Force. Ukraine offensive. Second Army and captured.
Fourth Panzer Group took a series of Heinz Guderian's Second Panzer Group By mid November the Germans had
northern objectives that brought it to the were ordered south to destroy the Soviet seized Rostov and the Perekop Isthmus,
Luga by 14 July. Army Group Centre Fifth Army and surround Kiev. Guderian which commanded the Crimea. In the
sealed off Russian forces at Bialystok and was radically opposed to abandoning the center, their victories at Smolensk and
Gorodische, taking 300,000 prisoners Moscow offensive, but he turned south on Bryansk had enabled them to capture
and 2500 tanks in a week's operations. 23 August as ordered. An unsuccessful Orel, Tula and Vyazma. The Baltic
Army Group South faced the greatest re- Russian counteroffensive failed to halt States had been occupied, and the Fin-
sistance in the Ukraine, where the Rus- the German advance north of Gomel, and nish alliance had helped open the way to
sian Fifth Army counterattacked on 10 the Soviet South-West Front suffered Leningrad.
 71

FINLAND

• TURKU

HELSINKI
SWEDEN •
3 Dec 1941 .~ (0's~~~
Evacuated by Russia

8 A L TIC

SEA
North-West Front

KALININ

TULA

.OREL

SEVASTOPOL

B LAC ~ SEA
72

Below left: With German assistance, the

Finns established a front line to the east of
The Finnish Front their 1939 border.
Below: Finnish infantry adopt defensive
positions on the Mannerheim Line as
Russian pressure increased.

T
he 1941 alliance with Germany north. Marshal Carl von Mannerheim, outflanked there and began to withdraw
brought significant improvements hero of the Russo-Finnish War, would by water, until the Finns had pursued to
in Finland's forces. Mobilization lead first the army and then the state for a point near their former frontier (1
and training systems were revamped, as the balance of World War II. September). On the Karelian Isthmus,
the Finns prepared to regain the territory Joint German-Finnish attacks began another attack reached Vuosalmi on 16
lost to Russia the previous year by ex- on 19 June 1941, with early successes August, but was stopped short of Lenin-
pediting the German assault in the around Lake Ladoga. The Russians were grad by a second Russian retreat. At this
point Mannerheim called a halt: having
- - - - 1939 RUSSO-FINNISH BOUNDARY regained the territory lost in the previous
ARCTIC + FINNISH ~ GERMAN *
DISPOSITION OF DIVISIONS, 10JULY 1941

• • • • • MANNERHEIM'S STOP LINE, 1 SEPTEMBER 1941

RUSSIAN
year, he was reluctant to become more
deeply involved in the attack on Russia.
Offensives did not resume until several
OCEAN ••••••••••• FINAL FRONT LINE DECEMBER 1941
MILES 200
days later, when attacks north of Lake
Ii Ladoga and against the Murmansk rail-
o
way achieved their objectives. Then the
Russian resistance grew increasingly
stronger, and by early December the
Finns were on the defensive. The front
line stabilized along an axis east of the
1939 Russo-Finnish boundary.

White
Sea

Gulf of
Bothnia
 73

The Attack on
Leningrad

erman Army Group North, com-

G manded by General Wilhelm von

Leeb, arrived near Leningrad on 1
September 1941. The Germans had de-
RUSSIAN FRONT
- 25SEPTEMBER1941
········9 NOVEMBER
cided not to storm the city, but to isolate it o MILES 50
and starve out its defenders. Artillery Ii" i.' I Ii II, I
o KM 80
bombardments began immediately, and
within two weeks Leningrad had been
cut off entirely from overland com- line' road from Zaborie to Lednevo, but weight of trucks. By Christmas Day, it
munication with the rest of Russia. winter weather and difficult terrain was possible to increase the bread ration
The city had only a month's supply of slowed supply trucks to a crawl. in Leningrad. But relief came too late for
food - heavily rationed - and starvation Thousands more had succumbed to many: on that same day, almost 4000
set in by October. The following month, starvation in Leningrad by early Decem- died of starvation.
11,000 died of hunger. Meager supplies ber, when the Red Army's counteroffen-
continued to come in by barge across sive began to make itself felt. Tikhvin Above: Supply routes to the besieged city
Lake Ladoga in the early fall, but on 9 was recaptured, and the Germans were ofLeningrad.
November the Germans took Tikhvin, pushed back to the Volkhov River. The Below: Finnish members ofthe Waffen-
the point of origin, and ice on the lake Russians repaired the railroad and SS in action.
made navigation impossible. Four weeks opened an ice road across the lake, which
later, the Russians opened a new tLife- was now frozen solidly enough to bear the
74

Below: The GermanArmy Group South

pushes to capture the Ukraine, but is
Moscow - Strike and forced to withdraw to the Mius River.
Bottom: Muscovites dig defense lines
Counterstrike around the capital, 1941.
Right: The German assault on Moscow.

A
fter capturing Kiev, the Germans - - - - FRONT LINE 30 SEPT 1941
redeployed their forces for the
assault on Moscow. They had a su-
periority of two to one in men and tanks,
.
KUPYANSK
__

11(
)'

•
~~~~:;'~2~~~~KS
f~~~~/~g~cUNTERATTACK
three to one in the air. Fourteen Panzer - - - - FRONTLINE 5DECEMBER
divisions were involved in the attacks MilES
, !
that converged on Russia's capital begin- I I I I
KilOMETRES 240
ning 30 September.
By 7 October large pockets of Soviet
troops had been cut off around Vyazma
and Bryansk. They were systematically
destroyed in the next two weeks, after
which heavy rains put a serious check on
German mobility. The Mozhaisk defense
line offered increasing resistance, and by
30 October German forces had bogged
down miles from Moscow. Many men and
tanks were lost in the frustrating ad-
vance through a sea of mud. 29 Nov
When the weather changed, it did little Russian forces
retake Rostov
to help the German cause. The freeze that
set in hardened the roads, but German
soldiers found it difficult to adapt to the
extreme cold, which also created new TIKHORETSK
SEA OF AZOV
problems with their vehicles. By 27 North Caucasus
November, units of the Third Panzer
 75

RUSSIAN
• • • VYAZMA DEFENSE LINE
A A A MOZHAISK DEFENSE LINE
VISHNI VOLOCHEK ................. MOSCOW DEFENSE LINES

Army
/
:+-i-i-i- II<alinin Front I
~ ~ TRAPPED POCKETS
o
I
o
MILES
I' I
KILOMETERS
'1
100
I
160
Group
North
,/

--xxxxx----""
Volga
Reservoir
j
ALEKSANDROV

Ninth Army

Second Army

.
STARODUB

CHERNIGOV

Second Panzer Army

begins offensive OBOYAN
. GERMAN
30 September.

.
All other armies attack - - - - - FRONT LINE, 30 SEPTEMBER 1941
2 October • ~ OFFENSIVE, 30 SEPT/30 OCT
- . - . - FRONTLlNE,100CTOBER
SUMY
- - - - - FRONTLINE. 300CT/15NOV

. BELGOROD C ) OFFENSIVE 15 NOV/5 DEC

PRILUKI - - • • --_.- FRONT LINE, 5 DECEMBER
- xxxxx- ARMY GROUP COMMAND BOUNDARY
Kharkov 30 miles I
76

FRONT LINES
5/6 DECEMBER 1941
1 JAN UARY 1942

.
END OFARPIL
BEZHETSK -.olIIIIIIIIlI1I(f----- MAIN RUSSIAN ATTACKS
~ RUSSIAN IV AIRBORNE
VISHNI
VOLOCHEK
'f CORPS LANDINGS 18/24 JAN 1942
••_ ~ . ~ GERMAN COUNTERATTACKS

II<alinin Front I o
b
MILES

KIL6~ETJRS 'i
80

I 1 ~O
Twenty-ninth ~'b
Army ~~
KALININ 5/6 December 1941
Thirty -first Army Red Army launches
counteroffensive

.
ALEKSANDROV

NEVEL VLADIMIR
•

KRICHEV

CHERIKOV
RYAZHSK
.
Army Group
Center (Bock,
then Kluge)

.
POCHEP

STARODUB
. .
LI PETSK

Group finally reached the Volga Canal, as the Germans faced temperatures that Tanks and planes became inoperable in
19 miles from Moscow center, but they plummeted to 40 degrees below zero. the extreme cold, and supply lines were
lacked the support for a frontal assault on On 8 December Hitler announced a tenuous or nonexistent.
the city. Elements of the Second Panzer suspension ofoperations outside Moscow, With the recapture of Kalinin and
Army had gotten as far as Kashira, but but the Soviet High Command was not Tula, the Russians removed the immedi-
they had to fall back for the same reason. listening. Employing the reserves it had ate threat to Moscow. Their offensive
By 5 December the Germans realized gathered in previous weeks, the Red drove on into late February, and German
that they could go no farther for the time Army launched a great counteroffensive troops took refuge in strongly fortified
being. Valuable time has been lost in the that recalled the winter of 1812, when defensive positions (called hedgehogs) in
capture of Smolensk, whose courageous Napoleon's forces came to grief on the hope of holding out until fresh troops
defenders had helped delay the German same ground. Avoiding German strong- could arrive. HitIer had ordered ~N 0 re-
advance on Moscow until the dreaded points, the Soviets advanced by infiltra- treat,' and airborne supplies kept many
onset of winter. Now the capital could not tion - passing over fields instead of roads , enclaves going through the winter. But
be completely encircled, and heavy bomb- making skillful use of Cossack cavalry, Operation Barbarossa had foundered in
ing did not offset the failure to close Mos- ski troops and guerrilla forces. The Ger- the snowfields of Russia. The Soviets
cow's window on the east. Fresh Soviet mans were harried from flank and rear, were regaining ground from Leningrad
troops began to arrive from Siberia even forced from one position after another. to the Crimea.
 77

o MILES 150

TheRedArmy I
o
I',
KM
1'1 "
250

FightsBack

uring the fall of 1941, the Rus- (Stavka) had rallied from the shock of

D sians were able to evacuate much

of their factory equipment and
many key workers to the east, where they
invasion to make effective use ofthe huge
army that had been so wastefully de-
ployed in June of 1941.
.....
.
MINSK

began to rebuild their industrial The Russian counteroffensive that be-

machine. Railroad equipment was also gan on 5-6 December saw immediate and
evacuated, giving the Soviets an edge in dramatic gains on many fronts. The siege
the number of locomotives and freight of Moscow was broken by the Kalinin,
cars per mile of track. The transportation
breakdown foreseen by Hitler did not
West and South-West Fronts (army
groups). Supplies began to reach Lenin-
ZHITOMIR
.
materialize, and Russian troop reserves grad in time to avert universal starvation
were built up in Siberia to replace the in the besieged city. In the south, the
great losses incurred on the Eastern Kerch Isthmus was retaken and the
Front. At the same time, war materiel Crimea re-entered with help from the
from the West began to reach Russia via Red Navy. The Russians had gone all the
Archangel, Murmansk, Vladivostok and way back to Velikiye Luki and Mozhaisk
Persia. before they had to rest and regroup in late
Since Operation Barbarossa had been February 1942.
designed to achieve a quick victory dur-
ing the summer months, German troops Opposite: The RedArmy launches its
had never been equipped for winter war- counteroffensive.
fare. Soviet troops by contrast, were Right: Russian territory regained by the
routinely equipped with clothing and end ofApril 1942.
vehicles appropriate to the theater of op- Below: A political meeting ofthe Russian
erations. The Soviet Supreme Command Twentieth A rmy nearSmolensk.
 eourseo
•
o a on I •
80

The Treaty of
Versailles: Blueprint
for Hostilities

internationalized as a ~free city,' and the

G
ermany had had no part in the there were demonstrations all over Ger-
negotiations that resulted in the many and a change of government before valuable coal region of the Saar passed
Treaty of Versailles; it was entire- it was signed. under League of Nations administration
ly the work of the 32 nations that had By the treaty's terms, Germany ceded and the economic control of France.
been leagued against her in World War I. Alsace-Lorraine to France, the towns of In addition, Germany lost all of its
The 80,000-word draft of the proposed Eupen and Malmedy to Belgium, the city overseas empire, most of its armed forces
peace treaty was approved by the Allied of Memel to Lithuania, and the province and control of the Rhineland - which was
Peace Congress on 6 May 1919, and Ger- of Posen and a ~corridor' through West to be occupied at Germany's expense un-
man representatives did not even see the Prussia to Poland. German Austria, Po- til the Treaty of Versailles was fully ex-
document until the following day. They land and Czechoslovakia were declared ecuted. A clause that even some of the
protested bitterly against its terms, and independent. The port city of Danzig was victors disputed forced Germany to claim
 81

PRE-1914 BOUNDARIES
full responsibility for the war and to
promise financial reparation (for all dam-
OF VERSAlllES,1919
age done to the civilian population of the
Allies and their property.' The initial
NATIONS CONTROL
OEMILITARISEO- ZONE payment was set at five billion dollars;
subsequent reparations were limited
~ NORTH SEA
only by (the utmost of [Germany's] abil-
ity' to pay. Disarmed, dishonored and
GREAT
NETHER~ANDS heavily mortgaged, the conquered nation
LONDON
•
:3
BRITAIN
AMSTERDAM
,{ embarked upon years of distress and re-
sentment that would culminate in the
conflict that was to eclipse even the Great
War itself.

Previous page: USS Arizona explodes at

PearlHarbor, 7 December 1941.
Opposite: Admiral Chester W Nimitz
points the way to Tokyo. Seated (left to
right) are General MacA rthur, President
FRANCE Roosevelt and A dmiral Leahy.
. ..;/'"> .BERN
Left: European boundaries before and
~ -SWITZ. - ...... ~.'\.
after Versailles.
GENE~ (",,,-,:~, /1.-.S
~ \J Below: The Allied premiers convene in
... > Paris for the Peace Conference in 1919.
\
MilES 250
, i ~J' ,.' 4bo
82

German Expansion,
1939-40

T
he German Army that went to war
in 1939 was armed and organized
much like that of 1918, but there
had been important developments in the
interwar years. The Stuka dive bomber
now served as a form of mobile artillery
at need. Submachine guns offered an
advantage in portability over the Vickers
and Bren machine guns used by the Brit-
ish. Allied forces had more tanks, but the
Germans were much better at using them
tactically. German generals knew how to
fight the war of movement, while the
French were still fixated on their Magi-
not Line - a static and incomplete system
that anticipated a second Verdun. The
Germans had no intention of fighting
another such action.
The new blitzkrieg style of German
warfare rolled over Poland, Norway,
Denmark and France in a matter of
months. The British Army was shattered
by the French campaign, but the evacua-
tion from Dunkirk and the crucial weeks
bought by the Battle of Britain staved off
invasion of the British Isles. Mussolini
took advantage of Allied defeats to enter
the war on the German side, but Italian

MOSCOW
•

.......~ ~ .

BORDEAUX

BLACK SEA

SPAIN
MADRID
•

ANKARA
•
 83

ARCTIC OCEAN AXIS PARTNERS: 1939

GERMANY CJ iTALY

·REYKJAV~. c==J
c=J
GERMAN SATELLITE

GERMAN OCCUPIED, 27 SEI;'T 1939

tJ c=J GERMAN OCCUPIED, 23JUNE1940

- - - - , GERMAN FRONT LINES AT
DATES SHOWN

500
I
800

?l

MOSCOW
ATLANTIC • s s I A

OCEAN

,"SEVASTOPOL .TIFLIS

BLACK SEA

MADRID
•
SPAIN ISTANBUL
T
.~

M E D
GIBRALTAR (Sd I
.SP.MOR.
,.-.- .. ~ '. ORAN
ALGIERS
iTUNIS
CASABLANCA
,
( i
i
ALGERIA
(Fr)
! AI
N A
"-TUNISIA
MOROC CO ._...... 1 " (Fr)
E A N S E

FAll
C)
(Fr) I'
,.~' \ j
'~"-"-"_.;.

Ceded Rumanian tarritories·:

1. Busarabia' N. Bukovina to RUllia, June 1940
"\
.,

j../
\/-
. / TRIPOLI

SIRTE
El AGHEILA
2. S. Dobruja to Bulg.ria, August 1940 y.
3. Transylvania to Hungary, September 1940 j L I B
(Italian)
A
© Richard Natkiel. 1982

armies in both Greece and North Africa

were struggling before the end of 1940.
By that time, German V-boats were tak-
ing a heavy toll of Allied shipping on the
convoy routes.

Above left: Saluting the Swa,stika.

Left: Axis expansion in the late 1930s.
A bove: German and Italian territorial
gains in 1939 and 1940.
Right: The dreadedJu 87 Stukadive
bomber, whose success in Europe became
legendary.
84

Below: 1942 saw the high tidemark of

German expansion. Allied landings in
German Conquest at North Africa combined with the Soviet
counteroffensive on the Eastern Front
Its Height were to turn the tide nnd sound the death-
knell for Hitler's territorial aspirations.

H aving been balked in his plan to Red Army, but the expected quick and homeland, and the Germans went onto
invade the British Isles, Hitler easy victory was not forthcoming. Ger- the defensive in Russia. An ill-advised
directed his attention to the east, man confidence and supplies began to declaration of war on the United States
where he gained control ofthe Balkans in erode with the onset of an early winter after Pearl Harbor guaranteed open and
the spring of 1941. He shored up the that found troops unequipped for freezing active American involvement, with all
tenuous Italian position in North Africa, conditions. The Russian Bear shook off the industrial and military strength that
then ordered the implementation of Op- its tormentors in a counteroffensive that this implied. Hitler's Germany had over-
eration Barbarossa - the invasion of the prevented the capture of Moscow, then reached itself.
Soviet Union. Operations beginning 22 Stalingrad, in 1942. Russian civilians
June 1941 inflicted great losses on the proved able defenders of their embattled

ARCTIC OC E A N GERMAN OCCUPIED" 1 JAN 1941

ALLIED WITH AXIS
GERMAN OCCUPIED,
1 JAN'- 29 MAY 1941
22 JUNE 1941-19 NOV 1942

GERMAN FRONT LINES

---16JULY1941
----_ •• 5 DECEMBER 1941
' - - - - _ END-APRIL1942
- •• _19NOVEMBER1942

MILES 500
. , i KIL~M~TE~~ i '
I
800

AT'LANTIC
I A

OCEAN

.TIFlIS

BONE ;TU'
i
ALGERIA
(Vichy French)
!
i-TUNISIA
" (Vichy French)
\
., .~.j TRIPOLI
\
\
.'
\
~wl
! L I
© Richard Natkiel. 1982
 85

Below: Two examples ofwar propaganda

from German (left) and Soviet artists;
The Propaganda their respective messages are clear.
Right: Anti-Semitic feelings found
War expression in such German posters as rThe
Eternal Jew'.

ropaganda was used by all of the and other media that fostered unques-

P belligerents in World War II to

inci te patriotism and inflame
popular feeling against (the enemy,' both
tioning loyalty and hatred of minorities,
who were accused of subverting the war
effort. During World War I, propaganda
outside and within the country. Luridly had been so falsified by all parties in-
illustrated Soviet posters trumpeted (Kill vclved that genuine atrocities like (The
the German Beasts!' and (Destroy the Final Solution to the Jewish Problem'
Hitlerite Army - It can and must be were widely disbelieved - until Allied li-
done!' Soviet leaders did not feel fully beration of concentration camp survivors
confident oftheir peoples' loyalty in every in 1945 revealed the incredible truth.
phase of the war, in which they lost more The US propaganda effort was less ob-
soldiers and civilians than any other vious, but not necessarily less effective.
single belligerent. Marine recruitment posters bore the
Germany produced comparable war art legend: (We're looking for a few good taken up as a powerful rallying cry in the
from 1943 on, after the office of National men,' emphasizing the Marines' reputa- war against Japan. Thus dictatorships
Socialist Leadership was created. tion as an elite force. (War Bonds' and and democracies alike waged the prop-
Psychological warfare played a major (Victory Gardens' abounded to foster aganda war with deep intensity and un-
role in the German war effort, with the wholehearted co-operation on the home shakeable conviction of the rightness of
production of films, posters, magazines front. (Remember Pearl Harbor' was their cause.

~HM4TDHiMTb rMTJIEPDHGHYtil APMHKl- :IlHiHB HJlllJ1tHHll

86
Below: Japan's sphere ofinfluence and
activity, December 1941.
Below right: Soldiers return to Japan
from Manchuria to a hero's welcome.

R u s s I A

e.
,~ '.
,.
~~" I

~v "

~
,DI{"ETE ROFU
STOK '" /I'O .f
_ Ho~kaido appu B

27 September 1940
Japan signs 'Tripartite'
pact with Germany and
Italy, and in April 1941.
a non-ag9fession pact
with Russia

DELHI
• BONIN IS "
P A c
'MARCUS
IWOJIMA

N D I A
BOMBAY 'WAKE
" Mariana
} Islands o
~~ II!IIII·SAIPAN

~---_ ...
, UAM
ENIWETOK. KWAJAlEIN

Marshall :' ~ ,;',

',~ TRUK Is :'
MAJURO·
oline l s I ands
August 1940
Japan establishes
___----EQ....:..u-a-to-r- 1 military bases in
ADDU French Indo-China
ATOLL and in July 1941, OCEAN
occupies the country
~BOUGAINVlllE
'-.J ~ Solomon Is
. NEW::~.~
.~ GEORGIA Cb~GUADAlCANAl
-GUAO/).,\'C.
/).,~/)..\.. ~
• SANT A CR
' . IS
COCOS IS
COR~L SEA ESPIRITU
I. N·O I A N o C E A N CAIRNS
New b; SANTI
Hebrides ~.~ EFATE
Northern ';
Territory l: ~ '~New
. ~Caledoll
Western Queensland ROCKHAMPTON NOUME~
A U S ~T R A~ L I A
: : :
Australia : : BRISBANE

i: South :

Ej'
Australia ~ . • NORFOL
.JAPANESE EMPIRE, 1933
OCCUPIED BY JAPAN, i ~ New
, _ 7 JULY 1937 - 7 DEC 1941
PERTH
.A 1SouthWales
AREA UNDER JAPAN·ESE CONTROL ADElAIDE~:......... SYDNEY
7 DECEMBER 1941 C:,. i··.......
·CANBERRA

MERCATOR'S PROJECTION
!Victoria····../
: MELBOURNE' AUCKlA
. .
 87

Japan Asserts Its

Power

Japanese occupation of most major

J
apanese resentment at the Pacific
settlement following World War I Chinese ports and extensive areas of
gathered strength through the their territory.
1920s. ~Patriotic Societies' agitated for an To prevent the Chinese from being sup-
aggressi ve foreign policy, and the plied through French Indochina, the
Japanese constitution gave the military Japanese put pressure on the area and
a disproportionate voice in national ended by occupying it in 1941. This
affairs. The rise of Chinese Nationalism brought open opposition from the US in
posed a threat to Japan's position as the the form of an export embargo. Japan's
leading Asian power, and the West was recent pacts with the Axis Powers and
widely distrusted as racist in its attitudes the USSR had imperiled Allied interests
- not without cause. in the Pacific, and stringent sanctions
All these factors were involved in the against Japanese trade and oil imports
Japanese seizure of Manchuria (1931), were decisive. Faced with the loss of 75
which was made by the so-called percent of her trade and 90 percent of her
Japanese Manchurian Army acting inde- oil supplies, Japan sent her aircraft car-
pendently of the government. Two years rier force into the Pacific on 26 November
later, Japan withdrew from the League of 1941. On 2 December General Tojo, now
•• MIDWAY
Nations and accelerated her arms pro- militant Prime Minister of Japan,
duction. Serious fighting with China ordered it to attack the US Pacific Fleet
F I c broke out in 1937 and resulted in at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
. Hawaiian Is
.0 OAHU
PEARL HARBOR"~b
. () HAWAII

N
July 1941
United States
freezes Japanese
assets

• PALMYRA
<.
...
~
'
~~ ;CHRISTMAS

JARVIS
~
.. Phoenix Is ~MALDEN

EA
./
·VICTORIA ~
C~ ?
" Tokelau Is ~
.,, , .~

\
:.SUVOROV
',Samoa Is

.
,.
,00.

I
••

'0
1
1 Cook Is' ':: .. Society Is
... I'
.: T?nga Is
Q. 1 RAROTONGA
I
I
I
I
I
I
: KERMADfc IS
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
LAND I
I
•
I © Richard Natkiel, 1982
88

Below right: Japan's surprise attack at

Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on 7 December
1941 (below) raised the curtain on nine
months offeverish expansion in the
Pacific - yet the scale ofthis empire-
building was destined to sap her strength.

R u

~~,.
~
,~

I
,.'.
~v /?'
~~ETEROFU
aido 'I'O;f apPli 8

6 August 1942
Limit of Japanese
expansion
BONIN IS "
P A c
·MARCUS
IWO JIMA

BOMBAY 'WAKE
'. Mariana
,,~ Islands
·SAIPAN
o c
.....-----...... 'GUAM
ENIWETOK. KWAJALEIN

Marshall :"';"
'.:. TRUK Is :.
MAJURO·
Car 0 lin·e I s I and s ' MAKI
TARAWA

Equator 23 Jan-1 August 1942

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I S~omonl~and~NENew -
:ADDU
ATOLL ADMIRAL~; Q .' Guinea and part of Papua
NEW
. NEW ~RELAND captured
·BRITAI.N ~RABAUL .....- - - -......- - -
I "~ \,-BOUGAINVILLE
• \..::J ~ Solom s
!PAPUA, NEW: :~.~
GEORGIA GUADALCANAL
~ ,
'SANTA CR

COCOS IS'
I IS
CORAL SEA ESPIRITU
New b; SANTe

o C E A N
Hebrides'b'~ EFATE
I N 0 I A N
Northern·i
Territory ~: ~'()New
Queensland ~Caledoni
Western NOUMEA
A U S T R A~ L I A
...........................
Austra,lia BRISBANE
South , NORFOL
Australia ~.: .
PERTH
; 'New
~ South Wales
JAPANESE CONTROLLED AT A ~h

B 7 DECEMBER 194'1 ' ADELAIDE SYDNEY

OCCUPIED BY JAPAN, ~ i······.. .CANBERRA
7 DECEMBER 1941-6AUGUST1942 ~Victo·;·ia······.f
: ' MELBOURNE AUCKLAI
MERCATOR'S PROJECTION
 89

The Japanese Sweep

the Pacific

hen the Japanese aimed their that - fortunately - were absent from

W stunning strike at Pearl Har-

bor, their strategists expected -
and achieved - a series of rapid victories
Pearl Harbor when the initial attack was
launched.) Japanese Imperial Headquar-
ters believed it was possible to achieve
in the Pacific. They had no real choice: their objectives within six months if they
without access to oil, their war machine moved decisively, and for the first four
would grind to a halt even as US industry months they effectively had the Pacific
geared up for new feats of production War to themselves.
under wartime conditions. The oil-rich At a cost of only 23 warships (none
East Indies were an inevitable target, as larger than a destroyer), the Japanese
were the Allied colonies astride the sea overran the Philippines, Malaya, Burma,
routes. the Dutch East Indies and a number of
Available forces were relatively mod- British islands between December 1941
est - some 80 percent of the 51 Japanese and May 1942. Then the Doolittle Raid on
divisions were tied up in China and Tokyo (18 April) awakened them to the
Manchuria. On the plus side, the out- danger of bombing on the home islands,
numbered Japanese troops had good air and inflamed the Japanese (Victory Dis-
support, jungle-warfare training and an ease' (as one of their leaders would call
impressive fleet that included 10 carriers it). The Japanese resolved to extend their
-- and 8 modern battleships. (The US defense perimeter despite their dimi-
c
,

F I
Pacific Fleet had nine battleships of nishing resources - and thereby ensured
. Hawaiian Is
,0 OAHU
World War I vintage and four carriers that they would lose the war.
PEARL HARBOR"~\:)
, () HAWAII

Dawn, 7 December 1941

A N Japanese carrier-borne
aircraft attack Pearl Harbor

• PALMYRA
.(~.. .
'

-Q ~ ; CHRISTMAS

JARVIS
~~MALDEN
Phoenix Is'.
:A ./
·VICTORIA ~
e. ?
" ' Tokelau ~
." '. Is -~
,
...SUVOROV
Samoa Is
,.
',°0
. I
•0
I
I , Cook Is-,_: Society Is
"' I'
.: T?nga
Q. I Is RAROTONGA
I
I
I
I
I
I
: KERMADfc IS

.AND
© Richard Natkiel.1982
90
Below: Japan's empire-building was
finally curtailed as a two-prongedAllied
offensive from the east and southwest
forced a retreat.
Below right: US and British combined
chiefs ofstaffdiscuss Allied strategy.

RU,SSIA. ,
.J .......
,." •-......
,.,./I. , ...... _.
\.
..-c.-. \..,._._.".,....... ~.
i/ .\.."'. ULAN BATOR. ,0:> e.

q= r , ;.j
\
'i-'·"'· \
t....
-.,.,.
MONGOLIA

i
.".
\._.,.............
,.'"
__ --_J.
J."".
,,0""·
. \"·1.
\,...... "r. C ' Honshu
(
TOKYO
7~ikoku JAPAN
~. Kyushu
KagoshimaB
~ ....'O:>P#
:'f..~'V'.. BONIN IS "
~~-v POKINAWA

'·OFO;.:n~Sa IWOJIMA
HONG KONG (Taiwan)

BOMBAY

, !\;RINCOMALEE

COlOMBOU NICO
',' Ceylon

:ADDU
ATOLL

INDIAN o c ADALCANAL
'SANTACf
IS
COCOS IS_ DARWIN t:l
ESPIRITU
Aug 1942-July 1944 New tl ; SANTe
US/Australian landings r H e b rl·deslI·,• EFATE
along north coast of
New Guinea
~ '~New
Western ~Caiedoll
ALLIED COMMAND BOUNDARIES, NOUME~
2JULY 1942 A U S T R A~
SUBDIVISIONS OF PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS ...........................
LIMIT OF JAPANESE EXPANSION,
Australia
South
6 AUGUST 1942 Australia ~ :. • NORFOI
~ AREA REOCCUPIED BY AMERICAN FORCES,
l.--...J 6AUGUST 1942-AUG 1944 PERTH ; 'New
~ SouthWales
11 Nov 19441 DATES OF MAIN AMERICAN LANDINGS A
ADELAIDE
:..... SYDNEY
AREA OCCUPlED BY JAPANESE FORCES, ~ i······.. .CANBERRA
JUNE-AUGUST 1944 ~Vict~·;·iir....··.f
: MELBOURNE AUCKLA
MERCATOR'S PROJECTION
 91

The Allies Strike

Back at Japan

s us forces gained experience in

A
ders were captured. An intensive study of
the challenging Pacific Theater, this campaign helped the Americans to
their leaders saw the necessity for avoid their mistakes on Tarawa in subse-
mounting two major lines of advance quent operations. They accepted the fact
North Pacific Area against Japan. US Navy carrier forces that the Japanese would have to be
(Nimitz) were strengthened for their essential flushed out of their caves and bunkers
role, amphibious assault capability was one by one, using grenades, flamethrow-
increased and a fleet train was created to ers and anything else that came to hand.
supply the fighting ships hundreds of The other half of the Allied offensive
miles from their bases. These units were was in the southwest Pacific, where
to advance toward Japan via the central American and Australian forces under
Pacific islands.Test case for the (island- General Douglas MacArthur made slow
hopping' strategy was Tarawa, where US but certain progress with massive sup-
forces fought one ofthe costliest battles in port from land-based aircraft. Australian
their history in proportion to the num- forces had a strong vested interest in de-
Pacific Ocean Areas bers engaged in November 1943. Three feating the Japanese, who were sure to
(Nimitz) thousand US Marines were casualties, attack their homeland if they could iso-
and only 17 of the 4000 Japanese defen- late it from American support.
• • MIDWAY

F I c
. Hawaiian Is
,0 OAHU
P~ARL HARBOR"~t)
() HAWAII

A N
r-------~
Central Pacific Area
(Kinkaid)

. PALMYRA
~ 20 Nov 19431 '. (~.. . "

~~ ;CHRISTMAS

JARVIS

I~Phoenix Is ~~.MALDEN
. / .
EA
·VICTORIA ~
~e
?
" Tokelau Is
. ,,,
~
.~

\
•.. SUVO~OV
',Samoa Is
\~a . . . .
. I
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Q.: RAROTONGA
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: South Pacific Area

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92

The Defeat ofNazi

Germany

out, US and British bombers were attack-

G
ermany's long retreat began in fact, Allied organization and equipment
1943; the Battle of Kursk in July ing both industrial targets and popula- were at their peak. The Germans, by con-
of that year was the death knell tion centers within the Reich. trast, were drained in every area: men,
for hopes of victory in the east. Two By the middle of 1944, after successful money, armaments and leadership. By
months before, Italy had been knocked massive Allied landings in Normandy the time Allied forces converged on the
out of the war, and it was only a matter of and breakthroughs aimed at the Rhine, Elbe to link up with the Russians (April-
time before the Allies would try to break the combined might of US and Soviet in- May 1945), most German units were pre-
into Fortress Europe. The German threat dustry and armies had become over- pared to show the white flag. Town after
to the Atlantic supply routes was effec- whelming. British resources were town surrendered eagerly to the Allies in
tively nullified, and before the year was strained, but not to the breaking point. In preference to the feared Russians.

ARCTIC OC E A N

?I'

ATLAN,TIC
·A

OCEAN

FRANCE
Bay a!
Biscay VICHY.

MADRID

SPAIN
•

GIBRALTAR (Br)
.. SP.MOR.
'.-..::J \ ORAN
CASABLANCA i
, ALGERIA
~ (Free French)
MOROCCO ._......../
(Free Frl ,

.,..._.-._ . ,..""- .,;

© Richard Natkiel.1982
 93

Below left: The contraction and (below)

final defeat ofHitler's Germany.
Right: Berlin lies in ruins, the target of
round-the-clock raids by British and US
bomber aircraft.

ARCTIC OCEA N ""

a L1BERATED{OCCUflIED BY ALLIES
23 JUNE -15 DECEMBER 1944··
15 DECEMBER 1944-7 MAY1945

ALLIED FRONT LINES

--- 25AUGUST1944
- •••••, 15 DECEMBER 1944
. _ . __ 21 MARCH 1945
_ •• _ 7MAY1945

* German forces withdrew from Greece. Albania

and' Yugoslavia in face of partisan attacks
MILES 500
i KIL~ME~E~~ i!
I
800

1/

MOSCOW
ATLANTIC • S
U s I A

VORONEZH
OCEAN

KHARKOV
•
Caspian
Sea

.nFLIS

MADRID
•
SPAIN

.~

M E D
GIBRALTAR (Br) I
.SP.MOR.

,
' - - . - .. .1 ORAN
CASABLANCA i iTUNIS
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(FreeFr) r \ .
I::)

.,. .. _._---;.,.'; -\ .",J TRIPOLI

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j L I B y .A © Richard Natkiel.1982
94
Below: The reversal ofJapanese
supremacy in the Pacific was confirmed by
the A llies' recapture ofthe Philippines in
early 1945. Defeat was then only a matter
ofmonths away.
Below right: A postwar view ofthe
business district ofKobe, showing the
damage caused by incendiary attack.

8 August 1945
(
R U S S I A Russia declares war ATTLJ
;......... on Japan and invades
f."·- ~ .\ Manchuria next day
~ ..A.:-. ,._.-."
. ~.~.
i '-.'.\ ULAN BATOR.

~ I · MONGOLIA
\{ -,.j f..... _
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Northern ~

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Territory 1:
Queensland ROCKHAMPTON
. ~ '~New
~Caledon:
NOU·MEA
A- U S T JR A~ L I A
_ SITUATION, AUGUST 1944

~ AREA OCCUPIED BY ALLIED FORCES

...........................
L-..J AUGUST1944-AUGUST1945
Australia BRISBANE
South
_ _ _ SITUATION, AUGUST 1945 Australia i..·························..... • NORFOL

AREA GAINED BY JAPANESE FORCES, PERTH

i New
E3
r----l
AUGUST-DECEMBER 1944
JAN-FEB 1945

REJAJ<EN BY CHINESE FORCES

ADELAIDE
A
o
~ South Wales
;.....
; ••••••••
SYDNEY
·CANBERRA
L-..J JANUARY - AUGUST 1945 ~Vict~·;·ia······.f
: MELBOURNE AUCKLAI
MERCATOR'S PROJECTION
 95

Dissolution of the
Japanese Empire

T
he first real check to the Japanese flung conquests so rapidly made in pre-
came with the Battle of the Coral ceding months.
Sea, six months after Pearl Harbor. To preclude a second Japanese attempt
There US carriers commanded by Rear on Port Moresby, the Americans deter-
Admiral Frank (Black-Jack' Fletcher mined to seize Tulagi and Guadalcanal in
dashed Japanese hopes of capturing Port the Solomon Islands. It was a six-month
Moresby, the key to New Guinea. The struggle in which US forces gained addi-
battle made history as the first naval en- tional skills from day to day despite
gagement in which opposing ships never heavy losses, and it set the tone for the
sighted each other - all fighting was done duration of the Pacific War - a campaign
by carrier-based planes. Both sides made that moved steadily toward Japan by
serious errors in this new form of war- avoiding heavily garrisoned enemy
fare, but many of these were corrected by strongholds and seizing weaker positions
US forces in the subsequent Battle of to use as a springboard to the next Amer-
Midway. ican objective.
In this action, the island of Midway General Matsuichi Ino summarized
served as an (unsinkable aircraft carrier' after the war: (The Americans attacked
•• MIDWAY
for Admiral Chester W Nimitz. Bungled and seized, with minimum losses, a
Japanese intelligence contributed to a relatively weak area, constructed air-
F I c disaster from which the Japanese Navy fields, and then proceeded to cut supply
. Hawaiian Is would not recover - the loss of every car- lines ... Our strongpoints were gradu-
~o OAHU rier commanded by Admiral Chuichi ally starved out.' It was a brilliant im-
PEARL HARBOR~:"t:l Nagumo. After Midway, the Japanese provisation on the theme of the indirect
.b HAWAII
would be incapable. of supporting the far- approach.

• PALMYRA
.( .to .' •
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JARVIS
/ ~MALDEN
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.VICTORIA ~
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a 'anes
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98

R u I
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4[
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8 Dec
Wake I. attac
23 Dec
surrendered
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KWAJALEIN·: ..... ~ Mars:
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SEA ESPIRITU-SANl
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BRISBANE
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PERTH : i New South
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ADELA'!~~;I;:::R~~yT A SMA N AUCKLA~

Q, SEA ~
\j NEWc~~~~~~TON
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JAPANESEEMPIRE,1933
OCCUPIED BY JAPAN, JULY 1937/DECEMBER 1941
MILITARY BASES ESTABLISHED BY JAPAN, SEPTEMBER 1940

~ ABDA (American, British, Dutch,andAustralian) COMMAND

MERCATOR'S PROJECTION f>

Previous page: The battleship Yamato

fitting outatKure, Japan, in 1941.
Above: Japan's occupied territories.
Right and far right: The Pearl Harbor
attacks in detail.
Above right: The magazine ofthe US
destroyer Shaw explodes during the raids.
 99

Pearl Harbor

T
he Japanese strike force that Radio moni toring of increased
approached Pearl Harbor on 6 De- Japanese radio traffic in the several days
Japanese carrier cember consisted of six fleet car- preceding the attack made it clear that
strike force riers escorted by two battleships and two an operation was underway. All Pacific
heavy cruisers. Anchored in Pearl Har- forces had been alerted, but those at
bor were eight battleships of the US Pearl Harbor remained on a peacetime
Pacific Fleet, numerous destroyers and footing despite the danger. Aircraft on
tenders, and submarines and minesweep- the several Oahu airfields were undis-
ers, The carriers Lexington and Saratoga persed, and ships were anchored in line
0600 hrs, 7 Dec 1941 were away on a supply mission to Wake with many members of their crews
Air strike on Island, which was fortunate for the fu- ashore. Reconnaissance flights had not
NAY
Pearl Harbor launched
o ture course of the war on the Allied side. been increased above the average.
" . c
. Hawaiian Is
.0 OAHU
PEARL HARBOR~~'t>b

• PALMYRA

;CHRISTMAS

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Tpng: U us AIRFIELDS First , Second

: MILES 8 Wave , Wave 1141
I I i I' I 'I i I Destroyers Destroyers
I KILOMETERS 12 I III I~and tender
I I
I V 'Blue
II
I

~hoenix
I 0850 hrs.
~DFc IS 0945 hrs. Destroyers
~andtender
Japanese attacks /11 X Detroi~
end ~?~ 1\ ~ ~ Solace
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PACIFIC o C E A N
100

The Japanese launched the first wave

of their two-part air attack at 6:00 AM on
7 December. A radar station reported in-
coming planes at 7:00 AM, but this report
was unaccountably ignored. An hour la-
ter, torpedo bombers came in to attack
the harbor as fighters began to strafe the
airfields. Virtually all the US aircraft
were destroyed on the ground. In the har-
bor, five of the eight battleships were hit
immediately; minutes later, West Virgi-
nia was in flames and sinking, Oklahoma
had capsized and California was badly
damaged. Arizona had exploded and
Nevada had to beach herself as she made
for the harbor entrance under fire from
the second wave of the Japanese attack.
Dive bombers and high-level bombers
had joined the first aircraft contingent to
create additional devastation.
By the time the second wave struck, US
forces had rallied from the initial shock to
offer a more effective defense. At 9:45 AM,
Vice-Admiral Nagumo's aircraft re-
turned to their carriers with loss of nine
fighters, fifteen dive bombers and five
torpedo bombers.
Had Admiral Nagumo launched an
additional attack against the harbor, he
might have destroyed the port facilities
entirely and accounted for the absent air-
craft carriers as well. Instead, he chose to
withdraw the strike force, from which he
dispatched several units to attack Wake
Island (8 December). US Marines garri-
soned there sank two Japanese des-
troyers and held the island against
steady air and sea bombardment for two
weeks, until they were overwhelmed by a
Japanese landing.
 101

Malaya

ieutenant General Tomoyuki

L Yamashi ta commanded the

Japanese Twenty-fifth Army in its
whirlwind invasion of Malaya. (December
1941). In this campaign, which drove all
the way to Singapore and was described
by Winston Churchill as the worst disas-
ter in British military history, Yamashita
earned'the nickname (Tiger of Malaya.' CHINA SEA
His force consisted of three divisions sup-
ported by 600 aircraft, as against Lieute-
nant General A E Percival's two divisions
with some 150 aircraft.
Northern landings met Ii ttle opposition
except at Kota Bharu, where Takumi
Force, a regimental group, had to fight its
way ashore. Meanwhile, air attacks wiped
out all but some 50 British planes.
A double advance south was led by the
Japanese 5 Division, which grappled
with 11 Indian Division around Jitra on
11 December. The defenders were pushed
back steadily, as the Japanese Guards
Division moved down the coast and 5 and
18 Divisions progressed inland. Within
70 days, Yamashita's troops had overrun
all of Malaya through a combination of
superior force, speed and surprise. Gener-
al Percival was tricked by skillful jungle-
warfare tactics into believing that the
Japanese force was vastly superior in
size, and on 15 February 1942 he and his
men surrendered.

Above left: Aftermath ofPearl Harbor,

with USS Downes at left, USS Cassin at Sumatra
right and USS Pennsylvania at rear. \\
Left: The garrison flag flies as Hickam DUTCH EAST INDIES
Field burns. tku
Right: The Japanese conquest ofMalaya,
DOVER 3000 FEET
completed in January 1942. 31 January 1942
o MILES 100
last British and Commonwealth L-_ _~-:::f(.~
Below right: Singapore falls inFebruary. I ' i
! i I
I
Below: General Yamashita (foreground) o KILOMETERS 160 forces withdraw to Singapore
surveys newly-conquered territory.
102

The Fall of Hong

Kong

S
imultaneous with the Japanese in-
FRONT LINES
vasion of the Malay Peninsula on 8
December 1941 came the invasion
of Hong Kong, whose defenders were
hopelessly outnumbered. Within 24
hours they had been pushed back to the
Gindrinkers Line, which was breached
by the capture of Shing Mun Redoubt.
The mainland then had to be evacuated,
an operation which was completed on 13
December. Five days later the Japanese
crossed Kowloon Bay on a wide front and Shelter
captured more than half of Hong Kong
Island. Fierce resistance continued until
several days before Christmas, but after
most of the reservoirs were captured, the STONECUTT~
garrison was forced to surrender on 25
December.

TUNGLej

East

Lamma

LammaI Cha nn e I V

o MILES
~
I i I Iii
o KILOMETERS

o
Above: The Japanese take Hong Kong on
C H N A MILES 10
Christmas Day 1941 .
{Area occupied by Japan) b K~! , 1~'
Opposite top: The Japanese conquest of
Bataan, completed inApril1942.
Opposite: The last US forces to hold outon
Above: British soldiers face captivity after Corregidor Island, south ofBataan, were
the fall ofHong Kong. finally neutralized on the morning of
R ight: Hong Kong and the surrounding 6 May.
area.

SOUTH CHINA SEA

 103

Victory in the
Philippines

n July 1941, when the Philippine

I Army joined forces with the United

States, General Douglas MacArthur
was made ,commander of US Forces in the
_11111
'-1--~--:";""'~
HEIGHT IN FEET
OVER 3500
. 1500-3500

1----------< 500-1500
Far East (USAFFE). His ten divisions UNDER 500

included some 19,000 American troops

tLONGAPO
and 160,000 Filipinos - most of them ill
equipped and undertrained. There were
also 200 aircraft at his disposal. The
Japanese believed, with some justifica-
tion, that their Fourteenth Army of two
divisions supported by 500 aircraft could
conquer the Philippine Islands.
Heavy air attacks struck US air bases
on 8 December (the same day as Pearl
Harbor, but dated a day later by the In-
Manila
ternational Date Line). Word of the Pearl
Harbor disaster had impelled USAFFE Bay
to fly its bombers off Clark Field in the
morning, but by the time of the midday
attack, they were back on the ground
with their fighter escorts. Forty-eight 26 Jan
hours of bombing against the airfields American forces
accounted for the vast majority of US reti re to 'Reserve
battle position'
warplanes and cleared the way for
Japanese landings north of Luzon to seize
the bases at Vigan, Laoag and Tuguegar-
ao. In the south, Legaspi was seized as a
base from which to interdict seaborne US Two Japanese
LAMAO
battalions eliminated
reinforcements. on beachheads Night 8/9 April
The main Japanese landings were at
Lingayen Bay on 22 December, whence
the invaders broke out of their beachhead
to advance against Manila. On 23 Decem-
ber MacArthur announced his plan to
withdraw to Bataan; five days later, he
declared Manila an open city. By early
~ USAFFE HQ
January, the Japanese were gaining
ground on the Bataan Peninsula, but -xxx- AMERICAN CORPS BOUNDARY
9 April, 1942
American forces on ~gidor
their troops were overtaken by disease I>\»~"'\'> JAPANESE BREAKTHROUGH, NIGHT 6/7 APRIL Bataan surrender <::1
there and gained little ground for the - - - - AMERICAN POSITIONS AT DATES SHOWN

next two months. o MILES 40

I i iI 'i i I

On 12 March 1942, MacArthur was o KILOMETERS 60

flown out and replaced by Lieutenant

General Jonathan Wainwright, who
frustrated several Japanese attempts to
establish beachheads behind US lines. Corregidor Battery Pt
Not until 3 April, after reinforcement by
a fresh division, were the Japanese able
to launch their final offensive. Within a RockPt
o
week's time, they had penetrated so deep-
ly that US forces were compelled to sur-
render (7 April). The last American HookerPt ~
1030 hrs, 6 May
troops held out on Corregidor Island in a Japanese occupy last
siege that ran from January until 5 May, US defence line,
when their artillery was almost entirely Americans surrender

knocked out by unceasing bombard-

ments. On that day, Japanese troops o GUN BATTERY .1. AA BATTERY
landed at Cavalry Point and established o MILE 1

their beachhead. It was all over for the

GearyPt
6 KILO~~TRE
time being in the Philippines.
104

--xxx-- us ARMY COMMAND BOUNDARIES

~ AIRFIELDS
• UNDER FOURTEENTH ARMY COMMAND

Fourteenth Army
(Homma) 10--------.. . Special Task Force
from Formosa

10 Dec
" ' - - - - - -... Tanaka Detachment
from Pescadores Is.

f?CAMIGUIN
V 10Dec

Main Japanese
landings
22 December 1941
48 Division
(Tsuchibashi)
from Pescadores Is.

~ NORTH LUZON FORCE'S (NLF) DELAYING

@ 31 Dec POSITIONS AS PLANNED AND DATES TAKEN UP
~ NLFPOSITIONOF1/4JANUARY1942
~- ROUTE OF SLF INTO BATAAN

North Luzon Force (Wainwright)

4 infantry divs
1 cavalry rgt

Reserve Force (Moore)

1 infantry div near Manila

23 Dec
MacArthur withdraws
HQ to Bataan

27 Dec
Manila declared
an open city

3 infantry diVS)
SAN JO f
o MILES 100
I I " I'
150
 105

Left: Japanese landings on Luzon,

December 1941 .
Above: Small Japanese field gun in action
during the Bataan campaign, April 1942 .
Right: American prisoners ofwar under
guard by Japanese troops after the
surrenderofBataan.
106

The Dutch East

Indies

OCEAN

.YAP

~~ ~~COBAR
o Caroline Is
(Jap.) •
G

. New Guinea
S
INDIA N OCEA N

D MILITARY BASES CONTROL LED BY JAPAN

, JAPANESE PARATROOP LANDINGS

o BATTLE OF LOMBOK STRAIT.19/20 FEB Arafura Sea
o BA.TTLE OF JAVA SEA. 27 FEB
MILES 800
i ~ a ~
'i
cG.~ ~ _ _a,'~':
! I
'. I iii I

KILOMETERS 1200
DARWI~omn ~q .
AUSTRALIA

T
he oil and other resources of the Force convoy in the Java Sea, where both
Dutch East Indies made them a Dutch cruisers were sunk before they
prime target for occupation by could inflict any damage. In the after-
Japan, which planned a three-part attack math, HMS Exeter was also destroyed, as
on the islands early in 1942. Western were HMAS Perth and USS Houston
Force, from Indochina and newly cap- when they resisted the Western Force on
tured Sarawak, would attack southern the following day - to some effect in terms
Sumatra, Western Java, and North Bor- of damage done. But on 1 March, the
neo; Central Force would attack Borneo Japanese made their inevitable landing
from Davao; and Eastern Force would on Java, whose Allied defenders suc-
jump off from the same point against the cumbed a week later.
Celebes, Amboina, Timor, Bali and east-
ern Java. A bove: Japan captures the East Indies
Defense of the islands was undertaken piecemeal, 1942.
by a combined force ofAllies in the South- Right: A Japanese column inBurma
west Pacific: American, British, Dutch crosses a footbridge south ofMoulmein.
and Australian (ABDA). General Archi- Far right: The invasion ofBurma was
bald WaveIl and his forces had more cour- accomplished with little A llied resistance.
age than support, which consisted largely
of a six-cruiser naval flotilla under Dutch
Rear Admiral Karel Doorman. The
attacks began on 11 January 1942, and
proceeded relentlessly from one objective
to another in the weeks that followed.
Naval engagements off Balikpapan (24
January) and in the Lombok Straits (19-
20 February) provided only a slight check
to the Japanese advance. On 27 February
Admiral Doorman attacked the Eastern
Burma Bows to
Joapan

he Japanese invasion of Burma be-

T gan on 15 January 1942 with the

occupation of Victoria Point by a
detachment of Fifteenth Army, which
moved north to take Tavoy four days la-
ter. British defenses in Burma were
pathetically unprepared to resist the
Japanese invaders; only two brigades,
one Indian and one Burmese, were able to
counter the push toward Moulmein that
began on 20 January. The British were
then forced back from the town under
constant threat of being outflanked, and
from this point on fought a series of de-
laying actions all the way to Rangoon -
the conduit for all British supplies and
reinforcements. Air support from a single
RAF squadron and a squadron of Major
Claire Chennault's ~Flying Tigers' was
insufficient to prevent the capture of
Rangoon on 8 March. The British garri-
son there was very nearly cut off before it
could pull out. Meanwhile, Lieutenant
General William Slim had taken com- SA Y 0 F
mand of British ground forces, while
General Harold Alexander had assumed BENGAL
overall command of the deteriorating
British defense. The Chinese Fifth and
Sixth Armies arrived to reinforce the
Allies, but they fought erratically despite
the best efforts of American commander
General Joseph Stilwell. Throughout the
month of April, Allied forces were in con-
tinuous retreat from the Japanese, who
were now bringing in reinforcements and
air support from conquered Malaya. By
mid May they were in control of Burma.

ANDAMAN

SEA

Gulf of
[] Southern Army
(Detachment of
Siam
~ AIRFIELDS Jap. Fifteenth Army)
HEIGHT IN FEET VICTORIA POINT
~--~ 15 Jan' I?:,. °
1--------4 OVE R 10000 0. / :~
6000 -1 0000 _'0/°
/0 :
~1=(~:-==T:;;i: 3000 - 6000
...........~~~ 1500 - 3000
500-1500
~--~
L...--_ _- - - I UN D ER 500
MILES
!

KILOMETER~
110

Hitler that an Allied landing in Italy Army under General Alfredo Guzzoni,
would probably have (most unpleasant with strong German support.
The Conquest of consequences, in view of the prevailing On 10 July the Americans landed in
atmosphere of fatalism.' Hitler remained Sicily's Gulf of Gela, the British in the
Sicily adamant about his doomed adventure on Gulf of Syracuse. The landings were a
the Eastern Front, which would finally surprise to the Italians, coming as they
collapse in July at the Battle of Kursk. did in poor weather that seemed to pre-
Even as Russian and German tanks clude air- or seaborne operations. Vigor-
battered each other in the Kursk Salient, ous German counterattacks against the
the Allies launched their invasion of Ita- Americans came from German divisions
hen the Tunisian bridgehead ly, which Churchill had described as (the on 11-12 July, but Patton's force pressed

W collapsed on 12 May 1943, a de-

moralized Italy found herself in
imminent danger of invasion. Serious
soft underbelly of the Axis.' Aerial bom-
bardment from North Africa struck Axis
airfields and communications centers in
on toward the north coast, clearing west-
ern Sicily by 23 July. Montgomery suf-
fered a check at Catania, but small
strikes in industrial northern Italy had Sicily, Sardinia and southern Italy, be- amphibious operations allowed him to
already warned both Mussolini and Hit- ginning in early June. Land forces for the continue his advance to Messina, which
ler of the depth of national discontent. In invasion comprised General George S he reached on 17 August. Meanwhile, the
a meeting with Hitler on 7 April, Musso- Patton's US Seventh Army and General Italians, who had offered minimal resist-
lini tried - and failed - to persuade his Bernard Montgomery's British Eighth ance from the first, evacuated the island.
ally to forget about Russia and concen- Army; they were transported to Sicily in The Germans were left to fight a rear-
trate on Mediterranean defense. On 5 a fleet of 3000 vessels. Axis defense of guard campaign until the Allied victory
May General von Rintelin reported to Sicily was entrusted to the Italian Sixth of mid August.

TYRRHENIAN SEA

HEIGHT IN FEET

~
OVER6000
. 3000-6000
1000-3000
UNDER 1000

Napoli Div rg5~~~:LO;E~~~SC~~RN~~~'~~ iRJ~HL:~ ~~~SE

SHOWN WERE SITUATED ALONG THE COAST)
0 - 0 - 0 - US SEVENTH ARMY'S FIRST OBJECTIVE ('YELLOW LINE')
_ _ _ _ FRONTLINE, 18JULY
'HUSKY',10July1943
•••••••••••• ,,3AUG
15 Army Group
~ AIRBORNE LANDINGS, NIGHT 9 JULY
(Alexander)
~ AIRFIELDS AND AIRSTRIPS
MILES 40
,
~II.OMETRES ~O
The Peninsular
Landings

n 24 July 1943, Mussolini was

O overthrown. His replacement,

Marshal U go Cavallero, began
secret armistice talks with the Allies.
Hitler suspected that the Italians were
trying to take themselves out of the war
and sent German reinforcements into
northern Italy to safeguard communica-
tions. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring
advised him that an Allied landing in
Italy could be expected soon after the con-
HEIGHT IN FEET
quest of Sicily - probably on the Gulf of
fJlliE~ OVER 3000
Salerno near Naples. I-----~~-.......j 1500-3000
On 3 September, the day that the I--------.J 500-1500
MILES
I 'ii!
armistice with Italy was signed, British L - -_ _--.....-J UNDER 500 KILOMETERS
Eighth Army made a landing on the toe of
Italy, at Reggio di Calabria - largely as a
diversion. The main landing did take 2 Para Div G ERMAN DISPOSITIONS, 3 SEPT 1943 IV
place at Salerno, on 9 September, after ~ GUSTAV (HITLER) LINE /
the secret armistice with Italy was made - - . . . . . - SR EIGHTH ARMY
public. General Mark Clark's US Fifth ~ US FIFTH ARMY
- FRONTLINESATDATESSHOWN
Army, with British X Corps, secured only
four small beachheads in the face of a 2/3 Oct c=:=J LAND OVER 1500 FEET
BrCommandos 0 MILES 80
well-prepared German defense. Farther .~ 01
south, Montgomery was advancing
,
'
KILOM'ETERk
!
I 1 io ,

• TERMOLI
through Calabria, and there had been a 28 Sept
second British landing at Taranto.
ADRIATIC
From 9 through 14 September, the
Fifth Army was in serious trouble at SEA
Salerno. German shells from the sur-
rounding hills, followed by a powerful
attack on the 12th, almost cut the Allies
in half. Reinforcements arrived two days
later, barely in time to salvage the opera-
tion, and by 18 September Clark's forces
had consolidated the beachhead. When
Montgomery's advance units arrived on
16 September, Kesselring began to with-
draw north to the Gustav Line, which ran
along the Rivers Garigliano and Sangro.
The Allies pursued from both east and
west until 8 October, when a rest halt was
called on the Volturno/Termoli Line. The
terrain grew increasingly rougher and
the weather more severe as the Allied
advance resumed in mid October.
TYRRHENIAN SEA
Previous page: US troops liberate Rome,
June 1944.
Left: Sicily falls to theAllies, 1943.
Above right: The mainAllied landing in
Italy was undertaken at Salerno by 'BAYTOWN' 'SLAPSTICK'
Clark's US Fifth Army. 0430 hrs, 3 Sept 9 Sept
Right: A diversionary attack at Reggio di Br Eighth Army Br 1 Airborne Div
(Montgomery) (Br Eighth Army)
Calabria by the British Eighth Army
preceded the main attack, while a third
landing was made at Taranto in the east.
112

Below: Mussolini(leftJ andHitlerconfer.

The former's displacement by Marshal
Allied Drive on the Ugo Cavallero on24 July 1943 led to
Anglo-Italian armistice talks.
Gustav Line Right: The Germans were less prepared to
yield than their former allies, finally
establishing the Gustav Line as 1943
ended.

F
ifth Army made a difficult crossing the time gained to complete the impress- On 20 November US Fifth Army
of the Volturno, swollen by autumn ive Gustav Line, which ran along the line attacked this strong sector, at a very high
rains, beginning on 12 October of the Garigliano and Rapido Rivers, over cost in casualties. Painful progress
1943. The roadless mountains north of the central mountains and north of the brought Fifth Army almost as far as the
the river posed even greater obstacles. Sangro River to the Adriatic. German Rapido, but there it was halted at year's
On the east coast, Eighth Army forced a Tenth Army held the line under General end by arctic weather conditions. Mont-
passage over the Trigno River, but their Heinrich von Vietinghoff. The western gomery had forced the Sangro on 15
progress on both sides of the central end was especially strong, as it was back- November and broken through the line
mountains was slowed by skillful Ger- ed by the mountains on either side of the east of Lanciano. The British took Ortona
man delaying tactics. Kesselring used Liri and by Cassino. on 27 December.
 113

GERMAN DEFENCE POSITIONS

V V V V V BARBARA LINE
~ ~ ..... BERNHARD(REINHARD) LINE
, , , , , GUSTAV LINE

FRONT LINES
12 OCTOBER 1943
- - - - 15JANUARY1944

MILES 15
'i
25

20 Nov 1943
Eighth Army
crosses the Sangro
Adriatic Sea

Tyrrhenian Sea
13 Oct 1943
US Fifth Army
crosses the Volturno

HEIGHT IN FEET

~
OVER6000
,~; 3000-6000
1500-3000
600-1500
UNDER 600
114

• CASALATTI

The Fight for Monte

Cassino
5 Mtn Div (part)

T
he ancient abbey of Monte Cassino
astride the Gustav Line was the
object of heavy fighting in the early
months of1944. The Allies made a frontal
assault on the almost impregnable posi-
tion on 17 January, but a whole series of
attacks failed to take it by storm. The
French Expeditionary Corps had joined
the Allied forces in Italy, but they made
only limited advances with very heavy
casualties. The New Zealand Corps suf-
fered similar repulses between 15 and 18
February.
A long hiatus followed the first offen-
sive, during which the Allies regrouped
and reinforced for a new effort, launched
11 May along a 20-mile front between the
area east of Cassino and the sea. The
British pushed over the Rapido but were
then contained by the Germans. The
Americans broke through the Gustav
Line along the coast, only to be stopped at
Santa Maria Infante. It was the French
Expeditionary Force that crossed the
Garigliano and cut the German lines of
communication; interdiction of German
supplies to the point of starvation was
also a factor. On 17 May Kesselring con-
ceded the loss of this key position by a
withdrawal. The historic abbey had been
riddled with tunnels and redoubts to pro-
tect its defenders from heavy bombard- Monti
ment; it was reduced to rubble by the Aurunci
time the Allies claimed it on 18 May, at
the cost of many lives.

.S CASTRESE

§'-
HEIGHT IN FEET

~::o~:~~~
1000-2000
. 500-1000
UNDER 500 - ~--- GERMAN COUNTERATTACKS
••

Right: InitialAllied attempts to break the o MILES GERMAN DIVISIONS ARE THOSE DEPLOYED
BETWEEN 17JANUARYT011 FEBRUARY
Gustav Line at Cassino in early 1944 met 6 I i KI~OJETRES
with failure.
 115

Right: Little remained intact after the

abbey at Monte Cassino was finally
overrun by the A llies on 18 May.
Below: The secondAllied offensive on the
Gustav Line was somewhat more
successful than its predecessor, pushing
the Germans to the Fuhrer-Senger line.

E
o
CI:
Ii)

HEIGHT IN FEET
.---::-;:::-=-;;-----;--

1--------1 OVER 3000 ---- - FRONT LINE,11 MAY,1944

2000-3000 • • • • • GUSTAV LINE
1000-2000 --~---' FUHRER-SENGER LINE
500-1000 MILES
1-------1
~ILOMETERS
i
UNDER 500 12
116
 117

Anzio and the Road

toRome

he Allied landings at Anzio on 22 Right: The intention oftheAnzio

T January 1944 were designed to re-

lieve pressure on Cassino, but the
results were just the reverse: only the
operation was to cut German
communications by landing behind their
front line.
Allied success at Cassino allowed the US Below: TheAllies on the road toRome.
VI Corps to break out of its bungled posi-
tion on the coast. Fifty thousand troops
came ashore under Major General John
Lucas, who made the fatal error of estab-
lishing a beachhead rather than pressing
inland so as to wait for his heavy artillery
and tanks. The Germans, under Macken- , lite reached by
sen, seized this welcome opportunity to AUSTRIA \ / ,!IIIsian forces,
pin down VI Corps at Anzio and mass , l.JVIay 1945 --U
, t-. ~
forces for a major counterattack on 16 .-.",.._"," \.
,-~.~ HUNGARY
February. Not until the 19th was this '~'\\ ,
halted, to be followed by a state of siege I
I
q.~~~.
~ ~.~.
that would last until late May. Lucas was I ~.-.

soon replaced by Major General Lucius

Truscott, but it was too late to retrieve
the situation.
When the Allies finally broke the Gus-
tav Line at Cassino, Clark's Fifth Army
could resume its advance northward. In-
stead of swinging east in an effort to trap
the German Tenth Army, Clark opted for
capturing Rome - an important moral
victory, though hardly necessary
strategically. The Germans were able to
delay his troops at Velletri and Valmon-
tone long enough to ensure the escape of
virtually all their forces in the area. The Corsica
Evacuated by
Allies finally entered Rome on 4 June German Forces,
1944,just two days before the invasion of e( 18 Sept-3 Oct,
France. (' c:! 1943
,.~~./
C>t)

TYRRHENIAN

SEA

PANTELLERIA
CV llJune OLA

••••••••• FRONT LINE AT DATE

TUNISIA D SHOWN
Above left: Mount Vesuvius' symbolic • L1NOSA
RMALTA
U(Br)
~ USFIFTHARMY
eruption failed to deter B -25 bombers of ~ BRITISH EIGHTH ARMY
~LAMPEDUSA
the US 12thAir Force en route to Cassino. MILES 200

K'LO~ET~R~
i!
Left: A second pall ofsmoke hangs over i I 300
the city and monastery as the bombs burst.
118

ALLIED FRONT GERMAN COUNTERATTACKS

- - - 24 JAN UARY ~ 3/4 FEBRUARY
- - - - 1 FEBRUARY ~7/9
•••••••• 19 FEBRUARY ~16/19
(ST.ABILIZED)

Remainder Br 1 Divas floating reserve.

US 1 Armd Div and 45 Divas follow-up reserve

MILES 10
! i I'
KILOMETERS
I j
16
 119

The End in Italy

A
fter Rome fell, the Allies forced
MILES 50
the Germans back to their last de- i I

fense - the Gothic Line. The Ger- KILdMETRES 75

mans were now being reinforced from the

Balkans and Germany, while Allied
troops, aircraft and landing craft had ADRIATIC
been drawn off to France. British Eighth SEA
Army reached the Gothic Line on 30
August 1944 and attacked with consider-
able success, but the Germans held com-
manding positions on the Gemmano and ANCONA
Coriano Ridges that slowed the advance
to Rimini until late September. x
x
US Fifth Army had also broken
through, but the approach of winter .SIENA

found Clark's exhausted forces short of

their objective of Bologna. The Allied
r
L Trasimeno
Br Eighth Army
(Leese, McCreery later)

advance did not resume until April 1945,

by which time Clark had become com- A......')U S T R A
mander of 15 Army Group. Reinforce- - F R O N T L1NE,9APRIL 1945
.-.---.-" ,-
- - - FRONT LINE, 23 APRIL Brenner Pass
ments and new equipment had reached c::===J LAND OVER 1500 FEET 6 May \
him during the winter, and he planned a
BRESSANO~'E'''''''-''' ._ .
two-pronged offensive against Ferrara
(Eighth Army) and Bologna (Fifth
Army).
The German Tenth Army, now under
General Herr, was surprised by the Brit-
ish attack across Lake Comocchio, which
had been covered by a major artillery
bombardment beginning on 9 April. The
British moved into the Argenta Gap and
Fifth Army, now led by Major General
Lucius Truscott, broke thr9ugh
Lemelsen's German Fourteenth Army
into the Po Valley (20 April). General von
Vietinghoff, who had replaced Kessel-
ring as overall commander in Italy, was
forced back to the left bank of the Po,
leaving behind all his heavy weapons and
armor. The Fascist Ligurian Army had
disappeared without a trace, and Axis
forces in Italy were out of the fight when
Bologna fell on 21 April. Vietinghoff MEDITERRANEAN SEA
signed the surrender of German forces in
Italy on 29 April 1945.

Opposite top left: The unsuccessfulAnzio

landing on22 January 1944 which left
both sides in a siege position.
Above left: AnAxis ammunition train
receives a direct hit, March 1944.
Left: Wehrmacht soldiers are marched
into captivity north ofA nzio.
Top right: Breaking the Gothic Line,
the finaL German defense in/taly.
Above right: The Allies advance into
Northern / taly.
Right: US 1 05mm howitzers fire across
theArno,August 1944.
 •
1e
•
e ale
122

a Covering Group under Rear Admiral without inflicting some damage in re-
Goto that included the carrier Shoho; a turn. Another Japanese error led to an
Battle of the Coral smaller support group; and Vice Admiral attack on the tanker Neosho and the des-
Takagi's Carrier Striking Force, includ- troyer Sims at the same time that the
Sea ing Shokaku and Zuikaku. The opera- main Allied force, still undetected, con-
tion's complexity suggests that no serious verged on Goto's Covering Group and
opposition was expected from the Allies, sank Shoho.
but Admiral Nimitz, Commander in The Japanese had already ordered the
Chief of the Pacific Fleet, moved quickly invasion transports to turn back, but now
to counter it. A hastily improvised Task that Fletcher's position was known an air
Force of three components, including the strike was launched against his group on

A
fter the Doolittle bombing raid on
Tokyo (18 April 1942), Japanese carriers Yorktown and Lexington, pre- the night of 7-8 May. Twenty-seven
strategists sought ways to extend pared to rendezvous in the Coral Sea on 4 Japanese planes took off, of which only
their defense perimeter in Greater East May. The Japanese attack came one day six returned. Then Shokaku was attack-
Asia. One of their options was to strike earlier. ed and disabled; a reciprocal Japanese
from Rabaul against Port Moresby, New Tulagi was occupied without opposi- strike fatally damaged Lexington and put
Guinea; extend their hold on the Solomon tion, after which the opponents lost Yorktown out of action. At no time in the
Islands; and isolate Australia from the several days seeking one another in vain. battle did opposing surface ships sight
United States. This task was assigned to Then Vice-Admiral Frank Fletcher dis- one another - a circumstance new to nav-
a five-part force designated MO, under patched British Rear-Admiral John Crace al warfare, but soon to become familiar in
command of Admiral Shigeyoshi Inouye. and his Task Force 44 to attack the Port the Pacific Theater.
It comprised a Port Moresby Invasion Moresby Invasion Group (7 May). The Tactically, the Battle of the Coral Sea
Group ofeleven transports and attendant Japanese mistook this group for the main was a draw: the Japanese lost more
destroyers; a smaller Tulagi Invasion Allied force and bombed it continuously planes, the US more ships. Strategically
Group charged with setting up a seaplane until Crace made his escape by skillful - and morally - it was a major US victory
base on Tulagi in the southern Solomons; maneuvering at the end of the day - not that came when one was needed most.

NEW GUINEA

3 May
Japanese land.
establish sea-
plane base
0815.4 May
First US air strike
on Tulagi

Japanese landings
at Port Moresby
planned for 10 May

C 0 R A L
1930. I .
0900, 8 May - -
Air attack launched,
( Shokaku damaged)
...;
6 May.'"

/-f.-
o ~~t~i~:?CCUPIED, 1118,8 May ,;/ Neosho fi
TF 17: Carrier Yorktown Yorktown damaged,
Lexington hit and sinks
7 .....····..:
· ·•• ·~ /
3 cruisers, 6destroyers
TF 11: Carrier Lexington,
2 cruisers. 5 destroyers
at 1956 hrs
TF's 11 and 17
.. .
......
TF 44: 3 cruisers. 1destroyer
NAUTICAL MILES 200 Noon, 7 May
! !
Sims and Neosho bombed.
Sims sunk; Neosho damaged,
scuttled 11 May
AUSTRALIA
 123

Previous page: The final dive ofa stricken Below: The complex Japanese plan of
Japanese bomber west ofthe Marianas attack at Midway involved no less than
Battle of Midway Islands, June 1944. eight task forces.
Opposite below: Coral Sea was the first Bottom: The battle took place north of
naval battle fought without surface Midway and ended in decisive defeat for
vessels sighting each other. the Japanese ..

idway was the turning point in The first few US carrier strikes inflicted Hiryu escaped immediate destruction

M the Pacific War and a watershed

in modern history. Having failed
to gain their objectives in the Coral Sea
little damage, but the decisive blow
caught all the newly armed Japanese
planes on their flight decks waiting to
and disabled Yorktown, but damage in-
flicted on her by Enterprise was so severe
that she had to be scuttled the following
operations of early May 1942, the take off. Five minutes later, three of the day. It was the end of Japanese naval
Japanese were determined to capture four Japanese carriers were sinking. supremacy in the Pacific.
Midway as a base within striking dis-
tance of Hawaii. The destruction of the
Pacific Fleet before US industry could orP~~
build it up again was recognized as a mat- ATTU~ {~"\\-
RUSSIA Q ..;- 0.,' • ~~~~.d-· :'\ s 1300,3 June
ter of supreme urgency, besides which KISKA A 1 ~ ~ t i a l\
the occupation of Midway would elimin-
ate the bombing threat to the home is-
lands. The operation was scheduled for 4
June 1942.
Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto,
architect of the Pearl Harbor attack,
formed a complex plan involving eight 0400.3 June
-US air search begins
separate task forces, one of which was to
make a diversionary attack on the Aleu-
tian Islands. Almost all of the Japanese
surface fleet would be involved - 162 I .. "
Task Force 17
(Fletcher)
warships and auxiliaries, including four ,~
fleet carriers and three light carriers Task Force 16 ~ Night 29 May
(Spruance)
commanded by Admiral N agumo. IWO JIMA •. ~ ~...
FRENCH FRIGATE _ . . '
Information - and the lack of it - play- SHOALS= .:> ~ OAHU
ed a crucial role in the battle's outcome. ..
/::PEARLHARBOR
~o
bt>
Yamamoto believed that the carrier Marianas •. Japanese submarine HAWAII
Yorktown had been destroyed in the Cor- Islands ~ cordon
SAIPAN:
al Sea along with Lexington. In fact, the GUAM'
damaged ship had been refitted for battle
at Pearl Harbor in the incredibly short
time of 48 hours. Nor did the Japanese JAPANESE FORCES SAIL BETWEEN 25-28 MAY (DATES ARE THOSE AT MIDWAY)

realize that the Americans had broken

their fleet code: Nimitz was fully aware of
their plans. Although he had only 76 TF 17 (Fletcher)
0510,5 June carrier: Yorktown;
ships, three of them were fleet carriers - Hiryu scuttled 2 cruisers, 5 destroyers
First Carrier Striking Force sinks about 0900
Yorktown, Enterprise and Hornet, with a (Nagumo) 0430,4 June, 1942
total of 250 planes - whose presence was carriers: AkagL Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu.
patrols launched ~
wholly unsuspected by the Japanese. As Second Fleet -later
a result, Nagumo sent out few recon-
2 battleships, 5 cruisers,
8 destroyers, 1small carrier.
0656
Strike force
<~ , '
naissance flights, which could have 1550
launched 0900
warned him of their presence. 1205-1215 and 1430 ", 0752
Before dawn on 4 June, the Japanese Hiryu's planes score Strike force)'.)
hits on Yorktown sets off , 0806
dispatched 108 bombers to Midway, re- ~,

serving 93 on deck armed for naval con- 1500 1205 1430,' 1530
Yorktown abandoned -~,,' ........
tingencies only with armor-piercing sinks 1057 ',\;
bombs and torpedoes. Many US planes 0501,7June _~
S ............
........ ........ t~ -----'.. ,,
,,
were destroyed on the ground in the first ,
attack, but those that survived took off to
intercept the incoming bombers. They 19071..
were largely destroyed by enemy Zeros, ~~ 1025-1030
but they made a second strike imperative ~~ Kaga, Akagi and Soryu hit by aircraft TF 16 (Spruance)
Midway based<\:)z_ from Yorktown and Enterprise carriers: Enterprise, Hornet;
and thereby ga ve their carriers the aircraft attack O~ 0928, US carrier borne aircraft attack 6 cruisers, 9 destroyers
chance to attack Nagumo's fleet while it (no damage)
was rearming with high-explosive and 0837 / 0918
carriers begin recovering Nagumo turns north to
fragmentation bombs. When a Japanese Midway strike force intercept US task forces
reconnaissance plane finally reported de-
tection of enemy carriers, N agumo's oI
NAUTICAL MILES 60
I
~ Midway 50 miles
planes were unready to mount a defense.
124

~-~~----------~~~
Guadalcanal and the __ - - - - - -
__ - - ~~ ST MATTHIAS GROUP
M USSAU &\ ~
~ """ ~
"--J..d'&
~r!:::> ~~
Solomon Islands ...- __ - -

Bi

P rior to 1942, few Americans had

ever heard of those far- f1 ung is-
lands whose names would become
so familiar during the war years - names BISMARCK SEA
like Okinawa, Iwo Jima and Guadalcan-
al. Japanese forces waged a six-month
battle for this island in the southern Solo-
mons with US Marines who landed there
on 7-8 August 1942. Their objective was a
Japanese airbase still under construction
to offset the loss of carrier air cover at
Midway.
Admiral Fletcher, who had disting-
uished himself at Midway, was in overall
command of operations in the southern
Solomons. Rear Admiral R Kelly Turner
led an amphibious task force responsible
for landing the 19,OOO-man 1st Marine L 0 M 0 N S E ).
Division and its equipment. The Marines
reached the airbase - renamed Hender-
son Field - soon after landing and found
it deserted, but they came under heavy
attack from the Japanese Navy, which
dominated surrounding waters by night
and soon sent reinforcements ashore to
retake the island. The Marines streng-
thened the airfield's perimeter and used
it to gain control of the sea lanes by day.
Two costly but inconclusive carrier
battles were fought, one in August (Bat-
tle of the Eastern Solomons), the other in
~ AIRFIELDS OR LANDING STRI PS
October (Battle of Santa Cruz), as the o MILES 300
Japanese landed additional troops and I I

KILOMkTERS
supplies on Guadalcanal. On land, there
were three major attacks on the Marine
 125

•V garrison, all of which were thrown back

at considerable cost to the Japanese. De-
spite reinforcement, the Marines were
exhausted by December, but the XIV
Army Corps relieved them and the
EN IS
Final 'Elktqo Plan' (26 April 1943) Japanese had to withdraw their own de-
AUSTRALIA
" 15 February
3 NZ Div
pleted forces.
Guadalcanal provided a jumping-off
8it" SUKA
.
place for successive conquests in the Solo-
mons, culminating with Bougainville in
iS~
October 1943. The campaign was char-
l
,Tenekau-r-
Bougainville
/.. PAC I F C o C E A N acterized by surprise landings, followed
- --
..........~. Kieta / 'BLISSFUL' (diversion for 'Cherryblossom') by hasty construction or repair of air-
f / 28 October strips for local defense and as bases for
2 Mar Para Bn
ess gusta
a y .,. Kara"f" -r-, 1'/
K. hT
(withdraws 3 Nov) SOL 0 M 0 N the next attack. Even strongly garri-
,BI~~' • voz~Choiseul soned islands like Bougainville, which
HORTLANii61'"~AURO SAGIGAI ISLANDS had 60,000 widely scattered defenders,

~~:~SSOM' IS~OTR~:;J:L~;:~~~:::OMB NGARA

were seized and isolated, while Japanese
0,,«;, strongpoints at Rabaul and Kavieng
Santa Isabel were bypassed. The Solomons Campaign
4 July fll;,
'GOODTIME' \.\ D ~ New e~ G wound down in mid 1944, after successful
27 October 15AU9~ t~~Georgiaeo/".9/ Allied landings on New Britain and the
8 NZ Bde Group 13Aug,---- ~~ - -- -- - q So ({'I Admiralty and St Matthias groups.
---
--'
-------RENDOVA ~ v
-r<:'VANGUNI
0'"'
"'..,
0'/
\."\:)
I
'TOENAilS' RUSSELL IS /FLORIDA Left and inset: Occupying the Solomons
30June ~ f NIKA CJ IS
US 431nf Div PAVUVU
o
/ 0'6 was a lengthy process that took the Allies
'ClEANSlATE' over a year to complete.
21 February 1943
US assault bnV Field
Opposite below: An attack by US aircraft
/,/ at the beginning ofthe battle for
_____ "",. Guadalcanal Guadalcanal.
Id 1942 -- -- -- 7 Aug 1942/7 Feb 1943 .. Below: US Marines landing on the island
-----------
~
head immediately for cover.
San
Cristobal 0
126

MILES 10
I i
20

~orid~I
TULAG~ ~.AVUTU
6 0740/1200,
2 Marine Regt plus 1 Para Bn ~
! 1/7Feb1943. V Strong resistance overcome

,
4. Japanese forces
I

C \
withdraw

.~
Esperancer I RON SOU N D

"
,
TENARO

Night 7/8 Sept

" ,, Marine raiders
attack Jap base

Aug~J.
~
17 Jan 1943, ~
Jap Seventeenth Army', Sept~~
begins withdrawal from , ~ AIVU
Left: US landings on Guadalcanal and
the Matanikau , the resistance encountered.
" ~
Below left: Japanese supply ships and
their escorts met US Task Force 67 near
Tassafarongaon30November 1942 in
one ofthe many naval actions off
'~ 12/14Sept, Guadalcanal. On this occasion, the
Kawaguchi suffers
heavy losses at Japanese emerged on top.
Bloody Ridge Bottom left: Marine reinforcements
disembark.
G u a d a c a n a Below: US Navy vessels weave to counter
.... • AMERICAN ATTACKS
air attack offthe Solomons.
~_!_. ~~A~T~~DC~A~;E~ATTACKS Right: US landingsonNewGuinea.
•••• ••• US DEFENSE PERIMETER 9 AUGUST
US POSITIONS 23 OCTOBER
Below right: General MacArthur (rightJ
EARLY DECEMBER, 1 MARINE DIV RELIEVED BY 25 INF. 2 MARINE AND AMERICAL DIVS (XIV CORPS [PATCH])
passes an encouraging word with a
paratrooperatPortMoresby.

I o NAUTICAL MILES
Tanaka's ! t I I ,

2nd Dest Flot

and transports ~Rear destroyers

~ 2306
••
',Takanami 'Ironbottom SOU n d'
" 2338 --·",~--2330
" Pensacola New Orleans
" torpedoed torpedoed
, destroyers:

~
Fletcher
" Minneapolis
/ /Perkins
~ ••~" torpedoed
-... / /Maur y

turn to engage
._'~&'''''''
Japanese destroyers', ~
','7
"
~f's;j Takanami
~\// Drayton cruisers:
---=, 2238 ~ Minneapolis
\~ New Orleans
US force ~~. - ..... 1 sunk ~ ...---- Pensacola
v'~jtt ~ Honolulu

~
~\_ Northampton
TASSAFARONGA " ~~ destroyers:
~Lamson
Guadalcanal Task Force 67 (Wright) Lardner
 127

NewGuinea

he Japanese made a second

T attempt against Port Moresby in

July 1942 - an overland advance
from Buna - but it was stopped by
ANSAPO'

~
~
.,,30 July

.
0~
~oo'?-
'11.~27May
~ lQ~.I~
~J.u.IY. f~
~
\
~~o~
17M
ay
~ ,M I LE~ I

US landings along north

Co:~ofNeWGU.i.nea
[ 5~O

Australian formations in September. HOLLANDIA~~22APr1944 ~

Allied forces built an airstrip at Milne
Bay, then proceeded over the Owen Stan-
ley Range against totally adverse ground
DUTCH !AITAPE EWAK
NEW GUINEA! N-E NEW GUINEA
~.-._.
I -.-.~
MADANG
~
0 ~

and weather conditions to capture Buna i! PAPUA ..,

.
rea of
main map
and Sanananda at year's end. Australian (
coast-watchers were instrumental in i
Allied success by providing early warn-
ing of Japanese moves, but all com-
batants were plagued by tropical disease,
grueling terrain and a lack of accurate
maps of the area.
After Buna fell, Lae and the Markham
Valley were captured with the assistance
of Allied air forces (excellent co-
ordination of all the services involved
was a feature of this campaign). A series
of operations around the Huon Peninsula
was followed by major landings at Hol-
landia and Aitape in April 1944. These
cut off some 200,000 Japanese troops and
numerous civilian workers centered
around Wewak. The final New Guinea
landings, at and near the northern tip of
the island, secured airfields to be used in
support of operations in the Marianas
and the Philippines. By July 1944, an
entire Japanese Army had been neutral-
ized in New Guinea, and the Solomons
Campaign had nullified the threat to
Australia and New Zealand.
128

The Battle of the

Philippine Sea

,- i?
't:>(} 6

()
Formosa

'WOLEAI

Japanese
Southern Force
• (Ugaki)

~ ~~ .
HALMAHERA

BATJA/:tl.
~ C=J= a 'V~_~J .~
0Q,
NAUTICAL MILES
, ,
NEW GU~
C1
Celebes B 0

Task Force 58
fter clearing the Marshall Islands,

A the US trans-Pacific drive con-

verged on the Mariana group,
whose conquest would cut off the
15 carriers plus supporting units

Japanese homeland from the Philippines

and Southeast Asia. When the US
assault fell on the main Japanese de-
fenses at Saipan, Tinian and Guam, the
Japanese Navy was there to counter it Forces' A' (Ozawa)
(June-July 1944), and 'B' (Joshima) 1220
Shokaku torpedoed
carriers: Taiho, Zuikaku,
The Japanese First Mobile Fleet, Shokaku, Junyo, Hiyo·,
by submarine Cavalla
under Vice-Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, Ryuho
SITUATION 19 JUNE 1944
rendezvoused with Vice-Admiral
Matome Ugaki's Southern Force on 16
June. Three days later, Ozawa's scouting NAUTICAL MILES
"
200
I
planes spotted Vice-Admiral Marc Mit-
scher's US Task Force 58 underway to Japanese fleet
withdraws ..I!. 1l!
give battle; strike aircraft were launched
1844 ' .....
immediately. Meanwhile, US sub- US air attacks sink .....
marines had located Ozawa's force and Hiyo and 2 oil tankers, 1600. 19 June
Zuikaku and Chiyoda
torpedoed his flagship, the carrier Taiho. damaged
Japanese fleet
The veteran Shokaku was also sunk. An sails NW to attempt
abortive second strike by Ozawa was mis- refuelling
Task Force 58
directed, and US fighters intercepted it SITUATION 20 JUNE 1944
on its way to Guam. Japanese losses by
nightfall of 19 June included 340 irre- suffered slight damage to a single bat- Top left: The opposing fleets rendezvous.
placeable veteran pilots and two carriers. tleship. Ozawa's reputation as an out- Center and above: The course ofthe battle
US crewmen dubbed the battle (The standing commander was impaired by on 19-20June.
Great Marianas Turkey Shoot.' this disaster, but his resignation was re- Top: A Japanese divebomber narrowly
Ozawa compounded his errors by ling- fused by his superiors and he fought misses USS Bunker Hill ofTask Force 58.
ering in the vicinity, with the result that again at the Battle of Leyte Gulf with Right: Return ofan F6F -3 Hellcat fighter
he lost three more ships the following skill and tenacity. By that time, however, to Lexington during ('The Great Marianas
day. The US had lost only 50 planes and the Japanese defeat was inevitable. Turkey Shoot'.
129
130

The Struggle for

Leyte and Luzon

G
eneral Douglas MacArthur's over- 50 and 80,000. The Americans had lost
riding desire to liberate the Phil- only 3600 men.
ippines played a major part in the At sea, four major actions comprised
Allied High Command decision to make the Battle of Leyte Gulf (21-25 October),
landings on Leyte in October 1944. in which Japan sought to prevent the
MacArthur's forces joined Nimitz's for Americans from regaining a foothold in
this operation, in a rare display of co- the Philippines. Admiral Ozawa's de-
operation between these two competitive pleted carrier force was to serve largely
leaders. Only 20,000 Japanese held the as a decoy, luring Admiral Halsey's
island against 130,000 men of General powerful Third Fleet away from the main
Walter Krueger's Sixth Army, who land- action. The real fighting was assigned to
ed on 20 October. Japanese reinforce- four task forces of Japanese battleships
ments could not keep pace with this kind and cruisers, which were still plentiful.
of manpower. By Christmas 1944, major On the US side, Halsey's force was aug-
engagements were almost over, with mented by Admiral Kincaid's Seventh
Japanese casualties estimated between Fleet, backed by carrier formation TF .38.

Sam a r

Part 77lnl DiU

.
~J
nfDiV .. ABUYOG
20 October 1944

.0
CAMOTES IS
BAY BAY
1 Nov

Ley t e
US Sixth Army
(Krueger)

Jap ThirtY_fifth~Arm.
Y SILAGO
(Suzuki)
LEY T E

CAMOTES SEA Left: The land battles for Leyte saw

G U L F
superior US forces emerge triumphant.
FRONT LINES Above: A Japanese fuel dump on Leyte
- - - - 24 OCTOBER blazes as a result ofnaval shelling.
- - - - 30 OCTOBER
•••••••••• 30 NOVEM BER

• MAIN JAPANESE COUNTER-

ATTACKS 26 NOV/5 DEC
AIRFIELDS
It-"-----.\ LAND OVER 1000 FEET

,
~
MILES 25
I
KILO~ETERS 40
 131

______ POSITIONS OF US CARRIER TASK GROUPS, 0600, 24 OCTOBER

TIMES ARE THOSE FOR 24 OCTOBER UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED

1.-.. NAUTICAL
' MILES
... .....L- 300
---J'

'II ~600, 25th

Group 'A" ~
(Matsuda),' ,I
II .
,,
2000 ( 0822. 25th
Second Striking Force
(Shima)
2241 Task Force 3~ (Halsey's
Third Fleet) steams north
to engage Ozawa's force

0935 Carrier Princeton h i t . - - - - - - 1 - - - - + - - - - - 4 - rcl-~:...:.---

sinks at 1630

1026/1530
US air strikes, Battleship Musashi ---~-~~~~~'---.,
sinks at 1935, cruiser Myoko
retires damaged

0632, 23 Oct
US Submarines sink
cruisers Atago and Maya.
Takao retires damaged ~
TG 38.1 (McCain)
toUlithi ~

~ Sui u Sea

First Striki~g
FOrCK(KuriJ

-
k - - BRITISH
NORTH BORNEO
Sails 22 Oct
y;
iBRUNEl
i '\.j ~("."'.,.....-.--."
'\'...;' ) i
\ .
-''/

Above right: The sea actions comprising Japanese Force A was turned back by October. Meanwhile, many of Ozawa's
the Battle ofLeyte Gulfresulted in a US US submarines and carrier aircraft, ships, including the valuable carrier
victory despite the involvement ofthree which then turned north in pursuit of Zuikaku, last veteran of Pearl Harbor,
separate Japanese forces. Ozawa's force. Vice-Admiral Nishi- had been sunk. Japanese desperation
mura's Force C was almost entirely des- was manifested in the first of the suicidal
troyed in a night battle, and Vice- Kamikaze missions, which struck an Au-
Admiral Shima's Second Striking Force stralian cruiser on 21 October.
was turned back. Only Kurita's First Lieutenant General Tomoyuki
Striking Force was still a factor, but it Yamashita, the ~Tiger of Malaya,' had
failed to capitalize on its opportunity to assumed command of Philippine defense
wreak havoc on the Seventh Fleet, and just as Leyte was being attacked. When
withdrew after limited success on 25 US forces moved to invade Luzon, the
132
:t: CAMIGUIN Jap defense sectors
Shobo Group
(Yamashita)
152,000 men
Kembu Group
(Tsukada)
30,000 men
.Shimbu Group
(Yokoyama)
80,000 men

I Corps (Swift)
6 Div and 43 Div

OCCUPIED BY US
FORCES,1 JAN 1945

~ YAMASHITA'S HEADQUARTERS

~ ~~~~~~6~~~S: REMNANTS
o MILES 100
I ' ,
o KILOMETiERS 1~0

4 Feb/3 March
15 Feb ~--Al--4--~~-- Battle for Manila
Regt of XI Corps - - - - - .
21 Feb
Bataan cleared
31 Jan
Majority 11 Abn Div

Command boundary
US Sixth Army
xxxx--~=--"-=:;,,j

'--~-­
US Eighth Army, 1 Jan 1945
o CO

{f () ~::n
d
15 December 1944
Western Visavan Task Force
(Dunckel) lands. Light OPPOSition:\
Other landmgs between 2LDecember SAN JOSE
and 22 January ~ ~

~~ ~ ~ o
o
o

Above and inset: The capture ofLuzon.

Right: The US make landfall on Leyte.

principal island, in January 1945, his

troops were ill prepared and poorly
armed, and most of his air support had
been destroyed or withdrawn to Formosa.
Doubting that he could hold the beaches,
Yamashita made his stand in the inland
mountain areas with the object of tying
up numerous American forces for as long
as possible. In the event, he did not sur-
render until the war's end, when he still
had 50,000 fighting men. By that time,
most of Luzon and the other islands had
been recaptured in fighting that reached
its crescendo at Manila in February-
March 1945.
 133

IwoJima

he rocky island of Iwo Jima, The Marines broke out and made

T although far from Japan, was part

of the Japanese homeland; it
offered the dual advantage to the Allies of
straight for Mt Suribachi, the sugar-loaf
massif at the island's tip. There they suc-
ceeded in raising the US flag after three
MILES
i
KILOMETERS
i

26 March
En~ of Japanese ~
Kitano Pt
demoralizing the enemy and providing a days of combat so costly that it eclipsed
resistance 9 Mar
fighter airbase in range of Tokyo - if it even Tarawa, but the northeast of the
could be captured. On the minus side, Iwo island remained unconquered. The maze
Jima was devoid of cover and strongly of underground defenses and lack of room
garrisoned by 22,000 troops under Major to maneuver made for hand-to-hand com-
General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, who bat of savage ferocity. Nearly 7000 US
had made the eight-square-mile island Marines and sailors lost their lives in the
impervious to aerial bombardment with fighting that raged until 26 March, and
a network ofpillboxes, caves and tunnels. the Japanese died almost to a man. Their
The most prolonged and intense bom- exemplar in courage was Kuribayashi,
bardment of the Pacific War preceded the who contacted Tokyo days after their food
US Marine landings of19 February 1945. and water ran out with the message:
The Japanese held their fire just minutes (Fighting spirit is running high. We are
too long, hoping to dupe the invaders into going to fight bravely to the last moment.'
believing they would offer no resistance.
19 February 1945
By the time their weapons opened up Right: IwoJima, a small island with US V Amphibious
against the beachhead, two Marine divi- immense strategic significance. Corps (Schmidt)
sions and all their equipment had landed, Below: US Marines advance with 3 Marine Div
with more to come throughout the day. flamethrowers toward Mt S uribachi. Tobiishi (floating reserve)
Pt 1020, 23 February
US flag raised on summit
PACIFIC OCEAN
134

Okinawa

T
he inexorable Allied advance to-
ward the Japanese home islands
reached Okinawa, the main island
of the Ryukyu group, in March of 1945.
Okinawa's capture was necessary to pro-
vide harbor and air-base facilities for the
invasion of Japan. The island was de-
fended by the Japanese Thirty-second
Army - some 130,000 men - under IE SHIMA

fl
General Mitsuru Ushijima. 12Bl~rE
Preliminary air operations were aimed Mo

at Japanese air bases on Formosa and the 16/21 April n

771nf Div V '~"i-""'-"
islands surrounding densely populated
Okinawa. US and British carrier forces EAST CHiNA SEA
suffered losses to waves of Kamikaze
attacks, but the Japanese paid a higher 'ICEBERG'
1 April 1945
price - 90 percent of their planes were US Tenth Army
shot down before they could sacrifice (Buckner)
themselves on the enemy's ships. From
23 March, Okinawa itself was the target
of continuous air and artillery strafing.
Allied forces began to land on 1 April,
when General Simon Bolivar Buckner's
Tenth Army and associated forces gained
a beachhead at the southern end of the
island. The Japanese had established KEISE SHIMA

themselves behind the formidable Shuri

Jap Thirty-second
Line, which remained almost impervious Army (Ushijima)
to attack until early May, when suicidal
counterattacks disclosed the locations of 21 May
JapJlnese withdraw
many Japanese defensive positions. from 'Shuri Line'
From this point on, both of the US corps 1/2 April
involved gradually pushed forward, as 21 June
Demonstrations
by 2 Marine Div
U shijima's forces retreated into the hill End of Japanese resistance
masses of the island's southern tip. Final
resistance was overwhelmed by a mas-
sive two-pronged attack on 21 June. figures were sobering to American
Throughout the operation, code-named strategists; General MacArthur esti-
Iceberg, supporting naval forces were mated that it would take five million men
under constant attack by Kamikaze to capture the home islands, of whom
pilots, who accounted for 36 US and Brit- perhaps one million would become
ish ships and damaged hundreds of casualties. Thus Okinawa strengthened
others. The Japanese lost a staggering the Allied case for ending the war by
4000 aircraft in these suicide missions, other means.
and even sacrificed the giant battleship
Yamato, which was dispatched to Okina- Above: The invasion ofOkinawa was seen
wa with insufficient fuel for a return trip as the dress rehearsal for a similar action
to do as much damage as possible before against the Japanese home islands.
she was destroyed. This happened on 7 Above right: Marines await survivors of
April, long before the battleship could an explosive attack on a Japanese hideout
reach the target area. on Okinawa.
On land, known Japanese dead totaled Right: The Japanese battleship Yamato
almost 108,000, and for the first time a was sacrificed in a vain attempt to stem
significant number of prisoners was the invasion.
taken - over 7000. General Buckner was
killed, with over 7000 of his men; almost
32,000 were wounded. US Navy casual-
ties were almost 10,000, ofwhom roughly
half were killed and half wounded. Since
Okinawa was considered a (dress rehear-
sal' for the invasion of Japan, these
135
136

B.~.~.~ TARGETS IN JAPAN: FEB/AUGUST 1945

,;/
Air Strikes on the MAIN INCENDIARY (FIRE RAID) TARGETS *
Home Islands • OTHER INCENDIARY TARGETS *
xx X MINE LAYING AREAS

ATOMIC BOMB ATTACK

* FIGURES SHOW PERCENTAGE OF URBAN AREA DESTROYED

T
he bomber offensive against Japan the planes at much lower altitudes with o MILES 150
I
could not begin until 1944, for lack heavier bomb loads, which paid off in im- I
o
i
KILOMETRES
i
200
of a very-long-range (VLR) bomber proved performance. New bases were
capable of carrying heavy loads for over established in the Marianas Islands of
3000 miles. Such a plane was finally ac- the Central Pacific in November, after
quired from Boeing by the US Army Air which up to 20 Bombardment Groups
Force (the B-29 Superfortress), but it was flew regularly over Japanese cities by
so newly developed that operational day and night. They dropped a total of
problems plagued its early operations. 9365 tons of incendiaries, which gutted
The B-29's bombing altitude of 30,000 32 square miles of urban areas. Then KOREA
feet created difficulties with high winds escort fighters began to arrive from new-
and the effect of ice on instruments and ly captured Iwo Jima (early April) and
engines. Losses were running high for American losses reached a new low. As
several months after the first raid, from more B-29s became available, mortal
eastern China, in June of 1944. Addi- blows were dealt to Japanese industry.
tionally, Japanese anti-aircraft defenses On 6 and 9 August 1945, the war with
proved much more effective than had Japan was ended - and a new era in hu-
~X J
Second atomic bomb
been anticipated. man history begun - by the atomic bomb-
Modified tactics resulted in operating ing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
dropped on 9 August
(over 60.000 casualties) XfX.
I(
. !--
SHIMONOSEKI
X\36f'- U~~ I. ~
~~zJJ;w
YA~OJI
21
27
OkURA
X FUKUOKA ~
·22

OIT,
~

KUMAMOTO
-20

Left: The now-familiar atomic mushroom

cloud rises over Nagasaki.
Above: The Japanese homeland and
(inset) the radius ofUS bomber
operations over it.
Right: Doolittle's daring one-offraid in
April 1942 from the USS Hornet had been
as much a propaganda exercise as an
attack. The firebomb raids of1945 were on
a different scale altogether.
Far right: Tokyo in ruins.
 137

First fire raid:

NAGAOKA
25 February 1945
66 Great fire raid
e
night 9/10 March
Raided again
25 May
(200,000 casualties)

Honshu
SEA o F J A PAN UTSUNOMI\~ •

MAEBAS~~ e ISEZAKI
e17
eKUMAGAYA
45

CHOSHI
34
irst atomic bomb Fire raid: KOFU
rapped on 6 August night 11/12 March 65 e
lver 92,000 casualties) and 19 March
(light casualties)
TSURUGA

SHIMIZU
50 X
SHIZUOKA
66 X
D

D
D

PACIFI C

DeE A N

)KA
Fighter cover by P-51 Mustangs
and P-61 'Black Widows' from
April 1945 and P-47 Thunderbolts
PACIFIC la,ter

o C E A N

~
.. 7,6001'vt1l.fS US 20 Air Force bases
(le May)
., .. p.HILIPPINE incl 20 and 21 Bomber
IS Commands (B-29s)
from February 1945
'i):C1,
('-)'M'\
. liff ...~
140

\ 14 IND DIV'S POSITIONS

The Arakan Battles i ._._-
\
31 DECEMBER 1942
- - - 31 JAN/END FEB 1943
\ - 25MAY
\ ~ ATTACKS BY JAP 55 DIVAND
, 213REGT4MAR/14MAY1943

\. 0 MILES 30

'..l b ~ILO~E~RES I I do !

'Souteol'
(flank guard)
ritish and US leaders disagreed on

B strategy in the Burma Theater af-

ter the British had been driven
into India in May of1942. The Americans
" , \
\
~
~
~
believed that Burmese operations should \
focus on reopening land communications J
with the Chinese Nationalists, who were
trying to contain large Japanese forces on k a n
their home ground. The British had little
faith in Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist
movement and maintained their hope of
winning back the imperial territories lost
to Japan in the 1942 debacle.
General Archibald Wavell, command-
ing Allied forces in India, knew that a
large-scale invasion was out of the ques-
tion for the time, but he sought to employ
his men and build up morale via small- Bay 0 f

scale operations near the Indian border. Bengal

The first of these centered on the Arakan,

where the island post of Akyab provided
Japan with a position from which to bomb
Chittagong and Calcutta. On 21 Septem-
ber Wavell's 14 Indian Division began to
advance cautiously into Burma by way of
Cox's Bazar. General Iida, the Japanese
commander, countered with a series of de- I. BAWL! 81 West Afr Div ....
laying tactics that created a stalemate last- ~AZAR (Woolner) ~~ _ , - - - xv CORPS FORWARD POSITIONS, DEC 1943

ing until March 1943 when his counter- (

) ~
~
In reserve "'?
./~~
--·GOPPE BAZAR ~ XV CORPS ATTACKS END DEC 1943/FEB 1944
- JAPANESE FRONT, 3 FEBRUARY
attack on two fronts forced a retreat. 1 ~ ' - ..... ~roppe Pass @ DISPOSITION OF XV CORPS UNITS, 3 FEBRUARY
\,' ) ~ JAPANESE COUNTERATTACK 3/24 FEBRUARY
In December 1943, the British sent : I "' ..... ./-
Christison's XV Corps on a second ex- I
,
I
/1- .... , , '
I
MILES 6
! Ii! Ii
pedition against Akyab. Lieutenant I // \./
KILOMETERS 10
General Renya Mutaguchi barred the
way through the Mayu Peninsula and
sent his Sakurai Column through moun-
tainous jungle that was believed impass-
able to cut off 5 and 7 Indian Divisions.
Lieutenant General William Slim, who
had led the 900-mile fighting retreat
from Rangoon, airlifted supplies to his
isolated troops until they had fought
their way through to one another in late
February 1944. (Slim's use of air supply
would ultimately be the key to British
success in Burma.) In March XV Corps
finally renewed its advance on Akyab,
but was stopped short again by the need
to send reinforcements back to India for
the defense of Imphal.

Previous pages: A 25-pounder gun is

brought ashore in Rangoon.
A bove right: The A llied route southwards
along fair-weather tracks was hampered
by enemy action. 3 Feb. assembly area
Right: 5 and 7 Indian Divisions reunite
after being isolated by a Japanese thrust.
Opposite: Japanese troops used elephants AJa~ .55 Div (Hanaya) I
as a means oftransporting supplies across
Burma's rugged terrain.
141
 142

TheChindit
Operations

orale had been a problem in Bur- Far East early in 1943 with guerrilla- and drove them back into India. The

M ma even before the Allies took

what Stilwell described as (a hell
of a beating.' During the disastrous cam-
warfare experience gained in Palestine
and Abyssinia. Backed by Winston
Churchill and General Wavell, he cre-
press lionized Wingate, and the mystique
ofJapanese invincibility began to lose its
power. Wingate's superiors then autho-
paign of 1942, fighting spirit reached a ated a (private army' to penetrate behind rized a far more ambitious operation -
new low-. The Japanese were perceived as enemy lines and disrupt Japanese com- involving six brigades - to complement
unbeatable in jungle warfare, and the munications and supplies. In so doing, he Stilwell's advance on Myitkyina.
Allied forces' sick rate reflected the pre- would also prove that the Japanese could The main Chindit force was airlifted
vailing malaise: thousands succumbed to be defeated in the jungle. into Burma in February 1944 to establish
dysentery, malaria, skin diseases and The Chindits (so called after Chinthe, a blocking points against supplies moving
other complaints. The heterogeneous mythical beast) crossed the River Chind- up against Stilwell. They encountered
assortment of troops involved in Burma- win into Burma in February 1943 and immediate difficulties that grew steadily
Indian, British and Gurkha - comprised spent four months raiding Japanese worse until midsummer, when they had
an army beset by problems of discipline territory. They cut the Mandalay- to be withdrawn. Wingate himself was
and discrimination. Myitkyina Railway in 75 places before killed in a plane crash soon after the
Brigadier Orde Wingate arrived in the the Japanese counterattacked in force abortive operation began.

MILES 30
I I !
i I I i
KILOMETRES 40

••••/ Burma Rifles' platoon to

•••• Kachin Hills to organise
Northern Group
(Wingate)
..
•••••• rising

Group HO,
Burma Rifles and
Columns 3,4,5,
7 and 8

3 March
18Feb Railway blown

j( MAINGNYAUNG ••• ~.~.~~•••••••••••••• ~ i:

E
lD
~\ , _ .
(Y)

,------~,
'--"'...

'... . ......
,-...
'... ..........
........-----......-. HO and 2 Col ...... :.:;-

,-
~ 7 KYAIKTHIN

- THAIKTAW " ......... _ ... YINDAIK 2 March

o
f- 2 Col dispersed

GROUP HEADQUARTERS CLASHES WITH WINGATE'S INTENDED 3 Col objective,

COLUMNS JAPANESE UNITS AREA OF OPERATIONS:
Gokteik Gorge ' "
MARCH/MAY 1943 25 miles
\ To Mandalay
 143

Japanese Defeat at
Kohima and Imphal

..... _------ .... \" I

,/ ....:.. II( _ JAPANESE 31 DIV'S ATTACK
14April ....... __ \ ... XXXIII CORPS COUNTERATTACKS
5 Bde (Br 2 Div) from " ~ _ ~ _ JAPANESE DEFENCE POSITIONS
Dimapur eliminates ') (Approximate) ON18APRIl
Jap company at road t ALL-WEATHER ROADS
block, relieves
161 Bde at Jotsoma
: ===== = FAIR-WEATHER ROADS
" TRACKS
I
~ HEIGHT IN FEET

I ~'
. OVER 6000
/- . ... . 5000-6000

,/.
,/ 0
~~~~=~~~~
MILE

.. I I I i
5 Bde ,/ 0 KILOMETRES
: SACHEMA

1 June
7 Ind Div breaches
Jap positions
and begins pursu it on 4 June

......
_-~--- ...
" ....... , 31 May
\ Japanese begin
\
withdrawal
",, \
\

\
I
I
I
I
, I

,
I

, I

26April !
4 Ode begins ~
right hook \
\\
\

*33 Bda anived 5May

T
Above left: The Chinditoperations in hree Japanese divisions were Scoones's XV Corps was cut off at Kohi-
Burma in 1943. ordered to prepare for the invasion rna on 4 April, and the garrison at Imphal
Left: Wingate (center) briefs pilots on of India (Operation V-GO) in early a day later. Both forces prepared to hold
invasion plans with the assistance ofthe March 1944. It was clear that an Allied out with the help of air supply until relief
USAAF's Colonel Cochran (left). offensive was being prepared, and the arrived from XXXIII Corps, which was
Above: Troop movements around only practical place from which it could assembling at Dimapur. The quality of
Kohima. be launched was the plain at Manipur, Slim's leadership would be reflected in
where Imphal and Kohima were located. the tenacity of his hard-pressed troops
Lieutenant General Mutaguchi's Fif- until that help arrived.
teenth Army was to spoil the planned Relentless Japanese attacks rolled
offensive and cut the single railway to over the small garrison at Kohima be-
Assam, north India. tween 7 and 18 April, when British 2
General William Slim, commanding Division's 5 Brigade pushed through the
Fourteenth Army, expected a Japanese roadblock at Zubza to reinforce the defen-
advance, but its speed was such that he ders. Then 5 and 4 Brigades undertook a
and his men were taken by surprise. sweeping pincer movement designed to
144

~ JAPANESE ATTACKS
_____ IV CORPS COUNTERATTACKS
.............. APPROXIMATE PERIMETER: 4APRIL 1944
====== ALL-WEATHER ROADS
.
LEISHAN

,
I
;'
.,---

== ==== FAIR-WEATHER ROADS ,

I

I
- - - - - TRACKS
/
...r- AIRFIELDS
~MARSH

o MILES 15
I I
i
KILOMETRES
I
20
!

KANGLATON
trap the Japanese; this was not achieved H EIG HTS I N FEET OVER
until 3 June. Meanwhile, IV Corps was
§
OVER5000
struggling desperately around Imphal, • 3000-5000
1000-3000
where air supply proved far more difficult
than foreseen. Slim reinforced the garri-
son to some 100,000 men during the
siege, which lasted for 88 days. British 2
Division advanced from Kohima to meet
IV Corps at Milestone 107, halfway be-
tween the two cities, on 22 June.
""",---
Japanese Fifteenth Army had fought "
with distinction against increasing odds,
but its remnants now had to pull back Night 15/16 April
toward the Chindwin, with British forces Japanese party blow up
in hot pursuit. Mutaguchi had lost some suspension bridge
65,000 men in the heaviest defeat suf- ".,_ ... -... / TAIRENPOKPI
fered by the Japanese Army in World i ~",,-,)/-, __-
War II.
~ A~
~
V5
9/30
Japanese attacks ~J /
repulsed (, I
("" l
"\

o \ I
f- \\~_
,. .......
,,.,.,
I
\

'---_ . )

Right: The unsuccessful Japanese siege of Jap 33 Div

Imphal that ended inJune.
Below: Merrill's Marauders, the US
jungle fighters renowned for their
expertise in combating the Japanese in
unfriendly terrain.
 145

To Mandalay and
Meiktila

ieutenant General Shihachi Kata-

L mura took command of Japanese

Fifteenth Army after the dis-
astrous losses at Kohima and Imphal, for i
j
\
which his predecessor was unjustly i
blamed. During the summer of 1944, he i
rebuilt his force of 10 divisions and then . ,.i
i'·
I
awaited the expected Allied push into i
central Burma. This operation, code-
named Extended Capital, began on 19
November and included Stilwell's North-
ern Combat Area Command, British
Fourteenth Army and the XV Corps. On
4 December bridgeheads were secured
across the Chindwin, and the British ad- GA~ 1w
vanced to meet elements ofStilwell's force Jap Twenty- an,:
for the drive across the Irrawaddy into ei ghth Armv {
(Sakurai)
Mandalay. Only General Slim, of all the
Allied leaders in Burma, correctly sur-
mised that Katamura would attempt to
destroy the Fourteenth Army at the river
crossing.
On 3 March 1945, Slim struck at
Japanese communication lines to Ran-
goon located at Meiktila, achieving total
surprise. The capture of this vital rail
~ ~-l OVER 500FT
center opened the door to the larger city
of Mandalay. Kimura pulled so many MILES 60
It Iii If I I
I
troops away from Mandalay to assault KILOMETERS 100
Meiktila that he lost both cities to the
Allies. Slim raced on to reach Rangoon
before the monsoon, but when he arrived
the Japanese had already evacuated.
Slim's outstanding leadership in the Bur-
ma Theater led to his appointment as
Commander in Chief of Allied Land
Forces in Southeast Asia.

Above right: Operation Extended Capital

took theAllies across the Chindwin and
on to Mandalay.
Right: Flamethrower and rifle-equipped
infantry ofthe United States Army
prepare for action.
146

~ FOURTEENTH ARMY BRIDGEHEADS

~ FOURTEENTH ARMY ATTACKS
21 FEBRUARY/30 MARCH
~ JAPANESE COUNTERATTACKS
= ALL·WEATHER ROADS
-r- AIRSTRIPS

MILES 40
I I
i
KILOMETERS Shan

Hills

BUDALIN

21 February 1945,
17 Ind Div, 255 Ind Tk Bde Jap Fifteenth
(Cowan) and 71nd Div (Evans) Army (Katamura)
attack

.KANDAW

Left: Control ofMeiktila was to prove of

crucial importance in the battle for
Mandalay.
Below: US troops pause on aBurmese
jungle trail.
Below right: General Claire Chennault,
whose rFlying Tigers' struck at Japanese
ground troops in China andFormosa.
Far right: China's struggle to repel the
Japanese invaders.
 147

China - An Erratic
Ally

apan's war on China predated World these bases hampered Allied operations General Okamura overextended the de-

J War II by several years, and by 1939

the aggressive island empire had
seized control of China's richest areas.
until December. Meanwhile, a truce was
patched up between the Communists and
Nationalists, allowing greater activity
ployment of his China Expeditionary
Army, and the Chinese were able to cut
off the corridor to Indochina. They held
The (sleeping giant' was especially against the Japanese, who renewed their this position for the duration, after which
vulnerable on account of the internal offensive in 1945. the Nationalists and the Communists
strife between the Nationalists (or In the war's final year, Japanese promptly resumed their civil war.
Kuomintang) led by Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung's OUTER ~ONGOLIA
Communists.
US General George C Marshall warned
the Allies that Nationalist China must be ............ ""..,..
,..-.-._._....... _._._.,.... ~.

.......] 7 July 1937 . MUKDEN

( Japan invades
propped up; otherwise, the Japanese Gov- .... China
ernment could flee to China when the
home islands were invaded - as was then
planned - (and continue the war on a \ 1\
great and rich land mass.' Throughout
the war, the US shipped enormous quan-
tities of supplies to China, first by the
Burma Road, and after 1942 by air over
the Himalayas - a dangerous route
known as (the Hump.' Chiang's position
was strengthened by the creation of the
US 14th Air Force, impressively com-
manded by Brigadier General Claire
Chennault, which inflicted heavy dam-
age on Japanese troops both in China and
Formosa. General Joseph (Vinegar Joe'
Stilwell was sent in to help retrain the
Chinese Army. However, many of the
supplies destined for use against the
Japanese were diverted into Chiang's
war on the Communists; corruption C H
flourished in his Nationalist Party.
US air strikes by Chennault's (Flying
Tigers' provoked a Japanese offensive
against the airfields at Liuchow, Kwei-
-·CHUNGKING EAST
lin, Lingling and other sites in the spring
of 1944. Chinese resistance did not hold CHINA
up, as was often the case, and the loss of
SEA
.oof-'
CHIHKIANG

:r
Formosa
(Taiwan)
EH

1895
;'.,.

·'/·\'·'.NANN G 24 Nov
r' .-r-' ........, I
~"..-., l .'. .:.'
/~/~.
HONG KONG 25 Dec 1941
• cO Twenty-third OCCUPIED BY JAPANESE FORCES AT-
':!.ANO~PAKHOI Army
(Part 6 Area - END1937 - - - END1938
Army) ............ END 1939 - - - _ . APRIL 1944
FRENCH
. - - - , OCCUPIED IN OPERATION '/CHI-GO',
INDO-CHINA l.--.-J APRIL 1944/APRIL 1945
-t" US/CHINESE AIR BASES

MILES 300
! I I
I
o 500
150

The German Drive to

the Volga

ermany's critical oil shortage was

.
G
KURSK MILES 200 oI MILES 200
I ,
decisive in Hitler's first 1942 cam- Fourth Panzer
paign plan for the Eastern Front. Army (Hath) ~ OIL ~ OIL

In April he instructed that the main KHARKOV. l::1 FIELDS .a FIELDS

Sixth Army
effort was to be in southern Russia, where {Paulus)
German forces must defeat the Red Army First Panzer_
Army (Kleist)
on the River Don and advance to the co-
Seventeenth --"
veted Caucasian oil fields. For this cam- m
paign, Bock's Army Group South was
reorganized into Army Groups A and B,
A to undertake the Caucasus offensive
and B to establish a protective front along
BLACK SEA
the Don and go on to Stalingrad. The
neutralization of <Stalin's City' soon
gained a compelling hold on Hitler's
mind, despite his staffs objections to di- TURKEY TURKEY
viding the German effort before the Red
Army had been shattered. Stalingrad
FRONT LINES, 1942
was a major rail and river center, whose
- - - - 28JUNE - - - - 7JULY
tank and armaments factories offered _ . _ . - 22 JULY •• _ . _ - •• 1 AUGUST
additional inducements to attack it. • ••••••••••• 18 NOVEM BER
The obsession with Stalingrad was a • .. GERMAN ARMOR C )1 INFANTRY

disastrous mistake on HitIer's part, com- Attacks - FORMED 9 JULY, FORMERLY ARMY GROUP
launched SOUTH
pounded by his seizure ofcontrol from his Second Army MILES 300
I
dissenting officers. Army Group A made (Weichs)
I i

KILOMETERS
a rapid advance from 28 June to 29 J·uly, 28 June KU RSK.
{ Fourth Panzer
capturing Novorossiysk and threatening Army (Hoth) Bryansk Front
the Russian Trans-Caucasus Front. But Army Group B- STA Y OSKOL (Vatutin)
the diversion of 300,000 German troops (Voronezh Front from 7 July)
(Bock, Weichs 13 July)
to the Stalingrad offensive prevented
them from achieving their original objec- 30 June
tive - the Batumi-Baku Line. They were
left to hold a 500-mile Caucasian front
against strong Russian opposition -
leaderless, except for the erratic and con-
tradictory orders of HitIer himself.
The Russians had made good their
9 July
1941 manpower losses from the subject
peoples of Asia, and they threw the T -34
tank into the field at this point to com-
plete the German fiasco in the Caucasus.
The vital oil fields were lost to Germany.
Army Group B raced toward Stalingrad
to attempt what had now become the only
possible success ofthe campaign. The city
could not be encircled without crossing
the Volga, which General Weichs lacked
the resources to attempt, so a frontal
assault was launched on 31 August.

Previous pages: RedArmy sappers clear TUAPSE

German barbed wire defenses.
Above right: The original German battle North Caucasus Front
plan, with oilfields the main objective.
Above far right: Splitting the forces to
BLACK SEA
(Bu denny)

SUKHUMI
.
strengthen the attack on Stalingrad
proved a major error.
Right: The German advance IIt1 t S

southeastwards with armor and artillery. BATUMI

Opposite: Commander C huikov ofthe To Baku
TURKEY ~
Russian 62ndArmyat the Volga.
151
152

Below: The German forces attack.

Below left: Stalingrad's position on the
Stalin's City Holds banks ofthe Volga enhanced its defensive
capabilities.
Out Bottom: Manstein's forces are repulsed.

FRONT LINES MILES

KIL~JETERSi
T
he slow pace of the German sum- - - - 3 1 AUG i I 410
mer offensive of 1942 allowed Sta- ~ STALINGRAD'S
DEFENSE
lingrad's defenders to strengthen PERIMETERS

their position considerably. The city was

home to half a million Russians, who
were united in their determination to re-
pel the German assault. Most of the
Soviet soldiers were assigned to the de-
fense perimeter, the city itself being en- Sixth Army
(Paulus)
trusted largely to armed civilians, whose
high morale promised fierce resistance.
The Volga wound through many chan-
nels around the city, posing serious
obstacles to any attempt at bridging it.
The Germans made no effort to establish
a bridgehead north of the city so as to
block river traffic and reinforcement.
YERZOVKA .r:m
f1J
FRONT LINES, 1942
_ _ _ _ 12 SEPTEMBER - - - - 26 SEPTEMBER
_ . _ . _ 13 OCTOBER •••••••••••• 18 NOVEMBER
MILES

KI~OMETERS

- - - - FRONT LINE, 23 DECEMBER 1942

.. • RUSSIAN ATTACKS, 24/31 DEC
- - - - FRONT LINE, 31 DECEMBER

ISouth-West Front I· OSTROV

5TA

I
 153

Right: A German soldier shows the strain

offighting an unwinnable battle.
Bottom: The red flag flies victorious over
Stalingrad in February 1943 as the
Germans finally surrender.

This was only one of many mistakes, the

worst of which was the decision to carry
the city by direct attack. The resultant
battle would become the Verdun ofWorld
War II.
By the end of August, the Russian de-
fenders had .been squeezed into a small
perimeter, and twelve days later the Ger-
mans were in the city, striving to fight
their way to the western bank of the Vol-
ga. Soviet civilians and soldiers strug-
gled si~e by side in a constant barrage of
bombs and artillery fire, falling back a
foot at a time. House-to-house fighting
raged until 13 October, when the ex-
hausted German infantry reached the
river in the south city. But the northern
industrial sector remained unconquered.
Hitler ordered intensified bombardments
that served only to make the infantry's
task more difficult. Stalingrad's de-
fenders continued to fight regardless.
By 18 November, when the winter
freeze was imminent, Hitler's armies
around Stalingrad were undersupplied,
overextended and vulnerable to the Rus-
sian counterattack that was forming.
Before the Germans were forced to sur-
render (February 1943), they had lost
100,000 of the 200,000 men involved.
Five hundred Luftwaffe transport planes
had been destroyed in impotent efforts to
supply them, and six months' worth of
German war production had been thrown
away. Wehrmacht morale was shattered,
not only by the great defeat itself, but by
the wanton intrusions into military plan-
ning that had wrecked the campaign
from Berlin.
154

0 MILES 50

The Battle of Kursk I

0
!
i
!
i
KILOMETERS
i
I
I
80

To MoscowA
150 miles

12 July
~:..-~-- .....- - Operation 'Kutuzov'

• ZHUKOVKA

T
he success of the 1942 Russian win-
ter offensive left a large salient
around Kursk that tempted the
German High Command into mounting a
major attack. The fact that US and Brit-
ish aid was now flowing freely into Rus- Army
sia lent urgency to this plan of attack, as Group
Germany's resources were steadily Center
(Kluge)
draining away.
The armored pincer movement against
the Kursk Salient - codenameq Opera-
tion Citadel - was scheduled for July of
1943. Early intelligence of it enabled the .
T RUBCHEVSK
Russians to prepare by moving in two
armies and setting up eight concentric
circles of defense. When the Germans
launched their attack on 5 July, it was in
the belief that they would achieve sur-
prise. On the contrary, Russian defenses
at Kursk were the most formidable they
had ever assaulted. The Soviet T-34 tank
was superior to anything the German
Panzer groups could field, and air com-
mand was seized at the outset by multi-
tudes of Russian planes. They were not
equal to the Luftwaffe in technology, but
they were far superior in numbers.
In the north, German Ninth Army ad-
vanced only six miles in the first few
days, at a cost of 25,000 killed and 400
tanks and aircraft. In the south, Man-
stein's Fourth Panzer Army drove
through the Russian Sixth Army - again
at high cost - only to face fresh Soviet

OREL AXIS KHARKOV AXIS

FRONT LINES: - 4 JULy •••••••• 5 AUGUST REGAINED BY

- 4JULY
- - - 10JULY·
- - - 19JULY
•••••••• 5 AUGUST
- - - 18 AUGUST
. _ . - . 12 JULY· •• _ •• 11 AUGUST
- - - 23 JULY - 23 AUGUST
D RUSSIAN FORCES
12/23 JULY

• LIMIT OF GERMAN PENETRATION (OPERATION'CITADEL)

 155
Opposite far left: The German offensive
againstKursk, launched on 5 July.
Left: By 20 July German forces were in
full retreat.
.. Right: The heavilyarmoredKV-l tanks
gave the Germans many problems.
Below: Soviet T -34s take part in the
biggest tank battle ofthe war near
Prokhorovka in the south.

tank units from the Russian Steppe Front

reserve. The largest tank armies in his-
tory clashed near Prokhorovka on 12
July and fought for seven days. Initial
German success was followed by increas-
ing Soviet ascendancy, and by 20 July all
German forces were in full retreat. Two
million men had been involved, with
6000 tanks and 4000 aircraft. Many of
the surviving German tanks were dis-
patched immediately to Italy to counter
the Allied offensive that had begun with
landings in Sicily. The Russians main-
tained their momentum in successful
advances south of Moscow.
156

The Dniepr and

Smolensk

y fall of 1943, the Soviets had

B pushed their front line far to the

west against diminishing German
forces that managed to stay intact and
FRONT Li N ES, 1943
_ _ _ _ 23 AUGUST
_ _ _ _ 16SEPTEMBER
. _ . _ . _ . 30 SEPTEMBER
••••••••••••••• 23 DECEMBER
resist, although they could not prevail. In Third
AS FROM
mid September the Russians threatened Fronts 20 OCTOBER
Smolensk in the north and Kiev in the MILES 100
i I
center. They crossed the Donets in the
south and by 30 September had captured
Smolensk and established themselves
along most of the Dniepr.
German Army Group A, virtually Reduced in size and moved north of
abandoned at its bridgehead in the Cau- Velikiye Luki as Baltic Front in early
October.
casus since the previous summer, was { Becomes 2 Baltic Front on 20 October
pulled out to operate on the right of Man-
stein's Army Group South, its parent
formation. Manstein had recaptured
Kharkov in February - against numeric-
al odds of seven to one - but his losses had
been staggering. When the Russians took .VORONEZH
Kiev (6 November) and penetrated his
sector, he called for evacuation of the
.OBOYAN Voronezh Front
Seventeenth Army from the Crimea. Hit- V 1 Ukrainian Front
ler's characteristic (No retreat' order was ; (Vatutin)

.
0

Manstein's reward for months of super- BELGOROD 0-;.

human effort. Seventeenth Army was cut Steppe Front

2 Ukrainian Front
off in the Crimean Peninsula, just as he :.... !.~~)e~·):··L.
had foreseen, and by year's end the Rus-
sians had effectively regained all the Sou~'~~~e~t Frgnt
territory lost in 1942 and more. 3 Ukrainian Front'·:..
(Malinovsky) ..::
-:: ..:
REOCCUPIED BY RUSSIAN
FORCES,
NOV 1942/JULY 1943
ft';,x:;) JULY/NOV 1943
o MILES 300
I iIi I' i "
o KILOMETERS 500

TIKHORETSK
.
North Caucasus
Front (Petrov)

·KRASNODAR
VOROSSiYSK
MAYKOP •

B LAC K SEA

I Left: The scope ofSoviet reoccupation at

•SJAVROPOLI
. .I their western border.
Above: The eventual German withdrawal
BLACK SEA
--..-..-' I
I.
GROZNY
was made all the more inevitable by the
removal ofarmor and personnel to the
I talian Front.
TURKEY Opposite: A German NCO leads his
infantry section at the front line.
158

The Relief of
Leningrad

~KRONSTADT
eningrad had been isolated from Lake

L the rest of Russia since 1941 by the

German-held corridor between
Tosno and Lake Ladoga. For 900 days its
people were deprived of food, fuel and
arms; by the end of the siege, they were
dying of hunger and cold at the rate of
20,000 a day. Throughout this ordeal,
Leningrad's citizens continued to pro-
duce goods in their factories, even at
greatly reduced levels, and to provide for
civil defense. A trickle of supplies began
to arrive in January 1943, thanks to a
concerted effort by the Leningrad and
Volkhov Fronts to secure a supply line 30
south of Lake Ladoga. It was little
enough, but it prevented total starvation.
Not until a year later did real relief reach ~: 0

Leningrad.
In mid-January 1944, three Russian ~ f\-...o. Q
Fronts - Leningrad, Volkhov and 2 Baltic G u I f of Finland
- launched attacks against German
Army Group North, commanded first by
Kuchler and after 29 January by Field
Marshal Walther Model. By that time the
Russians had cleared the Moscow-
Leningrad Railway and recaptured Nov- ~
c
gorod. Now threatened by encircl~ment, c

Model withdrew Army Group North east

of Lake Chudskoye and subsequently
stopped the Soviet advance into the Bal-
tic States. Beleaguered Leningrad was
restored to the Soviet Union.

FRONT LINES
- - - 11 JANUARY 1943 - - - 17 JANUARY
-e _ e _ 18 JANUARY oI MILES
I
6
I
PENO
./e
- . - - RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE

Above: Supplies reached Leningrad in Latvia BEGINNING 14 JANUARY 1944

FRONT LINES
limited quantities through the so-called - 14 JANUARY 1944
rCorridorofDeath'. - - - 31 JANUARY
. _ . _ . 15 FEBRUARY
Above right: The earlier division ofthe ......... 1 MARCH
Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts. ; e ~ GERMAN COUNTERATTACK
Right: Final reliefofthe siege was i SEBEZHE
achieved early in 1944.
Opposite: Defenders dig in at Leningrad's
I.J
"''''':'.
,_.I.-'-( I i
MILES
I I ! i!

perimeter.
./ \ .. / KILOMETERS
159
160

Regaining the
Ukraine

uring the drive to relieve Lenin- An improvised airlift kept First Panzer ture of Chernovtsy by First Ukraine

D grad, Russian forces in the south

were equally active. The 1 and 2
Ukrainian Fronts launched attacks on
Army supplied until.it could fight its way
out behind Russian lines. German tena-
city in south Russia at this time was
Front. The abandoned German Seven-
teenth Army was driven from the
Crimea, and Sevastopol fell to the Soviets
all German forces in the Ukraine be- almost unbelievable, but it was a losing on 12 May.
tween 24 December 1943 and 5 January fight. Kleist had to fall back to Odessa, Hitler was enraged by the losses in the
1944. German First Panzer Army was leaving elements of Sixth and Eighth Ukraine, whose rich mineral resources
trapped, and both Manstein's Army Armies surrounded. On 10 April he was were desperately needed by the Reich.
Group North Ukraine and Kleist's Army forced out of Odessa, and the Russian Instead of rewarding Manstein's heroic
Group A were hard pressed. Manstein front was extended almost as far as Brest role there, he relieved him of his com-
tried to counterattack under blizzard con- Litovsk. mand and put the trouble-shooting Model
ditions, but could do little to slow the The last rail link between the Germans in his place. Kleist was ousted in favor of
Russian advance to the Rivers Bug and in Poland and those in southern Russia the ambitious Field Marshal Friedrich
Dniestr. had been severed in March with the cap- Schorner.
 161

u s s

HUNGARY

_ _ _ _ FRONT LINE, 23 DECEMBER 1943

____ 24 JANUARY 1944
_._._. 4 MARCH
_ •• _ •• _ 21 MARCH
•••••••••••••• MID APRIL

~ GERMAN POCKETS
_ • GERMAN COUNTER AND BREAKOUT ATTACKS
~f,....""'·~,~:~:"'!"!~ PRE·WAR RUSSO·POLISH BOUNDARY
BLACK SEA
- - - - - - - - RUSSO·GERMAN BOUNDARY: 1940
o MILES 150
I I , EVPATORI~
o KILOMiETRES 260
SIMFEROPOL

Left: A column ofGermans captured near

the pocket ofresistance atKorsun-
Shevchenkosky.
Above: Soviet advances 0 n a grand scale.
Right: German soldiers advance through
the maize fields ofthe Ukraine.
162

Below: The frontiers ofGerman

occupation are pushed back.
From Warsaw to the Bottom: Marshal Ivan Konev,
Commanderof1 Ukrainian Front, 1944.
Oder Right: Russian forces halt at the Oder
prior to the final push to Berlin.
Below right: Troops of4 UkrainianFront
plod over the Polish Carpathians in the
winter of1944 -45.

E
arly summer of 1944 found widely
~ ~5~~:T~
FRONT LINES
scattered German forces trying to - - - 11 JANUARY 1945 i a
GERMAN
hold a 1400-mile Eastern Front - - - 17 JANUARY ~ COUNTER-
ATTACKS
with very few reserves. On 23 June the - - - - - 26 JANUARY
8 FEBRUARY
Soviets struck along the central sector
with three fronts under overall command
of Marshal Georgi Zhukov, now deputy
supreme commander in the USSR. With
a density of almost 400 guns per mile,
these troops assaulted General Busch's
Army Group Centre just as partisan
activity in its rear disrupted communica-
tions entirely. There was no contest in
the air, as many Luftwaffe units had
already been taken west. Busch lost half
a million men, killed or captured, from
his 33 divisions and was replaced by Mod-
el immediately. By the end of August,
Zhukov's offensive was at the gates of
Warsaw - in the the north, at Riga. Model
barely succeeded in preventing the Rus-
sians from entering Warsaw; their own
pause to resupply outside the city was
providential for him. Farther south,
Soviet troops had crossed the Vistula for
a combined advance of 450 miles in two
months. Operations had to be suspended
until supply lines could catch up.
By January 1945 the Russians were
poised to invade Germany for the first ~-
~~
time since 1914. Rokossovsky's 2 Be- ~) 5GTA
lorussian Front of nine armies assaulted \. RUSSO-GERMAN
~-~~ BOUNDARY:
the German Second Army north of War- o MILES
~-~1940
I
....,
i I'
saw, while the Russian Forty-seventh o
!
KILOMETRES
~~
~

Army encircled the city, which fell on 17

January. Army Group Centre was driven
back into a few pockets along the Bay of
Danzig, from which the German Navy
extricated some half a million men in
March and April. On 9 May the last Ger-
man beachheads surrendered.
As Rokossovsky attacked north of the
Vistula, the 1 Belorussian and 1 Ukrai-
nian Fronts advanced at top speed on a
wide front from Warsaw to Jasto. They
had reached the Oder by 31 January,
bypassing pockets of German resistance.
Russian armies of over 1,500,000 men
confronted German forces of 596,000,
with still greater inequalities in arma-
ments and aircraft. By 24 February
Pomerania and Silesia had fallen, giving
Soviet forces a solid front along the Oder
less than 40 miles from Berlin. Only one
sizeable German force would be left in
Europe after the fall of Berlin: Schorner's
Army Group Centre, which had moved
into Czechoslovakia. The Russian (libera-
tion' of that country would be a micro-
cosm of what transpired in Eastern
Europe after the German defeat.
 163

FRONT LINES
BALTIC SEA _ _ _ _ _ 11 JANUARY 1945

- - - - 17 JANUARY
. - . _ . - . 1 FEBRUARY, 8 FEB (E PRUSSIA)
_ •• _ •• - 20 FEB (POMERANIA), 24 FEB (SILESIA)
••• _ ••• _ ••• 31 MARCH
•••••••••••••••• 5 MAY
_ ) GERMAN COUNTERATTACKS

~ GERMAN POCKETS
- - - - - - - - PRE-WAR BOUNDARIES
o MILES 100
I I i I I
o 160

E/be

c z HOSLOVAKIA

·Heinrici later, then Student

 164

The Drive into

Czechoslovakia

esperate Nazi plans focused on the

D formation of a ~national redoubt'

on the German/Czechoslovak bor-
der after the fall of Berlin. These plans
were based on Sch6rner's armies ofalmost
a million men, which held the Reich's last
important industrial area. In reality.
however, their situation was hopeless.
surrounded as they were by the Russians
on three sides and with Patton's US Third
Army approaching from the west.
,..;I ,
~ MINSK
. By 6 March 1945 the Russians had
already overrun much of Slovakia, and
* J
/ two months later they held over half the
RUN... .~.
• • I RUSSIA country. Czech partisans in Prague and
other cities disrupted German com-

KIEV~
\.... • i.. .
G~MAl1Y
.\..~~~.r~~..... ".~
\-.~':. '",
munications and harassed German forces
in every way they could. On 8 May a
' ,""'·~PRAGUE···i·~. KRAKOW
~
\\.
.~ ~ ~.\.

'"'
c~~c~_ l···....
.~SSOlT t.r
. . r.'.'
·C..
\"'1

I
\.."'1 ........':\
LVOV
•
concerted Russian offensive attacked
from north, south and east, and Prague
was liberated the following day. US
.
".~.~
/.~
.. ~
••iI~'""'""'-l
••••• vAKTAJ /' ........
.~~.
-:J
'.\ : Army closed the circle on 12 May along a
VIEN..
:
[: )
~~
.~

.;1'"
UDAPEST

HUNGARY
.~.
, .\ line from Karlovy Vary to Linz. Sch6rner
surrendered with all his forces, five days
._._._._._..:..., (II" /-'-.. \ after the formal surrender of Germany.
" .....~~ l /._.'"'\ \
()\ l·~·.... ..;'-''1 '-'-''o._.i
· .· I \ f., RUMANIA Left: The western boundaries ofSoviet
~t:$~•••t : : ~ BUCHAREST
wartime expansion.
.~: ••••... /;·ElGRJD~ .~.~
\:
" \ YUGOS t''l"\,._._._._.7
)
VIA
•
Danube
Below: The Allies drive into
Czechoslovakia from all directions.
) BULGARIA
Opposite: Soviet anti -tank gunners.

G E R M A RUSSIAN AND ALLIED ATTACKS

• • 12 JAN/18 FEB 1945 10 MARCH/5 MAY
........ • _··(·,~W~ 26 MARCH/30 APRIL..... ::J 6 MAY/12 MAY
•••••••••••••• LINE REACHED BY RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN FORCES,
12 MAY 1945
._._._._. INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES 1938

N D'
-:::::

-----....._.,.
·\~UZHGOROD
fRuthenia
-
." ,"'"""~....... ."' .......
j
.

..,,'i
/"
i
.REGENSBURG
DEBRECEN
Y •
,./
\
i
MILES 100
!
i
1 ~O
i
KILOMETRES
S T
168

The Bomber
Of(ensive on
Germany

llied air raids on Germany began an increasing range of escort fighters

A as early as 1940, but it was not

until late 1943 that the bombing
offensive became systematic and wide-
allowed deep penetration raids over the
whole of Germany. RAF Bomber Com-
mand concentrated on night bombing of
spread. At that time American 8th Air German cities, while the US 8th Air G REA T
Force units joined the RAF Bomber Com- Force, with fewer planes, targeted spe-
mand in force, and several months later cific military installations by day. BRITA N

HIGH WYCOMBE
(HQ RAF Bomber Command/
• HQ US 8 Air Force)
SUNNINGHILL PARK
.(HQ US 9 Air Force)
•
B USHY PARK
(HQ US Strategic
D
Air Force)

F
R~
I
a
a INDUSTRIAL TARGET
CD RAILWAY TARGET

o OIL TARGET

MILES

KILOMETRES

Previous pages: Russian troops inRed

Square with capturedNazi banners.
Left: B -24 bombers ofthe USAAF
continue their daylight raids on the Reich.
Above: The ever-expanding operational
range of us escort fighters ensured that
yet more bombers would hit the target.
 169

j
i
.i-
I
i
\.
( ....... .1

" ;,
'",.
)

i
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/
/
/
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~.-.-.).
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® @ Em Oder \.,
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® @ 4D fl] "._.-
\ ,.-.' ....
@® '",.-'

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mm
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®

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

mm

c E
m
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.. ,
....
A U S T R A

,/\ ./.-."..

Prior to this, several historic raids had attacked the Erkner ball-bearing factory vastating fire bombing was carried out by
been made, including the first (1000- in Berlin, disrupting production con- 805 Bomber Command aircraft, with the
bomber' raid on Cologne (31 May 1942), siderably at a cost of 37 planes. Three loss of only eight planes. The following
which destroyed half the target area. weeks later, the RAF struck Nuremberg day, 8th Air Force bombers overflew the
Three months later, US 8th Air Force with almost 800 aircraft, causing some city again.
dispatched 12 Flying Fortresses against relatively minor damage but losing 95
the marshalling yards near Rouen. Dam- bombers in the process; 71 others were
age was slight, but no American planes damaged. The British abandoned area
were lost, and this raid set the pattern for raids on distant objectives after this re-
US concentration on precision bombing sounding failure.
in daylight hours. The most controversial raid of the war
The night of 18-19 November 1943 in Europe was that on Dresden (13-14
brought the first of sixteen major raids on February 1945). Estimates of civilians
Berlin, where serious damage was in- killed in this raid ranged from 35,000 to
flicted with loss of only nine RAF air- 135,000. Over 1500 acres of the beautiful
craft. With the arrival of escort fighters and historic city - of no military value
in spring of 1944, the 8th Air Force whatever - were destroyed. The first de-
 170

Strategy: Operation
Overlord

t the 1943 Trident Conference in Calais was the intended target. A dummy

A Washington, Allied leaders made

their plans for the invasion of
Europe - Operation Overlord - during
headquarters and railroad sidings were
built; dozens of sorties were flown over
the area; while tons of bombs were drop-
the coming year. France was selected as ped west of Le Havre.
the target of a cross-Channel assault, German forces guarding the coast of
with beachheads to be established in Nor- France consisted of Army Group B, com-
mandy between Cherbourg and Le manded by Rommel, and Seventh Army
Havre. This area was within easy reach under Dollmann. Hitler had a bad habit of
of fighter bases in southern England and bypassing von Rundstedt, Commander in
represented the shortest possible route Chief West, when he issued orders to his
for a massive amphibious operation, ex- Army Group leaders, so the Germans had
cl uding the Pas de Calais. Since the no effective chain of command in the
Allied invasion was expected in the latter west. Their position was further jeopar-
area, the Normandy beaches would be dized by topography; destruction of the
less heavily defended. river crossings on the Loire and the Seine
The main assault force consisted of the would isolate their forces in Normandy.
US First and the British Second Armies,
with air support from the US 82 and 101 Below: Nearly three million men made up
Airborne Divisions and the British 8 Air- the A llied army and supporting forces
borne Division. These forces would land ready for invasion.
right and left of the target beaches to Right: The first landings take place on the
cover the landings. Two artificial ports Normandy beaches.
(called Mulberry Harbors) would be Far right: The disposition ofopposing
towed across the Channel to permit the German forces.
landing of tons of supplies before a port
could be secured.
Elaborate plans were laid to deceive
the Germans into believing that Pas de

G REA T BRITAIN
/ US 82 Abn Div
'(/
\
. \
BRISTOL

HANNEL

DIEPPE

~ iiIi!ii!ii!i!!!ii!iiiiIIii!!ii!iii!1 ASSA U LT FOR MATI 0 N S

v···· ..;;(:::::;;;:·;;;::::/i::::1 ~g ~L2~AUJL T CO RPS

I I FOLLOW-UP CORPS

o MILES 80
6 KILO~ETR~S ! I 110!
NeE
 171

D-Day

General Dwight D Eisenhower, Sup-

A
ll the careful Allied planning that
went into the invasion of France reme Commander of the operation, de-
was subject to one imponderable - cided that the landings must go ahead on
the weather. June of 1944 opened with schedule. Then a fortunate break in the
unseasonable cold and high winds, which weather allowed the huge force to launch
posed serious problems for the strateg- the largest combined operation in milit-
ists. Optimum conditions of moon and ary history on· D-Day - 6 June 1944.
tide occurred only a few days each month, Three million men, 4600 transports and
and the first week ofJune comprised such warships, and almost 10,000 aircraft
a period. were involved. General Montgomery

-xxxxx- ARMY GROUP BOUNDARY

-xxxx- ARMY BOUNDARY
NORTH SEA
INFANTRY DIVISION CJ } REFiniNG
~ PARATROOP DIVISION ~ OR
-.a.

)
PANZER DIVISION ~ FORMING

MILES 150
I I I

GREAT ~o~ GERMANY

BRITAIN ~ALAIS'
~ .;BOULOGNE
z:yO

ENGLISH CHANNEL

N
~
17 SS pz Gr
(
.')..".-.
First Army c:.\
BA Y OF
(Chevallerie)
."
...i
BISCAY ."
\
."\
)
.)
.'.--..

TOULOUSE

MEDITERRANEAN SEA
SPA I N ,.""\.""" E!ll]
\.j\".,.- ...... ~., ......:.
 172

Left: Loading A llied wounded aboard a

C-47 Dakota. Note the aircraft's black-
and-white invasion stripes, adopted for
easy identification.
Below: The invasion beaches.
Right: LCVP landing craft en route to the
French coast.

US 110f Div

~-',.'"

/
PLANNED AIRBORNE DROPPING AND LANDING ZONES 7091nf Div SITUATION OF GERMAN UNITS AT DAWN ON D-DAY

h ASSAULT AREAS -r GLIDER LANDINGS ~ HELD BY GERMAN TROOPS AT 2400 HRS ON D-DAY

-.; _ FIRST ASSAULT WAVES COUNTERATTACKS BY 21 PANZER DIVISION

a
-.- - ATTACKS BY BRITISH 6 AIRBORNE DIVISION

HELD BY ALLIES AT 2400 HRS ON D-DAY

•••••••••• ALLIED OBJECTIVE AT 2400 HRS ON D-DAY

MAJOR GERMAN GUN BATTERIES

FLOODED AREAS (PRAIRIE~ MARECAGEUSES)

10
I
RCT US REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM i i
10 15

I
 173

'OVERLORD' 6 June 1944

21 Army Group
(Montgomery)

9 ClBde
47 RM Cmdos

231 Bde 69 Bde 7 Cdn Bde

8 Cdn Bde

G
How
~T EN BESSIN
Br 6 Abn Div
5 Para Bde
,
3 Para Bde

I
I
I
I
174

I
I
Western Task Force I Eastern ~~sk Force
(American) I (British)

I Northern limit of assault area 49°40' N

BARFLEUR--------------------------------------------i----------------------------------------------------------.

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NAVAL BOMBARDMENT @ HEADQUARTERS SHIPS OF ASSAULT FORCES cr~

TARGETS: 0530-0800
HRS ON D-DAY- lEI FLAGSHIP OF EASTERN TASK FORCE COMMANDER

'1' BATTERIES
~ FLAGSHIP OF WESTERN TASK FORCE COMMANDER
~ BEACHES
o
,
NAUTICAL MILES
I I ,
20

commanded ground forces, Admiral use of Rundstedt's reserve.

Ramsay co-ordinated naval operations Five beaches were targeted for the
and Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory was Allied landings, code-named Utah, Oma-
charged with air support. Preparatory air ha, Gold, Juno and Sword. At 2:00 AM on 6
attacks were particularly important in June, US and British airborne forces de-
view of the shortage of paratroop- scended on their objectives and consoli-
transport aircraft and the comparative dated a position within the hour. Tactical
strength ofopposing ground forces - some surprise was complete, thanks to the
half a million men of the German months ofpainstaking work by the decep-
Seventh Army. tion team. An hour later, aerial bombard-
Hitler himself contributed to Allied ment of the beaches began, soon followed
success by misusing the advice of two of by fire from the 600 warships that had
his ablest generals to produce a com- assembled off the coast. At 6:30 AM the
promise scheme that seriously hampered first waves went ashore, US First Army
the German defense. Field Marshal von on Utah and Omaha Beaches and British
Rundstedt, Commander in Chief West, Second Army on Gold, Juno and Sword.
wanted to form a strong central reserve Real problems were encountered only on
until the true Allied plan was known and Omaha, where landing forces were de-
then use it to repel the invasion, keeping prived of full amphibious tank support by
beach defenses to a minimum. Rommel, rough seas. They were pinned down on the
commanding German armies in northern beach for hours, but managed to fight their
France and the Low Countries, cautioned way out to the coast road by nightfall.
that Allied air power would prevent Within 24 hours, the Allies had achieved
Rundstedt's reserve from coming into ac- almost all their objectives for D-Day.
tion and recommended that the Allies
should be defeated on the beaches before Above: Disposition ofAllied
they could reach full strength. Hitler's bombardment vessels onD-Day.
compromise - strongly influenced by Top right: LST landing ships disgorge
inflated reports of Allied manpower men and materiel.
- nei ther strengthened the beaches Right: A convoy ofUS Coast Guard
sufficiently nor allowed for the flexible landing craft (LCI) head for Normandy.
176

The Anvil Landings

in Southern France

U
S and British leaders disagreed
on the necessity of landing forces
in southern France to support Op-
eration Overlord on the Normandy coast.
The Americans argued that such land-
ings could open the much-needed port of
Marseilles and draw off German troops SWITZERLAND
from the north, but this could be done
only by transferring troops from Italy.
British leaders saw vast untapped poten-
tial in the Italian campaign and argued
for pouring men and munitions into Italy
to facilitate an advance over the Alps to-
ward Vienna and the Danube. Stalin had
his own vested interest in an Anglo-
American effort as far west of Russia as
possible, and he enlisted US President
Franklin D Roosevelt's support. It was
the American plan that prevailed.
Operation Anvil was postponed from
June 1944 - simultaneous with D-Day-
to 15 August, due to a shortage of landing
craft. On that date US Seventh Army
made landings between Toulon and Can-
nes. Ninety-four thousand men and
11,000 vehicles came ashore with fewer
than 200 casualties: all of southern ITALY
France was defended by only eight Ger-
man divisions. The French II Corps,
under General de Lattre de Tassigny,
then advanced toward Toulon and
Marseilles, while US elements closed in
on the German Nineteenth Army, taking
15,000 prisoners. De Lattre captured
both his objectives, and US Lieutenant
General Alexander Patch fought his way
up the Rhone Valley to make contact
with Patton's Third Army on 12 Septem-
ber. The newly formed French First
Army then combined with US Seventh to
form the US 6 Army Group under Lieute-
nant General Jacob Devers to drive into
Germany on the right of the Allied line.

MEDITERRANEAN ..."

16Aug m
= m

=-=
n n
SEA Fr II Corps (de Lattre) =-
n n
passes through Q Q
a a
US VI Corps al»
= .....-----..!-
C.
Q
en
=.
c
Q
en

.\.,.~ _.", MARSEI llES "\.

•••••••••• FRONT LINE 28 AUGUST 1944
• .. GERMAN COUNTER AnACKS
S PAIN' ". (
\.".~
TOUl
I I LAN 0 OVER 6000 FEET
'ANVIL' ('Dragoon')
o MilES 60 0800 hrs, 15 Aug 1944
- - . - AMERICAN PLAN
6 " i 'Kll'OM'ETERS' '160 US Seventh Army (Patch)
-~ BRITISH PLAN
 177

The Allied Breakout

from Normandy

I
t took over half the summer for Allied slow but steady progress (although not the Seine crossings. Patton's armor
forces to extend their initial beach- enough to satisfy his critics, who were reached the Seine at Fontainbleu on the
heads well into Normandy, where numerous). By 27 July (D+50), the same day that US and Canadian forces
Rommel had been reinforced from the Cotentin Peninsula was in Allied hands. closed the gap at Falaise, cutting off the
south of France. Montgomery adhered to Patton's US Third Army broke through escape ofGerman Seventh and Fifth Pan-
his original campaign plan and made the Avranches gap into Brittany and cen- zer Armies. By this time, 10,000 German
tral France, and US, British and Cana- soldiers had died and 50,000 more had
Opposite bottom: Anvil, Overlord and the dian Forces attacked south and east in been taken prisoner.
British plan over which they prevailed. early August. The US XV Corps established a bridge-
Left: US troops drive the Germans from Hitler responded with orders for im- head downstream of Paris as soon as it
southern France. mediate counterattacks, which failed to reached the Seine, and five days later, on
Below: Patton's ThirdArmy pours contain the Allied advance. Both von 25 August, the French capital was liber-
through the Avranches Gap and sweeps Rundstedt and Rommel had been re- ated. Kluge had succeeded in salvaging
south toward the Loire. placed in early July, and their successor, much of Army Group B, but his command
Inset: Pursuit and defeat ofGerman forces von Kluge, was pulled out on 25 August was turned over to General Model by way
at the A tlantic coast. after four Allied armies pursued him to of thanks.

_ ., ALLIED THRUSTS
JIIII( • GERMAN COUNTERATTACK 7/8 AUGUST
- - - GERMAN FRONT, MORNING 1 AUGUST
- - - - GERMAN FRONT, EVENING 16 AUGUST
-xxxxx- ALLIED ARMY GROUP BOUNDARY
VIII,XXX,XII,I BRITISH CORPS
II CANADIAN CORPS

20 August
US XV Corps
establishes
bridgehead

4 August ST BRIEUC DINAN US Third Army

xxv Corps (Fahrmbacherl US VIII Corps
withdraws into (Middleton)
siege ports MERDR/GNAC· '~~NES
QUIMPER B r itt

~/
German forces
surrender
o MILES
i
40
!
8 May 1945
MILES 40
© Richard Natkiel. 1982 60 I
178

Above: US armor crosses the Siegfried

Line en route for Germany.
Left: The escape route for the Fifth and
Seventh German armies ended atFalaise.
Above right: Reclaiming France and the
Low Countries, summer 1944.
Right: German soldiers pictured on the
long march to captivity.

GERMAN FRONT AT MIDNIGHT 16 AUGUST

- - - - GERMAN FRONT AT MIDNIGHT 19 AUGUST
-.: :. ALLIED ATTACKS 17/20 AUGUST
- ~ GERMAN WITHDRAWAL ON NIGHT 19/20 AUGUST
MILES
!

KM
 179

Advance to Antwerp

,~

RQTTE
- FRONT LINE 25 AUGUST 1944
~ ALLIED SEINE BRIDGEHEADS NORTH SEA
......... FRONT LINE 3 SEPTEMBER
.~._. FRONT LINE 15 SEPTEMB.~R

-xxxxx- ARMY GROUP BOUNDARY

MILES 80
Ii,' ! I
KILOMETERS 140
DOVER ......

GREAT BRITAIN
BRIGHTON Army Group 'B'
(Model)

MAN Y

'ENGLISH CHANNEL

DIEPPE
1Sept

~.
•
LUDWIGSHAFEN

LE HAVRE
12 Sept

.
CAEN

Br Second
ARGENTAN Army
(Dempsey)
21 Army Group
(Montgomery I
--xxxxx-----~

12 Army Group
(Bradley)
• CHARTRES

FONTAINEBLEAU
.
US Third Army
(Patton)

cautious advance that did not underesti-

T
he remarkable achievement of
Allied operations in Normandy mate the power of German armies still in
should have been followed up, the field despite their losses - 700,000
according to Montgomery and other men since D-Day. There was far less risk
strategists, by a narrow-front thrust into in this approach, both strategically and
Germany to end the war in 1944. politically. The disadvantage was in
Eisenhower, who assumed direct control dragging out the war until 1945, which
of ground forces in September as a func- meant that the Russians would have time
tion of supreme command, favored a slow to establish their armies far west of their
advance in line by all Allied forces. The borders.
critical issue in August 1944 was that of The Canadian First Army seized sever-
supply: the logistics of providing food, al small French Channel ports, and on 4
fuel and other necessities to four Allied September the Allies captured the large
armies now 300 miles from the Norman- port of Antwerp with its facilities almost
dy coast had become unworkable. A port intact. But failure to consolidate their
was needed desperately. grip on this valuable harbor immediately
Montgomery, Bradley and other nar- resulted in loss of control of the ScheIdt
row-front proponents argued for sup- Estuary, its seaward approach, to the
plying part ofthe Allied force abundantly Germans.
and sending it through Belgium to encir-
cle the Ruhr and advance on Berlin at top
speed. Eisenhower held out for a more
180

Below: The Allies advance.

Bottom: The two tactical alternatives-a
Arnhem and the strong thrust (left) and the more cautious
advance actually adopted (right) .
Drive to the Rhine Right: Operation Market Garden,
mounted against four key river bridges.
Far right: British airborne forces ran into
trouble atArnhem.
Below right: US troops bridge the Rhine.

nce Belgium was liberated, the

O Allies sought to secure a con-

. tinuous northernward advance by
capturing a series of four bridges at key
canal and river crossings. This would cre-
ate a corridor through the Netherlands
for a swing around the northern end of
Germany's West Wall defenses (which
were by no means as strong as the Allies
supposed). Montgomery planned to drop
three airborne divisions near the bridges
at Veghel, Grave, Nijmegen and Arnhem
in an operation that was hastily assem-
bled under the code name of
(Market Garden.'
i L G
The 17 September landings at Veghel
and Grave by US 101 and 82 Airborne
\
.-.- i ......
Divisions were successful, and British L.,...._.-.
XXX Corps linked up with these forces v'
,,'
the following day. They captured the LL. .~.? ". r
bridge at Nijmegen on 20 September, but ".. \ J
\..-._ ....... ~. (')
were unable to make further progress. At ,-
Arnhem, British 1 Airborne Division was t.""
in desperate straits as a result of landing \.._.)
too far from the bridge in a strongly de- MANNHEI~.
fended area. Only one battalion reached
the objective, where it was immediately
cut off, and the rest of the division was
surrounded. Only 2200 survivors made it
back to British lines; 7000 others re- F R A
.
KARLSRUHE

mained behind to be killed, wounded or

captured. _ F R O N T LINE 15 SEPTEMBER 1944
The port of Antwerp was still useless to •••••••• FRONT LINE 8 NOVEMBER
the Allies on account of German forces in . _ . _ FRONT LINE 15 DECEMBER

the ScheIdt Estuary, which was not ~ALLIED ATTACKS

..... ALLIED AIRBO RNE LANDINGS
cleared until early November. Then -xxxxx- ARMYGRbup BOUNDARY
Bradley's 12 Army Group was enlarged
MILES 80
by the arrival of the US Ninth Army, and I I

KI~OMETERS
I
6· Army Group pushed through the 120

Vosges Mountains to the German border.

By 15 December 1944, the Allies were I' ."""'.L.
\....'"
poised to cross the Rhine. _ .r.;.~._...rr.~._:'
(~ SWITZ .
.J

MILES 100 MILES 100

KM 1~~ KM 1~~
LONDON- LONDON-
BRITAIN BRITAIN

GERMANY

.
CHERBOURG
'-- / .
SAAR)?o
\ .... ·.....r(.\
'\.,.. MAINZ

)~. .
CHERBOURG

• .@". KARLSRUHE
CAEN·

Dr 21 Army Group ~
METZ -'-j.. A'
(Montgomery) / F C E ;' STRASBOURG
US 12 Army Group t
(Bradle
// (
Loire S 6 Army Group {\.,.,~' Loire
(Devers) i SWITZ SWITZ
 181

OPERATION
'MARKET GARDEN'
17 Sept 1944
Strong German forces block
routes to bridge. PM, 2 Bn
captures bridge but is cut off.
Remnants of division
withdraw across river

,. ....../ to British lines on 25 Sept

~RMANY
,,-\ ~20SePt
f o
( i
Nijmegen bridge captured in
• joint attack by US paratroops
./ and Br XXX Corps
\..- .........
\. PM 17 Sept
Bridge captured. Br XXX Corps
links up with paratroops at
082019 Sept

17 Sept
W1rf.1'c';;;:---~-----------AII bridges captured. Br XXX
Corps links up with paratroops
PM 18 Sept

0
~. ALLIED AIRBORNE
'f LANDINGS AT MID-
DAY 17 SEPT 1944
~ MAIN GERMAN
COUNTERATTACKS
t.
MILES 10
'I I'
KM 15
182

Germany's Last
Throw: The Battle of
the Bulge

s they prepared to cross the Rhine ments through the Ardennes. On 16 De- from Operation Market Garden. The US

A into Germany, the Allies dis-

counted any possibility that the
Germans would launch a last-ditch offen-
cember eight Panzer Divisions appeared
seemingly from nowhere to fall upon the
US VIII Corps in the first encounter of a
101 Airborne Division arrived in Bas-
togneonly to be trapped on 20 December,
as German forces prepared to head for the
sive. In fact, Hitler had scraped together six-week struggle. The British would call Meuse.
his last reserves and ordered them to it the Battle of the Ardennes, the Amer- Then the Allies rallied to mount a con-
break through the Allied front in the icans the Battle of the Bulge. certed attack on the German salient by
Ardennes, split US and British forces, German tactical surprise was com- Hodges' US First Army and Patton's
and drive on to Antwerp to cut off Allied plete, and additional confusion spread Third Army. Montgomery took charge of
supplies. Twenty-four German divisions, through the US lines when English- all Allied units north of the bulge, and
10 ofthem armored, were involved in this speaking German soldiers in Allied uni- Bradley assumed command in the south.
bold offensive, which came dangerously forms (carefully coached in American By Christmas Eve, the Ardennes Offen-
close to succeeding. slang) made their presence known. sive was grinding to a halt for lack offuel.
Since they lacked air cover, the Ger- Eisenhower was forced to commit his re- The Germans were unable to overrun
mans were fortunate that low cloud and a serves to the bulge in his line, including Allied fuel dumps, and stiffening opposi-
heavy snowfall concealed their move- airborne divisions that were still resting tion completed their undoing. The last

Br XXX Corps

Dr Gds Armd Diy

Dr 53 Diy

R MAN Y
9 pz and
XLVII pz Corps 15pzGrDiys
\

US VIII Corps

- AMERICAN FRONT ON NIGHT

15 DECEMBER 1944
~GERMAN ATTACKS 16/20 DECEMBER
- - AMERICAN FRONT ON NIGHT 20 DECEMBER
~GERMAN ATIACKS 21/24 DECEMBER.
"
• ••••• I ALLIED FRONT ON NIGHT 24 DECEMBER
, GERMAN AIRBO RNE DROP ON NIGHT 15 DECEMBER \. US III Corps
\
~--- BATILEGROUP PEl PER
\
MILES 20 i.~
KILclMETERS
i
30
I
,
ARLON

\.
 183

I:

MILES 50
I i I I I I
KILO~ETERSi 80

major Luftwaffe effort of the war, against

airfields in France, Belgium and Hol-
land, had no effect on the punishing
aerial attacks that supported Allied
ground forces in the Ardennes.
Hitler's gamble had failed long before 7
February 1945, when the salient was
finally eliminated. With it went the last
German forces that might have stopped
the Russian onslaught now preparing to
fall upon the German homeland.

Above: Hitler's plan to split the British

and US forces by making for Antwerp.
Left: The Panzers break out into the
Ardennes.
Above right: AnAllied supply line rolls
through Bastogne in January 1945 after
its relief
Right: Bastogne under siege inDecember
1944; the US 101stAirborneDivision
defends the perimeter.
184

Below: A USArmy half-track guards

against air attack at Remagen, akeyRhine
Crossing the Rhine crossing-point captured on 7 March.
Bottom: German prisoners taken in the
drive to the Rhine east ofthe Roer river,
February 1945.
Right: Crossing the Rhine.

T
he Rhine River was the greatest
water obstacle in Western Europe,
and no Allied leader expected to
cross it with impunity. Not until early
March 1945 were sufficient forces in
place to attempt the capture of a vital
bridge. This was achieved on 7 March in a
brilliant stroke by men of Hodges' US
First Army, who seized the Ludendorff
railroad bridge at Remagen intact, then
established a bridgehead with bewilder-
ing speed. Valuable as this was, addition-
al cros'sings had to be secured both up-
and downstream of Remagen before it
could be exploited.
On 22 March, US Third Army made a
second crossing at Nierstein, soon fol-
lowed by others at points from Nijmegen
to Mannheim. Wiesbaden was captured
on 27 March; the day before, US Seventh
Army had crossed near Worms to link up
with Patton's Third Army on the east
bank. From 31 March onward, the
French First Army began to force cross-
ings south of Mannheim, and within a
week's time the Germans had lost all
their positions on the Rhine's east bank.
 ·MONSTER - - - - - FRONT LINE, 7 FEBRUARY 1945
---- 7 MARCH
_.-.- 10 MARCH
•• - •• _ . . 21 MARCH
••••••••••• 28 MARCH

~ GERMAN POCKETS
-xxxxx- ARMY GROUP BOUNDARY
-xxxx- ARMY BOUNDARY
o MILES 40
I
'KILOMETERS
6~ !

EINDHOVEN
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21 Army Group
(Montgomery)
\
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Army Group '8'
(Model)

R M A N y

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(Bradley)

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F R A N c STUTTGART

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( de Lattre de Tassigny)
186

Below: German anti-aircraft artillery

claims a direct hit on a US B -26 attacking
The Drive into road and rail targets in support ofAllied
ground troops.
Germany Right: The A llied drive into Germany
halted at the Elbe.

T
he Allied advance through Ger- Eisenhower had focused most of his commitments to the Soviet Union man-
many from the Rhine to the Elbe attacks in the south, due partly to reports dated a halt on the Elbe. As the Allied
met bitter opposition at several that the Germans would retreat to an armies advanced through Germany to
points where determined German lead- (Alpine Redoubt' whose unspecified loca- link up with the Russians, they disco-
ers still commanded veteran troops. But tion was largely in Hitler's mind. First vered Belsen, Buchenwald and other
for the most part, resistance was minim- and Third Armies had crossed the Rhine camps whose infamies had been rumored
al; German units lacked food, fuel, south of Aachen with unexpected ease, but not fully known until that time. An-
ammunition and leadership by this time, and German communications had broken ger against the Nazi regime hardened
and many welcomed the opportunity to down almost entirely. There is no doubt with every appalling discovery, as films
surrender to the Americans rather than that the Allies could have reached both and pictures from the camps began to
face the Russians. Berlin and Prague in April 1945, but US reach the world.
 BALTIC SEA

NORTH SEA
!~
~~
• ROSTOCK

. NEUSTRELITZ

• BERLIN KUSTRIN

• POTSDAM FRANKFUR,.

N y

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;
.J• SWITZERLAND
•,-.-1 I A
I I OCCUPIED BY ALLIED FORCES,28 MARCH 1945 S
_~ BRITISH AITACKS .TAMSWEG

- • US AITACKS
C • FRENCH AITACKS
~ GERMAN POCKETS fi.
I I OCCUPIED BY RUSSIAN FORCES, 16 APRIL KLAGENFURT
• ."..
o CONCENTRATION CAMPS
MILES 120 j
, y
KILOMET~RS i
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188

Below: The victors and the defeated.

Soviet troops enter Berlin, May 1945.
The Fall of Berlin Below left: The partition ofBerlin.
Bottom: Occupied Germany as it
appeared at the war's end.
Right: As Berlin falls, the war in Europe
comes to an end.

B
y mid April 1945, Soviet forces two days (16-18 April), hut deeper lottenberg Chaussee. Before they made
along the Oder were ready to ad- penetrations were made in the following contact, the Reichstag fell (30 April), and
vance on Berlin. Konev's 1 Ukrai- 48 hours. By 20 April, German resistance Hitler died by his own hand, naming
nian Front and Zhukov's 1 Belorussian on the Oder was shattered, and five days Admiral Karl Donitz as his successor.
Front (some 2,500,000 men) faced a later the two Russian forces had encircled On 4 May 1945, General Montgomery
million German defenders in strong posi- the city to meet on its west side. It was on accepted Germany's unconditional sur-
tions on the Oder's west bank. The des- the same day, 25 April, that US and render, and three days later the war in
perate Germans were keenly aware ofthe Soviet forces made contact on the Elbe at Europe was formally at an end. The vic-
consequences should the Russians break Torgau. tors divided both Germany and Berlin
through, and they were prepared to fight Berlin contained 2,000,000 civilians (which was deep in the Soviet sector) into
as never before. and a garrison of some 30,000. Its four zones each, to be controlled by the
The opening Russian bombardment rudimentary defens~s were wholly un- four major Allies. The stage was set for
employed a record-breaking concentra- equal to the forces massed against it, but Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, the
tion of one gun per 13 feet of front. It was the city resisted to the last. From 26 April Cold War, emerging nationalism among
a fitting prelude to one of the most fero- to 2 May, fighting raged in the streets, as former subject peoples around the world,
cious bouts of the war. Only two small the two Russian armies moved in from and the precarious new balance of power
bridgeheads were achieved in the first north and south to meet across the Char- that persists to this day.

ALLIED SECTORS
EAST IN BERLIN
GERMANY
(Russian Zone)
D BRITISH

D AMERICAN

D FRENCH

D RUSSIAN

'1" AIRPORTS
o CHECK-
POINTS

o ML
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RUMANIA MILES 2
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 189

MILES 40
i ( ! i !

60 B A L TIC SEA

2 Belorussian
Front (Rokossovskyl
attacks AM 20 April

.STARGARD

(]

1Belorussian
2 GTA Front (Zhukovl
attacks 0500 hrs, 16 April

wa rta

1GTA
JA

US First Army

4GTA

28A

FRONT LINES "

15 APRIL 1945
18APRIL
25 APRIL
6 MAY
~ ........... GERMAN DEFENSE LINES

__
~ GERMAN POCKETS
--I.~ GERMAN COUNTERATTACKS
c==~ ANGLO-AMERICAN ATTACKS
\:\
\ COLDITZ

ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS AT DATES SHOWN ~ Seventeenth Army

DRESDEN-