HOMEWORK: 2
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
NAME: Chirag Agrawal
ROLL NO.: 2018024
SECTION: A
[Link] V. MRS. NASREEN AHMED (2017) 4SCC 654
FACTS
The appellant-defendant is the owner of the property situated at No.191, Lloyds Road, Chennai-
86. She entered into an agreement for sale with the respondent-plaintiff on 05.03.1989 in respect
of a part of ground floor of the said property described in Schedule 'B' to the plaint together with
1/3rd undivided share in the property described in Schedule 'A' for a total sale consideration of
Rs.3,43,200/-. On the same day, a sum of Rs.1,30,000/- was paid by the respondent as advance
money to the appellant. Thereafter, the respondent paid Rs. 20,000/- towards sale consideration
to the appellant on 03.04.1989, Rs. 10,000/- on 04.05.1989, Rs. 15,000 on 03.07.1989, Rs.
15,000/- on 06.07.1989 and Rs. 16,000/- on 16.08.1989. So far as the balance amount was
concerned, the respondent agreed to pay the same on or before 31.12.1989 to the appellant. It
was alleged that the appellant also orally agreed to sell to the respondent an additional area of
132.25 [Link]. At the ground floor and 4 of undivided share and for that additional property, the
respondent paid a sum of Rs.46,000/- as advance money.
On 10.11.1989, the respondent sent a draft sale deed to the appellant for an area measuring
847.25 [Link]. and one 1/2 undivided share. The appellant though agreed to sell the additional
extent of land orally; she refused to do so and returned the draft sale deed on 04.12.1989 for
approval of the respondent by treating the sum of Rs.46,000/- paid by her for additional extent as
further advance for the earlier written agreement.
Thereafter on 15.12.1989, the appellant sent another draft sale deed for approval of the
respondent by removing clauses 18 and 27 and with minor changes. Since these deleted clauses
referred to clauses 17 and 24 of the agreement of sale, the respondent approved the first draft
which contained these clauses.
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On 27.12.1989, the appellant wrote a letter to the respondent insisting upon her to approve her
second draft on or before 31.12.1989.
The respondent approved the second draft sale deed and sent it to the appellant on 28.12.1989
by speed post and also enclosed a letter from the LIC sanctioning loan of Rs.1 lakh in her favor.
The respondent further informed that she is willing to bring the balance of sale consideration at
the time of registration of the sale deed.
On 30.12.1989, the respondent sent a legal notice through her advocate calling upon the
appellant to execute and register the sale deed on or before 10.01.1990 in her favor.
By letter dated 03.01.1990 through her advocate, the appellant refused to sell the property to the
respondent and cancelled the agreement.
The respondent then filed a suit against the appellant on 10.01.1990 seeking specific
performance of the agreement. The plaint contained aforementioned pleadings. It was alleged
that the respondent was and is ready and willing to perform her part of the agreement and has, in
fact, so performed. It was alleged that it was the appellant who failed to perform her part without
any justification and hence committed breach of the agreement thereby entitling the respondent
to claim specific performance of the agreement in relation to suit house. The appellant filed
written statement.
INTERPRETATION OF APEX COURT
It is true that the plaintiff 1 stated that he was buying for himself, that he had not sufficient ready
money to meet the price and that no definite arrangements had been made for finding it at the
time of repudiation. But in order to prove he ready and willing a purchaser has not necessarily to
produce the money or to vouch a concluded scheme for financing the transaction. The question is
one of fact, and in the present case the Appellate Court had ample material on which to found the
view it reached. Their Lordships would only add in this connection that they fully concur with
Chagla A.C.J. when he says:
"In my opinion, on the evidence already on record it was sufficient for the court to come to the
conclusion ' that plaintiff 1 was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It was not
necessary for him to ' work out actual figures and satisfy the court what specific amount a bank
would have advanced on the mortgage of his property and the pledge of these shares. I do not
think that any jury--if the matter was left to the jury in England--would have come to the
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conclusion that a man, " in the position in which the plaintiff was, was not ready and willing to
pay the purchase price of the shares which he had bought from defendants 1 and 2."
Law is not in doubt and it is not a condition that the respondents should have ready cash with
them. The fact that they attended the Sub-Registrar's office to have the sale deed executed and
waited for the petitioners to attend the office of the Sub-Registrar is a positive fact to prove that
they had necessary funds to pass on consideration and had with them the needed money with
them for payment at the time of registration. It is sufficient for the respondents to establish that
they had the capacity to pay the sale consideration. It is not necessary that they should always
carry the money with them from the date of the suit till the date of the decree. It would, therefore,
be clear that the courts below have appropriately exercised their discretion for granting the relief
of specific performance to the respondents on sound principles of law."
REFERRED CASES
1. [Link](DEAD) BY LRS. V K. SUBRAMANI AND OTHERS
2013 Indlaw SC 862
2. SUKHBIR SINGH & ORS. V BRIJ PAL SINGH & ORS (1997) 2 SCC 200
3. BANK OF INDIA LIMITED AND OTHERS V JAMSETJI A. H. CHINOY AND
MESSRS CHINOY AND COMPANY
1949 Indlaw PC 22
4. ARDESHIR H. MAMA V FLORA SASSOON
1928 Indlaw PC 60
5. CLOUGH V. LONDON AND NORTH WESTERN RAILWAY CO.
(1871) L.R. 7 Ex. 26
6. LAW V. LAW. (1905) 1 Ch. 140.
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