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FIRST DIVISION
G. R. No. 138929 - October 2, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. FLORENTINO DEL
MUNDO, Accused-Appellant.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a direct appeal of the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas,
Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 4139, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused
Florentino del Mundo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 4, Art. II
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of
P500,000.00 and the costs.
SO ORDERED.1
Accused-appellant Florentino del Mundo y de
las Alas (a.k.a. "Boy") was charged with
violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, as amended, in an Information
which reads:
That on or about the 20th day of November,
1997, at about 4:30 oclock in the afternoon,
at Barangay Real, Municipality of Calatagan,
Province of Batangas, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without having been
authorized by law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, distribute and
transport two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting
tops weighing one thousand seven hundred
twenty (1,720) grams, the said accused
being fully aware that the said marijuana he
is selling is a dangerous and a prohibited
drug.
Contrary to law.2
Accused-appellant del Mundo pleaded "not
guilty" when arraigned before the trial court.
Trial then ensued.
The prosecution presented three (3)
witnesses, namely: PO2 Ramon Ancheta and
PO1 Romeo Jonson, both of the Calatagan,
Batangas Police Station, and P/Sr. Insp. Mary
Jean Geronimo of the PNP Regional Crime
Laboratory Office at Camp Vicente Lim,
Canlubang, Laguna. The two (2) policemen
were part of the arresting team that was
dispatched by the Chief of Police of Calatagan
in response to information received at around
3:05 oclock in the afternoon of November 20,
1997, to the effect that accused-appellant
was at that very moment selling illegal drugs
in Barangay Real, Calatagan.
Considering that accused-appellant was
among those listed in their order of battle
against illegal drugs, a team of four (4)
policemen were immediately instructed to go
to the said barangay and to apprehend the
suspect. PO2 Ancheta and PO1 Jonson rode
tandem on a motorcycle, while PO2 Leonardo
Creus and PO2 Arnulfo Umali drove to the
place in an owner-type jeep.
Arriving at Barangay Real on or about 4:30
oclock of that same afternoon, the team saw
accused-appellant standing beside a tricycle,
conversing with another person whom the
policemen could not identify. From a
distance, they observed accused-appellant
hand something over to the other person.
Upon the policemens approach, accused-
appellant hurriedly boarded his tricycle and
sped away while his companion fled on foot
into the sugarcane fields. The latter was
chased by PO2 Creus and PO2 Umali, but
they failed to catch him. Meanwhile, PO2
Ancheta and PO1 Jonson caught up with
accused-appellant after a brief chase.
The arresting officers asked accused-
appellant to alight from his vehicle, after
which PO2 Ancheta subjected him to a body
search. Finding no illegal drugs or weapons
on accused-appellants person, the two police
officer proceeded to search the tricycle. There
they found a package wrapped in newspaper
inside a plastic bag. Upon closer inspection,
the policemen detected the distinct scent of
marijuana. When they opened the package,
they found what appeared to be two (2)
bricks of marijuana fruiting tops. They
arrested accused-appellant and brought him
to the police headquarters for investigation.
The package and its contents were sent to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for scientific
analysis. The forensic chemist, P/Sr.
Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo, later testified
that the laboratory examination she
conducted on the contents of the package
revealed that the same was marijuana
weighing 1,720 grams. The results of the
examination were reflected in Chemistry
Report No. D-1892-97.3
On the other hand, the defense presented
only one (1) witness, accused-appellant
himself. He vehemently denied the
allegations of the prosecution, and testified
that on the afternoon in question, while he
was plying the Barangay Lucsuhin, Calatagan
route on his tricycle, a man boarded the
vehicle carrying a plastic bag, asking to be
ferried to Barangay Real. While they were on
their way, said passenger told accused-
appellant that he wanted to be dropped off at
Barangay Sambungan instead. They arrived
at the said place and, while the passenger
was about to pay his fare, two unidentified
men aboard a motorcycle approached with
firearms aimed at accused-appellant and the
passenger.
Fearing for their lives, accused-appellant
drove his tricycle away from the scene while
his passenger ran towards the sugarcane
field. He was chased by the two (2)
policemen, and when they caught up with
him, they frisked him and searched his
vehicle. They found on the floor of the
tricycle a plastic bag which the passenger had
left behind in his frantic escape. Accused-
appellant denied that he was the owner of
the bag and its contents, which upon
inspection turned out to be two (2) bricks of
marijuana fruiting tops. Nevertheless, he was
placed under arrest and incarcerated at the
Calatagan Police Station.
After evaluating the evidence presented by
the prosecution and the defense, the trial
court found that the apprehending policemen
positively testified that the marijuana was
confiscated from the vehicle owned and
driven by accused-appellant; that the police
officers did not have any ill-motive that would
move them to fabricate such a serious charge
against accused-appellant; and that the
policemen were presumed to have regularly
performed their duties.
Moreover, the trial court noted accused-
appellants hasty, albeit unsuccessful, escape
from the approaching policemen thereby
failing to elude arrest and his contradictory
statements concerning what he and the
passenger were doing and talking about
immediately prior to his arrest.
Finally, the trial court upheld the validity of
the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant
and the seizure of the plastic bag containing
the marijuana, which was found in the
possession of the accused.
Accordingly, the trial court rendered
judgment convicting accused-appellant for
violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic
Act No. 6425, and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
a fine of P500,000.00.
Hence this appeal, assigning to the trial court
the following errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE OWNERSHIP OF THE CONFISCATED
MARIJUANA IS NOT IN ISSUE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE MERE FACT THAT THE CONFISCATED
MARIJUANA WAS FOUND IN HIS TRICYCLE IS
ENOUGH TO SUSTAIN HIS CONVICTION.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE UNIDENTIFIED PASSENGER WAS
THE OWNER AND TRANSPORTER OF THE
CONFISCATED MARIJUANA.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
VALID THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE
ACCUSED AND WARRANTLESS SEIZURE OF
THE CONFISCATED MARIJUANA.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE
CHARGED.
Discussing all the above issues jointly,
accused-appellant argues that the
prosecution failed to prove that he was the
owner of the marijuana, or that he was
selling, distributing or transporting the same
with full knowledge that he was transporting
a prohibited drug. The fact that the
policemen also chased the unidentified
passenger indicated that they themselves
were also in doubt as to who was the real
owner of the marijuana; and where the
ownership of the prohibited drug is doubtful,
such doubt must always be resolved in favor
of the accused.
Accused-appellant further contends that the
search of the vehicle and consequent seizure
of the marijuana were illegal since there was
neither a warrant of arrest nor a search
warrant issued prior to the incident. He
argues that without a warrant, his vehicle
cannot be searched nor can he be subjected
to a body search because "inspection is
merely limited to a visual search." When the
policemen unwrapped the package and
smelled the contents, they went beyond a
visual search since it is evident that the
marijuana was not immediately visible.
He also stressed that his arrest was illegal
because it was prompted in part by his being
included in the order of battle drawn up by
the police to arrest suspected drug dealers in
the area; and yet, no such copy of the order
of battle was ever presented by the
prosecution.
Finally, accused-appellant emphasizes the
prosecutions failure to prove that he was
arrested while in the act of selling marijuana
when all that the arresting officers testified to
was that he was seen conversing with
another person who just happened to be a
passenger paying his fare at the very
instance that the policemen approached
them.
The prosecution counters that accused-
appellants arguments are bereft of merit for
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended, punishes the sale,
administration, delivery, distribution and
transportation of prohibited drugs. Since
these acts are considered malum prohibitum,
ownership of the drugs or prohibited
substance is not an essential element of the
crime committed. Also, accused-appellants
arrest, though warrantless, was lawful.
Accused-appellants flight upon seeing the
approaching policemen gave rise to
suspicions that he was indeed committing a
crime. Under Rule 113, Section 5(a), the
policemens arrest of the accused-appellant
was lawful, since there was reasonable
ground to conclude that he either committed,
was actually committing, or was about to
commit a crime. Consequently, the search of
his tricycle and the inspection of the contents
of the package found on the floor of said
vehicle was valid as it was incidental to a
lawful arrest.
After a careful and thorough review of the
facts and issues of this case, we affirm
accused-appellants conviction.
The trial court did not err when it ruled that it
was immaterial whether or not accused-
appellant was the owner of the marijuana.
Proof of ownership of the marijuana is not
necessary in the prosecution of illegal drug
cases. Accused-appellants defense that the
package containing marijuana actually
belonged to the unidentified passenger is
much too convenient and trite an alibi to
instill belief.4
Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, as amended, makes punishable any of
the acts specified therein, such as selling,
administering, delivering, giving away,
distributing, dispatching in transit or
transporting, and the like.5 Thus, when an
accused is charged with illegal possession or
transportation of prohibited drugs, the
ownership thereof is
immaterial.6 Consequently, proof of
ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not
necessary; it is sufficient that such prohibited
substance was found in accused-appellants
tricycle at the time he was apprehended.7
Accused-appellants bare denial is an
intrinsically weak defense. It is negative and
self-serving evidence which has no weight in
law.8 His lone testimony was not
substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence and hence, it cannot prevail over
the positive testimony of the prosecution
witnesses and the physical evidence that
supports the judgment of conviction.9 Just as
accused-appellants bare denial has negligible
probative value, his uncorroborated assertion
that the unidentified passenger was the
owner and transporter of the marijuana
cannot constitute a valid defense. Apart from
his solitary testimony, there is nothing by
way of credible evidence that the courts can
rely on to even consider his defense.
Accused-appellant denies knowledge that the
package supposedly left behind by the
passenger contained marijuana.
Nevertheless, lack of knowledge cannot
constitute a valid defense, for lack of criminal
intent and good faith are not exempting
circumstances where the crime charged
is malum prohibitum.10 Thus, this Court has
uniformly held that the uncorroborated claim
of an accused of lack of knowledge that he
had a prohibited drug in his possession is
insufficient.11 To warrant his acquittal,
accused-appellant must show that his act of
transporting the package containing
marijuana in his tricycle was done without
intent to possess a prohibited drug.12 Despite
his protestations to the contrary, his reaction
to the arrival of the policemen belied his
claim of innocence.
Uncorroborated as his testimony was,
whatever credibility that may be appreciated
in his favor was dispelled by accused-
appellants own actuations. If indeed he did
not know that the package in his tricycle
contained marijuana, he would not have
attempted to flee from the approaching
policemen. His story that the policemen had
their guns drawn and he fled out of fear is
too hackneyed an excuse and is contrary to
human experience. An innocent person
caught in a like situation would more likely
stay and profess his innocence rather than
further endanger his life by fleeing.
In the parallel case of People v.
Baludda,13 this Court held:
x x x Indeed, the tale of appellant, too trite
and hackneyed to be believed, does not
suffice to overcome the prima facie evidence
of appellants awareness of his possession of
prohibited drugs. Worse still for appellant is
the undeniable fact that he and his
companions, except Maximo Baludda, fled
towards different directions after the police
authorities announced their presence. If
appellant had nothing to do with the
transporting of subject prohibited drugs, or if
he really had no knowledge that the sack he
carried contained marijuana, there would
have been no cause for him to flee. If he had
to run at all, it would have been more
consistent with his protestation of innocence
if he ran towards, and not away from, the
police officers. Obviously, what appellant did
removed any shred of doubt over his guilt;
exemplifying the biblical adage: "The wicked
flee when no man pursueth; but the
righteous are as bold as a lion."
(Underscoring ours)
It is obvious that his escape attempt was
precipitated by his knowledge that the
package contained marijuana. That he and
his passenger were caught in the middle of a
transaction or deal is clearly manifested by
their spontaneous attempt to flee when they
saw the policemen approaching.
Jurisprudence has repeatedly declared that
flight is an indication of guilt.14 The flight of
an accused, in the absence of a credible
explanation, would be a circumstance from
which an inference of guilt may be
established "for a truly innocent person would
normally grasp the first available opportunity
to defend himself and to assert his
innocence."15
In the recent case of People v. Tang Wai
Lan,16 citing the ruling in People v.
Burton,17 this Court pointed out that "an
explanation, standing by itself, which is too
trite and hackneyed to be accepted at its face
value, since it is obviously contrary to human
experience is insufficient to overcome
the prima facie evidence that accused had
knowledge of his possession of prohibited
drugs."
Be that as it may, accused-appellant posits
that, at the very least, his testimony should
have raised reasonable doubt in the mind of
the court. However, bare denials
unsubstantiated by convincing evidence are
not enough to engender reasonable doubt
particularly where the prosecution presents
sufficiently telling proof of guilt.18 Besides,
absolute certainty of guilt is not required for
a conviction. Moral certainty as to the
presence of the elements constituting the
offense is sufficient as long as the identity of
the offender is established.19
Accused-appellant cannot feign ignorance of
the fact that the package he was transporting
contained marijuana. That it was found in his
tricycle is prima facie evidence of knowledge
or animus possidendi and it is enough to
convict in the absence of a satisfactory
explanation.20 In the case at bar, the
constitutional presumption of innocence will
not apply as long as there is some logical
connection between the fact proved and the
ultimate fact presumed, and the inference of
one fact from proof of another shall not be so
unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary
mandate. Accordingly, the onus of evidence
to prove absence of animus possidendi is
thus shifted to the possessor of the
dangerous drugs.21
In the instant case, the evidence on record
established beyond any doubt that accused-
appellant was in possession of the package
containing the marijuana. It was found inside
the vehicle he owned and was driving at the
time he was apprehended. In fact, he sought
to evade arrest by driving his vehicle away
from the scene with the package on board.
His possession thereof gives rise to the
disputable presumption under Section 3(j),
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, that he is the
owner of the package and its contents. His
bare, unpersuasive and uncorroborated
disavowal that the package belonged to his
unidentified passenger is a mere denial which
by itself is insufficient to overcome this
presumption.22 It is well-established that this
defense, in the absence of convincing
evidence, is invariably viewed with disfavor
by the courts for it can be easily concocted.
In fact, it is the most common defense tactic
employed in most cases involving illegal
drugs.23
The evidence shows that accused-appellant
was apprehended in the act of delivering or
transporting illegal drugs. "Transport" as
used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is
defined to mean: "to carry or convey from
one place to another."24 When accused-
appellant used his vehicle to convey the
package containing marijuana to an unknown
destination, his act was part of the process of
transporting the said prohibited
substance.25 Inherent in the crime of
transporting the prohibited drug is the use of
a motor vehicle. The very act of transporting
a prohibited drug, like in the instant case, is
a malum prohibitum since it is punished as an
offense under a special law. The mere
commission of the act constitutes the offense
and is sufficient to validly charge and convict
an individual committing the act, regardless
of criminal intent.26 Since the appellant was
caught transporting marijuana, the crime
being mala prohibita, accused-appellants
intent, motive, or knowledge thereof need
not be shown.27
There is no reason to doubt the credibility of
the policemens testimonies, and after
scrutinizing the records on hand, this Court
finds no ground to disregard the findings of
the lower court giving credence to the
prosecutions evidence. It is a well-settled rule
that the trial court has the distinct advantage
to observe closely the deportment and
demeanor of witnesses on the stand as well
as their manner of testifying. The trial judge
has the unparalleled opportunity to observe
the witnesses and to assess their credibility
by the various indicia available but not
reflected in the record.28 Unless it is clear that
the trial court discarded or omitted certain
facts of significance that may alter the
outcome of the case, the trial courts findings
deserve the respect and approbation of the
appellate court.29 Accused-appellant,
however, failed to present justifiable grounds
to show that the trial court misconstrued or
overlooked any evidence of substance that
would necessitate the reversal of the trial
courts judgment.30
Finally, there is no question that the
warrantless arrest of accused-appellant and
the warrantless seizure of the marijuana was
valid and legal. Accused-appellant was caught
attempting to flee from the pursuing
policemen who were ordered to go to the
specific place where accused-appellant was
suspected to be dealing drugs. As it
happened, they found him in the act of either
selling, delivering or transporting marijuana.
Accused- appellants attempt to escape was
indicative of his guilt, and bolstered the
policemens suspicion that he had either
committed, was actually committing, or was
attempting to commit an offense when they
found him talking to an unidentified person
beside his tricycle. Under the given
circumstances, the warrantless arrest of
accused-appellant was valid since the
policemen had reasonable grounds to believe
that he was dealing or transporting prohibited
drugs, having been so informed by a reliable
police informer and acting upon orders of
their superior officer. This reasonable belief
was indelibly confirmed when both accused-
appellant and the unidentified person fled at
the sight of the policemen approaching, and
ultimately upon the discovery and seizure of
the marijuana in a package inside his
tricycle.31
Even assuming that accused-appellants
warrantless arrest overstepped the bounds of
legality, the same is not a jurisdictional
defect.32 It is a well-entrenched rule that any
objection, defect or irregularity attending an
arrest must be made before the accused
enters his plea on arraignment.33 Having
failed to move for the quashing of the
Information against him before his
arraignment, accused-appellant is estopped
from questioning the legality of his
arrest.34 In fact, he never raised the issue of
his warrantless arrest before the trial court
prior to or during the proceedings thereat. It
is a bit too late to do so in this appeal.
Consequently, any evidence gathered and
presented by the prosecution as a result of
the valid warrantless arrest cannot be
considered "fruit of a poisonous tree," but
were admissible and competent to prove
accused-appellants guilt.35 Accused-
appellants argument that inspection of the
immediate premises must be limited to a
visual search finds no application in this case.
The search of a moving vehicle is one of the
doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
constitutional mandate that no search or
seizure shall be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge after personally
determining the existence of probable
cause.36 The warrantless search of a moving
vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the
vehicle carrying the prohibited drugs can be
quickly moved out of the area or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be
sought.37 Therefore, the warrantless search of
accused-appellants tricycle, which he used in
transporting the marijuana, and by which he
attempted to escape, was valid.
The policemen did not even have to open the
package to determine its contents. The scent
of the marijuana, as testified to by witness
PO3 Ramon Ancheta, was evident although it
was wrapped in newspaper and placed in a
plastic bag.38 It is of judicial notice that
marijuana has a distinct, sweet and
unmistakable aroma very different from that
of ordinary tobacco.39 Having detected the
scent of marijuana, the policemen had legal
authority, as well as the legal duty, to open
the package and examine the contents if
indeed it was marijuana. There is thus no
merit in accused-appellants argument that
the physical evidence presented by the
prosecution was obtained through an illegal
warrantless search. Besides, there is no
showing that accused-appellant objected to
the search of his vehicle and the opening of
the package. Drugs discovered as a result of
a consented search are admissible in
evidence.40
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Balayan, Batangas, Branch 10, in Criminal
Case No. 4139, finding accused Florentino del
Mundo y de las Alas guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of Section 4, Article II of
R.A. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act) as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of P500,000.00, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and
Pardo, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., on official leave.
Endnotes:
1
RTC Decision dated January 28, 1999; Rollo, p.
19.
Records, pp. 1-2.
2
Exhs. "B", "B-1" to "B-3"; Records, p. 10.
3
4
People v. Tang Wai Lan, 276 SCRA 24, 34
(1997).
5
People v. Mantilla, 285 SCRA 703, 714-715
(1998).
People v. Jones, 278 SCRA 345, 352 (1997).
6
People v. Encinada, 280 SCRA 72, 84 (1997).
7
8
People v. Capillo, 319 SCRA 223, 237
(1999); People v. Tumaru, 319 SCRA 515, 528
(1999).
9
People v. Mahinay, 304 SCRA 767, 777
(1999); People v. Acala, 307 SCRA 330, 347
(1999).
People v. Sy Bing Yok, 309 SCRA 28, 38
10
(1999).
People v. Esparas, 292 SCRA 332, 343
11
(1998); People v. Burton, 268 SCRA 531, 551
(1997).
People v. Baludda, 318 SCRA 503, 511-512
12
(1999).
13
Supra, at 512.
People v. Janairo, 311 SCRA 58, 74
14
(1999); People v. Cahindo, 266 SCRA 554, 559
(1997).
15
People v. Solis, 291 SCRA 529, 540 (1998).
16
Supra, at 35.
17
Supra, at 552.
18
People v. Mantung, 310 SCRA 819, 830 (1999).
People v. Mijano, 311 SCRA 81, 86
19
(1999). People v. Santiago, 391 SCRA 644, 652
(1999).
20
U.S. v. Bandoc, 23 Phil. 14, 15 (1912).
Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, 234 SCRA 63, 74
21
(1993).
22
People v. Burton, supra., p. 27.
People v. Solon, 244 SCRA 554, 560
23
(1995); People v. Angeles, 218 SCRA 352, 361
(1993).
24
People v. Jones, 278 SCRA 345, 355 (1997).
People v. Leangsiri, 252 SCRA 213, 227-228
25
(1996).
People v. Correa, 285 SCRA 679, 699-670
26
(1998).
People v. Tang Wai Lan, supra., p. 35; People
27
v. Go Shiu Ling, 251 SCRA 379, 388-389 (1995).
28
People v. Accion, 312 SCRA 250, 261 (1999).
People v. Tan, 315 SCRA 375, 383
29
(1999); People v. Tahop, 315 SCRA 465, 473-474
(1999).
People v. Lacerna, 278 SCRA 561, 582 (1997).
30
People v. Lising, 275 SCRA 804, 811 (1997).
31
People v. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740, 760-761
32
(1999).
People v. Patalin, Jr., 311 SCRA 186, 207
33
(1999); Cadua v. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA
703, 722 (1999).
People v. Khor, 307 SCRA 295, 326 (1999).
34
People v. Alolod, 266 SCRA 154, 165 (1997).
35
Asuncion v. Court of Appeals, 302 SCRA 490,
36
498 (1999); People v. Valdez, 304 SCRA 140, 147
(1998).
Asuncion v. Court of Appeals, Ibid.
37
TSN, March 5, 1998, pp. 20-21.
38
Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 542, 550
39
(1996).
People v. Cuizon, 256 SCRA 325, 352 (1996).
40
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