II. Felonies A.

Dolo and Culpa (Article 3, RPC)

1. Elements of dolo - Freedom; intelligence; Intent
2. Effect of Mistake of Fact (See Article 3, Civil Code) - misunderstanding of circumstances leading to a
crime
3. Mistake of Law - error in understanding the applicability of law
4. Mens rea - “guilty mind”; mental state in committing a crime

Cases:
US vs. Tanedo, 15 Phil. 196 (1910) (Dela Rosa)
15 Phil. 196
February 12, 1910
Plaintiff-appellee: US
Defendant-appellant: Cecilio Tanedo
Ponente: Moreland, J.

Facts:
● The accused, Cecilios Tanedo, was a landowner. On the morning of the incident, he went to work
on a malecon or dam on his land. Tanedo took with him a shotgun and a few shells with the
intention to hunt wild chickens after he had set his laborers at work.
● He went across a stream to see how the alteration made in the malecon affected the flow of water
from the rice field on the other side of the stream. At the other side of the stream, Tanedo met
with uncle of Feliciano Sanchez and asked where he can hunt for wild chickens. Feliciano, was
under the mango tree tying something, but Tanedo said it was Feliciano who answered his
question and pointed out the place where the wild chickens were to be found
● Tanedo and Sanchez proceeded to hunt for wild chickens. When Tanedo shot the chicken, he also
heard a human cry. Tanedo picked up the chicken and went near the place where he heard the
noise and saw that he wounded a man. He then went back to the malecon and called one of his
laborers, Bernanrdino Tagampa, and told him what happened since Tagampa is a relative of
Sanchez.
● Tanedo and Tagampa examined the body of Sanchez. The body was concealed in the cogon
grass. Tanedo and Tagampa then looked for a place in which to hide the body. They disposed the
body by burying it in an old well, covering it with straw and earth, and burning straw on top of
the well.

Issue:
Whether or not Cecilios Tanedo is guilty of killing Feliciano Sanchez? NO

Held:
● If life is taken by misfortune or accident while in the performance of a lawful act executed with
due care and without intention of doing harm, there is no criminal liability.
● In this case, there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the part of the accused. Neither is
there any question that he was engaged in the commission of a lawful act when the accident
occurred. Neither is there any evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the death of the
deceased. All the suspicion rests upon the defendant’s concealment and denial.
 ● Where accidental killing is relied upon, prisoner admits the killing but denies that it was
intentional, the state must show that it was intentional. It is clearly an error to instruct the jury
that the defendant must show that it was an accident by a preponderance of testimony.
● Evidence is insufficient to support the judgment of conviction. Judgment of conviction is,
therefore, reversed, the defendant acquitted.

People vs. Ramirez, 48 Phil. 204 (1925) (G.R. No. 24084, November 3, 1925) (Sungcad)
Ponente: Villamor, J.
FACTS
1. This is an appeal from the judgement of the CFI of Ilocos Norte.
2. On the evening of February 1923, Bartolome Quiaoit invited Pedro Ramirez along with Victoriano
Ranga, and Agustin Menor to go hunting in Mt. Balitok.
3. The last 3 named went further up into the mountain, while Quiaoit stayed behind in a hut. Ramirez
was carrying Quiaoit’s Shotgun and a lantern. He was able to find a deer and told his companions to stay
behind while he entered the forest to get it. While his two companions waited for Ramirez to return, a
gunshot was heard that hit Ranga in the eye and right temple who died immediately on the spot.
4. The only witness who was able to testify was Agustin Menor as he was beside the deceased when he
was hit. Menor testified that when Ramirez left the two to enter the forest, “while far away, he fired the
shotgun” hitting Ranga. He later changed his testimony to “when [Ramirez] was a little away, he turned
toward us and fired.”
5. The defendant testified for himself, admitting that he was the one who shot Ranga. He told his
version of the events. He asked his companions to stay behind because it would be difficult for them to
find prey, if no one would have been left behind. Using his lantern, he saw what appeared to be deer eyes
about 50m from him, and shot it. Only to realize upon approaching it that he had hit his companion
Victoriano Ranga. He said that he didn’t expect to see his companions there as he warned them to stay in
the same spot, but they left.
ISSUES
1. W/N Ramirez acted with reckless imprudence?
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE the penalty of one year and one day of prision correcional
RATIONALE
1. YES. Although there are inconsistencies in the testimonies regarding the distance of the Ramirez
when he took the shot, it has to be known that they were hunting at night with only a lamp as their source
of light. The night being dark when the event took place, a hunter is likely to get confused to where he is.
He may have thought that he had gone far, but in actuality he had not. Judging by the facts, there is no
resentment or motive for Ramirez to act with the malicious intent to kill. However, it has to be concluded
that the act was homicide through reckless imprudence, since the defendant who was carrying the firearm
should have exercised caution, knowing well enough that he has two companions with him, as to avoid
and accident such as the one in this case.

US vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488 (1910) (Doctor)

United States v. Ah Chong
19 March 2010
Ponente: Carson, J.

Facts:
Aug. 14, 1908 - At 10 in the evening, Ah Chong, a cook in the Officer's quarters in Fort McKinley heard
a strange noise of what seemed to be a forceful attempt to break in his small room. Unsure of the identity
of the intruder, the defendant repeatedly warned the former and threatened to kill him if he continued to
try to break in. Amidst the confusion and fear of being harmed, the defendant proceeded to stab the
intruder when the former was accidentally hit in the knee by a chair which had been placed to keep the
door closed. The intruder happened to be the defendant's roommate - Pascual Gualberto. Gualberto died
the following night.

Upon his arrest and trial, the defendant stated that a series of break ins and robberies had happened within
Fort McKinley recently. This caused the roommates to have an agreement that whenever one would have
to enter the poorly locked room, he would have to knock and identify himself. Gualberto's failure to do
so that night led to Ah Chong to think that he was a threat. For the same reason, Ah Chong explains why
he kept a kitchen knife near him at the time.

The trial court found Ah Chong guilty of simple homicide.

Issue:
W/N Ah Chong's lack of intent and mistake of fact constitutes a crime? NO.

Held:
Art. 8 Sec. 4 of the Penal Code defines self-defenese (with illegal provocation, reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself) as an exemption to criminal liability.

Malice or criminal intent is an essential requisite in all crimes or offenses. The voluntary aspect of an act
must also be defined to be that which is free, intelligent, and intentional. The absence of intent makes an
act not criminal. In the case, although there was a voluntary aspect to stab and kill the deceased, there
was no malice because of the thought of the defendant that there was a legitimate threat to his safety.
There was no malice or criminal intent in killing his roommate.

Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea - the act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention were
so
actus me invito factus non est meus actus - an act done by me against my will is not my act

When a man undertakes self defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. The law
cannot punish him for mistakenly think that he is under threat to a point that he has to take a life to defend
himself from such threat. The proof of his innocent mistake of facts overcomes the presumption of
malice.

Ruling:
Judgment of conviction and subsequent sentence REVERSED. Defendant ACQUITTED.

US vs. Apego, 23 Phil. 391 (1912) (Dy)

Petitioner: United States
Respondent: Genoveva Apego

Facts: Case is an appeal from a judgment rendered Feb. 15, 1912 that sentenced respondent to reclusion
temporal (12yrs1day) and indemnity of P1000 to heirs of the deceased.

On Dec. 24, 1911 about 8pm, Pio Bautista and Maria Apego returned to their home in barrio Sampaga in
Batangas. Before entering the house they called on Maria’s sister, Genoveva, who they knew was in the
house, to no reply. They went in the house, the wife went to light a lamp while the husband approached
where Genoveva was. Genoveva was startled, seized a pocketknife and stabbed Bautista on the chest.
Maria then called on her sister and to Genoveva was surprised to find out the couple were home already,
she got up and called for help. Maria discovered her wounded husband, and he was examined by a
physician who ascertained that the victim received downward penetrating wounds in shape of a T. A few
moments later, Bautista died. Information was filed to court of first instance in Batangas and Genoveva
was charged with murder.

Issue: Should Genoveva’s crime of murder and subsequent penalty be demoted? Yes

Held: Court accepts classification of homicide given the facts of the case because no qualifying
circumstances determine a more serious crime and penalty. Genoveva stated that she thought she was
being raped and that caused her to take action. sat up.

On the other hand, Maria testified that within the 2 years the 3 of them stayed together, they actually had
a harmonious relationship and that there was never a sign of misunderstanding. This makes Genoveva’s
statements acceptable, that she killed his brother-in-law without knowing who he was that night and on
the belief that she was being raped.

But it was determined that her actions to defend herself manifest unlawful aggression because on
accounts of what happened that night; Bautista only touched respondents left arm and did not do anything
else but she found it necessary to take a knife and stab him. It was also shown how wounds were
consistent of being inflicted by Genoveva after she got up already.

Decision: Therefore, there was incomplete exemption from responsibility (as provided by subarticle 4 of
article 8 of penal code; 2nd requisite is absent *wala sa case kung and yun*) and that there was no
aggravating circumstance, the court lowers the penalty against defendant by 2 degrees and in the
minimum period. (2 yrs prison correctional + P500 indemnity)

People vs Oanis
GR 47722 July 27, 1943
Justice Moran
FACTS:
In 1938, corporal Antonio Oanis and chief Alberto Galanta of the Philippine Constabulary went
on a manhunt for a certain Anselmo Balagtas, an escaped convict who was rumored to be with Irene, a
bailarina, in Cabanatuan. Balagtas was to be taken dead or alive. When Oanis and Galanta arrived at
Irene’s house, they found one Brigida Mallare, who told them that Irene was upstairs, sleeping with her
paramour. Oanis and Galanta went to Irene’s room, and upon seeing a sleeping man with his back turned
towards them, shot the man. It turned out that this man was not Balagtas, but Serapio Tecson, who was
Irene’s paramour. In defense, Galanta argued that they first asked Tecson to stand up if he is Balagtas.
They only fired when Tecson was about to sit up in bed. On the other hand, Oanis argued that they fired
when Tecson was apparently getting something from the floor. The trial court refused to believe Oanis
and Galanta, due to material inconsistencies in their testimonies. Nontheless, the trial court found that
they acted in innocent mistake of fact. Hence, it found them guilty of reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide and not murder. The heirs of Tecson thus elevated the matter to the SC.
ISSUE:
- W/N Oanis and Galanta are guilty of murder, and not reckless imprudence (YES)
RULING:
- Ah Chong was cited as a defense for innocent mistake of fact. However, there are stark
differences between that case at the case at bar. In Ah Chong, the accused killed his roommate
because of an innocent mistake of fact. Because his roommate did not identify himself despite Ah
Chong’s warnings, and believing his roommate to be a robber who has invaded his room, Ah Chong
was pressed to act quickly. In the present case, there is no circumstance that would press Oanis and
Galanta to immediately fire at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas. Tecson was sleeping at the time, and
hence poses no threat to the policemen. Oanis and Galanta could have easily ascertained his identity
first before firing the fatal shot, or even before attempting a bloodless arrest. In this case, the act is
intentional. In criminal negligence, the injury should be unintentional and is simply the incident of
another act done without malice. There is clear malice in this case, because the reckless use of lethal
force was done in excess of duty, because other courses of action were readily available.
- Yet, over-anxiety and the desire to take no chances in the exercise of their duty are mitigating
circumstances for Oanis and Galanta.

Monfort III vs. Salvatierra, GR No. 168301, 5 March 2007 (Yao)

Petitioner: Antonio Monfort III and Idelfonso Monfort
Respondent: Ma. Antonia Salvatierra, Ramon H. Monfort Et al.
(block digest format kaya medj iba)

Summary: Petitioners claimed that respondents committed perjury on sworn statements made regarding
MHADC meetings and elections. Respondents were not guilty of perjury because they did not know that
the sworn statements they made regarding the MHADC meetings were erroneous. Perjury is defined as
“willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood”.

Doctrine: Article 183 RPC: Perjury (dolo) is willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.
Facts: Petitioners are children of Antonio Monfort Jr, one of the original stockholders of Monfort
Hermanos Agricultural Development Corporation.(MHADC) On Oct. 28, 1998 petitioners filed perjury
against respondents because they claimed respondents made false statements in counter affidavits dated
on June 11, 1998 in connection with another perjury case filed by petitioner. The alleged false statement
was that respondents said that MHADC stockholders meeting was held Oct. 16, 1996 and that they were
elected as board members. Petitioners claimed that meeting was held not October 16 but November 27 as
stated in the general info sheet (GIS) made by MHADC submitted to Securities and Exchange
Commission in Iloilo. Furthermore, that no election took place.

Respondents filed counter affidavit on dec. 9, 1998 stating that 1. They are stockholders of MHADC and
2. That Litunjua, Desebelle and Associates (LDA), MHADC corporate accountant, was responsible for
the erroneous dates in the GIS and that they submitted a letter to SEC informing them of their errors.

Respondents claim that they cannot be held liable for perjury because it constitutes that falsehood must be
willful and deliberate.

Prosecutor Tionko issued a resolution dated April 4, 1999 dismissing complaint for perjury. He points out
that indeed MHADC was erroneous because if meetings were on Nov. 27, some of the elected would
have been dead, which was impossible and that they stated that the meeting was Thursday night but Nov.
27 was a Wednesday.

It was also noted that since respondents did not know of errors written in GIS, it cannot be concluded that
they committed perjury. Petitioners filed appeals in the office of regional state prosecutor in Region 4, in
the department of justice, and the court of appeals but they were all dismissed. Petitioners filed review on
Certiorari the seeking to set aside decision of CA on perjury accusations.

Issues: W/N the respondents committed perjury?

Ruling: No. SC Affirms the decision of the CA in dismissing perjury case against respondents.

Ratio: Court said that they will not interfere in preliminary investigations by prosecutor unless he is found
guilty of grave abuse of discretion which he was not. The court also found no probable cause to indict
respondents of perjury. Elements of perjury are 1. Accused made a statemen under oath or executed an
affidavit upon a material matter 2. That the statement or affidavit was made before a component officer,
authorized to receive and administer oath 3. That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful
and deliberate assertion of falsehood and 4. That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is
required by law or made for a legal purpose. 3rd element requires willful and deliberate assertion, a mere
assertion of falsehood is not sufficient. Respondents sufficiently explained the situation that caused their
erroneous statements - that it was LDA’s error.

5. Elements of culpa (See Article 365, RPC) - Freedom; Intelligence; Negligence/Imprudence

Cases:
People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939 (1931) (Dela Rosa)
55 Phil. 939
August 15, 1931
Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines
Defendant-appellant: Francisco Sara
Ponente: Street, J.

Facts:
● appeal has been brough to reverse a judgment of the CFI
● Francisco Sara, armed with a shotgun, was out to shoot birds. Gabriel Catapang and his wife,
Ruperta Mendoza, were out collecting bananas.
● Ruperta is in front of Gabriel, and Gabriel is in front of Francisco. Suddenly a gun shot was fired.
When Ruperta turned around, she saw Gabriel stretched on the ground and Francisco running
away carrying a gun. Gabriel has been shot in the right lower part of the abdomen. Gabriel was
carried to the house of his wife’s uncle. He was asked who had shot him, he answered it was
Francisco Sara. Death followed as a result of the wound.
● According to the medical officer, the wound is circular in form with a diameter of 2 inches and
that in the space around the principal cavity there were 14 small holes produced by scattering bird
shot which had entered the body — meaning the shot was made at a distance and not up close
● Francisco testified saying that Gabriel wanted to shoot the bird and grabbed the gun from
Francisco. But, Francisco’s finger was holding the trigger when Gabriel grabbed the gun from
him thereby discharging the gun when Gabriel took it from him. Upon seeing Gabriel fall, he was
frightened and ran away. However, Ruperta said she did not hear her husband ask the accused to
him shoo the bird.

Issue:
Whether or not Francisco Sara is guilty of homicide? YES

Held:
● The wound as examined by the medical officer is contrary to what Francisco Sara testified. The
shot was made from a distance and not upclose.
● The cause of the discharge of the gun must therefore be sought in an act, or acts, of the accused.
He admits that his finger was on the trigger when the gun was discharged, the conclusion must be
that the accused was the responsible author of the homicide. Killing could not have been
intentionally committed, but homicide should be attributed at least to reckless and imprudent act
of the accused in handling and discharging the weapon in his hands.
● Accused guilty of homicide by reckless imprudence, judgment is in other respects affirmed.

People v Nanquil (G.R. No. 17933, March 23, 1922) (Sungcad)

Ponente: Romualdez, J.
FACTS
1. A cart and carabao belonging to Juan Rosas had disappeared. To recover them and find the wrong
doer, he requested the help of the Constabulary, who commission a sergeant and two soldiers to
investigate.
2. One night during the investigation, the Constabulary men called Severino Ramiscal. One of the
soldiers, Masiglat questioned/examined him, and upon receiving unclear information, turned him over to
his companion, Atanasio Nanquil, to continue examining him.
3. While Nanquil was examining Ramiscal 20 brazas (110 ft) away from Masiglat, the latter soldier
heard a blow and saw Ramiscal fall to the ground. He had been struck by Nanquil with his gun. Ramiscal
died a few moments after.
4. Nanquil was prosecuted for the crim of homicide and sentenced by the trial court to 14 years, 8
months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal.
ISSUES
1. W/N the trial court erred in:
a. Giving more credit to the prosecution’s witnesses instead of the defense’s
b. Finding that the deceased was maltreated by the defendant and his companion
c. Holding that the crime was simple homicide and imposing the penalty
d. Finding that the crime was aggravated with the circumstance of nocturnity
e. Declaring it was only at the trial that the defendant pleaded acting self-defense
f. Not finding the exempting circumstance of self-defense to have been proven
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE the judgement of the trial court is modified, the appellant sentenced to 12 years and 1 day
of reclusion temporal (minimum sentence).
RATIONALE
1. The discussion of the alleged errors are as follows:
a. NO. There is sufficient reason to give more credit to witnesses for the prosecution than those of the
defense, who, being members of the same organization to which the accused belongs to, were naturally
interested in his success in the present case, as most of them had sincerely admitted it in their testimony.
It also has not been proven that the witnesses for the prosecution had any special interest against the
client.
b. NOT IMPORTANT. It doesn’t matter in this case whether Masiglat maltreated the deceased. The fact
that the accused did is of importance.
c. NO. The accused contends that the most that can be proved by evidence is homicide through
reckless imprudence. The Court finds that the accused did not intend to commit so grave an evil, but
whether or not he had the intention, the fact is that he WILLFULLY maltreated the deceased. An act
willfully causing an evil is incompatible with reckless imprudence
d. YES. Nocturnity cannot be taken into account to aggravate the penalty in this case. Even if
Nocturnity was sought at all, it wasn’t sought in order to maltreat the deceased, but take advantage of the
secrecy of the night to render the investigation more effective.
e. NO. It is true that the witnesses of the defendant testified that, shortly after the event, the accused
alleged having acted in self-defense. However, serious doubt arises from the record as to the truth of this
statement of the said witnesses. This doubt prevents us from having this allegation of self-defense to have
been sufficiently established
f. NO. It wasn’t sufficiently shown that the deceased was the aggressor, which is highly improbably
under the circumstances. Since there was no unlawful aggression, the accused had nothing to defend
himself against. Therefore there is no need to go to the method of repelling the “aggression” being
reasonably necessary, neither it being important to determine whether or not the accused provoked the
aggression (not proven).
The Court finds no aggravating circumstance concurred in the commission of the crime, but a mitigating
circumstance is present since the accused had no intention to cause the death of the deceased. There
reclusion temporal to the minimum degree should be imposed.

People vs. Bindoy, 56 Phil. 15 (1931) (Doctor)

People v. Bindoy
No. 34665 - 28 August 1931
Ponente: Villamor, J.

Facts:
May 6, 1930 - Donato Bindoy (defendant) had an altercation with his drinking buddies in a tuba wineshop
in the barrio market in Brgy. Calunod, Baliangao, Mismamis Occidental. He offered tuba to the wife of
Faustino Pacas but upon her refusal, he threatened to injure her. Pacas tried to defend his wife and
struggled with Bindoy for the possession of the latter's bolo. Emigdio Omamdam, a nearby resident, saw
the altercation and wanted to take a closer look. When Bindoy was able to take control of the bolo and
disengaged with Pacas, the momentum from the struggle caused Bindoy to accidentally stab Omamdam
in the chest (who eventually died from this).

The CFI charged Bindoy with homicide and sentenced him to 12 years in prison and P1000+ worth of
damages to be paid to the deceased's family.

Bindoy claims that there was no intention to hurt anyone but rather to simply take possession of the bolo
which Pacas was trying to grab. There was even no intention to harm Pacas with the Bolo. It also appears
that Bindoy and Omamdam had a friendly relationship as they were actually relatives (nephew and uncle
respectively). According to a testimony, Omamdam, on his deathbed, stated that it was all an accident
and that Bindoy did not aim the bolo at anyone. No one refutted this testimony.

Issue:
W/N Bindoy can be held criminally liable? NO.

Held:
Bindoy's struggle for the bolo was not unlawful. It was not wrong for him to struggle with Pacas
considering the threat to his life if he had let Pacas get hold of his Bolo. There was no proof that Bindoy
was intending to use the Bolo to attack anyone resulting from the altercation with Pacas and his wife.
The lack of intent makes an act not criminal in this case. It would be a different matter if there was intent
from Bindoy to wound or harm anyone and in attempting to do so hurts Omamdam instead. That would
make Bindoy liable. However, again this is not the case. Bindoy's claims, backed up by the testimony
containing Omamdam's perspective shows that no such intent to harm Pacas, Omamdam, or anyone for
that matter was present.

Ruling:
CFI judgment REVERSED. Bindoy ACQUITTED.

People vs. Nepumuceno, GR No. 127818, 11 November 1998 (Dy)

People v. Nepomuceno Jr.
GR No. 127818 - 11 November 1998
Ponente: Melo, J.

FACTS:
1. On May 2, 1994, Grace Nepomuceno died of a gunshot wound located in her left hip. Her spouse,
Guillermo Nepomuceno Jr. is the principal suspect because Eden Ontog (housemaid) testified that the
couple had an argument that night and that she heard a gunshot from inside the victim and suspect’s
room. She later saw the accused carrying the wounded victim on the way to the hospital.
2. Mary Aranas (NBI Chemistry Division) found through a paraffin test no trace of nitrates on the hand of
the victim. On the other hand, the accused tested positive of nitrates with the same test conducted on his
hands.
3. Dr. Floresto Arizala Jr. (NBI Medico-Legal Officer), upon examination of the gunshot wound, found
that: a.) the trajectory of the round was going upward, b.) the shot was fired from a distance, c.) it was
impossible for the accused and the victim to have grappled for control of the gun. 4. The accused gave his
own account of what transpired and claimed that the victim had continuously nagged him because of
financial problems and that he considered taking his own life. His spouse then attempted to take the gun
away from him and in the grappling that ensued, the gun accidentally discharged, hitting the victim in the
leg. 5. The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. He was sentenced to 40
years of reclusion perpetua and had to pay P50,000 to the deceased’s heir, their son, Giordan
Nepomuceno. The accused then filed this appeal on the grounds that: a.) the RTC erred in not finding the
killing accidental, b.) the RTC erred in not finding the killing a result of simple negligence, and c.) the
RTC erred in finding that the guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
6. Accused-appelant cites the following as evidence for the lack of intention in killing her: a.) the fact that
the gunshot did not hit any vital organ, b.) the fact that the victim did not curse or use aggressive or harsh
language indicating a lack of “hatred or anger,” c.) the fact that the accused brought the victim to the
hospital, and d.) the fact that the accused “voluntarily surrendered to the police.”

ISSUE/s: 1. WoN the accused only accidentally killed his wife and is thus guilty of simple negligence –
NO

RULING: SC affirmed the RTC’s decision. The imprisonment of 40 years of reclusion perpetua is
modified to a simple reclusion perpetua.

RATIO: 1. The SC countered the accused’s claims (see Fact #6): a.) just because no vital organs were hit
does not constitute the absence of an intent to kill; the gravity of the victim’s injuries shows an “intention
to extinguish life,” b.) the fact that the victim said, “Masakit, papa” implies that it was the accused that
fired the shot, c.) bringing the victim to the hospital is a sign of, “repentance or contrition,” and d.)
surrendering the police is a mitigating circumstance; “Non-flight is not proof of innocence.” 2. The lack
of powder burns, traces of nitrate in the victim’s hands, and upward trajectory of the bullet wound show
that no grappling took place which is contrary to the accused’s claim. 3. Simple negligence is qualified by
the lack of malice or criminal intent in the act. None of the pieces of evidence (Facts 2-3) support the
accused’s version of the story. 4. Guillermo’s claims in Fact #6 are too weak to cast doubt on his prior
conviction. 5. Because the voluntary surrender was a mitigating circumstance, the lower penalty of simple
reclusion perpetua was given instead of the original 40 years of reclusion perpetua.

People vs Faller
No. 45964 April 25, 1939
Chief Justice Avancena
FACTS:
Restituto Faller was charged with the crime of damage caused to another’s property maliciously
and willfully. The Court of First Instance in Rizal found that the damage was not caused maliciously and
willfully, but through reckless imprudence. As such, Faller was ordered to pay Ramon Diokno, the
offended party, a fine of P38. Faller appealed to the SC, saying that he was being charged for a crime with
which he was not charged. According to Faller, a crime maliciously and willfully committed is different
from a crime committed through reckless imprudence. Hence, since he was sentenced for reckless
imprudence, he should not be liable to pay Diokno P38 pesos, because this liability is incurred only by a
malicious and willful act.
ISSUES:
- W/N Reckless imprudence is a different crime from a crime willfully and maliciously committed
RULING:
- YES, but this only because reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself. It is simply a way of
committing a crime, and is thus a circumstance that lowers degree of criminal liability. Since
negligence is a punishable criminal act when it results in the crime, the allegation raised in the
Information that Falller committed the acts charged unlawfully and criminally also includes the
charge that he acted with negligence.

Ivler vs. San Pedro, GR No. 172716, 17 November 2010 (Yao)

Petitioners: Jason Ivler y Agular
Respondents: Hon. Maria Rowena Modesto-San Pedro
Ponente: Carpio, J.

FACTS
1. Following a vehicular collision, Jason Ivler is charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City with two separate offenses namely 1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by Evangeline L. Ponce and 2) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of the husband Nestor C. Ponce
and damage to the spouses' vehicle.
2. Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries. He then moved to quash the second charge against him invoking double jeopardy
because of a second punishment for the same act of reckless imprudence.
3. The MeTC refused to quash. After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the
matter to the RTC of Pasig City in a petition for certiorari.
 4. MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner's previous motion to suspend the proceedings and
postponed his arraignment until after his arrest. RTC also dismissed his motion for certiorari and
affirms the MeTC. Petitioner elevates the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES
1. W/N petitioner's constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings?
YES.
2. Should petitioner be liable to Article 365 (quasi-offenses) OR Article 45 (complex crimes) under
the revised penal code. Article 365 used.

HELD
1. Petitioner's conviction bars his prosecution in the subsequent charge. Reckless Imprudence is a
single crime, its consequences on persons and property are material only to determine the
penalty.
2. Reckless Imprudence and Simple Imprudence are Quasi-offenses. Quasi-offenses whether
reckless or simple are distinct species of crime set apart from intentional crimes, and separately
defined and penalized under the framework of penal laws. The correct way in alleging quasi-
crimes is to state its commission results in damage either to person or property.
3. Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same
Quasi-Offense under Article 365. Quasi-offenses are not merely a means to commit other crimes.
A single quasi-crime is a crime by itself.
4. Article 48 referring to complex crimes and Article 365 referring to quasi-crimes are both under
the revised penal code. Article 45 allows a single prosecution of multiple felonies, while Article
365 is a substantial rule penalizing not the act defined as a felony, but the mental attitude xxx
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight xxx, a single mental
attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-
crime resulting in one or more consequences. In this case, ARTICLE 365 is used since it
provides protection from double jeopardy, which shall charge a stronger and simpler protection of
constitutional rights.

DECISION
SC grants petition. RTC is REVERSED and second information in criminal case against Jason
Ivler DISMISSED.

6. Mala in se (Inherently wrong/evil) and mala prohibita (Wrong because the law said so)

Cases:
People vs. Quijada, GR Nos. 115008-09, 24 July 1996 (Dela Rosa)
GR Nos. 115008-09
24 July 1996
Plaintiff-appellee: OSG
for the Accused-appellant: Alberto Bautista
Ponente: Davide Jr., J.
Facts:
● a benefit dance was held at the basketball court of Barangay Tinago, Bohol. A fist fight occurred
between Diosdado Iroy and Daniel Quijada because Quijada was constantly pestering Rosita Iroy,
Diosdado’s sister. Quijada ended up losing in the fist fight.
● Another benefit dance was held in the same place. Rosita and the others were inside dancing
while Diosdado and some of his friends were outside just watching the activities in the dance hall.
Rosita decided to leave and went onside the gate of the dance area. While she was facing
Diosdado, she saw Daniel approach her brother from behind and fired his revolver at Diosdado
thereby hitting the latter at the back portion of the head. Diosdado was immediately rished to the
hospital but the injury sustain was fatal. Police officer made entries and ordered his men to pick
up the appellant but he is unable to locate him. Appellant together with his father went to the
police station. Apparently, the firearm used by the appellant in shooting Diosdado was not
licensed. Accused is prosecuted for homicide or murder and for aggravated illegal possesion of
firearm.

Issues:
Whether or not Daniel Quijada will be put in double jeopardy? NO

Held:
● Illegal possession of firearm and homicide/murder are two separate offenses. The first is punished
under a special law while the second is punished under the RPC. Hence, double jeopardy will not
apply.
● It is possible where two different laws defines two crimes, prior to jeopardy as one of them is not
obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same fact.
● Since the informations were for separate offenses the first against public peace and order the
other against a person, one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double
jeopardy.
● Murder and homicide are defined and penalized by the RPC as crimes against persons. They are
mala in se because malice or dolo is a necessary ingredient. Offense of illegal possession of
firearm is defined and punished by a special law, P.D. 1866. It is malum prohibitum which the
lawmaker, then Pres. Marcos, in the exercise of his martial law powers, so condemned not only
because of its nature but also because of the larger policy consideration of containing or reducing,
if not eliminating, the upsurge of crimes of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms,
ammunition, and explosives.
● the elements of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form are different from the
elements of homicide/murder, alone the fact that htese crimes are defined and penalized under
different laws and the former is malum prohibitum, while both the latter are mala in se. Hence,
double jeopardy is unfounded.
● The penalty however is modified. Instant appeal is dismissed. Finding Daniel Quijada guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and illegal possession of firearm in its agravated
form is affirmed.

Veroy v Layague (G.R. No. 95630, June 18, 1992) (Sungcad)

Ponente: Paras, J.
FACTS
1. Petitioners are husband and wife who originally resided in their house in Davao, but moved to
Quezon City job on 1988. Their house in davao is cared and kept for by two houseboys. The Veroys
would send money top Edna Soquilon for the salary of the two houseboys. The Veroys still had the key to
the interior of the house. A key for the kitchen (where the circuit breaker is) was given to Soquilon for
emergency purposes. Meaning the Master and Children’s bedroom were locked, and neither Soquilon or
the caretakers could enter them.
2. On April 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero and a team, acting upon Commander Col. Franco Calida,
raided the house of the Veroys in Davao City as it was allegedly used as a safehouse for rebel soldiers.
They entered the yard with the help of the caretakers, but did not enter the house since the owner was not
present and they didn’t have a search warrant. They contacted Mrs. Veroy by telephone where Obrero
asked permission to search the house as it was allegedly used by rebel soldiers.
3. The following day, Capt. Obrero was given the authority by Mrs. Veroy to search the house. They
entered the yard with the help of the caretakers, and entered the kitchen with the key given to Soquilon. A
locksmith was needed to open the doors to the children’s bedroom where they found a handgun
containing live bullets, printed materials of RAM-SFP, a big travel bag containing clothes, a map, a book
entitled “Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation,” a telescope, and medicines. The items were
turned over to the police station.
4. An Information was filed against Mr & Mrs. Veroy for the violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession
of Firearms and Ammunition in Furtherance of Rebellion) with no bail, as recommended by the
prosecution. The Veroys filed a Motion for Bail (MB) before the respondent judge, but was denied for
prematurity as they have not been arrested yet. The petitioners surrendered themselves to the PC-CIS
Chief. However, the latter refused to receive them as they have not received copies of the warrants of
arrest yet. Petitioners were then admitted in St. Luke’s Hospital due to the stress from the criminal
complaint.
5. An Indorsement informed the trial court that the petitioners surrendered and that they were confined
in the hospital. A MB was reiterated and a hearing was set for the prosecution to present evidence
opposing the motion. Subsequently, the respondent judge ordered the CIS to produce the bodies of the
petitioners for arraignment. The petitioner entered a plea of not guilty and filed an, “Urgent Motion for
Hospital Confinement (MHC),” but was denied. The MR that followed was denied, but the alternative
prayer to reopen the motion for hospital confinement was approved. The petitioners continued to stay in
St. Luke’s. Thereafter, PC-CIS chief, Gen. Dumlao, issued a directive transferring the petitioners to Camp
Crame.
6. Hence, this petition. The SC issued a TRO ordering the respondent judge Layague from proceeding
with the petitioners MHC, and respondent Gen. Dumlao from transferring petitioners. A week later,
respondent judge denied the MB. The petitioners filed 2 supplementary petitions which sought to review
the order of the TC. The SC granted the MB and set it at 20,000 pesos each. The petition for mandamus
(for respondent judge to act on MB), and the petition for certiorari were rendered moot and academic.
What remains is the petition for prohibition.
ISSUES
1. W/N Paragraph 3 of Section 1 of PD 1866 is unconstitutional?
2. W/N PD 1866 was repealed by RA 6968?
3. W/N petitioners can be charged with the violation of PD 1866?
4. W/N the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in admitting in evidences certain articles
which were inadmissible for being violative of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures? (MAIN)
DISPOSITION
Petition GRANTED
RATIONALE
1. NO. PD 1866 is neither a bill of attainder nor does it provide a possibility of double jeopardy as held
in Misolas v. Panga.
2. NO. It is a cardinal rule in Statutory Construction that where the words and phrases are not obscure or
ambiguous, its meaning and intention must be determined from the language employed. A perusal of the
laws provides 2 distinct offenses: (1) for illegal possession of firearms; (2) rebellion. Although they
involve different subjects, they did not eliminate each other.
3. NO. Petitioners contend that Sec 1 of PD 1866 is couched in vague terms. (deal, acquire, possess)
which can have different interpretations. Petitioners were not found in actual possession of the firearm.
Other than that they were the owners of the house in Davao, no other evidence was shown that petitioners
possessed or had control of the seized items. Neither did the evidence show that they had the intention to
further rebellion.
4. YES. The petitioners concede that they allowed Capt. Obrero to break open the door, but only for the
purpose of ascertaining the presence of rebel soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to
conduct a room to room search. The items taken were products of illegal search for the lack of a warrant.
There are exceptions, however: (1) a search incidental to arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; (3)
seizure of evidence in plain view. None of which fall in the case at bar. Capt. Obrero initially refrained
from entering the house since they lacked a warrant, which means he was fully aware of its necessity.
However, from the time of asking permission from the petitioner to enter the house to the actual search,
they could have secured a search warrant, but failed to do so.
The illegal possession is malum prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is
necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in Mala Prohibita but the subjects of this kind of
offenses may not be summarily seized since they are prohibited. A warrant is still needed

People vs. Huang Zhen Hua, GR No. 139301, 29 September 2004 (Doctor)
People v. Huang Zhen Hua and Jogy Lee
GR No. 139301 - 29 September 2004
Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J.

Facts:
Oct. 25, 1996 - Members of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) raided the
Cityland Condominium with a search warrant issued on the same day. Although no one was inside the
condominium, 2kg of shabu, drug producing-machines, paraphernalia, and fake credit card machines
were found. The policemen rushed to Furama Laser Karaoke Restaurant in Manila to arrest Peter Chan
and Henry Lao before they could deliver the shabu. A firefight ensued ending with the deaths of Chan
and Lao. Two bags of shabu (1kg each) were located in Lao's car.

The policemen proceeded to Pacific Grand Villa to the drug suppliers' residence. Jogy Lee was at the
door when the policemen raided the residence. The policemen, aided by the condominium's security OIC,
searched the unit. The policemen found a large stash of shabu in the master's bedroom shared by Lee and
Lao (who were lovers). The policemen claimed that no other property were taken or damaged and that
the siezed articles were all accounted for. Huang Zhen Hua was sleeping in the other bedroom when the
raid began. He and Lee were subsequently arrested.

Both were found guilty of violating RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act) by the RTC.

On appeal, Huang contends that he was just a tourist and a visitor of Lee and that the evidence provided
by the prosecution against him would not suffice to prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Lee on
the other hand contends that no search warrant was provided, the policemen barged into the room, and
that the policemen had planted the shabu in her room and stolen her other affects (appliances, personal
belongings). She claims that the testimony of Pangan, the condo's security OIC, that he had not seen the
shabu that night but only in the news following the incident, supports her contention.

Issue:
W/N Huang is guilty of the charge? NO.
W/N the policemen's alleged disregard for protocol proves Lee's innocence? NO.

Held:
Huang - The prosecution failed to prove that Huang, at any time, had actual or constructive possession of
the drug, or had access to the room, or that he had knowledge of the drug in the area. Actual possession
exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused (which Huang did
not have). Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion or control of the accused
or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found (which was not
proved). Huang was a mere visitor and may not have known of the activities of Lee et. al. Conspiracy
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt (which again the prosecution has failed to do). Because this
crime is mala prohibita, the criminal intent is not an essential requirement.

Lee - There was no such disregard for protocol. The authorities may undertake an unannounced intrusion
when: a.) a party whore premises or is entitled to the possession thereof refuses, upon demand, to open it;
b.) when such person in the premises already knew of the identity of the officers and of their authority
and persons; c.) when the officers are justified in the honest belief that there is an imminent peril to life or
limb; and d.) when those in the premises, aware of the presence of someone outside, are then engaged in
activity which justifies the officers to believe that an escape or the destruction of evidence is being
attempted. The PARAC operatives provided a Cantonese interpreter to convey their directives to Lee and
have clearly informed her of their objective. It is obvious that the men were policemen due to their
uniform and Lee could not deny that she knew their identities. She failed to prove that a forceful entry
was done since she was the one who opened the door. Her claim that her other belongings were
destroyed or stolen was contradicted by Pangan's testimony. Lee also failed to prove her allegation that
the shabu was planted. She merely relied on Pangan's testimony. Her claim that she saw the policemen
placing the shabu on the bed did not impress the court. The SC said that if the policemen indeed attempt
to plant such evidence, they would not brandish the shabu so easily for Lee to see. Furthermore, Lee
failed to charge the policemen for planting the evidence which is also in violation of RA 6425. Also,
although she was not a party in the search warrant, she could still be arrested because there was probable
cause. The PARAC operatives' siezure of other articles not stated in the warrant does not make it illegal
or inadmissible in court. These articles (cards, passbook, passport, and other documents probably
relevant in the investigation) were seen in plain view and are thus legitimate.

Ruling:
Huang's appeal GRANTED. RTC conviction is REVERSED. Huang is ACQUITTED.
Lee's appeal is DENIED. RTC conviction AFFIRMED.

People vs. Dela Rosa, GR No. 84857, 16 January 1998 5 (Dy)

Petitioner: People of the PH
Respondent: Rodolfo Dela Rosa, Antonio Dela Rosa and Rodolfo Quimson(at large)

Facts: Rodolfo Dela Rosa appeals decision of RTC Pangasinan that convicted him of illegal possession of
firearms and explosives that imposed penalty of reclusion perpetua.

On Jan. 27, 1987, information for illegal possession of firearms and explosives were filed against Rodolfo
dela Rosa, Antonio dela Rosa Creencia Reyes and Rodolfo Quimson. Court held that above mentioned
were accused of possession of 3 homemade gauges, 12 shotguns and 14 pieces of dynamites. All accused
pleaded not guilty(feb) but changed it to guilty(march 12), on march 19, they all changed their motion to
not guilty. Cresencio Reyes changes his mind again and pleaded guilty and was utilized as witness by
prosecution. Trial proceeded with 3 accused.

Accounts of the case were as follows: the 4 men surrendered to Kagawad Rigor and revealed to him that
they were former members of NPA. They informed that one of them shot Benjamin Nano aka Kumander
Tamang, the person who recruited them. They also revealed that Tamang instructed them to use
explosives to assassinate Kagawad Rigor. After they killed Tamang, they decided that it was best for
them to surrender themselves to the authorities which they did. Kagawad Rigor offered them breakfast
and went to the police station to report the 4 surrenders. All 4 except Quimson were brought to the
philippine constabulary where their statements were taken. Quimson was left behind to help police
recover the body of Tamang. They asked for lawyers but the police told them it was not necessary since
they were going tone released immediately. After taking their statements, police took them to the police
station in Labrador where they were detained; they were transferred to provincial jail.

Lower court convicted the 3 accused, Antonio deal Rosa did not appeal while Rodolfo Quimson escaped
Bilibid prison. Rodolfo deal Rosa appealed contending that the court erred with finding him guilty of
illegal possession of firearms and explosives.

Issues: Did Dela Rosa commit crime of illegal possession of firearms and explosives? No
Held: SC found merit in appellant’s claim. While it is not disputed that Dela Rosa and companions were
the ones who surrendered the firearms and explosives, the possession of such was not in a manner
punishable by law. Illegal possession of firearms is committed when 1. Holder possesses a firearm 2.
Lacks the authority or license to possess it. People v Garcia clarifies possession for purposes of
convicting a person. Illegal possession of firearms is male prohibitum, punished by a special law, which
in case of good faith or absence of criminal intent are not valid excuses.

While that is true, People v Estoisa held that temporary, incidental, causal or harmless possession of
firearms is not punishable by law. People v Remereta also posed that a person who steals firearms can be
prosecuted for theft, but not for illegal possession of firearms. The kind of possession punishably law is
one where accused possess it physicallyor constructively with animus possidendi or intention to possess.
Animus possidendi is a state of mind and can only be proven by facts surrounding the case.

In People v Leo Lain, Leo Lain cannot argue that he did not have animus possidendi. LeoLain said he was
on his way to the municipal hall to surrender his firearm but he met some of his friends along the way. A
police officer then seized his firearm leaving him unable to surrender it himself. Court found it hard to
believe that appellant hid the firearm on his waist if he were to surrender it. People v Lubo is another
example of animus possidendi being proven by simultaneous acts of accused. Lubo contended that he did
not have intent to possess but he secured a temporary license to own firearm.

In case at bar, Dela Rosa and the others surrendered the firearms and explosives to the Kagawad even
before police showed up. Unlike in People LeoLain, Appellant’s intention to surrender firearms was clear
from the beginning. Moreover, Solgen’s contention that Dela Rosa had constructive possession of the
firearms is irrelevant; Dela Rosa’s possession was harmless, temporary and incendental for the purpose of
surrendering weapons - 1st element of Animus possidendi cannot be established.

Solgen’s argument that since Dela Rosa joined NPA, he illegally possessed the firearms was also
insufficient. Dela Rosa never admitted that the surrendered firearms had no license. Court said that it is
the burden of the prosecution to prove otherwise. In People v Solayao, extrajudicial admission does not
suffice, the least the prosecution could have done was to present certification that the firearms did not
have license. Mere suspicion does not prove prosecution's case in court.

The rule is the same in both crimes mala in se and mala prohibitum that speculation and probabilities
cannot substitute for proof required to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Decision: Accused-appellant Rodolfo deal Rosa is acquitted; immediate release is ordered.

Estrada vs Sandiganbayan
GR 148560 November 19 2001
Justice Belosillo
FACTS:
On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman filed 8 separate Informations before the Sandiganbayan
against former president Estrada, for violation of RA 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law. The Sandiganbayan
acted on these Informations, and after investigation, found probable cause for plunder against Estrada. A
warrant was subsequently issued, and Estrada’s motion for reconsideration was denied. On June 14, 2001,
Estrada moved to quash the Information, on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an
indictable offense because the law on which it was based on (RA 7080) was unconstitutional for
vagueness. This motion to quash was soon denied by the Sandiganbayan. Hence, Estrada filed the present
petition to the SC. He alleges that RA 7080 is unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) the elements
of plunder provided therein are ambiguous, (2) that “combination” and “series” were not defined and
hence vague, (3) by not requiring the prosecution to prove all acts of plunder and instead satisfy itself
with a clear pattern, the law violates right to due process, and (4) the law fails to classify plunder as
malum prohibitum or mala in se
ISSUES:
- W/N RA 7080 is unconstitutional (NO)
RULING:
- On Vagueness: A statute is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. This is not the case
with RA 7080. It is clear from RA 7080 that for plunder to exist, there must be (1) a public official
who worked together with his fellows to (2) amass ill-gotten wealth through a series or combination
of acts such as malversation or misappropriation (3) in the amount of at least P50 million. There is
nothing vague about the following elements. Petitioners also wrongly contend that “series” and
“combination” were not defined. It is a rule of statutory construction that unless it is clear that words
have a technical meaning, then words must be taken in their ordinary parlance. It is evident from the
deliberations on RA 7080 that Congress intended series and combination to mean what they do in
ordinary language.
- On Violation of Due Process: RA 7080 did not change the quantum of evidence. Under the said
law, the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that a number of acts suffice to form a
combination and series which would constitute a pattern involving P50 million exists. When the
charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act
done to further the scheme or conspiracy.
- On Classification: Plunder is malum in se, and hence requires proof of criminal intent. Mens rea
is thus an element of the crime of plunder. Plunder is a heinous crime, for it strikes at the larger socio-
economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor
masses. Being a heinous crime, plunder is mala in se.

People vs. Que Ming Kha, GR No. 133265, 29 May 2002 (Yao)
Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines
Accused-Appellants: Que Ming Kha (alias Alfonso GO) and Kim Que Yu
(Alfonso QUE)
Ponente: Puno, J.

FACTS
1. Members of the Police Central Police District, Batasan Station 6 intercepted a blue KIA van
carrying 9 sacks of shabu near Commonwealth Avenue in QC. The detailed facts are as follows.
2. Que Ming Kha (Alfonso Go) is driving the blue KIA van along with Ah Chai. In Commonwealth,
a 7-year-old boy suddenly crosses the road and gets hit by the van.
 3. Ah Chai disembarks and hails a tricycle to take the boy to the hospital. he instructs Go to stay put
and watch over the van. Kim Que Yu (Alfonso Que) riding a cab along Commonwealth chances
upon the scene and sees his friend Go. He asks Go about the commotion when policemen arrive
and requests both Go and Que (as translator) to go to the police station.
4. At the police station Que was instructed to stay in the office while Go was put inside a small cell.
Police personnel then report that they have found 253 plastic bags of shabu, 1 bag weighing 1
kilo. Que is then also put into jail.
5. Go and Que were charged at the RTC and were convicted under the Dangerous Drugs Act. The
RTC sentenced both to death.
6. The case is now before the Supreme Court for Automatic Review.

ISSUES
1. W/N Que Ming Kha is liable to the Dangerous Drugs Act? YES.
2. W/N Kim Que Yu is liable to the Dangerous Drugs Act? NO.
3. W/N the drugs found in the blue KIA van was admissible for evidence despite a warrantless
search? YES.

HELD
1. The defense testimonies sufficiently established from the tricycle driver, the passenger of the
tricycle driver when Ah Chai hailed the same, and the seven-year old boy show that Kim Que Yu
was not the other companion of Que Ming Kha when the accident occurred. Persistent doubt
exists on the full veracity of the prosecution's theory as regards Que's participation of the crime.
2. However, Go cannot assert that he was not aware of the existence of the contraband of the van he
was driving. The crime in consideration is malum prohibita. The lack of criminal intent and good
faith do not exempt the accused from criminal liability. Mere possession and/or delivery of a
regulated drug without legal authority is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.
3. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained may be admissible
in the following instances
a. search incident to a lawful arrest
b. search of a moving motor vehicle
c. search in violation of customs laws
d. seizure of evidence in plain view
e. when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
4. Clearly, the prohibited substance was within the plain view of the police officer who was in
position to be near the van at the time. The substance therefore is NOT a product of an illegal
search and not inadmissible to evidence.

DECISION
SC finds Que Ming Kha alias Alfonso Go GUILTY and sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua. Kim
Que Yu alias Alfonso Que is ACQUITTED and immediate release is ORDERED.

People vs. Ojeda, GR No. 104238-58, 3 June 2004 (Yao)

Appellee: People of the Philippines
Appellant: Cora Abella Ojeda
Ponente: Corona, J.

FACTS
1. Accused Cora Abella Ojeda was charged with 21 separate informations for estafa and for
violation of Batas Pambansa 22 (Bouncing Checks). A transaction between Ojeda and Ruby Chua
occurred where Ojeda bought fabrics and textiles worth P228,306.60 with 22 postdated checks.
2. Chua later presented the bank a check in the amount of P17,000 but it was dishonored due to the
account having been closed. Demands were allegedly made to no avail. Estafa and BP 22 charges
were filed against Ojeda.
3. Ojeda's defense was grounded on good faith or absence of deceit, lack of notice of dishonor, and
having already paid the full payment of the amount in the checks.
4. The trial court convicted Ojeda for estafa and BP 22 for 14 of the 22 checks that bounced. Ojeda
appealed to the SC seeking acquittal. The Appeal was dismissed due to her counsel filing the
brief late. Ojeda filed a MR, but this was also denied.
5. She then filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration with an Affidavit of Desistance, which was
also denied. She then files a motion to be recommended to President Fidel V. Ramos for
executive clemency, also attached with the motion the Affidavit of Desistence.
6. The SC decided to resolve the appeal based on humanitarian reasons and the interest of justice.

ISSUES
1. W/N deceit was employed by accused when she issued checks to the private complainant? NO.
2. W/N good faith is a valid defense against Estafa by a Postdating a Check in violation of BP 22?
YES.
3. W/N the lack of notice of dishonor is requisite in convicting someone of Estafa or in violation of
BP 22? YES.

HELD
1. Deceit and damage are essential elements to the offense of Estafa and must be established by
satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. Prosecution failed to prove deceit in the case. The prima
facie presumption of deceit was rebutted by Ojeda's evidence of good faith (Ojeda's business
collapsed after EDSA revolution; she did her best in paying back the money by paying through
finished goods).
2. The Revised Penal Code was enacted to penalize unlawful acts accompanied by evil intent
denominated as crimes in mala in se. The principal consideration is the existence of malicious
intent. There is a concurrence of freedom, intelligence, and intent which together make up for
"criminal mind" behind the "criminal act". actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. No crime is
committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent.
3. In People vs. Pacana,
Evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime. Actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting
4. Notice of Dishonor is required under both par 2(d) Art 315 of RPC and Sec 2 of BP 22. Under
both laws, the notice is necessary for prosecution. Without proof of notice of dishonor,
knowledge of insufficient funds cannot be presumed and no crime can be deemed to exist. In the
 case at bar, there is an evident lack of notice of dishonor. Hence, Ojeda cannot be prosecuted
since it is against due process.

DECISION
The trial court decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Cora Abella Ojeda is ACQUITTED.

7. Motive and intent

Cases:
People vs. Hassan, GR No. L-68969, 22 January 1988 (Dela Rosa)
GR No. L-68969
22 January 1988
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondent: Usman Hassan

Facts:
● appeal of the decision of the RTC
● Usman, a 15-year-old pushcart cargador selling mangos, was accused of murder for stabbing to
death Ramon Pichel, an employed manager of the sand and gravel business of his father.
● Jose Samson, the lone eyewitness, was employed at sand and gravel business of the father of the
deceased. He was a backrider in the motorcycle of Ramon when they went to buy mangoes at
Fruit Pradise. While Jose was selecting mangoes, he saw a person stab Ramon who was seated at
his motorcycle. Jose saw that Ramon was stabbed only once and that after stabbing Ramon, the
person ran towards PNB building. Jose testified that he does not know the name of the person but
he can identify him by face. Jose also stated that the person stabbed Ramon from behind on his
chest.
● Jose positively identified Usman as the very person who stabbed the victim. Usman denied the
charges levelled against him and admitted ownership of said knife; claiming among other things
that he used said knife for slicing mangoes.

Issue:
Whether or not Usman Hassan is guilty of murdering Ramon Pichel? NO

Held:
● The testimony of Jose is weak and unconvincing. The testimony of Jose is contrary to what NBI
medico-legal officer stated — wherein Ramon was stabbed thrice and it was concluded that the
alleged accused was in front of Ramon.
● Usman was alone when presented to Samson by Corporal Carpio. There was no such police line-
up as the police investigator claimed on second thought.
● Usman has no criminal record. We note the total absence of motive ascribed to Usman for
stabbing Ramon, a complete stranger to him.
● As a general rule, motive is not essential in order to arrive at a conviction, however, for purposes
of complying with the requirement that a judgment of guilty must stem from proof beyond
 reasonable doubt, the lack of motive on the part of the accused plays a pivotal role towards his
acquittal. This is especially true where there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit as when the
identification is extremely tenuous, as in this case.
● Usman was convicted on the bases of the testimony of a lone eyewitness for the prosecution and
the sloppiness of the investigation conducted by the police investigator, Police Corporal Rogelio
Carpio, who also testified for the prosecution. We rule that Usman’s guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt and that Usman must therefore be set free.
● Decision is hereby reversed, accused Usman is acquitted. His release from confinement is hereby
ordered.

People v Temblor (G.R. No. L-66884, May 28, 1988) (Sungcad)

Ponente: Griño-Aquino, J.

FACTS

1. The accused was charged with the crime of murder for shooting to death Julius Cagampang. The
RTC ruled him guilty sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

2. At around 7:30pm of December 30, 1980, while Cagampang, his wife and children, were conversing
in their store beside their house, Temblor arrived and asked to buy cigarettes. As Cagampang opened a
pack of cigarettes, he was shot in the head by Temblor. The wife, upon seeing that her husband was shot,
shouted her husband’s name. 2 people, one of which she identified later on, barged into the store
demanding that she bring out her husband’s firearm. The accused fired two more shots at Cagampang.
The wife hurriedly got the maleta where the firearm was hidden and gave it to the two. They fled
afterwards.

3. Months later, the wife was summoned to the Police Station where she identified Temblor as the man
who killed her husband. Temblor stated that from 4pm on Dec 30, 1980 to 8pm the following day, he and
his father had been drinking in the house of Silverio Perol. The accused, admittedly, was a member of the
NPA.

4. During the trial, the wife recognized Temblor since he was less than a meter away from her while
they were in the inside of well-lit store. The testimony was corroborated by a tricycle driver who knew
Temblor by his alias, “Ronald.” The driver saw the accused at the store of Cagampang at about 7:30pm of
Dec 30, 1980. A post-moerem examination report certified that the victim was shot 3 times. A
certification of Nasipit Lumber Company’s (NALCO) personnel officer, and a DTR of Perol shows that
Perol was not at home drinking with the accused, but at work from 10:50pm of Dec 30, 1980 to 7am the
next day, rebutting the accused’s alibi.

ISSUES

1. W/N the court a quo erred in finding that he was positively identified as the killer of Cagampang?

2. W/N the court a quo erred in rejecting his defense of alibi?

3. W/N the accused had a motive for killing Cagampang?

DISPOSITION

RTC decision affirmed

RATIONALE

1. NO. The settled rule is that the TC’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses while testifying is
generally binding on the appellate court because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct and
demeanor and its findings. Despite some minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the wife, she did not
lose her credibility since she identified the accused as the killer, which was corroborated with other
witnesses.

2. NO. The prosecution witnesses had no motive to falsely accuse him of a crime. It is not enough that
the appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; it must be demonstrated beyond doubt
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Which was not proved since the
house of Perol is only 15-20 mins away by either jeep or tricycle.

3. YES. The defendant’s knowledge that Cagampang possessed a firearm was motive enough to kill him
as killings by members of the NPA for the purpose of acquiring more arms and ammunition for their
group are prevalent. Moreover, proof of motive is not essential when the culprit has been positively
identified.

Avecilla vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 46370, 2 June 1992 (Doctor)

Avecilla v. People
GR No. 46370 - 2 June 1992
Ponente: Romero, J.

Facts:
Nov. 16, 1971 - Antonio Avecilla and an unnamed woman allegedly stole a registered letter (valued at
500 USD) addressed to Lourdes Rodriguez de Lacson, his co-employee at Litton Mills, Inc. Upon
testimonies of the employees of the Mandaluyong post office, it appears that Avecilla brought the
unnamed woman who posed as Lacson to claim the letter. Avecilla claimed that he left the letter in
Lacson's office table but no one was present in the office at the time.

July 16, 1973 - The trial court found Avecilla guilty of simple theft.
Dec. 20, 1976 - The CA found Avecilla guilty of qualified theft and adds to the penalty originally
imposed by the lower court (8 times longer).

Avecilla claims that his right to due process was violated because of the different criminal offense that
was charged (from simple to qualified theft). He was not duly informed of such change in charge. He
claims that the elements of theft are not present as he had no knowledge of the contents of the letter, there
was no unlawful taking of the letter since he simply followed postal procedures. Because he had no
knowledge of the contents of the letter, there was no intent to gain from it (another element of theft).

Issue:
W/N there was a lack of motive on Avecilla's behalf? NO.
W/N the CA can convict him of a different charge? YES.

Held:
The crime of theft contains the following elements: a.) that there be taking of personal property, b.) that
said property belongs to another, c.) the taking be done with intent to gain, d.) the taking be done without
the consent of the owner, and e.) the taking be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation
against persons or force upon things. In the case, all five are present. Avecilla's contention that there was
no intent to gain because he did not know what the letter contained is incorrect. It can be assumed that
the fact that the letter was unlawfully taken shows such an intent or motive to gain from the letter.

Qualified theft, according to Art. 310 of the RPC is considered if the property stolen is mail matter.
Avecilla contends that not all registered mail are mail matter. However, Sec. 1945 of the RAC of 1917
includes letters as first class mail matter. Sec. 1962 of the same code established a registry system,
"under which the senders or owners of the registered matter may be indemnified for losses thereof in the
mails..." In this case, although the trial information alleges only simple theft, when brought up to the CA,
the same information given a new perspective points to qualified theft. "He may be convicted of a crime
and sentenced to the corresponding penalty as long as the facts alleged in the information and proved at
the trial constitute the crime for which he is convicted although different from the crime designated and
charged in the information."

Ruling:
CA ruling and sentence are CORRECT.

People vs. Del Rosario, GR No. 131036, 20 June 2001 (Dy)

8. Presumption of criminal intent; general and specific intent (See Rule 131, Section 3[b] of the Rules of
Court)

Cases:
US v Elviña (G.R. No. L-7280, February 13, 1913) (Sungcad)
Ponente: Moreland, J.
FACTS
1. The accused was a municipal treasurer of San Juan de Guimba, Nueva Ecija who had in his
possession various properties and sums of money pertaining to his office, and allegedly maliciously and
criminally disposed of said properties and money for the sum of P2,505.61, and refused to render an
account of the same in spite of having it required by the District Auditor to do so.
2. The sum of P2,505.61 was actually paid by him and that such payments were made under resolutions
of the municipal board authorizing him to do so. The basis for this proceeding is that he didn’t furnish to
the auditor such vouchers and proofs of the payments conceded to have been made as the auditor thought,
under the law he was required to have.
ISSUES
1. W/N the Information is sufficient to charge misappropriation of public funds?
DISPOSITION
Judgement is reversed, accused ACQUITTED.
RATIONALE
1. NO. The accused is a treasurer, and under & in accordance with resolutions of the municipal council
authorizing him to make such payments, he has performed his duty in good faith. The elements making
up the crime of misappropriation of funds are lacking. There is no criminal intent. There is no conversion
of the money to the use of the accused. There is no deprivation of the municipality of its funds.
2. The absence of the sum P2,505.61 is also proof that the accused has paid out the said money in the
interest and benefit of the Municipality. If he failed to provide the kind of proof required by law, it
doesn’t necessarily mean he is criminal (Honest Mistake). He could be liable civilly, but not criminally.
3. To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made by statute, be accompanied by
criminal intent, or by such negligence to duty or consequences, which is equivalent in law to criminal
intent. Actus non facit reum nisi mens rea - “a crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of be innocent”

Recuerdo vs People
GR 168217 June 27, 2006
Justice Callejo, Sr.
FACTS:
In 1994, three separate Criminal Informations were issued, charging Joy Lee Recuerdo of estafa.
Recuerdo, according to the Informations, issued fake checks as payment for jewelry allegedly purchased
from Yolanda Floro. Recuerdo’s checks were all dishonored because they have been drawn against closed
accounts. When Floro informed Recuerdo that the checks were invalid, Recuerdo continued to decline to
pay for the jewelry. Recuerdo was convicted of estafa by the trial court. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the
conviction, but modified the penalty. Recuerdo filed a motion for reconsideration to the CA, saying that
out of 17 checks she issued to Recuerdo, 9 were honored. Furthermore, she made partial payments to the
checks while the case was pending in the CA. Finally, citing People vs Ojeda, she argued that she should
be acquitted because she acted in good faith when she drew and delivered the checks for payment. The
CA denied this motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition was filed to the SC.
ISSUES:
- W/N Recuerdo is guilty of estafa (YES)
RULING:
- The crime of estafa has three basic elements, according to Article 315 of the RPC: (1) postdating
or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted simultaneously at the time the check
was issued, and (2) this issuance was done when the offender had no funds in the bank, and (3)
damage was done to the payee. These elements were sufficiently established by Floro’s testimony.
The prosecution also satisfactorily established that the checks were issued by the accused to the
complainant in exchange for the jewelry, and as a result of the invalidated checks, Floro suffered
damages. Furthermore, the prima facie evidence of estafa- that the drawer of the check failed to
deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three days from receipt of notice of dishonor-
was also established.
- On Good Faith: Since estafa is a felony by dolo, intent is needed for conviction. Good faith as a
defense against estafa could be manifested by the accused’s offering to make arrangements with his
creditor to make up for the invalid checks. Recuerdo argues that since she started making partial
payments while the case was pending in the CA, good faith should apply to her. Yet, it must be
considered that Recuerdo stringently refused to pay Floro at first. It was only when the case was
pending in the CA that she started making partial payments. As such, her defense of good faith came
in too late. It is not good faith, but the threat of a long prison sentence, that prompted Recuerdo to
make partial payments.
- Judgment of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
US vs Catolico
No. 6486 March 2, 1911
Justice Moreland
FACTS:
In 1909, Judge Rafael Catolico had before him sixteen civil cases commenced by Juan Canillas
against sixteen distinct individuals. All of these cases were for damages stemming from a breach of
contract. Catolico ruled in favor of Canillas. The defendants in these cases soon appealed, and in
accordance with law deposited P16 each (16 cases, so total of P256), at the same time giving a bond of
P50. Canillas soon demonstrated to Catolico that the sureties on the bonds were insolvent. As a result,
Catolico dissolved the bonds and required the defendant-appellants to post another bond within 15 days.
When none of the defendant-appellants posted any bond, Catolico dismissed the appeals. He ordered that
the P256 deposited by the defendant-appellants be delivered to him in satisfaction of the said judgments.
Catolico soon ordered this sum to be attached and delivered to Canilllas, at the same time requiring
Canillas to pay a bond of P50 for each attachment. The attorney for the defendant-appellants soon filed a
complaint against Catolico in the CFI, by virtue of which the court ordered Canillas to deliver to the clerk
of the Court the P256 deposited by the defendant-appellants. Catolico was convicted of malversation of
public funds by the Court of First Instance. He thus brought the appeal to the SC.
ISSUES:
- W/N Catolico is guilty of malversation of public funds (NO)
RULING:
- Catolico did not convert the money to his own use or to the use of any other person. Everything
he did was done in good faith. The fact that he ordered the P256 sums and he delivered the same
sums to Canillas in satisfaction of the judgment cannot be considered malversation. He believed, in
good faith, that after the appeals were dismissed and the judgment became final, the sums deposited
were subject to be applied in payment of the judgments of the actions in which the said sums had
been deposited.
- To constitute a crime, the act must generally be accompanied with criminal intent. Criminal
intent is absent in the case at bar. The only wrong Catolico did was that he delivered the P256 deposit
to the plaintiffs in the said cases. This appears to be a pure mistake of judgment. There is no
presumption of criminal intent in this case because presumption of criminal intent only arises from a
criminal act. In this case, the act is definitely not criminal, hence, there is no presumption of criminal
intent.

People vs. Delim, GR No. 142773, 28 January 2003 (Yao)

Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines
Accused-Appellants: Marlon, Leon, Manuel (at large), Robert (at large), and
Ronald (all surnamed DELIM)
Ponente: Callejo, Sr, J.

FACTS
1. Marlon, Manuel, and Robert Delim are brothers. They are uncles of Leon and Ronald Delim. The
victim named Modesto Manalo Bantas, an Igorot and a carpenter, took the surname of Delim
after he was adopted by the father of Marlon, Manuel, and Robert. His wife Rita and son Randy
continued using Manalo Bantas as their surname.
 2. On January 23, 1999 in the evening at Brgy. Bila, Sison, Pangasinan, Modesto Delim was eating
supper with Rita, Randy, and Modesto's 2 grandchildren. Marlon, Robert, and Ronald all armed
with short firearms barged into the house and closed the door. Ronald simultaneously grabbed
and hog-tied the Modesto. a piece of cloth was placed in his mouth. The 3 herded Modesto out of
the house.
3. Leon and Manuel, also armed with short firearms stayed put by the door and ordered Rita and
Randy to stay in the house. As the 3 brought Modesto away, Leon and Manuel stayed until
7:00am before they left.
4. Randy immediately called for help after the 2 lookouts left. He went to his uncle Darwin Niño
and informed the latter of the incident. Randy opted to first look for his father. 2 days later Randy
along with his relatives found the cadaver of his dead father at the housing project where the
latter used to work. They immediately went to the police to report the incident and seek
assistance.
5. Police investigators sought for the arrest of the 5 involved. Police were able to confirm that the 5
had no licenses to their firearms.
6. To exculpate themselves, Marlon, Ronald, and Leon interposed denial and alibi. The RTC
rendered judgement convicting the Marlon, Ronald, and Leon for aggravated murder (treachery,
taking advantage of superior strength, nighttime, and use of unlicensed firearms as aggravating
circumstances). Marlon, Ronald, and Leon appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE
1. W/N accused also committed kidnapping when they abducted Modesto from his home? NO.
2. W/N accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt? YES.
3. W/N conspiracy between the accused existed? YES.

HELD
1. Specific Intent is used to describe the state of mind which exists where circumstances
indicate that and offender actively desired certain criminal consequences or objectively
desired, a specific result to follow his act or failure to act. The primary and ultimate purpose of
the accused is to kill the victim. the incidental deprivation of the victim's liberty does not
constitute the felony of kidnapping but is merely a preparatory act to the killing, and hence, is
merged into, or absorbed by, the killing of the victim. The crime committed would be homicide
or murder, not kidnapping.
2. The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct
evidence or by circumstantial evidence. In this case, prosecution adduced the requisite quantum
of proof of corpus delicti. Modesto sustained 5 gunshot wounds, and sustained 7 defensive
wounds. Prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence. It is the proof of collateral facts and
circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and
common experience. Prosecution used testimonies of Rita and Randy, of officers who arrested the
3 out of 5 accused, the doctor who did the autopsy. These testimonies corroborated each other.
3. Leon despite being a lookout is equally guilty because of conspiring with the other accused to kill
Modesto. Conspiracy is when 2 or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit
it notwithstanding their roles in the crime. Act of 1 is the act of all.
DECISION
Decision of the trial court AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of HOMICIDE. (Aggravating circumstances of treachery, superior numbers, nighttime were not proven
by evidence prosecution. The use of unlicensed firearms was NOT considered since it was NOT alleged
in the Information when it was raised to the SC)

People vs. Del Rosario, GR No. 131036, 20 June 2001 (Dy)

Petitioner: People of the PH
Respondent: Donato Del Rosario

Facts: Case is an appeal from the decision of RTC Olongapo regarding homicide and robbery case against
respondent, sentencing him to reclusion perpetual.

On or about Sept. 26, 1992, Donato Del Rosario willfully and feloniously took, with intention to gain
from, jewelry amounting to P10,700 belonging to Elemita Paraguay. Also on occasion of robbery, he
killed Emelita’s niece, Raquel Lopez, by strangling her with a CATV wire.

On that morning at around 8am, Emelita left her house with a companion to go to the public market. Her
Niece was left at home and had no classes because it was a Saturday. Emerita was notified that her house
was on fire. Upon returning home she found some of her possessions burning and found her dead niece,
head covered with a raincoat.

Inquiries were made and a certain Ramon Ilagan was interrogated but no evidence was found against him.
3 days after the incident, Ilagan’s live in partner sent information to the police that Donato Del Rosario as
seen at the back of Paragua’s house before the crime was committed.

On Oct. 2 1992, Olongapo city police received information that Del Rosario surrendered to PO Morales,
his brother in law of his wife. Del Rosario said that he surrendered because he was bothered by his
conscience. Then accompanied by the police, he lead them to pawnshops where he sold the jewelry he
stole. Gamboa, the pawnshop owner, and Adriano, the person who Del Rosario sold a stolen watch to,
both clearly identified him.

Del Rosario was brought the Olongapo Police station and was assigned a lawyer. On Sept. 26, 1992,
respondent released a statement and it was different from what happened: He presented alibi’s on what
happened the 26th of September, that he went to Zambales to buy containers for his vinegar and Clorox
business and that he stayed overnight with a certain Rancen Anonat. The following day he went to his
wife. On the 28th he went to navotas and returned to subic the next day. On the 30th he stayed with
Fernando Morales, brother in law of his wife, of whom he received the information that he was accused
of the said robbery. Del Rosario said that he was persuaded by Morales to place himself in custody of the
police which he did. Then he said that the police beat him and forced him to admit he committed the
arson. Based on evidence, lower court still found him guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua of
40 years + 100k as payment. Respondent Appeals.
Issue: W/N it was errouneous of the trial court to convict appellant of complex crime of robbery with
homicide. No

Held: SC found the appeal to be unmeritous. Donato Del Rosario believes that he was indicted of robbery
with homicide without sufficient evidence to prove such.

1. Elements of robbery with homicide, a crime against property, was established. That there was
taking of personal property by force, that property belonged to someone else, that there is animus
lucrandi or intent to gain and that on commission of robbery, homicide was committed in its
generic sense. Animus lucrandi is the presumed motive for any robbery crime, unless
circumstances show otherwise. In this case, it was proven that robbery was done to gain because
stolen jewelry was pawned/ sold and that the pawnshop owner and the person who bought
jewelry identified the accused.
2. With respect to homicide, it was clear that accused killed Paragua’s niece because she was in the
way of the robbery. Arson was a ruse to cover up the crime.
3. To say that his original testimony was forced by police from him cannot be taken seriously. First,
he voluntarily surrendered himself, confessed to the crime and even helped validate information
by pointing out the pawnshop where he sold the jewelry he stole. Also, accused-appellant signed
a waiver, assisted by Atty. deal Cruz, that says “Na ako ay kusang sumuko sa Pulisya noong ika-
02 ng Oktubre 1992 dahil sa nakokonsensiya ako sa nagawa kong pagpatay kay Raquel Lopez at
pagnanakaw at pagsunog ko sa bahay nila”; A confession to be admissible must be: express and
categorical; given voluntarily, and intelligently where the accused realizes the legal significance
of his act; with assistance of competent and independent counsel; in writing, and in the language
known to and understood by the confessant; and signed, or if the confessant does not know how
to read and write, thumbmarked by him. Without any irregulaties present, the waiver is held
valid.
4. Court does not believe that respondent was mauled for him to confess. Accusations of
maltreatment were not sufficient in standing view of cases People vs. Mada-I Santalani; People
vs. Balane; and People vs. Villanueva; where defendants did not present evidence of compulsion,
or violence on their person; where they failed to complain to the officer who administered their
oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged
intimidators for maltreatment + that upon examination of a qualified physician, no marks or
evidences of maltreatment were found.

Evidences provided in RTC were held.

Decision: Conviction of appellant is affirmed. But modifications for indemnity from 100k to 50k. So
ordered.