Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 130316             January 24, 2007

ERNESTO V. YU and ELSIE O. YU, Petitioners,

vs.
BALTAZAR PACLEB,1 Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

The present petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court originated from an action for forcible
entry and damages filed by petitioners Ernesto and Elsie Yu against respondent Baltazar Pacleb.

The antecedent facts follow.

Sometime in September 1992, Ruperto Javier allegedly offered to sell Lot No. 6853-D to petitioners
for P75 per sq.m.  The lot was approximately 18,000 square meters and was located in Barangay
lawphil.net

Langkaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite. Javier supposedly purchased the lot from one Rebecca del Rosario
who, in turn, acquired it from respondent and his wife. The title of the property (Transfer Certificate of
Title [TCT] No. T-118375), however, remained in the names of respondent and his wife. The
instruments in support of the series of alleged sales were not registered.

On September 11, 1992, petitioners accepted the offer and gave Javier P200,000 as downpayment
for the lot. Javier then delivered his supposed muniments of title to petitioners. After the execution of
a contract to sell, he formally turned over the property to petiti oners.

At the time of the turn-over, a portion of the lot was occupied by Ramon C. Pacleb, respondent’s
son, and his wife as tenants. On September 12, 1992, Ramon and his wife allegedly surrendered
possession of their portion to petitioners. Later on, petitioners appointed Ramon as their trustee over
the subject lot.

Aside from taking possession of the property, petitioners also caused the annotation on TCT No. T-
118375 of a decision rendered in their favor in Civil Case No. 741-93. 2 This decision attained finality
on April 19, 1995.

Petitioners alleged that they exercised ownership rights as well as enjoyed open, public and
peaceful possession over the property from September 12, 1992 until the early part of September
1995. During this time, respondent was in the United States.

Upon respondent’s return to the Philippines in May 1995, he allegedly entered the property by
means of force, threat, intimidation, strategy and stealth thereby ousting petitioners and their trustee,
Ramon.

Despite repeated demands, respondent, asserting his rights as registered owner of the property,
refused to vacate the premises and surrender its possession to petitioners.
Petitioners filed an action for forcible entry 3 in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Dasmariñas, Cavite
on November 23, 1995. Respondent filed an answer with compulsory counterclaim dated December
8, 1995. After the issues were joined, the MTC required the submission of the parties’ position
papers at a preliminary conference on March 11, 1996. Respondent failed to comply.

On June 17, 1996, the MTC ruled:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the [respondent] and other persons claiming right under him
are hereby ordered to surrender physical possession of Lot No. 6853-D in favor of the [petitioners]
and to pay the sum of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P25,000.00) PESOS as attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED.4

On appeal,5 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite rendered a decision affirming the MTC
decision in toto.6

Respondent elevated his case to the Court of Appeals (CA)7 which rendered the assailed decision
on March 18, 1997:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision dated October 25, 1996 of the [RTC] of
Imus, Cavite in Civil Case No. 052-96 and the Decision of the [MTC] of Dasmariñas, Cavite in Civil
Case No. 182 are SET ASIDE; and Civil Case No. 182 for Forcible Entry and Damages is hereby
ordered DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.8

In a resolution dated August 20, 1997, the CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration for lack
of merit.

Before us now come petitioners who claim that the appellate court erred in finding that respondent
had prior physical possession of the subject property. lawphil.net

"In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession of the land or
building and that he was deprived thereof by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth."9 The plaintiff, however, cannot prevail where it appears that, as between himself and the
defendant, the latter had possession antedating his own. 10 We are generally precluded in a Rule 45
petition from reviewing factual evidence tracing the events prior to the first act of
spoliation.11 However, the conflicting factual findings of the MTC and RTC on one hand, and the CA
on the other, require us to make an exception.

We overrule petitioners’ contentions.

The Civil Code states that possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. 12 In the
grammatical sense, to possess means to have, to actually and physically occupy a thing, with or
without right.13 "Possession always includes the idea of occupation x x x. It is not necessary that the
person in possession should himself be the occupant. The occupancy can be held by another in his
name."14 Without occupancy, there is no possession.15

Two things are paramount in possession.16 First, there must be occupancy, apprehension or taking.
Second, there must be intent to possess (animus possidendi).17
Here, petitioners failed to establish that they had prior physical possession to justify a ruling in their
favor in the complaint for forcible entry against respondent.

In the decision in Civil Case No. 741-93 (a case for specific performance and damages against
Javier, the alleged vendor of the lot in question) upon which petitioners based their right to possess
in the first place, the trial court categorically stated:

The [petitioners were never placed] in possession of the subject property on which [was]
planned to be [site of] a piggery, nor [were they] given a clearance or certification from the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer.18 (emphasis ours)

The claim that the lot was turned over to petitioners in 1992 was self-serving in the face of this
factual finding. On the other hand, the tax declarations and receipts in the name of respondent in
1994 and 1995 established the possession of respondent. 19 The payment of real estate tax is one of
the most persuasive and positive indications showing the will of a person to possess in concepto de
dueño or with claim of ownership.20

"[P]ossession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square
meter of the ground before he is deemed in possession." 21 In this case, Ramon, as respondent’s son,
was named caretaker when respondent left for the United States in 1983. 22 Due to the eventual loss
of trust and confidence in Ramon, however, respondent transferred the administration of the land to
his other son, Oscar, in January 1995 until his return in May 1995. 23 In other words, the subject land
was in the possession of the respondent’s sons during the contested period.

Petitioners cite an alleged document (Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at

Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan) dated March 10, 1995 executed by them and Ramon to
prove a turn over of possession. They also seek to prove their exercise of rights over the land
through alleged frequent visits and the designation of Ramon as their own trustee as declared in a
joint affidavit attached to their position paper filed with the MTC. These instruments, however, fail to
convince us of petitioners’ actual occupancy of the subject land. First, petitioners themselves
acknowledged that Ramon and his wife occupied part of the land as tenants of respondent. Second,
Ramon, a mere tenant, had no authority to sign such document dated March 10, 1995 waiving all
rights to the land. Third, there was no clear proof in the records of the appointment of Ramon as
petitioners’ trustee save their self-serving statements to this effect. Finally, at the time
the Kusangloob na Pagsasauli document was executed, the caretaker of the land was no longer
Ramon but Oscar.24

Most important, the title of the land in question (TCT No. T-118375) remained in the name of
respondent.25 "As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the property,
which is one of the attributes of ownership."26 The Civil Code states:

Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities
except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the
present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if
the dates of the possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if all these conditions
are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or
ownership through proper proceedings.

In view of the evidence establishing respondent’s continuing possession of the subject property,
petitioners’ allegation that respondent deprived them of actual possession by means of force,
intimidation and threat was clearly untenable. In Gaza v. Lim, we held that:
Where a dispute over possession arises between two persons, the person first having actual
possession is the one who is entitled to maintain the action granted by law; otherwise, a mere
usurper without any right whatever, might enter upon the property of another and, by allowing
himself to be ordered off, could acquire the right to maintain the action of forcible entry and detainer,
however momentary his intrusion might have been.27

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated March
18, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42604 is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ERNESTO V. YU and ELSIE O. YU, Petitioners,

vs.BALTAZAR PACLEB, Respondent.
ERNESTO V. YU and ELSIE O. YU, Petitioners, vs.BALTAZAR PACLEB, Respondent.
NATURE OF THE CASE: This petition was filed to set aside the decision made by the
Court of Appeals in ruling that the respondent has the better right over the subject
property and is the true owner thereof.

FACTS: Respondent Baltazar Pacleb and his late first wife, Angelita Chan, are the
owners of parcel of land in Langcaan, Dasmarinas, Cavite covered by a transfer
certificate of title.
Sometime in September 1992, Ruperto Javier offered the said land to spouses Ernesto
and Elsie Yu. Javier claimed that he purchased the property from Rebecca Del Rosario
who bought it from spouses Baltazar Pacleb and Angelita Chan. Despite the alleged
sales being unregistered, the spouses Yu accepted the offer and made a down payment
and entered into an Agreement for the sale of the property. After giving the amount, the
spouses Yu discovered that a portion of the property was tenanted by Ramon Pacleb,
one of the respondent's sons. The petitioners then demanded the cancellation of their
agreement and the return of their initial payment.
Javier then made arrangements with Ramon to vacate the property and to pay Ramon
for his disturbance compensation. With that, Javier and the spouses YU proceeded to
enter into a Contract to Sell. But, Javier failed to comply with his obligations. So, on
April 23, 1993, the petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for specific performance
and damages against Javier to compel Javier to deliver to them ownership and
possession, and the title to the property.
            However, Javier did not appear in the proceedings and was declared in default,
so, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. The decision and its
Certificate of Finality were annotated in the title of the property.
            On March 10, 1995, the petitioners and Ramon and his wife entered into an
agreement that the spouses will pay Ramon P500,000 in exchange for the waiver of his
tenancy rights over the land.
            On October 12, 1995, the respondent filed a Complaint for annulment of deed of
sale and other documents arising from it claiming that the deed of sale supposedly
executed between him and his late first wife and Del Rosario was spurious and the
signatures were forged. He also moved for the summons to be served upon Del Rosario
via publication since her address cannot be found, but was denied. So, respondent
moved to dismiss the case which was granted by the trial court.
            On November 23, 1995, the petitioners filed an action for forcible entry against
the respondent with the MTC. They contend that they had prior physical possession
over the property through their trustee Ramon Pacleb, until the respondent ousted them
in September 1995. The MTC and the RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, but the
Court of Appeals set aside the decisions of the lower courts. The CA decided that it was
the respondent who had prior physical possession of the property which was shown by
his payment of real estate taxes thereon.
            On May 29, 1996, respondent filed an instant case for removal of cloud from title
with damages alleging that the deed of sale between him and his late first wife could not
have been executed on the date appearing thereon. He claimed that he was residing in
the US at that time and that his late first wife died 20 years ago.
            On May 28, 1997, while the case was still pending, the respondent died, hence,
he was substituted by his surviving spouse and some of his children.
            On December 27, 2002, the respondent's case was dismissed and the
petitioners were held to be purchasers in good faith. The trial court also held that the
petitioners' action for specific performance against Javier was already final, and the trial
court also ordered the respondents' heirs and all other persons claiming under  them to
surrender the possession of the property to the petitioners. Upon appeal by the
respondent, the CA reversed the trial court's decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the action for specific performance filed by the petitioners against Javier
is not merely an action in personam, but an action in rem, and is thus, conclusive and
binding upon respondent even if he was not a party thereto since it involves a question
of possession and ownership of real property.
                                                                                                        
HELD: The action for specific performance and damages filed by petitioners against
Javier to compel him to perform his obligations under their Contract to Sell is an action
in personam.
The purpose of the action is to compel Javier to accept the full payment of the purchase
price, and to execute a deed of absolute sale over the property in favor of the
petitioners. The obligations of Javier mentioned attach to Javier alone and do not
burden the property. Thus, the complaint filed by the petitioners is an action in
personam and is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded therein and duly
heard or given an opportunity to be heard. So, the action cannot bind the respondent
since he was not a party therein and considering the fact that his signature and that of
his late first wife were forged in the deed of sale. Hence, the petition is denied and the
Court affirms the ruling of the CA finding the respondent having a better right over the
property as the true owner thereof.
TALUSAN VS. TAYAG
Not Cited Recently
THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 133698, April 04, 2001 ANTONIO TALUSAN AND CELIA
TALUSAN, PETITIONERS, VS. HERMINIGILDO* TAYAG AND JUAN HERNANDEZ,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

For purposes of real property taxation, the registered owner of a property is deemed the
taxpayer and, hence, the only one entitled to a notice of tax delinquency and the
resultant proceedings relative to an auction sale. Petitioners, who allegedly acquired the
property through an unregistered deed of sale, are not entitled to such notice, because
they are not the registered owners. Moral lessons: real property buyers must register
their purchases as soon as possible and, equally important, they must pay their taxes
on time.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the November 20, 1997 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV
No. 41586. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision is hereunder reproduced
as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision (dated February 4, 1993)

of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 7) in Baguio City in Civil Case No. 1456-R is hereby
AFFIRMED, with costs against plaintiffs/appellants."
Also assailed is the April 27, 1998 CA Resolution [2]which denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.

The questioned CA ruling affirmed the Decision [3] of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Baguio City in Civil Case No. 1456-R. The RTC, in turn, dismissed an action
for the annulment of the auction sale of a condominium unit, covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 651 and located in Building IV, Europa Condominium Villas,
Baguio City.

The Facts
The CA summarized the antecedents of this case in this wise: [4]

"On June 28, 1988, [herein petitioners] filed a complaint wherein they alleged, inter
alia, that:

--They bought the subject property covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No.
651, from its former owner, Elias Imperial, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale:
--On October 15, 1985, `[herein Respondent] Juan D. Hernandez, x x x sued x x x in his
capacity as City Treasurer of Baguio City, wrote a letter to the former owner Elias
Imperial informing him that the above described property would be sold at public
auction on December 9, 1985, x x x to satisfy the delinquent real estate taxes, penalties
and cost of sale, and demanded payment of the sum of P4,039.80, representing total
taxes due and penalties thereon;

--`Elias Imperial and his entire family emigrated to Australia in 1974.' Elias Imperial
never authorized `a certain Dante Origan x x x to receive any letter or mail matter for
and on his behalf;'

--[Respondent] Hernandez sold the above-described property to [Respondent] Tayag

for P4,400.00 `without any notice to the former owner thereof, [or] to [petitioners], and
without compliance with the provisions of PD No. 464, as evidenced by the Certificate
of Sale;'

--A final bill of sale was later issued `in favor of the [Respondent] Hermenegildo Tayag.'
The assessed value alone of the said property is P37,310.00 and the fair market value
of the same is more than P300,000.00 and both [respondents] knew these;

--The bid price of P4,400 `is so unconscionably low and shocking to the conscience,'
thus, the sale `for the alleged unpaid taxes in the sum of P4,039.79, including penalties'
is `null and void  Ab Initio;'

--`[Petitioners] have been in actual possession of the Unit in question, since they bought
the same from its former owners, and their possession is open, public, continuous,
adverse and in the concept of owners, while [Respondent] Hermegildo Tayag has never
been in possession of the said property;'

--[Petitioners] through intermediaries offered `to pay to the [respondents] the sum of
P4,400 plus all interests and expenses which [they] might have incurred x x x but said
offer was rejected without any just [or] lawful cause.'

There is a need to issue a writ of preliminary  Injunction to `preserve the status quo.'

They asked for: moral damages of not less than P50,000.00; exemplary damages of not
less than P20,000.00; attorney's fee of P30,000.00, plus appearance fee of P2,000.00
for every appearance; and litigation expenses of not less than P5,000.00 to prosecute
the case. (pages 3-8 of the Record)

On July 14, 1988, [Respondent] Hermenegildo Tayag filed his [A]nswer with
[C]ounterclaim (pages 28-32 of the Record), wherein he substantially denied the
allegations in the complaint and, at the same time, raised the following affirmative
defenses, among others:
--`(T)he ownership of the Condominium unit registered under Condominium Certificate
of Title No. 651, Baguio City, has been consolidated in his name by virtue of the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Branch 6, on September 16, 1987 x x x .
The said decision has [become] final and executory as evidenced by the Certificate of
Finality issued on October 8, 1987;'

--[Petitioners have] no cause of action against him, he being a `buyer in good faith in a
regular and lawful public bidding in which any person is qualified to participate.'

--The lower court has no jurisdiction over [petitioners'] claim `because the [petitioners]
pray for the annulment of the Certificate of the Sale and the Final Bill of Sale, which was
affirmed by virtue of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Branch 6, on
September 16, 1987 x x x. The said decision has [become] final and executory as
evidenced by the Certificate of Finality issued on October 8, 1987;'

--The public auction sale complied with `the requirements of Presidential Decree No.
464' - hence, the same is `lawful and valid:'

--`[Respondent] Tayag is not bound by the alleged [D]eed of [S]ale in favor of the
[petitioners] by Elias [I]mperial, because it was not registered and recorded with the
Registry of Deeds of Baguio City.'

[Respondent] Tayag then prayed for the award in his favor, of: moral damages of at
least P50,000.00; exemplary damages; attorney's fees in the sum of P10,000.00; and,
expenses of litigation.

[Respondent] Hernandez likewise filed an [A]nswer on July 18. 1988, wherein he

denied the material averments in the complaint and stated that `no irregularity or
illegality was committed in the conduct of the proceedings with respect to the delinquent
real property of Elias Imperial and the actuations of the defendant herein were all within
the limits of his authority and in accordance with the provisions of the law pertaining to
delinquent real property, particularly, P.D. 464 otherwise known as the Real Property
Tax Code and therefore, no damages may be imputed against him.' He also claimed, by
way of affirmative defenses, that:

--The complaint states no cause of action against the [respondent] herein:

--`[Petitioners] have not complied with x x x Section 83 of P.D. No. 464 x x x thus, the
case cannot prosper;'

--`Granting that a Deed of Sale was actually issued in favor of the plaintiffs [because of]
the fact that it is unregistered, the same does not bind third persons including defendant
herein.'"
In their Complaint, petitioners alleged that on December 7, 1981, they had acquired the
condominium from Elias Imperial, the original registered owner, for P100,000. The sale
was purportedly evidenced by a Deed of Sale which, however, had not and thenceforth
never been registered with the Register of Deeds.

Petitioners also averred that on December 9, 1985, Baguio City Treasurer Juan
Hernandez sold the property at a public auction due to nonpayment of delinquent real
estate taxes thereon. The property was sold to Respondent Herminigildo Tayag for
P4,400 which represented the unpaid taxes.

Thus, petitioners filed a Complaint seeking the annulment of the auction sale. They
cited irregularities in the proceedings and noncompliance with statutory requirements.

Dismissing the Complaint, Branch 7 of the RTC of Baguio City cited the December 16,
1987 judgment of Branch 6 of the same court in LRC Adm. Case No.207-R. This earlier
Branch 6 Decision had consolidated ownership of the condominium unit in favor of
Respondent Tayag. The Branch 7 Decision also cited the May 31, 1988 Order of
Branch 5 of the same court which had granted a Petition for the Cancellation of
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 651 in the name of Elias Imperial and directed the
Register of Deeds to issue a new Certificate of Title in the name of Respondent Tayag.
According to the trial court, the Decision in LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R had already
upheld the legality of the questioned auction sale. Hence, to rule again on the same
issue would amount to passing upon a judgment made by a coequal court, contrary to
the principle of "conclusiveness of judgment."

Ruling of the CA
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling and ratiocination. The CA explained
that LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R had already ruled on the validity of the auction sale of
the subject condominium unit. It further sustained the validity of that sale, because the
city treasurer complied with the requirements of notice, publication and posting. It added
that "[i]f [petitioners] never received the notices sent to Elias Imperial, then they have
only themselves to blame for failing to register the deed of sale between them and the
former owner x x x."

Rejecting petitioners' contention that the purchase price was inadequate, the CA ruled
that such inadequacy could not nullify the auction sale. It likewise held that petitioners
had not established bad faith on the part of respondents in conducting the auction sale.
Finally, it agreed with the latter's contention that the former were "remiss in causing the
registration of the sale in their favor of the subject property and they likewise did not
fulfill their obligation to pay taxes. It [is] thus clear x x x they should only have
themselves to blame. Laws exist to be followed, failing in which the price must be paid."

Hence, this recourse.[5]

The Issues
Petitioners assigned the following alleged errors for the consideration of this Court: [6]

"I. FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in failing to consider that the
petitioners were deprived of their right to due process in this case due to the gross and
inexcusable negligence of their former counsel who failed to inform them of the decision
in this case and protect their interest.

"II. SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in failing to nullify the auction sale of
the subject property of petitioners due to alleged tax delinquency when there was no
compliance with the mandatory requirement of Section 46 of P.D. 464 that such notice
of delinquency of the payment of the property tax should be published.

"III. THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in failing to consider the lack of
personal notice of the sale for public auction of the subject property to its owner which
nullifies the said proceeding.

"IV. FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in holding that the decision of the trial
court in the petition for the consolidation of the title case filed by the private respondent
in LRC Admin. Case 207 is a bar to this proceeding.

"V. FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not nullifying the auction sale of subject
property on equitable considerations."
We deem it appropriate to simplify the issues in this wise: (1) whether the RTC Decision
in LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R is a bar to this proceeding; and (2) whether the auction
sale of the subject condominium unit should be annulled on the grounds of (a) non-
publication of the notice of delinquency for the payment of property tax, (b) lack of
personal notice of the sale or public auction of the subject property and (c) equitable
considerations. As a preliminary matter, we shall also consider petitioners' submission
that they were deprived of due process because of their counsel's failure to inform them
immediately of the receipt of the CA Decision.

Preliminary Matter:
Negligence of Petitioners' Former Counsel
Petitioners aver that their former counsel informed them of the CA Decision only on
February 5, 1998, more than two months after he had received a copy on December 3,
1997. According to petitioners, their former counsel's negligence effectively deprived
them of their right to due process.

We disagree. Notwithstanding its late filing, their Motion for Reconsideration was
accepted and considered by the CA. Hence, this issue has become moot, a fact which
petitioners themselves admitted in their Memorandum: "As a matter of fact, in the very
resolution of the Court of Appeals of April 27, 1998 (Annex `C' to Petition) denying the
motion for reconsideration, wherein the matter of inexcusable negligence of counsel in
not informing petitioners immediately of the decision of the court a quo, were among the
grounds thereof, it was held that the issues raised therein had already been considered
in the Decision of November 20, 1997. The Court of Appeals obviously considered that
the Motion for Reconsideration was validly filed by petitioners so that the Court of
Appeals favorably considered the plea of petitioners to be afforded due process by
acting on the Motion for Reconsideration. Otherwise, it could have just denied said
Motion for late filing or simply noted the same without action." [7]

Moreover, petitioners themselves declared in their Reply Memorandum [8] that this matter
is no longer in issue: "At any rate this issue was raised in the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision of the appellate court and obviously it was favorably
considered as the said Court denied the merit of said Motion by stating that the issues
raised have already been treated in the Decision, instead of outrightly denying the same
for late filing. Hence, this is no longer in issue in this proceeding." [9]

First Issue:
Bar by Earlier Judgment
Petitioners contend that the Decision in LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R, rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City (Branch 6), did not preclude the filing of a separate
action to annul the auction sale. Citing Tiongco v. Philippine Veterans Bank,[10] they aver
that this RTC Branch had no jurisdiction to rule on the validity of that sale. Hence, its
Decision in the LRC case cannot bar the present proceedings.

Petitioners' reliance on Tiongco is misplaced, considering that its factual incidents are
different from those of the present controversy. In that case, the trial court was acting on
a Petition for the Surrender of Certificates of Title. In LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R, the
trial court was faced with a Petition for Consolidation of Ownership. It had jurisdiction to
rule on all matters necessary for the determination of the issue of ownership, including
the validity of the auction sale.

Indeed, this Court in several cases[11]has previously declared that a petition for the
surrender of the owner's duplicate certificate involves contentious questions which
should be threshed out in an ordinary case, because the land registration court has no
jurisdiction to try them.

Presidential Decree (PD) 1529, however, intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to
promote the expeditious termination of cases. In more recent cases, [12] therefore, the
Court declared that this Decree had eliminated the distinction between general
jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the latter's limited jurisdiction when
acting merely as a land registration court. Land registration courts, as such, can now
hear and decide even controversial and contentious cases, as well as those involving
substantial issues.[13]
Thus, petitioners err in contending that the RTC is, in a land registration case, barred
from ruling on the validity of the auction sale. That court now has the authority to act not
only on applications for original registration, but also on all petitions filed after the
original registration of title. Coupled with this authority is the power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. [14] Especially where
the issue of ownership is ineluctably tied up with the question of registration, the land
registration court commits no error in assuming jurisdiction. [15]

It is equally important to consider that a land registration court's decision ordering the
confirmation and the registration of title, being the result of a proceeding In Rem, binds
the whole world.[16] Thus, the trial court's ruling consolidating the ownership and the title
of the property in the name of herein respondent is valid and binding not only on
petitioners, but also on everyone else who may have any claim thereon.

Second Issue:
Validity of the Auction sale
Petitioners contend that the auction sale was invalid, because several requisites
regarding notice and publication were not satisfied. We are not convinced.

It has been held that matters of notice and publication in tax sales are factual questions
that cannot be determined by this Court.[17] Moreover, a recourse under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, as in this case, generally precludes the determination of factual issues.
This Court will not, as a rule, inquire into the evidence relied upon by the lower courts to
support their findings.[18] In this case, the CA had already ruled on the question of
compliance with the requirements of notice and publication in this wise:

"In the case at bench, it cannot be denied that the requirements of notice, publication
and posting have been complied with by the public defendant prior to the auction sale
wherein the subject condominium unit was sold. x x x Ergo, there was nothing irregular
in the questioned public auction -- thus, the validity of the same must be upheld in
accordance with the aforementioned cases." [19]
The CA ruling notwithstanding, we shall proceed to discuss these factual issues in order
to assure petitioners of a complete adjudication of their case, and not a mere disposition
of procedural technicalities.

The Non-Publication of Notice

of Real Property Tax Delinquency

Petitioners assert that the tax sale should be annulled because of noncompliance with
the requirement of publication prescribed in Section 65 of PD 464.

In this regard, we note that unlike land registration proceedings which are In Rem, cases
involving an auction sale of land for the collection of delinquent taxes are In
Personam. Thus, notice by publication, though sufficient in proceedings In Rem, does not
as a rule satisfy the requirement of proceedings In Personam.[20]As such, mere publication
of the notice of delinquency would not suffice, considering that the procedure in tax
sales is In Personam. It was, therefore, still incumbent upon the city treasurer to send the
notice of tax delinquency directly to the taxpayer in order to protect the interests of the
latter.

In the present case, the notice of delinquency was sent by registered mail to the
permanent address of the registered owner in Manila. In that notice, the city treasurer of
Baguio City directed him to settle the charges immediately and to protect his interest in
the property. Under the circumstances, we hold that the notice sent by registered mail
adequately protected the rights of the taxpayer, who was the registered owner of the
condominium unit.

For purposes of the real property tax, the registered owner of the property is deemed
the taxpayer. Hence, only the registered owner is entitled to a notice of tax delinquency
and other proceedings relative to the tax sale. Not being registered owners of the
property, petitioners cannot claim to have been deprived of such notice. In fact, they
were not entitled to it.

Lack of Personal Notice of the Sale

or of the Public Auction of the Subject Property

Petitioners also contend that the registered owner was not given personal notice of the
public auction. They cite Section 73 of PD 464, the pertinent portion of which is
reproduced hereunder:

"x x x. Copy of the notices shall forthwith be sent either by registered mail or by
messenger, or through messenger, or through the barrio captain, to the delinquent
taxpayer, at the address shown in the tax rolls or property tax records of the
municipality or city where the property is located, or at his residence, if known to said
treasurer or barrio captain. x x x." (Underscoring supplied by petitioners in their
Memorandum)
According to petitioners, the notice of public auction should have been sent to the
address appearing in the tax roll or property records of the City of Baguio. That address
is Unit No. 5, Baden #4105, Europa Condominium Villas, Baguio City; not the known
address or residence of the registered owner at 145 Ermin Garcia Street, Cubao,
Quezon City. They contend that notice may be sent to the residence of the taxpayer,
only when the tax roll does not show any address of the property.

The above-cited provision, however, shows that the determination of the taxpayer's
address to which the notice may be sent is the treasurer's discretionary prerogative. In
this case, the city treasurer deemed it best to send the notice of public auction to the
residence of the taxpayer. The former validly exercised this option, inasmuch as the
address of the latter was known to him. Moreover, it was more practical and favorable to
the registered owner that the notice of delinquency be sent to his permanent residence
in Manila, because he was using the subject condominium unit merely as a vacation
house and not as a residence.
This Court in Pecson v. Court of Appeals[21]made a clear and categorical ruling on the
matter, when it declared as follows:

"Under the said provisions of law, notices of the sale of the public auction may be sent
to the delinquent taxpayer, either (I) at the address as shown in the tax rolls or property
tax record cards of the municipality or city where the property is located or (ii) at his
residence, if known to such treasurer or barrio captain." (emphasis supplied)
To reiterate, for purposes of the collection of real property taxes, the registered owner of
the property is considered the taxpayer. Although petitioners have been in possession
of the subject premises by virtue of an unregistered deed of sale, such transaction has
no binding effect with respect to third persons who have no knowledge of it.

The importance of registration and its binding effect is stated in Section 51 of the
Property Registration Decree or PD 1529, which reads:

"Sec. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. - An owner of registered
land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in
accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms, deeds, mortgages, leases or
other voluntary instrument as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease or
other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or effect registered
land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as
a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Registry of
Deeds to make registration.

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land
insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the
registration shall be made in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or the
city where the land lies."
Thus, insofar as third persons are concerned, it is the registration of the deed of sale
that can validly transfer or convey a person's interest in a property. [22] In the absence of
registration, the registered owner whose name appears on the certificate of title is
deemed the taxpayer to whom the notice of auction sale should be sent. Petitioners,
therefore, cannot claim to be taxpayers. For this reason, the annulment of the auction
sale may not be invoked successfully.

The Annulment of the Auction Sale

on Equitable Considerations

As correctly pointed out by respondents, equitable considerations will not find

application, if the statutes or rules of procedure explicitly provide for the requisites and
standards by which the matters at bench can be resolved.

While it may be assumed that both petitioners and Respondent Tayag are innocent
purchasers of the subject property, it is a well-settled principle that between two
purchasers, the one who has registered the sale in one's favor has a preferred right
over the other whose title has not been registered, even if the latter is in actual
possession of the subject property.[23]
Likewise, we cannot help but point out the fact that petitioners brought this misfortune
upon themselves. They neither registered the Deed of Sale after its execution nor
moved for the consolidation of ownership of title to the property in their name. Worse,
they failed to pay the real property taxes due. Although they had been in possession of
the property since 1981, they did not take the necessary steps to protect and legitimize
their interest.

Indeed, petitioners' suit is now barred by Laches.[24] The law helps the vigilant, but not
those who sleep on their rights, for time is a means of obliterating actions. Verily, time
runs against the slothful and the contemners of their own rights. [25]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and

Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Corporate Law Case Digest: Roman Catholic
Apostolic Administrator Of Davao V. LRC (1957)
G.R. No. L-8451 December 20, 1957

Lesson Applicable: Exploitation of Natural Resources (Corporate Law)

FACTS:

October 4, 1954: Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of the City of Davao, executed a deed of
sale of a parcel of land in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc.(Roman), a
corporation sole organized and existing in accordance with Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a
Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent.

The Register of Deeds of Davao for registration, having in mind a previous resolution of the CFI in
Carmelite Nuns of Davao were made to prepare an affidavit to the effect that 60% of the members of
their corp. were Filipino citizens when they sought to register in favor of their congregation of deed of
donation of a parcel of land, required it to submit a similar affidavit declaring the same.

June 28, 1954: Roman in the letter expressed willingness to submit an affidavit but not in the same tenor
as the Carmelite Nuns because it had five incorporators while as a corporation sole it has only one and it
was ownership through donation and this was purchased

As the Register of the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) : Deeds has some doubts as to the
registerability, the matter was referred to the Land Registration Commissioner en consulta for resolution
(section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151)

LRC:

In view of the provisions of Section 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution, the vendee was
not qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines in the absence of proof that at least 60 per
centum of the capital, property, or assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc.,
was actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens, there being no question that the present
incumbent of the corporation sole was a Canadian citizen

ordered the Registered Deeds of Davao to deny registration of the deed of sale in the absence of proof
of compliance with such condition

action for mandamus was instituted by Roman alleging the land is held in true for the benefit of the
Catholic population of a place

ISSUE: W/N Roman is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands in the Philippines pursuant to the
provisions of Article XIII of the Constitution
HELD: YES. Register of Deeds of the City of Davao is ordered to register the deed of sale

A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one at a time), in
some particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal capacities and
advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have had.

In this sense, the king is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, or dens, distinct from their several chapters

corporation sole

composed of only one persons, usually the head or bishop of the diocese, a unit which is not subject to
expansion for the purpose of determining any percentage whatsoever

only the administrator and not the owner of the temporalities located in the territory comprised by said
corporation sole and such temporalities are administered for and on behalf of the faithful residing in the
diocese or territory of the corporation sole

has no nationality and the citizenship of the incumbent and ordinary has nothing to do with the
operation, management or administration of the corporation sole, nor effects the citizenship of the
faithful connected with their respective dioceses or corporation sole.

Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership should be
composed of Filipino citizens. (Register of Deeds of Rizal vs. Ung Sui Si Temple)

undeniable proof that the members of the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith within the territory of Davao
are predominantly Filipino citizens

presented evidence to establish that the clergy and lay members of this religion fully covers the
percentage of Filipino citizens required by the Constitution

fact that the law thus expressly authorizes the corporations sole to receive bequests or gifts of real
properties (which were the main source that the friars had to acquire their big haciendas during the
Spanish regime), is a clear indication that the requisite that bequests or gifts of real estate be for
charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, was, in the opinion of the legislators, considered
sufficient and adequate protection against the revitalization of religious landholdings.

as in respect to the property which they hold for the corporation, they stand in position of TRUSTEES
and the courts may exercise the same supervision as in other cases of trust

Labels: 1957, Case Digest, Corporate Law, Corporate Law Case Digest, December 20, Exploitation of
Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-8451, Juris Doctor, Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v.
LRC
RD OF RIZAL vs. UNG SIU SI TEMPLE DIGEST
DECEMBER 21, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

G.R. No. L-6776 May 21, 1955

THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL, petitioner-appellee,

vs.

UNG SIU SI TEMPLE, respondent-appellant.

FACTS: The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to accept for record a deed of
donation executed in due form on January 22, 1953, by Jesus Dy, a Filipino citizen, conveying a
parcel of residential land, in Caloocan, Rizal, known as lot No. 2, block 48-D, PSD-4212, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 11267, in favor of the unregistered religious organization “Ung Siu Si Temple”,
operating through three trustees all of Chinese nationality. The donation was duly accepted by
Yu Juan, of Chinese nationality, founder and deaconess of the Temple, acting in representation
and in behalf of the latter and its trustees.

CFI upheld the action of the Rizal Register of Deeds. Basis: sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the
Constitution of the Philippines limiting the acquisition of land in the Philippines to its citizens, or
to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital stock of which is owned
by such citizens adopted after the enactment of said Act No. 271, and the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Krivenko vs. the Register of Deeds of Manila, the deed of donation
in question should not be admitted for admitted for registration.

Not satisfied with the ruling of the Court of First Instance, counsel for the donee Uy Siu Si
Temple has appealed to this Court, claiming: (1) that the acquisition of the land in question, for
religious purposes, is authorized and permitted by Act No. 271 of the old Philippine
Commission, providing as follows:

SECTION 1. It shall be lawful for all religious associations, of whatever sort or denomination,
whether incorporated in the Philippine Islands or in the name of other country, or not
incorporated at all, to hold land in the Philippine Islands upon which to build churches,
parsonages, or educational or charitable institutions.

SEC. 2. Such religious institutions, if not incorporated, shall hold the land in the name of three
Trustees for the use of such associations; . . .. (Printed Rec. App. p. 5.)

and (2) that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates the freedom of religion clause of our
Constitution [Art. III, Sec. 1(7)].

ISSUE: whether a deed of donation of a parcel of land executed in favor of a religious

organization whose founder, trustees and administrator are Chinese citizens should be
registered or not.

HELD:

The provisions of Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission must be deemed repealed since
the Constitution was enacted, in so far as incompatible therewith. In providing that, —

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or

assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain in the Philippines,

the Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious associations.

The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not suffice to escape
the Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its members are of foreign nationality. To
permit religious associations controlled by non-Filipinos to acquire agricultural lands would be
to drive the opening wedge to revive alien religious land holdings in this country.

The resolution appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

CASE DIGEST: Krivenko vs. The Register of Deeds, City of
Manila G.R. No. L-360 November 15, 1947
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appelant, vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA,
respondent and appellee.

FACTS: Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot in December of 1941. The registration was
interrupted by war. In 1945, he sought to accomplish the registration but was denied by the register of
deed on ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land within the jurisdiction. Krivenko appealed to
the Court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land?

2. Whether or not the prohibitions of the rights to acquire residential lot that was already of private
ownership prior to the approval of this Constitutions is applicable at the case at bar?

RULING:

1. NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the Constitution states that: All agricultural, timber, and
mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. This means to say that, under the provisions of the
Constitutions, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or residential lands in the
Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the
fundamental law became effective are null and void per se and ab initio.

2. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which
granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity. It is to be observed that the
pharase "no land" used in this section refers to all private lands, whether strictly agricultural, residential
or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been acquired by any of the means
provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in
effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the
Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber,
dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire private land merely
by way of reciprocity.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 91189 November 27, 1992

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.

SAMUEL BUYCO and EDGAR BUYCO, represented by their

attorney-in-fact, RIEVEN H. BUYCO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In its Decision of 5 February 1985, 1 Branch 82 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Odiongan, Romblon
granted the application of the private respondents, who are American citizens, to bring within the
operation of the Land Registration Act a parcel of land with an area of 3,194,788 square meters
(319.4788 hectares) which spreads across the barangays of Canduyong, Anahao and Ferrol in the
municipality of Odiongan, Province of Romblon, and to confirm their title thereto.

Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals; he alleged therein that the trial court erred (a)
in not declaring the private respondents barred by the Constitution from applying for registration
because they are American citizens and are thus disqualified from acquiring lands in the Philippines, (b)
in holding that private respondents had established proprietary rights over the land even before
acquiring American citizenship through naturalization, and (c) independently of the issue of alienage, in
not dismissing the application for registration on the basis of the private respondents failure to
overthrow, by conclusive or well-nigh incontrovertible proof, the presumption that the land applied for
is public land belonging to the State. 2

In its Decision of 21 November 1989 in CA-G.R. CV No. 05824, 3 public respondent dismissed the appeal
"for lack of merit."4

Petitioner consequently filed this petition on 11 January 1990 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Reiterating the issues he raised before the respondent Court, he seeks a review and reversal of the
latter's decision. 5
In the Resolution of 11 July 1990, this Court gave due course to the petition after the filing by the private
respondents of their Comment to the same and by the petitioner of his reply thereto. 6 On 17 April 1991,
the parties were required to file their respective Memoranda. 7

The records disclose the following material operative facts and procedural antecedents:

A certain Charles Hankins, an American who was married to Laura Crescini and who resided in
Canduyong, Odiongan, Romblon, died on 31 May 1937 leaving a will (Exhibit "N"). He was survived by his
widow; his son Alexander and William; and his grandchildren Ismael Samuel and Edgar, all surnamed
Buyco, who are the legitimate issues of his deceased daughter Lilia and her husband Marcelino Buyco.
The will was submitted for probate before the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Romblon. Charles Hankins' son Alexander was appointed administrator of the estate in Special
Proceedings No. 796.

Laura Crescini died on 22 December 1941.

It appears that in a Project of Partition dated 25 June 1947 (Exhibit "O") and submitted to the probate
court in the aforesaid Special Proceedings No. 796, one of the properties of Charles Hankins described as
"a parcel of pastureland, riceland and coconut land containing an area of about 250 hectares, 21 ares
and 63 untares . . . assessed at for P6,950.00 as per Tax Declaration No. 15853," was partitioned among
his heirs as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

TO LAURA C. HANKINS, . . .

(a) 157 acres . . . comprised in what is known as Carabao Pastureland and Milk-Cow Pasture. (This land is
a portion of the land described in tax declaration N0. 15853 . . .)

xxx xxx xxx

TO ALEXANDER HANKINS, . . .

(a) 80 acres of land (pasture) which is a portion of the land described in Tax declaration No. 15853 . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

TO LILIA HANKINS, . . .

(a) 100 acres of pastureland situated in the barrio of Canduyong and which is a portion of the entire
parcel described in tax declaration No. 15853 . . . .

(b) 25 acres of pasture land situated in the barrio of Canduyong and which is a portion of the entire
parcel described in tax declaration No. 15853.

xxx xxx xxx

TO WILLIAM B. HANKINS, . . .

(a) 100 acres of pastureland situated in the barrio of Canduyong and which is a portion of the entire
parcel described in tax declaration No. 15853 . . . .

(b) 25 acres of pasture land situated in barrio Anajao and which is a portion of the entire parcel
described in tax declaration No. 15853 . . . . 8

The total area so adjudicated is 487 acres, or 197.086 hectares (1 hectare = 2.471 acres)

On 30 July 1948, Laura's share in the estate of her husband Charles was partitioned among her children.
Alexander and William, and her grandchildren, Ismael, Samuel and Edgar who were represented by their
father Marcelino Buyco (Exhibit "P"). Thereafter, on the same date, William sold his hereditary shares in
the estate of his parents to Marcelino Buyco (Exhibit "R").

On 20 August 1962, Marcelino Buyco donated to his children the property acquired from William
together with other properties (Exhibit "S").

On 8 September 1970, the Buyco brothers partitioned among themselves the properties acquired by
inheritance from their grandparents and by donation from their father (Exhibit "T"). However, Ismael
waived his right to his share therein in favor of Samuel, one of the private respondents in this case.

Edgar and Samuel Buyco became naturalized American citizens on 29 January 1972 and 12 September
1975, respectively.

On 14 October 1967, Edgar and Samuel, through their attorney-in-fact, Rieven H. Buyco, filed before the
then Court of First Instance of Romblon an application for the registration of a parcel of land, described
as follows:

A parcel of land (Lot I, under surveyed for the heirs of Lilia Hankins situated in the barrios of Canduyong,
Anahao and Ferrol, Municipality of Odiongan, province of Romblon, Tablas Island under PSU 127238)
LRC Record No. ________: Bounded on the North by properties of the heirs of Rita Fiedacan and
Alexander Hankins; on the Northeast, by Canduyong River and property of Alexander Hankins; on the
East, by properties of Andres Cuasay, Escolastica Feruelo, Candido Mendoza, Raymundo Goray, Pedro
Goray, Manuel Yap, Feliza Fedri and Silverio Mierculecio; on the Southeast, by properties of Candido
Mendoza, the Heirs of Benita Formilleza Silverio Mierculecio, Zosimo Llorca, Lot 2, and properties of
Beatrice Hankins and Zosimo Llorca; on the West, by properties of Maria Llorca and Miguel Llorca; and
on the Northwest, by property of Catalino Fabio. Point "I" is S. 33 deg. 24"., 4075.50 m. from B.L.L.M. 1,
Odiongan, Romblon. Area THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED NINETY FOUR THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
EIGHTY EIGHT (3,194,788) SQUARE METERS, more or less as Exhibit "C". 9

which they claim to own in fee simple as they acquired the same by inheritance and donation inter vivos.
However, they allege in paragraph 9 of the application that should the Land Registration Act be
inapplicable, the benefits provided for under C.A. No. 141, as amended, be made to extend to them
since both they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession thereof since time
immemorial. The application was docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-48 LRC Record No. N-51706.

The above description is based on a survey plan prepared by private land surveyor Santiago Español in
1950 (Exhibit "C") and subsequently approved by the Director of Lands. While in their application,
private respondents invoked the provisions of the Land Registration Act, 10 they eventually sought for a
confirmation of imperfect title pursuant to paragraph (b), Section 48 of the Public Land Act 11, as further
amended by P.D. No. 1073.

While only the herein petitioner filed an opposition thereto, the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP) manifested that the portion of the property pertaining to Samuel Buyco is covered by a mortgage
in its favor. After the jurisdictional facts had been established during the initial hearing and a general
order of default entered against all other parties, the lower court designated the Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Odiongan as commissioner to receive the evidence for the parties. Samuel Buyco, William
Hankins, Manuel Firmalo and Jacinta Gomez Gabay (who was 83 years old when she took the witness
stand in October 1979) testified for the applicants. The first two (2) recounted the history of the tract of
land up to the time of the abovementioned partitions and the alleged possession of the entire area by
the applicants (private respondents herein).

On 5 February 1985, the land registration court handed down a Decision 12 the dispositive portion of
which reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court hereby orders the registration of title to the parcel of land
designated as Lot No. 1 Psu-127238 and its technical description together with all the improvements
thereon, in the name of the herein applicants, recognizing the interest of the Development Bank of the
Philippines to be annotated on the certificate of title to be issued as mortgagee for the amount of
P200,000.00 with respect to the share of applicants (sic) Samuel H. Buyco.

Upon the decision become (sic) final let the corresponding decree and certificate of title be issued
accordingly.

The favorable decision is based on the court's conclusion that:

The oral and documentary evidence indubitably show applicants and their predecessors-in-interest —
their grandparents Charles Hankins and Laura Crescini, to their uncle Alexander Hankins, to them thru
their administrators Gregorio Gabay and later Manuel Firmalo — have possessed the property herein
sought to be registered in the concept of owners thereof, and such possession has been continuous,
uninterrupted, adverse, open and public for a period of more than eighty years. And their right over the
property is duly recognized by the adjoining owners in their individual affidavits marked as Exhibits "V",
"V-1" to "V-21", inclusive. Moreover, none of the adjoining owners filed any opposition to the herein
land registration case, thereby indubitably showing their recognition of the correctness of the boundary
(sic) between their individual lots and that of applicants land subject of this registration.
The late Charles Hankins declared said land for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 15853
(please see description of lot in Exh. "N") and thereafter in the name of applicants and/or their father
Marcelino Buyco since 1949 up to the present time (Exhs. "W", "W-1" to "W-19").

Applicants have also paid the real estate taxes thereon since 1948 up to the present time (Exhs. "X", "X-
1" to "X-194").

In 1950, the land of applicants was surveyed by Private Surveyor Santiago Español and its exact metes
and bounds were determined with accuracy in his survey plan PSU-127238 (Exh. "C"). This survey
corrected the impreciseness of the land area as mentioned in the several instruments –– the will, project
of partition, deed of partition, deed of sale (Exhs. "N", "O", "P", and "R") — under which applicants
acquired the land in question. The correctness of this survey is further shown by the fact that none of
the other heirs, like Alexander Hankins nor (sic) the adjoining owners ever made a claim over any
portion of the lot shown in said Psu-127238.

The land in question has been primarily devoted to cattle grazing (sic) and to the cultivation of rice and
coconut and it was (sic) the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have (sic) been reaping the
fruits thereof.

The evidence further show (sic) that applicants can rightfully and did validly acquire title and ownership
over the land in question because they were then Filipino citizens, their father Marcelino Buyco being a
Filipino citizen himself (please see personal circumstances of Marcelino Buyco in Exhs. "P" and "R") and
their modes of acquisition — by inheritance, intestate succession, and donation inter-vivos — are all
legally recognized modes to transfer ownership to them from their predecessors-in-interest.

Since time immemorial, applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have exercised all the attributes of
dominion and absolute ownership over the land in question, and have therefore established their vested
proprietary rights and registrable (sic) title over the land in question, rights which they have acquired
long before they became citizens of the United States (Edgar Buyco became a U.S. citizen only on
January 29, 1972; while Samuel H. Buyco, only on September 12, 1975. As a matter of fact, applicant
Samuel H. Buyco mortgaged in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines (Exhs. "U", "U-1" and
"U-2") the portion belonging to him in Lot 1, Psu-127238.

From the foregoing evidence it has been satisfactorily established that the applicants have acquired an
imperfect and incomplete title over the parcel of land subject of this registration proceedings in their
own right as citizens of the Philippines so as to entitle them to a confirmation and registration of said lot
in their names. Consequently Section II, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to this case,
neither (sic) does this case fall under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 713. 13

More specifically, the conclusion regarding possession is based on the testimonies of Manuel Firmalo,
William Hankins and Jacinta Gomez Gabay which, as summarized by the court, are as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Witness Manuel Firmalo testified that from 1970 to 1978 he was the administrator, of the property of
applicants; that the said property is located in the Barrios of Anahao, Canduyong, and Tubigon (now
forming part of the municipality of Ferrol) and the same is shown in the survey may marked as Exh. "C"
(Psu-127238); that said lot is separated from the adjacent properties by concrete monuments, big tress
and some barb (sic) wire fence (sic); that previous to his administration thereof, the same property was
administered by his father-in-law, Gregorio Gabay; . . . that during his administration, a large part of the
land was devoted to cattle grazing and a little portion, to coconut (sic) which are now fruit bearing; that
when he took over the administration of the ranch, there was a total of 120 heads of cattle and at the
time of termination of his administration there were 300 heads; that from time to time, some cattle in
the ranch were sold by him and he rendered an accounting to the applicants, the owners of the ranch;
that he employed cowhands to help him ran (sic) the ranch of applicants and the salaries of said
cowhands were paid out of the funds of applicant Samuel Buyco from the sale of the cattle; that the
proceeds of the coconuts harvested, the money was (sic) deposited with the bank and a portion was
used for the payment of the real estate taxes on the land; that during his administration no third person
ever claimed ownership over applicants land; that he was the one who procured the execution of the
affidavits of adjoining owners (Exhs. "V", "V-1" to "V-21") which were used to support the real estate
mortgage with the DBP over said land; that from the proceeds of the sale of the copra harvested from
the land of applicants,. he paid the real estate taxes thereon specifically the taxes covered by Exhs. "X-
83" to "X-144"; . . . that his administration over said land was adverse, open continuous and public.

William Hankins, then 72 years old and resident (sic) of Odiongan, Romblon, testified . . .; that ever since
he was still a small kid, he know (sic) that the big tract of land subject of their partition was already
owned by his father (Charles Hankins); that the possession of his father was in the concept of owner,
continuous, adverse, public, and open, up to his (Charles Hankins) death; that after receiving his
hereditary share from the estates of his father and mother, he sold his said shares to Marcelino Buyco,
father of applicants by executing a Deed of Sale (Exh. "R") dated July 30, 1948; that during the lifetime of
Charles Hankins; the big tract of land was devoted primarily to cattle grazing and to coconut and rice;
that after he sold his hereditary share of (sic) Marcelino Buyco, the latter took possession of his said
portion; that after Marcelino Buyco died, the property of Marcelino Buyco (including his share (sic)
hereditary share sold under Ex. (sic) "R") was transmitted to his children, namely: Edgar H. Buyco, Ismael
Buyco and Samuel H. Buyco (Samuel and Edgar Buyco, the (sic) applicants herein); that he known that at
present the owners in possession of the property subject of this registration proceedings are applicants
Samuel Buyco and Edgar Buyco; that the said land is devoted to cattle grazing and planted with coconuts
and rice.

xxx xxx xxx

Jacinta Gomez Gabay, 83 years (as of October, 1979) . . . testified that she knew the spouses Charles
Hankins and Laura Crescini because since the time she can remember, she stayed with said spouses up
to the (sic) their death (sic); that having stayed with the Hankins couple, she knew of their properties
because she lived with them in Canduyong where the property was situated; that the property is a big
tract of land; . . . that when she was living with the Hankins spouses, said spouses already owned and
were in possession of this big tract of land, and this land was fenced off with barbed wires, and that said
big tract of land has been used for grazing purposes since she reached the age of reason up to the
present time; that during all the time that she has been with said Hankins spouses, nobody ever claimed
any portion thereof; that this property extended from barrio Canduyong up to barrio Anahao; that after
Charles Hankins died, his property was divided among his children Alexander Hankins, William Hankins
and Lilia Hankins and the latter's share was received by her children named Ismael, Samuel and Edgar all
surnamed Buyco; that before Charles Hankins' estate was partitioned it was placed under the
administration of Alexander Hankins (one of the heirs); that after the partition, the portion (sic) that
went to the Buyco children (as heirs of Lilia Hankins) were administered by her husband Gregorio Gabay;
that her husband's administration over said property started 3 or 4 years after the war which (sic) lasted
25 years or until Gregorio Gabay died; that his son-in-law Manuel Firmalo took over the administration
of applicants' property; that the land she was referring to is utilized as a pasture land and it has been a
pasture since the time it was it was owned by spouses Charles Hankins and Laura Crescini up to the
present time; that Edgar, Samuel and Ismael, all surnamed Buyco have been receiving the fruits of the
portion that went to Lilia Hankins; that Charles Hankins' possession of that big tract of land was in the
concept of owner, continuous, adverse, open and public; that a portion of this big tract of land went to
Edgar H. Buyco, Samuel H. Buyco and Ismael H. Buyco as the heirs of Lilia Hankins; that the possession of
the said heirs of the late Lilia Hankins over the portion that went to them was in the concept of owner,
continuous, adverse, open and public up to the present time; that as far as she can remember the
Hankins family possessed said property for more than eighty (80) years. 14

The land registration court also summarized the testimony of private respondent Samuel H. Buyco as to
possession in this wise:

Applicant Samuel H. Buyco testified that he was 51 years of age, . . .; that prior to the death of his
grandfather Charles Hankins, that big parcel of pastureland was about 500 to 550 hectares, the
boundaries of which were marked off by concrete monuments, some big trees, some big stones until it
was partitioned in 1948, and to fix the actual boundaries, the land was surveyed by private surveyor
Español (Exh. "D"); that during the lifetime of their grandfather Charles Hankins this big land was
primarily used as a ranch and it was fenced off by barb (sic) wires to prevent the cattle from getting out;
that after the death of his grandfather Charles Hankins, the property was administered by his uncle
Alexander Hankins, and such administration was terminated when there was a partition in 1948 in
accordance with the will of his grandfather; that during the administration of the property by Alexander
Hankins, this property was used as a cattle ranch, even during the Japanese time; that after receiving
their share form the partition of the estate, they initially planted rice and coconut and later on they
reverted to cattle ranch operation (sic); that after he and his brother Edgar became the possessor (sic) of
said land, they were the one (sic) who have been harvesting the fruits of the land; that they did not
personally managed (sic) the land but hired in 1949 the services of Mr. Gregorio Gabay to administer the
estate for them until 1970 when the latter died, and Manuel Firmalo was hired to take over the
administration until 1977 when applicant took over active management of the property because he
obtained a loan of P200,000.00 from the Development Bank of the Philippines; . . . that the land was
declared in their name (sic) for taxation purposes by their administrator Gregorio Gabay in 1949 (Exhs.
"W", "W-1" to "W-19", inclusive) and that the taxes thereon were paid out of their own money since
1948 up to the present (Exhs. "X", "X-1" to "X-194", inclusive); that applicants' possession in the concept
of owner over the property sought to be registered has been open, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse
and
public. 15

As earlier adverted to petitioner's appeal from the said decision was dismissed by the public respondent
for lack of merit. As to the private respondents' title to the land subject of the application, public
respondent makes the following findings:

Undisputably, applicant-appellees anchored their title to the land in question by means of hereditary
succession as well as donation from their own father, Marcelino Buyco, who purchased the entire
hereditary share of William Hankins (Exhs. "R"). Subsequently, applicants-appellees and their brother,
Ismael, partitioned their hereditary share from their grandparents, the spouses Hankins, including the
property donated by their father, Marcelino Buyco, in an instrument dated September 8, 1970 (Exh.
"T"). In this partition, the share of Ismael H. Buyco went to applicant-appellee Samuel H. Buyco (Exh. "T-
1").

From the records extant in this case, it is Our considered view that from almost (sic) time immemorial or
a period of eighty (80) years, applicant-appellees through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
actual, continuous, and peaceful possession of the property in question so that the inescapable
conclusion is that all along it is private land and had been segregated from the dominion (sic) of the
State. Thus, We sustain the conclusion reached by the court a quo  that the latter (applicants-appellees)
thru their predecessors-in-interest have acquired title by acquisitive prescription over the same. . . . 16

As to the issue of the private respondents citizenship, public respondent held that:

. . . it is beyond per adventure (sic) of doubt that applicants-appellees were still Filipinos when they
acquired their title thereto. From the death of their grandfather Charles Hankins on May 31, 1937,
applicants-appellees right of succession was already vested. Moreover, as early as the year 1962, their
father Marcelino Buyco transferred his title thereto by donation inter-vivos so that on September 8,
1970, when the Buyco brothers partitioned the property in question, among themselves, they could
validly register the same as they already possess the necessary qualifications to have their title perfected
under the Torrens system of registration. 17

The petition is meritorious.

As could be gleaned from the evidence adduce, the private respondents do not rely on  fee
simple  ownership base on a Spanish grant or possessory information title under Section 19 of the Land
Registration Act; the private respondents did not present any proof that they or their predecessors-in-
interest derived title from an old Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or royal; (b) the "concession
especial" or special grant; (c) the "composicion con el estado"  title or adjustment title; (d) the  "titulo de
compra" or title of purchase; and (e) the "informacion posesoria" or possessory information title, which
could become a "titulo gratuito" or gratuitous title.18 The primary basis of their claim is possession, by
themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial. The land registration court and
the public respondent are of the opinion, and so held, that the private respondents had this in their
favor. Thus, both courts declared that the land applied for had been segregated from the public domain
and had become private land.

If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in possession since time immemorial,
the rulings of both courts could be upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho vs.  Director of Lands; 19

. . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify
the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain even before the Spanish
conquest. (Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. ed., 594.) 20 The applicant does not
come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began
in 1880.

This exception was reiterated in Susi vs. Razon, 21 where the first possessor was in possession was in
possession for an undetermined period of time prior to 1880. We stated therein:

. . . In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established, in

paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, 22 amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical
possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly,
continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land
under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the
land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had
become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of
Lands.

Although this additional pronouncement was rippled by the ruling Manila Electric Co.  vs.  Castro-
Bartolome 23, to the effect that land would cease to be public only upon the issuance of a certificate of
title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, 24 and that a piece of
land over which an imperfect title is sought to be confirmed remains public, this Court, speaking through
then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, in  Director of Lands vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court,  25 reiterated the Cariño and  Susi  doctrine, thus:

The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling
in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as
enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, 26 is that alienable public land held by a possessor,
personally or through his predecessor-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is covered to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.

It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public
land and (b) his possession, in the concept abovestated, must be either since time immemorial, as ruled
in both Cariño and Susi, or for the period prescribe in the Public Land Act. As to the latter, this Court,
in Gutierrez Hermanos vs.  Court of Appeals, 27 adopted the rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals, per
then Associate Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., now a distinguished member of this Court, that an applicant
for registration under Section 48 of the Public Land Act must secure a certification from the Government
that the lands which he claims to have possessed as owner for more than thirty (30) years are alienable
and disposable. It is the burden of the applicant to prove its positive averments.

In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove that the property subject of
the application is an alienable and disposable parcel of land of the public domain. On the contrary,
based on their own evidence, the entire property which is alleged to have originally belonged to Charles
Hankins was pasture land. According to witness Jacinta Gomez Gabay, this land has been pasture land,
utilized for grazing purposes, since the time it was "owned" by the spouses Charles Hankins and Laura
Crescini up to the present time (i.e., up to the date she testified). In Director of Lands vs.  Rivas, 28 this
Court ruled:

Grazing lands and timber lands are not alienable under section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution
and sections 8, 10 and 11 of Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. Section 10 distinguishes strictly
agricultural lands  (disposable) from grazing lands (inalienable).

The instant application was filed, heard and decided under the regime of the 1973 Constitution.

As to the second matter to be proved, the applicant must present evidence of an imperfect title such as
those derived from the old Spanish grants. He may also show that he has been in continuous, open and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership and for the period prescribed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act. 29 Simply put, a person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the basis of
possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and convincing
evidence; he should not rely on the weakness of the evidence of the
oppositors. 30 This rule is certainly not new. In the 1913 case of Maloles vs.  Director of Lands,  31 this
Court already held that in order that a petitioner may be entitled to have a parcel of land registered
under the Torrens system, he has to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple, of the
said land; moreover, it is the duty of the court, even in the absence of any oppositor, to require the
petitioner to show, by a preponderance of the evidence and by positive and absolute proof, so far as it is
possible, that he is the owner in fee simple of the land in question.

In Santiago vs.  de los Santos, 32 this rule was to find anchorage in policy considerations based no less on
one of the fundamental objectives of the Constitution, namely the conservation and utilization of our
natural resources. We held in the said case that there would be a failure to abide by its command if the
judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate. This Court then
set the quantum of evidence needed to be established by the applicant, to wit: well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence.

In the instant case, private respondents evidence miserably failed to establish their imperfect title to the
property in question. Their allegation of possession since time immemorial, which was conceded by the
land registration court and the public respondent, is patently baseless. There is an evident failure to
comprehend the meaning and import of the term immemorial. As defined, immemorial simply means
beyond the reach of memory, 33 beyond human memory, or time out of mind. 34 When referring to
possession, specifically "immemorial possession," it means possession of which no man living has seen
the beginning, and the existence of which he has learned form his elders. 35 Such possession was never
present in the case of the private respondents. The trial court and the public respondent based the
finding of the more than eighty (80) years of possession by the private respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest on the sole testimony of Mrs. Gabay who was eighty-three (83) years old when
she testified in October of 1979. Thus, she must have been born in 1896. If the asserted possession
lasted for a period of more than eighty (80) years at the time she testified the same must have
commenced sometime in 1899, or at the time that she was barely three (3) years old. It is quite
impossible that she could fully grasp, before coming to the age of reason, the concept of possession of
such a big tract of land and testify on the same some eight (8) decades later. In short, therefore, she
cannot be relied upon to prove the possession by Charles Hankins of the said property from 1899.

Charles Hankins was an American citizen. There is no evidence to show the date of his birth, his arrival in
the Philippines — particularly in Odiongan, Romblon — or his acquisition of the big tract of land; neither
is there any evidence to prove the manner of his acquisition thereof. Thus, there does not even exist a
reasonable basis for the finding that the private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest
possessed the land for more than eighty (80) years, much less since time immemorial. In Oh Cho
vs. Director of Lands, 36 possession which began in 1880  was not considered as possession "since time
immemorial."

There is as well, no evidence on record to show that Charles Hankins cultivated, had control over or used
the whole or even a greater portion of the big tract of land for grazing purposes. None of the witnesses
testified as to the number of heads of cattle which were bought by Charles into the land. There is
likewise no competent proof that he declared the land in his name for taxation purposes or that he had
paid the taxes thereon. Although his will (Exhibit "N") made mention of Tax Declaration No. 15853,
neither the said declaration nor any tax receipt was presented in evidence. Because of such non-
production, it cannot be determined when Charles initially declared his alleged land for taxation purpose
and what exactly were its natural boundaries, if any. It is clear that the non-production of this tax
declaration accounted for the obvious inability of the witnesses to testify with certainty as to the extent
of the area of the property. As correctly observed by the petitioner, none of the private respondents'
witnesses could give the court a definite idea thereon. Thus, Samuel Buyco declared:

I really don't know the exact area, but it is between 500 to 550 hectares. 37

while William Hankins admitted:

I cannot exactly tell because that is a very big estate. 38

On the other hand, witness Jacinta Gomez Gabay averred:

I could not exactly tell but I have heard that it was a big tract of land because we were staying there. 39
In any event, even if Charles had indeed declared the property for taxation purposes and actually paid
taxes, such facts are still insufficient to justify possession thereof, much less a claim of ownership
thereon. This Court has repeatedly held that the declaration of ownership for purposes of assessment
on the payment of the tax is not sufficient to prove ownership. 40

To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that Charles Hankins had possessed the
property — allegedly covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853 and made the subject of both his last will
and testament and the project of partition of his estate among his heirs — in such a manner as to
remove the same from the public domain under the Cariño and Susi doctrines. Thus, when he died on 31
May 1937, he transmitted no right whatsoever, with respect to the said property, to his heirs. This being
the case, his possession cannot be tacked to that of the private respondents for the latter's benefit
pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the alternative ground relied upon in their application.
It would have been entirely different if the possession of Charles was open, continuous, exclusive,
notorious and under a bona fide claim of ownership as provided under Section 48 of the Public Land Act.
Even if he were an American citizen at that time, he would have had the same civil rights as Filipino
citizens pursuant to the original ordinance appended to the 1935 Constitution. the pertinent portion of
said ordinance reads:

(17) Citizens and corporations of the United States shall enjoy in the Commonwealth of the Philippines
all the civil rights of the citizens and corporations, respectively, thereof.

The import of said paragraph (17) was confirmed and reinforced the originally by Section 44 of Act No.
2874 and Section 127 of C.A. No. 141 (The Public Land Act of 1936); the latter provided that:

Sec. 127. During the existence and continuance of the Commonwealth and before the Republic of the
Philippines is established, citizens and corporations of the United States shall enjoy the same rights
granted to citizens and corporations of the Philippines under this Act.

This right, however, vanished with the advent of the Philippine Republic on 4 July 1946. 41

Verily, private respondents had to rely exclusively on their own possession. under the applicable law at
the time, it was incumbent upon them to prove that they had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural land of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or  force majeure. 42

By their own evidence, private respondents admitted that they were never in actual possession of the
property prior to the filing of their application. During the pendency of Special Proceedings No. 796, the
estate of Charles Hankins appeared to have been administered by his son Alexander. This administration
was terminated in 1948 upon the execution of the Project of Partition. Private respondents and their
brother Ismael did not take possession of the share which pertained to their mother, Lilia; instead; they
allegedly hired Gregorio Gabay to administer the same. There is, however, no competent evidence to
show the extent of such administration. Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that Gregorio had the
property declared for taxation purposes, the correct area and boundaries of the same have not been
proven. As evidenced by the Project of Partition, the share of Lilia was only 125 acres or 50.59 hectares,
which is clearly not the portion applied for. The area applied for consists of 319.4788 hectares of land
based on a survey plan prepared by private land surveyor Español on the basis of a survey conducted in
1950. Obviously, therefore, the plan was not prepared to determine Lilia's share alone for, as admitted
by the private respondents themselves, this plan includes William Hankins' share which was sold to
Marcelino Buyco, private respondents father, and the other properties which the latter donated to the
private respondents and Ismael Buyco on 20 August 1962 (Exhibit "S"). However, there is no competent
evidence as to the respective boundaries and areas of the properties constituting the said share of
William Hankins; neither are there reliable descriptions of the other alleged properties belonging to
Marcelino Buyco. Be that as it may, when the survey was conducted by Español, private respondents
and their brother Ismael did not immediately acquire the portion originating from William Hankins and
the other alleged properties of Marcelino Buyco; hence, there was no valid basis for the inclusion of said
properties in the survey. And even if both William's share and Marcelino Buyco's properties were
included there would still be nothing to support the application for the entire 319,4788 hectares
considering that as per the Project of Partition, the share pertaining to William consisted only of 50.59
hectares. There was, moreover, no evidence to show the extent of the alleged "other properties" of
Marcelino Buyco. Given such circumstances, it would be reasonable to presume that what was surveyed
in 1950 was the entire pasture land alleged to form part of the estate of Charles Hankins, covered by Tax
Declaration No. 15853, and which necessarily included the share of Alexander Hankins. Significantly, per
Exhibit "O" the latter's share is specified as part of the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853.
The inclusion then of Alexander's share in the survey and the plan may provide the clue to this unusual
increase in the area covered by the survey plan.

Nevertheless, even if We are to assume for argument's sake that there was nothing irregular in the
inclusion in the survey plan of the share of William Hankins and the other properties of Marcelino
Buyco, the fact remains that the "ownership" thereof could have been acquired by the private
respondents and Ismael Buyco only on 20 August 1962 upon the execution of the deed of donation in
their favor. To be thus benefited by the possession of William or Marcelino for purposes of Section 48
(b) of the Public Land Act, there should be proof that said predecessors had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof. Unfortunately, no such proof was offered.

It is palpably obvious then that at the time Land Registration Case No. N-48 was filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Romblon on 14 October 1976, private respondents did not have in their favor an imperfect
title over that which they claimed to have inherited, by representation, from the estate of Charles
Hankins. With greater force does this conclusion likewise apply with respect to the properties donated
to them in 1962 by their father Marcelino Buyco. This is because they were not able to prove open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
application, 43 or from 12 June 1945. 44

Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before such filing, it goes without
saying that they had acquired no vested right, consisting of an imperfect title over to property before
they lost their Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of the public respondent of 21
November 1989 in CA-G.R. CV No. 05824 is hereby SET ASIDE and the Decision of 5 February 1985 of
Branch 82 of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon in Land Registration Case No. N-48, LRC Record No. N-
51706 is REVERSED.

Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Romero, Melo, JJ., concur.

Land Titles And Deeds Case Digest: Director Of
Lands V. IAC (1986)
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and Deeds)

FACTS:

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano
and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land

possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan

land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to
members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with
the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements

ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the government
when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela

donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela

IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of

ISSUES:

W/N the land is already a private land - YES

W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations
applies- NO

HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc

YES

already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is
not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by
the courts, an application therefore is sufficient

it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency
of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of
said patent.

The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law

2. NO

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally
sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must
also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition

The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural
lands in excess of 1,024 hectares

Labels: 1986, 1987, 1987 Constitution, Art. XII, Case Digest, Constitution, Director of Lands v. IAC, Juris
Doctor, Land Titles and Deeds, Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest, Sec. 3
Republic v. Villanueva
Facts:

Lots Nos. 568 and 569, located at Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan, with an area of 313 square meters
and an assessed value of P1,350 were acquired by INC on January 9, 1953 from Andres Perez in
exchange for a lot with an area of 247 square meters owned by the said church.

The said lots were already possessed by Perez in 1933. They are not included in any military reservation.
They are inside an area which was certified as alienable or disposable by the Bureau of Forestry in 1927.
The lots are planted to santol and mango trees and banana plants. A chapel exists on the said land. The
land had been declared for realty tax purposes. Realty taxes had been paid therefor.

On September 13, 1977, INC filed with the CFI Bulacan an application for the registration of the two lots.
It alleged that it and its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the land for more than thirty years.

The trial court ordered the registration of the two lots.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the registration of two lots.

Held:

Section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution stated that "no private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area".

INC, as a corporation sole or a juridical person, is disqualified to acquire or hold alienable lands of the
public domain, like the two lots in question, because of the constitutional prohibition already mentioned
and because the said church is not entitled to avail itself of the benefits of section 48(b) which applies
only to Filipino citizens or natural persons. A corporation sole has no nationality (Roman Catholic
Apostolic Adm. of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Registration Commission, 102 Phil. 596. See Register of Deeds vs.
Ung Siu Si Temple, 97 Phil. 58 and sec. 49 of the Public Land Law).

The contention in the comments of the INC that the two lots are private lands, following the rule laid
down in Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, is not correct. What was considered private
land in the Susi case was a parcel of land possessed by a Filipino citizen since time immemorial, as in
Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132. The lots sought
to be registered in this case do not fall within that category. They are still public lands. A land
registration proceeding under section 48(b) "presupposes that the land is public" (Mindanao vs. Director
of Lands, L-19535, July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).

As held in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, "all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule
would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-
interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had
never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest."

In Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, it was noted that the right of an occupant of public agricultural land to
obtain a confirmation of his title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Law is a "derecho dominical
incoativo" and that before the issuance of the certificate of title the occupant is not in the juridical sense
the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.

The lower court's judgment is reversed and set aside. The application for registration of INC is dismissed
with costs against said applicant. 
REPUBLIC v. CA AND SPS. MARIO B. LAPIÑA AND FLOR DE VEGA, GR
No. 108998, 1994-08-24
Facts:

On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a
total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the
time of the purchase, respondent spouses were then natural-born

Filipino citizens.

On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of
land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no
longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian... citizenship through naturalization.

An opposition was filed by the Republic... court a quo rendered a decision confirming private
respondents' title to the lots in question... petitioner submits that private respondents have not
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the registration thereof in their favor.

It maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed to be public lands under the...
principle that lands of whatever classification belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine.

before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of
the land since it still pertains to the State.

Issues:

Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase
while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for
registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?

Ruling:

It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or through his
predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the... vendee/applicant has been in possession of
the subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of
title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession.

respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious

possession of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937.

Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof,
acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.
open, continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure
converts the same to private property

This means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-
in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land

The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and
(b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period
prescribed in the Public Land Act

Torrens system

It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership.

private... respondents were able to establish the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest.

Evidence was offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the subject land and
introduced improvements thereon... certified true copy... of the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo and
her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that the subject parcels of land were inherited by
vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her only sister Simplicia... a...
report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of
Forest Development, to prove that the questioned lots were part of the alienable and disposable zone of
the government and that no forestry interest was affected... private respondents were undoubtedly
natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof,
acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of... owner and the
prescribed period of time held by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act.

private respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the contested property, now
occupied by respondent Lapiña's mother.

"Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a... transferee of private lands, subject to
limitations provided by law."

"Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his
residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide."

"Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has
the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up
to a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the... case of urban land, or one hectare in the
case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may
avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area
acquired shall not exceed the... maximum herein fixed.
what governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his
Philippine citizenship remains... to be BP 185.

Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of
the properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already private lands; consequently,
there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by... respondents in view of what the
Constitution ordains.

The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. They are already
private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous
and exclusive... possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or
since 1937.

The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may
be a transferee of a private land up to a... maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in
case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence

It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens of the
Philippines.

For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant whether
private respondents are no longer Filipino... citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels
of land in question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of
the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for registration

This decree of registration is the one that is submitted to the office of the register of deeds for issuance
of the certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior to... the issuance of the decree of registration,
the register of deeds has no participation in the approval of the application for registration of title as the
decree of registration is yet to be issued.

Principles:

The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and
(b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period
prescribed in the Public Land Act

When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law,
acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued

As such, the land ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the Director
of Lands to dispose of.
 Gordoland Devt. Corp. vs. Republic of the
Philippines
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 163757               November 23, 2007

GORDOLAND DEVELOPMENT CORP., Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

The instant petition assails the Decision 1 dated January 13, 2003 and the
Resolution2 dated May 20, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62545 which
reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated January 16, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 55, Mandaue City and denied the corresponding motion for
reconsideration, respectively.

Petitioner is engaged in the business of real property development. On November 18,

1996, it filed with the RTC, Branch 55, Mandaue City, an application docketed as LRC
Case No. N-5474 for original registration of title over eight parcels of land totaling
86,298 square meters located in different barangays within the Municipality of Lilo-an,
Cebu.

Petitioner avers it obtained title over said parcels in 1995 by virtue of several deeds of
sale and assignments of appurtenant rights from the alleged owner-possessors whom
petitioner claims had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation as would entitle them to acquire title by acquisitive prescription, under
Commonwealth Act No. 141,5 or the Public Land Act, in relation to Republic Act No.
4966 and Presidential Decree No. 1529.7

The petitioner presented (1) testimonies of its predecessors-in-interest with respect to

the eight parcels of land and (2) documentary exhibits; among them: tax declarations,
certifications from the Register of Deeds that there are no subsisting titles over the
subject properties, and certifications from the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
declaring that there are no subsisting public land applications with respect to the same.
After submitting its formal offer of exhibits and resting its case, the petitioner filed a
Manifestation8 dated November 14, 1997 with an attached photocopy of a
Certification9 dated January 10, 1996 from the Cebu CENRO declaring that,

…per projection and ground verification…a tract of land with list of lot numbers
attached herewith containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT POINT
FOUR SIX FIVE SEVEN (138.4657) hectares, more or less, situated in the Barangay at
Sta. Cruz, San Vicente and Lataban Lilo[-]an, Cebu. As shown and described in the
Sketch Plan at the back hereof…The same was found to be:

A. Within the Alienable and Disposable Block-1, land classification project no. 29 per LC Map no.
1391 of Lilo[-]an, Cebu. Certified under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-537 dated July 31, 1940;
and

xxxx

(signed) (signed)
EDUARDO M. INTING ATTY. ROGELIO C. LAGAT
Community Environment and Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Officer Natural Resources Officer

(Emphasis supplied.)

However, the list of lot numbers referred to in the certification was not included in the
certification, nor was it attached to the Manifestation. The list was never submitted to
the trial court. The petitioner’s Manifestation merely informed the court that it had
failed to include the said certification in its formal offer of exhibits, and that it was
"submitting" the same "in compliance with the requirements of the application."
Petitioner did not move to re-open the proceedings to present the certification in
evidence, have it authenticated and subjected to cross-examination, or have it marked as
an exhibit and formally offered in evidence. The original was never submitted.

The State, through the Director of Lands, entered its formal opposition to the
application, asserting that registration should be denied on the following grounds:

1. [T]hat neither the applicant/nor his/her/their predecessors-in-interest have

been in open[,] continuous[,] ex[c]lusive[,] and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto…[;]

2. [T]hat the muniment/s of title and/or tax declaration/s and tax payment/s
receipt/s of applicant/s if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do/es not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the
lands applied for or of his/her/their open, continuous, exclusive[,] and notorious
possession and occupation…[;]

3. [T]hat the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish Title or
grant can no longer be availed of by the applicant/s who have failed to file an
 appropriate application for registration within the period of six (6) months from
February 16, 1976 as required by Presidential Decree No. 892. 10 From the records,
it appears that the instant application was filed on November 18, 1996[;]

That the applicant is a private corporation disqualified under the [N]ew

Philippine Constitution to hold alienable lands of the public domain…

4. [T]hat the parcel/s applied for in/are portions of the public domain belonging
to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation. 11

On January 16, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision granting the application, and
directed the issuance of the respective decrees of registration for each of the eight
parcels of land, all in petitioner’s name.

WHEREFORE, premises con[s]idered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the

issuance of title to the lands designated as follows:

[1.] Lot No. 4221 described in the Technical [D]escription (Exhibit "L"), situated
at San Vicente, Lilo-an, Cebu[,] containing an area of Ten Thousand Two
Hundred [F]orty[-][E]ight (10,248) square meters, more or less;

2. Lot No. 4222 described in the Technical Description (Exhibit "T"), situated at
Lataban, Lilo-an, Cebu[,] containing an area of Two Thousand [F]our [H]undred
[T]wenty-[O]ne square meters (2,421), more or less;

3. Lot No. 4242 described in the Technical Description (Exhibit "AA"), situated at
San Vicente, Lilo-an, Cebu, containing an area of Three Thousand Four Hundred
Twenty-Eight (3,428) square meters, more or less;

4. Lot No. 7250 described in the Technical Description (Exhibit "MM"), situated
at Lataban, Lilo-an, Cebu, containing an area of Forty-Six Thousand Four
Hundred Eighty-Seven (46,487) square meters, more or less;

5. Lot No. 7252 described in the Technical Description (Exhibit "XX"), situated at
Lataban, Lilo-an, Cebu, containing an area of Seven Thousand Nine Hundred
Thirty-Two (7,932) square meters, more or less;

6. Lot No. 7260 described in the Technical Description (Exhibit "QQQ"), situated
at Lataban, Lilo-an, Cebu, containing an area of Two Thousand Nine Hundred
Twenty (2,920) square meters, more or less;

7. Lot No. 7264 described in the Technical Description (Exhibit "CCC"), situated
at Lataban, Lilo-an, Cebu, containing an area of Two Thousand Seven Hundred
Eighty-Seven (2,787) square meters, more or less;

8. Lot No. 7269 described in the Technical Description (Exhibit "III"), situated at
Barangay Lataban, Lilo-an, Cebu, containing an area of Nine Thousand Nine
Hundred Seventy-Eight (9,978) square meters, more or less;
All in [f]avor and in the name of Gordoland Development Corporation, a corporation
duly organized and existing under and by virtue of Philippine Laws with address at Suite
801, Ermita Center Building, Roxas Blvd., Manila.

Upon finality of this decision, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued in
favor of applicants in accordance with Section 39, P.D. 1529.

SO ORDERED.12

The State filed its notice of appeal.

Meanwhile, on February 23, 1998, the trial court received a Report 13 from the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), Office of the Director, Department on Registration, which
declared that LRA was not in a position to verify whether or not the subject lands were
covered by land patents, or within the area classified as alienable and disposable. It
recommended that the Land Management Bureau (LMB) in Manila, the CENRO and the
Forest Management Bureau (FMB) in Cebu be ordered to determine and make a finding
if the lots were alienable and disposable.

Thereafter, the trial court, acting upon the LRA report, directed the LMB, Cebu CENRO
and FMB to report on the true status of the lands. 14 It did not, however, recall or
suspend its judgment in the main.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, upon the following
grounds:

WHEREFORE, finding merit to the appeal of [respondent] Republic of the Philippines,

the Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 55 dated
January 16, 1998 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.15

The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, the instant
petition, raising the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT

THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION AND THE CERTIFICATION
OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING WERE DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF AUTHORITY
FROM THE CORPORATION’S BOARD OF DIRECTORS.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT

PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES WERE
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE PUBLIC LAND.
 III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT

PETITIONER AND ITS PREDECESSOR[S]-IN-INTEREST FAILED TO COMPLY
WITH THE 30-YEAR POSSESSION REQUIRED BY LAW.16

Stated simply, the petitioner raises the following issues, to wit: (1) whether or not its
petition for registration is defective; (2) whether or not the subject parcels of land are
alienable and disposable; and (3) whether or not petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest
were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the properties for a
period of at least 30 years.

Petitioner contends that its petition for registration is not defective because the Rules of
Court is not applicable in land registration cases, 17 the parcels of land are alienable and
disposable as can be readily gleaned from the annexes to its application, 18 and it
presented more than enough documentary and testimonial evidence to show possession
of the subject parcels of land in the nature and duration required by law, even going way
back to World War II.19

On the other hand, respondent contends that petitioner’s petition for registration is
defective because Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga, petitioner’s counsel, was not authorized
by petitioner’s board of directors to file the application and sign the certification on non-
forum shopping.20 Respondent also contends that petitioner failed to prove that the
subject lands were alienable and disposable public lands, 21 and to present convincing
proof that it and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the subject lands in the concept of an owner for more than
30 years.22

Anent the first issue, this Court has consistently held that the requirement regarding
verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is a condition
affecting the form of the pleading; non-compliance with this requirement does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to
secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the
product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in
good faith.23 Further, the purpose of the aforesaid certification is to prohibit and
penalize the evils of forum-shopping. Considering that later on Atty. Paderanga’s
authority to sign the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping was ratified 24 by
the board, there is no circumvention of the aforestated objectives.

We now go to the second issue. At the outset we note that this issue involves a question
of fact. As a general rule, this Court does not resolve questions of fact in a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. When supported by
substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and
binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under
any of the following recognized exceptions:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises

and conjectures;
 (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;

(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 25

Exception (7) as quoted above is present in this case. In its decision the trial court found
that the subject parcels of land were within the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals found that petitioner had not
been able to prove that the subject parcels of land were indeed alienable and
disposable.26

A review of the records shows that the conclusions of the Court of Appeals are well-
founded. There is no evidence on record showing that the subject lots have already been
classified as alienable and disposable.

The CENRO certifications offered in evidence by petitioner, particularly exhibits "DD,"

"OO," "ZZ" and "SSS" only similarly, except as to the lot numbers, state:

This is to certify that according to the records available in this office, Lot Nos. 4221,
7264, 7260, 7270 and 4325, Pls-823, Liloan, Cebu are not covered by any subsisting
public land application.27

There is no mention in any of these certifications that the subject lots are within the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

The photocopy of a Certification dated January 10, 1996 from the Cebu CENRO,
attached to petitioner’s Manifestation before the trial court, cannot be given any
probative value. As suitably explained by the Court of Appeals:

…What was attached to the Manifestation quoted above is merely a photocopy of the
Certification dated January 10, 1996 without the list of lot numbers attached thereto. It
does not appear that said Certification was ever utilized by Gordoland in support of its
application, neither was the original copy or certified true copy thereof ever presented
nor submitted to the lower court to form part of the records of the case. It was not
marked and formally offered in evidence. Evidence not formally offered before the trial
court cannot be considered on appeal, for to consider them at such stage will deny the
other parties their right to rebut them. (Ong v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 387 [1997]).
The reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence that has not been formally
offered is to afford the other party the chance to object to their admissibility (Ong Chia
v. Republic, 328 SCRA 749 [2000]).

It is true that the trial court had noted the said Certification in its questioned decision of
January 16, 1998. Thus:

"In resolving the Opposition interposed by the State,…And as certified to by the CENRO,
these lots are already within the alienable and disposable land of the public domain and
therefore susceptible to private appropriation."…

Verily, the trial court just adopted entirely the statements embodied in the said
Certification, a photocopied document, which had not been formally offered in evidence,
without inquiring into the supposed attachments thereto, without examining the
contents thereof, and without verifying whether such Certification really pertained to
the lands in question. The trial court simply could not ascertain such facts, for nowhere
in the records can be found the alleged attachments. 28

It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that

the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable. 29

In view of the lack of sufficient evidence showing that the subject lots were already
classified as alienable and disposable lands of the government, and when they were so
classified, there is no reference point for counting adverse possession for purposes of an
imperfect title. The Government must first declare the land to be alienable and
disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and
adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title. 30 Consequently,
there is no point in discussing the third issue on the length of petitioner’s possession.

In conclusion, we see no reason to disturb the findings of the Court of Appeals, which we
find supported by evidence on record. In our considered view, the Court of Appeals
correctly held that:

The facts and circumstances in the record render untenable that Gordoland had
performed all the conditions essential to reinforce its application for registration under
the Property Registration Decree.…

The Court is of the opinion, and so finds, that subject Lot No. 4221, Lot No. 4222, Lot
No. 4242, Lot No. 7250, Lot No. 7252, Lot No. 7260, Lot No. 7264, and Lot No. 7269
form part of the public domain not registrable in the name of Gordoland. To reiterate,
under the Regalian doctrine, all lands belong to the State. Unless alienated in
accordance with law, it retains its basic rights over the same as dominus.…31
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and the
Resolution dated January 13, 2003 and May 20, 2004, respectively, of the Court of
Appeals which reversed and set aside the Decision dated January 16, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Mandaue City, are hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice