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Fabella vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 110379. November 28, 1997.

HON. ARMAND FABELLA, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF

THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
SPORTS; DR. NILO ROSAS, in his capacity as REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, DECS-NCR; DR. BIENVENIDO ICASIANO, in his
capacity as the SUPERINTENDENT OF THE QUEZON CITY
SCHOOLS DIVISION; ALMA BELLA O. BAUTISTA, AURORA
C. VALENZUELA and TERESITA V. DIMAGMALIW, petitioners,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROSARITO A. SEPTIMO,
ERLINDA B. DE LEON, CLARISSA T. DIMAANO, WILFREDO
N. BACANI, MARINA R. VIVAR, VICTORIA S. UBALDO,
JENNIE L. DOGWE, NORMA L. RONGCALES, EDITA C.
SEPTIMO, TERESITA E. EVANGELISTA, CATALINA R.
FRAGANTE, REBECCA D. BAGDOG, MARILYNNA C. KU,
MARISSA M. SAMSON, HENEDINA B. CARILLO, NICASIO C.
BRAVO, RUTH F. LACANILAO, MIRASOL C. BALIGOD,
FELISA S. VILLACRUEL, MA. VIOLETA ELIZABETH Y.
HERNANDEZ, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, ADRIANO S.
VALENCIA and ELEUTERIO S. VARGAS, respondents.

Constitutional Law; Due Process; The resolution of this case revolves

around the question of due process of law, not on the right of government
workers to strike.—In the present case, however, the issue is not whether the
private respondents engaged in any prohibited activity which may warrant
the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against them as a result of
administrative proceedings. As already observed, the resolution of this case
revolves around the question of due process of law, not on the right of
government workers to strike. The issue is not whether private respondents
may be punished for engaging in a prohibited action but whether, in the
course of the investigation of the alleged proscribed activity, their right to
due process has been violated. In short, before they can be investigated and
meted out any penalty, due process must first be observed.

______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

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Same; Same; What due process in administrative proceedings include.

—In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include
the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution
of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real
opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to
present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights;
(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to
afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty
as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported
by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or
contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.
Same; Same; Republic Act 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers specifically covers administrative proceedings involving
public school teachers.—The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670
known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically
covers administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section
9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public
schoolteachers’ administrative cases should be composed of the school
superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or
any existing provincial or national teachers’ organization and a supervisor of
the division.
Same; Same; In any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process
is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be
heard.—In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to
hear the administrative charges against private respondents did not include
“a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or
national teacher’s organization” as required by Section 9 of RA 4670.
Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent
jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily
void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of
private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers’
organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial
tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and
meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of
procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a
real opportunity to be heard.

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Fabella vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same; There is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by

the DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever designated or
authorized by a teachers’ organization as its representative in the
committee.—Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teachers’
organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of
such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this
section, the teachers’ organization possesses the right to indicate its choice
of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating
committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of
education or the director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant
case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as
members of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized
by a teachers’ organization as its representative in said committee.
Same; Same; Court will never countenance a denial of the fundamental
right to due process which is a cornerstone of our legal system.—Contrary
to petitioners’ asseverations, RA 4670 is applicable to this case. It has not
been expressly repealed by the general law PD 807, which was enacted
later, nor has it been shown to be inconsistent with the latter. It is a
fundamental rule of statutory construction that “repeals by implication are
not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is convincingly
and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly repugnant
and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. This is based on the
rationale that the will of the legislature cannot be overturned by the judicial
function of construction and interpretation. Courts cannot take the place of
Congress in repealing statutes. Their function is to try to harmonize, as
much as possible, seeming conflicts in the laws and resolve doubts in favor
of their validity and co-existence.” Thus, a subsequent general law does not
repeal a prior special law, “unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest,
although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases
embraced in the special law.”
Statutory Construction; Republic Act 4670 has not been expressly
repealed by Presidential Decree 807.—Because the administrative
proceedings involved in this case are void, no delinquency or misconduct
may be imputed to private respondents. Moreover, the suspension or
dismissal meted on them is baseless. Private respondents should, as a
consequence, be reinstated and awarded all

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monetary benefits that may have accrued to them during the period of their
unjustified suspension or dismissal. This Court will never countenance a
denial of the fundamental right to due process, which is a cornerstone of our
legal system.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Froilan M. Bacungan and Narciso Albarracin for private
respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Due process of law requires notice and hearing. Hearing, on the

other hand, presupposes a competent and impartial tribunal. The
right to be heard and, ultimately, the right to due process of laws lose
meaning in the absence of an independent, competent and impartial
tribunal.

Statement of the Case

The principium is explained by this Court as it resolves this petition

1
for review on certiorari
2
assailing the May 21, 1993 Decision of the
Court of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 29107 which affirmed the trial
court’s decision, as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED and the appeal

is DISMISSED.
The Hon. Armand Fabella is hereby ORDERED substituted as
respondent-appellant in place of former Secretary Isidro Cariño and
henceforth this fact should be reflected in the title of this case.

________________

1 Rollo, pp. 44-57.

2 Third Division, composed of J. Vicente V. Mendoza (now anassociate justice of the Supreme
Court), ponente and Chairman; andJJ. Jorge S. Imperial and Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr.,
concurring. 3 Penned by Judge Martin S. Villarama, Jr.

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4
SO ORDERED.”

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The Antecedent Facts

The facts, as found by Respondent Court, are as follows:

“On September 17, 1990, then DECS Secretary Cariño issued a return-to-
work order to all public school teachers who had participated in walk-outs
and strikes on various dates during the period September 26, 1990 to
October 18, 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of
13th month differentials, clothing allowances and passage of a debt-cap bill
in Congress, among other things.
On October 18, 1990, Secretary Cariño filed administrative cases against
herein petitioner-appellees, who are teachers of the Mandaluyong High
School. The charge sheets required petitioner-appellees to explain in writing
why they should not be punished for having taken part in the mass action in
violation of civil service laws and regulations, to wit:

1. grave misconduct;
2. gross neglect of duty;
3. gross violation of Civil Service Law and rules on reasonable office
regulations;
4. refusal to perform official duty;
5. conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service;
6. absence without leave (AWOL)

At the same time, Secretary Cariño ordered petitioner-appellee to be

placed under preventive suspension.
The charges were subsequently amended by DECS-NCR Regional
Director Nilo Rosas on November 7, 1990 to include the specific dates
when petitioner-appellees allegedly took part in the strike.
Administrative hearings started on December 20, 1990. Petitioner-
appellees’ counsel objected to the procedure adopted by the committee and
demanded that he be furnished a copy of the guidelines adopted by the
committee for the investigation and imposition of penalties. As he received
no response from the committee, counsel

__________________

4 Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 14; rollo, p. 57.

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walked out. Later, however, counsel, was able to obtain a copy of the
guidelines.

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On April 10, 1991, the teachers filed an injunctive suit (Civil Case No.
60675) with the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, charging the
committee appointed by Secretary Cariño with fraud and deceit and praying
that it be stopped from further investigating them and from rendering any
decision in the administrative case. However, the trial court denied them a
restraining order.
They then amended their complaint and made it one for certiorari and
mandamus. They alleged that the investigating committee was acting with
grave abuse of discretion because its guidelines for investigation place the
burden of proof on them by requiring them to prove their innocence instead
of requiring Secretary Cariño and his staff to adduce evidence to prove the
charges against the teachers.
On May 30, 1991, petitioner-appellee Adriano S. Valencia of the Ramon
Magsaysay High School filed a motion to intervene, alleging that he was in
the same situation as petitioners since he had likewise been charged and
preventively suspended by respondent-appellant Cariño for the same
grounds as the other petitioner-appellees and made to shoulder the burden of
proving his innocence under the committee’s guidelines. The trial court
granted his motion on June 3, 1991 and allowed him to intervene.
On June 11, 1991, the Solicitor General answered the petition for
certiorari and mandamus in behalf of respondent DECS Secretary. In the
main he contended that, in accordance with the doctrine of primary resort,
the trial court should not interfere in the administrative proceedings.
The Solicitor General also asked the trial court to reconsider its order of
June 3, 1991, allowing petitioner-appellee Adriano S. Valencia to intervene
in the case.
Meanwhile, the DECS investigating committee rendered a decision on
August 6, 1991, finding the petitioner-appellees guilty, as charged and
ordering their immediate dismissal.
On August 15, 1991, the trial court dismissed the petition for certiorari
and mandamus for lack of merit. Petitioner-appellees moved for a
reconsideration, but their motion was denied on September 11, 1991.
The teachers then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court
which, on February 18, 1992, issued a resolution en bacn declaring void the
trial court’s order of dismissal and reinstat-

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ing petitioner-appellees’ action, even as it ordered the latter’s reinstatement

pending decision of their case.
Accordingly, on March 25, 1992, the trial court set the case for hearing,
June 8, 1992, it issued a pre-trial order which reads:

“As prayed for by Solicitor Bernard Hernandez, let this case be set for pre-trial
conference on June 17, 1992 at 1:30 p.m., so as to expedite the proceedings hereof.

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In which case, DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño, as the principal respondent, is hereby
ordered to PERSONALLY APPEAR before this Court on said date and time, with a
warning that should he fail to show up on said date, the Court will declare him as IN
DEFAULT. Stated otherwise, for the said Pre-Trial Conference, the Court will not
recognize any representative of his.”

By agreement of the parties, the trial conference was reset on June 26,
1992. However, Secretary Cariño failed to appear in court on the date set. It
was explained that he had to attend a conference in Maragondon, Cavite.
Instead, he was represented by Atty. Reno Capinpin, while the other
respondents were represented by Atty. Jocelyn Pili. But the court just the
same declared them as in default. The Solicitor General moved for a
reconsideration, reiterating that Cariño could not personally come on June
26, 1992 because of prior commitment in Cavite. It was pointed out that
Cariño was represented by Atty. Reno Capinpin, while the other respondents
were represented by Atty. Jocelyn Pili, both of the DECS-NCR and that
both had special powers of attorney. But the Solicitor General’s motion for
reconsideration was denied by the trial court. In its order of July 15, 1992,
the court stated:

“The “Motion For Reconsideration” dated July 3, 1992 filed by the respondents thru
counsel, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. It appears too obvious that respondents
simply did not want to comply with the lawful orders of the Court.
The respondents having lost their standing in Court, the “Manifestation and
Motion,” dated July 3, 1992 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is hereby
DENIED due course.
SO ORDERED.”

On July 3, 1992, the Solicitor General informed the trial court that
Cariño had ceased to be DECS Secretary and asked for his substitution. But
the court failed to act on his motion.
The hearing of the case was thereafter conducted ex parte with only the
teachers allowed to present their evidence.

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On August 10, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, in which it stated:

“The Court is in full accord with petitioners’ contention that Rep. Act No. 4670
otherwise known as the “Magna Carta for Public School Teachers” is the primary
law that governs the conduct of investigation in administrative cases filed against
public school teachers, with Pres. Decree No. 807 as its supplemental law.
Respondents erred in believing and contending that Rep. Act. No. 4670 has already
been superseded by the applicable provisions of Pres. Decree No. 807 and Exec.
Order No. 292. Under the Rules of Statutory Construction, a special law, Rep. Act.
No. 4670 in the case at bar, is not regarded as having been replaced by a general law,

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Pres. Decree No. 807, unless the intent to repeal or alter the same is manifest. A
perusal of Pres. Decree No. 807 reveals no such intention exists, hence, Rep. Act No.
4670 stands. In the event that there is conflict between a special and a general law,
the former shall prevail since it evidences the legislator’s intent more clearly than
that of the general statute and must be taken as an exception to the General Act. The
provision of Rep. Act No. 4670 therefore prevails over Pres. Decree No. 807 in the
composition and selection of the members of the investigating committee.
Consequently, the committee tasked to investigate the charges filed against
petitioners was illegally constituted, their composition and appointment being
violative of Sec. 9 of Rep. Act. No. 4670 hence all acts done by said body possess no
legal color whatsoever.
Anent petitioners’ claim that their dismissal was effected without any formal
investigation, the Court, after consideration of the circumstances surrounding the
case, finds such claim meritorious. Although it cannot be gainsaid that respondents
have a cause of action against the petitioner, the same is not sufficient reason to
detract from the necessity of basic fair play. The manner of dismissal of the teachers
is tainted with illegality. It is a dismissal without due process. While there was a
semblance of investigation conducted by the respondents their intention to dismiss
petitioners was already manifest when it adopted a procedure provided for by law, by
shifting the burden of proof to the petitioners, knowing fully well that the teachers
would boycott the proceedings thereby giving them cause to render judgment ex-
parte.

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The DISMISSAL therefore of the teachers is not justified, it being arbitrary and
violative of the teacher’s right to due process. Due process must be observed in
dismissing the teachers because it affects not only their position but also their means
of livelihood.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GRANTED
and all the questioned orders/decisions of the respondents are hereby declared NULL
and VOID and are hereby SET ASIDE.
The reinstatement of all the petitioners to their former positions without loss of
seniority and promotional rights is hereby ORDERED.
The payment, if any, of all the petitioners’ back salaries, allowances, bonuses,
and other benefits and emoluments which may have accrued to them during the
entire period of their preventive suspension and/or dismissal from the service is
hereby likewise ORDERED.
5
SO ORDERED.”

From this adverse decision of the trial court, former DECS Secretary
Isidro Cariño filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals raising the
following grounds:

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“I. The trial court seriously erred in declaring appellants as in

default.
II. The trial court seriously erred in not ordering the proper
substitution of parties.
III. The trial court seriously erred in holding that R.A. No.
4670, otherwise known as ‘Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers,’ should govern the conduct of the investigations
conducted.
IV. The trial court seriously erred in ruling
6
that the dismissal of
the teachers are without due process.”

As mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC

decision, holding in the main that private respondents

________________

5 Ibid., pp. 1-7; rollo, pp. 44-50.

6 Ibid., p. 8; rollo, p. 51.

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were denied due process in the administrative proceedings instituted

against them. 7
Hence, this petition for review.

The Issues

Before us, petitioners raise the following issues:

“I

Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of

discretion in holding in effect that private respondents were denied due
process of law.

II

Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals seriously erred and

committed grave abuse of discretion in applying strictly the provision of
R.A. No. 4670 in the composition of the investigating committee.

III

Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of

discretion 8 in dismissing the appeal and in affirming the trial court’s
decision.”
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These issues, all closely related, boil down to a single question:

whether private respondents were denied due process of law.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit. We agree with the Court of Appeals

that private respondents were denied due process of law.

_________________

7 The case was deemed submitted for resolution upon receipt by the Court of
Petitioner’s Memorandum on July 16, 1996.
8 Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 16-17, rollo, pp. 271-272.

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Denial of Due Process

At the outset, we must stress that we are tasked only to determine

whether or not due process of law was observed in the
administrative proceedings against herein private respondents. We
note the Solicitor General’s extensive disquisition
9
that government
employees do not have the right to strike. On this point,
10
the Court,
in the case of Bangalisan vs. Court of Appeals, has recently
pronounced, through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado:

“It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public service
may not engage in strikes. While the Constitution recognizes the right of
government employees to organize, they are prohibited from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action
which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. The
right of government employees to organize is limited only to the formation
of unions or associations, without including the right to strike.”
11
More recently, in Jacinto vs. Court of Appeals, the Court explained
the schoolteachers’ right to peaceful assembly vis-a-vis their right to
mass protest:

“Moreover, the petitioners here, except Merlinda Jacinto, were not penalized
for the exercise of their right to assemble peacefully and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances. Rather, the Civil Service
Commission found them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service for having absented themselves without proper authority, from
their schools during regular school days, in order to participate in the mass

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protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the non-holding of classes and

in the deprivation of students of education, for which they were responsible.
Had petitioners availed themselves of their free time—recess, after classes,
weekends or holidays—to dramatize their grievances and to

_________________

9 Ibid., pp. 17-30, rollo, pp. 272-285.

10 G.R. No. 124678, July 31, 1997.
11 Merlinda Jacinto, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124540, November 14, 1997, per
Panganiban, J.

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dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds of law, no one—not
the DECS, the CSC or even this Court—could have held them liable for the
valid exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. As it was, the
temporary stoppage of classes resulting from their activity necessarily
disrupted public services, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the
prohibition against strikes by government workers. Their act by its nature
was enjoined by the Civil Service law,
12
rules and regulations, for which they
must, therefore, be made answerable.

In the present case, however, the issue is not whether the private
respondents engaged in any prohibited activity which may warrant
the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against them as a result of
administrative proceedings. As already observed, the resolution of
this case revolves around the question of due process of law, not on
the right of government workers to strike. The issue is not whether
private respondents may be punished for engaging in a prohibited
action but whether, in the course of the investigation of the alleged
proscribed activity, their right to due process has been violated. In
short, before they can be investigated and meted out any penalty, due
process must first be observed.
In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized
to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice
of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s
legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s
favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person
charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well
as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported
by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the
hearing or
13
contained in the records or made known to the parties
affected.
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________________

12 Ibid., pp. 16-17.

13 Air Manila, Inc. vs. Balatbat, 38 SCRA 489, 492, April 29, 1971, per Reyes,
J.B.L., J.

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The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna

Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers
administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section
9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public
schoolteachers’ administrative cases should be composed of the
school superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative
of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers’
organization and a supervisor of the division. The pertinent
provisions of RA 4670 read:

“Sec. 8. Safeguards in Disciplinary Procedure.—Every teacher shall enjoy

equitable safeguards at each stage of any disciplinary procedure and shall
have:

a. the right to be informed, in writing, of the charges;

b. the right to full access to the evidence in the case;
c. the right to defend himself and to be defended by a representative
of his choice and/or by his organization, adequate time being given
to the teacher for the preparation of his defense; and
d. the right to appeal to clearly designated authorities. No publicity
shall be given to any disciplinary action being taken against a
teacher during the pendency of his case.

Sec. 9. Administrative Charges.—Administrative charges against a

teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the
corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized
representative who would at lesst have the rank of a division supervisor,
where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in
its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher’s organization and a
supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of
Public Schools. The committee shall submit its findings, and
recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days from
the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, That where the school
superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of
the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education.”

The foregoing provisions implement the Declaration of Policy of the

statute; that is, to promote the “terms of employment and career
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prospects” of schoolteachers.

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In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear

the administrative charges against private respondents did not
include “a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing
provincial or national teacher’s organization” as required by Section
9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have
no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them
were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the
suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a
representative of a teachers’ organization in these committees was
indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement
that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be
heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due
process is embodied in14the basic requirement of notice and a real
opportunity to be heard.
Petitioners argue that the DECS complied with Section 9 of RA
4670, because “all the teachers who were members of the various
committees are members of either the Quezon City Secondary
Teachers Federation
15
or the Quezon City Elementary Teachers
Federation” and are deemed to be the representatives of a teachers’
organization as required by Section 9 of RA 4670.
We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their
respective teachers’ organizations does not ipso facto make them
authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by
Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers’ organization
possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative to be
included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to
designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the
director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant case,
there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS
as members of its investigating committee was ever designated

________________

14 See Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, p. 108, (1996).
15 Petition, p. 30; rollo, p. 37.

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Fabella vs. Court of Appeals

or authorized by a teachers’ organization as its representative in said

committee. 16
Contrary to petitioners’ asseverations, RA 4670 is applicable to
this case. It has not been expressly repealed by the general law PD
807, which was enacted later, nor has it been shown to be
inconsistent with the latter. It is a fundamental rule of statutory
construction that “repeals by implication are not favored. An implied
repeal will not be allowed unless it is convincingly and
unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly
repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. This is
based on the rationale that the will of the legislature cannot be
overturned by the judicial function of construction and
interpretation. Courts cannot take the place of Congress in repealing
statutes. Their function is to try to harmonize, as much as possible,
seeming conflicts in the laws
17
and resolve doubts in favor of their
validity and co-existence.” Thus, a subsequent general law does not
repeal a prior special law, “unless the intent to repeal or alter is
manifest, although the terms of the general law18 are broad enough to
include the cases embraced in the special law.”
The aforementioned Section 9 of RA 4670, therefore, reflects the
legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate set of
procedural requirements in connection with administrative
proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Clearly, private
respondents’ right to due process of law requires compliance with
these requirements laid down by RA 4670. Verba legis non est
recedendum.
Hence, Respondent Court of Appeals, through Mr. Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza who is now a member of this Court,
perceptively and correctly stated:

________________

16 Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 35-38; rollo, pp. 290-293.

17 Ty vs. Trampe, 250 SCRA 500, 512, December 1, 1995, per Panganiban, J.
18 Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 42, 56,
December 7, 1995, per Hermosisima, Jr., J.

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Fabella vs. Court of Appeals

“Respondent-appellants argue that the Magna Carta has been superseded by

the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807) and that pursuant to the latter law
the head of a department, like the DECS secretary, or a regional director,
like the respondent-appellant Nilo Rosas, can file administrative charges
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against a subordinate, investigate him and take disciplinary action against

him if warranted by his findings. Respondent-appellants cite in support of
their argument the following provisions of the Civil Service Decree (P.D.
No. 807):

Sec. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.—

xxx xxx xxx

b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities xxx shall have

jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action
against officers and employees under their jurisdiction x x x.

Sec. 38. Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees.

—

a) Administrative Proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate

officer or the employee by the head of department or officer of equivalent
rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional
directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of any other persons.

There is really no repugnance between the Civil Service Decree and the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Although the Civil Service Decree
gives the head of department or the regional director jurisdiction to
investigate and decide disciplinary matters, the fact is that such power is
exercised through committees. In cases involving public school teachers, the
Magna Carta provides that the committee be constituted as follows:

Sec. 9. Administrative Charges.—Administrative charges against a teacher shall be

heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School
Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who would at
least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as chairman,
a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national
teacher’s organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated
by the Director of Public Schools. The committee shall submit its findings, and
recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days from the
termination of the hearings: Provided, however, that where the school superin-

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Fabella vs. Court of Appeals

tendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the

committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education.

Indeed, in the case at bar, neither the DECS [s]ecretary nor the
DECS-NCR regional director personally conducted the investigation
but entrusted it to a committee composed of a division supervisor,
secondary and elementary school teachers, and consultants. But
there was no representative of a teachers organization. This is a
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serious flaw in the composition of the committee because the

provision for the representation of a teachers organization is
intended by law for the protection of the rights of teachers facing
administrative charges.
There is thus nothing in the Magna Carta that is in any way
inconsistent with the Civil Service Decree insofar as procedures for
investigation is concerned. To the contrary, the Civil Service Decree,
[S]ec. 38(b) affirms the Magna Carta by providing that the
respondent in an administrative case may ask for a “formal
investigation,” which was what the teachers did in this case by
questioning the absence of a representative of a teachers
organization in the investigating committee.
The administrative committee considered the teachers to have
waived their right to a hearing after the latter’s counsel walked out
of the preliminary hearing. The committee should not have made
such a ruling because the walk out was staged in protest against the
procedures of the committee and its refusal to give the teachers’
counsel a copy of the guidelines. The committee concluded its
investigation and ordered the dismissal of the teachers without
giving the teachers the right to full access of the evidence against
them and the opportunity to defend themselves. Its predisposition to
find petitioner-appellees guilty of the charges was in fact noted by
the Supreme Court when in its resolution in G.R. No. 101943
(Rosario Septimo v. Judge Martin Villarama, Jr.) it stated:

The facts and issues in this case are similar to the facts and issues in Hon.
Isidro Cariño, et al. v. Hon. Carlos C. Ofilada, et al., G.R. No. 100206,
August 22, 1961.
As in the Cariño v. Ofilada case, the officials of the Department of
Culture and Education are predisposed to summarily hold the petitioners
guilty of the charges against them. In fact, in this case Secretary Cariño,
without awaiting formal administrative procedures and on the basis of
reports and “implied admissions” found the petitioners guilty as charged

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Fabella vs. Court of Appeals

and dismissed them from the service in separate decisions dated

May 16, 1991 and August196, 1991. The teachers went to court. The
Court dismissed the case.”
Furthermore, this Court sees no valid reason to disregard the
factual findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals. It is not
our function “to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence,
testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties particularly
where, such as here, the20 findings of both the trial court and the
appellate court coincide.”
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It is as clear as day to us that the Court of Appeals committed no

reversible error in affirming the trial court’s decision setting aside
the questioned orders of petitioners; and ordering the unqualified
reinstatement of private respondents and the payment to them of
salaries, allowances, bonuses and other benefits that accrued to their
21
benefit during the entire duration of their suspension or dismissal.
Because the administrative proceedings involved in this case are
void, no delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to private
respondents. Moreover, the suspension or dismissal meted on them
is baseless.22
Private respondents should, as a consequence, be
reinstated and awarded all monetary benefits that may have accrued
to them 23during the period of their unjustified suspension or
dismissal. This Court will never countenance a denial of the
fundamental right to due process, which is a cornerstone of our legal
system.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DENIED for its utter failure to show any reversible error on the part
of the Court of Appeals. The assailed Decision is thus AFFIRMED.

_________________

19 Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 10-13; rollo, pp. 53-56.

20 South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA 744,
749, June 2, 1995, per Vitug, J.
21 See Decision of the Regional Trial Court, p. 6; rollo, p. 84.
22 See Paragraph 4, Section 26, E.O. No. 292.
23 See also Miranda vs. Commission on Audit, 200 SCRA 657, 662, August 16,
1991, per Paras, J.

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274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Recio

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Romero, Melo and Francisco,

JJ., concur.

Petition denied; Decision affirmed.

Note.—The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to

be heard. (Roces vs. Apartadena, 243 SCRA 108 [1995])

——o0o——

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